

HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN WAR.

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PICTORIAL HISTORY

OF THE

RUSSIAN WAR

Schenck & Mc Farlane, Lith.rs Edinburgh

SEBASTOPOL, 9th September 1855.

1 Malakoff 2 Karabelnaia Faubourg 3 Fort St Paul 4 Military Port 5 Fort St Nicholas 6 Sebastopol 7 Batteries 8 Fort Alexander 9 Quarantine Fort

PICTORIAL HISTORY

OF THE

RUSSIAN WAR

1854-5-6

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WITH

Maps, Plans, and Wood Engravings

H. H. C. 15

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PREFACE

THE Russian War of 1853–6 differed from all preceding wars in this among other characteristics—that it admitted, to a very remarkable degree, of historical narration during the progress of the events themselves. This facility was due to a combination of favourable circumstances. More numerously than at any former period were official documents made public by the British government, and papers relating to passing occurrences printed at the request of parliament. More fully than ever before was light thrown upon the conduct of those intrusted with the management of the War—whether political, military, or naval—by the Reports of Royal Commissions and Parliamentary Committees. It is worthy of note, too, that the parliamentary debates revealed to a greater extent than usual the inner workings of government departments, in the explanations given by Cabinet Ministers consequent on the collisions of parties and the rupture of ministries. Again, the periodical press displayed an activity, and diffused an amount of information, never equalled during any other period of warfare—not only in the fulness of news obtained from all parts of the world, including translations of official documents promulgated in the chief European countries, but also by the maintenance, at the various seats of war, of skilful writers, who traced day by day the movements of armies and fleets, and vividly described battles witnessed by them under circumstances of difficulty and peril. Literary enterprise tended towards the same result, in the publication of numerous volumes by military officers, describing rapidly but faithfully such portions of the scenes and events of warfare as came under their personal observation. The facilities of the postal service contributed towards the same end, by enabling soldiers and sailors to send their simple narratives to home-friends, with a frequency which, in earlier times, would have been rendered by costly postage almost impracticable; many of these letters, made public through the medium of the newspapers, revealed truths otherwise unattainable concerning the daily duties, multiplied sufferings, and heroic endurance of

the humbler combatants. Physical science and mechanical inventions lent their aid towards the same general result, by supplying steam-ships, railways, and electric telegraphs: rendering many things possible which were impossible in former wars, and substituting celerity for slowness in many others. All these favourable circumstances combined to render practicable the writing of a History of the War during the progress, and shortly after the termination, of the war itself: leaving to a later generation that more complete analysis of events, in their causes and their consequences, which can only be wrought when generals and statesmen—by means of Memoirs, Letters, and Dispatches—have given to the world their knowledge of occurrences fully to be explained by none but themselves.

The Author of the present volume has endeavoured so to avail himself of all the above-mentioned resources—augmented and in some instances corrected by private communications—as to present a truthful picture of that short, but fearful and extraordinary war. While estimating the contest conscientiously as a whole, in its national and international aspects, he has endeavoured to be—so far as such a character is possible—an impartial spectator; and while seeking to trace events up to their causes, to deduce the probable consequences, or to disentangle perplexities, he has deemed it a duty to observe caution in passing judgment on the actors in those scenes—judgment which cannot fairly be pronounced until angry controversies have been smoothed away by the lapse of time, or by the shedding of new light on transactions hitherto obscure.

G. D.

August 1856.



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
HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN WAR

CHAPTER I.

CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE WAR.—PREPARATIONS.

EUROPE might be said to have been, at the beginning of 1853, in a state of profound peace. The revolutionary agitations of 1848 and 1849 had ended in a reaction which left the old governments at ease, and had fixed Louis Napoleon as Emperor of France. England, advancing under favour of free-trade and the development of her colonial gold-fields in a career of unexampled prosperity, had no serious apprehension of war, and was, on her own part, little prepared for such an event. Yet at this time, a series of comparatively obscure transactions was in progress in a remote part of Europe, which was soon to involve us in a contest of the most sanguinary character.

TRADITIONARY AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF RUSSIA.

If we survey the history of Europe from the commencement of the last century, and set aside from it the career of revolutionised France between 1792 and 1815, we shall be struck by nothing so

much as the progress made during that time by Russia, in extent of territory and in influence over the affairs of other states. In the middle of the fifteenth century, as will be seen by a glance at the accompanying map, what is now Russia consisted only of the grand-duchy of Moscow—a limited territory in the centre of Northern Europe, scarcely known even by name in the countries of the West. From that nucleus, in pursuance of an ambitious policy, and by a series of skilfully executed manœuvres, it has been enlarged in all directions, till it now embraces the vast region lying between the Arctic Ocean on the north and the Black Sea on the south, with the Pacific as its eastern and the Baltic as its western boundary. Previous to the reign of Peter I., surnamed the Great, who ascended the throne in 1689, the history of Russia presents only a succession of savage struggles with surrounding nationalities. The ruling authority had attacked and been attacked by Mongols, Tatars, Cossacks, Turks, Lithuanians, Poles, and Swedes; and, advancing in power, had acquired the title of Czar or Emperor. Slavonic in race and language, and professing the Greek form of Christianity, the Russian people have never intermingled with the Western nations, but may be said, as a race, to partake of that character which we associate with the semi-civilised inhabitants of Asia. Amidst the rude Slavonians, Peter arose as a reformer of manners; and notwithstanding some grave faults, deserves to be spoken of as one of the greatest men in an age prolific in distinguished persons. His personal history is well known, and need not be repeated. What concerns us at present, is his eager desire to extend as well as to consolidate the Russian power. Peter was animated with great aspirations. Besides desiring to civilise his people, his aim was to elevate them to the position of a leading nation; and he lived to accomplish his purpose. Assuming the title of 'Emperor of all the Russias,' he vastly enlarged his dominions, built cities, created a navy and a well-disciplined army; and, aiming at trade with India, pushed his conquests to the borders of the Sea of Azof. In these projects may be perceived the first encroachment on the Ottoman dominions, which, during a period of nearly two centuries, would appear to have been the coveted prey of Russia. In 1709, Peter established a series of posts from the Volga to the Don; and at the mouth of this latter river built Taganrog, as a centre of intercourse on the south, whence further advances could be effected. He was, however, in 1711, obliged to relinquish Taganrog and the Sea of Azof to the Turks. Being thus shut out from Persia and India by a route westward of the Caucasus, he turned to the east. In 1717, he sent Prince Alexander Bekevitch on an apparently friendly mission to Khiva, eastward of the Caspian, but with secret orders to seize certain gold-mines, in whose existence he thought he had reason to believe; but the Khivans were as cunning and cruel as he was treacherous; they defeated his plan, and destroyed all the members of his embassy. He next sent an embassy to Persia, to open commercial relations with India; and here Peter met with that which the czars have ever seemed to take delight in—a discontented tributary to a neighbouring monarch. The governor of Kandahar was at issue with his sovereign, the Shah of Persia. Persia was weak, and was attacked by Turks, Afghans, and Lesghis all at once. Peter, in 1722, interfered in the wonted Russian fashion: he 'protected' his 'old good friend the shah,' his 'great friend and neighbour,' his 'dear friend,' as he called him in a remarkable manifesto; he sent an army of 50,000 men into Persia; and ended by conquering and appropriating three Persian provinces on the shores of the Caspian. After this, the Afghans deposed one shah and set up another: this was a favourable opportunity for Russia; Peter offered his aid to the deposed monarch, on condition of certain concessions; and the result was, that in a few years Russia obtained a hold on Daghestan, Ghilan, Mazanderan, and Asterabad—valuable provinces on the south-western shore of the Caspian.

All the ambitious proceedings of Peter in the East were, however, suddenly checked. The terrible Nadir, the freebooter of Khorassan, who made himself Shah of Persia, was an antagonist such as Russia had not before encountered in Asia. Nadir first attacked the Afghans, driving them from all their conquests in Persia; then turned westward, and similarly expelled the Turks from certain provinces which they had appropriated; and then directed his attention to Russia, who was forced to relinquish every Asiatic acquisition she had gained. Thus ended Russian aggression in the East for a time. Peter himself had departed from the scene; he died in 1725; and the treaty of 1735, whereby the Russians evacuated the Persian provinces, was made with one of his successors.

After Peter's death, the throne was held by his widow Catherine. This remarkable woman had been a peasant; her most powerful minister, Prince Menchikoff—ancestor of the prince who was concerned in the events of 1853—had been a pastry-cook's boy in the royal kitchen; and neither of the two could read or write. Nevertheless, Russia prospered during this short reign of two years, although Catherine's foreign acquisitions were limited to the exaction of homage from the Kubinskan Tatars, and of allegiance from a Georgian prince. After her death, in 1727, there was a succession of feeble reigns, during which Russia was too much occupied with domestic affairs to attend much to foreign conquests; yet she was not idle. In the triangular portion of country between the Don, the Volga, and the Caucasus, were various tribes—Kalmuks, Nogays, and Circassians—nomad in habits, and more or less tributary to surrounding nations. Russia turned a wistful eye upon these. She sent some

missionaries to convert to Christianity the Ossetians, a pagan tribe in the Caucasian mountains; whether or not they succeeded in this, they at least made the Ossetians consent to become tributary to Russia. The Ossetian country opened a pathway to Georgia, a fertile region for which Persia and Turkey had long struggled; and Russia turned her attention to this path.

Catherine II., during her reign from 1762 to 1796, was the great representative of Russian aggression. Of her personal character, we have not here to speak; but her conduct as an empress towards her neighbours, as of vast political importance, cannot pass unnoticed. Her tyranny over the tribes near the Caucasus, in the early years of her reign, was such, that the Circassians took refuge in the almost inaccessible fastnesses of their mountains; the Nogays sought refuge with the Khan of the Crimea—then an independent Tatar state; the Kabardans of Circassia abandoned Christianity for Islam, as a means of exchanging Russian for Turkish rule; and the Kalmuks took the wonderful resolution, in 1771, of departing in a body to their own original territory in Chinese Tatary, on the borders of the Tibetan dominions. History has, perhaps, recorded nothing more striking than this voluntary journey of half a million human beings, to a distance of probably two thousand miles, as a means of escaping from Russian despotism. When, at a later date, troubles broke out in Georgia—a fertile country southward of the Caucasus, and between the Black and Caspian Seas—and Persia and Turkey struggled for its possession, Russia stepped in on her wonted footing, offered to assist the one against the other, and ultimately took Georgia itself as her reward.

While these affairs were in progress in Asia, Catherine was not idle in Europe. Poland had fallen into difficulties concerning the succession to the crown, and Catherine succeeded in placing one of her dependents on the throne, and overrunning Poland with her agents. Turkey now became uneasy at the progress of the czarina, for the possession of Poland would bring Russia too near the Ottoman dominions; and the sultan, having a stock of injuries to complain of, declared war against Russia in 1769. England assisted Russia in this war with a fleet; and the results were so disastrous to Turkey, that she was driven to many humiliating concessions in the Treaty of Kainardji in 1774.* By this treaty, Russia secured the free navigation of the Black Sea, the passage of the Dardanelles, the privilege of having one ship of war in those regions, and the acquisition of Azof, Taganrog, Kertch, and Kinburn; she secured an extension of her frontier to the river Bug or Boug, assumed the sovereignty of Kabarda, near the Caucasus; and obtained the renunciation by Turkey of suzerain power over the Khan of the Crimea—a renunciation which Russia did not fail afterwards to turn to her own advantage. These successes were not all that Catherine wished, but they paved the way for more. In 1776, she established a line of posts, including nearly thirty fortresses, from the Black Sea to the Caspian. A few years afterwards, the Christian princes of Georgia, Imeretia, and Mingrelia—all on the southern base of the Caucasus—flattered by Russian gifts, or intimidated by Russian threats, transferred their allegiance from Turkey to Russia; as did also the chiefs of many petty principalities in the Persian dominions.

The Treaty of Kainardji had rendered the Crimea independent of Turkey; and Catherine immediately began to 'protect' the khan in that extraordinary way so peculiar to Russia. The Russian determination to obtain Constantinople, also began about this time to be openly acknowledged; and hostilities again commenced between the Russians and the Turks. Potemkin and Suvaroff poured their troops into the Caucasian region; while other armies, under pretext of assisting the khan against the Turks, forcibly seized the Crimea, expelled and deposed the khan, and slaughtered all the Tatar nobles who tried to maintain the independence of their sea-girt peninsula. About the same time, too, she offered her 'protection' to the voyvodes or princes of Wallachia and Moldavia, and contrived that they should look up to her, rather than to the sultan, as a suzerain; the Christians in Bulgaria and Servia were also encouraged to revolt, and to claim her protection whenever they pleased against the sultan—all in defiance of any pre-existing treaties. The conquest and massacre in the Crimea occurred in 1783; but there had previously been a treaty, signed at Constantinople in 1779, containing a few clauses which effected but little in settling the relations between the two countries. They made a commercial treaty together in 1783; but Catherine did not announce her determination to seize the Crimea *until after this signing*. The city of Kherson was built at the mouth of the Dnieper, in suspicious proximity to the Turkish frontier; and in 1787, Catherine made a brilliant entry into her new city, passing under a triumphal arch, on which was inscribed in the Greek tongue—'THE WAY TO BYZANTIUM.' Again did Russia and Turkey go to war; and again was the war ended by a treaty—signed at Jassy in 1792—disastrous to the latter power: she was forced to yield the territory between the rivers Bug and Dniester; to relinquish all control over Georgia and the neighbouring provinces; and to give Russia a certain claim to influence in other quarters without actual sovereignty.

While making these aggressions towards the south, Catherine was not less successful in extending

* As the treaties and conventions between Russia and Turkey will frequently be mentioned, the following list may be useful, relating to the period between 1774 and 1849:—

Treaty of	Kainardji,	1774
"	Constantinople,	1783
"	Jassy,	1792
"	Bucharest,	1812
"	Adrianople,	1829
"	Unkiar-Skelessi,	1833
"	St Petersburg,	1834
"	Constantinople,	1836
"	London,	1841
"	Balta-Liman,	1849

her empire towards the west. Poland suffered its first great disaster in 1772—its 'first partition.' There is much reason to believe that Prussia suggested this nefarious project—that Frederick planned it with Catherine; and that a slice was given to Austria, as a means of winning consent to the spoliation. By the Treaty of St Petersburg, signed August 5, 1772, Russia grasped Polotsk, Vitepsk, Micislaf, and Polish Livonia; Prussia helped herself to Malborg, Pomerania, Varmia, and portions of Culm and Great Poland; Austria appropriated Galicia, with parts of Podolia and Sandomir; while distracted Poland had to do as she best might with what was left to her. Russia acquired 3440 square leagues of territory, and 1,500,000 inhabitants. If Prussia suggested the first partition, assuredly Russia dictated those which followed. Exhausted alike by internal dissensions, external attacks, and foreign bribery of her subjects, Poland became yearly more and more powerless; until at length, in 1793, the 'second partition' took place, by which the Russian boundary was advanced to the centre of Lithuania and Volhynia; while Prussia obtained the remainder of Great Poland and a portion of Little Poland—Austria taking no part in this spoliation. Poland was by this time reduced to 4000 square miles. The attempt of the brave Kosciusko to restore the liberties of his country was disastrous; it brought about the 'third partition,' in 1795, which blotted Poland from the list of nations. Austria took Cracow and the country between the Pilitza, the Vistula, and the Bug; Prussia absorbed the country as far as the river Niemen; while Russia appropriated all the rest. The large area of these acquisitions by Russia is clearly shewn in our map.

During the reigns of Paul and Alexander (1796 to 1825), Russia obtained a larger area of country from Persia than from Turkey. Paul seems to have inherited from Catherine two great desires—for a road to India through Persia, and a road to Constantinople through the Danubian provinces. Independently of these, however, the provinces between the Black and Caspian Seas were useful to Russia on other grounds. During the first quarter of the present century, there was an almost unceasing struggle between Russia and Persia, marked every now and then by the cession of provinces to the former. Thus, Georgia was permanently annexed in 1800; Mingrelia and Imeretia, in 1802; Sheki, in 1805; and various other patches of country, in 1812 and 1814. Turkey had a few years of release from open war with Russia after the death of Catherine; but the intrigues in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia, became so intolerable, that the sultan declared war upon the czar in 1806. Turkey narrowly escaped a snare. In 1804, during the complexity of European politics, a friendly alliance was just on the point of being formed between Turkey and Russia; but Sultan Selim luckily looked closely at one of the clauses, and found that the Czar Alexander claimed, as part of the price paid for Russian friendliness, that all the subjects of the Porte professing the Greek religion should be placed under the immediate protection of Russia. The sultan refused to concede this, and war ensued some time afterwards. Turkey was in a wretched position: Paswan Oglu, in Widdin; Ali Pacha, in Albania; Djezzar Pacha, in Syria; Mehemet Ali, in Egypt; Czerny George, in Servia; Ypsilanti, in Moldavia—all were more or less in a state of rebellion against the sultan, obeying him or not as their inclinations varied. The Peace of Tilsit gave a short respite to Turkey; but hostilities soon recommenced, and continued several years. When a settlement of accounts took place, by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812, the czar obtained Bessarabia (by which his frontier was advanced westward from the Dniester to the Pruth)—secured the navigation of the Danube to merchant-ships—obtained for his ships of war a right to ascend the Pruth up to its junction with the Danube—procured an amnesty for the rebellious Servians who had aided him—and stipulated for the demolition of the fortresses recently erected by the Turks in Servia. Thus, again, was Turkey despoiled by its formidable northern neighbour.

The Treaty of Tilsit sanctioned a few juggling arrangements, by which portions of Poland were bandied about from one spoliator to another; but all these changes ended in the permanent annexation of the greater part of that kingdom. Sweden was destined next to suffer. Taking as a pretext the refusal of this state to close her ports against England, during a disagreement between Russia and England, Alexander suddenly despatched an army to Finland, without any declaration of war; and when Sweden thereupon declared war, two years' hostilities ensued, which ended with the Treaty of Friedrichsham in 1809. By this treaty, Sweden surrendered Finland, the whole of East Bothnia, and a part of West Bothnia lying east of the river Tornea. With her most fertile provinces, she lost more than one-fourth of her inhabitants. These transactions were without sufficient warrant on any principle of justice. Alexander invaded a neighbour's country without declaring war; and when the injured monarch resisted the inroad, he was punished for his resistance by a vast loss of territory.

A striking parallel has been pointed out between the proclamation of General Buxhowden in Finland in 1808, and that which Prince Gortchakoff issued in Moldavia forty-five years afterwards—noticed in a later page. In both places, a Russian general invaded the territories of a neighbouring power; and in both instances the general issued a proclamation to the inhabitants. Buxhowden states, in high-sounding terms, the motives which induced the czar 'to place your country *under his protection*, and to take possession of it, in order to procure by these means *a sufficient guarantee* in case his Swedish majesty should persevere in the resolution not to accept the equitable conditions of peace that have been proposed to him.

It is his imperial majesty's pleasure, that all the affairs of the country should have their ordinary course in conformity with your laws, statutes, and customs, which will remain in force so long as his imperial majesty's troops shall be obliged to occupy the country. The civil and military functionaries are confirmed in their respective employments, always excepting those who may use their authority to mislead the people, and induce them to take measures contrary to their interests. All that is necessary for the maintenance of the troops, shall be paid in ready money on the spot. All provisions shall be paid for according to an amicable agreement between our commissaries and those of the country.' In both cases, the reasons alleged were fallacious, and the promises were broken.

The congress of Vienna, which 'settled' the affairs of Europe in 1815, left Russia in possession of the whole of her ill-acquired conquests in Poland, Finland, Turkey, and Persia. In later years, when Nicholas had succeeded to Alexander in 1825, Russia fomented disturbances in Greece; then offered her military aid to Turkey to quell the disturbances; and then professed to be offended at the refusal of her kind offices. Nicholas also incited Persia to attack Turkey. In July 1827, England and France, influenced doubtless by a kind wish concerning Christian interests in Turkey, signed, with Russia, the Treaty of London, binding all three to insure a settlement of the Greek affairs of Turkey. Only a few months afterwards, Russia signed the convention of Akermann with Turkey, in which Russia bound herself to a certain course, which could not possibly be reconciled with the Treaty of London. That 'untoward event,' the battle of Navarino; the destruction of the Turkish navy; the forced acknowledgment of the independence of Greece—all strengthened the czar; and when, after two campaigns in 1828–9, the Treaty of Adrianople was signed, the sultan was forced to yield Anapa and Poti, with a considerable extent of coast on the Black Sea—a portion of the pachalik of Akhilska—the two fortresses of Akhilska and Akhilkillak—and the virtual possession of the islands formed by the mouths of the Danube. But this was not all. The treaty arranged for the abandonment of certain Turkish fortresses; it stipulated that Moldavia and Wallachia should be governed according to arrangements which Russia had introduced when she 'protected' them; it claimed increased immunities for Russian subjects in Turkey; it stipulated for the payment of an immense sum, to defray the expenses of Russia in the war; and it allowed the czar to retain the Principalities and Silistria until the money was paid. About the same time, too, by the Treaty of Turcomanchai, Russia obtained immense advantages in Persia—immense, not so much in respect to the area of territory annexed, as in the command given to Russia over the Caspian Sea and the Caucasian provinces.

Russia was not yet worn out with her efforts in 'protecting' Turkey. Mehemet Ali, the Pacha of Egypt, raised a formidable revolt against the sultan; and the latter was so ill advised as to accept the aid of Russia to quell it. The effects of this appeared in the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, in 1833, when Turkey agreed to assist Russia in case of need—which Russia cared little about; and Russia agreed to assist Turkey in case of need—which Russia greatly wished. A secret article was inserted in this treaty, to the effect that Russia would forego the debt from the last war, if Turkey would close the Dardanelles against all vessels of war whatever, *except those of Russia!*

Russia had now attained to a dangerous position—she became the 'protector' of Turkey in general. The other states of Europe took the alarm. They did not seem to regard as important a treaty which prevented any Mohammedan from living in Wallachia or Moldavia, or any Turkish army from remaining in those countries; nor were they moved by the Treaty of St Petersburg in 1834, which gave increased power to Russia in Asia Minor; but the closing of the Dardanelles alarmed them. Hence, after many contentions, an agreement was signed in London, in 1841, by Turkey, Russia, Austria, England, and France, that the Dardanelles should be closed against *all* ships of war so long as Turkey should be at peace; and that Turkey should be allowed to call in the naval aid of any one of the five, in case of attack from any of the others. This convention, as we shall see afterwards, had an important influence on the conduct of England and France in 1853.

The last in this series of treaties was the convention of Balta-Liman in 1849, whereby the affairs of Wallachia and Moldavia were settled; but in such a way as to leave the sultan little control over these provinces of his empire, and allowing the czar to interfere in that 'protective' mode which is so peculiarly Russian.

It may be useful to sum up the gains of Russia from Turkey and Persia between 1774 and 1812, omitting all mention of those from Poland and Sweden.

FROM TURKEY.

Country to the north of the Crimea,	1774
The Crimea,	1783
Country between the Caspian and the Sea of Azof,	1783
Country round Odessa,	1792
Bessarabia,	1812

FROM PERSIA.

Georgia,	1800
Mingrelia,	1802
Imeretia,	1802
Ganja,	1803
Sheki,	1805
Kara-bagh,	1805
Shirvan,	1806
Talish, on the Caspian,	1812

Since that date, Russia has obtained from Persia the cession of Erivan, Mount Ararat, Etchmiazin, and Akalzia; while from Turkey she has obtained important posts on the east, north, and west shores of the Black Sea, a commanding influence at the

mouths of the Danube, and an irritating kind of influence in nearly all the provinces still left to the sultan, leaving it doubtful how far the latter is master in any part of his dominions.

We should form an inadequate idea of Russian capacity, if we imagined that these acquisitions were gained exclusively by the valour of soldiers and the skill of generals. Since the reign of Peter I., Russia has effected some of the greatest designs by adroitness in diplomacy. Scheming and far-sighted, and sparing no means to attain any desired end, this remarkable power has established agents in every corner of Europe and Asia, and, it may be added, America—male and female, open and avowed, secret and furtive, commercial and military, princely and plebeian, literary and scientific, connected with the press as well as with the recesses of private life. Some of this extraordinary army of agents are accredited to foreign courts, for ostensible purposes; some are merely spies, appointed to detect and report on the 'nakedness of the land,' moral or material; while others appear to have a mission combining the powers of the envoy and the spy. Brilliant, fluent, accomplished, polished—the Russian agents are difficult to resist, and as difficult to match; while, if occasion seem to need it, these fascinating qualities can quickly be exchanged for a kind of overbearing audacity, which scares the timid into submission. Sparing no expenditure of means to accomplish an object, and unrestrained by constitutional forms, the ruling power in Russia pursues a steady onward progress of deceit and aggression, as if governed by but one principle—that of aiming at universal empire. The policy of other European nations may at various times have been aggressive, but that of Russia stands apart; it has peculiarities of its own, and those peculiarities impart to it a character which other nations will do well to study. The policy is *traditionary*, or rather *hereditary;* it is handed down from father to son, from one generation to another. Alexander has promised to his subjects, that he will carry out the plans of his father Nicholas; Nicholas remembered Catherine; Catherine bore in mind the conquests of Peter. The Greek priests have instilled into the minds of the people a belief that the favoured Russian nation must and will one day possess Constantinople; and the half-savage serfs who are driven into battle, entertain an obscure notion that they are fighting, in part for this object, in part for their demi-god the czar. As for this demi-god, it is scarcely conceivable to what an extent the blasphemous teachings of the priests have extended. The following two questions, with their answers, are extracted from the new catechism prepared for the use of schools and churches in the Polish provinces of Russia—literally translated:—

'*Question.* How is the authority of the emperor to be considered in reference to the spirit of Christianity?

Answer. As proceeding immediately from God.

Q. What are the supernaturally revealed motives for this worship (of the emperor)?

A. The supernaturally revealed motives are—that the emperor is the vicegerent and minister of God to execute the divine commands, and consequently disobedience to the emperor is identified with disobedience to God himself; that God will reward us in the world to come for the worship and obedience we render to the emperor, and punish us severely to all eternity should we disobey or neglect to worship him. Moreover, God commands us to love and obey from the inmost recesses of the heart every authority, and particularly the emperor—not from worldly considerations, but from apprehensions of the final judgment.'

It was especially towards the late Czar Nicholas that this excess of reverential submission was demanded and shewn.

Sir John M'Neill places in a striking light the mode in which the great Russian Colossus has stridden over surrounding nations: 'The acquisitions she has made from Sweden are greater than what remains of that ancient kingdom; her acquisitions from Poland are as large as the whole Austrian Empire; the territory she has wrested from Turkey in Europe is equal to the dominions of Prussia, exclusive of her Rhenish provinces; her acquisitions from Turkey in Asia are equal in extent to all the smaller states of Germany, the Rhenish provinces of Prussia, Belgium, and Holland, taken together; the country she has conquered from Persia is about the size of England; and her acquisitions in Tatary have an equal area to Turkey in Europe, Greece, Italy, and Spain.'*

Again referring to our coloured map, these vast acquisitions, which enlarged the population of Russia from fourteen millions in 1722, to sixty-five millions in 1850, are rendered appreciable to the eye. Since the comparatively recent year 1772, Russia has acquired territory greater in extent and importance than the whole empire she had in Europe in that year! Since then, 'she has advanced her frontier 850 miles towards Vienna, Berlin, Dresden, Munich, and Paris; she has approached 450 miles nearer to Constantinople; she has possessed herself of the capital of Poland; and has advanced to within a few miles of the capital of Sweden, from which, when Peter the Great mounted the throne, her frontier was distant 300 miles. Since that time, she has stretched herself forward about 1000 miles towards India, and the same distance towards the capital of Persia. The regiment that is now stationed at her furthest frontier post on the western shore of the Caspian, has as great a distance to march back to Moscow as onward to Attock on the Indus; and is actually further from St Petersburg than from Lahore, the capital of the Punjab. The battalions of the Russian Imperial Guard that invaded Persia found, at the termination of the war, that they were as near to Herat as to

* *Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East.*

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the banks of the Don; that they had already accomplished half the distance from their capital to Delhi; and that therefore, from their camp in Persia, they had as great a distance to march back to St Petersburg as onward to the capital of Hindostan.'

The circumstance especially needing attention, is not merely that these acquisitions are vast in area, but that they have all been made in the steady pursuance of one fixed policy. There is, indeed, something remarkable in the methodic system of Russian aggression, which presents almost the precision of a science. The authority just quoted has pointed out—what, indeed, may be gathered by any impartial reader of the past history of Russia—that this code or system presents four stages, which may be indicated by the words *disorganisation, occupation, protection,* and *incorporation.* First, by means of innumerable agents, Russia sows discord in a neighbouring country; she observes whether there are rival sects, rival races, rival claimants to the throne, rival parties in the legislature, rival interests in towns, discontents between the nobles and the peasants, discontents between the taxed and the untaxed; and by means of subtle and well-schooled agents, often supplied with 'material' arguments in great plenty, she encourages internal dissensions, which weaken the stability of a state. If her agents are detected a little too soon, she scruples not to sacrifice them; but if the agency be not very apparent, then comes the next stage. She *occupies* some of the provinces, kindly intent upon preventing the dissentients from injuring each other, and from injuring her own subjects by a pernicious example. Then, having planted a foot firmly, matters are ripe for a display of magnanimity; she offers *protection;* she undertakes to shield the sovereign of the distracted country from his disorderly subjects; she asks no money for this; she requires only to be allowed to do good, but makes it a condition that her military forces shall hold undisturbed possession of the protected country. The fruit ripens; the province is found, by degrees, to be unsatisfactorily placed under this divided allegiance; and it requires only a very easy logic to shew that the protector, hale and strong, must necessarily be a better governor than the protected, sick and weak; and then arrives the fourth stage—*incorporation.*

Epigrammatic as this statement of the case may seem, it is no more than the simple truth. In Poland, in the Crimea, in Georgia, in Imeretia, in Mingrelia, all these four stages have been fulfilled; in Moldavia and Wallachia, Russia has more than once arrived at the third stage, *protection,* after the second, or stage of *occupation;* and it is difficult to see how the manœuvres of the 'Russian party'—for there is a Russian party in almost every country—in Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, Greece, and Persia, can be explained on any other principle than that of *disorganisation* —the first stage in a significant march towards annexation.

Thus, a summary has been presented of the aggressive achievements of Russia down to the period when, in 1853, Nicholas I., following the hereditary policy of his house, and more accomplished than his predecessors, prepared to make a final clutch at what remained in Europe of the once great Turkish Empire. An excuse for this movement, as will be immediately shewn, was not wanting.

THE 'HOLY PLACES' AT JERUSALEM: A SUBJECT OF CONTEST.

It is a well-known principle in political government, that an independent power shall not be embarrassed by foreign interference. The equivocal right to protect Greek Christians in Turkey, granted or implied under treaties with Russia, was at variance with this sound maxim; for it furnished the czar with a plausible reason for encroachment. One of the treaties which seemed to sanction this exercise of authority by Russia, was that of Kainardji.* On the general ground of protecting the members of the Greek Church in Turkey, a cause of quarrel was easily found; but there was a more special reason at hand. It was the method of managing what are called the 'Holy Places,' which was alleged to be opposed to the rights of Russia.

The Holy Places or Sanctuaries, at Jerusalem and Bethlehem, are certain buildings and fragments of buildings which—as is alleged by ecclesiastics of the Latin and Greek Churches—refer to the time of our Saviour, and were concerned in some of the momentous events of his ministry. Many recent writers reject as insufficient the evidence on which the location is inferred; but this does not in any way disturb the faith of the thousands of pilgrims who visit the spot. As the

* A careful perusal of the Treaty of Kainardji will shew that, out of the twenty-eight clauses, there are only three which touch upon the liberties and privileges of Christians in the Ottoman Empire, as follow:—

'ARTICLE VII. The Sublime Porte promises to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches; and it also allows the ministers of the Imperial Court of Russia to make, upon all occasions, representations, as well in favour of the new church at Constantinople, of which mention will be made in ART. XIV., as on behalf of its officiating ministers, promising to take such representations into due consideration, as being made by a confidential functionary of a neighbouring and sincerely friendly power.

ART. VIII. The subjects of the Russian Empire, as well laymen as ecclesiastics, shall have full liberty and permission to visit the Holy City of Jerusalem, and other places deserving of attention. No charatsch, contribution, duty, or other tax shall be exacted from those pilgrims and travellers by any one whomsoever, either at Jerusalem or elsewhere, or on the road; but they shall be provided with such passports and firmans as are given to the subjects of the other friendly powers. During their sojourn in the Ottoman Empire, they shall not suffer the least wrong or injury; but, on the contrary, shall be under the strictest protection of the laws.

ART. XIV. After the manner of the other powers, permission is given to the High Court of Russia, in addition to the chapel built in the minister's residence, to erect in one of the quarters of Galata, in the street called Bey Oglei, a public church of the Greek ritual, which shall always be under the protection of the ministers of that empire, and secure from all coercion and outrage.'

Groundless as are the vast protective claims of Russia, based on these three simple clauses, they are not strengthened by anything contained in the Treaty of Adrianople (1829), which merely states (ART. XV.) on this subject, that all former agreements remain in force, unless otherwise specified.

capital of the Hebrew kingdom, the Jews hold Jerusalem in high veneration; as the chief scene of Christ's career, the Christians also venerate it; and even the Mohammedans regard it with interest and respect.

In so far as concerns the pilgrimages and the monastic services of Christians, they refer to the *supposed sites* of the ancient buildings; for none of the buildings of the New-Testament period actually remain, except a few ill-defined substructures or foundations. The chief object of interest to Christian pilgrims, is the church which contains the alleged sepulchre of Christ—the ostensible, if not the real, source of solicitude to the Crusaders. This church, built by the Empress Helena fifteen centuries ago, is so large, and of such an oblong figure, and has so many projections or bays in particular parts, that the builder contrived to include within its walls various spots alleged to be connected with the death and burial of Christ—not merely the sepulchre itself, but also the scene of the crucifixion. This church, the work of the mother of Constantine the Great, was partly destroyed by fire in 1808; it was rebuilt with attention to the same included area, but with inferior materials. It is quite extraordinary to see how little change a century or two makes in bigotry: the Latins and Greeks quarrel about these Holy Places now, just as they quarrelled when Maundrell visited Jerusalem. As an example of contrast in time, but not in conduct, it may be well to give here Maundrell's account, written in 1697, of the sanctuary and its devotees: it will prepare us for the transactions of 1850.

'The Church of the Holy Sepulchre is founded upon Mount Calvary; is less than 100 paces long, and not more than 60 wide, and yet is so contrived, that it is supposed to contain under its roof twelve or thirteen sanctuaries, or places consecrated to a more than ordinary veneration, by being reputed to have had some particular actions done in them, relating to the death and resurrection of Christ. As, *first*, the place where he was derided by the soldiers; *secondly*, where the soldiers divided his garments; *thirdly*, where he was shut up, whilst they digged the hole to set the foot of the cross in, and made all ready for his crucifixion; *fourthly*, where he was nailed to the cross; *fifthly*, where the cross was erected; *sixthly*, where the soldier stood who pierced his side; *seventhly*, where his body was anointed, in order to his burial; *eighthly*, where his body was deposited in the sepulchre; *ninthly*, where the angels appeared to the women after his resurrection; *tenthly*, where Christ himself appeared to Mary Magdalene. The places where these and many other things relating to our blessed Lord are said to have been done, are all supposed to be contained within the narrow precincts of this church, and are all distinguished and adorned with so many several altars. In galleries round about the church, and also in little buildings annexed to it on the outside, are certain apartments for the reception of friars and pilgrims; and in these places almost every Christian nation anciently maintained a small society of monks, each society having its proper quarter assigned to it by the appointment of the Turks; such as the Latins, Greeks, Syrians, Armenians, Abyssinians, Georgians, Nestorians, Cophtites, Maronites, &c., all which had anciently their several apartments in the church. But these have all, except four, forsaken their quarters, not being able to sustain the severe rents and extortions which their Turkish landlords impose upon them. The Latins, Greeks, Armenians, and Cophtites keep their footing still; but of these four, the Cophtites have now but one poor representative of their nation left; and the Armenians have run so much in debt, that it is supposed they are hastening apace to follow the example of their brethren who have deserted before them. Besides their several apartments, each fraternity have their altars and sanctuary, properly and distinctly allotted to their own use; at which places they have a peculiar right to perform their own divine service, and to exclude other nations from them. . . . . But that which has always been the great prize contended for by the several sects, is the command and appropriation of the Holy Sepulchre—a privilege contested with so much unchristian fury and animosity, especially between the Greeks and Latins, that in disputing which parties should go into it, to celebrate their mass, they have sometimes proceeded to blows and wounds, even at the very door of the Sepulchre, mingling their own blood with their sacrifices; an evidence of which fury the father-guardian shewed us, in a great scar upon his arm, which, he told us, was the mark of a wound given him by a sturdy Greek priest in one of these unholy wars. . . . . The daily employment of the recluses inhabiting this edifice is, to trim the lamps, and to make devotional visits and processions to the several sanctuaries in the church. Thus they spend their time, many of them for four or six years together; nay, so far are some transported with the pleasing contemplation in which they here entertain themselves, that they will never come out, to their dying day—burying themselves, as it were, alive in our Lord's grave.'

Similar disputes respecting the same localities continued to scandalise and disgrace the Christian world; for although the fire in 1808 destroyed much of that which Maundrell describes, the monks fought as fiercely as ever for possession of, or control over, the sites reputed holy.

The successive sultans have repeatedly issued *firmans* and *hatti-sherifs** respecting the Holy Places at Jerusalem—sometimes as a matter of favour; sometimes as a means of allaying disputes between the Latin and Greek Christians. When the Saracens conquered Jerusalem, 621 A.D., the

* The difference between these two kinds of Turkish documents seems to be this—a *firman* is a government order or permission, issued from any one of many different offices; whereas a *hatti-sherif* (*sheriff*, *shereef*, *scherif*) emanates more directly from the sultan, and is a result of his individual will and pleasure.

victor, Hazret-Omar-Hatap, placed the Holy Sepulchre and its dependencies under the control of the Greek patriarch; and all other Christian bodies were rendered subordinate to him. During the eight centuries which next followed, and which witnessed so many conquests and reconquests of Jerusalem—Saracens, Turks, Tatars, and Crusaders, all gaining the ascendancy by turn—the Mohammedan regulations of the place cannot very clearly be traced; but when the Sultan of the Turks became master both of Constantinople and of Jerusalem, the exercise of the Christian rites in the latter-named city became immediately dependent on the good-will of the Ottoman potentate; and such has continued to be the case during the last 400 years. Sultan Mehemet, soon after the conquest of Constantinople, gave into the hands of the Greek patriarch a hatti-sherif, confirming the Greek Christians in all their rights of possession and immunities in regard to the Holy Places at Jerusalem. In the sixteenth century, two similar hatti-sherifs were granted by Sultans Selim and Suleiman; in the seventeenth century, three more by Sultans Murad, Ibrahim, and Mehemet; in the eighteenth century, four or five by Mehemet, Suleiman, Osman, and Mustapha; while hatti-sherifs have, in later years, been issued by Sultans Selim, Mahmoud, and especially Abdul-Medjid. Some of these grants related to the Greek Church alone; but in most cases they took cognizance of the wrangles between the Latin and Greek Christians. Thus, in 1665 and 1668, Sultan Murad IV. issued two hatti-sherifs, 'one against the Armenians, and the other against the Papists, when the latter endeavoured to expel the Greeks from certain holy places of which they formerly held possession.' Two other hatti-sherifs soon afterwards were strongly condemnatory of certain pretensions put forth by the Latins and Armenians, leaving the Greek Church in full favour at Jerusalem.

The emperors of Russia, during the last century and a half, have steadily kept in view these maxims or propositions, and have endeavoured to impress them on the minds of the sultans—that the Greek Church has always been more favoured than the Latin by the sultans; that the czar is the recognised head of the Greek Church; and that the czar has hence a right to interfere in all that concerns the Holy Places at Jerusalem. On the other hand, France insists that the Latins have always had privileges at Jerusalem, and that the kings of France have been recognised as 'protectors' of those Latins. For instance, a treaty between the sultan and Francis I., in the early part of the sixteenth century, consigned the Holy Places, and the monks who took care of them, to the protection of France. This treaty appears to have been the cause of numerous disputes—the Greeks refused to yield to the Latins; and many of the hatti-sherifs adverted to in the last paragraph had for object the healing of feuds between the two bodies of Christians. In 1757, these disputes became so intolerable, that the Divan issued an ordinance expelling the Latins altogether from the Church of Bethlehem and the Church of the Tomb of the Virgin, leaving them access to other of the Holy Places, but placing the whole under the care of the Greek monks. In the year 1808, the Holy Sepulchre, as noticed above, was partly destroyed by fire; and the Porte, in granting permission for rebuilding, gave this into the hands of the Greeks rather than the Latins; and on this ground the Greeks afterwards claimed additional rights and prerogatives. There were prolific elements of discord here; for the sultans, despising both the Latin and the Greek Christianity, cared little as to which should triumph over the other; while the ordinances or hatti-sherifs, in giving custody of the Holy Places, neglected to designate those places by name; and each body of monks succeeded in finding something 'holy' which had not been given over to the other. Scandals continued to arise so frequently, and Christianity became thereby so brought into contempt in the East, that Russia and France thought it proper to interfere—the one, as the protector of the Greek Christians; the other, of the Latin. M. Dashkoff was sent from Russia, and M. Marcellus from France, in 1819, to make personal inquiries at Jerusalem concerning the state and occupancy of all the sacred buildings. The two envoys made a minute examination, and sent in reports to their respective governments. It was hoped that the foundation was laid for an amicable settlement of the whole subject: but shortly after this, the troubles broke out between Turkey and Greece; and troubles in other directions kept the subject in abeyance until the year 1850.

Now, laying aside all doubts concerning the localities, a rational curiosity may arise to know the nature and number of the sacred buildings, or parts of buildings, in respect to which Christendom is thus divided. A document, drawn up by M. Marcellus in 1820, gives a list of these; and it will be admitted, that the list bears no small resemblance to the items in an auctioneer's catalogue—so much is the spirit of the subject frittered down by a string of petty details. There is a list, first, of the Sanctuaries or Holy Places, which, as France alleges, were possessed exclusively by the Latins in 1740 in Jerusalem, and outside Jerusalem; next, of the Sanctuaries, both within and without Jerusalem, possessed by the Latins in common with other Christians in 1740; next, of the Sanctuaries whence the Latins had been altogether excluded by the events which occurred shortly before 1820; and, lastly, of the Sanctuaries which, exclusively belonging to the Latins in 1740, were shared by other bodies in 1820. The list is worth recording, as an example of the trifling matters which will sometimes plunge great nations into war. The original document was in French; but the official translation, prepared for the Parliamentary Papers on Eastern Affairs, assumes the form

here given in a note.* M. Marcellus, at the same time, enumerated twenty-one 'prerogatives' which he claimed for the Latins at Jerusalem, as follow:—'1. The fathers of the Holy Land, Latin monks, alone to possess the keys of the gates of the convents or sanctuaries above mentioned, and particularly the three keys of the Altar of the Manger at Bethlehem. 2. They have a right to guard those places, to repair, maintain, decorate, and light lamps there. 3. To celebrate Holy Mass there, and to exercise the rites and ceremonies of their worship. 4. To take the lead over all other nations in their visitation of the pilgrimages of the Holy Places. 5. They have a right to visit the half of Mount Calvary which does not belong to them; to celebrate mass on the aforesaid half; and to light lamps there. 6. The Frank monks have an exclusive right to exercise their worship in the lower part of the cave of the Great Church of Bethlehem. 7. To prevent other nations from lighting lamps there, to celebrate their offices, and to exercise their religious worship there. 8. To oppose the visits of other nations to the Holy Places possessed by them, the Frank monks. 9. The actions at law brought against the Frank monks shall not be submitted to the authorities of the country, but referred to the Sublime Porte at Constantinople. 10. The Mogrebins are forbidden to offer any violence to the Frank monks at Aining'arim, under any pretext. 11. The Turkish custom-officers are forbidden to search the baggage of the monks, or Catholic pilgrims, which had been searched in the Levant, where they landed. 12. It is likewise forbidden to take or delay the clothes of the monks, or the ornaments of the Latin churches. 13. To compel the monks to receive base coin. 14. To take money from them. 15. It is forbidden to demand the smallest fee from the Frank monks for the privilege of burying their dead. 16. To ill treat the monks who bring the usual tribute from Europe, in case they arrive too late. 17. To disturb in any manner the monks

* 'SANCTUARIES POSSESSED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE LATINS IN 1740.

At Jerusalem—

1. The Holy Sepulchre; that is to say, the grand cupola, called the Leaden Cupola, and the small cupola, situated under the larger one, and covering the tomb itself. The entire court which surrounds the tomb, and the circular space between the pillars of the dome and the wall, now occupied by the chambers built by the Greeks after the fire.

2. The Grand Arch which separates the Greek Church from the dome, and which serves for the choir for the Latins when they perform their ceremonies before the tomb.

3. The Stone of Unction and the court which surrounds it, as far as the door of the church and the chamber now occupied by the Greeks.

4. The southern half of Calvary, that on which our Saviour was crucified; the four interior arches which compose Adam's Chapel, in front of which are the tombs of Godfrey of Bouillon and of Baudouin, destroyed in 1811; as well as five other royal tombs, situated at the foot of the wall of the Greek choir; the chamber at the side of Adam's Chapel.

5. The Grotto of the Invention of the Holy Cross, and of the staircase leading to it.

6. The entire court and the altar of the Church of the Magdalene; the seven contiguous arches, called the Arches of the Virgin, below as well as above; and the chapel called the Prison Chapel.

7. The small church situated at the side of that of the Magdalene; the convent of the Latin Monks, with half of the gallery of the great cupola; the adjoining chambers, the cistern, the gallery above the Seven Arches of the Virgin, and a covered passage leading to the cupola.

8. The chapel called the Holy Virgin's, outside the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, to the south of Calvary, and the entire space before the door of the church.

9. The Convent of the Holy Saviour, with the places appertaining to it, the church, gardens, &c.

Outside Jerusalem—

10. The Cemetery of Mount Sion.

11. The Tomb of the Holy Virgin, with the altars of St Joseph, St Joachim, St Anne. The keys of the church were in the hands of the Latins, who had the exclusive custody of them. Other nations, nevertheless, had each an altar in the church, but they could not perform service at them without the permission of the Latins, and the Tomb of the Holy Virgin itself was exclusively reserved for the latter.

12. The Grotto of Gethsemane, with the olive-trees and the adjoining grounds.

13. The Grand Church of Bethlehem altogether, excepting the baptistry; the Grotto of the Manger, and the two staircases which lead to it. The Latin monks alone possessed the three keys—one of the door of the church, and the other two for each of the side-doors of the grotto. Masters of the church, they could freely enter, and there perform all the ceremonies of their religion at the high-altar of the church, as well as at the two altars situated in the grotto—that of the Nativity and that of the Manger. A silver star, bearing a Latin inscription, was fastened on the marble, on the spot where our Saviour was born. A piece of tapestry, bearing the arms of the Holy Land, and belonging to the Latins, covered the walls of the grotto. The Latin monks possessed, besides, at Bethlehem the square before the church, the entire cemetery, and the buildings known as those of the Old Mill.

14. The convent situated by the side of the Grand Church of Bethlehem, with the small Church of St Catherine, and all the grounds which extend as far as the Grotto of the Nativity, and in which are the Sanctuaries of St Joseph, of the Holy Innocents, of St Eusepius, of Saints Paul and Eustasia, of St Jerome, of the adjoining garden, and of another garden situated near the grotto called the Grotto of Milk.

15. The Grotto of the Shepherds, and the grounds which surround it.

16. The Church of St John the Baptist, in the village of Aiakarem, with the convent and the garden.

17. The spot where the Holy Virgin visited St Elizabeth, near the village of St John (Aïntharem), and the Grotto of St John in the Desert.

SANCTUARIES POSSESSED BY THE LATINS IN COMMON WITH OTHER NATIONS IN 1740.

1. The half of Calvary, which properly belongs to the Greeks—that on which the cross was placed. The Latins possessed, and still possess, the right of having a ceremony there on Holy Thursday.

2. The Church of the Tomb of the Virgin, on this understanding—that the other nations should each have an altar there, and perform their ceremonies there, with the permission, and under the surveillance, of the Latin monks.

SANCTUARIES AND POSSESSIONS FROM WHICH THE LATINS ARE NOW ALTOGETHER EXCLUDED.

Jerusalem—

1. The Seven Arches of the Virgin, and the Chapel of the Prison.

2. The two interior arches of Calvary, the chapel in front, and the chamber which is by the side. The Tombs of Godfrey of Bouillon and of Baudouin have been destroyed.

3. A portion of the court surrounding the Stone of Unction, that part where the other tombs were which have been destroyed, the Greeks having pushed forward the wall in order to enlarge their church. The chamber on the right has likewise been taken possession of by the Greeks.

4. The space situated between the pillars of the cupola, and between the pillars of the wall, which the Greeks have filled up by building chambers there. They have likewise usurped about four "pics" of space under the great arch, by pushing forward, in order to enlarge their church, the wall which separates it from the cupola.

Outside Jerusalem—

5. The entire church which encloses the Tomb of the Holy Virgin, and the garden by the side of it. The Latins can no longer perform their ceremonies there, nor even enter, without the permission of the Greeks, who have the keys.

6. The Grand Church of Bethlehem altogether; the two staircases which lead to the grotto; the Altar of the Nativity in that grotto. The silver star has been carried off: there no longer remains anything but a few tatters of the tapestry belonging to the Latin monks. The three keys are at the present time in the hands of the Greeks.

7. The half of the two gardens of the convent at Bethlehem.

8. The place and the store known as that of the Old Mill.

9. The Grotto of the Shepherds, and the surrounding grounds.

SANCTUARIES BELONGING IN 1740 EXCLUSIVELY TO THE LATINS, IN THE ENJOYMENT OF WHICH OTHER NATIONS NOW PARTICIPATE.

1. The Holy Sepulchre, and the court which surrounds it under the grand cupola.

2. The Stone of Unction.

3. The Grotto of the Manger at Bethlehem. The Greeks and the Armenians perform their ceremonies there at the Altar of the Nativity, and the Latins at the Altar of the Manger.'

and pilgrims of the Holy Land, in the course of their visitations or pilgrimages. 18. To disturb them at any time in the exercise of their religious worship, so long as that worship out of doors is not contrary to the Mussulman laws. 19. The Turkish authorities are forbidden to pay more than one visit each year to the Holy Sepulchre. 20. To compel the Frank monks to purchase damaged wheat. 21. The Latin fathers possess an exclusive right to send members of their communities or couriers to Constantinople, on business, without opposition.'

Thirty years after these monkish trifles were thus recorded by M. Marcellus, troubles concerning them recommenced. In the beginning of 1850, the pope, and many Roman Catholic sovereigns, agreed to assist France in endeavouring to obtain a settlement of this knotty question; urging that the Greeks had usurped property belonging to the Latins at Jerusalem, and had purposely allowed some of the chapels and monuments to fall into decay. General Aupick, the French ambassador at Constantinople, formally made certain demands from the Porte; but M. Titoff, the Russian ambassador, resisted them, insisting that the Greeks were in the right, and that Russia was their protector. Our ambassador, Sir Stratford Canning, since become Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, at once saw that serious consequences might spring out of this simple matter, and counselled the Porte to be cautious of offending either party by conceding too much to the other. The Porte then proposed to appoint a commission, to examine all the firmans or hatti-sherifs which the Ottoman government had at any time given to any of the Christian communities at Jerusalem, with a view to make arrangements in conformity with them. The sultan was much embarrassed by the urgent claims of the two great Christian powers; and there can be no question, that he would honestly and in good faith have dealt equitably by them, had he seen his way clearly, for he had no sympathy with either in preference to the other. The British ambassador was fully alive to the difficulty of the sultan's position. In one of his dispatches to the home-government, he said: 'General Aupick has assured me, that the matter in dispute is a mere question of property, and of express treaty stipulation; but it is difficult to separate any such question from political considerations, and a struggle of general influence, especially if Russia, as may be expected, should interfere in behalf of the Greek Church.' On another occasion, speaking of the Greek interest, he said: 'No one seems to doubt that every nerve will be strained by that church and nation to maintain their present vantage-ground, and that Russian influence, however masked, will be vigorously exerted, as on former occasions, to defeat the attack of the Latin party. He expressed an opinion that the Porte, 'in its embarrassment between the two conflicting interests animated by religious zeal, would no doubt be glad to find an issue in some private arrangement between the parties more immediately concerned' —a wish in which he fully sympathised.

The year 1850 passed away in these discussions; and 1851 commenced with a strong demand from General Aupick, urged by dispatches from Paris to insist on a restitution of the state of matters which existed at Jerusalem in 1740; while M. Titoff, stimulated by dispatches from St Petersburg, insisted that no change whatever should be made at Jerusalem. The poor sultan was thus placed between two angry claimants, each of whom would be offended by any concessions made to the other. In May, M. Lavalette succeeded General Aupick as French ambassador at Constantinople, and renewed the Latin claims in very importunate terms. In July, the Porte appointed a commission to examine all the documents: and the report of the commission was so far favourable to the Latins, that M. Lavalette thought himself entitled to raise his tone; he said, that 'if the moderation of his government, in seeking only a joint participation of the Holy Places, were not appreciated, the claim of undivided possession by the Latins would be urged with all the weight of a demand warranted by treaty.' At this very time M. Titoff declared to the Porte, that he and his legation would immediately quit Constantinople, if the *status quo* of the sanctuaries was in any degree unsettled! It is easy to picture the embarrassment of the sultan and his ministers at such a dilemma.

The year 1851 passed away like that which preceded it, still leaving the French and Russian ambassadors striving which could extract most concessions from the Porte concerning the Holy Places, and still leaving the Porte uncertain how to please both parties. Early in 1852, the Turkish ministers flattered themselves on the formation of an excellent plan: they offered to the Latins 'the right of officiating in the Shrine of the Virgin near Jerusalem, together with keys to the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem;' while they offered to the Greeks 'the right of officiating, on certain occasions, in the mosque of Mount Olivet.' But, alas! Lavalette spurned the concessions to the Latins, as being too insignificant, and Titoff equally spurned those on the part of the Greeks; and the peaceful wish of the Moslem was again frustrated. The British ambassador stated, in a dispatch to Earl Granville, that M. Titoff 'expressed himself with unusual vehemence, and no small degree of irritation, against the proposed arrangement.'

At length, on 19th March 1852, the British ambassador was enabled to transmit to his government a copy of a firman which the sultan had just issued, in relation to the Holy Places. It may be well to give this firman in full, in a note;*

* 'FIRMAN.

To thee, my Vizier, Ahmed Pacha, Governor of Jerusalem; to thee, Cadi of Jerusalem; and to you, members of the Medjliss.

The disputes which, from time to time, arise between the Greek and Latin nations, respecting certain Holy Places which exist both within and without the city of Jerusalem, have now been again revived.

A commission has, in consequence, been formed, composed of

because it presents some curious information concerning the actual state of those sanctuaries, and because it was itself a subject of renewed dispute afterwards. The month of August had scarcely arrived, when M. Lavalette was found quarrelling with the Porte concerning the smallness of the concessions made to the Latins. The conciliatory spirit of the Porte is shewn in a remarkable way by the 'blessings' called down upon the names of the sacred personages of Christianity in the firman; so different from the generally conceived notion of the bigoted intolerance of the Mussulmans. But this conciliatory spirit availed nothing as between the rival claims of the two Christian churches. The firman was considered to be more favourable to the Greek than to the Latin Church; and hence M. Lavalette was more dissatisfied with it than M. Titoff.

The British consul at Jerusalem, in a dispatch to Lord Malmesbury, dated October 27, gives a curious account of one month's proceedings between certain 'Christian' dignitaries in that city. It appears that they met by appointment, to settle matters of detail on the spot. There were M. Basily, M. Marabutti, and Prince Garari, as representatives of the Russian or Greek party; M. Botta and Count Pizzamano, as representatives of the French or Latin party; Afif Bey, and a suite of local effendis, as commissioners from the Turkish government; together with the three patriarchs, Greek, Latin, and Armenian. The Russian agents arrived first. 'They were received with extraordinary honours; refreshments awaited them at three different stations between Jaffa and Jerusalem; the Greek patriarch went out to meet them; and they entered the city with an escort of 100 irregular cavalry, drums beating, and muskets firing.' After some days, the whole of them met 'in the Church of the Resurrection, just in front of the Holy Sepulchre itself, and under the great dome; there they were regaled with sherbets, confectionaries, and pipes, at the expense of the three convents, who vied with each other in making luxurious display on the occasion.' Afif Bey made an oration, and announced the sultan's intention to repair the dome of the church at his own expense. The Russian or Greek party then waited impatiently for the reading of a firman which, as they supposed, would consign to their keeping the whole of the Christian sanctuaries of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Afif Bey read an order of the sultan, permitting the Latins to celebrate mass once a year, but requiring the altar and its ornaments to remain undisturbed. 'No sooner were these words uttered, than the Latins, who had come to receive their triumph over the Orientals, broke out into loud exclamations of the impossibility of celebrating mass upon a schismatic slab of marble, with a covering of silk and gold instead of plain linen, among schismatic vases, and before a crucifix which has the feet separated, instead of one nailed over the other.' It appears, from the details entered into by Mr Consul Finn, that each party attended in the full expectation of overthrowing the other; but that the Porte, in its vacillation, had issued contradictory orders, which could not possibly be reconciled. One of the sources of trouble was a certain 'silver star, which had been stolen in 1847, and which, the firman declared,

certain muchirs and distinguished men of the law, and of other persons, to examine this question thoroughly; and this is the result of the researches and of the investigations of that commission, and of those of the cabinet-councils held after the commission. The places in dispute between the two rites are—the great cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre; the little cupola, which is above the spot called the Tomb of Jesus, on whom may the blessing of God rest, and which is in the church before mentioned; the Hadjir-el-Moughtesil; Golgotha, which is also within the enclosure of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre; the Arches of the Holy Mary; the Great Church, which is in the village of Bethlehem; as well as the Grotto, which is the true spot where Jesus—may the blessing of God be upon him!—was born, and which is situated below that church; and the Tomb of the Blessed Mary, whom may God bless.

Seeing that the great cupola above mentioned applies to the entire church, the Latins have no right to claim exclusive possession either of that cupola, or of the lesser cupola, or of the Hadjir-el-Moughtesil, or of Golgotha, or of the Arches of the Holy Mary, or of the Great Church of Bethlehem, or of the Holy Manger; all these places must be left in their present state. In former times, a key of the two gates of the Great Church of Bethlehem and of the Holy Manger was given to each of the Greek, Latin, and Armenian nations—a measure which was also confirmed by the firman delivered to the Greek nation in the year of the Hegira 1170; and that arrangement shall still continue. But as it does not follow from this, that it is permitted to alter the existing state of things in that church, or to prevent the Latins from officiating there, or, in short, to make any new arrangement calculated to incommode other sects, either in the passage from the church to the Holy Manger, or in other respects; the smallest pretension in regard to this shall not be allowed or entertained, on the part of any one whatsoever.

No change shall be made in the present state of the gates of the Church of Bethlehem.

As, according to ancient and modern documents, the two gardens belonging to the Frank convent at Bethlehem, to which the Latins have also laid claim, are under the superintendence of both parties; they shall remain as at present.

The Latins, on the ground of certain firmans of which they are in possession, have advanced the pretension that the Tomb of the Blessed Mary belongs exclusively to them; but they are not right in this either. Only since the Greeks, the Armenians, the Syrians, and the Copts at present exercise their worship within this holy tomb; that is to say, as the exercise of worship is not confined to a single rite, it has been declared just to uphold and to confirm on behalf of the Roman Catholic Christians the permission which they possess *ab antiquo*, of exercising their worship in a spot where various nations exercise theirs, but upon condition that they shall make no alteration either in the administration or in the present condition of that monument.

As this decision confirms and consolidates the rights which have been granted to the Greek subjects of my empire by my august ancestors, and confirmed by firmans invested with hatti-sherifs issued from my imperial throne—it has accordingly obtained my sovereign assent, as I have much at heart to maintain the above-mentioned rights. None of the parties shall allow themselves to contravene this decision.

Furthermore, the Latins at the present day perform service once a year, on Ascension Day, in an oratory at Jerusalem, called Coubet-el-Messad, which is situated on Mount Olivet; and the Greeks perform their devotions outside that oratory. Now, this oratory is a Mohammedan temple, and it consequently does not belong exclusively to any Christian sect; and I do not consider it right that the subjects of my empire who profess the Greek faith should be deprived of the power of worshipping in the interior of the above-named oratory. The Greeks shall, therefore, not be prevented from exercising their worship in the interior of the Coubet-el-Messad (the Cupola of the Ascension), on condition that they make no alteration in the present condition of that oratory, and that there shall be a Mohammedan porter at the door, as heretofore. This measure shall be recorded at the head of the copy of the imperial firman, dated the month of Sheval 1254 (December 1838).

Such is my decided and sovereign will; and in conformity with the orders which I have in consequence given, the present firman, which is furnished with a hatti-sherif, and issued from my imperial Divan, has been delivered to the Greek nation.

As soon as my sovereign orders shall become known to you, you will take every care that henceforward my decision and my commands above mentioned shall not in any way be contravened, either by those who profess the Greek, Armenian, Syriac, and Copt religions, or by the Latins.

You will take care to have the present imperial edict recorded in the archives of the Mehkémé, to serve constantly, and for ever, as a permanent rule. Understand this; and give heed to the noble signature with which it is decorated.

Issued about the end of the month of Djemadi-ul-evel 1268 (February 1852).'

was to be replaced at the Latin expense. It was supposed to be brought on this occasion, having been approved of in Constantinople; but on inquiry, it was found that no one had brought it, or knew where it had been left behind.'

The close of the year 1852 was marked by a continuance of the same disputes as before at Constantinople, between Russia and France, but rendered more serious by mutual irritation. If a sultan's order or firman were issued, confirming the arrangements of 1740, it offended the Russian or Greek party; if it departed from that arrangement, it offended the French or Latin party. Colonel Rose, in a dispatch to Lord Malmesbury on 20th November, stated, that the cupola of the Holy Sepulchre had for a length of time been in decay; that the Greeks and Latins had disputed so violently who should repair it, that nothing was done; that the sultan had hereupon undertaken to repair it at his own expense; but that further collisions were even then expected, concerning the question whether the inscriptions round the cupola should be in Greek or in Latin, and whether the sacred images in it should be made and habited according to the Greek or the Latin fashion! The attempt seems almost hopeless to reconcile Christian bodies who could thus wrangle in the sight of the Moslem—degrading the Cross not a little in the sight of the Crescent. Turkey promised Russia that the Latins 'should *not* be allowed to pass through the great door of the Church of Bethlehem;' but France threatened that, unless this privilege were conceded, a French fleet should enter the Dardanelles; and so it was that the Turkish government, bandied about from the one to the other, knew not what course to adopt for the best. The British representatives, in conformity with instructions from home, remained neutral, ready to aid in healing the differences, if opportunity arose. Colonel Rose represented this state of things forcibly, in a dispatch written to Lord Malmesbury on 20th November: 'The Porte's position is most disadvantageous. Against all her wishes and interests, she has been dragged into a most dangerous and difficult dispute between the great powers, who found their respective claims on contradictory documents, which date from remote and dark ages. The Porte, a Mohammedan power, is called upon to decide a quarrel which involves, ostensibly, sectarian Christian religious feeling; but which, in reality, is a vital struggle between France and Russia for political influence, at the Porte's cost, in her dominions. The sultan is required to be a judge, and to decide this dispute; but so far from having judicial independence and immunity, his majesty is coerced, and humiliated before his subjects by menaces, forced to give contradictory and dishonouring decisions, and then accused of perfidy by those who have driven him into it.'* Just before the close of the year, the much-talked-of silver star was brought in great pomp from Jaffa, and deposited in its proper place in the Holy Sepulchre, and new keys for two of the buildings were made for the Latin monks.

Thus the eventful year 1853 approached. There would be something merely ludicrous in the conduct of these many grave men concerning such trifles, were it not that political ambition lurked behind the scene. The British ambassador at St Petersburg ascertained that the czar had commenced warlike preparations at the beginning of 1853, or towards the close of 1852. The answer given to his inquiries was, that those preparations bore relation to the threats of France; that if France adopted a hostile tone to the Porte in the interest of the Latin Christians, Russia would do the same on the part of the Greek Christians; but that beyond this, she had no unfriendly intentions towards Turkey. In a dispatch from Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow,* January 14, 1853, the Russian ambassador in London was urged to explain to the Earl of Aberdeen's government, as he had to that of the Earl of Derby, that the czar's only solicitude with Turkey had relation to the fulfilment of promises concerning the Holy Places. He complained that the sultan's firman had not been read at Jerusalem; that it had been treated with derision by the Turkish officials; that the key—that unfortunate key!—of the Church of Bethlehem had been made over to the Latins; and that the Greek Christians had been grievously offended thereby. In another dispatch, from Count Nesselrode to M. Kisseleff, at Paris (8th February), the gateway grievance is thus dilated upon: 'Matters at Jerusalem have got into such a state of confusion and disorder, that whilst a Catholic prelate, supported by the French consul, called in the assistance of the locksmiths of the town to open for him the great gate of the Church of Bethlehem, although he could have entered by the two other side-gates—Cyril, the patriarch of Jerusalem, a venerable old man, and generally remarkable for his conciliatory disposition and for the moderation of his character, was compelled to protest, in writing, against these acts of violence, and to set out for Constantinople, in order to lay his complaints, and those of his nation, before the sultan.'

It was now that Russia, on pretence that a *chargé d'affaires*, such as had previously been at the Turkish capital, was not of sufficiently high rank to conduct such important negotiations, despatched Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople. The Russian grandee seems to have been purposely chosen from among the most arrogant and influential of the czar's favourites. The first Menchikoff, adverted to in a former page, was one of the creations of Peter the Great. First, a pastry-boy, who hawked about pies in the streets of Moscow, he was raised, step by step, into favour, until at length he became a major-general in the army, a prince of the empire, and governor of Ingria. The first advance was due to his intelligence in discovering a plot for poisoning Peter with some pastry, and his

* Parliamentary Papers on Eastern Affairs. Part I. p. 46.

* Parliamentary Papers. Part I. p. 61.

subsequent promotions were earned by mingled skill and cunning. Still greater was his power under Catherine, whom he assisted in gaining the throne after the death of Peter; he became first senator and field-marshal, albeit he could neither read nor write. From the powerful family thus founded, sprang the prince who acted as envoy from Nicholas to Abdul-Medjid in 1853. Prince Menchikoff came to Constantinople with all the halo which surrounds one high in favour with a powerful sovereign. He was one of the wealthiest men in Russia; his estates were immense, and his serfs numerous; his palaces were more than princely; he had been made Minister of Marine; he had had the important government of Finland placed under his control; he had long been regarded as one of the chiefs of the Muscovite or old Russian party—a party which sets up Moscow

Constantinople.

against St Petersburg, and Slavonism against Germanism, and which works all the engines for the acquisition of power over the Ottomans. It is true that, in the external politics of Russia, Prince Menchikoff had taken little part. He had been a subaltern in the artillery; then an employé at the war-office; then an unsuccessful envoy to the court of Persia at Teheran; then a military officer at the siege of Varna in 1828; then an admiral of the Russian fleets; then chief of the censorship, by which any intellectual food for the Russians is either tamed down or removed altogether; but in all these strangely incongruous positions, he had been very little known beyond the limits of his own country. High in favour, great in power, arrogant in bearing, he was a man to be dreaded at Constantinople—not so much for what he had done, as for what he had been, made. Full well did Colonel Rose appreciate the meaning and importance of the impression which Menchikoff desired to make. The British *chargé d'affaires* was told in due form by the officials at the Russian mission, before the prince arrived, that that nobleman was about to land from Odessa; that he had the title of 'Altesse Sérénissime;' that he was an admiral, and the governor-general of Finland; and that he was as high in rank and in the imperial estimation as Count Nesselrode, Prince Paskévitch, Prince Voronzoff, and Count Orloff—all of which was, perhaps, equivalent to saying: 'Tremble at the approach of so great a man!' As if to frighten the timid and embarrassed sultan still further, by the ostentatious magnificence of his display, Prince Menchikoff was accompanied by Count Demitri Nesselrode, son of the Chancellor of the Empire, Prince Galatzin, General Nikapotchinski, and Admiral Korniloff. Such was the Imperial envoy, whose hauteur was soon displayed.

When received by the grand vizier on the 2d of March (1853), he used peremptory language; and on being invited to visit, as was customary, the minister for foreign affairs, Fuad Effendi, he at once refused, on the ground that Fuad had advocated measures hostile to Russia. The galling nature of this insult cannot be fully understood, without bearing in mind the importance of ceremonials in the eye of an Oriental. Colonel Rose

describes this momentous visit in a dispatch written 7th March, a few days after Menchikoff's arrival. He plainly saw that it was a bad omen for Turkey. 'Prince Menchikoff, with his whole embassy, waited on the grand vizier at the Porte. It is an invariable rule, that a new ambassador makes the second visit of ceremony to the minister of foreign affairs; but Prince Menchikoff, after leaving the grand vizier, although invited by Kiamil Bey, the *Introducteur des Ambassadeurs*, to visit Fuad Effendi, whose apartment adjoins those of the grand vizier, declined to do so. Prince Menchikoff, passing by the line of troops and Kavasses, and the very door of Fuad Effendi, which had been opened to receive him, left the Porte. The affront was the more galling, because great preparations had been made, for the purpose of receiving the Russian ambassador with marked honours; and a great concourse of people, particularly Greeks, had assembled, for the purpose of witnessing the ceremony. The incident made a great and most painful sensation. The grand vizier expressed to me his indignation at the premeditated affront which had been offered to his sovereign; and the sultan's irritation was excessive. M. Benedetti and myself at once saw all the bearing and intention of the affront. Prince Menchikoff wished, at his first start, to create an intimidating and commanding influence; to shew that any man, even a cabinet minister, who had offended Russia, would be humiliated and punished, even in the midst of the sultan's court, and without previous communication to his majesty.'

The immediate consequence of the insult was, that Fuad Effendi resigned. By the sultan, anxious for conciliation, though greatly offended, the resignation was accepted, and Rifaat Pacha was appointed as foreign minister. At this time Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador to the Sublime Porte, was absent in London; but his place was filled by Colonel Rose, who seems to have had a shrewder sense of the designs of Russia than his principal. To him the conduct of Prince Menchikoff appeared in so serious a light, that, much to the surprise of quiet people in England, he sent a dispatch to Admiral Dundas at Malta, requesting him to send a squadron to the Dardanelles, as a check to Russian influence. This order the admiral did not feel at liberty to obey; and the home-government afterwards approved of his decision. The French authorities took a different view of the matter; M. Benedetti, *chargé d'affaires* at Constantinople, summoned a French fleet from Toulon, and the Emperor Napoleon sanctioned this arrangement.

On the 8th of March, Prince Menchikoff had a formal audience of the sultan; and soon afterwards the prince disclosed his views to Rifaat Pacha. There are many proofs that at that time the British government ill understood the state of affairs, and had very imperfectly plumbed the depths of the czar's schemes. The Earl of Clarendon wrote a dispatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour, British ambassador at St Petersburg, dated 23d March, in which he expressed himself as follows:—'The reports current in Constantinople with respect to the real objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission, the alarm of the Divan, and the resignation of Fuad Effendi, the rumoured advance of a large Russian force to the Turkish frontier, the request made for the approach of the British fleet, and the orders given for the sailing of the French fleet, have naturally excited great alarm, both in England and France, with respect to the fate of Turkey, and the events of European importance that might at any moment occur in the East. Her Majesty's government have felt no alarm, and have not shared the apprehensions which the rumours and facts above alluded to might appear to justify; for, on more than one occasion, *they have received the personal assurances of the Emperor of Russia*, that it was his determination to maintain the independence of the Turkish Empire; and that, should the views of his majesty undergo any change upon that important question, they should frankly be made known to Her Majesty's government. *No such communication having been received*, Her Majesty's government felt secure, that, whatever might be the objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission, neither the authority of the sultan nor the integrity of his dominions was exposed to danger.'* The sequel shewed how little value was to be placed on the 'personal assurances' of the czar.

Prince Menchikoff had interviews with Rifaat Pacha on the 17th and 22d of March; and Colonel Rose soon ascertained that Menchikoff was endeavouring to draw Turkey into a secret treaty with Russia, unknown to England or France. Some days later, the Russian envoy requested Rifaat Pacha to give a promise that the English and French ambassadors should not be informed of the nature of a secret treaty which Russia would propose. As Menchikoff's conduct had been marked by mingled arrogance and vagueness, Rifaat Pacha refused to give the required pledge; the negotiation referred openly and ostensibly to the 'Holy Places' at Jerusalem; but it seemed as if the secret treaty was intended to mask some further inroad upon the independence of the Ottoman Empire. On the 1st of April, a further conference revealed the fact, that the czar demanded an unconditional control over all the Greek and Armenian subjects of the sultan; offering, in return, 'to put a fleet and 400,000 men at the service of the sultan, if Turkey should ever need aid against any Western power whatever.' This complete system of 'protection' would have been exactly Russian in both its clauses. The grand vizier refused the treaty, refused to keep the knowledge of it from France and England, and greatly offended Menchikoff; but Rifaat Pacha seemed disposed to have yielded to the Russian demands, had he not been controlled by a superior minister.

* Parliamentary Papers on the Eastern Question, 1854. Part I. p. 94.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe arrived at Constantinople on the 5th of April, and resumed the exercise of that great influence which he had long held over the Ottoman Porte. He was speedily immersed in the diplomacy of the time and place. His advice to the Porte was, to keep the question of the Holy Places separate from any other question concerning the Greek Christians of Turkey generally—to be conciliatory on the former, but to be on their guard against any promises to Russia regarding the Greek Christians. Prince Menchikoff, on the other hand, evidently wished to insinuate the second question as a consequence of the first. There was about this time an extraordinary system of double-dealing on the part of the Russian government. Baron Brunnow, in reply to the Earl of Clarendon, and Count Nesselrode, in reply to Sir Hamilton Seymour, protested over and over again that the armaments of Russia meant nothing, or nothing that should alarm the Turkish or other courts; and yet there was a continued pouring down of troops towards the Turkish frontier on the Pruth, and an evident augmentation of naval power in the Black Sea. Prince Menchikoff, too, in reply to questions from the grand vizier and Rifaat Pacha, evaded any direct explanations concerning the purport of these warlike manifestations. The eagerness of Prince Menchikoff for a secret treaty, and the extensive arrangements for secret arming, indicate plainly that Russia had objects in view concerning which it desired that England and France should be hoodwinked. Sir Hamilton Seymour was evidently much struck with this fact. In one of his dispatches, he states that, in conversation with Count Nesselrode respecting the augmentation of troops, 'the subject was one upon which it was manifest that the chancellor was unwilling to be questioned; and that, as I really believe, because he was unable to return a satisfactory answer.'* This dispatch was dated 19th April. On the next day, he reported another conversation with the veteran diplomatist, during which Sir Hamilton asked for explanation concerning the rumoured secret treaty. Count Nesselrode 'denied the correctness of the rumour; and after some little hesitation, said that he did not know what objects could be derived from an offensive alliance with Turkey. Having thus changed the form of my inquiry, the chancellor replied that he would again state that the report was incorrect, but that it was true that the emperor had caused it to be intimated to the sultan, that he might count upon the protection and aid of Russia in case of an attack,' &c.—a most fatherly care, certainly, often proffered during the last fifty years, and in most cases disastrous to Turkey if accepted.

On the 13th of April, Prince Menchikoff received a communication from St Petersburg, complaining of the slowness of his proceedings, and ordering him to demand peremptorily the assent by the Porte to all the czar's demands. There was an urgent desire to conclude the whole before France or England could have any chance of interfering; and Rifaat Pacha was perplexed by the impetuosity of the prince. It appears, at the same time, that Menchikoff was conciliatory and courteous in all his interviews with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who only intimates, in his dispatches, 'a mystery that hangs over the intentions of Russia,' and a discrepancy between the conduct of the prince and 'the military demonstrations and movements of Russian partisans.' What, above all, lulled the English representatives at the five great capitals into security, was the fact that the disputes regarding the Holy Places were actually reaching a conclusion. France had become conceding, and Turkey was enabled to give what appeared full satisfaction to Russia, so far as this matter was concerned. On the 5th of May, appeared the firman of the sultan, completely settling the question. We do not transcribe it, simply because, though important, it involves the same kind of petty details as all the documents concerning these Holy Places—the key of the Sepulchre-gate; the right of Greeks and Latins to use the key; the right of joint or separate worship; the right (or the wrong) of the Greek door-keeper to shut out the Latin monks; the ownership of the new silver star in the Grotto of the Sepulchre; the hours at which the Greeks, Latins, and Armenians may severally worship at the Sepulchre, in order that three bodies of Christians may not be mutually contaminated by worshipping together; the repair of the dilapidated cupola by the sultan, to allay the quarrels of the Christians, who disputed which fraternity should undertake this duty; the blocking up of some windows which looked upon the church of the Holy Sepulchre—such were the matters on which the firman dwelt. But this progress towards, and final attainment of, an accommodation on the old subjects of dispute, seems to have been precisely what Russia did not want, and what impelled her to be pressing with her new and secret demands.

Strange to say, it was on the same day which witnessed the issue of the conclusive firman, that Prince Menchikoff sent in an official 'note' to Rifaat Pacha, so exigeant in its tone as thoroughly to alarm Lord Stratford. The sultan was ill at the time; and Rifaat Pacha, troubled at his position, requested the full advice of the British and French ambassadors. It soon appeared that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, M. de la Cour, Rifaat Pacha, and the grand vizier were of one mind, that the demands of Russia could not be acceded to—claiming, as she did, the 'protectorate' of eleven millions of the Christian subjects of the sultan; in other words, a share of the sovereignty of Turkey. In the dispatches of the Earl of Clarendon, written in the months of May and June, it is made evident that the British government had placed faith in the declarations made by Count Nesselrode and Baron Brunnow: they had thought that the settlement concerning the Holy Places would comprise all the matters in dispute; and they were wholly unprepared for the news which Lord Stratford

* Parliamentary Papers. Part I. p. 140.

had now to transmit to them. A sudden change of ministry took place at Constantinople; Reshid Pacha, Mustapha Pacha, and others assumed important offices; and the tone employed against Russia became more decided. Menchikoff demanded from Reshid Pacha, the new minister for foreign affairs, an immediate answer to the 'note.'

The last scene in this act of the Turkish drama occurred on the 21st of May, when Prince Menchikoff departed from Constantinople, and the imperial arms were withdrawn from the Russian embassy. Count Nesselrode wrote to Reshid Pacha, stating that Menchikoff would remain at Odessa a short time, and that if Turkey sent in its adhesion within a week, all might yet be well. Turkey did *not* send in its adhesion; and thus the end of May witnessed the termination of the eventful Menchikoff mission.

RUSSIAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, UNDER PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF.

A phrase, used by an English statesman in parliament, concerning 'drifting into war,' might be applied to Turkey at this time. It is a term that presupposes a sort of vacillation and timidity, rather than a bold pursuit of a clearly defined object. Turkey drifted into war, much against the wish of its own sultan, and also of the European powers generally. It earnestly begged and prayed its haughty neighbour Russia to be conciliatory, less exacting, more disposed to do unto others as it would itself be done unto. But Russia deemed herself strong, and Turkey weak.

While the diplomatists were, on every hand, covering the Turkish question with a profusion of documents; while the names of Nesselrode, Drouyn de Lhuys, Manteuffel, Buol, Stratford de Redcliffe, Clarendon were in every one's mouth —Russia was silently but vigorously bringing her vast forces to concentrate upon the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, evidently aiming at that 'material guarantee' which she afterwards attempted to exact. These military preparations were in progress from the time when Prince Menchikoff's mission seemed likely to fail, perhaps still earlier. The whole of the southern provinces of Russia were alive with soldiers for many weeks, corps d'armée and regiments descending from the regions of the Don, the Dniester, and the Dnieper, towards the Pruth—ready to cross over into Moldavia as soon as the word of command should arrive.

The die was cast; the aggression occurred in the beginning of July 1853. On the 2d of that month, one corps d'armée crossed the Pruth under General Lüders; and on the following day, another considerable force crossed under General Dannenberg. Nearly one-third of these united forces was cavalry, and they were provided with seventy-two guns of large calibre. A pro-Russian party had already been organised in the Principalities; and Gortchakoff introduced himself and his mission to the inhabitants in a flaming proclamation.

The general who was called upon to lead the first attack against the Turks in this war, is liable to be confounded with another Russian of the same name. Prince Gortchakoff* the soldier, is the brother of Prince Gortchakoff the diplomatist, who conducted the negotiations at Vienna on the part of Russia during the subsequent Conferences. Born in or about the year 1792, Prince Michael Dmitrivich Gortchakoff has been known to the rest of Europe only as a highly rewarded general, not as one who has achieved great exploits. He first served in the artillery of the Imperial Guard, and was an officer of artillery during the siege of Silistria in 1828–9; during this siege, he is said to have embarrassed the operations of his commander by running his guns into a deep fosse, where they stuck fast, and could not be fired. In 1831, he took part in the war in Poland, on the staff of Count Pahlen. Some accounts give a disparaging view of his exploits there, but others speak of the good service rendered by his artillery; and, at anyrate, the czar raised him to a higher rank in the army when the Polish insurrection was quelled. In 1843, he was appointed general of artillery, and soon afterwards military governor of Warsaw. When Austria obtained the aid of Russia during the Hungarian campaign, Gortchakoff was

* Much confusion exists in the current orthography of Russian and Turkish names. A few words, therefore, may not be inappropriate here concerning the diversities in the current modes of spelling these names.

The letters of the Russian alphabet are not only, for the most part, different in *form* from those in the Roman, but in many cases different in *power* also. Hence, when a Russian name has to be expressed in English, it becomes a question what combination of English letters will best convey the Russian sound of the syllables; and different persons judge differently on this point. This is especially observable in respect to the uncertain usage of *b* and *v*, of *v* and *f* or *ff*, of *v* and *w*, of *ch* and *tch* or *tsch*, of *cz* and *ts*. Moreover, many of the consonants and diphthongs have, in English, sounds differing a little from those which they bear in French, German, and Italian; and on this ground alone a foreigner would be prone to spell Russian names in a way different from an English writer. Hence such discrepancies as the following:—*Azof, Azoff, Asoph; Oczakow, Otchakof; Menchikoff, Menschikoff, Mentschikoff, Menzikoff; Gorchakoff, Gortchakoff, Gortschakoff; Woronzaw, Woronzof; Suwarrow, Swarof; Crimea, Krimea; Balaclava, Balaklava; Sebastopol, Sevastopol; Wallachia, Valachia; Sweaburg, Sveaborg.* Some think that the doubling of the final *f* is quite superfluous; and that *Orlof* and *Yermolof*, as English forms of Russian names, are more consistent than *Orloff* and *Yermoloff*. There is no authority empowered to settle these differences; and the differences will probably continue. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in his diplomatic dispatches, spells Russian names with more simplicity of structure than many other writers; and his example in these cases will be generally followed in the present work.

In the Turkish language, in like manner, there are sounds of letters and diphthongs concerning which the most fitting English equivalents are by no means determined. Hence the following groups of uncertainties:—*Reshid, Reschid, Redshid, Redschid; Omar, Omer; Pasha, Pacha; Sherif, Scherif, Sheriff, Shereef; Redif, Rediff, Redeef; Vizir, Vizier, Vizeer, Wuzeer;* and others of similar character. So perplexed have many writers been concerning Oriental orthography, that in a *History of Hindostan*, written half a century ago, the name of the famous Asiatic conqueror *Ghengis Khan* is spelled in no less than seven different ways, without any apparent consciousness of the discrepancy on the part of the author. To this uncertainty of English equivalents for Oriental sounds may perhaps, in great part, be attributed the diverse names of *Mahomet, Mahommed, Mahmud, Mahmood, Mahmoud, Mehemet, Mehmet, Mohammed*, and *Muhummed*. Within the last few years, a tendency has been shewn to make great changes in the English orthography of Oriental names; the heroes of our boyish days, *Aladin* and *Saladin*, are scarcely to be identified in their modern dresses of *'Alá-ud-dín* and *Salah-ud-dín*.

The reader must, therefore, consider this evil, of uncertain orthography in respect to Russian and Turkish names, as one not at present to be cured.

one of the generals present; but his name meets with little attention in the histories of that remarkable war. Whatever may be his military status, his late imperial master seems to have showered down a profusion of favours on him: aid-de-camp-general, general of artillery, chef d'état major, governor of Warsaw, lieutenant-general of Poland —these are, or ought to be, positions of reward for high services. Gortchakoff was the representative of the czar in London on occasion of the funeral of the Duke of Wellington in 1852. The Russian troops, when the Danubian campaign of 1853 commenced, are said to have wished that their leader had been Lüders rather than Gortchakoff. The latter has been severely handled by the foreign correspondents of some of the newspapers. 'Though of gainly person and aristocratic bearing, he is not able to look you full in the face with honest frankness; but, when speaking, eyes you askance, and turns away if you look on him. This peculiarity is very painful to Englishmen; but nothing is more common in Russia. . . . . It is generally his lot to be defeated in every combat; but, with sublime impudence, he claims the victory, and sings a *Te Deum* for it. He oppresses the people in whose country he is in the most atrocious way; yet makes them sign addresses, expressing profound gratitude for his humanity. He robs and pillages by wholesale, and yet pompously announces that his mission is to "protect" his victims. He audaciously accuses the enemy of needless severity, and yet issues orders of the day in which he recommends his men to be ruthless in slaughter. He pretends to despise religious fanaticism,' and yet makes his brutal army believe that St Sergius and the Panagia are leading them to victory. He affects a scrupulous love of truth, and yet gravely tells his men that if they are killed for the orthodox faith, they will rise again after three days in their native villages.' Severe as this language is, still the prince's conduct in the Principalities afterwards afforded justification for portions of it.

Gortchakoff's proclamation on entering Moldavia, adverted to in a former paragraph, was neither better nor worse than those which the elder Napoleon was wont to issue when he invaded the territories of others. An aggressor easily finds language to justify his aggression:—

'His majesty the emperor, my august lord and master, has ordered me to occupy your country with the armies the command of which he has deigned to confide to me.

'We come among you neither with projects of conquest nor with the intention to modify the institutions under which you live, or the political position which solemn treaties have guaranteed to you.

'The provisional occupation of the Principalities which I am ordered to effect, is for no other purpose than that of an immediate and efficacious protection in grave and unforeseen circumstances, when the Ottoman government, distrusting the numerous proofs of a sincere alliance which the imperial court has never ceased to give it since the conclusion of the Treaty of Adrianople, replies to our most equitable proposals with refusals, and opposes the most offensive suspicions to our disinterested advice.

'In his magnanimity, in his constant desire to maintain peace in the East as well as in Europe, the emperor will avoid an aggressive war against Turkey, so long as his dignity and the interests of his empire shall permit him to do so.

'On the day on which he obtains the reparation which is due to him, and the guarantees which he has a right to claim for the future, his troops shall return within the frontiers of Russia.

'Inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia, I also execute an order of his imperial majesty in declaring to you, that the presence of his majesty's troops in your country shall not impose on you any fresh charges or contributions; that the forage and rations for the troops shall in due time, and at a rate appointed and agreed on in advance by your governments, be paid for from our military treasury.

'Look tranquilly to the future! Engage with security in your agricultural labours and commercial speculations! Be obedient to the laws under which you live, and to the established authorities. It is by the faithful discharge of these duties that you will acquire the best claim to the generous solicitude and the powerful protection of his majesty the emperor.'

By reference to a map, it will be seen that the Danube separates the two Turkish provinces of Bulgaria and Wallachia throughout a distance of from 400 to 500 miles, from Orsova to Galatz; that the remaining course of the Danube, to the Black Sea, separates the Dobrudscha or Dobrudja district of Bulgaria from Moldavia and from the Russian province of Bessarabia; and that the Pruth enters the Danube near Galatz. In the first instance, the Russians did not cross the Danube into the Dobrudscha, but crossed the Pruth into Moldavia. The passages were made near the villages of Skouliany and Leova; and the troops quickly marched to Jassy or Yassy, the capital of Moldavia.

The Czar Nicholas had armed himself to the adoption of this step by the publication of a manifesto (June $\frac{14}{26}$),* in which he gives quite a religious tone to the motives which actuated his conduct. He professes his obligation, as head of the Greek orthodox church, to adopt stern measures against the sultan, on account of certain alleged infractions of agreements with the Christian subjects of the Porte; ambition, he declares, has no influence with him, nor does Russia either seek or need conquests. It was a manifesto calculated to rouse the religious fanaticism of his people; and in what this fanaticism consisted, may be seen from a

* It is frequently necessary, in Russian documents, to give a double date. This arises from the fact, that Russia still retains the Old Style, which England abandoned in 1752, and which has been abandoned by most other nations. June 14, in Russia, corresponds with June 26 in England. In any double date, the *earlier* of the two dates is Russian. A want of attention to these facts, gives rise to frequent mistakes on the part of English writers.

popular song which appeared at St Petersburg about that time, called the *Song of a Russian Warrior*. The following has been given as a prose translation of a part of this effusion:—'From the summit of the Balkan our brethren stretch out their hands to us with hope and prayer. Their sufferings are not unfelt by us. Russia has compassion on them, and goes forth to combat for them. It is *there* that our ancestors received the holy baptism, which rescued them from the darkness of idolatry. *There* is the sanctuary of our faith. It is *there* that the chalice of salvation restored them to life. The mother of orthodox Russia, Kief, holy and sublime city—is she not the god-daughter of Constantinople? These traditions are sacred to us. They contain the promise and the pledge of destinies which are gathering strength in silence. We go forth to chastise the proud, to avenge our altar, insulted by the impious. Burst forth, then, holy war! Let our cry, the precursor of victory, be raised! That cry is: "All for the God of Russia, for the Czar of the Russians!"' This may be said at once—that if the Russians were not destined to vanquish the Turks, it was through no want of fiery impulse given by the priesthood of the Russian Church; and it is equally apparent, from events which transpired about the same time on the other side of the Danube, that the Turks were in like manner worked up to excitement by the priests of Islam;* so much did this contest partake of the characteristics of that most sad of all conflicts—a religious war.

When the Russians entered Jassy, they found that much had been done to smooth their path—an address of homage to the czar had been prepared by the Russian emissaries in the city; and the Hospodar of Moldavia, Prince Ghika, was very lukewarm in his allegiance towards his master the sultan. In like manner, when Prince Gortchakoff, towards the close of July, made a journey of 160 miles from Jassy to Bucharest, the capital of Wallachia, he was received by a deputation of bishops and nobles, with obsequiousness and adulation. Whatever may be the state of opinion among the mass of the people, it is evident that the late czar—by means of stars, ribbons, snuff-boxes, swords, and pecuniary treasures more immediately useful—exercised a powerful influence over the minds of official persons in nearly all the countries which bordered his vast dominions; and, in respect to the Principalities, community of religious belief came in aid of this patronising spirit.

Before the Russians encountered any Turkish forces, they effected their worst in spoiling the mouth of the Danube. Of all the channels by which this river empties its waters into the Black Sea, the channel known as the Sulina Mouth is the only one practicable for large shipping. It was one of the evil consequences of the Treaty of Adrianople, signed in 1829, that the Sulina Mouth was made over by Turkey to Russia, with power to establish a quarantine station. This quarantine station has been so managed as to give Russia an effective control over the trade of the Danube. The Danube is the outlet for Austrian trade with the Black Sea and Constantinople; and Austria, interested in the maintenance of a clear channel, agreed to the possession by Russia of the Sulina Mouth, on condition that a sand-bar across the mouth should be kept constantly dredged and deepened. This condition Russia repeatedly evaded; and it had for years become pretty evident, that she was willing enough to benefit Odessa and the Dniester by contributing to stagnate Galatz and the Danube. Austria had long had much to complain of in this respect; but when Gortchakoff entered the Principalities, still more arbitrary measures were adopted to check the trade of the Danube. Although corn was sent down that river in such large quantities in July and August, that more than a thousand vessels were required for its further removal, yet these vessels were checked by Russian obstructions, and by the middle of September, a vast quantity of corn was accumulated, useless both to buyers and sellers.

Meanwhile the Russians assumed complete governing control in the Principalities; ordered the two hospodars, Ghika and Stirbey, to obey the czar and not the sultan; made contributions on the inhabitants; forced some of the younger men to serve in the Russian army; issued proclamations and decrees in the czar's name; and punished those who persisted in faithful allegiance to their Ottoman master. The czar, having gone too far to recede, made arrangements for strengthening his armies by a new levy of 7 in the 1000; and Gortchakoff, assured of reinforcements, became more and more arrogant in his proceedings. While at Bucharest, he issued a proclamation, in which it is difficult to see what difference was made between the Deity and the czar: 'Russia is called to annihilate paganism; and those who would oppose her in that sacred mission, shall be annihilated with the pagans! *Long life to the czar! Long life to the God of the Russians!*' Giurgevo, on the north bank of the Danube, opposite Rustchuk, was selected as the chief Russian camp; and by the months of September and October, many indications were presented of an intention on the part of the Russians to cross the Danube into Bulgaria.

In consequence of the proceedings of the Turkish government—presently to be noticed—Omar Pacha received orders to summon the Russian army to quit the Turkish territories. Accordingly, on or about 8th October, Omar Pacha wrote thus to Prince Gortchakoff:

'While the Sublime Porte has exhausted all means of conciliation to obtain at once peace and its own independence, the court of Russia has not ceased to raise difficulties in the way of any such settlement, and has ended with the violation of treaties—invading the two Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, integral parts of the Ottoman Empire.

* *Islam* ('salvation') is the name which Mohammedans give to their religion; it is their equivalent for our word *Mohammedanism*.

'True to its pacific system, the Porte, instead of exercising its right to make reprisals, confined itself even then to protesting, and did not deviate from the way that might lead to an arrangement.

'Russia, on the contrary, far from evincing corresponding sentiments, has ended by rejecting the proposals recommended by the august mediating courts — proposals which were alike necessary to the honour and to the security of the Porte. There only remains for the latter the indispensable necessity of war. But as the invasion of the Principalities, and the violation of treaties which has attended it, are the veritable causes of the war, the Sublime Porte, as a last expression of its pacific sentiments, proposes to your excellency, by my intervention, the evacuation of the two provinces; and grants for your decision a term of fifteen days, to date from the receipt of this letter. If within this interval a negative answer shall reach me from your excellency, the commencement of hostilities will be the natural consequence.'

Prince Gortchakoff's reply to Omar Pacha's missive was brief enough; it simply announced that the prince 'had no orders to commence hostilities, nor to conclude peace, nor to evacuate the Principalities.' It was tantamount to a refusal to discuss such matters with the Turkish generalissimo.

It now becomes necessary to consider what was the military position of Russia at that period; what amount of force she had poured into the Principalities, to secure her 'material guarantees;' what reserves were in store; and on what principle of organisation her military system was conducted.

The most discordant accounts have been written concerning the numerical strength of the Russian armies—some writers magnifying the force to nearly 1,500,000 men; while others enumerate so many causes of weakness, as to bring down the effective number to something under 400,000. As in most similar cases, the truth probably occupies a middle position between these extremes. The main bulk of the army is entirely recruited from serfs. When once a levy is made, and a peasant drawn for the army, the chances of his return to his native village in life and health are so few, that his relations take leave of him as one about to be removed from them for ever! His term of service is long, and during this term his hardships are many; for blows and scanty food, piercing cold and stagnant marshes, are too often the return for his fidelity to the czar his master. The infantry are formed into regiments of the line, the Guards, and the Grenadiers. These regiments are larger than with us, comprising frequently four battalions of 1000 men each. A Russian account, drawn up in 1853, gives the infantry of the active army at about 504,000; the cavalry, 63,000; the artillery, 20,000; the engineers, 13,000; besides this active or movable army of 600,000, there were enumerated the corps of invalids and criminals in the garrisons and hospitals, forming a stationary force of 90,000; the reserve of 250,000, formed to fill up gaps in the active army, and 60,000 irregulars. All these would form a military force of above 1,000,000, provided the numbers are not modified to suit the imperial views. Under ordinary circumstances, vacancies are filled up by an annual levy of 5 in 1000 of the male inhabitants within certain limits of age; these recruits are intended to replace those who fall in war, and those also—a mere fraction—who live to be discharged from the army after their term of service. But in times of exigency, such as those which occurred in 1853–4–5, the levies are more extensive and more frequent.

A diplomatic paper of some value gives the numbers and positions of several corps of the Russian army just before the Russians and Turks were about to come in collision. It was written by Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British ambassador at St Petersburg, apparently in reply to queries forwarded by the Earl of Clarendon. It is dated October 27, 1853; and the following is a portion of its contents:—'The disposition of the Russian forces, according to an account which your lordship may rely upon, is as follows. The fourth corps, composed of four divisions under the orders of Prince Gortchakoff and General Dannenberg, are quartered at and about Bucharest. This force hardly exceeds 60,000, comprising detached bodies of troops engaged in guarding the line of the Danube some 200 leagues in extent, from Widdin to Ismail. The three points of the Danube which are the most closely observed, as those at which the passage of a Turkish army is the most to be apprehended, are Widdin, Nicopoli, and Silistria. Prince Gortchakoff's reserves, formed of the third corps of 60,000, under the command of General Baron Osten-Sacken, are in cantonments between Kieff and the Pruth. The fifth corps, 60,000 strong, under General Lüders, are quartered about Odessa and in Bessarabia; it was the third division of this corps which was lately disembarked at Soucoum Kalé. The sixth corps, another body of 60,000 men, are at present quartered at Moscow. Two corps of cavalry of the reserve remain among their colonies at Krumenshuk and Kharkoff. The second corps, commanded by General Paniutine, is stationed in Poland. The first corps, under the orders of General Sievers, occupies the Baltic provinces and Lithuania. The Corps de la Garde, and that of the Grenadiers, each of 40,000 men, are quartered in the capital, at Novogorod, and Narva. The corps of the Caucasus, with its reserve division stationed at Taganrog, forms a force of 80,000 men. The troops in Mingrelia, under the command of General Beboutoff, which are destined to operate in Asia Minor, amount at present to 25,000. This force, however, can at any time be reinforced by detachments from the army of Prince Woronzow. I will only observe that the above statements, although meagre and incomplete,

are, as far as they go, worthy of confidence.'* To render some of these details intelligible, it may be well to remark that the Russian military forces are mostly grouped in corps, army corps, or corps d'armée, each comprising about 60,000 men, and each forming a complete and distinct army, with its due proportion of infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, guns, and stores of every kind.

According to the best accounts, the Russian troops which crossed the Pruth in July 1853 were the following:—

3 Infantry Divisions, of 16,000 men each,	= 48,000
2 Cavalry Divisions, ...	= 8,000
1 Infantry Brigade, ...	= 8,000
1 Battalion Chasseurs, ...	= 4,000
10 Cossack Regiments, of 600 men each,	= 6,000
Total, ...	74,000

An infantry division in the Russian army, it may here be observed, has two brigades, each brigade two regiments, and each regiment 4000 men. Each regiment has a battery of 12 guns; so that the above force was probably accompanied by about 260 guns. A few thousands more crossed the Pruth in August, making the total number about 80,000—that is, supposing the regiments had their full complement, and making no deductions for those who fell by the way, under the influence of cholera and fever. The troops belonged chiefly to the fourth army corps; and the principal officers under Prince Gortchakoff were Lüders, Dannenberg, Simonoff, Perloff, Liprandi, Nirod, Sixtel, Möller, Engelhardt, and Fischbach. These names will shew how largely the Russian army is officered by Germans, and may serve to explain the leaning of German military men towards the czar and Russia.

The Russian soldiers, it is easy to conceive, have few home-sympathies to warm their hearts after they once enter the army. They are drawn for twenty-five years of service; but after ten or fifteen years, they are withdrawn from the active to the reserve battalions or squadrons of their regiment. As a reserve, they are restored to a certain amount of liberty; but the old ties have been severed, the poor men lead a vagabond sort of life, and they are liable to be called upon for further service in times of exigency. Germain de Lagny says: 'When a man is once enlisted, the brutality of his instructors, the cruelty of his officers, the privations of every description which he has to undergo, and the passive, animal-like submission to the requirements of a torturing system of discipline, soon reduce him to the level of a mere walking-machine. At the expiration of twenty-five years' service. . . . . the state owes him nothing, and gives him nothing, except the liberty of providing, in any manner he can, for his own support and that of his family. If he is merely lame or deaf, he becomes a fireman or a breaker of stones upon the highways . . . . . Most of the men, on their discharge, become ostlers, porters, or beggars. Some drag out a miserable existence of suffering along the public roads, in the endeavour to regain the village in which they were born.'*

Russian Soldiers.

Bad as this system may be, it behoves Englishmen to be cautious in condemning it, until the discharged soldiers of their own country are better provided for than has hitherto been the case.

At the end of October, the Russian troops had spread throughout the two Principalities, and had penetrated to the north bank of the Danube. Here we must leave them a while, and attend to the course of events in the trans-Danubian provinces.

TURKISH PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, UNDER OMAR PACHA.

While Gortchakoff was thus advancing to the Danube, many agitating scenes were occurring in the Turkish metropolis.

The departure of Prince Menchikoff from Constantinople, with all the indications of offended hauteur and disappointed diplomacy, was of course a grave event in the eyes of the Turkish ministers and their sultan, and not less so in the estimation of the ambassadors from the different European courts. All felt that there was a machine under their

* Parliamentary Papers on Eastern Affairs. Part II. p. 212.

* *The Knout and the Russians*, p. 35.

guidance in a very fragile and dislocated condition; that this machine would be sadly shaken by any actual conflict with so powerful a neighbour as Russia; that it would be desirable to stave off the evil day as long as possible; and that it would be a duty to allay, rather than excite the passions of the people. Many writers have since asserted, that if the Turkish government had been left to itself untrammelled by advice from the Allied ambassadors, Menchikoff's demands would probably have been complied with. It may be so; but Turkey would in that case have assuredly been more bound in shackles than ever, and the Russian Colossus would have made one more step towards the planting of his foot upon Constantinople.*

It soon appeared, that had the mild-tempered sultan been ever so peacefully disposed at that period, he would scarcely have been permitted to succumb: his own subjects would have risen against him. On the 28th of May—Menchikoff having departed on the 21st—the Turkish government sent an official note to the several embassies of the foreign powers, explaining the circumstances which had arisen. The note expressed the sultan's acquiescence in the Menchikoff demands respecting the Holy Places; it announced the sultan's determination to issue a firman, consolidating and securing the privileges of the Greek Church throughout the Turkish Empire; it stated that Russia had insisted upon an express treaty with her, and her alone, binding the sultan to these new arrangements; but it shewed how inconsistent this would be with the dignity and independence of the empire. 'However great,' the note argues, 'may be the desire of the porte to cherish and preserve more and more the most amicable relations with Russia, she can never engage herself by such a guarantee towards a foreign government, either concluding with it a treaty, or signing a simply official note, without compromising gravely her independence and the most fundamental rights of the sultan over his own subjects.' The sultan shewed his good faith by issuing, a few days later, the firman in question, addressed to the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople, and confirming certain rights and immunities to the Christian subjects of the Porte. A diplomatic correspondence ensued between Reshid Pacha on the part of Turkey, and Count Nesselrode on the part of Russia; but it soon became evident that the departure of Menchikoff was a sign of warlike intentions. It was in Nesselrode's note, of the 31st of May, that 'material guarantees' were spoken of as the only means of averting war: and it is now known that warlike preparations had been commenced even before that date.

When the crossing of the Pruth by the Russians became known at Constantinople, the news caused great excitement. Reshid Pacha and Mustapha Pacha, two ministers who had endeavoured to bring about a peaceful result by negotiation, became at once unpopular; the sultan was urged to dismiss them, and was only prevented from so doing by the strong expostulations of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. The Porte issued (14th July) a formal protest against the invasion of the Principalities, characterising that invasion as a virtual declaration of war, and refusing to submit to it as a menace. The war-party in the Divan, or Grand Council at Constantinople, headed by Mehemet Ali the seraskier, were desirous to precipitate matters, against the advice of Reshid Pacha and the peace-party.

It may be useful here to explain, that the terms 'Divan,' 'Porte,' 'Sublime Porte,' are used conventionally for the great council of the empire, or for the ministry, as we should call it in England. This council is formed by the grand vizier, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the seraskier, the capudan pacha, and other great officers of state, equivalent in some respects to the members of the Privy Council in England. These dignitaries meet twice a week, in ordinary times, at the house and under the presidency of the grand vizier, who may be regarded as the prime-minister, to discuss and settle the general affairs of the government; but on special occasions, some of the higher members form a secret or cabinet council, to decide matters of urgency. There are ten subordinate councils, presided over respectively by the Ministers of Instruction, Justice, War, Foreign Affairs, &c.; and each comprising several members; but the principal ministers alone form the Grand Council, or Divan.

On one occasion, after the rupture, but before the declaration of war, the council was assembled, when a body of about forty *softas*, or students of the Koran, appeared and demanded admission to the council-chamber. On being admitted, they presented a petition asking for war: it was in some sort a fanatic petition, for it was signed by ulemas and softas—Moslem haters of all forms of Christianity. It has been one of the unhappy features of this war, that however just as between the sultan and his would-be oppressor the czar, it has roused the fiery zeal, and has indeed been in great part caused by the fiery zeal, of the followers both of the Crescent and the Cross. The petition presented to the council contained many quotations from the Koran, enjoining war against the enemies of Islam; and its prayer hinted at threats of disturbance, if war were longer delayed. If any of the ministers expostulated, they were met with the answer: 'Here are the words of the Koran. If you are Mussulmans, you are bound to obey. You are now listening to foreign and infidel ambassadors, who are the enemies of the faith; we are the children of the Prophet; we have an army, and that army cries out with us for war, to avenge the insults which the giaours have heaped upon us.'

A grand council of a special nature was

* 'Quand le Colosse Russe aura un pied aux Dardanelles, un autre sur le Sund, le vieux monde sera esclave, la liberté aura fui en Amérique: chimère aujourd'hui pour les esprits bornés, ces tristes previsions seront un jour cruellement réalisées; car l'Europe, maladroitement divisée, comme les villes de la Grèce devant les rois de Macedoine, aura probablement le même sort.'—THIERS, *Du Consulat et de l'Empire.*

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summoned, to be held at the sultan's palace on the 25th of September, composed of the chief notabilities of the empire. It was called upon to decide, whether a mode of mediation, proposed by the ambassadors —the celebrated 'Vienna Note,' which will come under consideration in a later page—should be accepted or rejected. The decision was unanimous, that the Divan should take what may be called a high tone in the matter; and this decision was communicated to the representatives of the four powers. On the next day, the council again met, and presented to the sultan a series of resolute decisions, tending to bring matters to a crisis with Russia.

The state of feeling in Constantinople at that time was, indeed, one of great excitement; and the sultan was forced onward by a pressure too strong to be resisted. Abdul-Medjid has few of those characteristics which correspond with the popular notion of a Turk: he is a quiet, somewhat indolent, well-meaning man, who would fain allow the world to go on smoothly without much interference on his part. The Earl of Carlisle, who saw the sultan in 1853, says of him: 'He looks pale, old for his age—about thirty-one, I believe—and he has lately grown corpulent. The impression his aspect conveys is of a man gentle, unassuming, feeble, unstrung, doomed; no energy of purpose gleamed in that passive glance; no augury of victory sat on that still brow.'* The sultan, as suzerain over the Pacha of Egypt, had called upon him for his contingent of troops; and this call had been responded to many weeks before the actual commencement of hostilities. An Egyptian fleet arrived at Constantinople as early as the middle of July, with a force of 12,000 troops. Turcoman chiefs had arrived, also, from Asia Minor, roused by the apprehended danger to Islam, and had offered to bring vast reinforcements of the wild and turbulent spirits whom they had under their command. Day after day, assemblages of the people took place in the streets and squares of the metropolis; and warlike cries were echoed from one to another. On one occasion, the ulemas and softas excited the people to such a degree that the sultan became alarmed; he feared for the safety of himself and his capital; and he requested the English and French ambassadors to send for two or three of their ships, which were at that time stationed a little without or southward of the Dardanelles. This was done; and there was presented the strange spectacle of six war-frigates, three French and three English, moored in the Bosphorus, and intended to protect an unwarlike sultan from his warlike subjects.

With or without the desire of the sultan, war approached. A levy of 80,000 men was made early in September; and troops gradually concentrated in great number in and near Constantinople. Under the old Turkish system, before Sultan Mahmoud, father of Abdul-Medjid, had begun to introduce his army reforms, whenever the Porte declared war, all the inhabitants of each district, between the ages of sixteen and sixty, were summoned to join the standards of their respective pachas, and to rendezvous at a certain place. Those who liked the war, and liked their commanders, joined the army, but were under no obligation to serve throughout a campaign; they remained, or returned home, as their inclination directed. Even the Janissaries did the same; and also the Spahis, or cavalry. This, in truth, is the very spirit of Oriental warfare. Under the modern system, however, by which a standing army has been formed on the European model, a levy or conscription is conducted on definite rules, and each soldier becomes bound for a certain time.

At length, on the 4th of October, the sultan issued a manifesto; and on the following day, a declaration of war against Russia was published in Constantinople. In this declaration, all the main points of the quarrel are touched upon—the desire of Turkey to remain at peace; the demands of Russia concerning the Holy Places; the unreasonable tone in which those demands were made; the founding of new claims respecting the Greek Church, after the question of the Holy Places had been apparently settled; the seizure of the Principalities as a 'material guarantee;' the 'Vienna Note,' and its conditions; the evident desire of Russia that the terms of that note should be left vague, in order that she might interpret them as she pleased; and the necessity thence arising that Turkey should repel aggression by force of arms. A singular proof was afforded of the degree in which Turkey now conforms to the usages of European nations, in comparison with the system of past days. Sir James Porter was British ambassador at Constantinople exactly a century ago; and Sir George Larpent, in his recent publication of Porter's manuscripts,* gives the ambassador's account of the Turkish mode of declaring war in those days: 'When the Turks have formed a resolution to declare war against any power, they discover their resentment immediately by their treatment of its minister; they imagine that, by insulting his person, they affront the crowned head that has offended them; and consider him an hostage in their hands, whom they must secure. Their constant practice has been to imprison them in the Seven Towers.' Compare the above with the following paragraph, in the declaration of war in 1853:—'It is distinctly to be understood, that should the reply of Prince Gortchakoff (to the demand for the evacuation of the Principalities) be negative, the Russian agents are to quit the Ottoman states, and that the commercial relations of the respective subjects of the two governments shall be broken off. At the same time, the Sublime Porte will not consider it just to lay an embargo upon Russian merchant-vessels, as has been the

* *Diary in Turkish and Greek Waters*, p. 62.

* *Turkey; its History and Progress.*

practice. Consequently, they will be warned to resort either to the Black Sea, or to the Mediterranean Sea, as they shall see fit, within a term which shall hereafter be fixed. Moreover, the Ottoman government, being unwilling to place hinderances in the way of commercial intercourse between the subjects of friendly powers, will, during the war, leave the straits open to their mercantile marine.'

No sooner was war thus declared, than Constantinople became wild with excitement. The declaration or manifesto was read in all the mosques, and was received with great enthusiasm. Wealthy Turks at once made large contributions to the national treasury, to enable the sultan to bear the expenses of the war; and some offered to clothe and equip bodies of troops. The Bosphorus was alive with caïques, or boats, bringing over Turcomans and Bashi-Bazouks from Asia—picturesque ragged rascals, who would certainly fight for Islam, but who had a keen eye for plunder whenever opportunity should offer. It was a strange sight at Constantinople in October; Turcomans, Koords, Arabs, armed with scimitars, bows and arrows, and lances, roamed about the streets, bringing back the past scenes of the fifteenth century, when the Osmanli* conquered Constantinople; and these contrasted with the picturesque Albanian, and the Europeanised Nizam, or regular troops.

It now becomes necessary to notice the Turkish army, its numbers and its organisation. Russia, as has been seen, has at command an armed force of vast amount, even if we take the lowest of many different estimates; and it is interesting to know how far Turkey is capable of meeting her formidable neighbour in the field. Turkey, besides difficulties of other kinds, has had to contend with that of substituting a European for an Asiatic organisation of her armies.

The modern reforms, or attempts at reform, in Turkey, are closely associated with the terrible massacre of the Janissaries in bygone years—that coup d'état which, like some other coups d'état, has been often regarded as a necessary though violent cure for a social malady. The Janissaries were, for the most part, chosen from the robust Moslems of Bosnia and Albania; and they gradually acquired, through the favour of successive sultans, such an enormous military power, as virtually to rule the whole empire; for the Janissaries had more concern than any other persons in the setting up and pulling down of sultans. The existence of this troop of body-guards rendered the Turkish government unfitted for any amalgamation with the powers of Christian nations. The Divan could promise nothing with certainty, for the Janissaries could revoke its decisions; and it could accomplish no reforms which interfered with the immunities, or offended the prejudices, of this powerful body. They usurped the chief appointments of the government, holding or conferring them nearly as they pleased; and they inspired much terror in the population by their lawlessness and cruelty. When, therefore, the late Sultan Mahmoud began to play the part of an Osmanli Peter the Great, reforming and civilising his subjects whether they would or not, he found the Janissaries the first great bar to his progress. These men were medieval rather than modern soldiers, and they gradually found themselves eclipsed in strategy and tactics by soldiers who had studied the modern art of war. The sultan resolved on the re-organisation of his army on the European model; the Janissaries refused to submit; and hence arose a choice between two evils—either to see the state crumble to pieces, or to crush this unmanageable body. The sultan chose the latter alternative, and achieved his work in a tragical way: he caused nearly the whole of the Janissaries, 25,000 in number, to be massacred in June 1825; and thus ended a military corps which had existed during four centuries and a half. The Nizam Djedid, or Europeanised troops, triumphed over the Janissaries, who refused to be Europeanised.

Most writers agree in opinion that this destruction, terrible though it was, has been salutary to Turkey. The road was cleared for the introduction of measures which could alone secure the existence of a tottering empire. Since this change, the Turkish troops, if well commanded, have shewn that they can adapt themselves to European discipline without losing their old bravery. The Divan regained the power, which it had so long virtually lost by the arrogant assumption of the Janissaries, of guiding its own councils, and organising its own army. But Turkey has, nevertheless, suffered in many ways by this sudden and startling act. As soon as the Janissaries were despatched, Sultan Mahmoud resolved to carry out his schemes of reform in costume, usages, tactics, and conscription. These reforms were repugnant to Moslem feeling. The Osmanli saw no reason why he should not continue to fight the infidel in the same manner as before, and he long and stubbornly resisted the sultan's European tendency. The new regulations were often enforced at the point of the bayonet, and many a bloody scene was the consequence. It is, moreover, to be observed that, after the massacre of the Janissaries, there was scarcely a Mussulman family in Bosnia and Albania who had not to deplore the loss of some relative; and there thence arose a deadly hatred against the government in those pachaliks. How that hatred shewed itself, may be easily explained. Whatever may have been the despotic arrogance of the Janissaries, they were always ready to defend the Ottoman Empire from enemies, whether Russian or any other. When, however, the tragedy had been fulfilled, the state of things became changed. The few who fled, and saved their lives, raised to a greater pitch of fury the relatives of those who had fallen; while a host of fanatic Mussulman priests went about everywhere exciting the people to vengeance

* *Osmanli* and *Ottoman* are nearly equivalent terms, derived from *Osman* or *Othman*, who founded the present Turkish dynasty about a century before the Turks captured Constantinople.

against the reforming sultan. When the Russians invaded Turkey in 1828-9, the fruit of these discontents shewed itself plainly; for the sultan in vain endeavoured to persuade the Mussulmans of Bosnia and Albania to take up arms against the giaour—the Czar of Russia; for they deemed the sultan himself little better than a giaour—an enemy to the true faith. Much of Omar Pacha's military skill has been exerted in quelling disturbances among these people; and Turkey yet feels the opposition of those Moslems who, being what we might term Tories in their creed, have never relished the Radical or reforming tendencies of Sultan Mahmoud. It is one of the many strange things in Turkey, that the Slavon Moslems of Bosnia—those who were Slavonic Christians a few centuries ago—are more bigoted in their faith and usages than even the regular Turks themselves—the Moslems of the race of Osman.

The old or unreformed Turkish army comprised the Spahis and the Janissaries, highly favoured cavalry and infantry bodies; together with a larger number of troops of inferior grade. The campaigning tactics were based on the plan of sending forth the humbler troops to bear the burden and bloodshed of the contest, and then winning the day by a terrible onslaught with the Spahis and Janissaries, who came fresh upon an exhausted enemy. It was this impetuous mode of attack with the choice reserve corps which gained so many victories for the Osmanlis in past ages. When the modern European infantry system became perfected, and a line of troops steadily met with the bayonet the fierce attack of any horse-troops whatever, then did the Oriental system of the Turks cease to produce its wonted and wonderful results.

Under the influence of the reforms wrought by Sultans Mahmoud and Abdul-Medjid, the Turkish army has assumed a state partaking both of the European and the Oriental. In the first place, the bulk of the active army is grouped in six *ordus*, or divisions, each of which constitutes a kind of small army in itself. In a state of peace, these six divisions are located in as many different parts of the wide-spreading empire—from the Hungarian frontier in the north-west, to Mesopotamia in the south-east; but, in a state of war, these locations would of course be modified. The division stationed at or near Constantinople is treated as a kind of Imperial Guard, and is better trained, clothed, and armed than the rest. This organisation into six camps, army corps, or divisions, was completed in 1843; and the six armies so formed constitute the *Nizam*, or regular troops. The men are engaged for five years, after which they may retire to their homes; but at any time during the next seven years, they are liable to be called out to active duty as a reserve corps, under the name of the *Rêdif*. It will be useful to bear in mind this relation between the Nizam and the Rédif. The government provides directly for all the wants of the soldiers; and, according to M. Ubicini, each man receives, in addition to the different articles necessary for his equipment, daily rations of the following amounts:—

300	dirhems,	=	2½ lbs. bread,
80	"	=	8½ oz. meat,
15	"	=	1½ oz. butter,
23	"	=	2⅔ oz. rice,
6	"	=	½ oz. salt,
			1 lb. vegetables.

Each ordu, or army, is commanded by a *mushir* (field-marshal); it has two corps, each under a *ferik* (general of division); each corps has three brigades, under as many *livas* (generals of brigade). The *seraskier pacha* is commander-in-chief of the whole six ordus collectively. Each ordu comprises 6 regiments of infantry, 4 of cavalry, and 1 of artillery; and amounts, when complete, to about 21,000 men. Each infantry regiment has 4 battalions, of 8 companies each; the colonel of each regiment is a *mir alaï*, while the commandant of each battalion is called a *bin-bashi*. The cavalry regiments consist of 6 squadrons each. The artillery regiments each comprise 70 guns.

So far as the theory of this organisation is concerned, it seems to be well conceived. Each ordu, or complete army, has its own distinct store of matériel; besides its tents and stores, it has a triple supply of ammunition. The Rédif is divided into ordus as well as the Nizam; each army corps of active troops having its own reserve or rédif, marshalled into regiments, battalions, squadrons, and companies, and commanded by a staff of officers. The rédif assembles once a month at the head-quarters of its ordu; and its officers are under the direct control of the mushir of the ordu. Hence it follows, that the rédif is nearly equivalent to another army, and raises the total force of each ordu or army to something like 40,000 men.

But the nizam and the rédif do not constitute the whole force of the Turkish army. There are four central corps of artillery, together about 5200 strong; there is a brigade of engineers, about 1600; there are detached corps at Crete, Tripoli, and Tunis, 16,000; there are the *Auxiliary* troops, which vary in amount according to the willingness of the pachas of the respective provinces to assist their sultan in times of difficulty; there are the *Irregular* troops, consisting of the semi-barbarous Bashi-Bazouks and other wild adventurers, who are with difficulty brought under subjection to European discipline. It is a remarkable element in the recent reforms, too, that a very efficient Turkish constabulary or police has been formed. They serve as a permanent guard whenever the ordu has to leave its appointed location. The whole constabulary is divided into brigades; each brigade into companies, officered by captains; and each company into detachments, under sergeants. The territorial arrangement is such, that every *eyalet*, or great division of the empire, has a constabulary brigade; every province in each eyalet has a constabulary company; and every

department in each province has a constabulary detachment. The constables are all well mounted and armed, and they form collectively a valuable body of 30,000 men—presenting some points of resemblance to the constabulary force in Ireland.

A rough estimate has been made, that these several bodies of armed defenders of the Ottoman Empire may, in their fullest organisation, present something like the following numbers:—

The Nizam,	=	150,000
" Redif,	=	150,000
" Auxiliaries,	=	120,000
" Irregulars,	=	90,000
" Constabulary,	=	30,000
Total,		540,000

But this, like many other armies on paper, differs widely from the number which the sultan could actually make available at any given time. The sultan would have as much difficulty in raising and maintaining 300,000 as the czar in raising and maintaining 1,000,000—perhaps more. The Ottoman government made two levies during the course of the summer and autumn of 1853, and called upon its various tributary pachas to come forth in defence of Islam. Troops gradually concentrated towards the Danube, as the line of operation most threatened by Russia; and an endeavour was made to mark out a course of strategy for the defence of the principal towns in Bulgaria. What attitude England and France assumed at this time, with their powerful fleets near at hand but doing nothing, will come for consideration in a future chapter. All we have at present to bear in mind is, that Turkey entered upon the contest single-handed.

Who was the general selected by the czar to manage the Danubian campaign, has been stated; and it now becomes desirable to glance similarly at Gortchakoff's antagonist, Omar Pacha, a much more remarkable man—remarkable for his change of nationality, his change of religion, his cool bravery, his unquestioned skill as a military leader, and the success which has almost uniformly attended his movements in the field.

Omar Pacha's career has indeed been a strange one. Born at the village of Vlaski, in Croatia, in 1801, he was an Austrian subject. His name was Lattas, and his father was administrator-general of the circle of Ogulini. He studied while a youth in the school of mathematics at Thurm, in Transylvania; and then entered the Austrian military corps of Ponts et Chaussées. The young man, Michael Lattas, wrote well and quickly, and had a competent knowledge of mathematics; but after filling a clerkship in two government offices, he quarrelled with his rulers and his religion; passed over the frontier into Turkey in 1830, and became a Mohammedan. The reasons for these changes do not appear to be well known. He became clerk to a Turkish trader at Widdin; and under the Oriental name of Omar, he next became tutor in a wealthy family—his knowledge of the Servian, Italian, and German languages being of great service to him. When his patron removed to Constantinople, Omar gradually learned the Turkish language, and by degrees became acquainted with military men. He obtained a situation in one of the military schools established by the late Sultan Mahmoud; and in this situation he attracted the attention of Khosrou Pacha, the sultan's right-hand man in the military reforms then in progress. The old pacha admitted him into the army, made him his aid-de-camp, and got him the appointment of writing-master to the future sultan, Abdul-Medjid, then a boy. Omar soon afterwards married Khosrou's ward—a daughter of one of the last of the Janissaries. He threw himself energetically into the army reforms planned by the sultan, first as chief of battalion, and then as aid-de-camp and interpreter to General Chzanowski, who instructed the Turkish troops in European tactics at Constantinople. Ever active, he was next employed in superintending a topographical survey in Bulgaria and Wallachia—an apprenticeship which proved to be of immense service to him when he had to manage a Danubian campaign in later years. He was a lieutenant-colonel when Abdul-Medjid came to the throne in 1839; but he was rapidly promoted to the offices of colonel and major-general. Up to this time he had seen no service in the field; but between 1840 and 1847, he was employed in quelling insurrections in Syria, Albania, and Bosnia—insurrections from which Turkey is seldom free more than a few months at a time. His services in this way brought him the honours of lieutenant-general and pacha. In 1848, he had a delicate mission, partly military and partly diplomatic, in the Principalities; and his imperial master signified his approval of his services, by conferring on him the dignity of mushir. In 1851, when the Moslem inhabitants of Bosnia refused to bend to the reforming tendencies of the sultan, Omar—now Omar Pacha—was sent against them; and both in Bosnia and Montenegro he displayed great military abilities. When the troubles broke out with Russia in 1853, Omar was appointed generalissimo of the Turkish army; and worthy did he afterwards prove himself of the choice. There is a remarkable mixture of the Oriental and the cultivated European in Omar. The author of the *Frontier Lands of the Christian and the Turk* thus speaks of Omar and his family, whom he met during the Bosnian campaign of 1851: 'I stayed the whole day at the camp with his officers, who shewed me every possible attention in their tents. When the retreat was beat, the whole troops turned out, and gave three cheers of, "Padishah chok yasha!" and I then returned to town. On my way, I met Omar Pacha in a small open carriage, drawn by four very handsome Hungarian horses, with his little daughter Eminé on his knee, and a brilliant staff following him on horseback. His wife and her mother occupied a chariot-and-four; and a calèche came next, with the daughter's French governess, the wife's German lady's-maid,

and two female slaves; and the cortége was closed by armed retainers of the pacha on horseback, and a half squadron of lancers. They were taking their usual evening exercise "on the slopes." Eminé is a pretty child of nine years old, already betrothed to the son of a distinguished Turkish statesman. Omar Pacha's wife is young, fair-haired, and good-looking, as far as I could judge through the semi-transparent yashmak.'

At the end of October 1853, then, a Russian army under Prince Gortchakoff, and a Turkish army under Omar Pacha, met face to face on the opposite banks of the Danube.

The Holy Sepulchre.

CHAPTER II.

CAMPAIGN ON THE DANUBE IN 1853-4.

THE campaign on the Danube in 1853-4 will ever remain an honourable memento for the Turks. Theirs were the efforts; theirs the strategy; theirs the danger; theirs the success; and theirs also should be the praise. The English and French —the one powerful by sea, and the other by land—were dancing attendance on the diplomatists, striving to stem the torrent of Russian aggression by paper missives. How this was manifested, and by what steps English and French troops were drawn upon Turkish soil, will be explained in the next chapter. The present is of right devoted to the Turks, who fought well before any allies came to their aid.

Omar Pacha, as has already been stated, was commissioned by his sultan to manage the important strategetical operations necessary in a contest with so formidable an opponent as Russia. The formation of a plan partly preceded, partly followed, the actual termination of peace. The formal declaration of war by Turkey on the 5th of October, was a document of considerable length; for it entered into various particulars and reasonings, intended to justify the course which the Porte felt compelled to pursue. The Russian declaration in reply to it, given in the *Gazette de St Petersburg*, was more brief, and was couched as follows:—'By the grace of God, we, Nicholas I., Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russians, &c., make known as follows: By our manifesto of the $\frac{14}{26}$ of June, in the present year, we made known to our faithful and dearly beloved subjects the motives which had placed us under the obligation of demanding from the Ottoman Porte inviolable guarantees in favour of the sacred right of the orthodox church. We also announced to them, that all our efforts to recall the Porte, by means of amicable persuasion, to sentiments of equity, and to the faithful observance of treaties, had remained unfruitful, and that we had consequently deemed it indispensable to cause our troops to advance into the Danubian Principalities; but in taking this step, we still entertained the hope that the Porte would acknowledge its wrong-doings, and would decide on acceding to our just demands. Our expectation has been frustrated. Even the chief powers of Europe have sought in vain, by their exhortations, to shake the blind obstinacy of the Ottoman government. It is by a declaration of war, by a proclamation filled with lying accusations against Russia, that it has responded to the pacific efforts of Europe, as well as to our spirit of long-suffering. At last, enrolling in the ranks of its army revolutionary exiles from all countries, the Porte has just commenced hostilities on the Danube. Russia is challenged to the combat; and she has no other course left her than, putting her trust in God, to have recourse to force of arms, and so compel the Ottoman government to respect treaties, and to obtain reparation for the insults with which it has responded to our most moderate demands, and to our most legitimate solicitude for the defence of the orthodox faith in the East, professed also by the people of Russia. We are firmly convinced that our faithful subjects will join their prayers to those which we address to the Almighty, beseeching Him to bless with His hand our arms in this just and holy cause, which has always found ardent defenders in our ancestors. —Done at Czarskoe-Selo, the 20th day of October (1st of November), in the year of grace 1853, and the twenty-eighth of our reign.—NICHOLAS.'

Russia thus stated that to be white which Turkey had designated black, and *vice versâ;* but such is almost necessarily the case in declarations and counter-declarations of war. Czarskoe-Selo, it may here be mentioned, is the name of one of the czar's residences, a few miles south of St Petersburg.

In tracing the events of the campaign which followed these two declarations, it may be well to describe, first, the materials with which Omar Pacha had to work, and the field whereon his operations had to be conducted.

FORCES AND STRATEGY OF OMAR PACHA.

The Turkish army, it will be remembered, is composed of five *ordus*—the Nizam, or regiments of the line; the Rédif, or reserve; the Auxiliaries, furnished by the nearly independent tributary pachas; the Irregulars, from any and every source; and the Constabulary.

The amount of the Turkish forces at the time when Omar Pacha took the field was estimated as

follows:—There were about 120,000 men in Bulgaria, between the Balkan and the Danube; 15,000 in Bosnia and the north-western provinces of the empire; 6000 on the Servian frontier; 50,000 in Roumelia, around Adrianople; and from 80,000 to 100,000 in Asia—making a total of about a quarter of a million under arms. There was a busy military spirit at work at the time; for arrangements were being made for embodying

Turkish Soldiers.

50,000 of the rédif, to be stationed around Constantinople and one or two other chosen points. All was enthusiasm: the arsenals produced in one week the cannon, muskets, and ammunition for the 50,000 rédif; Constantinople supplied in one day all the horses for the rédif cavalry; and the men themselves came forward with the utmost promptness to fight for Islam and the sultan. In addition to this, patriotic gifts poured in from all quarters—jewels, money, horses, houses, lands. Such, indeed, seems also to have been the case in Russia, in support of the antagonistic cause.

Since the hatti-shérif of Gulhané, which introduced many army reforms in 1839, and especially since the decree of 1843, which remodelled the army on the French system, the Turkish regular infantry have worn a neat and simple uniform, widely different from the ample flowing garments of the poetical Turk—the Turk of our books and pictures and dramas. The dress consists of blue trousers; a single-breasted round jacket of coarse cloth; a red front to the collar, and red edges to the cuffs; and white cross-belts. There are two or three drawbacks in respect to this dress. In the first place, the shoes are of a very slipshod character—an imperfect hybrid between the European and the Asiatic. In the second place, trouser-straps are worn—always embarrassing to a soldier, and particularly inconvenient to men whose religion requires that they should take off their shoes on entering a mosque. In the third place, the fez—the red brimless hat or cap—must assuredly be very unsuitable for a sunny climate. This fez is heartily abused by Europeans. M. Golovin says: 'The turban gives more expression to the eyes. Our hats are ridiculous; but the fez worn by the Turkish army is still worse—neither protecting the eyes from the sun, nor the head from the enemy's sword.' Nor is Captain Spencer in any degree better disposed towards it: 'Among all the various coverings for the head, it is at once the most inconvenient and the least graceful; as it generally rests on the ears, and has the effect of pressing them down till they become a deformity. As a protection against the heat, cold, or rain, it is of no use whatever: in summer, the face is broiled; and when it rains, unless you are provided with a capote, it serves admirably to conduct a stream of water down the neck of the wearer.'

English officers have remarked, that the Turkish soldiers appear stiff and uncomfortable in their new dress when well looked after, slovenly when not. The change has perhaps been too sudden from Oriental to European costume. The regular cavalry and artillery corps are attired somewhat on the same principle as the infantry. The rédif, when organised as a reserve corps to each ordu of the nizam, as also the constabulary, are similarly Europeanised. The Bashi-Bazouks, and other auxiliaries and irregulars, exhibit far different characteristics.

A picture of the Bashi-Bazouk has been painted in words, strongly coloured, though not very flattering: 'He is a dark-brown, wild-looking fellow, in golden clothes—a modern captain of a Free Company. His arms are a wonder of expensive uselessness. The settings of his pistols are perhaps solid silver, or silver-gilt, inlaid with precious stones, but their barrels were probably made by some clumsy Greek armourer during the War of Independence; their locks are on the old flint-and-steel principle, and bad of their kind; yet the treacherous flint is, of course, fixed in a silver holder, and the worthless lock has very likely a thumping turquoise stuck rudely on it.' So much for his arms; now for his dress: 'The fellow is a barbarian, and looks like it. He is tawdry, loose, and dirty beyond belief. He is fierce, selfish, and greedy, to an equal degree. He is clumsy and awkward. His gorgeous clothes seem to be thrown on rather than put on, and his apparel presents the same odd contrasts as his mind. He comes from some far-away country—from the mountains of Karamania or Albania, from Syria or where not—so that he does not comply with the modern fashion of the Turks at Constantinople, and cover his head merely with a red cap; but he twines an

immense shawl in picturesque folds round and round it, till he looks, when sitting down, like a gigantic mushroom.... An immense sash of thick silk is wound many times round his loins, and again above it is girded a broad thick red leathern belt, with pockets and receptacles for arms. This makes a capital support for a man who sometimes passes twenty hours on horseback at a time, and who never saw a chair with a back to it. His pistols and silver-sheathed sword—as splendid and untrustworthy as the pistols—stick out so far both before and behind, that he could hardly wear a long coat, or button even a short one. His waistcoat, therefore, is one dirty blaze of bad embroidery in front, and he has also embroidered sleeves to it; while his jacket is made somewhat on the principle

Bashi-Bazouks.

of our hussar's—save that it covers both shoulders—that is to say, the large open fantastic sleeves hang down behind, like a fanciful pair of golden wings. His breeches are also embroidered, and they appear at first sight too short, for they fasten far above the knee, and leave the hinges of the leg as free as a Highlander's, and probably for the same reason. From the commencement of the calf of the leg down to the ankle, the limb is bandaged as tightly as strength can bandage it; it is bandaged till the leg becomes as hard, as shapeless, and almost as thin as a broomstick. Over the bandages he wears leggings of the same eternal gold tinsel, confined by long, gay, flaunting garters of scarlet silk. His shoes are curiously old and frail; he kicks them off, therefore, at every opportunity, and curls his legs under him.' If the personal characteristics of the Bashi-Bazouk be correctly portrayed, he must be a doubtful auxiliary in any army. A general ill supplied with a commissariat might, it is true, value one of whom it is said that he 'is abstemious almost to contempt of daily food: a few grapes or olives, according to the season, a lump of coarse black bread, a few onions, and a little unsweetened coffee, is all he cares for:' but, on the other hand, 'he has none of the virtues or vices of a soldier. He avoids fighting whenever it is possible, and will think it an extremely proper thing to decamp on the approach of danger. His idea of the duties of the military profession is firing felon shots with a long rusty gun, from a rock on the sea-coast, or a tree by the way-side. His glory is to surprise and butcher the defenceless, as they wind through some lonely mountain-gorge.'*

If all the Turkish Irregulars answered to this character, they would be irregular indeed; but some are of a better stamp. The Arnauts, for instance, the Albanian Mussulmans, seem to be a fine set of fellows. Scorning the European costume, they are yet not so reckless as the volunteers who come in from Asia Minor. The

* *Pictures from the Battle-Field*, p. 114.

Arnaut, with his jacket of fine red cloth or silk, his braided and buttoned breast, his white many-folded fustinella, his red cap placed jauntily on his head, his red gaiters, his pointed red shoes, his silken sash, his pistols, his long gun, his crooked sabre—is a picturesque-looking personage, having about him much of that dash and spirit so observable in mountaineers. Captain Spencer, in 1850, while crossing the rugged mountains from Bosnia to Albania, came upon a troop of Arnauts, who were watching a body of Montenegrins on the heights above; and he speaks of their striking appearance, their picturesque dresses, their separation into clans, each commanded by its own chieftain, their care-for-naught bivouac round their fires in the night, and their war-songs, with which they made the mountains echo. Some of the Arnauts are always in the Turkish armies.

But of all the Irregulars of the Turkish army, nothing perhaps could be more remarkable than the Kurdish cavalcade which entered Constantinople in April 1854. It was headed by a woman, Kara Fatima Hanoun—'Dark Fatima.' She came from Marash, a town in Kurdistan, in Asia Minor, and was the chief of a Kurdish tribe. Slight as is the allegiance of those semi-barbarous rovers to the sultan, the fiery zeal of the Moslem had been roused by the accounts from Europe; and Fatima came to offer the services of 300 Kurdish horsemen to the sultan. Beautiful and Oriental as Fatima may sound to our ears, the real Fatima was anything but beautiful as she presented herself at Constantinople: she was a little, shrivelled, elderly woman, dark and ugly. She wore a very dirty pelisse, with broad sleeves; dirty white trousers; dirty yellow boots; and a white linen wrapper covering all the head and neck except the face. She had long pistols and a yataghan in her girdle, and a lance in her hand. She rode, in cavalier fashion, a lean and ungroomed charger, having a long flowing mane and tail. By her side rode her brother, wearing an immense fez over his rolled turban, and covered by a ragged cloak; and near her was a kind of fool or jester, apparently a privileged satellite of her court. In her train were numerous mules bearing bags of money. The worthies whom this modern Amazon came to place at the disposal of her suzerain were worthy of their mistress. Some had pistols and yataghans; two or three had rifles, which had found their way from Birmingham to Asia Minor; others had scimitars; one had nothing more than a wooden club or mace; some matchlocks, others bows and arrows; while all alike had the appearance of fellows whose consciences would not greatly trouble them in the event of a sack or a pillage.

Although there were specimens of all these motley components of a military force in the various corps with which Omar Pacha fought the Danubian campaign, yet the regular troops, the nizam, were his chief supporters; and to them must be given the chief praise for the courage and steadiness with which the operations were conducted.

Such were the materials with which the Turkish generalissimo had to work; and now for the theatre whereon his operations were to be performed.

Whenever Russia and Turkey go to war, the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia become the chief scene of operations, because they are on the highway from Russia to Constantinople. The contests in Asia, east and south-east of the Black Sea, are secondary in importance. It is an 'aggression' for Russia to occupy these two Principalities with her armies; but the great feature in military conquest, is to cross the Danube from Wallachia into Bulgaria; thence cross the Balkan into the southern provinces of Turkey; and then dictate the terms of peace under the walls of Adrianople or Constantinople. It is for this reason that a Danubian campaign has such significance.

Almost throughout the whole distance, from the Austrian frontier to the Black Sea, the Danube separates Bulgaria from Wallachia. These two are, practically, the Danubian Provinces, which have been the theatre of so many struggles between the Russians and the Turks. All writers agree that the provinces are fertile; but there is by no means an agreement in opinion concerning the characteristics of the inhabitants. Bulgaria is finely situated, bordering the Danube for nearly 400 miles, and having a sea-coast on the Black Sea of 200 miles, from the southern mouth of the Danube to the Balkan. The Balkan range sends down towards the Danube numerous offshoots—parallel ridges which diminish in height as they approach the river; and between these ridges are beautiful valleys, watered by streams which flow into the Danube, and enriched by verdure and corn and fruit. These lateral valleys have marked characteristics in their vegetation—woods on the uplands and mountain-sides; orchards, vineyards, and mulberry-groves on the middle slopes; corn-fields near the alluvial basin of the Danube; while flowers spangle the whole more or less. Cattle, buffaloes, sheep, and horses, constitute the livestock of the graziers. Wool, hides, corn, wine, silk, wax, honey, timber, tallow—all are yielded; iron-mines are worked to a small extent; and iron and leather are manufactured.

In characterising the inhabitants, however, authorities differ. The author of the *Progress of Russia in the East*, says that 'the peasant population, industrious, cleanly, and prosperous, is better dressed, better housed, and in easier circumstances than the agricultural population of most of the other countries in Europe.' The Earl of Carlisle, while voyaging down the Danube from Orsova to Widdin, finds occasion to comment on the Wallachians who happened to meet his view; but his observations seem to have been directed to the river-side people generally, whether of the Hungarian Banat, Wallachia, or Bulgaria: 'Many were standing and lying about in their loose tunics,

red sashes, high woollen caps, and most unwashed sheep-skins—a common vesture, it seemed to me, of all the Danubian races—models of picturesque filthiness. I do not know what is most to be wished for these populations. I am inclined to believe that they have scarcely advanced a single step since the conquests of Trajan; and one gets to feel that almost any revolution which could rouse their torpor and stimulate their energies—which would hold out a motive to exertion and secure a return to industry—with whatever ingredients of confusion and strife it might be accompanied, must bring superior advantages in the end. As far as I can make out, there seems to be general distaste for the Russians. The hopes of human progress do not lie in that quarter.'* Captain Spencer, too, gives a doubtful character to that portion of the Danubian population living in Bulgaria: 'The Bulgarians have neither the bold determination of their neighbours the Servians, nor the spirit of enterprise, combination, and fiery valour of the Greeks; they more resemble the moujik (serf) of Russia—a machine to be guided at the will of a clever engineer.' The Osmanlis, the real Mohammedan Turks, are a mere handful in comparison with the Christians in all the parts of Bulgaria near the Danube and the Black Sea; and yet, from habits of long submission, the Christians cringe in rather a mean spirit to a Turk. Even to this day, says Captain Spencer, 'a Bulgarian, when he enters the hall of audience of a pacha, is seen crawling on his knees, and bending his neck in abject submission to the man in power. While travelling, he dismounts from his horse till the great man passes; and in all the small towns and villages, the whole population bend like a reed at the nod of the meanest Turk.'†

In such estimates as the above, whether favourable or unfavourable, allowance must be made for the circumstances, often merely temporary or local, under which a traveller sees a district or a nation. Generally speaking, all sweeping judgments on such matters are found to be wrong.

In respect to Wallachia and Moldavia, the industry of the inhabitants is sadly interfered with by the contests between Russia and Turkey. No fewer than eight different times has Russia 'occupied' these provinces—bringing many miseries in her train after each occupation; for it seems unquestionably true, that the spoliation on these occasions is great; the Russian troops seizing on the crops and herds of the peasantry, and leaving as an unsolved problem the question of payment. The Earl of Carlisle, while speaking of Galatz, which he characterises as indescribably rude and topsy-turvy, says that during the 'occupation, the Russian armies never fail to introduce the plague, or at least some bad fever which passes under that name.' During the last eighty or ninety years, more than thirty have been years of Russian 'occupation' of these provinces; and not less than twenty campaigns between Russ and Turk have taken place. Yet, in spite of these disturbing influences, the Moldo-Wallachian plains have advanced in cultivation. The two provinces together occupy an area of about 50,000 square miles, and contain 2,000,000 of inhabitants. From early days they have produced an amount of food more than adequate to the wants of the inhabitants; they were regarded as the granary of Trajan's troops, as they have since been of those of Russia. In the twenty years preceding the troubled year 1853, the Principalities progressed greatly in wealth. It was in 1834 that an English ship first took in a cargo of corn at Galatz, a short distance up the Danube on the northern shore; and the corn-trade has since become one of considerable magnitude—the Principalities taking English manufactured goods in exchange for the corn which she purchased. From 200 to 300 ships were engaged in this trade; and England frequently took 500,000 quarters of corn from the Danube in a year. The total export of corn amounted in the years 1850-1-2 to as much as 5,000,000 quarters annually. This great increase of Danubian trade doubtless whetted the appetite of the Russians for acquisitions in such a quarter. Mournful is it, indeed, to see that peaceful industry in such a region should so frequently be disturbed by the horrors of war, or rather should be the indirect cause of involving it in that calamity.

The system of strategy proper to be adopted by the Russians in a campaign on the Danube, and the proper defensive system for the Turks, are subjects which have been largely discussed by military men—Austrian, Prussian, French, and English, as well as those more immediately concerned. The banks of the Danube have been a battle-field between the two nations for a century and a half past. In 1711, Peter the Great made an irruption into the Principalities; but the grand vizier, aided by officers from Charles XII., marched along the right bank of the Danube through the Dobrudscha, crossed at Isakcha, penetrated between the Pruth and the Dniester to Choczim, interrupted the czar's line of communication, recrossed the Pruth, attacked the Russians in the rear, and completely defeated them. In 1770, the Turks, instead of following this system of tactics on the Pruth, opposed a Russian army by crossing the Danube from Bucharest to Giurgevo; the Russians met and attacked the Turks at Giurgevo and Bucharest, and defeated them. In 1771, the Turks, instead of looking to the Dobrudscha, crossed the Danube at Widdin and at Bucharest; but were driven back, and the Russians were enabled to advance so far into Bulgaria as to blockade Silistria, Shumla, and Varna. In the wars from 1788 to 1792, the Turks, endeavouring to occupy a position in central Wallachia, met with repeated defeats in their direct attacks on the Russians. In 1806–12, the Turks met with success so long as they acted through the Dobrudscha upon the Pruth and the lower Danube; but when the

* *Diary in Turkish and Greek Waters*, p. 27.
† *Travels in European Turkey*, p. 387.

Russians enticed them to a contest in the plains of Wallachia, opposite Rustchuk, the result was very disastrous to the Turks. In 1828–9, the Russians obtained command of the Dobrudscha, and successfully carried on their operations thence towards the Balkan.

The experience furnished by the above campaigns has led many military men to the opinion—that whenever Russia attacks the Principalities, Turkey should look well to that peculiar marshy part of Bulgaria called the Dobrudscha, watered on two sides by the Danube, and on a third by the Black Sea. When a Russian army has crossed the Pruth into Moldavia, and thence crossed the Sereth into Wallachia, it finds itself within a triangle, of which the two long sides are formed by the Carpathians and the Danube, and the short side by the Sereth—the dividing river between Moldavia and Wallachia. Thus placed, if attacked by a Turkish army in the rear, it would be in great peril; and such a rear attack, it is contended, is always practicable, if the Turks can manage to cross the Danube from the Dobrudscha, at Isakcha or Tultcha, into Bessarabia; because the Turks, in that case, would cut off the communications between the Russian army and the heart of Russia.

Military writers often discuss the position of Bulgaria as if it were one huge fortress; and indeed the strategy of the antagonist generals is best understood by so regarding it. The Balkan is the main line of defence for central Turkey—the wall, the rampart which must be crossed before the fertile plains of Thrace, with Adrianople and Constantinople, can be reached. The Danube, in a strategetical sense, may be said to form an immense wet ditch, running parallel with this rampart, and from 50 to 100 miles distant in front of it. This ditch, perhaps 400 miles long, is strengthened by powerful outworks, at four widely separated parts of its length—Widdin, Rustchuk, Silistria, and Hirsova, all on the Bulgarian side, overlooking the northern or Wallachian shore. The plain of Bulgaria forms, in military language, a *glacis* or gentle slope from the Balkan to the Danube, from the rampart to the ditch. The rugged country between Servia and Bulgaria forms a projecting bastion at one end of the line, while the Dobrudscha forms another at the other end. Between the Balkan and the Danube are the two powerful fortresses of Shumla and Varna—the one commanding all the roads from Rustchuk and Silistria towards Constantinople, and the other commanding the sea-margin road from the Dobrudscha and the lower Danube.

Taking these few topographical elements as a basis, a non-military reader may perhaps be able to comprehend a little concerning the strategy of a campaign in these regions, by regarding Wallachia as a wedge and Bulgaria as a fortress. North of the Danube, the Russians have to pay careful attention to the base of their wedge, on the Sereth and the Pruth, as well as to the two sides formed by the Danube and the Carpathians—the Hungarian frontier at Orsova being the point of the wedge. South of the Danube, the Turks have to be on the alert concerning the state of their great outworks at Widdin, Rustchuk, Silistria, and Hirsova; of their projecting bastions at the Dobrudscha and the Servian frontier; and of their intrenched camps at Shumla and Varna. Shumla, it is agreed on all hands, is a most important point in the defensive system of Turkey—not only in respect to its position between the Danube and Constantinople, but in respect also to its characteristics as a fortified town, or rather a fortified camp. Its fortifications are so vast, that they require fully 50,000 men effectually to defend them; and some military writers have urged, that this shews an error of judgment on the part of the Prussian engineers who constructed the works, since it is not likely that Turkey can at any time spare 50,000 men to defend one single fortress. But, on the other hand, it has been pointed out that Shumla is like a centre whence radii spring to all the fortified posts of Bulgaria, whether on the Danube or on the Black Sea, and has thus a peculiar commanding influence. Moreover, the hills which almost encircle Shumla, and which are very steep, are clothed over their whole surface with impenetrable brushwood three or four feet high—old, stiff, close, entangled, and most difficult to traverse, except in single file at particular spots. The Turkish fortifications defend these heights; but even if an enemy could approach, the forest brushwood would interpose a formidable obstacle to any near attack upon the town.

As a means of rendering intelligible to civilians the importance of *large towns* such as Widdin, Silistria, Varna, or Shumla, to the operations of an army, M. Schimmelpfennig has made the following useful observations:—'The conqueror finds in them all that his troops require, to recover from their hardships, and to obtain new supplies. For the conquered party they become, when fortified, strong positions, furnishing the means of collecting, reorganising, re-equipping, and strengthening their forces, and thus enabling them to recommence their operations in the open field. If we wish to make a correct calculation of the operations of an army, we should first form a proper estimate of the situation of the large towns on the seat of war, and of the equally important depôts, ports, river-passages, and other defiles which cannot be avoided. When an army founds or bases its operations upon such points—that is to say, obtains from them its reinforcements and supplies, or secures them as places of retreat—they are called technically, in military language, its *subjects;* but as soon as the operations are directed towards them, they are called its *objects.* Generally, the "subjects" of one army are the "objects" of the other. Lines of road leading from the subjects to the objects, or to the enemy's army, are called *lines of operation;* but those lines of road which connect an army with its subjects are called *lines of communication or of retreat.* When several subjects are so

situated as to offer different lines of operation towards the same objects, they furnish us with what is called a *base of operations*. The preservation of our own army makes it necessary that our operations should be so conducted as, in case of a lost battle, to leave the communication with at least one of the "subjects" open; whilst, as far as the destruction of the enemy's army is our aim, we should direct the operations in such a manner as to cut off the beaten enemy from his subjects—to force him out of his line of retreat, and to allow him no opportunity of reuniting and strengthening his forces.'*

Unfortunate is it for Turkey, that two of the main elements of civilisation, *roads* and *bridges*, are sadly wanting. The deficiency impedes her military operations, as well as her peaceful commercial enterprises. As Sir James Porter described them a century ago, so are the Turkish roads to the present day, with a few exceptions on the main arteries of communication. It was his remark, that no one in this country thinks of a permanent improvement in the roads. The pachas seem to care little on the matter in their respective pachaliks. Occasionally, a few swampy pits are filled up with stones, or steep declivities are scraped down to an easier slope; but, for the most part, the roads are nothing but the paths which the beasts of burden have trodden out. The materials for road-making are abundant; and there are few countries in which a slight outlay would produce more important results in respect to intercommunication.

It must in fairness be admitted, however, in so far as bridges are concerned, that Turkish indolence is not the only cause of the absence of bridges across the Danube—an element which would greatly affect any Danubian campaign. The Danube is a broad river, and is only crossed by ferry-boats, except in the upper or Bavarian and Austrian part of its course. Armies usually cross it by means of temporary bridges of boats; but sometimes bodies of troops are ferried across in large flat-bottomed boats. All operations on the Danube are affected by this circumstance—that the state of the river varies greatly at different seasons. The freshets, produced by the melting of the snow in spring, frequently overflow the whole plain, and do not subside until the end of May, or sometimes not even before the beginning of July. Sometimes, in the middle of summer, torrents descending from the Carpathians, in Transylvania, will occasion so rapid a rising of the river, that such constructions as bridges of boats are liable to be swept away. The throwing of a military-bridge across a river for the transport of troops and artillery, is an important operation in every war; and it is one of the duties of the engineer-officers to ascertain the spots at which these means of communication can be most conveniently and profitably made. The points which have been named as most suitable for the purpose of crossing the Danube from Wallachia into Bulgaria are—at Orsova; at the point of confluence of the Timok with the Danube; at two points near Widdin; at Agrulgrad; at Zibru Palenka; at the mouth of the river Schyl; at the mouth of the Aluta; at Nikopolis; at Rustchuk; at or near Giurgevo; at Turtukai; at and near Silistria; below Hirsova; at Ibraila; below Galatz; at Isakcha; at Ismail; and at Kilia, close to the spot where the northern arm of the Danube enters the Black Sea.

All these various circumstances—personal, topographical, hydrographical, engineering—affect the system of strategy by which a general proposes to conduct a campaign. Omar Pacha, conversant with the whole district long before, formed a plan based on the amount of information which he possessed, and on the strength of the forces placed at his disposal.

* *The War between Turkey and Russia: a Military Sketch*, p. 44.

BATTLES OF KALAFAT, OLTENITZA, CITALE, AND GIURGEVO.

The events of the Danubian campaign, in the period between October 1853 and July 1854, separate themselves naturally and conveniently into two groups, distinguished by particular characteristics. In the one, the Turks crossed the Danube from Bulgaria into Wallachia, and attacked the Russians; in the other, the Russians crossed the Danube from Wallachia and Moldavia into Bulgaria, and attacked the Turks. In the one, the actions have become familiar by the names of Kalafat (Kalefat), Citale (Citate), Oltenitza, and Giurgevo; in the other, the operations are connected with Silistria, and with the Dobrudscha towns of Rassova, Kustendji, Hirsova, Matchin, Isakcha, and Tultcha.

The Turks crossed the Danube at four widely separated points, in each case entering Wallachia from Bulgaria. One of these transits was from Widdin to Kalafat; another from Rustchuk to Giurgevo; a third from Turtukai to Oltenitza; and a fourth from Silistria to Kalarasch; and the period during which these movements were made, was from 28th October to 4th November. Three out of four of these proceedings led to important results; the fourth, the crossing from Silistria to Kalarasch, was of non-effect; for the Russians drove back the Turks, and afterwards laid siege to Silistria. The most western of these movements was from Widdin to Kalafat. Widdin is a town of about 30,000 inhabitants, and has for centuries past been a strong post in all the contests between the Turks and their northern neighbours. Viewed from a distance, the mosques and minarets tower rather oddly above the fortified walls. In so far as concerns its Ottoman rather than its Slavonic features, Widdin partakes of the character which Sir Gardner Wilkinson gives to Turkish towns generally. In external beauty they are, he says, 'superior to those of Europe. The minarets and domes, the cypresses and gardens interspersed with

the houses, the projecting roofs, the wooden lattice-work, the coloured walls, and the variety of outlines, are most picturesque. . . . The houses of the rich Osmanlis frequently look as if they had been brought from a distance, ready made, and placed in juxtaposition with their strange neighbours; they might, with equal propriety, belong to a village or to the capital of a province; and they are often as distinct from each other as tents, from which they have evidently derived their form.' * Kalafat, the Wallachian town opposite Widdin, is a smaller place; but, nevertheless, it has 2000 houses, a town-hall, a custom-house, three churches, a barrack for cavalry, a quarantine station, and fortified walls. There are two high hills outside the town, about a mile asunder, which have furnished the means of supplying Kalafat with strong fortifications. In the campaign of 1828, these hills were occupied by the Russians; but in that of 1853–4, the Turks had this advantage.

It was from Widdin to Kalafat that a Turkish force, about 12,000 strong, crossed the Danube on the 28th of October, occupying both Kalafat itself and a small island near the Wallachian shore. The Russian force situated in this part, being too weak to resist the Turks, retired to a position at Slatina, a town on the Aluta. It may here be remarked, that Wallachia is, for government purposes, divided into Lesser or Little, Great or Upper, and Lower, separated respectively by the rivers Aluta and Arjish; and that Kalafat is in Lesser Wallachia, Giurgevo in Great, and Oltenitza in Lower. The Turks did not attempt much in the way of pursuit, but proceeded at once to fortify Kalafat and its vicinity. They raised redoubts of great strength and extent; some of them on the two lofty hills, and completely commanding all approach to the Danube in that direction. The little island, too, was defended by strong earthen intrenchments, mounted with large guns. Taken in connection with Widdin and its defences, the two towns and the interlying island formed one stronghold, well fortified, supplied with 250 heavy guns, and occupied by a large army.

The Russians were not prepared for such a vigorous attack in this one spot. In the first place, they did not expect that Omar Pacha would have so promptly kept his word, to attack Gortchakoff unless he withdrew from the Principalities within fifteen days; and in the next place, they had 400 miles of the Danube to look to, and could not spare a large force at each important place.

While these events were occurring at Kalafat, stirring scenes were presented at Oltenitza (Oltenicza), 250 miles lower down the river. The Turkish forces that crossed the Danube from Turtukai to Oltenitza have been numbered by the Turks at about 12,000. A corps had been for some days concentrated near Turtukai, concealed from the enemy partly by bushes and partly by a fog. An island stands in the middle of the Danube, exactly between Turtukai and Oltenitza, and this island played an important part in the tactics of the battle. On the 2d of November, the Turks began to make the passage, favoured by the interposition of the island; and by the morning of the 3d, 5000 men were on the island, 5000 had crossed over to the northern or Wallachian shore of the Danube, and 2000 were in barges ready to cross. During the night, the rest crossed; and the morning of the 4th found the Turks ready to meet the Russians, who were placed in pickets along the shore. The picket at Oltenitza, with a reserve behind the town, amounted to about 5000 men; but other reinforcements came up in the course of the day. The engagement commenced at dawn of day, and lasted many hours. The Russians, inferior to their opponents in number, fought well; and the contest was severe on both sides. About noon, the Turks suffered a temporary check; but when night closed in, they remained masters of the shore, while the Russians retired behind Oltenitza.

The details of the action at Oltenitza were given by Omar Pacha in the following dispatch to his government:—'The possession of the island situated in front of Turtukai having been considered indispensable, I had effected the passage of troops, and in the course of the night of the 1st, managed to raise tolerably strong fortifications. On the following day, two battalions of infantry, three pieces of cannon, and 100 of the mounted police, were conveyed in large boats to the locality, with ammunition, provisions, and greatcoats. They had scarcely landed when, from the batteries of Turtukai, we opened a fire on the lazaretto, situate on the left bank. After the first discharge, the Russians quitted this position; and the Imperial (Turkish) troops took possession of the building, which is of solid construction, with vaulted chambers. Without loss of time, 400 workmen, under the direction of staff-officers, commenced raising fortifications, for which purpose 2000 gabions had been already prepared. On the 3d, again other troops were sent to fortify the position. As soon as the Imperial troops had landed on the left bank of the river, the Russians, quartered in a large village, at about an hour's distance, turned round and began to retreat. A body of cavalry was despatched to reconnoitre, and having encountered at Oltenitza an outpost of Cossack cavalry, they killed five, and rejoined our lines with a loss of three men. We found at Touzla, on the left bank, a great quantity of boats, which we sent to Turtukai. The number of boats at our disposal having facilitated the construction of the bridge, we were enabled without delay to place in the fortifications twelve large guns which were brought from Shumla. On the 3d, at four P.M., three battalions of Russian infantry, with eight cannon, a regiment of cavalry, and a party of Cossacks, entered the village of Oltenitza. Our troops, posted within the works constructed on the left bank, waited them firmly. This same night I caused to be constructed a bridge

* *Dalmatia and Montenegro*, p. 56.

at the confluence of the Arjish with the Danube, and flanked it with redoubts. Yesterday, 4th November, at six A.M., we began to perceive the movement of the Russian forces. As soon as their march was well defined, I caused to be embarked and carried to the lazaretto a reinforcement of one battalion. The evening before, I had placed on a level piece of ground a battery of guns calculated to face any attack which might be made. The Russian force amounted to twenty battalions, three regiments of cavalry—one of Cossacks—sixteen mounted batteries, and as many foot. They formed in order of battle, with fourteen pieces of cannon in the rear of twelve battalions, and the regiment of Cossacks in lines beyond the reach of our guns, and fronting the centre of our works. They advanced, supported by the fire of their artillery; and at the same time two battalions, with two guns, came on threatening our left flank. Having commenced the assault, another stronger division —consisting of six battalions, with four guns, and having in the rear three regiments of cavalry supporting and outstripping their left flank—took its position, and formed in two lines, with artillery, horse and foot, into *échelons*, attacking our right flank. After an exchange of a few shots, the centre gave the assault, whereon they charged both our wings. The centre attacked three different times, and each with a fresh battalion, twice on the left and once on the right. A well-directed fire from our fortress at Turtukai soon dispersed their right column; and the centre gradually fell back, after having suffered severely, and half its number *hors de combat*. The battery of the island, also, mounted with powerful guns, menzil top, and commanded by Khalid Pacha, did admirable execution on the enemy's right wing. The Russians advanced with coolness and resolution almost to the brink of the trench, and on this account their loss was considerable, amounting to 1000 men killed, and double the number wounded. The engagement lasted four hours—from noon till four P.M.; and during this interval, the wagons never ceased to carry off their dead; and twenty were observed heavily laden even after the conflict. With a view of facilitating this duty, as long as it lasted, we abstained from molesting the enemy, and from firing a shot; but found, nevertheless, 800 dead bodies on the field. A private carriage, moreover, was remarked, and from the pains taken in the search, we conjecture it must have been destined to receive the body of a general officer. At five P.M., a total confusion ensued in the Russian ranks; their lines were completely broken, and their retreat precipitate. An hour later, some few rallied in the neighbouring villages, but the remainder fled in disorder. Some of our men pushed forward in pursuit of them beyond the lines, but were summoned back by trumpet to their own quarters. Our loss amounted to 106 men. We found on the field of battle 500 muskets, sacs, cartridge-boxes, equipments, &c.'

The Russians state that they were 9000 against 18,000 Turks; the Turkish account of numbers is widely different; and it is difficult to decide between the two. The Russians were commanded by Generals Dannenberg and Perloff. Heavy rains prevented the Turks from pursuing the Russians from Oltenitza towards Bucharest; and they re-crossed the Danube about the middle of November.

The last few weeks of the year exhibited only a few minor skirmishes at these two points of the Danube—Kalafat and Oltenitza. Both parties probably were a little surprised at the result—the Turks at their success, the Russians at their failure; and both parties made resolute attempts to strengthen their forces, and to apply them at the points where likely to be most valuable. There are authentic means of knowing the actual strength of the Russian armies, in all parts, at the close of the year. Sir Hamilton Seymour's dispatch to the Earl of Clarendon, concerning the state of the Russian armies in October 1853, was followed by another bearing date 9th January 1854, noticing several changes which had been made in the numbers and location of the troops: 'The 1st and 2d infantry corps are in Poland and Lithuania; the reserve battalions of these corps are in course of being formed. Two battalions being raised for each regiment, twenty-four will be added to each corps d'armée. It is stated that no additions have been made yet to the artillery and cavalry of these two corps; but here a slight explanation becomes necessary—the horses have not yet been purchased, but as regards men, the number required have already been assembled. The 3d, 4th, and 5th corps have already been placed on the full war-footing; and the same statement may be made respecting their cavalry and artillery. The 6th corps is in course of being put upon a war-footing; one division proceeds to the Crimea, one to the Caucasus, and the third to the government of Kherson. Those troops not already marching, will proceed shortly to their destinations. The half of the cavalry of this corps is ordered to the Crimea, the other half to the government of Kherson. The corps of dragoons is equally in course of being put upon the war-footing; two regiments have already been sent off to the Caucasus; and the other six are to proceed next week to the Principalities. The Corps de Gardes, and the Grenadier Corps, have likewise received orders for being placed upon the footing of war. The Guards are to be increased by a fresh battalion and squadron for each regiment; the Grenadiers, by two battalions and one squadron for each regiment. I should here observe, that when upon the war-footing, the battalion numbers 1000 men, and the squadron 130 horses; while the reserve battalions are 600 or 700 strong, and the reserve squadrons have each 150 horses. As regards the army of the Caucasus, under the command of Prince Woronzow, its numbers cannot be less than 150,000, and may amount to 170,000 or 180,000.'* These various

* Parliamentary Papers on the Eastern Question. Part ii. p. 372.

corps of the Russian army, thus augmented to the war-footing, could not have amounted to much less than 800,000 men.

Attention must now be directed to the brilliant affair which opened the year 1854 near Kalafat —an achievement which equally exhilarated the Turks and mortified the Russians. Nominally, it was the battle of Citale; but it was in effect a series of conflicts, lasting several days. The Russians, during November and December, gradually strengthened themselves in Lesser Wallachia. General Aurep received orders to advance upon Kalafat from Krajova; and he employed urgent means to render passable for heavy artillery the roads between Slatina, Karakal, Krajova, and Kalafat. About the end of December, the Turks succeeded in forcing the Russian General Fischbach to evacuate Krajova, and to retire behind the Aluta. On or about the first day of the new year, three Russian columns advanced through Lesser Wallachia towards the Danube—one through Karakal, one along the Aluta, and a corps of more than 20,000 men towards Kalafat.

The presence of the Turks at Kalafat could not be otherwise than annoying to Prince Gortchakoff; he sent large reinforcements from Upper Wallachia to Krajova—a town about sixty miles north-east of Kalafat—with orders to drive the Turks back across the Danube by a resolute attack on their position at Kalafat.* The Russians got round on the flank of the Turkish intrenchments, and threw up redoubts at Citale, a village a little higher up the Danube than Kalafat. The news of the intended attack had reached the Turks; and Achmet Pacha, the general in command, determined to anticipate it. On the 5th January, he sent a strong corps from Kalafat to Maglovet, a small village on the way to Citale, where they bivouacked during the night. Next morning they were under arms. As yet, however, no sign had been seen of the Russians. Not a sound was to be heard in the village; not a sentinel even was visible; and it was conjectured that the village might have been evacuated. Six companies of chasseurs, under the command of Tefnik Bey, Omar Pacha's nephew, were sent up the hill to commence the attack, and advanced, firing as skirmishers, but without eliciting any response. They were on the point of entering, when a single cannon-shot, followed closely by a whole broadside, revealed the presence of the enemy, who now made their appearance, and seemed disposed to contest the ground on the outside. Some sharp firing followed, but the chasseurs were pushed on, and close behind came the four battalions of infantry under Ismail Pacha, with a battery of field-artillery, which opened a heavy fire with great effect. The Russian gunnery was bad; few of the balls hit, and the shells nearly all burst in the air, and fell harmless. Before the Turks had fired a dozen shots, the enemy retired into the village, sheltered themselves in and around the houses, and opened a deadly fire of musketry upon the advancing column. 'Ismail Pacha's appearance at this moment struck all who saw him with admiration, as it spoke volumes for his daring hardihood as a soldier, though it said but little for his prudence as a general. He rode into the village at the head of the troops, sword in hand, mounted on a white horse, his orders glittering on his breast, and wearing a white pelisse—the mark for a thousand bullets at every step. But he seemed to bear a charmed life; for though two horses were killed under him, it was long before he was wounded, and then only slightly in the arm.'

The battle soon began to rage fearfully. As the troops came on, the numbers falling increased on both sides. A rush was made on the houses with fixed bayonets, and the contest was then indeed terrific. The Russians contested every wall and room with desperate courage, and were literally massacred *en masse*. No quarter was asked or given: the Turks, enraged by the resistance, put to death all who fell in their way; nor were the Russians slow to follow the example. The officers were seen, in some instances, pulling down their caps tightly on their foreheads, and rushing madly on death, scorning to yield. In little more than an hour, the high road and the space round the houses were covered with heaps of dead, and the blood ran in rivulets down the hill. The conflict raged in this way for nearly four hours, with heavy loss on both sides. Towards twelve o'clock, every house had been carried at the point of the bayonet, and the enemy fell back upon the road, but found themselves intercepted by the Turkish cavalry, two regiments of which had advanced along the ravine on the right, and stationed themselves in the rear of the village. Being thus cut off, the Russians had no resource but to fling themselves into the redoubt, carrying their artillery with them. This they were enabled to accomplish in safety.

Critical was the hour of noon for both armies. Another half-hour would, in all probability, have seen the destruction of the remaining Russians, if the attention of the combatants had not been drawn by events of weightier importance in another part of the field. News of the perilous position of the Russians had been conveyed to various villages wherein troops were quartered, and a formidable reinforcement appeared about half-past twelve. The Turkish reserve prepared to receive these fresh troops, who numbered 10,000 men—comprising nine battalions of infantry, a regiment of Uhlans, and a regiment of the Paskévitch Hussars, with sixteen guns. Four battalions advanced in line, three in column as a second line, and two as a reserve; the cavalry and artillery were placed on the flanks, and their march was directed towards the Kalafat road. The object was to place the Turks between two fires, and cut

* One of the numerous examples of vivid description of battle-fields, afforded by the correspondents of the London newspapers during the war, was the account of the action of 6th January by the correspondent of the *Daily News*, who evidently wrote as an eye-witness. It forms the basis of the following sketch.

off their means of communication. With five Turkish battalions of reserve, Achmet Pacha prepared to receive these new foes. On the side of the hill below the ravine on the right was a sort of old fence, enclosing a square space of ground; and the Turkish troops were deployed to the right, above this enclosure, three battalions in line, and two in reserve, the right wing behind it, and the left extending into the plain; on the right flank was placed a battery of four 12-pounders, and on the left, one of six field-pieces. The cavalry at the village was recalled, and in conjunction with those of the reserve, was stationed on the left, one regiment a little in advance of the rest. The time occupied in making these arrangements was one of painful suspense; and when all was ready, the inferiority of the Turkish force was very evident; but they had no other resource than to defend their position as bravely as they could.

Now arrived the moment of conflict. 'The advance of the Russians was an imposing sight. Nothing could exceed the steadiness of their march; every line and column stepped in time as one man, and all the distances were as accurately observed as if they were parading at St Petersburg. As they began to get nearer, three or four officers rode out in front to reconnoitre the ground, and then hastily retired. Immediately afterwards, the two battalions of reserve changed their position, and advanced with two pieces of artillery towards the ravine on the right of the Turks.' The Russian artillery appears to have been badly served, whereas the Turkish, under Hadji Mustapha, was worked with skill and effect. Onward, nevertheless, came the dense mass of Russian infantry; and a slight confusion having occurred among the Turks, occasioned by the bursting of a gun, the Russians prepared to charge with the bayonet. The Turkish batteries now opened a tremendous shower of grape-shot, every shot telling with fearful effect upon the close ranks of the column, sweeping them away one after the other as fast as they were filled up. The infantry, at the same time, becoming impatient, the order was given to advance, and the whole line came forward—the right wing entering the enclosure—and fired and loaded as they marched, shouting their national war-cry. The Russians for some minutes bore up bravely; but at last the head of the column began to waver. In vain the officers urged the men to move onwards. Broken by the iron-shower from the batteries, and the close and raking fire of the musketry, they fell into disorder, and turned and fled pell-mell across the plain, casting aside everything—muskets, and even musical-instruments. The Turkish cavalry neglected, or were unable, to pursue; and the Russians were thereby enabled to carry off their artillery. Although the Russians had been thus defeated both in the village and the plain—for, in effect, there were two distinct battles—yet the Turkish general did not think it desirable to renew the attack on the Russian redoubt at Citale: he retired with all his forces to Kalafat, which he retained, while the Russians voluntarily abandoned Citale and all the villages in the neighbourhood. The Turkish wounded were brought into Kalafat during the night, and were thence transported across the Danube to Widdin. 'The poor fellows seemed to treat their misfortune very lightly, talking and laughing in the boats with so much hilarity, that, but for the blood and bandages, one would scarcely imagine that they were not sound in wind and limb. Nothing can exceed the joy and enthusiasm of the army. Every soldier has carried off a trophy of some kind or other—scarfs, swords, muskets, &c.; and groups may be seen standing in every corner at Kalafat, discussing, with animated gestures, the various details of the action, and crowing over the rout of the "Muscoviz."'

Under the supposition that the opposed generals were equal in tactics, and the soldiers equal in daring and powers of endurance, the artillery of the Turks must evidently have been worked more skilfully than that of the Russians; but be the explanation what it may, the victory was a remarkable one, and the Turks had just reason to be proud of it. The loss was serious: the Turks told of 338 dead and 700 wounded on their side; with 1500 dead, and an unnamed number wounded, on the side of the Russians. In the village, the two forces suffered about equally; but in the plain, the loss was chiefly on the side of the Russians, who appear to have been swept down with fearful rapidity by the Turkish artillery.

The Turkish officers did not spare themselves in these engagements. Ismail Pacha, Mustapha Pacha, Osman Pacha, Abdullah Bey, Hussein Bey—all were wounded. The two actions at Citale, and at the road between that village and Kalafat, were only parts of a series; for it appears that, between the 5th and the 10th of January, the Turks and Russians encountered each other at Plenitza, Salcutza, Perischor, Karaula, Mazezoi, Banului, Risipitz, Rudari, Giubega, Galikea, and Pojana—villages in Lesser Wallachia, not far from Kalafat. On the 8th, Omar Pacha arrived at Widdin, and crossed over to the battle-field on that and the two following days; and orders and swords were distributed, in recognition of the valour of the conquerors. A correspondent of the Vienna newspaper, *The Wanderer*, visited this scene of strife about the middle of the month, and said that the villages 'are now nothing but ruins steeped in blood. The most miserable hut on the plain was made to serve as a position either for attack or defence. Most of the inhabitants fled before the engagement began, leaving their winter stores to the mercy of the combatants; many, however, were taken by surprise, and unfortunately lost their lives in the tumult of war.' Such miseries to peaceful industrious peasantry are among the everyday horrors of war.

The position and condition of the Russians in Lesser Wallachia, after the various encounters at and near Citale, required serious consideration.

The Russians ceased from attacks for a time, and strengthened their posts. Prince Gortchakoff went to Krajova, and inspected all the positions held by his forces. Reinforcements had been constantly arriving, and notwithstanding the heavy losses, the Russian troops in this part of Wallachia amounted, by the 18th January, to 36,000 men. About the same time, the Turks crossed the Danube near the mouth of the Aluta, from Nikopolis to Islacz and Turna; they were also posted in some force at Rahova, nearly opposite the mouth of the Schyl; and thus Gortchakoff was necessitated to bestow a part of his attention and his strength on the nook of marshy plain included between the Danube, the Schyl, and the Aluta. At the close of the month, the Russians had formed a semicircle, the extent of which was about thirty-five English miles, around the Turkish position at Kalafat. As their forces had now been augmented to considerably more than 40,000, confident hopes were entertained that success would attend the next attack. Prince Gortchakoff and General Aurep both incurred the czar's displeasure for their want of success at Citale, as had been the case with Dannenberg at Oltenitza; and General Schilders suddenly received orders to leave Warsaw, and pass through Hungary to Lesser Wallachia, there to examine into all the circumstances of the recent

Omar Pacha.

defeat, and to form a plan for future operations—a formidable passage of the Danube by the Russians being one of the manœuvres to which his attention was to be directed. One result of Gortchakoff's examination had been, to remove the head-quarters from Krajova to Bolcshti, a village nearer the Danube; but Schilders afterwards withdrew it as far as Slatina. The difficulties of the Russians were much increased by the horror with which they had inspired the Wallachians; the exactions of the invaders were so terrible, the plunder so undisguised and unscrupulous, that the people were driven into revolt; and the Russians felt the effects of the aid which the Wallachians often rendered to the Turks. In race partly Slavonic, like the Russians: in religion, Greek Christian, like the Russians—yet did these Wallachians lean rather to the Moslem sultan than to the Christian czar in their hour of misery and oppression.

About the beginning of February, then, the Russians were concentrated in great force in Lesser Wallachia, awaiting the time when they might make a second and more formidable attack upon the Turks at Kalafat; while their opponents, strengthened by more troops from Widdin, waited unflinchingly for them. Leaving these belligerents for awhile, we must now attend to the operations going on in Upper Wallachia, after the victory at Oltenitza early in November.

It has already been mentioned that, of the four passages of the Danube by the Turks in October and November, two were at Rustchuk and Turtukai. A small body of Turks crossed from Rustchuk to Giurgevo, between which two places

is an island in the Danube; and they continued to hold for a considerable time the position which they had thus seized, in spite of the efforts of the Russians to dislodge them. Of the passage from Turtukai to Oltenitza, and of the smart engagement which followed it, a description has already been given. Rustchuk, which continued for many months to be regarded by both armies as an important position, is a large town of 50,000 inhabitants, with a considerable trade. It is on a dead level, close to the Danube; but immediately to the south are a few hills, which, although of no great elevation, suffice to command the town. Rustchuk was very ill defended at the commencement of the war; but under Said Mirza Pacha and Khalid Pacha, it speedily changed its character from a tumble-down Turkish city to a fortress constructed on European principles. Turtukai has a more commanding position than Rustchuk; the river-shore at that spot rises precipitately to a high ridge, which completely commands the opposite flat shore at Oltenitza. After the battle at the last-named place, the Turks constructed a battery east of Turtukai, and a redoubt on a plateau behind the town. A correspondent of the *Times*, writing from Turtukai about the middle of January, describes the scene around him as one of picturesque ruggedness. 'Snow having entirely disappeared during the thaw, everything is green and bright; and although all the regular troops have been withdrawn, except a battalion of infantry, the place is full of bustle, from the field-works that are going on, and from this being the head-quarters of the irregular troops under the command of Giafer Pacha, head of the Moslem Arnauts, and Achmet Pacha, who watches the Danube line from Rustchuk to Silistria. The town itself, lying on the last steep slopes of the hill next the Danube, is small, and every house packed as full as it can hold of troops, in drab clothes and kilts of Manchester cotton, which has now universally superseded the native linen fustinella; and as it is rather a cold costume for winter weather, I see a great many with the Russian greatcoats, furnished by Oltenitza from the bodies of poor fellows who will never march across the Pruth again. I am happy to say that Giafer Pacha keeps as good order among them as is possible; for perfect discipline is unattainable with a nation that has still to serve an apprenticeship to *meum* and *tuum*.' The 'nation' here referred to is not the Osmanli, but the Arnauts or rugged mountaineers of Albania. The writer goes on to say, that 'the town itself is anything but inviting, with six inches of black liquid mud in the streets, as if all the reserve stores of Day and Martin had been poured out on them.'

The operations during the last two months of 1853, and the first two of 1854, in this part of the Danubian region, may be characterised as an almost uninterrupted series of sudden attacks—a small force dashing across the river, inflicting mischief on the enemy, and then recrossing. The Russians could make no permanent lodgment on the south bank, nor the Turks on the north. The Russians kept up a supply of forces at Giurgevo, Oltenitza, and Kalarasch, from Bucharest; while the Turks strengthened their garrisons at Rustchuk, Turtukai, and Silistria, from Shumla—there being in this respect a curious parallelism between the opposing forces. At one time we read of Turkish reserves going from Shumla to Rasgrad, Turtukai, Silistria, and Sistova; at another, of a series of resolute attempts to effect a landing either at Giurgevo or Oltenitza; but no decisive advantages seem to have been obtained by them.

The Russian plans and the Russian commanders underwent many changes during these four or five months. The want of success brought some of the generals into disgrace; and the presence of the Allied fleets interfered with any operations in the direction of Varna. When Osten-Sacken's corps entered the Principalities, two camps of cavalry were established near Kremanzoff and Charcov, intrenchments were formed near Bucharest, and the general operations of the campaign were conducted from this town as a central depôt. About the middle of January, there were 18,000 Russians near Giurgevo under General Simonoff, and 5000 at Kalarasch under General Aurep, watching the Turks at the opposite towns of Rustchuk and Silistria. Recollecting that it was in the depth of winter that these movements were made, and that the Principalities, like all other parts of the Turkish dominions, are wretchedly provided with roads, we shall be prepared to believe that the Russian troops suffered greatly on their marches. The advanced-guard of Osten-Sacken's corps arrived at Bucharest in miserable condition, having been forced to march during fifty days over the worst roads in pelting rain, and falling in fearful numbers by the way; the poor fellows, too, after barely three days' rest, were ordered on to Kalafat—a further distance of 200 or 300 miles. By the end of January, it was announced that the army of occupation would be augmented to 200,000 men, thus distributed—30,000 at Radovan, to keep the Turks in check at Kalafat; 40,000 at Bucharest and other posts in Wallachia and Moldavia; 40,000 to cross the Danube into the Dobrudscha; 50,000 to cross at Giurgevo, 20,000 to cross at Oltenitza, and 20,000 to cross at Turnu or Turna. There can be no doubt that many or all of these measures were planned; but the activity and frequent successes of the Turks greatly interfered with the prosecution of the Russian schemes. It is difficult, too, between the names of Paskévitch, Gortchakoff, Osten-Sacken, Lüders, and Schilders, to discover who was the real leader at any particular time; for changes were frequent. There were Turkish flotillas of gun-boats in the Danube, under the walls of Silistria and Rustchuk; there are islands opposite both of these towns; and the Russians frequently fired on the flotillas from the islands. The Russian troops employed in these several

operations appear to have been worked up to an extraordinary state of mind; they imagined that they were on the way to the Holy Land, to rescue it from the hands of infidels—under which flattering appellation were included English and French as well as Turks. On one occasion a party of soldiers halted at a Wallachian cottage to ask for water; having satisfied their thirst, they asked, in all simplicity, how far they were from Jerusalem!

In respect to the actual forces engaged on the side of the Russians in these encounters, there appear to have been about 130,000 troops sent across the Pruth by the end of January; of whom 35,000 fell by the sword, cold, sickness, and desertion—leaving 95,000 in the Principalities at that time.

The intention of the Russian generals seems to have been to commence, at the cessation of the severities of winter, so formidable an attack on Kalafat as to insure its capture. The newspapers frequently declared, that the Emperor Nicholas had ordered that position to be taken, 'cost what it might;' for the power of penetrating into the western part of Bulgaria, and thence across one of the western passes of the Balkan, depended on the possession of Kalafat and Widdin. This intention was destined to disappointment. Although frequent skirmishes between the Russians and the Turks took place within a few miles of Kalafat, no definite advantages were obtained. The Russians were too formidable in number to permit the Turks to make further inroads into that part of Wallachia, but yet they were not in sufficient force to seize Kalafat; and thus February, March, April, May, passed away, without much change in the relative positions of the belligerents. At one time Gortchakoff, at another Schilders, at another Liprandi, were in command. There were two circumstances which embarrassed the Russians in Lesser Wallachia as summer approached—the obstinate resistance of the Turks at the siege of Silistria, presently to be described; and the proposal of Austria to hold the Principalities for the Turks against the Russians.

Lower down the Danube, at various points between Widdin and Silistria, the Turks continued throughout the spring a series of desultory attacks—crossing the Danube, and then recrossing—effecting nothing of mark or moment, but yet embarrassing the Russians in their movements. In a letter written by Omar Pacha, which found its way into the newspapers, he said: 'We continually annoy the Russians by strong sudden descents upon their advanced posts on the Danube;' and this will sufficiently characterise the warfare of the period. But when midsummer brought about the extraordinary and unexpected failure of the Russians at the siege of Silistria, matters took a different turn; Bulgaria was no longer a place for the czar's troops; the eyes of the generals became turned occasionally to their line of retreat towards the Pruth—having both the Turks and Austrians to take into account. It was then that the Turks crossed the Danube, and fought the battle of Giurgevo. Relieved from all fear for Silistria—having no longer any Russians near that place—they saw that the time was come for an advance; and although the Turkish general did not quite obey the instructions of Omar Pacha, he yet commenced a series of operations which led ultimately to success.

Well contested and sanguinary, the battle of Giurgevo may be regarded as the last serious conflict between the Turks and the Russians—the last, in the Danubian campaign, in which the Turks shewed how much they could accomplish without English or French assistance. In the middle of the Danube, between Rustchuk and Giurgevo, is a narrow island about two miles in length. This island is 900 yards from the Bulgarian side, but is separated from the Wallachian by a very narrow channel only. There is a shallow pool along the centre of the island, and much sedge and marshy weed in other parts. This island was one of the first places fortified by the Russians when they arrived at the Danube in the autumn of 1853; and it was destined to be nearly the last scene of battle, for the engagement took place on the island, as well as in the village of Giurgevo. Although England and France were not represented by armies on the occasion, there were many English officers in the Turkish army.

When the siege of Silistria appeared to be ending disastrously for the Russians, Hussein Pacha, Turkish commander at Rustchuk, determined to make a dash at the island, and, through it, at Giurgevo. He thought the Russians were in retreat, and resolved to pursue them without previously consulting Omar Pacha; he was wrong in his belief, and his resolve led him into difficulties which taxed his courage and skill. Among the officers under his command were General Cannon—under the Oriental name of Behram Pacha—Lieutenant Burke of the Royal Engineers, Lieutenant Meynell of the 75th, Captain Arnold of the Bombay Engineers, and Colonel Ogilvy—all of whom took a sort of voluntary honorary share in the proceedings. These English officers, in fact, managed the expedition, under the orders of Hussein Pacha. At four o'clock on the morning of the 7th of July, four boats filled with 350 men passed over from Rustchuk to the island; while a steamer landed 200 men a little higher up—the one party commanded by General Cannon, the other by Colonel Ogilvy. The Russian pickets retired hastily; but soon afterwards a body of riflemen appeared, and fired at the Turks from among the sedge and brushwood. The Turkish riflemen replied, and kept up a sharp fire. Russian infantry, however, now began to advance in great force; and General Cannon recrossed to Rustchuk, to announce to Hussein Pacha that he must either have reinforcements or withdraw his troops. The two small bodies of Turks had by this time joined, under Colonel Ogilvy, and were driven back to the very edge of the island, bravely bearing up

against formidable numbers. Reinforcements now arrived from Rustchuk, until Ogilvy found himself at length at the head of 5000 men; while the Russians were, in like manner, reinforced from the Giurgevo side. For ten hours continuously did the struggle last, until nightfall put an end to it. Busily did the Turks occupy themselves during the night, throwing up intrenchments, and preparing for a renewal of warm work on the morrow; but when daylight arrived, they were surprised to find that the Russians had retreated during the night, and were at that moment passing out of the village of Slobodsa, on the Wallachian side. The Turks immediately advanced, and occupied Giurgevo. The loss was severe: 300 killed and 600 wounded on the side of the Turks; and a much larger, but unknown number, on the side of the Russians. The floating of dead bodies down the Danube conveyed to Silistria the first news of the engagement. Soon after this, a corps of engineers laid down a bridge from the island to the Wallachian shore, and Omar Pacha passed the Danube with an army of 45,000 men.

The battle of Giurgevo was very disastrous to the English officers engaged. Lieutenant Burke, Lieutenant Meynell, and Captain Arnold crossed to the island early in the day, with a few hundred men each; but, through want of sufficient concert, they landed at three different points, and were never able to assist each other. Burke and his party were attacked fiercely by the Russians immediately on landing; they were all, after a long struggle, either bayoneted or driven into the river; and Burke himself, sharing manfully the dangers with those under him, fell with two rifle-balls and thirty bayonet wounds. Meynell experienced almost exactly the same fate as Burke, at a different part of the island-shore. Arnold had at first a gleam of success: he advanced against one of the Russian batteries, and drove them out of the intrenchment; but a superior force came against him, and the bayonet and the river put an end to his corps as to the other two. Not only were these three unfortunate small bodies of troops separated one from another, but each and all were far distant from the main body under Colonel Ogilvy. The bodies of Arnold and Meynell were never found. Burke's body was found, and was interred in a simple way—affecting from its very simplicity. His loss was greatly regretted; for he was not only a skilful officer, but it was remembered that he had strongly objected to Hussein Pacha's attack, as being in its character injudicious; and his loss, under such circumstances, was all the more to be lamented. He had just rendered Omar Pacha service in the defence of Silistria; and was about to depart for the scene of operations on the Circassian shores of the Black Sea, when his career was thus suddenly ended.

After the contest at and near Giurgevo, some of the Russians retreated to Frateschti, some to Kalugereni, and some to a position still nearer Bucharest. The Turks crossed the Danube at two other points, a few miles above, and a few miles below Rustchuk, nearly at the time when the attack upon the island took place; and there were, in effect, three battles in progress at once—one on the island, and two between the Danube and Bucharest. The Russian generals were unfortunate in these encounters: Pagoff and Beboutoff were both wounded; while General Aurep, disgraced by the czar for his want of success, committed suicide. The Turkish Generals Iskender Bey, Halim Pacha, and Said Pacha, had various and frequent advantages over their antagonists of the Russian army. The two leaders were in near vicinity; and in proportion as Omar Pacha advanced into Wallachia, so did Prince Gortchakoff retire. The latter gathered his scattered forces from various directions, and posted them, to the number of 60,000, behind the river Arjish, in a position to command the roads from Giurgevo to Bucharest. These busy events in and around Giurgevo occurred during the first two weeks of July.

OPERATIONS IN THE DOBRUDSCHA AND AT SILISTRIA.

While the Turks, during the winter and spring, were thus making formidable attacks on the Wallachian side of the Danube, and occupying positions whence they could not be dislodged, the Russians were making attacks on the Bulgarian side, which there placed the Turks on the defensive. These attacks were mostly made in the Dobrudscha, near the mouth of the Danube; and at Silistria, which underwent a formidable siege.

This Dobrudscha is a remarkable district. The Danube, after an eastward course, turns suddenly to the north at Rassova; then bends eastward at Galatz; and finally empties itself into the Black Sea by several mouths, of which the Kilia, the Sulina, and the St George's, are the chief. The central mouth, the Sulina, is that which is adopted for the maintenance of the greater part of the trade of the Danube. The strip of land bounded on the west and north by these two bends of the river, and on the east by the Black Sea, constitutes the Dobrudscha. It is inhabited chiefly by a remnant of the Nogay Tatars, who, driven from Southern Russia by the Muscovites, sought a refuge here: they have intermarried with the Bulgarian peasantry, and, after having been converted to Christianity, they gradually conformed so intimately to the habits and usages of their neighbours, that they can now hardly be distinguished from the pure Bulgarians. The Dobrudscha is a wretched country. As far as the eye can reach, not a tree, not a shrub appears; the slight inequalities of the ground are covered with a coarse grass, which becomes yellow rather than green in the summer. Although near a large river, water is hardly visible on the surface, except in stagnant pools and marshes, and the inhabitants are forced to dig wells to obtain it. On the north, the Dobrudscha is bounded by the numerous

flat islands which constitute the delta of the Danube. These islands have no inhabitants, no trees, no shrubs; mosquitoes, ague, and fever attack those who make any long stay on these miserable spots. The Romans, when they arrived in their victorious career at this part of the Danubian regions, deemed the Dobrudscha a fitting place to act as a barrier against northern barbarians; they did not attempt to occupy it, but separated it from Mœsia—the name then given to Bulgaria—by a wall running from the Danube to the Black Sea; the terminal points of this wall are now marked by the towns of Rassova and Kustendji; and the wall itself, or its site, is still marked in the maps. Wretched as the place is, it has often been traversed by armies. When the Russians were in Bulgaria in 1828-9, the Dobrudscha suffered severely; many of the villages were quite extinguished, and all the towns were greatly reduced in population. At present, the inhabitants are supposed to be about 20,000 in number, in a district 70 miles long by 50 or 60 in width. The towns of Tultcha, Isakcha, Matchin, Hirsova, Rassova, Babadagh, and Kustendji, though important as military positions, are little other than villages in appearance and population.

It may be proper here to state, that a project was brought forward many years ago, and has been frequently discussed, to make a ship-canal across the neck of the Dobrudscha from Rassova to Kustendji, nearly in the line of Trajan's Wall. The Sulina mouth of the Danube is gradually becoming choked with sand; and the Russians, as part of their sinister policy, are more disposed to promote than remove the obstruction. It is conceived, therefore, that a canal, entirely within the limits of Bulgaria, would be advantageous, as being under the control of the Turkish authorities, and as saving a distance of considerably more than 200 miles in a voyage from the Middle or Upper Danube to Constantinople. There are, however, great difficulties in the way—difficulties which would entail an expenditure of several millions sterling, and a necessity for several years of peace and internal prosperity. The canal would require to be cut at certain places to a depth of 120 feet, along an aggregate distance of ten miles. In the formation of Kustendji, too, into a harbour fitted for large commerce, great outlay would be incurred; for the ships have, during many centuries, been in the habit of emptying out their ballast there, until the harbour has become almost completely silted up. Supposing it to be at all practicable, a canal here would certainly be of great value. 'It is impossible not to feel hearty good wishes for the success of this project. It would almost totally supersede the difficulty about the Sulina mouth of the Danube, which must always exist even if perfect fair play were observed; and few matters can have more direct bearing upon the general interests of European commerce. It is an important point for our consideration at the present moment, that the largest portion of our direct importations into the Turkish dominions are consumed in the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.'* Some engineers have directed their attention rather to a railway than a canal across this isthmus; but Turkey must undergo many ameliorations before railways can be reckoned among her media of commerce. The Dobrudscha in war-time, however, and not when the arts of peace are free to exercise their beneficial influence, is that with which we have now to treat.

Although the Russian operations in the Dobrudscha took the lead in importance, the Turks actually commenced in order of time. As early as October 23, 1853, before the crossings at Kalafat and Oltenitza, a collision occurred near the mouth of the Danube. On the preceding day, a Russian flotilla stationed at Ismail—on the northern or Kilia arm of the river—had sent off eight gun-boats, with six companies on board, in tow of two steamers, up the river to Galatz and Ibraila (Brailow, Brailoff). In their voyage they had to pass Isakcha, on the Turkish side of the river; and the Turks then fired upon them—the fire being returned by the gun-boats, and also by a body of Russian troops posted at Satanova opposite. About 100 Russians were killed and wounded, including the commander; but the gun-boats succeeded in passing on to their destination.

This was the commencement of bloodshed between the two forces. To prevent a repetition of such an attack, and to obtain entrance to Bulgaria through the Dobrudscha, the Russians assumed the offensive; and throughout the Danubian campaign, they took the lead in this part of the field of operations. The Russians made frequent attacks on the Dobrudscha, under General Lüders; and Omar Pacha ordered that, if a passage were made, the Turks should thereupon fall back to the line of Trajan's Wall, to bar further progress. The Russians collected a park of artillery at Galatz in December, numbering 120 guns. At Galatz and Ibraila they assembled about 10,000 men; but the Turkish garrisons at Matchin, Tultcha, and Isakcha, were at that time very small. In the little nook of country near the mouth of the Danube, where Wallachia, Bulgaria, Moldavia, and Bessarabia all meet, the Russians speedily brought down upon themselves the dislike and indignation of the inhabitants, by their unjust and even barbarous conduct. In the district of Mehedenz, a Russian general ordered all the men, women, and even young girls, to be employed in the severest labour for the service of the army; and when the villagers of Isvosila refused to obey, a detachment of 200 Cossacks was sent to chastise them; the villagers defended themselves, but were nearly all put to death during the struggle. A few who escaped, gave the alarm to the neighbouring villages; and during the ensuing night, 3000 peasants fell upon the Cossacks, and exterminated them. Hereupon the general ordered all the corn and provisions of

* Earl of Carlisle's *Diary*, p. 174.

the villages for miles round to be seized for the use of the Russian army; and the poor peasants found themselves visited by the sword and by hunger in the midst of winter, at the hands of their 'protectors.'

On the 8th of January, 3000 Russians crossed the Danube from Ibraila to Matchin, destroyed some field-works, and then retired under a brisk fire from the Turks. They also formed an intrenched camp in the island of Tchetal, in the Danube; which Halim Pacha prepared to attack from Tultcha. The Turks raised fortifications opposite all the Russian strong posts, with a view of resisting any and every passage as stoutly as possible; and from these opposed positions, as well as from the islands in the Danube, almost daily firings were maintained. On the 12th, General Engelhardt crossed from Galatz with 2000 men, and inflicted some mischief on the Turks.

The Russians fought by means of priests as well as by gunpowder. When they entered the Principalities, prayers and hymns were provided, suitable to the language and religion of the Wallachians; and when the Danube was about to be crossed, those same effusions were translated into the Bulgarian tongue. The prayers and hymns were printed in thousands, and were distributed by trusty agents. There was a general supplication for all orthodox believers, and for the synod and clergy; and then a special prayer for the Most Pious Autocrat, the Grand Master and Emperor of All the Russias, Nicholas Paulovitch, in which the Almighty is prayed to protect him 'from all evil, passion, and distress; to preserve him from all enemies, visible and invisible; to grant him peace, health, and a long life; and to encompass him with armed angels.' The Russian royal family were in like spirit to be prayed for—'Give, O Lord, to the Emperor Nicholas, to the Empress Alexandrina Feodorovna, and to their offspring, happy days, a peaceful life, health, and safety; and grant them the victory over all their enemies.' When such documents are distributed among the subjects of a neighbouring sovereign, it is easy to see how largely the religious element is adopted by one of the belligerents as an instrument of warfare. The soldiers belonging to the corps which Osten-Sacken brought into the Principalities, had the Greek cross depicted on their flags—a sufficient indication of the crusading spirit which the generals wished to impart to the war.

During January and February, the Turks succeeded in repelling most of the attacks of the Russians in the Dobrudscha; but the Russian forces became afterwards too powerful to be successfully resisted. In the latter half of the month of March, the Russians crossed the Danube from Galatz, Ibraila, and Ismail, and captured Tultcha, Matchin, and Isakcha; a few days afterwards, they took Hirsova; and the Turks next abandoned Czernavoda, near the Rassova end of Trajan's Wall. These operations rendered the Russians in great part masters of the Dobrudscha; but it was not without severe losses that they obtained such advantages over the Turks. And worse was to follow; for the Turks succeeded in preventing the Russians from advancing southward out of the Dobrudscha; and thus the latter remained for several weeks—indeed, during the greater part of April and May—pent up in this dismal, marshy, unwholesome district, with a broad river behind them, an active enemy in front of them, a hostile fleet on the east, and a discontented peasantry around them. So completely, indeed, was this the case, that during the remainder of the campaign, a Russian army remained locked up, as it were, in the Dobrudscha, contributing little towards the advancement of the czar's favourite objects.

A correspondent of the *Times* made a comparison between the condition of the Russian and Turkish soldiers, as exhibited during these frequent conflicts. 'From all that I can hear, the Turkish troops are far better fed than the Russians across the river; and this physical support, added to the more impetuous bravery of the Turk, renders the private Ottoman soldier decidedly superior to the Russian. At Oltenitza, the Russian officers were ahead of the infantry, sabre in hand, tugging on the not over-willing troops. On the contrary, the Turkish soldier was like the willing horse that required neither whip nor spur. It is in the excellent superior and staff officers, in the admirable cavalry horses, and in the native intelligence of the Cossacks, that the real strength of the Russian army lies—certainly not in either the moral or physical vigour of the common soldier.' The contrast, however, appears not to be always favourable to the Turk: 'But the Turkish soldier is as much worse dressed and equipped than the Russian as he is better fed. The coat and the two vests, which he receives once a year, are of bad cloth, and badly fitted. Instead of being done by open contract, they come out of the government establishments at Constantinople and Slivno, in Bulgaria. The soldier also receives one fez and two shirts a year, which are of fair quality; but the fez is certainly a most unsuitable head-dress—cold in winter, and exposing the eyes to the glare of both sun and snow. The want of a cravat is also a great defect. The allowance of shoes is apparently liberal, being three pair a year; but there is no soling, and they are often worn out in six weeks. In order to prevent the soldier from wearing his shoe down at the heel, the heels are hard, and consequently rub out the stocking in a day's time. The greatcoat and hood, furnished once in three years, are the best part of the costume; but, altogether, one may say respectfully to the minister of war, "Reform your tailor's bills."' At Shumla, the correspondent had a word to say concerning the Turkish commissariat. 'Early in the morning you may see orderly-sergeants, followed by a file of men, passing hither and thither in the streets, carrying the uncooked meat and rice, which is about to be converted into soup or pilau. A couple of hours later, you may

see the cooked rations carried to the different houses where the men are quartered. But you see no trains of commissariat wagons in or about the town; and every one knows there are no magazines. How the army is fed, is a mystery at first sight to a military man. To explain it, you must have a knowledge of the people and the circumstances of the country: you must know, that to the Christians of Bulgaria tradition has taught the necessity of obedience to masters whom they have not the courage or the ability to resist. They know that, being ordered to bring supplies for the army, they must do so; and finding that on delivery they receive *bons* for payment, which, after some time, are converted into money by the authorities in the villages and towns—they not only submit, but are glad to bring in supplies to feed the hosts which a few months back they imagined would have devastated their territory.' The matter is plain enough: if both Turks and Russians make compulsory demands on the peasants, the latter have little to choose between them; but if the Turks *pay*, and the Russians pay not, the Turks will naturally be the favourites.

The only great contest in which the numbers engaged were formidable in the Dobrudscha, occurred on the 18th and 19th of April, when Omar Pacha attacked Lüders in great force. The collision was not exactly in the Dobrudscha, but between Silistria and Rassova; the Russians, however, after great loss on both sides, were driven past Rassova into Czernavoda, and again shut up in the Dobrudscha.

It is now time to attend to the siege of Silistria —the most remarkable event in the Danubian campaign.

This town is perhaps the most important possessed by Turkey on the banks of the Danube. Whether it is equalled by Widdin in a military sense, is hard to say. The Danube is very broad at Silistria. The town contains about 20,000 inhabitants. It was held for some time by Russia, as a pledge for the fulfilment by the Turks of the provisions of the Treaty of Adrianople; and during that period a large Greek church and convent were commenced. The town is nearly semi-circular in form, with five bastions on the river-side, and seven landward. All the scarps and counterscarps of these bastions are of solid masonry. The main strength of the place consists in a series of detached forts, commanding the whole enciente of the town. One of these forts, called Abdul-Medjid, after the name of the sultan, is on an eminence at the back of Silistria, and is flanked on the right and left by two others—the three enclosing a kind of oval space. The town and its forts have been compared to a bracelet, of which Silistria is the jewel, and fort Abdul-Medjid the clasp—the two being connected by the minor forts on either side. The positions of these forts have direct relation to the bastions of the town; and most of these great defensive works were constructed by the Turks during the last six months of 1853—so important is Silistria deemed by them in a time of war. The fortifications were planned by Colonel Gutzkavskoi, a Polish officer. The fort Abdul-Medjid is of a semi-octagonal form; and in the centre of its base or diameter is a shell-proof redoubt, having a vaulted roof of vast solidity. Outside this redoubt is an esplanade; then a pentagonal rampart; and then a wall, loopholed for infantry, completely sunk between the rampart and the covered-way, with three shell-proof block-houses, each mounted with 12-pound howitzers. Three of the minor forts, to assist the Abdul-Medjid in defending Silistria, are on neighbouring but lower eminences; and four others are in the low ground east and west of the town. The main defences, however, in the great struggle of 1854, were earthworks constructed eastward of the town.

The Russians and the Turks are equally aware of the strategetical importance of Silistria. If this town be taken, the Turks at once lose one angle of the triangle which it forms with Rustchuk and Shumla; they become, moreover, in danger of losing any troops which they may have in the Dobrudscha, and which might thus be cut off; and the Russians, in holding Silistria, would possess a *tête de pont* for operations on Shumla and Varna, in the direction of the Balkan. The Russians found the conquest of Silistria practicable in 1828–9; but the fortifications and the troops were of a very different character in 1854, when another attack was made.

Although there were repeated skirmishes during the winter near Silistria, sometimes on one side of the Danube, and sometimes on the other, it was not until April that siege operations commenced in form. About the 14th of this month, Russian batteries of great power were completed on the north bank of the Danube, and a bombardment commenced. This cannonading was continued almost uninterruptedly for a fortnight, day and night, during which time a prodigious number of balls and shells were thrown into the town. By the close of the month, the Russians had established other batteries on the south bank, east of the town. Fearful was the destruction; the Turks were so incessantly active, so bold and resolute, that every operation by General Schilders was watched and met promptly; and it was three weeks before the investment was completed. The Russian forces were, however, tremendous; besides enormous batteries on the north shore, there were no less than 50,000 troops conveyed over to the south shore; while the Turks were less than 10,000 altogether. Eastward of the town were some earthworks, called *tabias*, sufficiently elevated to command the town itself; these the Russians naturally wished to take; these the Turks naturally determined to defend; and the hand-to-hand conflict became terrific. The Turks were well commanded; and, as usual, they fought well when the officers were men of skill and courage. The commander of Silistria was Mussa or Moussa

Pacha, Director-general of the Artillery of the Turkish Empire; a man well versed in the best systems of European artillery and fortifications, and possessing energy and spirit unlike those which we are in the habit of attributing to the 'lazy Turks.' He was seconded by Mehemet Bey, colonel of engineers—a Mulatto of herculean frame, who had arrived with a contingent of tried Egyptian soldiers.

This was a period at which the Turks waited anxiously for any help which their Allies could afford them. They had heard much of the formidable preparations of the English and French at Varna and Gallipoli, and elsewhere; and they naturally thought that now, when the most critical period of the campaign had arrived, was the time at which aid should be afforded to them. But such was not to be. The English and French generals were embarrassed by intricate diplomacy and uncertain orders from London and Paris; and none of their regiments were sent to Silistria. What were the Turks to do? They were hemmed into a town on the banks of the Danube, a mere handful of men; they looked out in vain for help from other quarters; and they were beset by a Russian army, which swelled day by day, and which now numbered Prince Paskévitch among its officers. Early in May, the Russians established a position in some small islands immediately in front of the town; and the Turks had to defend themselves against these assailants, as well as against those who had landed on the south shore.

The Turks began to droop; and they would perhaps have drooped more—drooped to destruction—but for two Englishmen. There happened to be two young officers on their passage from India to England, Captain Butler, and Lieutenant Nasmyth, who stopped at Silistria on their way. Their blood warmed up at the heroic defence made by the Turks; and they did their best to render the defence still more heroic. They taught the Turks a few things which they had learned in India; and they assisted a Prussian officer, who happened also to be present, to give a scientific turn to some of the defensive operations. Thus encouraged, the small band of Turks fought wonderfully; they made frequent sorties, which inflicted great loss on the Russians.

The Russian operations, when the troops had crossed the Danube, were chiefly eastward of the town. Here the Turks had two forts or earthworks—the Arab Tabia and the Illani Tabia. Earthen as they were, the safety of Silistria depended on their preservation; and there have perhaps been few examples in war in which earthworks have been so pertinaciously attacked and defended. Schilders brought an enormous force to bear against them; but the Turks, burrowing in holes to avoid the bursting shells, re-appeared instantly, and disputed, inch by inch, the possession of the ground. By the middle of May, the Russians outside Silistria amounted to nearly 70,000, of whom nearly one-half were on the right bank of the river, while the rest were in the islands and on the opposite shore. The fort Abdul-Medjid, or Medjidié Tabia, was too strong to be attacked until the earthworks were taken; and thus for three weeks was an incessant bombardment of the Arab Tabia maintained, conducted by Prince Paskévitch in person.

The 29th of May (1854) was a tremendous day at Silistria—a day not speedily to be forgotten. Three bodies of Russians, amounting in the whole to 30,000 men, proceeded to storm the forts—some advancing to Arab Tabia, and some to Illani Tabia—and all well provided with fascines, scaling-ladders, and the other apparatus necessary for a storming-party. A letter from Lieutenant Nasmyth thus speaks of the day's hot work: 'About midnight, aroused by the report of musketry from Arab Tabia; and on reaching the rampart at the Stamboul Gate, found that a second and much more serious night-attack on that work was going on. The first assault was on the left face, the enemy actually penetrating into the redoubt before they were observed. A Russian officer who led it, and cut down a lieutenant of artillery, was immediately brained by a hand-spike. A severe and desperate struggle took place, terminating in the repulse of the enemy, who were driven into the ditch, having suffered severely from our grape and canister tearing through them. Re-forming, they again attempted it in the same place, led gallantly on with drums beating, but were again driven back with great slaughter. After about a quarter of an hour, a third attack was made—this time on both left and front faces at once, but meeting with the same determined resistance. After a bloody fight, the Russians were finally beaten off, the Albanians pursuing them into their own batteries. The force in Arab Tabia at the time was only four battalions of Egyptians, and 500 Albanians, under the command of Hussein Pacha. The lowest estimate of the numbers with which the enemy attacked is nine battalions; and it is not improbable, from the number of dead found in and about the fort, that this is considerably under the mark. The affair lasted from midnight till after daybreak, and is one of the most brilliant occurrences in the whole course of the siege.' The Turks lost about 200 killed and wounded in this attack; while it is asserted, on more than one authority, that the Russian loss could not have been much less than ten times as great, so murderous was the fire with which the Turks met them.

It was about this period that an interview took place between the opposing commanders, under a flag of truce. If the conversation be correctly reported, it was certainly characteristic of the respective nations. Prince Paskévitch said, that it might perhaps stop the further effusion of blood if he made the simple announcement, that the czar, his imperial master, had sent *positive orders that the place must be taken*. Mussa Pacha replied, that *he* also had a simple announcement to make, to the effect that 'Abdul-Medjid Khan had honoured

him with positive instructions to defend the place, and that he would not surrender even if he had but a thousand men, and all Russia was at its gates, headed by the czar in person.' There is one account of this interview which states, that the Muscovite prince thereupon made a sort of masonic sign with his hand, denoting a large sum of money; which sign the Turk did not deem it consistent with his duty to respond to. Unfortunately for Russia, bribery is too prevalent to permit us to disbelieve the probability of such an occurrence as this.

On the 31st of May, the Russians resumed operations by a fierce assault; but they were received as fiercely as before, and were repulsed with a loss of 2000 men. On the 2d of June, a mine was sprung, which might have worked terrible mischief to the Turks; but being badly primed, it exploded in the wrong direction, and killed Russians instead of Turks. It was on this day that the Turks met with a severe loss in the person of their gallant commander, Mussa Pacha, who was struck between the shoulders by a piece of an exploding shell while sitting outside his quarters at the Stamboul Gate: he had just received intelligence that the sultan had sent him the Order of Medjidié for his gallantry; but he did not live to wear this honour. Being an active, intelligent, and skilful officer, as well as devoted to his sovereign and kind to his men, his loss was much deplored. The command devolved upon Hussein Pacha, who was succeeded at the Arab Tabia by Latif Bey. The 2d of June was a busy day in yet another particular—the arrival of a reinforcement of 5000 Bashi-Bazouks under Mehemet Pacha.

After various assaults on the part of the Russians, and various sorties of the Turks, the 13th of June was the day fixed upon for a tremendous attack by the Russians. Prince Gortchakoff had received a contusion which compelled him to retire; but Paskévitch and Schilders headed the formidable movement in person. The Russians had become quite dispirited by this long series of unsuccessful attacks, and it was as much as Paskévitch, Schilders, and Lüders could do to urge them to this grand assault. The conflict was terrific; the Russians were impelled by the mingled threats and encouragements of their commanders—the Turks would not yield an inch in any quarter. The cannonading and musketry were incessant; Schilders was struck by a cannon-ball, which carried off both his legs; Lüders had his jaw carried away; Paskévitch was slightly wounded; Orloff was dangerously wounded; and Dannenberg, who had failed in Wallachia, had to take the command. The defeat of the Russians was utter and complete—mortifying to them beyond almost any event of the campaign. The Turks fought with a degree of obstinate perseverance and dauntless valour which is said to have utterly confounded the Russians; they rushed up close to the Russian batteries with hatchets, if other weapons were wanting, and in many cases scared away the gunners by their very audacity.

The Russian works outside Silistria at this time were quite extraordinary for their magnitude. There was a bridge of boats across the Danube; there were batteries on two islands in the river; and there were numerous batteries on the south side of the river, eastward of the town. The Russian covered-ways extended their zigzags for some miles, the nearest at about 50, and the furthest at about 300 yards from the Arab Tabia. There was an encampment in a hollow beyond, and this encampment was defended by numerous small forts, some as far distant as seven miles from the town.

The Turks met with a sad loss in Captain Butler, who was wounded on the 13th, while making a reconnoissance of the enemy's position for a proposed sortie. He was struck in the forehead by a ball; and although there was no apparent danger, he sank eight days afterwards. Yet the Turks, although they had lost Mussa Pacha and Captain Butler, did not relax their defensive operations for an instant. Not only were the Russians defeated on the 13th, but an immense portion of their siege-works was destroyed. On the 15th, the Turks assumed the offensive: they made a sortie; they drove the Russians across the Danube; they gained access to the islands; they turned the guns in these islands against the Wallachian shore; and they erected new batteries of their own on the Danube front of Silistria.

At length, on the 23d of June, after a close siege of forty-five days, the Russians had the humiliation of retiring from their work, beaten at all points. In every particular, the Turks had o'ertopped them in glory. The Russian army was many times as large as the Turkish, yet not one of its assaults had been successful. There were 7000 Russians left killed or wounded outside Silistria; while the hospitals on the Wallachian side are said to have received as many as 20,000 invalids, who had suffered in various ways during the siege. The conflict on the earthworks was often quite remarkable: when the walls and embrasures were knocked to pieces, the Turks would burrow in passages beneath their redoubts, wait till the cannonading was suspended, watch for the approach of the storming-parties, rush out of their places of concealment, and fall upon the Russians with inconceivable fury, overthrowing and repulsing them by their impetuosity. The defence of Silistria has attracted much attention from those engineers who advocate earthworks instead of masonry for fortifications.

It was right that the Turks should honour the memory of Captain Butler. Omar Pacha wrote a letter to Lord Raglan, dated 1st July, in which he said: 'Parmi les braves qui ont pris part à la défense glorieuse de Silistrie, se trouvaient deux officiers Anglais, dont je ne dois oublier les noms. Le jeune Capitaine Butler, arrivé pendant l'hiver avec M. Nasmyth au Quartier General de Shumla, était à Silistrie au moment où les Russes commençaient l'attaque contre la place. Tous les

deux pouvaient se rétirer, mais, la voix de l'honneur parlant haut chez eux, ils préférerent de rester, dans l'idée d'être utile dans la lutte qui se préparait. Leur exemple, leur conseil, ont puissamment contribués à la conservation des forts attaqués. . . . Malheureusement, M. Butler, blessé d'un balle au front, a trouvé là une mort glorieuse ; mais sa mémoire ne périra pas dans l'armée Ottomane.' Lord Raglan, in a dispatch to the Duke of Newcastle, spoke of Captain Butler as an officer who 'had so greatly distinguished himself, and had in all he had done shewn so much prudence, courage, and ability, that his death cannot be too deeply lamented.' Lord Hardinge, when the news reached England, wrote a generous and feeling letter to Lieutenant-general Butler, concerning the death of his young and heroic son, who, although only twenty-seven years of age, had served against the Kafirs, and for several years in Ceylon. In the course of the letter, his lordship said: 'During the whole of the siege, your son displayed very rare qualities, combining with the skill and intelligence of an accomplished officer, the intrepidity of the most daring soldier; at one moment gaining the confidence of the garrison—over which he had only the authority of a very young volunteer—by the example of his personal valour; at another, prolonging the defence of the place by the prudence and firmness of his counsel; and, on all occasions, infusing into those around him that spirit of heroic resistance which led to its triumphant defence.' A letter from the seat of war stated, in reference to Butler, 'there can be no doubt that he and Lieutenant Nasmyth have been the mainstay of the place; as, had it not been for their energetic remonstrances on the 25th May, the outwork of Arab Tabia would have been abandoned.' It is said that Omar Pacha was more affected by the death of Captain Butler than by any other event in the course of the campaign. The young Englishman was attended to the grave, in the Armenian cemetery at Silistria, by officers from every company in the Turkish army.

A correspondent of one of the London newspapers, by permission of Omar Pacha, visited Silistria immediately after the siege. He said: 'The street through which we passed was broken every few yards by large holes, five feet deep and three wide, in which were the remnants of Russian shells. The roofs of the houses were all more or less pierced by the passage of these terrible balls, and the party-walls were full of holes. The minarets in many places were pierced into steeples *à giorno;* but though many were much damaged, none had fallen. Nor had the houses crumbled to the ground under the fire, but stood bravely up under their wounds; it seemed, in truth, as if the edifices of Silistria had partaken of the spirit of its defenders, and had determined, like them, not to fall at any price. It is almost needless to say, that in Silistria no inhabitants had remained—they had all taken refuge in caves scooped out of the earth at the side of the hills, where they lay safely ensconced, suffering no doubt from want of motion, and sometimes from want of food, but safe. The soldiers alone remained in this place, sleeping at their posts by the walls, where they could man them at a moment's notice.' There was a spot where, during the siege, the Russians imagined the Turks had hidden in underground passages. 'Upon this spot they had thrown thousands of shells. The places where they exploded harmlessly, were marked by little sticks planted there by the Turks; they were willow-wands, which, if they were to grow, would make a small forest. To the right of this favourite spot, no less than 2000 unexploded shells were picked up during the progress of the siege. This may give a faint idea of the warmth, more than tropical, there during several weeks.'

Lieutenant Nasmyth—who was raised to the rank of major by his own government, decorated with the Cross of the Legion of Honour by the French, and with that of the Medjidié by the Turks—commented, with some severity, in a letter in the *Times*, on the Russian tactics at Silistria. 'The Turkish army,' he says, 'may well talk with pride. Their opponents had an army on the right bank of the Danube, which at one time amounted to 60,000 men. They had 60 guns in position, and threw upwards of 50,000 shot and shell, besides an incalculable quantity of small-arm ammunition. They constructed more than three miles of approaches, and sprang six mines. Yet during forty days, not one inch of ground was gained; and they abandoned the siege, leaving the petty field-work against which their principal efforts had been directed, a shapeless mass from the effects of their mines and batteries, but still in possession of its original defenders.'

We are now in a position to gather up the scattered threads of the Danubian campaign. When once the Turks had succeeded in making a passage from Widdin to Kalafat, all attempts of the Russians to dislodge them from the last-named town proved unavailing; and, as was narrated in a former page, the Russians found it necessary to retreat across the Aluta towards Bucharest, as summer approached. The various contests at Oltenitza, and other parts on the north side of the Danube, in the wide extent between Kalafat and Rassova, were desultory, so far as regards any permanent advantage of one army over the other. The Russian occupation of the Dobrudscha, too, became nearly fruitless, as long as they were prevented from passing out of that district towards the south or west. Thus it arose that the siege of Silistria became the turning-point of the whole campaign: if the Russians had gained it, the command thence obtained over Bulgaria would have given them great advantages in respect to any future proceedings; but the utter failure of the siege rendered the position of Paskévitch and Gortchakoff very embarrassing. It was immediately after this failure at Silistria, that the Turks

crossed the Danube, and fought the battle of Giurgevo, as already narrated. Omar Pacha crossed the Danube when the last Russian soldier had left the neighbourhood of Silistria; and the battle of Giurgevo was only one among many conflicts which then occurred in Wallachia.

The two extreme points in the Russian line of operations—Lesser Wallachia on the west, and the Dobrudscha on the east—were necessarily affected by the turn which affairs were taking at Silistria. By degrees, Krajova, Radovan, Ternova, Karakal, and Slatina, were abandoned in the one; and Rassova, Hirsova, Matchin, Isakcha, and Tultcha, in the other: one Russian army retired through Upper Wallachia towards Bucharest; and a second re-crossed the Danube at various points into Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bessarabia.

The Danubian shores became an unfitting locality for the Russians by the end of July. The siege of Silistria raised, Giurgevo and its island abandoned, both banks of the river near that town held in great force by Omar Pacha—Gortchakoff found his position at Bucharest untenable, at a distance of only thirty-five miles from Giurgevo. The Russian general made a virtue of necessity: he issued a proclamation to the inhabitants, telling them that the all-puissant czar had ordered the troops to quit the unhealthy regions of the Danube for a brief season; but promised to return and deliver them from the barbarian Turks, as soon as a more healthy time arrived. He left the city with his army on the 28th of July; and on the 8th of August, the Turks entered it with colours flying, drums beating, and trumpets sounding. Christians as the Wallachians are, they had tasted the bitters of Muscovite 'occupation' so keenly, that they welcomed the Mussulman Turks as being less objectionable than the Christian Russians. Halim Pacha issued a proclamation to the inhabitants, running thus: 'Inhabitants of Bucharest! the troops of your sovereign have entered this city to maintain good order, and the respect due to all established authority. Let no one presume to take the initiative in committing any violence tending to produce any change whatever. At the moment of their retreat, the Russian troops confided to our care the sick, whose weak state did not permit their removal. We will shew that we are worthy of this confidence, and that, until such time as our hospitals shall be established in this city, they shall be treated in the houses where they now are, with all the anxious attention demanded by the love of our neighbour, and by humanity; for two empires, enemies at this moment, may be friends to-morrow, and ought to respect each other even amidst the horrors of war. Such are our wishes; the Wallachians, by conforming to them, will prove the gratitude and respect they owe to their all-powerful sovereign.' Whether this document had been peculiarly worded to suit the position and tastes of the Moldo-Wallachians, certain it is that a spirit of enlarged liberality and charity is manifested in it, for which we should search in vain in any of the Russian proclamations, high-flown as they may be. The Moslem has not much to learn from the Muscovite in this matter.

The present Chapter has been purposely kept free from the intricacies of diplomacy, because it has had to deal with the stern events of actual war. But there was one ambassadorial proceeding which must not be left unnoticed—exercising, as it unquestionably did, a marked influence on the close of the campaign. This was the treaty between Turkey and Austria. Without previous concert with England and France, the Porte concluded a treaty with the court of Vienna—a treaty which, fair on the surface, was much canvassed afterwards. By this treaty, Austria undertook to occupy the Principalities as against Russia: it was signed on 14th June, and runs thus:—

'His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, fully recognising that the existence of the Ottoman Empire within its present limits is necessary for the maintenance of the balance of power between the States of Europe, and that, specifically, the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities is one of the essential conditions of the integrity of that empire; being, moreover, ready to join, with the means at his disposal, in the measures proper to insure the object of the agreement established between his Cabinet and the High Courts represented at the Conference of Vienna;

His Imperial Majesty the Sultan having on his side accepted this offer of concert, made in a friendly manner by His Majesty the Emperor of Austria;

It has seemed proper to conclude a Convention, in order to regulate the manner in which the concert in question shall be carried into effect.'

Then, after two or three merely formal paragraphs, the articles of the treaty run thus:

'ART. I.—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria engages to exhaust all the means of negotiation, and all other means, to obtain the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities by the foreign army which occupies them, and even to employ, in case they are required, the number of troops necessary to attain this end.

ART. II.—It will appertain in this case exclusively to the Imperial Commander-in-chief to direct the operations of his army. He will, however, always take care to inform the Commander-in-chief of the Ottoman army of his operations in proper time.

ART. III.—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria undertakes, by common agreement with the Ottoman Government, to re-establish in the Principalities, as far as possible, the legal state of things such as it results from the privileges secured by the Sublime Porte in regard to the administration of those countries. The local authorities thus reconstituted, shall not, however, extend their action so far as to attempt to exercise control over the Imperial army.

ART. IV.—The Imperial Court of Austria further engages not to enter into any plan of accommodation with the Imperial Court of Russia which has not for its basis the sovereign rights of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, as well as the integrity of his Empire.

ART. V.—As soon as the object of the present Convention shall have been obtained by the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between the Sublime Porte and the Court of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria will immediately make arrangements for withdrawing his forces with the least possible delay from the territory of the Principalities. The details respecting the retreat of the Austrian troops shall form the

object of a special understanding with the Sublime Porte.

ART. VI.—The Austrian Government expects that the authorities of the countries temporarily occupied by the Imperial troops will afford them every assistance and facility, as well for their march, their lodging or encampment, as for their subsistence and that of their horses, and for their communications. The Austrian Government likewise expects that every demand relating to the requirements of the service shall be complied with, which shall be addressed by the Austrian commanders, either to the Ottoman Government through the Imperial Internunciate at Constantinople, or directly to the local authorities, unless more weighty reasons render the execution of them impossible.

It is understood that the commanders of the Imperial army will provide for the maintenance of the strictest discipline among their troops, and will respect, and cause to be respected, the properties as well as the laws, the religion, and the customs of the country.

ART. VII.—The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Vienna in the space of four weeks, or earlier if possible, dating from the day of its signature.

In faith of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed it, and set their seals to it.

Done in duplicate, for one and the same effect, at Boyadji-Keuy, the fourteenth of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four.

(L.S.) V. BRUCK. (L.S.) RESHID.'

BUCHAREST.

It belongs not to the present chapter to touch upon the complaints which the Moldo-Wallachians, with too much justice, made at a subsequent period, concerning the mode in which the Austrians conducted themselves during this occupancy. The occupancy itself, as a historical event, simply offers itself for notice here. An Austrian force was placed under the command of Count Coronini; and this force crossed the Carpathians from Transylvania into Wallachia on the 20th of August. The Austrians entered Bucharest on the 6th of September. Coming, as they did, as the allies and defenders of Turkey, arrangements were made to afford them a kind of triumphant entry. Omar Pacha, with a Turkish division and a detachment of Wallachian militia, went out at the principal gate of the city; near which were assembled the members of the administration, several of the boyars or nobles, a large number of priests of the Greek and Latin churches, and a vast concourse of people. Count Coronini was then conducted in form into the city, at the head of his army. Dervish Pacha, Ottoman commissioner in Wallachia, issued the following proclamation, explanatory of the objects for which the Austrians had entered the Principalities:—'The Sublime Porte having entered into a convention with his Imperial Apostolic Majesty, as previously with the governments of France and England, it is my duty to make known to you, that in accordance with that convention, the Imperial Austrian troops will provisionally occupy both Principalities. The presence of these troops in Wallachia need cause no uneasiness to you, for they enter the country as one of the friendly powers allied with the Sublime Porte. These troops will be in noway a burden to you, for they will pay for everything purchased with ready money. After the Russians have positively evacuated the Principalities, the former government of the country will be restored.

Your ancient privileges are and will be scrupulously preserved.'

These unfortunate Principalities! Turned over to the 'protection' of different powers in succession; overrun with the armies of Turkey, Russia, and Austria, as the fluctuations of diplomacy or war may determine; controlled now by the Moslem creed, now by the adherents of the Greek Church, now by the believers in Latin Christianity; deprived of the exercise of manly spirit, which self-dependence and self-government afford—the inhabitants of Wallachia and Moldavia are seldom allowed long to remain at peace. In 1849, a Russian army and a Turkish army were watching each other's movements here; the Wallachians having to feed both. In 1853, the Russians unceremoniously walked into their houses, reaped their corn, took their cattle. When the Turks drove out the Russians in 1854, Wallachian corn and cattle had to feed the Osmanlis; and when the Austrians succeeded the Turks, still were the inhabitants of the Principalities made to feel that they could only be nominally their own masters. The provinces are on the confines of three great empires; and hence these experiences. Ivan Golovin speaks strongly on this point: 'If there be a wretched people, it is the Moldo-Wallachian people, partitioned into three like Poland and like Armenia. The Bukovina belongs to Austria, Bessarabia to Russia, and Moldavia and Wallachia to Turkey. The Russian spirit has already penetrated into the administration of the Principalities. The construction and repair of roads, the magazines of corn, the recruitment, and the law, are only so many means of venality for the officials. The extraordinary taxes already exceed the legal obligations; the expenses exceed the receipts; and the Russian decorations and titles serve to foster servility.'* This is an anti-Russian account: the Moldo-Wallachians could probably bring forth grievances anti-Turkish and anti-Austrian.

The best mode of dealing with these provinces has occupied much attention on the part of the several courts of Europe. About a year after the signing of the Treaty of Boyadji-Keuy, between Austria and Turkey, Lord Palmerston, in reply to a suggestion that the Principalities should be declared neutral, said: 'I am not disposed to attach any great importance to this proposition. In the first place, whenever a quarrel has arisen, and when it became desirable for the belligerent powers to possess the neutral territory, that neutrality has never been very religiously respected. Besides, are the Principalities, if declared neutral, to be continued as a portion of the Ottoman Empire? If they are not, then they would soon share the fate of Poland; if they are, then the moment hostilities break out, Russia would cease to respect their neutrality; for war dissolves all treaties.' This seems rather a fatal dilemma for the Moldo-Wallachians. His lordship, however, proceeded as follows:—'But the interests of the Principalities have not been neglected. It has been proposed to put them under the protection of the Five Powers, and to establish a system of internal defence; a force would thus be established which, if not at once sufficient to resist a Russian invasion, would supply the foundation for a national defence.'*

There are peculiarities in the Principalities which offer many inducements to speculate on their future fortune. The inhabitants are neither Russians nor Turks, neither Slavons nor Magyars; they are descendants of the ancient Dacians, who intermarried with Roman colonists established by Trajan. They have a sufficiency of Roman blood in them to obtain the national designation of Romani or Roumani or Daco-Romans, although more usually called Wallacks; and their language contains many words of Latin origin. Their country, in past ages, comprised not only Wallachia and Moldavia; but Bessarabia, now Russian; the Buckowine or Bukovina, Transylvania, and the Banat, now Austrian; and Bulgaria, now Turkish. Unfortunately, Dacia, if we give this name to the whole country, lay in the route of the fierce tribes who entered Western Europe from Asia—Goths, Huns, Avars, Bulgars, Scythians, all desolated those fertile plains in turn. After many dislocations and curtailments of territory, the nation settled down into two independent princedoms or hospodarates—Wallachia and Moldavia. Four centuries ago, they were so far conquered by the Osmanlis as to become tributary states; but only to the extent of paying an annual sum of money to the sultan. About a century and a half ago, the Moldo-Wallachians were deprived of the power of choosing their own princes: the Porte usually granting that dignity to some Greek who would pay highly for the honour, and who took care to reimburse himself by the most grinding exactions on the people. In other matters, the Porte does not appear to have ill used the Moldo-Wallachians; but there was here quite sufficient to tempt the czars and czarinas to interfere. Reign after reign has increased the power of Russia in the Principalities, until both national independence and Turkish supremacy have nearly disappeared. The events of 1854 developed many schemes for restoring the nationality of this people, who, in the various provinces above named, amount in all to nearly 10,000,000 souls. A map of 'Europe as it will be' appeared about that time, in which, among other liberties taken with our familiar political geography, a new state is laid down under the title of *Rumania*, containing such provinces of three empires as are inhabited by the Daco-Romans or Wallacks or Roumani. In view of the complicated relations of European politics, the English premier could scarcely hold out encouragement to any such development of 'nationalities' in those regions.

* *The Nations of Russia and Turkey*, p. 46.

* Speech in the House of Commons, June 8, 1855.

That Bucharest (Bukhorest), the capital of Wallachia, should present many of the strange diversities occasioned by these conflicting nationalities, might reasonably be expected. Jassy, the capital of Moldavia, is a much less important place: if 'Rumania' be ever formed, Bucharest will doubtless be its metropolis. Bucharest is a medley of nations, among whom Russians, or Greeks in Russian interest, contrive to hold the upper place. Considered as a town, it contains the hospodar's palace, the residences of the boyars or feudal nobles, the metropolitan church, about sixty other churches, about twenty monasteries and convents, Roman Catholic and Lutheran churches, a Jewish synagogue, a large bazaar, several hospitals and infirmaries, a lyceum or university, and several consular residences. Regarded as the residence of the prince or hospodar of Wallachia, the seat of the divan or council, the see of an archbishop, and the head-quarters of the foreign envoys or consuls, Bucharest might be expected to present the aspect of a fine town; yet the bulk of the 50,000 or 60,000 inhabitants live in a heap of wretched brick or mud cabins, ranged along lines of streets either unpaved or covered with trunks of oaks. The town contains an immense number of coffee-houses, almost every one of which has a gambling or billiard table. The inhabitants are fond of outward display, and of public festivals, drinking, music, and dancing; and when assembled on their favourite Corso, or public mall, their dress and appearance present a singular admixture of the European and the Oriental. Bucharest has been somewhat hastily set down as 'the most dissolute town in the world;' but those who know Wallachia best, assert that the immorality is mostly among the extra-national or Russian employés; that the native inhabitants would fairly stand comparison in this respect with those of more western cities.

Reverting to the Danubian campaign—the last scene now approached. The Austrians entered Bucharest on the 6th of September; and the rear corps of the Russians recrossed the Pruth into their own dominions about the middle of the same month.

This campaign, as the course of the present chapter will have sufficiently shewn, redounds solely to the credit of the Turks. The knowledge that the English and French forces were not far removed, undoubtedly affected the Russian plans as summer approached; and the Austrian intervention precipitated the retreat of the Russians; but the Turks formed their own strategy—selected, in most cases, their own battle-fields—fought their own battles—and certainly achieved more victories than their opponents, albeit inferior in numbers.

Sir George Larpent, writing his volumes about the time when the Danubian campaign ended, thus comments on it: 'Omar Pacha has most brilliantly refuted the croaking predictions of the friends of Russia. His position, from the Black Sea to the Austrian frontier, has gained the approbation of all military men. How correctly he judged when he selected Little Wallachia as the point of attack, and made Kalafat the *tête de pont* of Widdin, is proved by the desperate exertions made by the Russians to regain this position. There is a certain touchstone, by which it can be discovered which of two commanders is superior in talent: it is the one who, through his operations, undertakes the management of the war, and forces his opponent to follow his movements. Omar Pacha has undoubtedly acted this part. In another point he has also shewn his superiority: he has never suffered himself to be deceived by pretended attacks, which was frequently the case on the Russian side, more especially when Omar Pacha intended to take up his permanent position at Kalafat, and crossed the Danube and attacked the Russians at other points; so that they neglected the position which it was so important to their clever opponent to obtain. In addition to this, his management of the war is based on a very correct estimate of what the troops on either side are able to do. He chooses those modes of fighting in which the Turks are superior to the Russians. The Turkish soldier is a good *tirailleur*, which the Russian never learns, for he is nothing but a machine. The Turkish soldier defends walls and intrenchments with a love of the sport, in which he is only probably surpassed by the Spaniards; while the Russian is perfectly helpless in an attack on strong places. In accordance with these qualities of the opposed troops, Omar Pacha regulates his plan of campaign, carries on an interrupted little war, and intrenches himself when larger bodies are marched against him.'* This language is in some parts perhaps exaggerated; but nevertheless the fact is certain, that the Russians fight best in masses, while the Turks prefer those more detailed tactics in which each soldier feels the value of his own individual exertions towards the attainment of the one common end. This quality is in some degree expressed by the French military term *tirailleur*.

Kalafat and Silistria will ever be ranked as the chief memorials of the Danubian campaign in 1853–4. Oltenitza and Giurgevo brought a share of honour to the Turks, and the Russians had a few gleams of success in the Dobrudscha; but the defence of Kalafat and Silistria shewed sufficiently that the Osmanli is not yet utterly effete in presence of the Muscovite.

The operations of this campaign have also attracted much attention in connection with the relative merits of earthwork and masonry in fortifications; and it is believed that subsequent operations in the war were based on the experience hence derived. The battle of Oltenitza has been characterised as one fought quite as much with the spade as the musket: it shewed how important to raw troops even the slightest breast-work

* *Turkey: its History and Progress*, ii. 330.

is, when they are called upon to resist the disciplined masses of a regular army. When the Turks crossed the Danube, they began immediately to trench or defend themselves by mounds of earthwork; and behind these defences they resisted every attack which the Russians could bring against them. Again, at Kalafat; the Turks so quickly and so effectually threw up defences of earthwork, that all attempts of the Russians to overcome the resistance were frustrated; and any passage across the Danube into the western parts of Bulgaria was rendered abortive by this one work; for the Russians dared not leave in their rear a place so defended. Again, at Silistria; the defence was essentially an affair of earthworks, supported by the heroic courage of a small body of men. The *tabias* were field-works on elevated spots commanding the town; they consisted of trenches, ditches, and parapets, all formed by the spade, and mounted with cannon. It was these simple earthworks which the Russians so long and fiercely attacked, and which the Turks so pertinaciously and successfully defended. When the Russians found they could effect nothing by assault, they mined underneath; but the Turks, listening attentively to the miners, abandoned the front works, and hastily threw up new works in the rear; whereby the Russians, when their mines were exploded, found that the Turks were beyond reach, and that the work had to be commenced *de novo*. The calculations of the Russian engineers were repeatedly overturned; and the Turkish defence of Silistria has almost assumed the rank of a new discovery or invention in the art of war.

Wallachian Peasantry.

CHAPTER III.

ALLIANCE OF THE WESTERN POWERS WITH TURKEY.

INVOLVING as it did different nations in hostilities, and appealing to the honour and interests of those nations on different grounds, the war grew in magnitude as time advanced. At first, it appeared little else than a dispute on a trifling question at Jerusalem; then it extended to exciting discussions and hostile threats at Constantinople; then it amplified into formidable battles and desperate sieges on the banks of the Danube; and finally it drew into its vortex the Western Powers—England with her powerful navy, France with her magnificent army. So important is it, to a due comprehension of the *rationale* of the war, to know the exact grounds whereon England and France were impelled into a conflict which cost them millions of treasure and thousands of lives, that it will be necessary here to enter somewhat fully on this matter, before tracing the advance of the British and French armies to Gallipoli and Varna. Clearness of arrangement will be obtained by noticing in succession the diplomacy of the statesmen and ambassadors, the celebrated 'Secret Correspondence,' and the actual declaration of war, with its accompanying proceedings.

DIPLOMACY OF 1853: THE ATTACK AT SINOPE.

It was the policy of England to remain neutral in respect to the question of the Holy Places; peacefully advising all parties, but claiming no right of interference. When, however, the demands made at Constantinople became imperious; and when Sir H. Seymour obtained unquestionable proofs, from his position as British ambassador at St Petersburg, that the Emperor Nicholas was pouring down vast bodies of troops towards the Turkish frontier—then did the British government feel that this neutrality must have an end. England was bound by treaties which she could not suffer to fall into oblivion at such a time.

When Lord Stratford de Redcliffe returned to his embassy at Constantinople, in April 1853, he was struck with the fact that Prince Menchikoff disliked to be questioned concerning any ulterior designs of Russia, after the difficulty of the Holy Places should have been settled; and this made the ambassador fear that those designs might be perilous to the welfare of Turkey. Baron Brunnow, on May $\frac{1}{2}\frac{3}{5}$, sent a long document to the Earl of Clarendon, justifying everything the emperor had done, and denying the allegations concerning any ulterior views. The earl, nevertheless, on hearing of the threatening departure of Menchikoff from Constantinople, wrote to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on the 31st May, empowering him to order up the British fleet from Malta towards the Dardanelles, there to be employed as his judgment might suggest. 'A declaration of war by Russia against Turkey,' said his lordship, 'the embarkation of troops at Sebastopol, or any other well-established fact denoting intentions of unmistakable hostility, would, in the opinion of her majesty's government, entirely justify your excellency in sending for the fleet, which, however, would not pass the Dardanelles except on the express demand of the sultan.'

This 'passing of the Dardanelles' has been intertwined in all the diplomacy respecting Turkey for many generations past. It means this—that as Turkey possesses both the European and the Asiatic sides of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, she commands the entrances through those straits into the Black Sea; and, for her own protection, she has always insisted that no ships of war shall pass through those straits without her permission. In 1840, when the sultan was threatened by his rebellious vassal, Mehemet Ali, he placed the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus under the joint 'protection'—an ominous word—of England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia; but in the convention of the 15th of July in that year, he expressly stipulated, in Article IV., for the maintenance of his ancient rights over the straits. Turkey claimed, and the five powers agreed, that this protection 'shall be considered only as a measure of exception, adopted at the express demand of the sultan, and solely for his defence in the single case above mentioned; but it is agreed, that such measure shall not derogate in any degree from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, in virtue of which it has in all times been prohibited for

ships of war of foreign powers to enter the straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus.' Again, in a convention signed at London on the 13th of July 1841, between the representatives of the six powers, it was demanded by the sultan that his right should be admitted, of prohibiting the passage of ships of war through the straits; and this right was formally conceded by England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia.

During the month of May (1853), it was ascertained, by diplomatic correspondence, that Austria and Prussia, as well as England and France, agreed that Russia's demands upon Turkey were indefensible, and could not be submitted to without injury to the Ottoman authority. So far there was agreement; but the almost interminable negotiation which followed, shewed that there was not so much unity of opinion concerning the course to be adopted towards Russia. In June, the French government sent orders to their fleet, under Admiral de la Susse, to join the English fleet, under Admiral Dundas, at Besika Bay—immediately outside or southward of the Dardanelles—there to await further orders from the two ambassadors at Constantinople. One circumstance presents itself to view throughout the voluminous correspondence of that summer and autumn—that all the ministers and all the ambassadors of England, France, Austria, and Prussia, so far as their opinions found expression in dispatches, condemned the conduct of the czar in picking a new quarrel with Turkey after the question of the 'Holy Places' had been settled. Clarendon, Stratford de Redcliffe, Westmoreland, Cowley, Bloomfield, Seymour, Drouyn de Lhuys, Walewski, De la Cour, Buol, Colloredo, Manteuffel, however they may have differed as to the means of healing the wound, agreed as to the wound itself. This was important; for it amounted nearly to a vote passed by united Europe against Nicholas, and weakened his power of appealing to any of his neighbours against the rest.

On the 12th of June, the Russian government published a circular addressed to all its ministers at foreign courts, explanatory of the reasons which had actuated the czar in his proceedings. This circular elicited many replies and counter-statements; and England and France became more and more decided in their reprobation of the Russian schemes. Just about the time when Russia advanced to the Principalities, Austria concentrated troops near the Servian frontier; and this circumstance for a time excited uneasiness; but no further progress was made in that direction, and Austria continued to act with the Western Powers in an endeavour to obviate war by diplomatic means. In July, the first of many 'Conferences' met at Vienna, attended by the representatives of England, France, Austria, and Prussia; these representatives proposed, with the sanction of their respective governments, to prepare a 'note,' or schedule of agreement, which should be sent to St Petersburg and Constantinople; and that the four powers should use their best energies to obtain the assent of the two belligerent powers to the terms therein imposed. Another conference on the same subject was held towards the close of the same month, during which the terms of the proposed note were determined on. This note, as drawn up on the 26th of July, and as transmitted to Constantinople, assumed the form of a declaration from the sultan to the czar. The sultan, after expressing his 'unbounded confidence in the eminent qualities of his august friend and ally,' declared that he 'will remain faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople relative to the protection of the Christian religion; and that his majesty considers himself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice, either now or hereafter, the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted by his majesty's august ancestors to the orthodox Eastern Church, and which are maintained and confirmed by him; and moreover, in a spirit of exalted equity, to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites by convention or special arrangement.' There were comprised in the note, also, a few minor declarations respecting pilgrims at Jerusalem, a Russian church and hospital in or near the same city, and an increase of power to the Russian consuls in Palestine.

This 'Vienna Note'—the first of that name—was the main subject of European diplomacy during the latter half of 1853. The reader will remember that, in a former page, reference was made to the note, as exemplifying the importance of attending to the phraseology of any documents to which Russia is a party. The Turkish ministers saw that—whether the note had or had not been drawn up with the connivance of Russia—it was worded in such a way as might leave an opening for a Russian interpretation injurious to Turkey at some future time. More than once has it occurred, in the past relations of Russia with other countries, that if two or three short words were susceptible of a double meaning, or two or three apparently insignificant words omitted, a claim of startling import was afterwards founded, to which the other contracting party had not originally intended to assent. In the case now under notice, the czar, early in August, accepted the Vienna Note with a promptness which was in itself suspicious; and later in the same month, the sultan signified also his acceptance, but with the 'modification' of a few words. This modification was to define the meaning of terms otherwise too undefined; but, nevertheless, it proved to be the rock on which the whole negotiation split. The Allies were willing to accept the amendments made by Turkey, and even acknowledged that those amendments were just in themselves, however lamentable it might be that peace should be disturbed by small changes. But the czar refused his assent; and this refusal offers much justification to the conduct of Turkey, since it shews that the czar regarded the altered words as important in the very sense that Turkey had suspected. There

were only two paragraphs of the Vienna Note thus altered, and altered in only three places; and it may be desirable to transcribe them here, if only to shew how mighty are the political results which sometimes spring from the turn of an expression. Of the six paragraphs of the Vienna Note, the most important were the two following:—

'If the Emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for *the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans have never refused* again *to confirm them* * by solemn acts testifying their ancient and constant benevolence towards their Christian subjects.

'The undersigned has in consequence received orders to declare by the present note, that the Government of His Majesty the Sultan will remain faithful *to the letter and to the spirit of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople relative to the protection of the Christian religion, and* † that His Majesty considers himself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice, either now or hereafter, the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted by His Majesty's august ancestors to the orthodox Eastern Church, which are maintained and confirmed by him; and moreover, in a spirit of exalted equity, to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages *granted to the other Christian rites by convention or special arrangement.*' ‡

Turkey proposed to substitute for the words printed in *italics*, those given in the foot-notes; and the rejection of these substitutions by Russia rendered ineffectual all the subsequent labours of the diplomatists. It will be seen, on carefully perusing the above, that the pith of the amendments consists in the declaration, that the Porte will both concede and protect, in respect to the Christians of Turkey; whereas the original clauses would have afforded a loophole for the czar to enter in his assumed capacity as 'protector of Greek worship.' Protection to Greek Christians might be well; but protection *by the czar* was the point yearned for by Russia.

September approached; a month during which Besika Bay and its vicinity become dangerous for shipping lying at anchor. The Allied governments were exceedingly urgent that Turkey and Russia should arrive at an amicable conclusion, in order that the fleets might be withdrawn to safer quarters; but, pending the negotiations, such withdrawal would not be expedient. France proposed that the fleets should enter the Dardanelles, with the consent of Turkey; but England proposed a further delay, to afford the czar time to signify his assent to the altered terms of the Vienna Note. But this assent was never given. The court of St Petersburg stated in writing the reasons why Russia could not accept the amended note; and the Earl of Clarendon promptly pointed out that the reasons thus assigned were such as to justify Turkey in the suspicions which the original note had excited; that, in fact, 'it would not be fair to urge the Porte to sign a document which would give Russia such advantages as it was now clear the Russian government expected from it.'* It was, indeed, throughout, a most unfortunate achievement in diplomacy, and seems to indicate that a pro-Russian pen had traced the terms of the Vienna Note; for the Earl of Clarendon, after stating the sense in which England and France understood the original note, declared that it would now be 'highly dishonourable to press its acceptance on the Porte, when they have been duly warned by the power to whom the note is to be addressed that another and a totally different meaning is attached to it by that power' (p. 124).

The month of October brought the first ominous reference to possible collisions in the Black Sea between the several fleets. Admiral Dundas received orders to inform the Russian admiral commanding at Sebastopol, 'that if the Russian fleet should come out of that port for the purpose of landing troops on any portion of the Turkish territory, or of committing any act of overt hostility against the Porte, his (Admiral Dundas's) orders are to protect the sultan's dominions from attack.' The English government became more and more distrustful of Russia: they declined to urge Turkey to accept the Vienna Note; they declined to accede to a new note prepared at Olmütz by Austria; and they now refused to permit Russian ships of war to roam over the Black Sea. Turkey declared war early in the month; and the Allied fleets soon afterwards passed through the Dardanelles. Vain attempts were made at further agreements. The original Vienna note had been rejected by Turkey; the amended note had been rejected by Russia; the Olmütz proposition was rejected by England; Lord Stratford de Redcliffe prepared a plan, which was rejected by Austria; and now the Earl of Clarendon prepared a plan, which was suddenly cut short by the passing of the Danube at the end of the month, and the virtual commencement of hostilities. The earl issued a circular-letter to all the British ministers abroad, dated 7th November, in which the imminency of approaching war was touched upon. Meanwhile, the Russian proceedings in the Danubian Principalities had become so audacious, that even the Prussian court was alarmed at them. Baron Manteuffel told the British ambassador at Berlin, that 'Prince Urusoff (a Russian general) had taken the entire government of the province of Moldavia into his own hands; and that his language towards the inhabitants was as insulting as his acts were

* 'the orthodox Greek Church and worship, the Sultans have never ceased to provide for the maintenance of the privileges and immunities which at different times they have spontaneously granted to that religion and to that church in the Ottoman Empire, and to confirm them'

† 'to the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by that of Adrianople, relative to the protection by the Sublime Porte of the Christian religion; and he is moreover charged to make known'

‡ 'granted, or which might be granted, to the other Christian communities, Ottoman subjects.'

* Parliamentary Papers on Eastern Affairs, ii. p. 113.

oppressive. On one occasion, some Jews were called into his presence; and on his accosting them in his customary hard language, they claimed the privileges of Austrian subjects; on which the prince ordered them to leave at once for Lemberg.'*

At length came the terrible news of the battle, or rather slaughter, at Sinope, which was effectual, more than anything else, in rousing a spirit of indignation throughout Western Europe. The news reached London and Paris on 11th December. The two governments were chagrined that such a destructive act should have been permitted at a time when Turkey was nominally under the protection of the English and French fleets. An investigation of all the circumstances was made by the English ships *Retribution* and *Mogadore*, sent to Sinope for that purpose immediately after the catastrophe; and the following is the substance of the information obtained:—

On 13th November, a Turkish flotilla anchored in the Bay of Sinope. This town is on the south shore of the Black Sea, 350 miles east of Constantinople, and 200 miles south-east of Sebastopol. The flotilla consisted of seven frigates, three corvettes, and two steamers. On the 21st, a Russian squadron appeared off the mouth of the bay, reconnoitred the Turks, and established a blockade. Some of the Turkish officers thought it would be well to

Battle of Sinope.

break the blockade, and engage in a running-fight; but Osman Pacha, the commander of the flotilla, unfortunately determined to remain at anchor, and to await the attack from the Russians. On the 30th, the Russian squadron, consisting of three three-deckers and three two-deckers, under Admiral Nachimoff, stood in for the bay under full sail before the wind, and took up a position close alongside the Turkish ships; while two frigates and three steamers remained outside to cut off the retreat of any Turkish vessel attempting to escape. Osman Pacha immediately gave the signal for a determined and energetic defence. About noon, the Russians opened fire, and for an hour or two the conflict was fearful. The *Navick* frigate, commanded by Ali Bey, when just about being boarded by a huge three-decker, was heroically blown up by her commander, thereby consigning himself and crew to destruction. Some of the Turkish ships were burned by the enemy's red-hot shot; others blew up; and the rest, whose sides were literally beaten in by the enormous weight of the Russian metal, slipped their cables, and drifted on shore. The Russians now manned their yards, and cheered in honour of their bloody victory, if victory it can be called. They then recommenced firing upon the helpless wrecks, which still kept up a feeble but unyielding resistance, and did not cease until the work of ruin and death was achieved. Out of the whole Turkish flotilla, one vessel alone escaped: this was the steamer *Taif*, which slipped her cable shortly after the commencement of the battle, and after forcing her way at some risk through the force cruising outside, brought the first news of the fatal encounter to Constantinople. The land-batteries at Sinope fired in aid of the Turks; but the aid was inconsiderable, partly because the guns were light, and partly because the Turkish ships intervened between the Russians and the batteries. The town of Sinope was

* Parliamentary Papers, ii. 272.

completely destroyed, and the whole coast strewed with dead bodies. Of the ships, nothing was left but heaps of fragments; and of the crews, only 1500 remained alive out of 4500. The ships were the following:—

	Guns.	Men.	
Navick,	52	500	—blown up.
Nezim,	52	500	—destroyed.
Farsli,	28	400	—destroyed.
Gullu Sefit,	24	200	—destroyed.
Aon Illah,	36	400	—taken.
Damietta,	56	500	—destroyed.
Nedji Feshir,	24	200	—on shore.
Kaid,	56	500	—blown up.
Nezemiah,	60	600	—blown up.
Faisi Marbout,	22	240	—destroyed.
Iregli,	4	150	—steamer, 150 h. p.—destroyed.
Taif,	16	300	— do. 300 h. p.—not engaged.
Total,	434	4490	

Osman Pacha, the commander in the *Aon Illah*, was wounded, then taken prisoner, and afterwards died in captivity; Ali Bey, of the *Navick*, was blown up with his ship; Hassan Bey was killed in the *Nezim;* Ali Maher Bey in the *Farsli;* Sadi Bey in the *Gullu Sefit;* Hussein Pacha and Kadi Bey in the *Nezemiah;* and Izet Bey in the *Faisi Marbout*. The Russians themselves suffered considerably, through the indomitable courage of their antagonists. They are believed to have had about 600 large pieces of cannon engaged—68-pounders, 42-pounders, and 32-pounders. Admiral Nachimoff returned to Sebastopol before the Allied ships reached Sinope.

The emperor, willing to catch at every trifle which might afford an opportunity for addressing his subjects in magniloquent language, sent an autograph-letter to Prince Menchikoff, glorifying Russia for the victory at Sinope:—

'St Petersburg, $\frac{\text{Nov. 20,}}{\text{Dec. 11,}}$ 1853.

The victory of Sinope proves evidently that our Black Sea fleet has shewn itself worthy of its destination. With hearty joy, I request you to communicate to my brave seamen, that I thank them for the success of the Russian flag on behalf of the glory and honour of Russia. I perceive with satisfaction that Tchesmé has not been forgotten in the Russian navy, and that the grandsons have proved themselves worthy of their grandsires.

I remain, always and unalterably, your well-inclined and grateful NICHOLAS.'

St Petersburg was thrown into an ecstasy of delight; illuminations, balls, festivals, health-drinkings, succeeded each other for many days; and the *Battle of Sinope* was played, with variations *à la Russe*, at the theatres.

It is difficult to mark clearly the difference between a fair and an unfair attack during war; but the point at which Russia and the Allies diverged in their interpretation of the Sinope catastrophe was as follows:—Russia asserted that the Turkish flotilla had on board troops and ammunition destined to aid rebellious tribes in an attack on Sécoum-Kalé, a Russo-Circassian town on the north-east of the Black Sea; and that Russia was justified in destroying the flotilla under such circumstances. Turkey and her Allies, on the other hand, asserted that the flotilla was only charged with provisions for Batoum, a Turkish town near the Russian frontier of the Black Sea; and that the destruction of a Turkish flotilla in a Turkish harbour was virtually a defiance to the Allies, who had undertaken to defend Turkey. In the correspondence between the various courts, the affair at Sinope was treated by the Allies—not so much as a breach of the recognised rules of honour in war, as a disregard of the efforts of the Allies to bring about peace; but the general impression produced in England and France, as well as in Turkey, was one of indignation, and which unquestionably tended to weaken the efforts of the peace-makers. It is indeed undeniable that the conflict was rather a slaughter than a fight; for the Russians, departing from the usages of civilised Europe, poured forth a burning torrent of grape and canister-shot upon the hapless wretches, who, escaping from the burning and sinking ships, sought to gain the shore.

The close of the year was marked by the issue of circulars from the English and French governments to their ministers abroad, narrating the proceedings which had taken place, lamenting the failure of all attempts to preserve peace, and announcing that the Allied fleets would at once enter the Black Sea, and assume an attitude that would prevent such another calamity as that at Sinope. The year 1853 did not pass away, however, without one more effort to preserve peace. The ambassadors of England, France, Austria, and Prussia, at Constantinople, presented to the sultan, on the 12th of December, an 'Identic Note,' or proposal in which all agreed, containing the basis for a settlement of the difficulties between Turkey and Russia. The sultan assented to this on the 31st of December, and proposed that forty days should be allowed for the czar to signify his assent; after which all the six powers should confer, at Vienna or some other central city, and agree on an amicable settlement of the various points at issue. All the four powers were satisfied with this acceptance by the sultan, as maintaining the dignity and independence of Turkey, while at the same time meeting every demand that Russia was entitled to make.

The year 1854 opened amid busy attempts on the part of the four powers to obtain the assent of Russia to the terms of the Identic Note; but when the Allied fleets actually entered the Black Sea—which they did on the 4th of January—and when the czar was informed of this fact, his irritation rendered him indisposed to accede to peaceful diplomacy. An angry correspondence ensued at St Petersburg, London, and Paris, between Russia on the one side, and England and France on the other; the Identic Note was forgotten or laid aside; and, early in February, the Russian ambassadors were withdrawn from London and Paris, and the English and French ambassadors from St Petersburg.

Between the leading states of Europe, the withdrawal of ambassadors is the immediate forerunner of war, unless some special intervention occurs.

No such intervention presented itself in this case; and thus it arose that the month of March 1854, witnessed the formal rupture of peaceful relations between England and France on the one hand, and Russia on the other—on grounds which especially concerned Turkey in the first instance, but which would have been dangerous to the welfare of Europe generally, if the designs of Russia had been quietly submitted to. M. Kossuth, in one of his speeches made while in America, spoke energetically to the effect, that nations cannot with profit isolate themselves—cannot afford to be selfishly indifferent to the assaults of a strong power upon a weaker. 'Even your own peculiar interests,' he said to his transatlantic auditors, 'are best served when your foreign policy rests, not on transitory considerations, but on everlasting principles. Even in private life, no man can entirely cut himself off from others. A man willing to attempt it, would be an exile at home: just so with nations, which in the larger family of man are individual members. In a nation, the consequence of total isolation is not felt as soon, but it will at length be felt as surely. The *hours* of nations are counted by *years;* yet the secluded nation, self-exiled from mankind, dwindles away. Wo to the people whose citizens care only for their own present, and not for the future of their country!'* The exiled Magyar had sympathy with Hungary in his thoughts when he made this speech; but his exhortations apply also to the case of Turkey, as oppressed by Russia. At one time, most of the nations of Europe had to rise to stem the claim of Turkey for almost universal dominion; then against Spain; then France; and in 1854, the time seemed to have arrived when something similar must be effected against Russia, and for similar reasons.

Thus, then, were all the labours of European statesmen and ambassadors rendered of non-effect. The Vienna Note, the amended note, the Identic Note, the protocols, the proceedings at the conferences, the dispatches—documents which fill many hundred folio pages of close print—were fruitless, in so far as regarded the maintenance of peace between Russia and the Western Powers.

THE 'SECRET CORRESPONDENCE' OF 1844 AND 1853.

But while these open and avowed negotiations were going forward, there was a remarkable under-current of 'secret correspondence,' of which the world knew nothing until twelve months after it occurred; a correspondence in which two of the great powers of Europe interchanged opinions without the cognizance of the others.

The secret correspondence between the English and Russian governments respecting Turkey and its future fate, constituted, indeed, a remarkable episode in the history of the war. It was complete in itself—begun, continued, and ended separately and distinctly from the acknowledged diplomacy of the period. Episode though it be, however, it was of grave import; for it unquestionably encouraged the Emperor Nicholas in the pursuance of those schemes which superinduced the war. It was grave in another sense, for it exemplified the entanglements into which a nation might be brought, unknown to and unsanctioned by the people, by unacknowledged though well-meant diplomacy on the part of its ministers. Not only was there a secret correspondence, but another involved in it—a wheel within a wheel—a Chinese ball-puzzle translated into English; for the correspondence of 1853 involved that of 1844, and both were alike unknown to the English parliament and the English nation until the spring of 1854. It is true that the English diplomatists did not assent to any spoliation schemes—did not countenance any line of conduct which would be injurious to Turkey; but the rejection was worded in such courtly phrases, the moral scorn of injustice was so feebly expressed, the compliments paid to the czar had so much of fulsome flattery in them, that the diplomatists afforded a handle which the czar did not afterwards fail to apply to his own purposes. This correspondence subsequently formed the theme of a remarkable article in the *Westminster Review*,* under the title of 'International Immorality;' in which the writer sought to shew the ill consequences which result to nations from a want of sincerity on the part of diplomatists, a tendency on their parts to call things by the wrong names, and to adopt crooked means for obtaining that which might be a worthy and proper end.

This correspondence was remarkable also in another particular—the mode in which it was discovered or made public. For aught that can now be seen, it might have remained yet many more years in the archives of the Foreign Office, had not one of the diplomatists made use of language inconsistent with that used by him during the correspondence itself. How this lapsus drew forth the truth, bit by bit, it will be desirable here to shew; for the episode is of a kind which can best be understood by tracing the steps of the discovery, and thus, in some sort, travelling backward. Lord John Russell, the *Journal de St Petersburg*, the *Times*, the Earl of Derby, and the Earl of Aberdeen, were the instruments whereby the nation became conversant with a correspondence which either ought not to have taken place at all, or ought to have been known much earlier.

It was on the 17th of February 1854, when Mr Layard brought on a discussion in the House of Commons concerning Eastern affairs, that Lord John Russell commented in terms of great severity on the conduct of the Emperor Nicholas. He said: 'There were concealment and deception on the part of Russia towards the government of this

* Speech at Baltimore, December 27, 1851.

* New Series, No. XV.

country; but, while we gave credit to the assurances of the Russian government, we were not blind to the possibility that it might be deceiving us.' How one party can 'give credit' to another with such a proviso, is not easy to see. His lordship expressed his belief, that the emperor's object was 'to endeavour in the present year to degrade Turkey still more than she has been before degraded, by successive wars and treaties on the part of Russia; and it was hoped that by means of force, or of costly and lavish diplomacy, to obtain terms from the sultan which would render him completely subject to Russia; so that, if at any time he should attempt to throw off his chains, his prostrate and helpless condition would make the conquest of the country an easy task. Such I believe to have been the policy of Russia.' In respect to the rejection by the czar of the Vienna proposals, Lord John said that 'the course adopted by the Emperor of Russia shewed a total disregard of the peace of Europe, an utter contempt of the opinion of Europe, and a disregard of those sovereigns with whom he had been allied.' The war was characterised as a guarantee to mankind of 'the peace of Europe, of which the Emperor of Russia is the wanton disturber; and it is for mankind to throw upon the head of that disturber the consequences which he has so flagrantly, and, I believe, so imprudently evoked. And it is to mankind the independence not only of Turkey, but of Germany, and of all European nations. The state of Germany for the last few years has been one, if not absolutely of dependence upon the Emperor of Russia, at least one in which independence has not been very loudly asserted.' It would be difficult to employ language more severe and galling to Russia; and as it corresponded with the prevailing opinion in England on the subject, the speech was received with general favour.

This speech roused the Russian government. No newspapers are free in that country; but the *Journal de St Petersburg* is believed to be employed as an organ through which the opinions of the government are promulgated in a non-official form. On the 2d of March, a leading-article appeared, evidently emanating from high quarters, concerning Lord John Russell's speech. That speech is characterised as a 'brutal outrage' against the emperor. England, it is asserted, should least of all nations misconstrue the emperor's intentions; for 'the emperor had spontaneously explained himself with the most perfect candour to the queen and her ministers, with the object of establishing with them a friendly understanding even upon the most important result which can affect the Ottoman Empire.' The emperor, foreseeing that Turkey must crumble one day, had sought an interchange of opinions with England concerning that impending catastrophe; and the result shewed itself in 'a correspondence of the most friendly character between the present English ministers and the imperial government.' Finally, after adverting to the correspondence as a collection of non-official documents, which could not rightly be divulged, the newspaper writer advised Lord John Russell 'to reperuse that correspondence, in which he was the first to take part, before ceding to the Earl of Clarendon the direction of foreign affairs.* Let him consult his conscience, if the passion which leads him astray permit him to recognise its voice. He can decide now whether it be really true that the emperor has been wanting in frankness towards the English government.'

The next link in the chain was furnished by the *Times*—that extraordinary journal which knows every one's business, dives into every secret, sends commissioners to inquire into every abuse, braves the anger of governments, parliaments, classes, and corporations, and puts forth a flood of articles which occupy a place among the highest specimens of English composition. On the 11th of March, an article appeared, commenting on the semi-official manifesto from St Petersburg; and in the course of the argument appeared these words: 'We have not now to learn for the first time that, before the Emperor Nicholas entered upon these extraordinary transactions, he had attempted at various times, and in different forms, to lure almost every court in Europe to share in the plunder of Turkey. As long ago as his own visit to this country, he held the same language, and it may have been repeated in greater detail in the course of last winter. *But what answer did he get to these overtures?* What answer did he get when he sounded Lord John Russell, of all men in the world, on the subject of an eventual partition of Turkey? We confidently reply, that he was met by an indignant refusal on the part of the British government. He was told, if we are not greatly mistaken, that this country could entertain no proposal in any form which pre-supposed the dismemberment of an empire the integrity of which we had frequently engaged to respect and even to protect.' After further revelations, under cover of the words 'if we are not mistaken,' the *Times* ended by saying: 'Lord John Russell's answer to the Russian overture will do him no dishonour; and although in time of peace it might have been inconvenient to lay bare the pretensions Russia has sometimes indicated, our present relations are not likely to suffer from an "indiscretion" she herself has provoked; and we trust the whole correspondence will be immediately produced.'

The scene changes, and the actors also. On the 13th of March, the Earl of Derby, in the House of Lords, requested from the Earl of Aberdeen an explanation concerning the Russian allegations, and concerning the knowledge which the *Times* appeared to have possessed of some secret correspondence not known to parliament. His lordship said: 'This is not the first time, by many, within the last few months, that the *Times* newspaper has professed to have, and has proved to be in possession

* Lord John Russell was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during about three months, from December 1852 to March 1853.

of, secret and exclusive information, which ought and was supposed to have been known only to the cabinet; also to have possession of, and access to, papers and documents refused to both Houses of Parliament; and to be at liberty, and apparently authorised, to make public these documents, previously refused even to parliament itself. The noble earl may disclaim, if he pleases, any communication, either direct or indirect, with the *Times* newspaper, or that he ever personally in any way communicated with that journal; but all his disclaimer cannot persuade me, or any other human being, I believe, in the country, that the *Times* newspaper could convey such information, or insert such an article as I have just read to the House, without being informed by some person who had official information on these matters, and one who, in conveying such information, betrayed that which ought to be considered as a cabinet secret.' The Earl of Aberdeen, in reply, stated that a secret correspondence had certainly been carried on between England and Russia in the early spring of 1853; that this correspondence had not been printed, out of

COUNT NESSELRODE.

delicacy to the emperor, on so confidential a subject; but that the reference to it in the St Petersburg newspaper absolved England from further secrecy, and that the correspondence should forthwith be presented to the House. The earl next stated, that when the Emperor of Russia was in England in 1844, many conversations were held between the emperor, the earl, the Duke of Wellington, and Sir Robert Peel, respecting the probable future fate of Turkey; that Count Nesselrode drew up an account of those conversations; that he—the Earl of Aberdeen—had not seen that document during the intervening ten years; but that it should be sought for, and presented to the House.

Here, then, was a solution of one mystery—the existence of secret correspondence referring to the years 1844 and 1853; but another yet remained. How had the *Times* obtained an insight into these matters? The Earl of Aberdeen, the prime-minister himself, was wholly and entirely unable to answer the question. He had never, he said, either directly or indirectly, sanctioned any breach of trust in such a matter; and he could only surmise that a junior clerk in the Foreign Office had been betrayed into a departure from the strict line of duty in this respect. This accusation brought about an indignant denial from the person accused; which denial the Earl of Aberdeen felt it incumbent on him to accept. But there the mystery remained. The *Times* assumed a haughty tone; denied that it had bribed any of the underlings of office; claimed the right of determining when and how it would make public any early or peculiar

information possessed by it; and vouchsafed no explanation whatever. The peers abandoned further search, with a significant reminder by the Earl of Malmesbury of Sancho Panza's theorem—that 'a cask may leak at the top just as well as at the bottom.'

The Secret Correspondence was printed and presented to parliament shortly afterwards—both that of 1844 and that of 1853. It appears that when the Emperor Nicholas returned to St Petersburg, from his visit to London in 1844, he put Count Nesselrode in possession of the outlines of the conversations he had had with the English statesmen; and from these outlines a document was drawn up, designated a 'Memorandum by Count Nesselrode, delivered to Her Majesty's Government, and founded on Communications received from the Emperor of Russia subsequently to His Imperial Majesty's visit to England in June 1844.'

This memorandum consists of twenty-eight paragraphs. Four of these assert that Russia and England are interested in the maintenance of Turkey as she is; three relate to a tendency, of which Turkey is accused, to evade treaties; six relate to religious difficulties in Turkey; and then comes the important part of the memorandum:

'However, they [Russia and England] must not conceal from themselves how many elements of dissolution that empire contains within itself. Unforeseen circumstances may hasten its fall, without its being in the power of the friendly cabinets to prevent it.

As it is not given to human foresight to settle beforehand a plan of action for such or such unlooked-for case, it would be premature to discuss eventualities which may never be realised.

In the uncertainty which hovers over the future, a single fundamental idea seems to admit of a really practical application: it is that the danger which may result from a catastrophe in Turkey will be much diminished, if, in the event of its occurring, Russia and England have come to an understanding as to the course to be taken by them in common.

That understanding will be the more beneficial, inasmuch as it will have the full assent of Austria. Between her and Russia there exists already an entire conformity of principles in regard to the affairs of Turkey, in a common interest of conservatism and of peace.

In order to render their union more efficacious, there would remain nothing to be desired but that England should be seen to associate herself thereto with the same view.

The reason which recommends the establishment of this agreement is very simple.

On land, Russia exercises, in regard to Turkey, a preponderant action.

On sea, England occupies the same position.

Isolated, the action of these two powers might do much mischief. United, it can produce a real benefit: thence, the advantage of coming to a previous understanding before having recourse to action.

This notion was in principle agreed upon during the Emperor's last residence in London. The result was the eventual engagement, that if anything unforeseen occurred in Turkey, Russia and England should previously concert together as to the course which they should pursue in common.

The object for which Russia and England will have to come to an understanding may be expressed in the following manner:—

1. To seek to maintain the existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present state, so long as that political combination shall be possible.

2. If we foresee that it must crumble to pieces, to enter into previous concert as to everything relating to the establishment of a new order of things, intended to replace that which now exists, and in conjunction with each other to see that the change which may have occurred in the internal situation of that empire shall not injuriously affect either the security of their own states and the rights which the treaties assure to them respectively, or the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.

For the purpose thus stated, the policy of Russia and of Austria, as we have already said, is closely united by the principle of perfect identity. If England, as the principal maritime power, acts in concert with them, it is to be supposed that France will find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course agreed upon between St Petersburg, London, and Vienna.

Conflict between the Great Powers being thus obviated, it is to be hoped that the peace of Europe will be maintained even in the midst of such serious circumstances. It is to secure this object of common interest, if the case occurs, that, as the Emperor agreed with Her Britannic Majesty's Ministers during his residence in England, the previous understanding which Russia and England shall establish between themselves must be directed.'

The remarkable features in this agreement, if agreement it may be called, are these—that Russia, by looking so confidently at the future dissolution of Turkey, was more likely to bring about than to retard that event; that the connivance of England with Russia was to be kept quiet; that Austria would do and think exactly as Russia might suggest; that France would be *compelled* to agree to any settlement of Turkish difficulties which the other three powers had previously agreed upon; and that Prussia was ignored altogether, as if her wishes and opinions were not of the smallest importance.

Such, then, was the Memorandum of the confidential conversations held in 1844; and now we come to the Secret Correspondence of a later period.

This correspondence commenced on the 11th of January 1853, and ended on the 21st of April. It consists of twelve dispatches from Sir Hamilton Seymour at St Petersburg, four enclosures in those dispatches, one dispatch from Lord John Russell to Sir Hamilton, and two from the Earl of Clarendon—the office of foreign secretary in England having changed hands during this interval. Sir H. Seymour, in his first dispatch, stated that the Emperor of Russia, on the 9th of January, expressed his pleasure that the Earl of Aberdeen had succeeded to office—the Derby ministry having been broken up in the previous month—and his hope that the ministry would be of long duration. 'His imperial majesty desired me particularly to convey this assurance to the Earl of Aberdeen, with whom, he said, he had been acquainted for nearly forty years,

and for whom he entertained equal regard and esteem. His majesty desired to be brought to the kind recollection of his lordship.' It would be unjust to blame a statesman simply because a foreign sovereign respected and esteemed him; but there can be little doubt, that the emperor's sentiments towards the Earl of Aberdeen induced him to bring forward projects which would have been kept yet longer in abeyance if any other statesman had been premier of England. The emperor spoke of the value he attached to alliance with England, and used these remarkable words: 'When we are agreed (*d'accord*), I am quite without anxiety as to the west of Europe; it is immaterial what the others may think or do.' This was a side-blow at France. Sir H. Seymour endeavoured to draw the emperor into some explanation of his suspicious proceedings in regard to Turkey; and it was then that the phrase concerning the 'sick man' was first used. The emperor said: 'Tenez. Nous avons sur les bras un homme malade—un homme gravement malade; ce sera, je vous le dis franchement, un grand malheur si, un de ces jours, il devait nous échapper, surtout avant que toutes les dispositions nécessaires fussent prises.'* To which Sir H. Seymour replied: 'Votre majesté est si gracieuse, qu'elle me permettra de lui faire encore une observation. Votre majesté dit que l'homme est malade; c'est bien vrai; mais votre majesté daignera m'excuser si je lui fair observer, que c'est à l'homme généreux et fort de ménager l'homme malade et faible.'†

On the 14th, Sir H. Seymour had another conversation with the emperor. The emperor still harped upon the 'sick man.' He spoke of the probable downfall of Turkey, and then said: 'Now, I desire to speak to you as a friend and as a *gentleman:* if England and I arrive at an understanding of this matter, as regards the rest it matters little to me; it is indifferent to me what others do or think. Frankly, then, I tell you plainly, that if England thinks of establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople, I will not allow it. I do not attribute this intention to you, but it is better on these occasions to speak plainly. For my part, I am equally disposed to engage not to establish myself there, as *proprietor* that is to say, for as *occupier* I do not say. It might happen that circumstances—if no previous provision were made, if everything should be left to chance—might place me in the position of occupying Constantinople.' In the conversation that ensued, the emperor dwelt on what would have to be done if the 'sick man' should die; whereas the British ambassador dwelt rather on the desirability of curing the 'sick man' if possible—a difference too characteristic to be regarded as unimportant. The emperor stated that he had expressed his views on these points to the Duke of Wellington, when in England in 1844.

Lord John Russell, as secretary of state for foreign affairs, replied to Sir H. Seymour (9th February), that the emperor's remarks concerning the 'sick man' were unsatisfactory, because any agreement between Russia and England ought to refer to some particular time that could be guessed at, at least, within a few years; whereas the 'sick man' might live twenty—fifty—a hundred years. His lordship proceeded to remark: 'In these circumstances, it would hardly be consistent with the friendly feelings towards the sultan which animate the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Queen of Great Britain, to dispose beforehand of the provinces under his dominion. Besides this consideration, however, it must be observed, that an agreement made in such a case tends very surely to hasten the contingency for which it is intended to provide. Austria and France could not, in fairness, be kept in ignorance of the transaction; nor would such concealment be consistent with the end of preventing a European war. Indeed, such concealment cannot be intended by his imperial majesty. It is to be inferred that, as soon as Great Britain and Russia should have agreed on the course to be pursued, and have determined to enforce it, they should communicate their intentions to the great powers of Europe. An agreement thus made, and thus communicated, would not be very long a secret; and while it would alarm and alienate the sultan, the knowledge of its existence would stimulate all his enemies to increased violence and more obstinate conflict.' He further stated, that the emperor, as *occupier* of Constantinople, would be exposed to numberless temptations to go one step further, and make himself *proprietor* at last.

In two further conversations, held on 20th and 21st February, the emperor learned from Sir H. Seymour that the English government deemed it better to try and support the 'sick man,' than to dwell so much on his prospective death; and that that death did not, after all, appear to be so very near. 'Then,' rejoined the emperor, 'I will tell you, that if your government has been led to believe that Turkey retains any elements of existence, your government must have received incorrect information. I repeat to you that the sick man is dying; and we can never allow such an event to take us by surprise. We must come to some understanding; and this we should do, I am convinced, if I could hold but ten minutes' conversation with your ministers—with Lord Aberdeen, for instance, who knows me so well, who has full confidence in me, as I have in him.' Following up the conversation, which became a matter of delicacy and difficulty to the British ambassador, the emperor, in reply to a question, said: 'You must understand, that when I speak of Russia, I speak of Austria as well; what

* 'Stay. We have on our hands a sick man—a very sick man; it will be, I tell you frankly, a great misfortune if, one of these days, he should slip away from us, especially before all necessary arrangements were made.'

† 'Your majesty is so gracious, that you will allow me to make one further observation. Your majesty says the man is sick; it is very true; but your majesty will deign to excuse me if I remark, that it is the part of a generous and strong man to treat with gentleness the sick and feeble man.'

suits the one, suits the other; our interests, as regards Turkey, are perfectly identical.' When pressed for some explanation of his views concerning Turkey, he said: 'In the event of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, I think it might be less difficult to arrive at a satisfactory territorial arrangement than is commonly believed. The Principalities are, in fact, an independent state under my protection: this might so continue. Servia might receive the same form of government. So, again, with Bulgaria: there seems to be no reason why this province should not form an independent state. As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. I can then only say, that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objections to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia: that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession.'

All this struck Sir H. Seymour as being ominous and alarming. In writing home concerning it, he said: 'It can hardly be otherwise but that the sovereign who insists with such pertinacity upon the impending fall of a neighbouring state, must have settled in his own mind that the hour, if not *of* its dissolution, at all events *for* its dissolution, must be at hand. Then, as now, I reflected that this assumption would hardly be ventured upon unless some, perhaps general, but at all events intimate, understanding existed between Russia and Austria. Supposing my suspicion to be well founded, the emperor's object is to engage her majesty's government, in conjunction with his own cabinet and that of Vienna, in some scheme for the ultimate partition of Turkey, and for the exclusion of France from the arrangement.' That a secret understanding between the Emperors of Russia and Austria concerning Turkey had been arrived at during their meeting at Olmütz in 1852, was a probability which Sir H. Seymour frequently insisted on in the course of his dispatches.

A few days after these important conversations, the emperor dictated to Count Nesselrode the wording of a 'memorandum,' which should embody the heads of the conversations; because as only two persons were present, those two alone could narrate what had passed. The count gave a copy of the memorandum to Sir Hamilton, who sent home another copy to the English government. The memorandum was chiefly a recapitulation of what had been said; but while Count Nesselrode, on the part of the emperor, wished the matter to be carried on further in the same secret way, the British ambassador, on the part of his court, urged that the sooner such a mode of discussing such delicate affairs was put an end to the better.

The Earl of Clarendon, on taking the seals of the foreign office, replied fully to Sir H. Seymour's several dispatches, and discussed at some length (23d March) all the points of the emperor's memorandum. He stated that England had still faith in the vitality of Turkey; that nothing can be more fatal to that vitality, than the assumption of its rapid and inevitable decay; that if the emperor's opinion on this point were made known, it would hasten rather than retard the catastrophe; that no sound government for Turkey can at present be devised, if the Moslem rule should cease; that England desires no such aggrandisement of territory as the emperor had hinted at in respect to Egypt; that England must refuse to make any agreement on such matters with Russia, unknown to the other powers of Europe; that the fall of Turkey can be followed only by a general European congress, such as that of 1815; that a congress would develop such a stream of hostile rivalries, that the longer it can be postponed the better; and that a considerate forbearance on all sides towards Turkey, would be better than any reiterated assertion of her approaching downfall. His lordship came in strong collision with the emperor in the following passage:—'Nor can we admit that the signs of Turkish decay are now either more evident or more rapid than of late years: there is still great energy and great wealth in Turkey; a disposition to improve the system of government is not wanting; corruption, though unfortunately great, is still not of a character, nor carried to an extent, that threatens the existence of the state; the treatment of Christians is not harsh; and the toleration exhibited by the Porte towards this portion of its subjects, might serve as an example to some governments who look with contempt upon Turkey as a barbarous power.'

A few more dispatches passed; but the one just noticed, from the Earl of Clarendon, was the last which contained any definite explanations of views. The remainder was chiefly a string of courtly phrases, in which each party expressed satisfaction at being so well understood by the other. It is impossible, nevertheless, not to feel that the whole subject was left in a nebulous state—nothing being cleared up. Such, by fatality or by design, has been the character of many diplomatic discussions in which Russia has been concerned. It is almost inconceivable that, after the indication of Russian views thus given, the Earl of Clarendon, in a dispatch dated 5th of April, should have spoken of the Nesselrode memorandum of the conversations in the following terms:—'It is my duty to inform you, that that important and remarkable document was received by her majesty's government with feelings of sincere satisfaction, as a renewed proof of the emperor's confidence and friendly feelings.' The English statesmen blew hot and cold in this matter—used too many honeyed phrases to sweeten their censure; and it can hardly be wondered at if the Emperor of Russia, in the prosecution of his schemes, afterwards insisted upon the honey rather than upon the censure.

The results of secret diplomacy were frequently illustrated during the progress of the war—or rather, the existence of state documents was frequently ascertained, of which the nation had been

entirely ignorant. Thus, the Earl of Aberdeen remained for a quarter of a century under the imputation of having connived at the Treaty of Adrianople—the most disastrous which Turkey was ever called upon to make with Russia. He had been secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1829, when that treaty was signed; and when, in 1854, as prime minister, he bore the responsibility of war with Russia, he was frequently charged in the House of Lords with entertaining pro-Russian views, and with having, in 1829, been instrumental in fixing Russian shackles upon Turkey. To defend himself from these charges, the Earl of Aberdeen moved for the production of a state document—namely, a dispatch, dated October 31, 1829, from himself to Lord Heytesbury, British ambassador to the court of St Petersburg. This dispatch announced the receipt, by the English government, of the information that the Treaty of Adrianople had been signed. It expressed regret and alarm at the terms of that treaty. It passed in review the numerous disadvantages accruing to Turkey from the treaty—the cession of Asiatic fortresses; the insinuation of Russia like a wedge between the Turkish and Persian empires; the protectorate by Russia of Wallachia and Moldavia; the intermeddling of Russia in the affairs of Servia; the power acquired by the czar over the mouths of the Danube; the encroachment on the power of the sultan in the Dardanelles—all were touched upon in the dispatch; and the earl forcibly expressed his apprehensions at the consequences of a treaty so disastrous to Turkey. The dispatch, which was directed to be read to Count Nesselrode, was not unworthy of an English statesman; but it is strange that the Earl of Aberdeen, writing thus in 1829, should have allowed himself to be hoodwinked by the czar in 1844, and again in 1853.

RUPTURE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN POWERS.

The diplomacy, whether secret or avowed, failed to heal the wounds which distracted Europe; and war against Russia was declared by England and France in March 1854. England and France regarded it as a political war—a war to preserve the balance of power in Europe by preventing Russia from crushing Turkey; but Russia chose to give it a religious aspect, as if the existence of the orthodox faith were imperilled. Sir G. Larpent remarks on this point: 'If the Emperor of Russia has the right to attack a foreign state, because he believes his co-religionists are oppressed there, then we must concede a similar right to other nations. Are not the Catholics and Protestants who live under the sceptre of the czar in a far more hopeless condition than the Christians in Turkey? Has not the Russian government forced millions, by every description of cruelty and treachery, to give up the belief of their fathers? If these are notorious facts, it necessarily follows, from the premises of the Russian court, that all the Catholic states of Europe have the right to invade the Russian territory, and to regain for their co-religionists those liberties of which they have been robbed, in contradiction to morality and in the face of the most solemn compacts. Russia will not grant such a right to the Catholic and Protestant states; and for that very reason she ought to refrain from such injustice herself.'*

Two of the documents which were made public shortly before the commencement of the war, are of remarkable character, in respect to the imperial position of the writers. These were—a letter from the Emperor Napoleon to the Emperor Nicholas, and the reply. After the bold seizure of power in 1851 by the then President of the French Republic, Prince Louis Napoleon, followed by the assumption of the imperial title in 1852, the small states of Europe hesitated whether or not to recognise the new Emperor of the French: they waited for a sign from the great continental leader—the Czar Nicholas. Nicholas gave that qualified assent which is typified by the appellation of 'good friend' to the person addressed, instead of 'brother'—a difference which is understood to have a definite meaning in royal circles. The Emperor Napoleon, thus admitted to a sort of equality with the czar, wrote an autograph letter to Nicholas, dated 29th January 1854—intended as a last attempt to induce the czar to listen to reasonable terms of accommodation. Copies of this letter were profusely distributed throughout France, as if to notify to the French nation that their emperor would not unnecessarily or wantonly plunge into war. The letter passed in review all the circumstances of the quarrel between Russia and Turkey, and the obligations of England and France towards Turkey; and it then sketched a proposal, that an armistice should be signed forthwith; that the Russian troops should be withdrawn from the Principalities; that the English and French fleets should be withdrawn from the Black Sea; that Russia and Turkey should appoint two plenipotentiaries; and that these should agree upon a convention to be submitted to the four powers. The letter ended by the declaration, that it was written by 'Your Majesty's good friend, Napoleon.' The reply from the czar, dated $\frac{28\text{th Jan.}}{9\text{th Feb.}}$ 1854, was courteously worded, but non-effective towards the maintenance of peace. It exonerated Russia, and threw all the blame on Turkey and her Allies. It proposed that the Allies should withdraw the fleets before he was to be called upon to withdraw his armies; and that Turkey should send an ambassador to St Petersburg to sue for peace. The letter contained these words: 'Whatever your majesty may decide, menaces will not induce me to recede; my confidence is in God and in my right; and Russia, as

* *Turkey: its History and Progress*, ii. 414.

I can guarantee, will prove herself in 1854 what she was in 1812.' This allusion to the disasters at Moscow was very galling, and was perhaps intended so to be, to the French. The correspondence took place without previous concert with the British sovereign or government; whether it would have been approved beforehand, has not been stated; but the English ministers afterwards expressed their assent to what the Emperor of the French had advanced.

Another effort to preserve peace, and one of a singular character, was made in a non-official quarter. The members of the Society of Friends have ever been remarkable for the consistency with which, through good report and evil report, they have deprecated war in all its forms; and they resolved on an attempt to move the mighty czar, who would not be moved by the united voice of Europe. On the 20th of January, three Quakers —Henry Pease, of Darlington; Joseph Sturge, of

Louis Napoleon.

Birmingham; and Robert Charlton, of Bristol—set out on a winter-journey from London to St Petersburg, by way of Berlin, Königsberg, and Riga. The route from Riga to St Petersburg was traversed by means of sledges; and no fewer than 300 horses were required for this service, by successive relays on the road. Considering the great amount of snow which had fallen, however, and the extent of the journey, the travellers reached their destination with less discomfort than they had expected. On their arrival at the Russian capital, they obtained an introduction to a gentleman who had resided in Russia for forty years, and who, it was thought, would be of service to them in their delicate mission. He advised them to solicit an interview with Count Nesselrode, chancellor or prime minister of the empire. This they did, stating that they had not deemed it advisable to apply to their own ministers, or to the Russian ambassador in London; and that, for the same reasons, they had preferred applying to Count Nesselrode direct, for the purpose of securing his assistance in the presentation of the Society's address to the emperor. They waited on the count, and left him a French copy of the address for the emperor's perusal. As a consequence, they were admitted to an audience of the emperor on the 10th. They read an Address from the Society of Friends, praying the emperor, in the name of that Christianity which was alike his religion and theirs, to avert the horrors of war by adopting some other means than those of bloodshed to heal the wounds between him and other sovereigns. He received them kindly, and then spoke at some length, throwing the whole blame of the war upon others—as was his wont whether in speaking or writing. He then introduced them to the empress and the Grand-duchess Olga—daughter of the czar,

and Princess-royal of Wurtemberg—by whom they were courteously received. The emperor sent a written reply by the three deputies to the Society of Friends in England; and thus ended an attempt, fruitless in result, but respectable for the singleness of purpose and the unselfishness which had suggested it. The proceeding, however, did not pass without strictures in parliament. It was urged in many quarters that private individuals, however excellent their motives, could not thus assume the management of international disputes, without incurring a risk of embarrassing the government on whom the responsibility of public affairs rested.

At a somewhat later period in the history of the war, Frederika Bremer, the Swedish authoress, sought to apply her womanly gentleness towards the maintenance of peace—not, as the Quakers had done, by a direct appeal to the czar individually, but by appealing to European sympathies generally. She prepared an address, for publication in the English, American, French, Russian, Swedish, and German newspapers; and, as might have been expected, selected the *Times* as the representative of the English press. The address was an invitation to a Peace Alliance, among the women of all nations. It commenced thus:—'At a time like this, when the Powers of the West arm themselves against those of the East, and enter into a struggle threatening to spread over several of the countries of Europe like a large bleeding wound, tearing men from their homes, leaving thousands of widows and fatherless children, destroying harvests, burning cities, filling hospitals, calling up bitter and hateful passions, laying shackles on commerce, imbittering life in many thousand quiet, industrious families: a struggle, the sorrowful effects of which possibly may be felt by most of the nations of the earth—at such a time we have ventured a thought, a hope, that through woman a peaceful alliance might be concluded, embracing the whole earth—an alliance opposing the direful effects of war, and contributing by united and well-directed efforts, under the blessing of God, to the development of a state of peace, love, and well-being, to come forth when once the terrors of war shall be over, and the time of devastation has passed away.' The project consisted in an attempt to combine all the benevolent societies of women in all countries into one great alliance: to enable those who heal the sick, educate the young, shelter the houseless, feed the hungry, clothe the naked, reform the vicious, raise the fallen, to combine their efforts to yet greater purpose during a time of war—if not to stem the warfare itself, at least to mitigate its horrors. Addressing the benevolent women of all countries, the writer, or perhaps writers said: 'We ought now to tell you who they are who thus address you. We are Swedish women, united for the care of poor orphans and destitute families in Stockholm, the capital of Sweden. We can rejoice in the co-operation of our queen, and the humblest woman can join us, and taking care of a family or a single child, rise to the dignity of its guardian-angel on earth. We have recently entered into connection with the societies of women, daily becoming more numerous, in different parts of this country, in order thereby to strengthen and encourage each other. We are a little flock, and belong to a small nation; but we rejoice that from this nation have risen great men and benefactors to humanity.' Generous as was the intention, all-womanly the feeling, the project was not of a practicable character. The *Times*, in a friendly editorial article, pointed out this to Miss Bremer, and added: 'The influence of women is boundless in the world: as mothers, wives, sisters, daughters, we have to thank them for well-nigh every particle of real happiness we enjoy in our passage from the cradle to the grave. Wherever misfortune falls or calamity oppresses, or sickness chains the limbs of a sufferer to his bed of pain, there they will be found, with pity in their glances, comfort in their touch, and charity in their hearts. But we have a very strong belief that a woman must be left to select the objects of her sympathy for herself, and that any attempt to drill her into the measured step of a battalion of charity, marching to the relief of the world in general, would most signally break down. In benevolence, as in all things else—if we may argue from the practice of the best and kindliest among them—women shew to most advantage in the quiet of their own homes. Leave it to them to find out the poor neighbour, and the poor neighbour's sick child, and to administer relief in their own way. As many as step out of this sacred circle, are not altogether so admirable as those who remain within it. We have never heard of any real advantage to humanity which has resulted from high-soaring female endeavours to regenerate mankind.'

To revert to the course of public affairs. The withdrawal of the Russian ambassadors from London and Paris, after the failure of the correspondence between the two emperors, was quickly followed by the issuing of the following manifesto by the czar:—

'We, Nicholas I., &c.—

We have already informed our beloved and faithful subjects of the progress of our disagreements with the Ottoman Porte.

Since then, although hostilities have commenced, we have not ceased sincerely to wish, as we still wish, the cessation of bloodshed. We entertained even the hope that reflection and time would convince the Turkish government of its misconceptions, engendered by treacherous instigations, in which our just demands, founded on treaties, have been represented as attempts upon its independence veiling intentions of aggrandisement. Vain, however, have been our expectations so far.

The English and French governments have sided with Turkey, and the appearance of the combined fleets off Constantinople served as a further incentive to its obstinacy; and now, both the Western Powers, without previously declaring war, have sent their fleets into the Black Sea, proclaiming their intention to protect the Turks, and to impede the free navigation of our vessels of war for the defence of our coasts. After a course of proceeding so unheard of among

civilised nations, we recalled our embassies from England and France, and have broken off all political intercourse with those powers.

Thus, England and France have sided with the enemies of Christianity against Russia combating for the orthodox faith.

But Russia will not betray her holy mission; and, if enemies infringe her frontiers, we are ready to meet them with the firmness bequeathed to us by our forefathers. Are we not still the same Russian nation of whose exploits the memorable events of 1812 bear witness?

May the Almighty assist us to prove this by deeds! With this hope, combating for our persecuted brethren, followers of the faith of Christ, with one accord let all Russia exclaim: "O Lord, our Redeemer! whom shall we fear? May God be glorified, and His enemies be scattered!"

ST PETERSBURG, $\frac{9th}{21st}$ February 1854.'

This manifesto created a very uneasy feeling throughout Western Europe; it so evidently shewed what efforts would be made to give the approaching war a religious aspect, and to kindle the torch of fanaticism in aid of the czar's views. To say that 'England and France have sided with the enemies of Christianity against Russia combating for the orthodox faith,' was to say that which would rouse millions of ignorant serfs into implacable hostility against Western Europe.

The formal declaration of war by England is here given in full, as an official record of the circumstances which led to hostilities:—

'It is with deep regret that Her Majesty announces the failure of her anxious and protracted endeavours to preserve for her people and for Europe the blessings of peace.

The unprovoked aggression of the Emperor of Russia against the Sublime Porte has been persisted in with such disregard of consequences, that after the rejection by the Emperor of Russia of terms which the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, and the King of Prussia, as well as Her Majesty, considered just and equitable, Her Majesty is compelled by a sense of what is due to the honour of her crown, to the interests of her people, and to the independence of the states of Europe, to come forward in defence of an ally whose territory is invaded, and whose dignity and independence are assailed.

Her Majesty, in justification of the course she is about to pursue, refers to the transactions in which Her Majesty has been engaged.

The Emperor of Russia had some cause of complaint against the Sultan with reference to the settlement, which His Highness had sanctioned, of the conflicting claims of the Greek and Latin Churches to a portion of the Holy Places of Jerusalem and its neighbourhood. To the complaint of the Emperor of Russia on this head justice was done, and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople had the satisfaction of promoting an arrangement, to which no exception was taken by the Russian Government.

But, while the Russian Government repeatedly assured the Government of Her Majesty, that the mission of Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople was exclusively directed to the settlement of the question of the Holy Places at Jerusalem, Prince Menchikoff himself pressed upon the Porte other demands of a far more serious and important character, the nature of which he in the first instance endeavoured, as far as possible, to conceal from Her Majesty's Ambassador. And these demands, thus studiously concealed, affected, not the privileges of the Greek Church at Jerusalem, but the position of many millions of Turkish subjects in their relations to their sovereign the Sultan.

These demands were rejected by the spontaneous decision of the Sublime Porte.

Two assurances had been given to Her Majesty—one, that the mission of Prince Menchikoff only regarded the Holy Places; the other, that his mission would be of a conciliatory character.

In both respects Her Majesty's just expectations were disappointed.

Demands were made which, in the opinion of the Sultan, extended to the substitution of the Emperor of Russia's authority for his own over a large portion of his subjects, and those demands were enforced by a threat; and when Her Majesty learned that, on announcing the termination of his mission, Prince Menchikoff declared that the refusal of his demands would impose upon the Imperial Government the necessity of seeking a guarantee by its own power, Her Majesty thought proper that her fleet should leave Malta, and, in co-operation with that of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, take up its station in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles.

So long as the negotiation bore an amicable character, Her Majesty refrained from any demonstration of force. But when, in addition to the assemblage of large military forces on the frontier of Turkey, the Ambassador of Russia intimated that serious consequences would ensue from the refusal of the Sultan to comply with unwarrantable demands, Her Majesty deemed it right, in conjunction with the Emperor of the French, to give an unquestionable proof of her determination to support the sovereign rights of the Sultan.

The Russian Government has maintained that the determination of the Emperor to occupy the Principalities was taken in consequence of the advance of the fleets of England and France. But the menace of invasion of the Turkish territory was conveyed in Count Nesselrode's note to Reshid Pacha of the $\frac{19th}{31st}$ of May, and re-stated in his despatch to Baron Brunnow of the $\frac{20th\ May}{1st\ June}$, which announced the determination of the Emperor of Russia to order his troops to occupy the Principalities, if the Porte did not within a week comply with the demands of Russia.

The dispatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, authorising him in certain specified contingencies to send for the British fleet, was dated the 31st of May, and the order sent direct from England to Her Majesty's Admiral to proceed to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles was dated the 2d of June.

The determination to occupy the Principalities was therefore taken before the orders for the advance of the combined squadrons were given.

The Sultan's Minister was informed, that unless he signed within a week, and without the change of a word, the Note proposed to the Porte by Prince Menchikoff on the eve of his departure from Constantinople, the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia would be occupied by Russian troops. The Sultan could not accede to so insulting a demand; but when the actual occupation of the Principalities took place, the Sultan did not, as he might have done in the exercise of his undoubted right, declare war, but addressed a protest to his Allies.

Her Majesty, in conjunction with the sovereigns of Austria, France, and Prussia, has made various attempts to meet any just demands of the Emperor of Russia without affecting the dignity and independence of the Sultan; and had it been the sole object of Russia to obtain security for the enjoyment by the Christian subjects of the Porte of their privileges and immunities,

she would have found it in the offers that have been made by the Sultan. But, as that security was not offered in the shape of a special and separate stipulation with Russia, it was rejected. Twice has this offer been made by the Sultan, and recommended by the Four Powers—once by a Note originally prepared at Vienna, and subsequently modified by the Porte; once by the proposal of bases of negotiation agreed upon at Constantinople on the 31st of December, and approved at Vienna on the 13th of January—as offering to the two parties the means of arriving at an understanding in a becoming and honourable manner.

It is thus manifest that a right for Russia to interfere in the ordinary relations of Turkish subjects to their Sovereign, and not the happiness of Christian communities in Turkey, was the object sought for by the Russian Government. To such a demand the Sultan would not submit, and His Highness, in self-defence, declared war upon Russia; but Her Majesty, nevertheless, in conjunction with her Allies, has not ceased her endeavours to restore peace between the contending parties.

The time has, however, now arrived when—the advice and remonstrances of the Four Powers having proved wholly ineffectual, and the military preparations of Russia becoming daily more extended—it is but too obvious that the Emperor of Russia has entered upon a course of policy which, if unchecked, must lead to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire.

In this conjuncture, Her Majesty feels called upon, by regard for an ally, the integrity and independence of whose empire have been recognised as essential to the peace of Europe, by the sympathies of her people with right against wrong, by a desire to avert from her dominions most injurious consequences, and to save Europe from the preponderance of a Power which has violated the faith of treaties, and defies the opinion of the civilised world, to take up arms, in conjunction with the Emperor of the French, for the defence of the Sultan.

Her Majesty is persuaded that in so acting she will have the cordial support of her people; and that the pretext of zeal for the Christian religion will be used in vain to cover an aggression undertaken in disregard of its holy precepts, and of its pure and beneficent spirit.

Her Majesty humbly trusts that her efforts may be successful, and that, by the blessing of Providence, peace may be re-established on safe and solid foundations.

WESTMINSTER, *March* 28, 1854.'

The English and French governments, as has been before observed, steadily maintained the political character of the struggle—especially England, who had no concern with the question of the Holy Places, except that of a well-wisher, ready and willing to heal the wounds of all parties, had it been possible. The purport of the war is clearly stated in the above Declaration. Lord Palmerston stated, in the following year: 'It is not necessary for me to follow in detail all the extensions of territory which have marked the advance of Russia for a long time. It would be easy for me to follow her from the eastern shores of Asia through Central Asia, through the Caspian Sea, through Armenia, Poland, and the Danube, and then through the extreme confines of Norway and the Arctic Sea—it would be easy for me to shew that in her treaties she never took any natural boundary as the limit of her territory, but some artificial separation, which would give her the pretence or the occasion for further aggression. When such has been the policy pursued by Russia, and when we find the present Emperor of Russia [Alexander II.] declaring that his mission was to carry into effect the system pursued by Peter and Catherine, by Alexander and Nicholas, we felt that the time was come for defending the independence of Turkey and of Europe from such aggression.'*

Lord Palmerston, in another speech, delivered himself as follows:—'When Count Nesselrode asserted, at a later period, that our government had known from the outset what were the whole demands of Russia upon Turkey, he asserted that—I am bound to say it—which was utterly at variance with the fact. It is painful to speak of a government like Russia in terms of censure or reprobation; but I am bound to say, on behalf of the English government, that the Russian government, by itself and its agents, has throughout these transactions exhausted every modification of untruth, concealment, and evasion, and ended with assertions of positive falsehood.' Lord John Russell, too, in one among many speeches on the subject, said: 'At each step Russia has threatened Turkey. She has kept Turkey in that state that, without giving immediate alarm to Europe, she could dictate at Constantinople. Late years have seen a considerable change in the government of Turkey. I will not say that that change has extended to all its inferior pachas and governors; but the government of Turkey have seen that there are new and improved modes of government, consisting in dispensing equal justice to all her subjects, whatever might be their religion, and which might make Turkey stronger as a power than she had ever been while her strength rested upon the ascendancy of the Mohammedan race and the subjugation and degradation of every other race. That improvement of Turkey has excited the jealousy and apprehension of Russia. You will see that in no case has the government of Russia, which has pretended to be anxious for Christian privileges and for the good of the Christian subjects of Turkey, been favourable to those amendments and enlightened reforms which the government of Turkey have made. On the contrary, the language of Russia has always been: "Turkey must fall, unless her ancient Mohammedan maxims are maintained in force—Turkey must fall, unless the old Mohammedan system is kept up in full vigour—Turkey must fall, unless the separation between the Mohammedan and Christian races is carefully preserved and strengthened." Such being the language of Russia, who can doubt what is the intention of Russia? Who can doubt that, going from step to step, augmenting her territory and increasing her influence, alienating the Christian subjects of the Porte from the sovereignty of the Porte, her final object—which

* Speech in the House of Commons, June 8, 1855.

commenced before the middle of last century, and which might not be completed for some time to come—who can doubt, I say, that her final object must be the subjugation of the Ottoman Empire, and the absorption of a great portion of that empire in her own dominions, while the other portion, nominally independent, would be dependent, in fact, on her influence and her authority? Such a state of things would be so dangerous to Europe that we, on our side, must not stop until we have obtained some security against such a consummation being effected; we on our side, must not stop—and, let me say it, will not stop.' *

These views certainly accorded with those entertained by the nation at large, and spoke the true feeling of British statesmen on the case between Russia and Turkey; but it is to be regretted that the same energetic tone was not assumed throughout in their diplomacy. The czar, bearing on record the adulatory phrases so frequently applied to him in former years by English statesmen, was tempted to assume an air of injured innocence; while the English nation, comparing their heroic denunciations with a timid and vacillating course of policy, remained long doubtful of the sincerity of the government officials.

The terms on which England and France undertook to assist Turkey—or, rather, the objects to be attained—were defined in a convention, ratified on the 15th of April 1854, of which the following are the principal clauses:—

'Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of the French, having determined to afford their support to His Majesty the Sultan Abdul-Medjid, Emperor of the Ottomans, in the war in which he is engaged against the aggressions of Russia; and being, moreover, compelled, notwithstanding their sincere and persevering efforts for the maintenance of peace, to become themselves belligerent parties in a war which, without their active intervention, would have threatened the existing balance of power in Europe, and the interests of their own dominions; have in consequence, resolved to conclude a convention in order to determine the object of their alliance, as well as the means to be employed in common for fulfilling that object; and have for that purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries—[here the names of the Earl of Clarendon and Count Walewski are given, in the pretentious style of such documents; after which the clauses of the Convention appear as follow]:—

Art. I.—The High Contracting Parties engage to do all that shall depend upon them for the purpose of bringing about the re-establishment of peace between Russia and the Sublime Porte on solid and durable bases, and of preserving Europe from the recurrence of the lamentable complications which have now so unhappily disturbed the general peace.

Art. II.—The integrity of the Ottoman Empire being violated by the occupation of the provinces of Moldavia and of Wallachia, and by other movements of the Russian troops, their Majesties, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of the French, have concerted, and will concert together, as to the most proper means for liberating the territory of the Sultan from foreign invasion, and for accomplishing the object specified in Article I. For this purpose they engage to maintain, according to the requirements of the war, to be judged of by common agreement, sufficient naval and military forces to meet those requirements, the description, number, and destination whereof shall, if occasion should arise, be determined by subsequent arrangements.

Art. III.—Whatever events may arise from the execution of the present convention, the High Contracting Parties engage not to entertain any overture or any proposition having for its object the cessation of hostilities, nor to enter into any arrangement with the Imperial Court of Russia, without having first deliberated thereupon in common.

Art. IV.—The High Contracting Parties being animated with a desire to maintain the balance of power in Europe, and having no interested ends in view, renounce beforehand the acquisition of any advantage for themselves from the events which may occur.

Art. V.—Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of the French, will readily admit into their alliance, in order to co-operate for the proposed object, such of the other Powers of Europe as may be desirous of becoming party to it.'

Another convention between England and France, relating to prisoners of war, was ratified in London on the 20th of May 1854. Its principal clauses run as follow:—

'Art. I.—The prisoners made in the course of the present war shall, as far as possible, be divided equally between the two countries.

Whenever one of the two countries shall have maintained a greater number of prisoners, or shall have supported a certain number for a longer period of time, an account shall be made every three months of the excess of expenditure which may have been incurred, and repayment shall be made of the half of the amount by the government of the other country.

Art. II.—Instructions shall be hereafter concerted between the two governments, in order to make known to the officers of their naval and military forces the places or ports to which the prisoners are to be sent.

Art. III.—If a depôt for prisoners should be established in any place not in the possessions of either of the two countries, the expenses of it shall be borne between the two governments; but the advances to be made shall be by the government which shall have appointed officers to take charge of the establishment.

Art. IV.—Whenever the two governments shall agree to an exchange of prisoners with the enemy, no distinction shall be made between their respective subjects who may have fallen into the hands of the enemy, but their liberation shall be stipulated according to priority of the date of their capture, except under special circumstances, which are reserved for the mutual consideration of the two governments.'

It was a natural consequence of the unity of purpose with which England and France entered upon the war, that the two nations should place themselves, as nearly as possible, on an equality in all that concerned actual conflict with Russia. Hence, the foreign secretary sent to all our consuls, the colonial secretary sent to all our colonial governors, the Admiralty sent to all naval commanders on foreign stations, and the French government sent to all their consuls and naval commanders, instructions, the general tenor of which may be gathered from the following:—'It

* Speech in the House of Commons, July 21, 1854.

is a necessary consequence of the strict union and alliance which exists between Great Britain and France, that, in the event of war, their conjoint action should be felt by Russia in all parts of the world; that not only in the Baltic, and in the waters and territory of Turkey, their counsels, their armies, and their fleets, should be united either for offensive or defensive purposes against Russia, but that the same spirit of union should prevail in all quarters of the world; and that, whether for offence or defence, the civil and military and naval resources of the British and French Empires should be directed to the common objects of protecting the subjects and commerce of England and France from Russian aggression, and of depriving the Russian government of the means of inflicting injury on either. For these reasons, Her Majesty's government have agreed with that of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, to instruct their civil and naval authorities in foreign parts to consider their respective subjects as having an equal claim to protection against Russian hostility; and for this purpose, either singly or in conjunction with each other, to act indifferently for the support and defence of British and French interests. It may be that, in a given locality, one only of the powers is represented by a civil functionary, or by a naval force; but in such a case, the influence and the power of that one must be exerted as zealously and efficiently for the protection of the subjects and interests of the other, as if those subjects and interests were its own.'

So far in respect to England and France. The attitude assumed by Austria and Prussia towards Russia was much less clearly defined. A convention between those two powers was signed at Berlin on the 20th of April 1854; but this convention did not bind either to assist against Russia. It stated that 'His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, penetrated with deep regret at the fruitlessness of their attempts hitherto to prevent the breaking out of war between Russia on the one hand, and Turkey, France, and England on the other,' had deemed it necessary to make arrangements for defending each other, and Germany generally, whether attacked by Russia or by England and France. The convention consists mainly of the following five articles:—

'Art. I.—His Imperial Apostolic Majesty, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, guarantee to each other reciprocally the possession of their German and non-German possessions, so that an attack made on the territory of the one, from whatever quarter, will be regarded by the other as an act of hostility against his own territory.

Art. II.—In the same manner, the High Contracting Parties hold themselves engaged to defend the rights and interests of Germany against all and every injury, and consider themselves bound, accordingly for the mutual repulse of every attack on any part whatsoever of their territories; likewise, also, in the case where one of the two may find himself, in understanding with the other, obliged to advance actively for the defence of German interests. The agreement relating to the latter-named eventuality, as likewise the extent of the assistances then to be given, will form a special as also integral part of the present convention.

Art. III.—In order also to give due security and force to the conditions of the offensive and defensive alliance now concluded, the two Great German Powers bind themselves, in case of need, to hold in perfect readiness for war a part of their forces, at periods to be determined between them, and in positions to be fixed. With respect to the time, the extent, and the nature of the placing of those troops, a special stipulation will likewise be determined.

Art. IV.—The High Contracting Parties will invite all the German Governments of the Confederation to accede to this alliance, with the understanding that the federal obligations existing in virtue of Article 47 of the final Act of Vienna will receive the same extension for the States who accede as the present treaty stipulates.

Art. V.—Neither of the two High Contracting Parties will, during the duration of this alliance, enter into any separate alliance with other Powers which shall not be in entire harmony with the basis of the present treaty.'

An additional article to this convention was signed on the same day, binding the two powers to endeavour to bring Russia to peaceful views, and defining the minimum of aggression which would induce them to attack Russia in hostile form: 'A mutual offensive advance is stipulated for only in the event of the incorporation of the Principalities, or in the event of an attack on or passage of the Balkan by Russia.'

Just before war between Russia and the Western Powers actually commenced, the czar placed many parts of his dominions in a state of siege—all commercial and civil proceedings being rendered subservient to military rules. Five imperial ukases or orders were issued at St Petersburg on the 5th March. One placed the government of Ekatherinoslav and the district of Taganrog in a state of siege, under General Khomuloff; a second related to St Petersburg, under the Czarévitch or Grand-duke Alexander, afterwards Alexander II.; a third, to the governments of Esthonia and Livonia, under General Berg and General Suvaroff-Kiminski; a fourth, to the government of Archangel, under Vice-Admiral Boël. The fifth ukase related to the western and south-western provinces—Poland, Courland, Kovno, Vilna, Grodno, Volhynia, Podolia, Bessarabia, and so much of the government of Kherson as is situated on the right or western side of the river Boug, were declared in a state of siege; the command in the western provinces was given to Prince Paskévitch and General Rudiger, and in the southern or south-western to Prince Gortchakoff and General Osten-Sacken. The Grand-duke Constantine, the most daring and ambitious of the four sons of Nicholas, commenced an energetic arming of all the salient points of the empire on the shores of the Baltic; he travelled with untiring activity from station to station, examined all the fortifications; and, in his capacity of Grand Admiral, made defensive arrangements against the formidable fleets of England and France.

One remarkable circumstance connected with

this war, illustrative of the sympathy felt by the British colonists for the mother-country, was the presentation of numerous addresses from the colonists to the crown—first, when the news of the declaration of war arrived; and, secondly, when a Patriotic Fund was established for the relief of the widows and orphans of the soldiers who might fall in the war. The Earl of Elgin, as Governor-general of Canada, transmitted to England 'loyal addresses' from the Legislative Council, the Legislative Assembly, the municipal councils of some of the towns, the ministers and elders of the Presbyterian community, and the chiefs and sachems of six nations of Canadian Indians. At a later date, the same colony transmitted £20,000 from the Canadian legislature for the soldiers' widows and orphans. New Brunswick sent three addresses from the Council, the Assembly, and the inhabitants. Newfoundland, Barbadoes, Grenada, Gibraltar, New South Wales, Van Dieman's Land, South Australia, New Zealand—all in like manner sent addresses to the crown in the summer of 1854, and contributions to the Patriotic Fund in the following winter. One pleasing incident in respect to these expressions of sympathy was, that the munificent Canadian donation of £20,000 was sent, half to the British, and half to the French forces—thus regarding them truly as brethren in arms. The Emperor Napoleon, in acknowledging this gift, spoke in graceful terms of the bygone days when the Canadians were French colonists.

So long a period had elapsed since Europe had been involved in an extensive war, that the more ardent advocates of hostility with Russia were scarcely prepared for the numerous disturbances of ordinary commerce which immediately and necessarily followed. The Declarations, Proclamations, and Orders in Council, issued between February and April 1854 by the British government, were many in number, and bore relation to the following subjects:—*Proclamation*, 18th February, prohibiting the exportation of arms, ammunition, gunpowder, military and naval stores, or steam-marine apparatus: *Proclamation*, 9th March, prohibiting the equipment of any ship in British ports for the service of a foreign state, without an express royal licence: *Declaration*, 28th March, explanatory of the causes which had compelled Her Britannic Majesty to go to war with Russia: *Declaration*, 28th March, to the effect that, while the queen maintains the right of a belligerent to prevent neutrals from breaking any blockade she may establish against the enemy's coasts, she will, nevertheless, waive the right of seizing enemy's property (not contraband of war) on board a neutral vessel; and also the right of issuing letters of marque to privateers, in order to render the war as little injurious as possible to the states with which she remains at peace: *Order in Council*, 29th March, granting a general reprisal or power of seizure of all Russian ships and goods, whether belonging to the emperor or to his subjects, and to condemn and sell the prizes thus taken: *Order in Council*, 29th March, placing an embargo on all British ships from entering Russian ports, or Russian ships from entering British ports, except under certain special circumstances: *Order in Council*, 29th March, allowing a period of six weeks for the loading and departure of any Russian merchant-vessels which happened at that date to be in British ports: *Proclamation*, 29th March, regulating the mode in which the net-value of any prizes shall be distributed among the commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, seamen, and marines on board the ship or ships which might have captured the prize, and defining the circumstances which would justify a claim to rank any particular ship of the fleet among the captors: *Order in Council*, 4th April, lessening the severity of the terms of the proclamation of 18th February, and allowing powder and other materials of war to be exported, except to places where they might be likely to be rendered available to Russia: *Order in Council*, 7th April, relating to Russian ships in India and the colonies, and allowing them thirty days to take in cargo and depart, reckoning from the time when they should receive formal notice of this order: *Order in Council*, 7th April, extending to the Channel Islands and to the Isle of Man the same restrictions as to other British ports, in respect to the cessation of trade with Russia: *Order in Council*, 15th April, relaxing the severity of the declaration of 28th March, and permitting the ships of friendly nations to import or export cargoes at British ports, to whomsoever those cargoes might belong—with these provisos, that the goods shall not be contraband of war, and that the trade shall not be with blockaded ports: *Order in Council*, 15th April, extending the time during which Russian ships may take in cargoes for a British port, in respect to Russian ports of shipment in the Baltic and the White Sea: *Order in Council*, 15th April, prohibiting the exportation of arms, ammunition, or steam-marine apparatus, from Malta or Gibraltar, without especial licence from the respective governors of those places.

One observation suggests itself at the close of this Chapter. The war was distinguished by a double current of operations, simultaneous but independent—that of diplomacy, and that of campaigning. The diplomacy assumed varying hues, according to the progress of the campaigning; and thus it arises that both currents must be watched in turn, to trace the mode in which each acted upon the other. The diplomacy of 1854, in which England and France endeavoured in vain to induce Austria and Prussia to participate in the war, will suitably present itself for notice in a more advanced portion of the work.

CHAPTER IV.

COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE ALLIES IN 1854.

THE alliance between England and France for a common object, to be attained by warlike means if diplomacy should fail, was at first scarcely comprehended by the two nations. It was something so strange, that men doubted how to understand it. From the days of Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt—from the reigns of the Edwards and the Henries of feudal times—England had experienced alternations of war and peace with France, but none of warlike alliance and co-operation. There may, possibly, have been instances slightly approximating to such community of interest during times of war, but none of such magnitude as to occupy a prominent place in the pages of history. Many manifestations of national pride, many of mutual irritation, had been presented from time to time; insomuch, that when the Treaty of Alliance was signed, and war against Russia declared, prejudices had to be swept away on both sides. Again, England had never been at war with Russia, except to a slight degree during the complications which followed the French Revolution; and even then it was a war rather of paper than of cannon. That our country should sever all friendly ties with the powerful czar, seemed therefore as novel as the formation of an alliance by which England and France would fight side by side in the same cause. The explicit declaration in the Treaty, that neither power sought for any aggrandisement by reason of a contest intended to assist the sultan against a formidable enemy, appealed to the justice and good faith of the English and French nations; and this appeal met with a warm response.

FORCES AND STRATEGY OF THE WESTERN POWERS.

But England had something more to learn than the remodelling of alliances. She was called upon to meet the difficulty of waging war after a long period of European peace, during which the arts of industry had flourished, and the enthusiasm for military and naval glory had cooled down. The Duke of Wellington, during the last twenty years of his life, had repeatedly drawn attention to the fact, that the military arrangements of this country were in a defective state—coast-defences crumbling away, militia system neglected, stores insufficiently maintained. The assertion was in some quarters disbelieved, and in others regarded as of no importance; while those who admitted and deplored the fact, were too few in number to possess a remedial power in the government or in parliament. The army and ordnance estimates were invariably high each year, however profound the state of peace may have been; and there was a feeling spread abroad in the country, that if inefficiency appeared in our military power, offensive or defensive, it must be attributed to misappropriation of means, and not to the parsimony of the nation in respect to the amount of supply. Happily, or unhappily, nothing had occurred to put to the test the defensive power of Britain; nor was it known, except to a few, how limited were our military means of external attack; but various circumstances, necessarily made public during the progress of the war, rendered abundantly evident the fact that, in 1854, England was ill prepared for a campaign, so far as the exigencies of military service abroad were concerned. Slowly and painfully did this truth become apparent.

The object of the war being primarily to protect Turkey from the attacks of Russia, and, in a secondary degree, to lessen the power of the czar to inflict mischief on his neighbours generally, it became a duty on the part of the Allied Powers to agree on a plan for obtaining these results. In all wars, strategy must be intimately dependent on geography, both natural and political; and in this war against Russia, geography had marked out certain conditions to which the plans of the Allies must bend. Glancing at a map of this gigantic empire, we see that the czar's dominions touch the ocean at only a few practically available points. The Arctic Ocean, along the whole of the northern coast of Europe and Asia, from Norway to Behring's Strait, bounds these dominions; yet it presents but one single port of any commercial or political value—namely, Archangel. Eastward, the power of Russia is bounded by the sterile and thinly inhabited coasts of the North Pacific; westward,

her commerce finds an outlet by means of the Baltic and the Sound; in the south, the Black Sea and the Bosphorus furnish the only maritime channels to the Mediterranean; while in the south-east, the Caspian, an inland lake without an outlet, simply separates the Russian dominions from certain Persian and Tatar provinces. The maritime regions, therefore, in which an enemy could weaken Russia, are the shores of the Baltic and the Black Sea: the others being of comparatively smaller value. In respect to land-frontier, Russia touches upon the dominions of Sweden, Prussia, Austria, Turkey, Persia, the Tatar Khans, and China; and her vulnerability on any part of this wide-spreading frontier must depend upon the relations existing between the various governments. Now, the only one of these states which was in hostility with Russia in 1854, was Turkey; for in the midst of the diplomacy of the period, Sweden, Prussia, and Austria, all kept free from any actual rupture with the czar. The land-frontier brought within range of probable warfare, was that which is conterminous to Russia and Turkey—namely, at the boundary between Moldavia and Bessarabia, marked by the river Pruth; and an irregular line from the eastern end of the Black Sea to Mount Ararat, separating Asia Minor from Georgia and the Caucasus.

These conditions determined the limits and nature of any plan whereby the Allies might act effectively against Russia. English or French troops could be brought into action in four regions —the shores of the Baltic, the shores of the Black Sea, the Russian frontier at the Pruth, and the Russian frontier between Georgia and Asia Minor. All other military operations, on anything like an extensive scale, were virtually interdicted by the political relations existing at the time between Russia on the one hand, and the states of Northern or Central Europe on the other. The elder Napoleon frequently demanded a right of way for his armies through the central states of Germany, when Prussia, Russia, or Austria was to be attacked; but the Western Powers, in 1854, neither asked nor could have obtained such a permission. To attack and capture all Russian vessels on the high seas; to blockade all Russian ports of any commercial value; to land armies on any or all of the four Russian boundaries above named—these were the courses open to the Allies. It was speedily determined that both powers should despatch fleets to the Baltic and the Black Sea; that both should send armies to Turkey, there to be employed as circumstances might suggest; and that the forces of both powers should act together—sharing the cost and the dangers equally—earning equally any glory which might accrue from the struggle—and contributing equally to the liberation of Turkey from the trammels of the czar, and Europe generally from the disastrous influence of the czar's power.

The plans of the Allies were not publicly known at the commencement of the war; but circumstances transpired early in the next following year, which led the governments of both countries to afford explanations concerning the strength and destination of the respective forces in the spring of 1854. The Duke of Newcastle, who was secretary of state for war and the colonies when the war broke out, was appointed to a new office, minister or secretary for war, in the autumn of the same year; and in this office, it was his duty to superintend all the arrangements for the conduct of the war. The following were the answers to five questions, relating to the plan of campaign, which the duke gave before a Committee of the House of Commons:—

'At what period was the expedition to the East first determined on?—The first official order for sending any troops abroad was given on the 9th of February. Those troops were sent to Malta.

When it was first decided upon, was it intended to make an expedition to Turkey?—Certainly.

With what object was that expedition undertaken?—The first and immediate object was to protect the Turkish Empire from invasion, then threatened by the Russian forces, which had advanced upon the left bank of the Danube.

What was the origin of the determination to make war?—The course taken by the Emperor of Russia in invading the Principalities—a part of the Turkish dominions—was the immediate cause.

Can you explain why Malta was selected, in the first instance, as the destination of the troops?—The reason was this: it was considered desirable that at the moment of declaring war, or of signing a convention with Turkey, we should send a military force into the sultan's territories, and it was desirable that that force should be as large as possible. The distance from England being so great, I considered it right to recommend to the government, which adopted my suggestion, to send out a body of 10,000 men to Malta in the first instance; to have the steam-transports which had conveyed those troops sent home to fetch a similar number of troops; while the advanced corps at Malta could be transferred, by means of sailing transports and the men-of-war steamers, to Turkey; so that the whole force of 20,000 or 25,000 men would be landed there in one-half the time which would have been requisite had none been sent on first to Malta.'*

The Duke of Newcastle gave further information concerning the preliminary arrangements made by the English government, before the actual declaration of war. 'As early as the beginning of January, foreseeing the great probability of our being obliged to send out a military force to that country, we sent Lieutenant-colonel Vicars, with three other officers of engineers, to Turkey, with general directions to inspect the country, and the means of defence especially bearing upon the capital, and also to render any assistance they could to the Turkish government to prepare defences. Colonel Vicars was taken seriously ill at Gibraltar, and unable to proceed; in consequence of which, we applied to Sir J. Burgoyne to recommend an officer to succeed him, and Sir J. Burgoyne at once, in the

* *Proceedings of the Committee on the State of the Army before Sebastopol.* The history of this committee belongs to a later portion of the present work; but the evidence collected will occasionally be adverted to, in so far as it throws light on circumstances connected with the early stages of the war.

handsomest manner, offered to go himself. He did so, leaving this country by the next mail; I think about the 27th or 28th of January. They made an accurate survey of the whole country, and recommended that lines should be thrown up at Bulair, and even, if necessary, in front of Constantinople. Soon after he had left this country, I, believing he had not a sufficient engineering staff, sent out Major Dickson of the artillery—a distinguished officer, who was selected on account of his knowledge of the Turkish language and manners—and three other engineer officers, with further instructions to examine the country, and report upon its salubrity, to ascertain what places were suitable for the encampment of troops, and where wholesome water was to be procured. Those officers executed the duty intrusted to them, and Major Dickson subsequently reconnoitred the Danube and the greater part of Bulgaria: Sir J. Burgoyne having confined himself to Roumelia, with the exception of a visit to the camp of Omar Pacha.'

Powerful as is the navy of this country, both royal and mercantile, the arrangements for the shipment of troops and artillery were very defective when the war began; the old system had fallen into disuse since the end of the former war, and had not been succeeded by anything of better character. There is the authority of Captain Milne, one of the Lords of the Admiralty, for the statement, that in February 1854 the Admiralty had not a single transport-ship in its service: the duties of the transport-service being performed by the comptroller of the Victualling Department. A Transport Board was established later in the year, in connection with the Admiralty; but at the period now under notice, the whole system was in utter confusion. Sir James Graham, first Lord of the Admiralty, afterwards gave evidence, that 'requisitions to the Admiralty used to come from seven different quarters—occasionally from the Secretary of State as to the embarkation of men; frequently from the Horse Guards, after consultation with the Secretary of State; from the Board of Ordnance, in reference to the embarkation of artillery and engineers; then from the Treasury, as to the commissariat; from the Secretary at War, for the medical supplies; and then a double requisition from the Board of Ordnance, sometimes as to ammunition, and sometimes as to stores. I found the inconveniences arising from that state of things to be so great, that I represented strongly my opinion that it was absolutely necessary that these various requisitions should be brought to a common centre; and I suggested to the Secretary for War, that day by day the requisitions should be fiated and approved by him, and that when so approved, it should be the duty of the Transport Board to carry them out.'

The government being almost wholly unprovided with means of transport to the East, tenders were sought from such shipowners as would undertake the service. As a means of dispatch, steamers were preferred to sailing-vessels; and thus an enormous amount of steam-power was speedily called into use. This, however, was so costly, that sailing-vessels were mostly selected as transports for artillery and heavy stores; and it was planned that there should be an incessant passage of such transports to and from the Levant, as rapidly as the voyages could be made. The government applied to seventeen steam-navigation companies for aid in respect to steamers, and to individual shipowners in respect to sailing-vessels. The withdrawal of many steamers from the various mail-packet routes, consequent on these urgent demands of the executive, occasioned for many months considerable derangement in the postal service. Some of the transports thus taken up were engaged with the question of payment left to arbitration, under a clause of the mail-packet contracts, which empowers the government so to hire vessels belonging to the steam companies; while others were engaged at a certain sum per month. During the month of February, the Admiralty was called upon to furnish means of transport for 509 officers, 10,933 men, 272 women, 12 children, 1598 horses, 750 tons of camp-equipage, 850 tons of baggage, 989 tons of ordnance, and 1088 tons of provisions. Small as an army of 10,000 or 12,000 may be, it becomes here evident how enormous is the weight to be moved when such an army is provided with all its accompaniments; and when it is further considered that the whole had to be transported to a distance of 3000 miles to reach the Black Sea, the magnitude of the undertaking is sufficiently displayed. Under the dislocated arrangements of our transport-service, it was a work of great labour to despatch twelve steamers by the 20th of March, containing a little more than 10,000 officers and men. The stores were sent on two plans: in the first, a ship was hired at so much per ton for the voyage, and it was the interest both of the government and the shipowner that the voyage should be completed as quickly as possible; on the other plan, the ship was hired at so much per month, insomuch that the owner had no especial motive to expedite the voyage. The authorities preferred the former of these plans, but were often obliged to adopt the latter, particularly in respect to the large steamers. A sum of about 50s. per ton per month was the usual average rate at which the government hired steamers; and thus a steamer of 2000 tons burden, employed in carrying troops to the East, cost the country at the rate of £5000 per month. The government would have found it much cheaper in the end to have purchased the vessels at once: but men were wanting; the pay is higher in the commercial navy than in the royal navy; and anomalies would have been introduced by the entry of the transports into the rank of government vessels. Thus, the charge upon the nation was rendered higher because the available hands were too few. At a later period, however, the government purchased the *Himalaya*

and the *Prince*, two noble steamers belonging to the fleet of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam-navigation Company.

But it was not alone in the means of transport that the war found England ill prepared. The ordnance store had fallen to a low condition since the former war; and it was only by great exertions that it could be augmented during 1852. Lord Hardinge, commander-in-chief, in affording information concerning the state of the artillery at the beginning of the war, said: 'My first act, on taking office in March 1852, as Master-General of the Ordnance, was to examine into the state of our artillery; and I found the number of guns, field-batteries for Great Britain, to be about forty or fifty, and those of the date of the battle of Waterloo. I proposed to Lord Derby's government, in a long memorandum, my reasons for considering that to be a dangerous condition for our artillery to be in, and I recommended that 300 guns, and two wagons to each gun, should be immediately prepared. Lord Derby's government assented to that proposal, which was carried into effect by the succeeding government.'* When the ordnance came to be

Lord Raglan.

despatched to the East, vessels were freighted especially for this service; and with every gun were sent the men, horses, ammunition-wagons, and stores requisite for one gun, in order that, when landed, each consignment or detachment might be complete in itself. With 24 guns were despatched from Woolwich 42 officers, 1090 men, 961 horses, and 124 ammunition-wagons.

The English army itself, taken in its totality, had fallen into an ill-organised state during a peace of forty years. It was not enough that conquests had been made in India, China, Birmah, Kaffirland; it is not by such conquests that an army can be maintained in the discipline and habits of European warfare; and, indeed, most of these conquests were made by troops belonging to the East India Company, calling forth only a small amount of service from the queen's troops. At the beginning of 1854, the British army, besides the Guards composing the Household Brigade, consisted mainly of 100 regiments of the line, including the rifle brigade, together with 8 local corps. The cavalry, including 7 regiments of dragoon-guards, made up 23 regiments. The artillery numbered 14 battalions. The 23 regiments of dragoons, light dragoons, dragoon-guards, hussars, and lancers, together with the horse-guards and 2 regiments of life-guards, supplied about 12,500 sabres; the regiments of the line, with the grenadiers, Coldstreams, fusileers, and rifles, amounted to about 105,000 infantry. Making allowance for certain deductions, the effective army, at the end of 1853, scarcely

* Evidence: Sebastopol Committee.

exceeded 100,000. It received, however, two augmentations, shortly before the commencement of the war, of 10,000 and 15,000; and in that state it comprised about 4600 commissioned officers, 9000 non-commissioned officers, and 114,000 privates. These were independent of a few colonial corps, such as the Ceylon Rifles, the Canada Rifles, the Malta Fencibles, &c., making about 6000 or 7000 more. The artillery, comprising horse-artillery, foot-artillery, engineers, and sappers and miners, numbered about 17,000 men at the close of 1843; but about the time of commencing the war, the number had augmented to nearly 19,000. Glancing at the widely spreading British dominions, we become forcibly struck with the fact, that England can have little to spare for European warfare out of such a force. The 30,000 queen's troops in India may bear a small ratio to the Company's army of 250,000 men; but they constitute a serious deduction from the imperial army. Then, all the various colonies must be so circumstanced as to command military aid when necessary. The commander-in-chief must think of Gibraltar, controlling the entrance to the Mediterranean; of Malta, the small but important military position in the middle of that sea; of the Ionian Islands, in such near proximity to Turkey and Greece; of the Cape of Good Hope, and its neighbour the Mauritius; of the rapidly growing Australian colonies; of the isolated but influential positions at China, Singapore, and Ceylon; of the colonies which occupy so large an area in North America; of the scattered West India Islands—all required, when the war broke out, a share of military protection from the mother-country. When, therefore, the announcement was made that 10,000 men would be despatched to Turkey, to be followed by 12,000 or 15,000 more, it was felt to be a great draught from the British army, however small to contend against so gigantic a power as Russia.

This British portion of the Allied army was placed under the command of Lord Raglan, who, as Lord Fitzroy Somerset, had during many years been military secretary to the Duke of Wellington. The Duke of Cambridge, the Earls of Cardigan and Lucan, Generals Brown, Evans, England, Bentinck, Scarlett, Campbell, Pennefather, were among the chief officers appointed to the expedition.

Great was the excitement when the several regiments began to leave our shores for their destination in the East. So long a time had elapsed since the din and turmoil of war had been heard in England, that a new generation had sprung up, whose knowledge of the costs and horrors of warfare was little other than traditionary. Two months elapsed before any cavalry left England, for there was long a doubt whether it would be transported through France, or round by way of Gibraltar; but the infantry began to depart at the end of February—a month before the actual declaration of war. As regiment after regiment embarked, cheers, tears, good wishes, high hopes, accompanied them. The Fusileers, quartered in the Tower, were among the first to depart; and when the cavalcade, headed by the band playing inspiriting airs, emerged from the old fortress, and threaded its way through the busy streets of the metropolis, countless thousands watched and greeted the soldiers as they passed—not that all understood the real nature of the quarrel which was to issue in battling; for many of the soldiers could never comprehend why they were called upon to fight against an emperor, merely because that emperor had behaved wrongfully towards the sultan. Setting politics aside, however, the troops, actuated by an *esprit de corps*, departed cheerfully for the East, resolved to maintain the honour of their flag and country in any contests in which they might be engaged. Southampton was one of the chief ports of departure; and the military value of railways was fully experienced in the facility with which troops were conveyed from London and the heart of England to that port. Cork was the chief place of embarkation for the troops despatched from Ireland. Liverpool was another scene of active operations. The embarkation of the 88th was one only among many exciting scenes which that town displayed during the early spring. The regiment arrived at Liverpool by railway from Preston, and marched through the streets to the landing-stage. The troops were in high spirits; but there was the usual drawback to their enthusiasm. 'A number of women, the wives and sweethearts of the men, were taking their adieus; and it was most painful to witness their unrestrained grief, and the efforts of the men to comfort them. A few minutes before one o'clock, the order was given to march; the band playing several bars of *St Patrick's Day*, and the multitude cheering heartily as they set out. In defiling through the streets ..... old men, women, and young boys, jostled with each other, and struggled for the honour of shaking hands with the troops, who were greeted with good wishes from all sides.'

The *Ripon* steamer was one of the first which conveyed troops to Malta, on their way to the East. This fine vessel, belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental Steam-navigation Company, made the passage from Southampton to Gibraltar in five days. On each morning, the men were exercised at Minié-rifle shooting, firing at a target hanging from the end of one of the ship's yards; while in the evening, soldiers and sailors joined in dancing and singing. As with the Grenadiers on board the *Ripon*, so with the Coldstream Guards on board the *Orinoco*, all went well, under the care of the commanders of those vessels. It was on the 22d of February that these two vessels, accompanied by the *Manilla*, received detachments of the Household troops at Southampton; and on the 23d, all three started for Gibraltar, in the midst of a rough sea, which tried the patience and good-humour of the men. A space of fourteen inches is 'man-of-war's allowance' for the width of

hammocks on board ship, but the Guards were allowed eighteen inches; and this half-yard was in many instances a troubled region of sea-sickness.

Malta became a scene of strange excitement. Steamer after steamer arrived during the month of March, bringing consignments of troops, until the little island was almost filled to repletion. Valetta, the chief town, became busy as a fair; and the Maltese made a fine harvest on the occasion. Besides the three steamers already named, the *Niagara*, the *Himalaya*, the *Vulcan*, the *Emu*, the *Kangaroo*, the *Simoom*, and the *Valetta*, successively arrived; and as the troops conveyed in these vessels were landed at Malta, the military throng became very great. It was a fine achievement of that magnificent steamer, the *Himalaya*—at that time the largest ship in the world—to bring 1500 men from Plymouth to Malta in seven days; and, indeed, the steamers belonging to the several companies invariably eclipsed the few belonging to the government employed in this service. Among 10,000 or 12,000 soldiers, thus conveyed in a small number of steamers, some complainings and repinings were to be expected. In one vessel, the provisions were badly cooked; in another—the government steamer *Simoom*—the machinery went

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wrong, and the voyage was rendered very tedious. For the most part, however, the men landed at Valetta in high spirits; and those who had money to spend, whether officers or privates, met with little difficulty in so doing. Every Maltese workman found immediate and incessant employment, to supply the numberless little wants of so large a body of persons.

The provisioning of this unoccupied army became a matter of much importance. That the troops were idly detained at Malta for many weeks, was a subject of regret both to officers and men; and severe strictures were made both at home and abroad on the government, concerning the enforcement of this idleness. The delay was occasioned partly by the indecision of the home authorities, and partly by the necessity of acting in concert with the French; but, explained as it may be, the long detention at Malta was injurious to the object in view, which would have been better secured by an earlier advance from that island to Gallipoli or Constantinople. In a former paragraph, the Duke of Newcastle's arrangement is adverted to, whereby it was expected that if 10,000 men were despatched to Malta by swift steamers, they might be forwarded thence to Gallipoli by sailing-vessels; while the steamers returned to England for 10,000 more, which would in that case proceed direct to the Levant without landing at Malta. The plan might perhaps have been judicious; but it does not explain the unprofitable detention of the first 10,000 at that island. The commissariat officers were incessantly engaged in providing for the wants of these troops. The regiments arrived more rapidly than these functionaries were prepared for them; and it was alleged, in defence, that the instructions sent out from England were tardy and insufficient. Sometimes coal, sometimes lamps and candles, sometimes the more important items of food and forage, were deficient in quantity at the tents of the camps. The livestock on the island diminished very rapidly when the troops

were added to the resident population, and the commissariat officers were despatched to Tunis to purchase oxen. Biscuit was made and baked at the rate of 30,000 pounds per day, partly for present consumption, and partly to accumulate a supply for the East. There was a kindliness of intention, if not a skilfulness of application, in many of the government arrangements. For instance, about the middle of March, a Treasury minute was issued, whereby directions were given to the commissariat department for supplying the troops with malt liquors, preserved potatoes, chocolate, coffee, tea, sugar, rice, and Scotch barley for broth. These articles of diet were in addition to the ordinary rations of bread and meat, and to be supplied in detail at their nearest wholesale cost, without payment of duty, and excluding inconvenient fractions, thus leaving the public to bear the expense which would be incurred for freight, packing, and other incidental charges.* The regulations under which these different articles were to be delivered in bulk by the commissariat to each regiment, and then distributed in detail, were left to the commander-in-chief to determine—his duty being, to fix a limit to the quantity allowed to officers and men, in order that the boon thus conferred might not be converted to other purposes than the soldiers' benefit. The importance of this precaution was pointed out in the Treasury minute, it being very naturally presumed that in the article of beer, especially, the predilections of our troops were likely to undergo no change from service in the East. The fulfilment of this minute, however, was scarcely rendered available until after the troops left Malta.

About the end of March, Sir George Brown, one of the officers to whom the management of the expedition was intrusted, landed at Malta; and arrangements were forthwith made to transfer the troops from that island to Gallipoli. The last-named town is a seaport on the Straits of the Dardanelles. It is situated in a peninsula which juts down southward from the mainland of Turkey, bounded on the east by the Dardanelles, and on the west by the Gulf of Saros or Xeros. The sea distance from Malta to Gallipoli is about 750 miles, round the southern point of Greece, and threading a way between the numerous islands forming the Grecian Archipelago: having the kingdom of Greece on the west or left hand, and Asia Minor on the east or right hand. To this place it was, during April, that the British troops were conveyed from Malta, in consignments or detachments of such magnitude as the ships available could accommodate. Mrs Young—better known by her earlier name of Mrs Postans, as the authoress of various works relating to India—who was at Malta and Gallipoli during this stirring period of 1854, has given a lively description of the scenes which preceded and accompanied the embarkation. 'After passing about a month in this fashion—all racket and arrival at Valetta, all bustle and confusion in the harbours, all anxiety and distraction at the barracks—the order came for the gallant regiment to advance. Then came a scene baffling all description. The square within the fine new barracks of Vederla was crowded with Maltese, trying hard to dispose of baggage-animals of all descriptions—the blind, the halt, the spavined, the vicious—donkeys, mules, horses, ponies..... Then the packing, the exchanging, the selling superfluous comforts; the collection of a few standard edibles; the saddles to be mended at the last moment; the tin dinner-services—of two plates, one dish, and a drinking-cup—to be made complete; the camp bedsteads and stools to be selected; the parading, the drumming, the orders and counter-orders; the private frying of bacon and eggs for officers' breakfasts—often by the officers themselves—on the most doubtful fires, and in the most unworthy frying-pans; and, at last, the embarkation on board the *Vesuvius* steamer! The crowding, the discomfort; the luxury of one officer, who was allowed to lie on the floor in the surgeon's cabin, with his feet under the chest of drawers; the misery of another, taken on board so ill as to be scarcely considered out of danger for the voyage! But at last it ended; and at sunset of the 6th of April, away steamed the *Cyclops*, with her troublesome burden in tow, to arrive in a dreadful snow-storm in the Dardanelles, and to land at Gallipoli in as much misery as the newly arrived on Turkish soil perhaps ever endured. Of this, however, I was not a personal witness, intending, as I eventually did, to follow in the wake of the *grande armée* by some more tranquil means.'*

With more or less of such discomforts as usually accompany landsmen when afloat, the 10,000 British soldiers were conveyed from Malta to the Dardanelles; and 10,000 or 12,000 more were afterwards conveyed from England without an intermediate detention at Malta.

It becomes necessary now to notice the French preparations for war, coincident with, and in furtherance of, the operations of their Allies.

When the war was about to commence, the French newspaper *Le Pays* gave a detailed account, apparently from trustworthy sources, of

* The following Tabular Statement shews the supplies provided, the cost-price, and the rate of proposed charge:—

Articles.	Quantities Provided.	Cost-price.	Rate of Proposed Charge to the Troops.
Porter, . .	64,300 gals.	35s. per bar. of 36 gals. .	3d. per qt.
Pale Ale (for the Officers), .	2,700 "	40s. per barrel.	4d. "
Preserved Potatoes,	50,000 lbs.	5d. per lb.	5d. per lb.
Chocolate, . .	10,000 "	£1, 16s. per cwt.	4d. "
Coffee, . .	80,000 "	£61, 10s. per ton.	6½d. "
Tea, ...	8,000 "	1s. per lb.	1s. "
Sugar, . . .	100,000 "	£1, 1s. 6d. per cwt.	2d. "
Rice, ...	200,000 "	£26, 10s. per ton.	3d. "
Scotch Barley for Broth, . .	10,000 "	14s. 6d. per cwt.	1½d. "

* *Our Camp in Turkey, and the Way to it*, p. 13.

the organisation and amount of the French army at that time. According to this document, the directing or controlling power of the army consisted of a general staff, a staff corps, and a private staff for the artillery and engineers; there were in it 7 marshals of France, 80 generals of division, 160 generals of brigade, and 560 officers of the staff, from the rank of colonel to that of lieutenant. The bulk of the army, consisting of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers, was thus constituted:—The infantry was composed of 100 regiments, of 3 battalions each; 20 battalions of foot chasseurs; 3 regiments of Zouaves and 2 of the foreign legion, with 3 battalions; 3 battalions of native sharpshooters; 3 of African light infantry; and, lastly, a few companies of veterans. The 100 regiments of the line could afford immediately 2 battalions of 1000 men each, and had also the means for recruiting with a third battalion from the reserve. The 9 battalions of Zouaves, the 6 of the foreign legion, the 6 of the sharpshooters and of the light infantry, were on a war-footing, and could furnish from 20,000 to 25,000 men ready at once to enter on a campaign. Of the 20 battalions of the foot-chasseurs, 10 were organised, and 10 in course of organisation; they numbered 1200 men each, able to give war-battalions of 1000 men. The force of the French infantry ready to enter on a campaign, while leaving good staffs of regiments at their depôts in France, was thus estimated at 240 war-battalions, or 240,000 men. The cavalry was composed of 12 reserve regiments, 20 of cavalry of the line, 20 of light cavalry, all with 5 squadrons; and 8 regiments of light cavalry—4 of African chasseurs, 3 of Spahis, and 1 of Guides—with 6 squadrons. The mounted troops gave, consequently, 300 squadrons. Each of the 52 regiments, with 5 squadrons, could immediately furnish 4 war-squadrons of 130 horses each; and the 8 regiments, of 6 squadrons, 700 horses each. Thus the force of the cavalry ready to enter on a campaign was estimated at from 32,000 to 35,000 sabres, leaving, to keep up the regiments, the fifth squadrons, of good *cadres* and of young horses. The artillery was composed of 14 regiments, of 16 batteries; and in addition, 1 regiment of pontonniers, of 12 companies; 13 companies of military workmen; 4 squadrons of flying-artillery; and 5 companies of veteran artillerymen. The force of this artillery, ready for battle, was 360 guns, and from 28,000 to 30,000 men, including the flying-train. The engineers formed 3 regiments, with 2 battalions each, or 6000 men. The total force of the army able to enter at once on a campaign was, consequently, nearly 300,000 men and 60,000 horses; while the military organisation of France provided the means of raising this army to a much higher number, if occasion required. The above analysis referred to the beginning of the year 1854; but levies were soon afterwards made, which increased the disposable force at the service of the government.

The course of strategy marked out by the French government, doubtless with the concurrence of their English allies, was embodied in the instructions which the Emperor of the French drew up for the guidance of Marshal St Arnaud, to whom the command was given. The chief paragraphs of these instructions, which were dated the 12th of April 1854, were the following:—

'In placing you, marshal, at the head of a French army, to fight at a distance of more than 600 leagues from our mother-country, my first recommendation is to have a care for the health of the troops, to spare them as much as possible, and to give battle only after having made sure first of, at least, two chances out of three for a favourable result.

The peninsula of Gallipoli is adopted as the principal point of disembarkation, because it must be, as a strategical point, the basis of our operations—that is to say, the *place d'armes* for our depôts, our ambulances, our provision-stores, and whence we may with facility either advance or re-embark. This will not prevent you on your arrival, should you deem it advisable, from lodging one or two divisions in the barracks, which are either to the west of Constantinople or at Scutari.

As long as you are not in presence of the enemy, the spreading of your troops cannot be attended with inconvenience, and the presence of your troops at Constantinople may produce a good moral effect; but if, perchance, after having advanced towards the Balkan, you should be constrained to beat a retreat, it would be much more advantageous to regain the coast of Gallipoli than that of Constantinople; for the Russians would never venture to advance from Adrianople upon Constantinople, leaving 60,000 good troops on their right. If, nevertheless, there should be the intention of fortifying the line from Kara-su, in front of Constantinople, it should only be done with the intention of leaving its defence to the Turks alone; for, I repeat it, our position would be more independent, more redoubtable, when on the flanks of the Russian army, than if we were blockaded in the Thracian peninsula.

This first point established, and the Anglo-French army once united on the shores of the Sea of Marmora, you must concert measures with Omar Pacha and Lord Raglan for the adoption of one of the three following plans:—

1. Either to advance to meet the Russians on the Balkan.

2. Or to seize upon the Crimea.

3. Or to land at Odessa, or on any other point of the Russian coast of the Black Sea.

In the first case, Varna appears to me the most important point to be occupied. The infantry might be taken there by sea, and the cavalry more easily, perhaps, by land. On no account ought the army to go too far from the Black Sea, so as to be always in free communication with its fleet.

In the second case, that of the occupation of the Crimea, the place of landing must first be made sure of, that it may take place at a distance from the enemy, and that it may be speedily fortified, so as to serve as a *point d'appui* to fall back upon in case of a retreat.

The capture of Sebastopol must not be attempted without at least half a siege-train and a great number of sand-bags. When within reach of the place, do not omit seizing upon Balaklava, a little port situated about four leagues south of Sebastopol, and by means of which easy communications may be kept up with the fleet during the siege.

In the third case, my principal recommendation is—never to divide your army; to march always with all your troops united, for 40,000 compact men, ably

commanded, are always an imposing force; divided, on the contrary, they are nothing.

If compelled, on account of scarcity of provisions, to divide the army, do so in such manner as always to be able to unite it on one point within twenty-four hours.

If, when marching, you form different columns, establish a common rallying-point at some distance from the enemy, that none of them may be attacked singly.

If you drive back the Russians, do not go beyond the Danube, unless the Austrians enter the lists.

As a general rule, every movement must be concerted with the English Commander-in-chief. There are only certain exceptional cases, where the safety of the army might be concerned, when you might act on your own resolution.'

Toulon and Marseilles were the Southampton and Liverpool of France in the busy spring of 1854. France being more extensively a military power than England, and being nearer the scene of action, it was from the outset agreed that the French army in the East should be more numerous than the English, while the English fleet was to be more numerous than the French. The French, having a much more complete military organisation than ourselves, proceeded in their plans systematically and quickly. Toulon and Marseilles, the two great French ports in the Mediterranean, became alive with military and naval preparations. The harbours crowded with shipping; the quays laden with military stores; the barracks filled with soldiers; the hotels occupied by officers about to embark; the cavalry horses located in temporary stables; the artillery gradually approaching the place of embarkation; dealers and venders of all kinds making a harvest during the sunny-time of prosperity; men volubly discussing and actively gesticulating; messengers and aids-de-camp hurrying to and fro, to receive and communicate orders—all tended to make these southern French ports foci of intense activity and excitement. It was about the end of March when the embarkation commenced. The French troops were packed on board ship more closely than their English allies, in reference to the number of troops to the tonnage of each vessel. One screw-steamer, the *Jean Bart*, received 1200 soldiers, besides the crew necessary to navigate it. The first convoy, of about 20,000 troops, was despatched in six or seven divisions, as follows:—5400 men in the *Montebello*, *Alger*, *Jean Bart*, and *Ville de Marseilles;* 3450 men and 225 horses in the *Asmodée*, *Ulloa*, *Labrador*, *Coligny*, *Météore*, and *Gorgone;* 1495 men and 40 horses in the *Mouette*, *Eclaireur*, *Laplace*, and *Infernal;* 1130 men and 20 horses in the *Caffarelli*, *Véloce*, and *Brandon;* 3040 men in the *Napoléon* and *Suffren;* 4663 men and 80 horses in the *Montezuma*, *Panama*, *Albatross*, *Canada*, and *Titan;* and the rest in the *Christophe Colombe*. The whole of these vessels sailed within a few days of each other; and further contingents took their departure at a later date. The men were mostly despatched from Toulon; the cavalry horses, munitions, provisions, and articles for encampment, mostly from Marseilles, at which port more than 300 vessels were freighted for their conveyance.

Malta, by an arrangement between the two governments, was adopted as a midway resting-place for a few French troops, in addition to the English who had arrived; and thus the little island became still more vivacious and bustling. The *Christophe Colombe* and the *Mistral*, which had left France on the 19th of March, arrived at Malta on the 23d, bringing General Canrobert, General Bosquet, General Martimprey, about 50 other officers, and 800 or 900 soldiers. It was a strange

French Soldiers and Zouave.

scene to the men. Malta had never before been trodden by English and French troops at the same time, except during the heat and passion of war; and the soldiers now gazed at each other with intense curiosity. The dress of the Highland regiments was a wonder to the French troops; while the Arab-like Zouaves of the French were no less an object of attention to the English. But curiosity and wonder soon gave place to enthusiasm; the troops 'fraternised'—to use a favourite French term—with great heartiness, and the national anthems, *God Save the Queen* and *Partant pour la Syrie*, were exchanged from ship to ship, and band to band, in complimentary style. The Zouaves were originally a tribe of Arabs, in or near the regency of Algeria. When the French effected an occupation in that country, some of the Zouaves agreed to join their army; and being active, fearless, and dashing fellows, they became great favourites; young Parisians joined their corps, although in distinct companies; and by degrees

there was established a regular branch of infantry under the name of Zouaves—French in composition but Arab in dress, and fitted for a particular kind of service in active warfare. The Zouave dress is picturesque—an open, simply ornamented jacket of blue cloth, faced with red; an under-tunic of red, descending to the hips; a broad silken sash coiled round the waist; dazzling scarlet pantaloons, very full above the knee, and gathered in folds just below it; embroidered yellow leather greaves, covering the leg from the knee to the ankle; a red fez cap, with a roll of cloth at the edge to protect the head—such was the dress of the sun-burnt Zouaves, upon whom the British troops gazed in the harbour of Valetta. The full-pantalooned Zouave and the kilted Highlander might well scrutinise each other with some curiosity.

The sojourn of the French at Malta did not amount to a residence. A troop-laden ship would anchor in the harbour of Valetta for a day or two; and the officers and a few men would take advantage of the opportunity to exchange civilities with their allies. The beginning of April found French as well as English soldiers tossing on a frequently stormy voyage towards the Dardanelles. The officers reached their destination in many ways —some *via* Marseilles and Malta, some by way of Vienna and Trieste, while others took the sea-route from Southampton to Gibraltar and the Levant. Not only was Malta a central point, touched upon by many regiments both of the French and English; but it was rendered available in some respects as a depôt for the British fleet in the Mediterranean, and was visited also by the French admirals. Added to this, it was a station at which mail-steamers stopped on their way from Southampton, Gibraltar, and Marseilles, in one direction; and from Trieste, Constantinople, Syria, and Alexandria, in the opposite direction. Hence, nothing could exceed the turmoil, activity, money-spending, polyglot loquacity, and belligerent speculations, of which Malta was the scene during the spring of 1854.

PROCEEDINGS AT GALLIPOLI, PERA, AND SCUTARI.

A strange scene, too, was presented to the quiet Turks, when the Allies soon afterwards took possession of Gallipoli. The singular oblong peninsula, the Thracian Chersonese,* forming one side of the Dardanelles, is well fortified, to maintain the rights of the Porte in respect to the passage of ships through those straits; thus, Bovali Kalessi, Kiamleh Kalessi, Dyrmen Bounoun, Killis Bahar, Kamasieh, and Seetil Bahar, are all fortified posts in the Chersonese, near the southern mouth of the Dardanelles, mounting from 200 to 300 guns, and faced by a line of yet more strongly armed forts on the opposite or Asia-Minor side of the straits. Higher up, however, where the straits terminate in the Sea of Marmora, and where Gallipoli is situated, military arrangements are less prominent; and the 12,000 or 15,000 inhabitants of that town—a medley of Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews—occupy themselves with a peaceful trade in corn, wine, oil, and fruit. Such a place, then, could not have been otherwise than disturbed by an impetuous rush of military men from the West.

The French preceded, by a brief interval, their English allies in their arrival and encampment at Gallipoli; or, rather, although both continued to arrive for some weeks, a French regiment was the first to make a landing. One consequence of this soon appeared. War is more a matter both of business and of pleasure to a Frenchman than to an Englishman; in accordance with this tendency, the French troops made their new home comfortable in a very brief space of time; and in so doing, appropriated the best of everything, leaving inferior accommodation to the English who were to follow them. It was not simply an exemplification of the proverb, 'First come, first served;' but those who came first were better able, by their previous habits, to make the best of that which was available.

By the first week in April, 4000 French troops were encamped in and near Gallipoli, under the command of General Canrobert; and, to assist them in fortifying the peninsula—a plan at one time proposed, but only partially carried out—a body of English sappers were employed. It was on the 5th of the month that the *Golden Fleece* anchored off Gallipoli, bringing the first contingent of the regular British army; and by the 21st, there were no fewer than 22,000 French and 5000 English soldiers in the peninsula, cooped up in quarters ill prepared for their reception. There is a deficiency of water near the town; and for this and other reasons, partly strategical, a camp was formed at Bulair (Blejar, Boulehar, Bulari), seven or eight miles higher up the peninsula than Gallipoli, and overlooking the Gulf of Saros.

Gallipoli presented at that time a motley spectacle to the troops who successively arrived. The elements of the East and the West were there, mingled in utter confusion. Possessing all the characteristics of a Turkish town—narrow, crooked streets, dilapidated houses, filthy roadways, picturesque mosques and bazaars—it had also the living accompaniments of such a town. Turks squatting on their shop-boards, smoking their pipes, and marvelling why the English and French are always in such a hurry; women with their veiled faces and yellow-booted feet, gliding along the streets; children rolling about and glorying in the mud; dogs, large, shaggy, fierce, and dirty, picking up the offal which scavengers should have removed—such was Turkish Gallipoli. Then there were the Greeks, Jews, and Armenians, who

*The Greeks frequently applied their name for a peninsula (*Chersonesus*) in geography. Thus, *Thracian Chersonesus* was the name for the peninsula now under notice; while the Crimea was the *Taurica Chersonesus*.

constitute a large portion of the population, each in his national costume. To these were added the red-coated English soldier, the neat and quiet-looking rifleman, the kilted Highlander, the crimson-trousered Frenchman, the dashing Zouave, the officers seeking about for their quarters in the tumble-down houses of the town. The Turkish population looked upon all this in quiet amazement—wondering why so many English and French soldiers should thus settle down at a place so far distant from the Danube, where Omar Pacha at that very time would have been glad of their aid.

The English officers and men complained seriously of the discomforts to which the imperfect arrangements of the home-government subjected them. The very first day was enough to dishearten them; for when the *Golden Fleece* arrived, there was no pilot to shew her where to anchor, no one came off to her from the shore, no British flag shewed that she was expected and welcomed, no British consul or interpreter was at hand; and when, on the following morning, the officers landed, they had to learn that horses were scarcely obtainable; that food was dear; and that the French had

Gallipoli.

secured all the best localities in and near the town. Rustum Pacha, the Turkish governor, effected all that good-will could accomplish; but he could not render Gallipoli suddenly capable of accommodating twice its ordinary number of inmates. The French found quarters in the Turkish part of the town, and the English in the Greek—that is, the latter did so after having been cooped up two days and a half in the *Golden Fleece* in Gallipoli harbour: a thousand soldiers having been so circumstanced, because no sufficient arrangements had been made for receiving them on shore. It did not improve the temper of these men to see, during these two or three days, French vessels arrive and land their contingents of troops with ease and celerity.

At a later date, when complaints reached the home-government, direct denials were frequently given in parliament concerning their truth; and from these denials, together with the details of evidence given before a Committee of the House of Commons many months afterwards, it appears that the discomforts *ought* not to have been experienced, if the different parts of the government machine had been fitted for harmonious working; but it was this want of harmony which lay at the root of the evil. The Duke of Newcastle, when examined by the Sebastopol Committee, was asked whether, in his capacity as minister of war, he had sought information as to the capabilities of Turkey to furnish supplies for the wants of the army; to which he replied:

'Directions were given to the commissariat officers, who were sent out at the very commencement—on the 7th or 8th of February. Inquiries as to the capabilities of the country were not, in the first instance, made in Bulgaria, but were confined to Roumelia—the first object being to send troops to Gallipoli. Commissary-general Smith was sent from Corfu, he being to a certain extent acquainted with the languages of the East, Greek and Italian. He had provided, I believe, generally speaking, sufficient supplies before the arrival of any troops at all at Gallipoli. It was in consequence of the recommendation of Sir J. Burgoyne, on strategical grounds, that Gallipoli was occupied; that officer's opinion being confirmed by that of Colonel

Ardent, who had been sent by the Emperor of the French for a similar purpose.

What steps were taken to prepare for the reception of troops at Gallipoli?—Instructions were given to the commissariat, who were informed of the number of troops for whom they would have to provide.

Did you receive information that they had provided for the wants of the army when it came?—I did not receive any such information from the commissariat directly. It was not then under me. The commissariat corresponded with the Treasury, and from the latter department I received information of its movements. I should say vast supplies of all kinds were sent from England.

What supplies did you expect to find in the country where the army was to be sent?—Principally fresh meat, and, of course, bread to the greatest extent to which it could be obtained. In apprehension of the possibility of the supply of bread there failing, a large supply of biscuit was sent out from this country.

As to forage for horses?—I considered that ought to be provided in that country, but provision was nevertheless made for sending out hay from England. I apprehend none of that hay was landed at Gallipoli, as it was sent from here in sailing-vessels, which would not arrive until after the troops had left Gallipoli. No cavalry was landed at that place.

But the infantry had all their wants supplied at Gallipoli?—At first there were complaints; but, to the best of my recollection, more of want of transport than of provisions.'

This minister was further asked, whether there had not been a great want of means of transport at Gallipoli. His reply was: 'I cannot say. It was undoubtedly the duty of the commissariat to provide such transport as was needed; whether they have any justification, I cannot say. My impression is, that there had been considerable difficulty in procuring animals in that part of the country, although there was none nearer to Constantinople. I was not aware of any difficulty having arisen, until I received an intimation of it through a private source.'

Sadly frequent were the instances, in the earlier months of the war, in which the British officials at home were ignorant by whom instructions ought to have been given; and equally ignorant whether the instructions, when given, had or had not been properly carried out.

As more and more troops arrived at Gallipoli, new camps were formed outside the town; and in these camps the superiority of the French commissariat arrangements was speedily exhibited, in the better supply of the men with tents, food, fuel, and medicines. The French landed with their baggage-trains, and conveyed their stores to the camping-ground with great quickness; the English had to seek for vehicles and animals of draught before they could move. The commissaries worked actively and willingly; but they were too few in number; and had not the advantage of a well-organised system to work upon. Such, in like manner, was the case with the medical department of the British troops at Gallipoli; the surgeons were few; and there was unaccountable delay or neglect in forwarding the medicine-chests from Malta. At a time when the 4th, 28th, 44th, 50th, and 93d regiments were all in or near Gallipoli, as well as the rifle-brigade and many sappers and engineers, any dislocation in the commissariat and medical departments was sure to be felt with some severity and dissatisfaction. Soldiers have a tendency to make the best of circumstances as they arise; yet many such letters as the following, from an officer of the 50th, found their way into the English newspapers during the spring of 1854:—

'CAMP, GALLIPOLI, *April* 18.

Our encampment is very wretched, and hardly anything except the men's rations to be got to eat; no beer, or anything but rum—"one gill," the same as the men. The commissariat is dreadfully managed: nothing of any sort. The French have everything—horses, provisions, good tents, and every kind of protection against contingencies. To-morrow morning, we march at six o'clock to another encamping-ground, where we are to throw up trenches, and to remain for two months; it is about seven miles from this place; the ground is beautifully situated, overlooking the Bay of Gallipoli. It would be a good lesson to some of our government to take a lesson from the French: the care and attention paid to their troops are perfect. I had to purchase a mule, and pay £11 for him. Everything is dear. I cannot get any tea to drink; I should have found it a great comfort. The streets are horrible, and the town is bad. I never saw anything to equal it anywhere. We are all obliged to sit on the ground, and eat what we can. My breakfast consists of a piece of brown bread—no butter, and no milk; and till yesterday our men got no breakfast. We get eggs, and they are the only things to stand by at present, as the meat served out is so bad no one can touch it. We have no potatoes, or any other kind of vegetables, except onions. It is really more than a joke, and all owing to the very bad management of our commissariat department.'

Here we see that the commissariat, whether in fault or not, had to bear the burden of censure—a burden which those officers deemed exceedingly unjust. A private in one of the regiments wrote home thus: 'The French are one hundred years in advance of us in regard to military equipments for the field. We are loaded like packhorses, with our knapsacks, cross-belts, with sixty rounds of ammunition, haversack, and an article termed a "canteen," shaped like a butter firkin, which would wear out a pair of trousers in a month. We were nicely fooled at home as to getting all the things furnished to us at about cost-price. We were to get the best London porter at 4d. per quart—I have not seen a drop of porter since I came here.' This 'London porter' grievance was bitterly dwelt upon by the men; owing to clumsy management, the casks of porter were far away from the spot where the beverage was needed.

The main bulk of troops remained idle several weeks in and near Gallipoli; but some of the regiments, as lately mentioned, sought quarters at Bulair. The idleness was, however, not shared by the engineers or sappers, who were employed in forming a series of field-works and intrenchments across the peninsula. Much diversity of opinion seems to have existed concerning the

policy of this arrangement; for, irrespective of the improbability that the Russians would penetrate so far southward, there was a deficiency of wood and water in the Chersonese; and, moreover, most of the provisions for the commissariat had to be brought from the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. Be the explanation what it may, however, the camp of the sappers and miners, and of two infantry regiments, was on the gentle slope of a ridge between Gallipoli and Bulair, about seven miles from the former and three from the latter. Near Bulair, the peninsula narrows to an isthmus less than three miles in width, between the Dardanelles and the Gulf of Saros; intrenchments and earthworks were carried across this isthmus, and a fort constructed about midway in the line, for the defence of the position. English and French troops worked in turn, to construct these defensive posts; and by degrees there appeared a trench 7 feet deep by 13 broad at the top, with a parapet and banquette formed of the earth dug out of the trench. The 28th and 44th British regiments were quartered near these works. Their camp consisted of streets of bell-tents. The French camp was not far distant; and there were daily rounds of visitings between the troops of the two nations. The extreme novelty of the alliance raised a doubt in some minds concerning the light in which the soldiers would regard each other; and Lord Raglan deemed it prudent to issue the following order:—'The commander of the forces avails himself of the earliest opportunity to impress upon the army the necessity of maintaining the strictest discipline; of respecting persons and property, and the laws and usages of the country they have been sent to aid and defend; particularly avoiding to enter mosques, churches, and the private dwellings of a people whose habits are peculiar and unlike those of other nations of Europe. Lord Raglan fully relies on the generals and other officers of the army to afford him their support in the suppression of disorders; and he confidently hopes that the troops themselves, anxious to support the character they have acquired elsewhere, will endeavour to become the examples of obedience, order, and of attention to discipline, without which success is impossible, and there would be evil instead of advantage to those whose cause their sovereign has deemed it proper to espouse. The army will, for the first time, be associated with an ally to whom it has been the lot of the British nation to be opposed in the field for many centuries. The gallantry and high military qualities of the French army are matters of history; and the alliance which has now been formed will, the commander of the forces trusts, be of long duration, as well as productive of the most important and the happiest results. Lord Raglan is aware, from personal communication with the distinguished general who is appointed to command the French army, Marshal St Arnaud, and many of the superior officers, that every disposition exists through their ranks to cultivate the best understanding with the British army, and to co-operate most warmly with it. He entertains no doubt that Her Majesty's troops are animated with the same spirit, and that the just ambition of each army will be to acquire the confidence and good opinion of each other.' Any doubt on this matter was speedily dispelled; the troops greeted each other heartily on all occasions; and, indeed, the 'fraternisation' was at times so excessive, that a Zouave and a Highlander on one occasion partially exchanged dresses under the influence of an exhilarating cup, and appeared at muster the next morning in strange motley—kilt and baggy red trousers having changed places.

The sojourn at and near Gallipoli, while it shewed that the organisation of the various departments of the French army is more complete than that of the English, revealed also the fact, that the French private soldier is a better manager, a better caterer, than the English. He knows how to make the best of such supplies as are obtainable; how to provide ingenious substitutes for such appliances as may be wanting. In or near Bulair, the English troops suffered many annoyances through defects in the commissariat, which they had not adroitness enough to remedy; whereas the French hunted about for eggs, caught tortoises, gathered herbs, and prepared dishes and 'potages,' which perfectly astonished their Anglican neighbours. The French soldier is encouraged in the practice of numerous employments and contrivances, which render essential service during the precarious events of a campaign.

The month of May was far advanced before any considerable number of the troops made a move from Gallipoli towards the scenes of warfare in the Black Sea. There had been a long detention at Malta; there was now a long detention at Gallipoli. The necessity for fortifying the country around Gallipoli seems to have been overrated; and thus the labours of many weeks were rendered of no avail. The Turks marvelled greatly at the proceedings of the English and French. Omar Pacha was at that time maintaining a desperate struggle with the Russians on the banks of the Danube; and it was fully expected by the Osmanlis, that their western Allies would have advanced at once to Shumla or Silistria, to assist them in their heavy trial. But the generals were in communication with the ambassadors at Constantinople; the ambassadors were in correspondence with the diplomatists at Vienna; the diplomatists were receiving instructions from London, Paris, Berlin, and St Petersburg; and thus military operations were retarded by the obscure and fluctuating course of diplomacy. The officers, for the most part, arrived in the East long after the troops. Sir George Brown, on the part of the English, and General Canrobert, on the part of the French, accompanied the earliest contingents to Gallipoli, towards the close of March, to prepare the encampments; but the commanders and the princes

arrived much later, and, in most cases, steamed on towards their quarters at Constantinople without stopping at Gallipoli. On the 22d of April, Sir de Lacy Evans and staff arrived; on the 23d, General England and staff; on the 2d of May, Lord Raglan and Lord de Ros; a day or two afterwards, Prince Jerome Napoleon; on the 7th, Marshal St Arnaud; on the 9th, the Duke of Cambridge. Reviews and inspections, courtesies and visitings, followed these arrivals: pleasant in themselves, but absorptive of fine days, which should have been appropriated to active operations further north.

As we have traced the two armies from the English and French shores to Malta, and from Malta to Gallipoli; so does it now become necessary to follow them to Pera and Scutari, where another detention awaited them.

At this point it is desirable to attend a little to the topography of the region around Constantinople; for, on the one hand, it is well to know why other nations have so eagerly sought to possess this magnificent locality; and, on the other, a knowledge of the topography is essential to a due comprehension of the relations which Constantinople bears to the Dardanelles and Gallipoli on the south, to Scutari on the east, to Adrianople on the west, to the Bosphorus and Varna on the north. Constantinople is thirsted for by the Russians as gold by the miser: czar, princes, patriarchs, priests, nobles, serfs—all inherit more or less the tendency to regard Constantinople as one of the great prizes which destiny has in store for Russia. The longing for this splendid locality underlies many aggressive schemes. Whether the secret archives of France or Austria contain the outlines of any plan for the acquisition of the city of the Bosphorus, the world may perhaps one day know; but that Russia has entertained such dreams, is as plain as noonday. The knowledge of this fact inspires dread in the rulers of other nations; and it is thus that may be explained, in part, the perpetual interference of other powers in the affairs of Turkey.

Never, perhaps, was there such another position for a commanding city. It controls the only outlet from the greatest of European lakes to the greatest of European seas; for although the Euxine, under its modern name, is the Black *Sea*, it has most of the characteristics of a lake. Constantinople almost touches Asia; for while the city itself is in Europe, Scutari, a sort of suburb, is in Asia; they are separated by the channel of the Bosphorus. There can be little doubt that this Bosphorus is a mere rent in the land, caused by some geological convulsion, or by the impetuous rush of the waters of the Euxine to find an outlet; if such be the case, Europe and Asia were once joined at this point. In commanding the Black Sea, Constantinople commands also the commerce of the fine wheat-growing countries on the northern margin of that sea, watered by the Don, the Dnieper, the Boug, the Dniester, and the Pruth. In the same way, and for the same reasons, Constantinople is the key which unlocks the treasures of the Danube and of Southern Germany; the produce of Bavaria, Austria, Hungary, Servia, Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bulgaria, naturally seeks the Danube as the easiest and most profitable outlet; but this produce cannot leave the Black Sea for the Mediterranean unless Constantinople permit. Again, Constantinople is on the great highway from Europe to the regions of the Euphrates, the Tigris, and the Indus—a highway which, though superseded in great degree since steam-navigation developed its power, is yet followed largely by the Armenian, Greek, and Persian merchants. As if to render this extraordinary spot still more powerful as a commercial and political watchtower over the south-eastern corner of Europe, it has a second narrow strait almost under its immediate control. The waters of the Black Sea flow through the Bosphorus into the Sea of Marmora, or Marmara (the ancient *Propontis*), and thence into the Mediterranean through the narrow but deep channel of the Dardanelles (*Hellespontus*).

Is it, then, strange that nations should have cast a longing eye at such a commanding position; or that struggles, both diplomatic and warlike, should have resulted from the wish to possess it?

The topography of Constantinople must be described in brief, as a means of rendering intelligible the positions which the English and French troops took up in May 1854. The city is built on undulating ground, fronting both the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora, at the southern extremity of a wedge-shaped promontory. The opposite coast of Asia is so near to the point of this wedge, that a boat can be rowed thither, across the Bosphorus, in a quarter of an hour. Exactly at the point, the wedge is split into two by the magnificent harbour called the Golden Horn, which runs up north-westward beyond the limits of the city. Thus the Turkish metropolis consists essentially of three distinct parts, all combining to form one great city, although separated by channels of deep water: Constantinople, the city proper, frequently called Stamboul—although this name is sometimes applied by the Turks to the entire city—containing the Seraglio and the chief public buildings, is bounded on one side by the Golden Horn, and on another by the Sea of Marmora; Pera, containing the residences of the foreign ambassadors, with Galata, the 'Wapping' of Constantinople, and Tophané, a little higher up—occupy the jutting peninsula bounded on one side by the Golden Horn, and on the other, by the Bosphorus; while Scutari is in Asia, on the east side of the Bosphorus, and immediately opposite Constantinople. The whole, collectively—including Pera, Galata, Tophané, Scutari, and Stamboul—form the Turkish capital, and contain a population variously estimated at 700,000 to 1,000,000. Not only is the actual site of the city undulating, but it is bounded by higher ground landward. This

character of surface imparts a beautiful appearance to Constantinople, and a degree of salubrity and cleanliness which would not otherwise exist in a city belonging to the Turks. Constantinople receives healthy breezes from all sides, and the steep slope of the streets assists in carrying off all filth into deep water. The depth of the water in the Bosphorus, the Golden Horn, and the Sea of Marmora, greatly increases both the magnificence and the practical value of the site. The occasional heavy rains, the abundant supply of pure water by means of aqueducts from artificial reservoirs ten or twelve miles inland, and the numerous public fountains, all tend towards the purification of the city. Notwithstanding the disappointment expressed by travellers at the dissolving of many beautiful views when Constantinople is actually entered, it does not appear that the streets are so filthy as those in many other Turkish towns, except in the humbler trading districts near the water; although on other grounds there is sufficient reason for discontent at the mean and dilapidated appearance of most of the houses and buildings. There is only one really long street, extending from the

The Bosphorus.

high walls of the Serai or Seraglio to the Adrianople Gate; all the rest are short, narrow, crooked, and comfortless. They have, too, a dull and deserted appearance. Indeed, this feeling of desolation is experienced in a remarkable degree at many points both within and without Constantinople —remarkable considering the largeness of the population. Immediately beyond the magnificent city-walls built by the Greek emperors, but utterly neglected by their Moslem successors, the waste and solitude are at once observable, to which a sort of melancholy interest is imparted by the white marble tombs and dark cypresses of numerous cemeteries. Within the city, the narrow streets are rendered still more narrow by the projecting windows, latticed and closed most jealously; or, if these be not present, the streets are rendered still more dull and irksome to the eye by the absence of windows altogether, nothing being present to break the monotony but low and narrow doorways. So little tendency have the Turks to repair old buildings, that they have even left untouched the breach in the city-wall, through which the Ottoman army entered Constantinople 400 years ago, when Sultan Mohammed conquered these regions from the Emperor Palæologus: the rent is simply fringed with straggling trees and brushwood. The old Greek structures in the city, too, have been allowed to fall utterly to ruin. One among many indignant writers has bitterly reproached the Turks for this matter. 'Even the coldest philosopher,' he says, 'could scarcely lament the passing away of a race who never founded but one civilised empire in the world (Granada), and who, from the palsying influence of Mohammedanism, have done nothing for art, science, or literature, during the 400 years that they have possessed, in wealthy leisure, one of the finest countries upon earth; who have done worse—who have suffered the sands to collect upon her storied monuments, and the pride of her palaces and towers to crumble into dust. Where stood the Forum of Constantine, the founder of the city, with its porticos and lofty

columns of porphyry? Where is the colossal statue of Apollo, supposed to be the work of Phidias? Where is the stately Hippodrome, with its statues and obelisks?—the Baths, with their threescore statues of bronze?—the Circus?—the Theatres?—the Schools?—the marvellous treasures of antiquity, which would have been standing to-day had they fallen into other hands? Alas! every one is destroyed, and the thoughtful traveller may look in vain for anything to remind him of the thousand glories of the past.' If the doom of Turkey were pronounced by an art-student, the race of Osman would unquestionably fall to rise no more.

In respect to the accommodation for the Allies in the earlier months of the war, the waters around Constantinople were of much importance. The Golden Horn constitutes a splendid harbour—safe, capacious, and beautiful; and it is adequate to the accommodation of an enormous commerce—far larger, it must be candidly confessed, than Constantinople is ever likely to have as a Turkish city. But it is the Bosphorus that affords the most magnificent prospect. Glowing descriptions without number have been given of the whole locality. The Earl of Carlisle supplies a lively sketch, not so much of the natural beauties of the Bosphorus, as of the celebrated points concerning which guides and interpreters have something to say. Under date of 10th August 1853, he has this entry: 'Steamed down to Constantinople. Mr Skene was with me, and made an incomparable cicerone for the Bosphorus, telling me the tenants of the long line of palaces, and their histories. This was the house of Mehemet Ali of Egypt. This is the house of his chief rival, old Khosrew Pacha, now living there at ninety-six; he has filled the office of grand vizier for fifty years altogether, with various breaks, and still retains many of the simple habits of his origin as a Circassian shepherd. Here Darius Hystaspes crossed the strait on his Scythian expedition; here he sat on the rock to witness the passage; the inscription on the stone to commemorate it, which was formerly known to exist, has not been discovered. The ground on either side is now occupied by the tall round white towers of the forts, the Rumili and Anatoli Hissars—Castle of Europe and Castle of Asia: the first, built by Mohammed II. before the capture of the city, still goes universally by the name of the conqueror. From that window, or rather slit in the wall, he used to examine the means of approaching the capital. Under that low culvert, in the after-destination of the place as a prison, the bodies were floated into the Bosphorus. The European fort is built on the most fantastic plan, to imitate the Arabic letters of the word Mohammed. On one side is Balta Liman, on the other Unkiar Skelessi, both famous in the annals of modern treaties. This rapid bit of current is the Sheitan Akindesi, or Devil's Current; so said to be called because a sultana had been angered by seeing a Christian congregation coming out of a church on a Sunday, and had immediately given orders for the destruction of the church; whereupon, on her return, her boat was upset, and all saved but herself. It was in that long-spreading house in the bay that the sister of the present sultan, the wife of Halil Pacha, kept long watch over her boy, to avoid the law which doomed all the male children of the sisters of sultans to immediate death; and when at last she found that the child had been strangled, she died herself from the shock very soon afterwards. This tragedy has happily put an end to the practice. That very long façade is the house of Fuad Effendi, whom Prince Menchikoff found the other day prime minister, and refused to visit.'* The earl, like most travellers, was struck with the contrast between the distant beauty and the near squalor of the Turkish metropolis. 'On landing and walking up to Messiri's Hotel at Pera,' he says, 'I was struck far beyond my expectation with the ruggedness, the narrowness, the steepness, and the squalidness of the streets; an impression which the extension of my walk through Galata (the old Genoese quarter) and Constantinople proper (Stamboul), materially aggravated. I could not see the close dwellings and bazaars, the mangy dogs, and the swarms of human kind, without wondering—not that the plague has ever got there, but that it has ever got out again.'

Such is the region, with its mingled beauties and deformities, towards which the English and French troops were conveyed on their way from Gallipoli to Varna.

By agreement with the Turkish government, arrangements were made for the reception of a portion of the British troops in a large pile of buildings at Scutari, forming the new barracks; while others were encamped at Unkiar Skelessi. The 33d, 41st, 49th, 77th, and 88th regiments thus found a temporary location on the east of the Bosphorus. One of the famous voyages of the *Himalaya* was from Malta to Scutari, with 2100 souls on board—a number perhaps unprecedented in the annals of sea-transit. When landed, the officers and men tried to while away the time as they best might—still marvelling when and where they should meet the Russians, against whom they expected to have had to contend; some ran foot-races, and some played at cricket—a game which many of the astonished Turks are said to have almost lost their senses in endeavouring to comprehend. By the third week in May, the above-named regiments were further augmented by the 7th, 19th, 23d, 30th, 47th, 93d, and 95th, together with the Rifles and three battalions of the Guards. Of cavalry, there was yet none; and the artillery was rendered very incomplete by deficiency of horses. Lord Raglan and his staff had before this arrived, and frequent inspections of the troops took place. The weather was becoming hot; the supplies

* *Diary in Turkish and Greek Waters*, p. 111.

were frequently lax and insufficient; and men and officers were desirous of pushing on to some scene of active exertion. The 55th regiment arrived to swell the numbers at Scutari; and the cavalry officers also, but without the cavalry.

The closing weeks of the month of May were full of excitement at Scutari. Lord Raglan's quarters —a neat, but perfectly plain wooden building, situated on the beach, at a distance of half a mile or so from the barracks—was the focus of general activity. Officers of all grades were hastening to and fro, receiving and communicating orders. The Turks and Greeks from Scutari were wont to squat on a grassy knoll near this house, and gaze on the high-pressure intensity of everything going forward—the Greek, lively and inquisitive, the Turk lost in wonderment why men should move so quickly, and should give themselves so much trouble to serve others. The Guards were encamped near this spot; the other regiments pitched their camps further inland; and near these camps a number of suttling-booths were established by Smyrniote Greeks, who obtained permission to drive a profitable trade in cakes, sweetmeats, lemonade, and sherbet—to which stronger beverages were added when practicable without detection. The most wondrous specimens of horseflesh, almost valueless even as a gift, were vended for sale by worthies whose honesty was on a par with the merits of their beasts. Jew and Armenian money-changers, with their bags of gold and silver, completed the motley scene, in which English, Turk, Greek, Armenian, and Hebrew, were thus strangely mingled.

On the Queen's birthday, 24th May, to keep up home-associations when far away, 15,000 British troops were paraded on the outskirts of Scutari, in the presence of a few Turks who cared sufficiently about it to walk half a mile, and of a larger sprinkling of foreigners from the opposite side of the Bosphorus. Nearly all the principal officers were present, including Lord Raglan, the Duke of Cambridge, the Earl of Lucan, Sir George Brown, Sir de Lacy Evans, Sir Colin Campbell, and Generals Bentinck, Pennefather, Airey, Adams, Buller, &c.

Meanwhile, the French had not been idle; although the activity was such as scarcely responded to the wishes of men who looked forward to the excitements of active service. Portions of the French army, under General Bosquet, after sojourning awhile at Gallipoli, proceeded to Adrianople. This city, the second in importance in Turkey, is situated in the fertile plains of Thrace, about 100 miles north of Gallipoli, and 150 west or north-west of Constantinople; it is of considerable strategical importance, being at the point of confluence of the principal rivers of Thrace, and on the high road from Constantinople to the Balkan and the north-western provinces. The Allies, wavering between many plans, knew not whether it were better to act on the defensive or the offensive in Turkey; and, during this period of uncertainty, they deemed it well to occupy Adrianople. The French camp occupied an island formed by the two arms of the river Joungia, and also the left bank of that stream. General Bosquet enlivened the Adrianopolitans by many entertainments and field-days, during which the dashing Zouaves and Chasseurs d'Afrique excited no small degree of admiration. General Prim, a Spanish officer, who was present as a spectator at many of the incidents of the war, was one of the guests at Adrianople on this occasion.

Large bodies of French troops were conveyed from Gallipoli up to Varna, without stopping at Constantinople, and without adopting the inland route *via* Adrianople. The means of transport possessed by the French were inferior to that which was available to their allies, so far as vessels were concerned—one of the very few points wherein England held a superior position during the war. The English, even in the magnificent *Himalaya*, scarcely went beyond an accommodation for 1500 or 1600 troops; whereas the *Euphrate*, a steamer belonging to the Messageries Impériales, was employed to receive nearly an equal number in less than half the space. The French soldiers are said to have been 'packed close all around, like negroes in a Brazilian schooner;' the buoyant spirits of the men, however, maintained them in good-humour amid all the discomforts of the passage.

It was at Constantinople, nevertheless, that the gay trappings of war, or rather of warriors, were presented with most effect to the gaze of the Turks. On one occasion, towards the close of the sojourn there, a review of the French troops was held in brilliant style. Marshal St Arnaud, Prince Napoleon, and a staff of officers decked to the highest pitch of military splendour, proceeded to a plain situate between Daoud Pacha and Rumilsifilk, on the western or Adrianople road, whither marched the French troops from their temporary barracks near Constantinople, and whither the sultan and his courtiers also proceeded, to witness the spectacle. Cuirassiers, Spahis, Chasseurs de Vincennes, all turned out in their best; and their wheeling and deploying, their marching and countermarching, delighted the sultan, as he galloped his magnificent black charger along the line. Whatever might be the moral or political equality of the two nations, there were many circumstances during the war which gave the French an exterior advantage over the English in the eyes of the Osmanli. The French studied effect. The Prince Napoleon, when he first landed, was dressed in full splendour, and surrounded by a brilliant staff; the Duke of Cambridge, when he touched Turkish soil, wore a round hat and a shooting-jacket; and the Turks were driven to infer that the French prince must necessarily be a more important personage than the English. Travellers accustomed to Oriental ideas assert that it is not prudent to disregard

externals, when a stranger would convey an impression of his dignity, rank, or influence: moral grandeur is less understood in the East than in the West. Reverting, however, to the military inspection outside Constantinople, the sultan had rarely appeared so delighted and animated as when he rode for three hours between the marshal and the prince; he perhaps formed in his thoughts a golden picture of the aid which such allies might furnish in reviving the strength and healing the wounds of the Osmanli. He thanked the marshal, and expressed his regret that his imperfect knowledge of the French language did not permit him to render justice to his feelings. Madame St Arnaud was on the ground in a carriage; and the sultan paid her a degree of delicate attention which greatly astonished the Turks of the old school, who could not reconcile themselves to the idea of a Giaour, even though the wife of a marshal, being so condescendingly treated by the Padishah of All the Ottomans. The sultan invited the lady to take up her abode temporarily in his kiosk at Therapia, and to visit him at the palace—a further departure from Oriental usages. The proceedings of this day at Constantinople, which immediately preceded the departure of the French troops from the neighbourhood of the capital to Varna, were regarded as among the most brilliant which the Turks have witnessed in modern times. They made a great impression at the time; and they had a national and political importance, in so far as they indicated a tendency in the sultan and his court to adopt European habits and usages.

During the brief sojourn in the neighbourhood of the Turkish metropolis, the English and French troops were on opposite sides of the Bosphorus. The English, as has been said, were encamped on the heights near Scutari; while their allies occupied a position at Mashlak, a short distance from Pera. Here arrangements were made for encamping 50,000 men, if the plans of the Allies should lead to the location of so many French troops in that quarter. One of the aqueducts which convey water to Constantinople was rendered available for the service of the camp. Pera became almost as much a French as a Turkish town, so busily was it occupied by the officers and soldiers of that nation. During several years past, the Turks, in so far as they have studied foreign languages, have attended to French rather than any other; and French is beginning to supersede Italian among the motley groups of foreigners always to be found at Pera; French merchants and dealers, too, have settled there in considerable number; and French fashions and usages are being adopted by the wealthier natives; insomuch that the French are, all things considered, more at home at Pera than the English. By a happy stroke of ingenuity, the soldiers converted the designation 'Frank quarter' into 'French quarter,' as a general appellation for Pera as one component part of the Turkish metropolis; and they behaved in many respects in a very frank fashion. An eye-witness described them as 'roaming through the halls of the sultan's new palace in their muddy boots; while a Mussulman submissively walked behind with a wet cloth to wipe the polished floor, which the Western warrior had dirtied at every step.' Nearly all the large public buildings in Pera were made over to the use of the French, together with some of those in Stamboul or Constantinople proper. The hills north of Pera were white with the tents of the French camp; and the roads were covered with wagons and carts, each bearing its little tricolor-flag, or its board with the inscription, '*Armée Française.*' All the horses around were bought up; and meadows were appropriated on the banks of the Bosphorus for the cattle and horses. In short, the French arrangements at Constantinople presented an aspect rather of permanent occupation than of temporary location.

It was a time of rich emolument for the boatmen of Constantinople. French officers at Pera, and English at Scutari, interchanged courtesies as frequently as opportunity permitted: they had occasional recourse to the boatmen; and the Turks themselves, intensely enjoying the lazy luxury, did likewise. A beautiful sight it is when the waters are speckled with caïques or kaïks—boats generally manned by two or three rowers. Darting across the Golden Horn, from Stamboul to Pera; or across the Bosphorus, from Stamboul and Pera to Scutari; or up the Bosphorus to Therapia, Buyukdere, Beikos, and other villages on its shores—the caïques throw great life into the whole scene. Though slight, they are suited to the particular service required of them. Carrying no ballast, and being very light, these dancing, buoyant, tricksy caïques would speedily be capsized by a sudden gush of wind; and hence the boatmen have acquired great dexterity in managing oar, sail, and helm, at such a time. War might possibly be a misfortune for Turkey; but it was a source of profit to the Constantinopolitan boatmen, in bringing so many English and French officers to the shores of the Bosphorus.

Here it may be well to advert to the fact, that Turkey is gradually experiencing the advantages accruing from steam-navigation; and, moreover, that she possesses a supply of fuel in convenient proximity to the capital, available both for war-steamers and for ordinary traffic. There is a useful bed of coal at Kozlou, near Heraclea or Erekli, in Asia Minor, about midway between the Bosphorus and Sinope. When the war commenced, the English and French governments each made a contract with the owners of these coal-mines, for the supply of several hundred tons per week, at a price somewhat less than a pound sterling per ton. The cost of coal brought from England was so enormous at Constantinople, that these Heraclea pits became of essential service—directly to the Allies, and indirectly to the sultan, who was to be benefited by those Allies.

The pleasure-traffic of the Bosphorus, too, has

been brought within the range of steam; and the English and French officers, during their residence in the Turkish metropolis, availed themselves of the advantages thus offered. In addition to the caïques, there are now small steamers plying across the Bosphorus, and up and down between Constantinople and Therapia—their decks rendered gay by the richly coloured dresses of the Turkish ladies, as well as by the picturesque costumes of Osmanlis and Greeks. One act of thoughtful kindness was much appreciated by the officers: the sultan placed at their disposal a pretty little steamer, cushioned with scarlet cloth, shaded by an awning, and supplied with refreshments; this steamer crossed from Constantinople to Scutari at the even hours of the day, and from Scutari to Constantinople at the intermediate hours; and as the whole was provided at the sultan's expense, the officers were always certain of a convenient and costless means of transit.

Many of the arrangements for the reception and accommodation of the English troops in Turkey, whether at Gallipoli or Scutari, seem to have been unfavourably affected by the circumstance that the Turkish language was but little understood by those employed. The following facts, mentioned some months afterwards by Commissary-general Smith, illustrate a few of the difficulties against which the officers of the commissariat were called upon to contend. He was sent in March 1854 from Corfu to Constantinople, to make arrangements preparatory to the arrival of the forces. He took with him an officer and two clerks. None of the party spoke Turkish, but the two clerks were well acquainted with Greek and Italian. Having been furnished by Sir C. Trevelyan (secretary to the Treasury) with credentials, immediately on arriving at Constantinople, he waited on Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who promised him every co-operation in his power. The Turkish government appointed an officer who spoke English to assist witness, but that person was so destitute of intelligence that he was quite useless. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe then gave him the assistance of his chief dragoman or interpreter; and he had two interviews with the Seraskier Pacha as to the means of providing for an English army in Turkey, and the information he then received was generally of a satisfactory nature. Mr Smith further stated: 'It was not part of my duty to find barracks for the troops, but I did so—that is, assisted in finding them. I had no indication of the place where the troops were likely to be quartered, but I suggested to Lord Stratford the necessity of getting the barracks at Scutari for them. He applied for and obtained them in the beginning of April. I visited them then, and found them in a better condition than Turkish buildings usually are. Commissary-general Filder arrived about the 21st of April, the troops having arrived before that date at Gallipoli.'*

* Evidence: Sebastopol Committee.

VARNA: PREPARATIONS FOR THE CRIMEA.

The desultory proceedings of the Allies—first at Malta, then at Gallipoli and Bulair, and then at Pera and Scutari—having thus been traced, a further stage in the progress now awaits attention—namely, the expedition to Varna.

This Turkish seaport is on the western shore of the Black Sea, about 180 miles, sea-distance, from Constantinople, 160 north-east of Adrianople by land, and 100 south-east of Silistria. This last-named fortress, at the period to which the narrative has arrived, was under siege by the Russians; and it was partly in reference to that siege that the advance to Varna was made. Varna bears a reputation similar to that which belongs to most Turkish towns: it is crooked, irregular, dirty, dilapidated, and unfitted for the due accommodation either of visitors or of mercantile dealers. And so the Allies found it, when military necessity led them to make it a temporary place of residence.

The advance from Constantinople to Varna was commenced soon after the arrival of the Allies at the first-mentioned place; for, whatever may have been the vacillations in council, a long detention in the neighbourhood of the capital did not enter as a component element into the plan. About the middle of May, the Turkish minister of war, Riza Pacha, steamed up to Varna, as did likewise the Allied generals and admirals, with a view of holding a council of war with Omar Pacha, either at that place or at Shumla, Omar's head-quarters. The Turkish generalissimo was known to be exceedingly anxious that the Allies should advance to Silistria, then deemed to be in a precarious state; or, supposing him to advance with reinforcements from Shumla to Silistria, his hope was that the Allies would occupy the country between Shumla and Varna, thereby cutting off any threatened advance of the Russians from the Dobrudscha to the neighbourhood of Constantinople. Whatever may have been the imperfect acquiescence in Omar's plans in other respects, an advance to Varna was speedily resolved upon; and the camps of the Allies—the British near Scutari, and the French near Pera—soon became alive with busy scenes of embarkation.

The last week in May witnessed the commencement of this sea-journey for the troops. More regiments had come up from Malta and Gallipoli, and a large fleet of transports was ready in the Bosphorus, between Pera and Scutari. There was a wharf or landing-place at Scutari, surprisingly good in the eyes of the Turks, but rickety and inefficient in the estimation of those accustomed to the convenient piers and quays of Southampton and Portsmouth, of Marseilles and Toulon. Officers superintending the carriage of stores and equipments from the camp to the wharf; sappers and miners busily engaged in fitting up horse-boxes on board the transports; boatmen paddling about

in hundreds, conveying casks of water and barrels and packages of provisions; buffalo-carts making toilsome journeys to and fro between the elevated camp and barracks and the sea-shore; aids-de-camp galloping or walking hither and thither—such was the busy scene, at which the Turks looked on with their wonted apathy. Some of the transports were despatched northward with stores only, while others were fitted up for the accommodation of troops.

Mr Russell, an able correspondent of the *Times*, was in a position, even at so early a stage in the history of the war, to detect numberless defects in the organisation of the British military in the East—not in the willingness of officers and men to fulfil their duties bravely and efficiently, but in the preparations made by the home-authorities. In reference to some of these defects, he remarked in one of his letters: 'Who was the wise man who warned us in time of peace that we should pay dearly for shutting our eyes to the possibility of war, and who preached in vain to us about our want of baggage and pontoon-trains, and our locomotive deficiencies? No outlay, however

VARNA.

prodigal, can atone for the effects of a griping penuriousness; and all the gold in the Treasury cannot produce at command those great qualities in administrative and executive departments which are the fruits of experience alone. A soldier, an artilleryman, cannot be created suddenly, no matter how profuse may be your expenditure in the attempt.' The miseries which resulted from imperfect administrative organisation, developed themselves still more forcibly as the war advanced. The same writer proceeded with his strictures thus: 'It would be a great national blessing if all our political economists [meaning, of course, economists who are politicians, for assuredly the political economist is not necessarily a votary of frugality] could be caught and enlisted in this army at Scutari for a month or so, or even if they could be provided with temporary commissions, till they have had some practical knowledge of the results of their system.' This might be a correct reproof, if the arguments of the economists, or the alleged 'griping penuriousness' of the parliament and the nation had brought below a proper level the amount of supplies furnished annually for the united services; but such has not been the case. The grants for the army, navy, and ordnance, taken collectively, during the thirty-eight years of peace from 1815 to 1853, were amply sufficient for the due development and maintenance of every arm of the service, *had they been better distributed;* but wasteful extravagance and injudicious management in some departments dissipated the funds which might have provided all the necessities in others; and thus, while new ships of war were being constantly built, and unused ships constantly rotting in the harbours, the supplies were squandered which should and could have provided all that was required in transports, gun-boats of light draught, pontoon-trains, baggage-trains, and other necessities of warfare. The tax-payers and the legislature have been amply liberal in these respects; but the managers of the complex machine have not duly adjusted the several parts of which the machine consists.

To return to the embarkation for Varna. Sir George Brown and a few other officers preceded the troops, to superintend the arrangements for their landing. The light brigade, on the 29th of May, struck their tents with wonderful celerity, packed them on carts or arabas drawn by cattle, formed into order, marched down to the beach, and embarked in the vessels, some sailing and some steamers, prepared for their reception. The scene was full of animation. The 7th and 23d Fusileers, the Connaught Rangers, the rifle-brigade, the 33d, 77th, 19th—6000 or 7000 men in all—embarked, and passed on their way up the beautiful Bosphorus towards Varna. Ten steamers and nine sailing-vessels thus received their living freights. Onward they went, between and amongst the numerous caïques, and in sight of the pretty villas and villages which deck the borders of the Bosphorus.

Arrived at Varna, near which the Allied fleets were then stationed, the troops were assisted in their disembarkation by the ships' boats; and when the month of June opened, the small British army was safely located on the shores of Bulgaria—that is, the portion of the army thus despatched from Scutari in the first instance. The steamers and transports returned to the Bosphorus for other consignments; while further reinforcements were sent from Malta or from England without an intervening stoppage in the straits.

The arrangements made at and around Varna comprised a temporary camp near the town; another at Aladyn, nine or ten miles distant; and a third at Devno or Devna, eighteen or twenty miles inland from Varna. A few of the regiments stopped temporarily at Aladyn, while others marched up to Devna immediately on landing. Omar Pacha had provided an immense number of horses, oxen, buffaloes, and carts, to assist in conveying stores and provisions from the shore to the camps; and very speedily the roads were rendered full of life by the passage to and fro of hundreds of teams. The camp at Aladyn was fixed at a spot near a small lake; but the water of the lake was impure—one of many minor troubles which the troops were called upon to bear as best they might. Provisions were moderately good and cheap at Varna, for the officers who had the means of making purchases; but the troops depended on the commissariat, and knowing that many promised comforts, including London porter, had not yet made their appearance, the men were less satisfied than if no such promises had been made. The soldier's life on active service is affected by numberless contingencies, which necessity compels him to meet; nevertheless, he feels more indignantly any privations due to the want of skill or of attention on the part of his own government, than such as may be traced to actual collision with an enemy. One of the comforts, almost necessities, of the commissariat at such a time was a supply of fresh vegetables, which the commissaries had much difficulty in procuring; and another deficiency was in medicines and medical comforts, concerning which there was much confusion at Malta, Gallipoli, Scutari, and Varna.

Busy with military proceedings was the whole vicinity of Varna. As regiments passed onward from that town to Aladyn and Devna, so did new comers take their places. Early in June, the *Himalaya* made one of her wonderful voyages—having brought a military load from Cork to Varna in twelve days, without detention at any intermediate port, without discomfort to the men, without injury to the horses. She brought three or four hundred men of the 5th Dragoon Guards, with all their horses: these being the first British cavalry which landed. The transport of cavalry is always one of the difficult achievements in the prosecution of war in a distant country—arising, in great part, from the susceptibility to injury on the part of the horses. Many horses belonging to the British cavalry were lost in the Black Sea, not so much in the passage to Varna, as in the passage from thence at a later date. Diversity of opinion has existed concerning the best mode of stowing cavalry horses on shipboard. One plan, extensively followed by Hull shipowners in their horse-trade with the Baltic, allows more room for each horse than the government plan; but the transport officers assert that a plan adopted by the government is better fitted for cavalry horses during a long voyage. Whatever be the relative merits of the two plans, there were a few horses lost in the Black Sea by being placed on the upper-deck; a storm came on, the poor animals broke loose, and were speedily washed overboard. The point, however, most conclusively proved was—the superiority of such a steamer as the *Himalaya* in providing a quick and easy passage for horses as well as men. When she arrived at Varna with the dragoons and their horses, the latter were landed by means of large boats, and a sort of stage built over two paddle-box boats lashed together; they were lowered from the ship on this stage, and were towed to a short pier; here they were picketed for the night on a bit of turf close to the beach, and next day they set off to the inland camp. The horses were in such admirable condition, owing to the careful stalling and feeding they had enjoyed, that the military men were forcibly struck with the superiority over the ordinary arrangements. The dragoons, who were well pleased to see their horses thus treated, applied to the *Himalaya* the frolicsome designation of 'Her Majesty's floating mews.'

Little did the troops expect, when landed at Varna, that seventeen weeks of detention awaited them. The delays already experienced had wearied the men, who now fully expected a resumption of active service; but the middle of September arrived before opportunity for such service presented itself. Under these circumstances, the salubrity of the place became a consideration

of more importance than had at first been supposed. Varna, Aladyn, and Devna, proved to be less favourable than the quarter-master's department had expected. The camp at Aladyn was on a hill, at the foot of which are meadows watered by a small fresh-water lake; and the Devna camp was also near a lake, which imparted something of picturesqueness to an otherwise wild scene; but the hot days of June, July, and August, shewed that the lake and meadows were sources of much sickness and disaster. Varna itself, said one of the officers who was not well pleased with his quarters, 'is such a town as only could have been devised by a nomadic race aping the habits of civilised nations. If the lanes are not so painful to walk upon as those of Gallipoli—if they are not so crooked and inexplicable—if they are not so rugged and fantastically devious—it is only because nature has set the efforts of man at defiance, and has forbidden the Turk to make a town built upon a plain as unpleasant to perambulate as one founded on an irregular surface.' The town is built on a slightly elevated bank of

Himalaya Steam-ship.

sand, on the northern side of a semicircular bay, about a mile and a half in depth, and two miles across. The land is so low at the bottom of this semicircle, that the fresh waters from the neighbouring hills form a lake, which extends for some distance through the marshy lands and plains that run westward towards Shumla. General Canrobert, who had derived much experience from Algerine campaigning, expressed doubts when he visited the English camps concerning the salubrity of the spot, which seemed to him exposed to liability of malaria and its attendant agues and fevers.

The sand-bank whereon Varna is built varies so much in its elevation, that whereas in some places the base of the city-wall is twenty or thirty feet above the sea-level, at others it sinks to the level of high-water. This wall, about ten feet high, is of stone, loopholed; and landward of it are some detached batteries, well provided with heavy guns. On the sea-face of the wall are two batteries of earthworks and fascines, and two heavy stone parapets and embrasures, all supplied with cannon of large calibre. As viewed from the sea, the town presents a huge jumble behind the wall of red-tiled houses, speckled with mosques and minarets. Opposite the town are three small wooden jetties; while a portion of beach between the sea and the wall, a few yards in width, serves as a landing-place for boats and barges. When the Allies arrived, this beach was encumbered with tens of thousands of shot and shells, for artillery of all dimensions. And here, as at Gallipoli and Scutari, the Turks who were not actually engaged looked on in great wonderment at the activity of their western Allies. This characteristic, however, was less marked than it had been at the two places just named; for Varna, being situated in Bulgaria, contains relatively few Turks, being chiefly those in some way employed by the government. The native inhabitants—Bulgarians of the Greek religion—are wholly a different race, and sympathise more readily with the Greeks of the south than with the Osmanli.

The troops having arrived in large number in Varna and its neighbourhood, the town speedily put on some such appearance as Gallipoli had presented when similarly invaded by the warriors from the West. The dealers wrote inscriptions on strips of gaudy-coloured calico, in English, French, Turkish, or Greek, and hung them up in front of their open stalls or shops, to denote that beer or spirits or other comforts were on sale within. Most of the shops, indeed, were windowless; and in front of them were passing and repassing, loitering, chattering, bargaining, and purchasing, endless groups of Chasseurs, Zouaves, English military servants, interpreters, cantinières, Greeks, Smyrniotes, Italians, French, Turks, Bashi-Bazouks, and a motley group of dirty vagabonds, whose origin and country were not very apparent. Gallipoli and Scutari had been profitable places to hundreds of itinerant dealers; and when the regiments successively advanced from those towns to Varna, the dealers followed them, with the intent to open shop in that locality in the same primitive style as before. Hams, pickles, tongues, brandy, biscuits, saddles, confectionary, wine, preserved soups and vegetables, crockery—all found their way to the open shops and bazaars at Varna. The costumes were as diverse as the wares and the languages: shakos, Highland bonnets, wide-awakes, turbans, fezzes, Guernsey-frocks, haversacks on officers' backs, jackets of all colours and shapes—all were to be seen in the busy streets of Varna; and an eye-witness speaks of 'a captain in a crack English regiment riding through the sally-port with a bottle protruding from his pocket, a haversack containing tea and sugar over his shoulder, and a large mat rolled up behind his saddle.'

By the end of June, the neighbourhood of Varna had become one vast camp of 60,000 English, French, and Turks; while 300 vessels lay at anchor in Kavarna Bay, ready to ship English troops from Varna, or French from Baltschik. When the news reached Varna that the siege of Silistria was raised, all hopes of sharing the honours of beating the Russians in that quarter were dissipated; and officers and men began then to speculate on the probable future before them. The route which the Russians had taken in their retreat was quite unknown in Varna; and to ascertain this important fact, a few dragoons, under the Earl of Cardigan, made a galloping excursion towards the Danube and the Dobrudscha; they ascertained that the Russians had crossed into Wallachia; and they returned to Varna with a strong impression that the north-eastern part of Bulgaria is a wretched region for an army, in respect to rations, fodder, and encampment. What little the Cossacks had left, the Bashi-Bazouks had either plundered or destroyed. The earl, a few months afterwards, gave a *vivâ voce* account of this expedition. 'I received orders to proceed with a body of cavalry to ascertain what had become of the Russian army; for the siege of Silistria had been raised, and the commander-in-chief was totally ignorant whether the Russians were about to advance towards Varna and attack our position, or retreat towards their own country. You can easily imagine that this was a somewhat anxious undertaking, and one that required considerable caution. We might have come at any moment upon the Russian army or its outposts. We travelled over the country, which I may call a perfectly wild desert, for three hundred miles. My orders were to proceed as far as Trajan's Wall, on the confines of the Dobrudscha. We marched one hundred and twenty miles *without ever seeing a human being*, nor saw a single house in a state of repair or inhabited, and not an animal to be seen except those which inhabit the wildest regions. Having ascertained that the Russian army had retreated by Babadagh, and having given the information to the commander-in-chief by means of my aid-de-camp, Captain Maxse, I proceeded on a very interesting march, patroling along the banks of the Danube to Rustchuk and Silistria, and returned thence by that grand fortress Shumla.'*

Prince Napoleon arrived at Varna in the third week in June, to take the command of one of the French divisions; and transport-ships, laden with English and French troops, continued to cast anchor in the bay. The Duke of Cambridge at first fixed his quarters at Varna, but afterwards camped out near the men of his division. Early in July, Omar Pacha rode over from Shumla, inspected the Allied troops, and conferred with the English and French commanders concerning the future plans of campaign. Amongst the strange medley of soldiers, there was now an encampment of Bashi-Bazouks near Varna—varlets whose dirtiness and rascality rendered them unwelcome neighbours to the English and French camps, and whom it would be necessary to lick into shape before they joined the Turkish army. An Englishman, General Beatson, and an Algerine, General Yusuf, had undertaken the difficult task of taming these wild spirits. In respect to the Allies of the Turks, the French maintained their encampment principally at and near Varna; while the English were spread over the country to a distance of twenty miles west or north-west of that town.

The men became wearied. They had little to do; no laurels to gain. As they possessed less of the dancing, singing, dramatic, and culinary tastes than their French companions, the English desired books and newspapers to read; but these desiderata were supplied very scantily. The officers became careless in their attire; Sir George Brown waged war against their beards and moustaches; Lord Raglan reproved them for the shooting-jackets and wide-awakes they wore in private; and when this matter was remedied, he issued a further order relating to the undress-uniform itself: 'The sword may be worn, the

* Speech at the Mansion House, February 6, 1855.

jacket may be the regimental jacket, and the cap may be the uniform forage-cap; but such want of care is shewn in wearing the uniform in a becoming manner, that it is difficult to recognise the officers in some cases as officers at all. The shell-jacket is allowed to fly open, shewing underneath a red flannel-shirt, with nothing round the neck, not even a white shirt-collar. Often a turban is worn over the forage-cap; the chin unshaven; and there is an absence of what is befitting the appearance of an officer in the whole person.' How like the reproof which a group of idle boys might have called down upon themselves! Officers and men were insufficiently employed; they had few amusements; the weather was hot; and hence came a languor which rendered them careless of personal appearance.

Towards the close of July, consequent on a council of war between the commanders, a portion of the French army broke up its encampment, and moved northward towards the Dobrudscha. Some of the officers, too, took ship on a short exploratory voyage towards the Crimea; and portions of the naval squadron arrived with news picked up on the shores of Circassia. In August, the soldiers began to be employed occasionally in making gabions, fascines, sand-bags, and other military requirements for a siege; and whispers spread about the camp that something would shortly be attempted in the Crimea, where the Russians had one of their strongest arsenals. Some of the officers had, indeed, approached so near this arsenal, Sebastopol, as to be enabled to count the guns in the formidable fortress. The two armies now began to receive their siege-trains of heavy guns, which remained on shipboard until required; stores arrived in enormous quantity; and vessels of all kinds assembled in the bay. Great, indeed, was the excitement attending the expected movement of 80,000 soldiers, to which number the Allies now amounted.

It is necessary here to notice the plans of the Allies in respect to Gallipoli, Constantinople, Varna, and the Crimea.

That the Allies did not, in the first instance, meditate an advance upon Russian territory, is evident. The original plan was entirely defensive, under the apprehension that Turkey was placed in great and immediate peril. The minister who had the conduct of the various diplomatic negotiations throughout the war, on the part of England, himself acknowledged this. In the autumn, while the army was yet at Varna, the Earl of Clarendon spoke as follows:—'Little more than four months ago, it was the universal opinion—I do not mean the opinion of Her Majesty's government, but of the most able and experienced military officers in England and France—that Russia meditated a war of further aggression. Nobody believed, with the great forces she had in position on the north of the Danube, with all the efforts she had made, and with all the mass of *matériel* she had accumulated, that she did not intend to march south of the Danube. Although we did full credit to the known bravery of the Turks, we could not bring ourselves to believe that they would be able to resist the great numerical superiority of well-disciplined troops, under experienced generals, to whom they were opposed—more especially, too, as the only Turkish general of whom we had knowledge by name was Omar Pacha, who, however well established his reputation may be now, had not then had the opportunity since afforded to him of achieving for himself a lasting renown. My lords, so much were we convinced of this, that Sir J. Burgoyne and an experienced French officer of engineers were sent to Constantinople, in order to devise the means of defending that city and the Dardanelles; and so much importance was attached to this mission, and so entirely was the whole plan of the campaign supposed to be connected with it, that the departure of Lord Raglan and General St Arnaud was delayed, in order that they might have personal communications with a view to that special object. The Allied armies then went to Gallipoli, where great works were thrown up. They then went to Constantinople, still having this necessity of defence in view; and upon their arrival there, were received with the greatest enthusiasm, and imparted new vigour and courage to the Turks. The commanders of the two armies went to Varna to meet Omar Pacha; and he entreated that a large portion of the Allied forces might come to Varna, knowing well how great would be the moral effect of such a movement on the part of the Allied troops. The Russians made then every exertion to take Silistria before the arrival of these troops, and that fortress was heroically defended by the Turks. The arrival of the Allied army was made useful to them, and, as your lordships are aware, the siege was raised; the Russian army recrossed the Danube, the most part of the Dobrudscha was evacuated, and all thoughts of offensive operations on the part of Russia were at an end. The Allied armies are therefore now ready, and have, perhaps, already commenced more important operations.' *

This course of policy was further elucidated by the English government at a later date, through the instrumentality of the Sebastopol Committee. The Duke of Newcastle, being asked at what period the expedition to the Crimea was determined on, replied: 'We received by telegraph on the 27th of June the intelligence that the siege of Silistria had been raised. On the following day, a mail left this country for Constantinople. I wrote privately to Lord Raglan, informing him that he would receive by the next mail official instructions to prepare for an expedition to the Crimea and to besiege Sebastopol, as I was about to prepare a dispatch to that effect to be submitted to the cabinet.'

His Grace had previously written to Lord Raglan, on the 10th of April, a dispatch which pressed upon the commander the necessity for

* Speech in the House of Lords, August 10, 1854.

making careful and secret inquiries into the condition and amount of the Russian army in the Crimea, and the strength of the fortress of Sebastopol, as in the event of the Russians making any further movement, it might become essential that operations of an offensive character should be undertaken. No blow could be struck at the southern extremity of the Russian Empire which would tend more to the conclusion of a solid and satisfactory peace, than the taking of Sebastopol and the destruction of the Russian fleet. It recommended Lord Raglan to ascertain whether during the previous few months the works of the fortress had been materially strengthened on the land-side: Captain Drummond having reported on the sea-defences. The dispatch requested his lordship to make himself acquainted with the facilities for landing troops upon any part of the coast between Kaffa and Eupatoria; he was also requested to ascertain, if possible, the number of troops in the Crimea—reported to be 30,000—and how they were distributed; and as it was stated that the water for the town was derived from a source eight miles off, it was important and advisable to ascertain that fact. The amount of provision for the garrison and the town was also an important point to be ascertained if possible; and as the siege-train could not arrive for three or four weeks, the dispatch urged upon the general in command the necessity of using the interval to obtain the required information. Such was the tenor of a dispatch which, written a few days after the declaration of war, certainly shewed that the war-minister was alive to the importance of obtaining correct information respecting Sebastopol and the Crimea. The Duke of Newcastle also read to the committee a dispatch, dated 29th June, two days after the government had received information of the raising of the siege of Silistria. After referring to the dispatch of the 10th of April, it stated that the gallant and successful resistance of the Turkish army had compelled the Russian army to raise the siege of Silistria, and it was expected they would evacuate the Principalities; consequently the safety of Constantinople was for the time secured. No further advance of the Allied army could on any account be contemplated, as to occupy the Dobrudscha would be dangerous to the health of the troops; and Lord Raglan was desired to concert measures for undertaking the siege of Sebastopol, unless he should be in possession of information unknown to the government, and which, in his opinion, left no reasonable prospect of success in the undertaking. If he should be of opinion that the united strength of the armies was insufficient for the purpose, he was not precluded from exercising that discretion which had been originally intrusted to him, although the government was of opinion that the difficulties in the way of the siege of Sebastopol were of a nature more likely to be increased than diminished by delay. As the communications by sea were in the hands of the Allies, it was of importance to cut off the communication between the Crimea and the rest of the Russian dominions, which object would be obtained by the occupation of Perekop, if a sufficient number of the Turkish army could be spared, and assisting them with English and French officers to advise them; and that, as Captain Drummond had recommended, vessels of a light draught of water should be obtained, if possible, to prevent the passage of troops from the Sea of Azof. The dispatch, after noticing the importance of selecting favourable weather for a descent upon the coast of the Crimea, referred to the Russian fortifications on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, and observed that the reduction of Anapa and Soudjuk Kalé would be, next to the capture of Sebastopol, of the greatest importance; but their fall was of less consequence than that of the other place, as the reduction of Sebastopol would in all probability immediately lead to their surrender. In the event of delay being necessary, the dispatch invited Lord Raglan to consider with Marshal St Arnaud whether the Turkish army could not be made available to interrupt the march of the Russian army. After expressing reliance that Lord Raglan would not expose the army to unnecessary risk, the dispatch concluded by observing, at the same time, that it was to the gallantry of the troops under his command that the country was looking to secure the results of a just war, for the vindication of national honour, and the restoration of peace in Europe.

It further appeared, from information supplied to the Committee by Mr Sidney Herbert, at that time secretary at war, that the primary instructions given to Lord Raglan had been to defend Gallipoli and the Dardanelles from any threatened attack by the Russians, as a consequence of an inland march *via* Adrianople; that in case of any advance of the enemy short of that place, he was to defend the line of the Balkan, from Varna and other points; that he was advised, at the same time, to collect all possible information concerning Sebastopol and the Crimea; that when, on the 29th of June, the expedition to the Crimea was determined on by the government, Lord Cathcart was sent out with a reinforcement of troops; and that a speedy *coup de main*, rather than a long campaign, was contemplated in the Crimea.

Thus much, then, in respect to the views of one of the two Allied powers; and it may be inferred that, as an accompaniment or rather a preliminary to effective joint action, the other ally formed plans based on corresponding considerations. At various periods during the Russo-Turkish war, the views of the imperial government were made public through the columns of the *Moniteur*. Such was the case in respect to the motives of the Allies in advancing from Varna to the Crimea in September 1854. In two long papers, which may be regarded as semi-official French documents, the policy of this advance was defended—at a time when the public mind was

agitated by unsatisfactory news from the East. The Russians having raised the siege of Silistria, and re-crossed the Danube, the position of the Allies was thus touched upon in the documents in question:—

'What could the united generals do at Varna after the retreat of the Russian army? Were they to remain in an inactivity which would have led to discouragement, and from which the prestige of our flag would inevitably have suffered? Neither military honour nor political interests allowed the commander-in-chief to take such a position.

Once on this great theatre, inaction was out of the question: it was necessary to act, to shew our object to the troops, to compel the enemy to fear us; to excite the ambition of Europe to follow us, by arousing its admiration and respect.

It was then only that a landing in the Crimea was mooted.

An expedition against Sebastopol might hasten the dénouement of the war. It had a determined and limited object; it might place in the hands of the Allies a province and a stronghold which, once conquered, would be a pledge and a means of exchange to obtain peace. It was under the influence of those considerations that the commanders-in-chief conceived the idea and decreed the execution of the plan.

This expedition having been examined at Paris and London as an eventuality, the Marshal St Arnaud received then, not the instructions—they could not be given at such a distance—but the following advice:—

"To obtain exact information of the strength of the Russian forces in the Crimea; if not too considerable, to land at a spot which might serve as a basis for operations. Theodosia (now Kaffa) appeared the most eligible spot; although that point of the coast has the disadvantage of being distant forty leagues from Sebastopol, it nevertheless offers great advantages. First, its bay is vast and safe; it would hold all the vessels of the squadron and the vessels with provisions for the troops. Secondly, once established on that point, it might be made a real basis for operations.

In thus occupying the eastern point of the Crimea, all the reinforcements coming by the Sea of Azof and the Caucasus could be cut off. A gradual advance could be made towards the centre of the country, taking advantage of all its resources. Simferopol, the strategic centre of the peninsula, would be occupied. An advance would then be made on Sebastopol, and probably a great battle fought on that road. If lost, a retreat in good order on Kaffa, and nothing is compromised; if gained, to besiege Sebastopol, to invest it completely, and its surrender would follow as a matter of course in a short interval."'

The Allied generals and admirals, it is fully evident, had very insufficient knowledge of the territory which was to be attacked. 'It may have been the misfortune, but it is also the defence of the government in the conduct of this campaign, that it had no access to extraordinary or secret sources of information. We were compelled to send our fleets to seas which had never been navigated by our ships of war—to land our troops where no soldier of Western Europe had trodden since the Crusades. The Russian government is in full possession of all the advantages of secrecy and absolute power, which had long since built an impassable barrier round the vast resources of the empire. A disposition existed to underrate the power of a state whose springs of action are diametrically opposed to our own; and the first events of the war heightened this disregard of the strength of Russia into absolute contempt of the troops and generals who had failed to force the lines of Kalafat or the outworks of Silistria; and, by the same rule, the power of the Ottoman Empire was exaggerated and enhanced by its partial successes.'*

Partially informed of plans which they were bound to keep secret, if such were possible, the Allied generals and admirals conferred and debated, examined and calculated, without communicating definite arrangements to those under them; and thus it happened that, during June, July, and August, the armies and fleets were held in tormenting suspense, ready to enter on active duty, but ignorant when and where that duty would present itself. In June, rumours went from tent to tent, from camp to camp, that an advance would soon be made to Silistria; but when the rumours died away without further result, officers and men fell back to their enforced but unwelcome idleness.

Mrs Young—one of a small number of officers' wives who tasted camp-life at Gallipoli and Varna before the advance of the troops to the Crimea—has given a lively description of this sort of life under its more pleasant aspects, free from the stern disasters and miseries which had afterwards to be encountered. Arriving at Varna from Constantinople in the *Caradoc*, she had to search her way as best she might through the town to the spot where her husband's regiment was encamped, two miles distant; surmounting many difficulties occasioned by her ignorance of the Turkish language, and threading her route between the tents of a French camp. At last reaching the place, 'There,' she says, 'was our little tent, half-covered with the well-known mat; our servant, revelling in green-wood smoke, as usual, in the rear; there were the ponies, and the charger, and the mule; the packsaddles and the towels drying on the bushes; the red flag of the colonel's tent; and the band playing pleasantly as the men wound back by the side of the lake after their morning's parade. One feature, however, was quite new, and a very pretty one it was: the tents were everywhere interspersed with bowers of green leaves. The soldiers had been employed in cutting branches from the trees that clothed the hillsides; and long poles, borrowed from the commissariat stores, being forced into the ground, light boughs were arched over them, secured with strong twine; and on these, all the leafy twigs that could be found were heaped in abundance. Nearly every officer had a bower; and while kept green by continual relays of leaves, nothing could be more agreeable than these retreats; their fresh coolness, and the admission of air they permitted, forming such a delicious relief to the heat and want of circulation of air, from which, after seven in the

* *Edinburgh Review*, No. CCV.

morning, we suffered so terribly in the bell-tents. My first demand was for a bower; and in about three hours, with the aid of a strong fatigue-party, I had one that was quite the pride of the camp. Then a charming little oval deal-table, the top of which closed like a draught-board, was set therein; a bullock-trunk and a hamper for chairs; and in this green drawing-room we breakfasted, wrote, and received our visitors. Being in the East, we felt little hesitation in asking our friends to subside on what formed our Turkey carpet.' *

This holiday tone was not of long continuance at the camp. Many a soldier's letter reached home from Varna, as from Gallipoli, complaining of deficient rations or camp discomforts. One writer compares the English and French arrangements in many particulars; and in the course of his observations he says: 'The Zouaves are armed with rifles, and I suspect know how to use them pretty well. One of the best articles of their equipment is the water-bottle. Ours is a heavy, lumbering wooden thing, fit to carry beer for haymakers, which chafes the leg on the march, and interferes with the handling of the musket, and makes a man cover at

Interior of an Officer's Tent at Varna.

least four inches more ground; theirs is made of metal, covered with cloth, fitting to the body, and by the curving way it is adjusted, is no impediment to the man. Their commissariat and staff are better able, by their experience, to carry out the intentions of their government than ours are. Notwithstanding all that is said in the newspapers and elsewhere about the liberality of the government, our men get no tea or groceries of any sort, and those in the town are too dear for them to buy. The officers, of course, can carry a small supply of things about with them from place to place; but the men can do nothing of the kind, and suffer a good deal if they do not get their breakfast and supper.' The writer comments on the tailoring achievements of our army authorities, and proceeds: 'Our tents are much better than those of the French, but we must pitch them exactly in a straight line, regardless of ants' nests, furze-bushes, or steep inclines. In this, and in many other cases, real utility and the comfort of the men are disregarded, for the purpose of satisfying an absurd craving for an unattainable uniformity. So about whiskers and moustaches. God gives one man red whiskers, and another black; some can grow moustaches, and some cannot; so, do what we will, we cannot make ourselves exactly, or even nearly alike; nor does the reasoning, which proves the necessity of a uniform system of clothing, apply at all to whiskers and beards.' In numerous other letters which reached the public eye, and of the authenticity of which there is no reason to

* *Our Camp in Turkey*, p. 167.

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doubt, the writers complained sometimes of the quality of the food, sometimes of its deficient quantity, but more frequently of the irksome idleness in a foreign land during the hot season.

When, at a later period in the history of the war, the Duke of Cambridge communicated the results of his experience at Varna, he adduced an instance of the clumsy mode in which the book-keeping arrangements of the commissariat were managed at that place—not irrational, perhaps, in relation to the quiet everyday proceedings at home during a time of peace, but unsuited to the exigencies of war. 'The system,' said his royal highness, 'is exceedingly inconvenient, throwing difficulties in every one's way instead of removing them. I will give an instance of that which occurred at Varna soon after we landed. My division had gone on to Aladyn, but I remained behind for a few days, as the ammunition-horses had not been duly equipped, and I had my own tents. A company was left in charge, and I was of course anxious that the men should be properly rationed, and I therefore desired their officer to get rations from the head-quarter commissariat. The first day I sent, although the men were in want of their daily rations, instead of sending those rations at once, the commissariat sent a printed form to the officer for him to fill up. Hence there was considerable delay; and then, not satisfied with that, the officer was supposed to have put down one or two more horses than he was entitled to. Instead of sending the rations for the men, and pointing out the inaccuracy in the return of horses, they would send no rations at all because the form was wrong. Upon that the officer came to me, and I desired him to go with his animals to get the rations, and put matters to rights; and he did then get them that day, although very late. As it turned out, the commissariat officer was wrong, and there was no mistake in the return at all. I think that is a mode of proceeding quite preposterous.' *

Preposterous it certainly was; and to such formalism was due the loss of many valuable lives, not only of horses, but of men, during the war; nevertheless, the actual amount of blame deserved by the commissariat officers must depend on the stringency of the rules imposed upon them by their superiors. In respect both to the supply of rations to the men and fodder to the horses, and to the conveyance of provisions and stores, the commissariat was ill provided; the officers of that department reached Varna only a few days before the troops themselves; and hence they were called upon to effect a month's work in a week, under circumstances of much difficulty.

Seldom, perhaps, has an army been more embarrassed for means of locomotion than the English at Varna. The troops were frequently compelled to submit to scanty food, because the commissariat was deficient in means of transport; and the possibility of an advance towards Silistria, to assist Omar Pacha against the Russians, was rendered doubtful on the same grounds. The evidence collected many months afterwards by the Sebastopol Committee was conclusive on this point. Captain Wrottesley, who was sent to Varna to superintend the construction of wharfs for landing the horses, gave evidence, of which the following is a summary. When the troops arrived at Varna, there was a great want of means of transport. It was the chief difficulty the English engineers had to contend with; the French sappers brought their own horses from France; while to convey wood for the wharfs, the English engineers, after sending a requisition to the quarter-master-general's department, whence another requisition went to the commissariat, had to depend on the native arabas. Thus, though the French, who were building wharfs at the same time, often worked with less skill as workmen, the English engineers were so unfavourably circumstanced, that they were beaten from not having the same means of transport. Five hundred bullock-wagons were sent down to Varna by Omar Pacha, being all he could spare from his own army; but when they arrived, there were no arrangements for organising them; the drivers were not regularly fed or paid, and gradually they all ran away. There was an absolute want of horses, although officers were then in Syria and Spain purchasing them. A few fine mules were obtained, but they were vicious brutes, quite unused to harness. No horse fit for the shafts of an army-carriage constructed for English horses could be obtained. The ambulance-carts sent out could not be used, for there were no means of drawing them. If a Turkish horse were placed in a cart built for the English standard, the shafts would be on a level with his backbone; few horses of the country exceeded eleven hands in height. The medicine-chests of the army were all too large; they were used as tables, and would dine four persons very comfortably, but they could not be carried by mules. The engineers were ordered to make smaller ones. Captain Wrottesley further stated that the siege-train of artillery was not landed at Varna at all, because it was sent out from England without the means of traction. It was the opinion of this officer that the commissariat ought not to be charged with the transport of the army. Overwhelmed on the one hand with applications for food and forage, and on the other with applications for means of conveyance, the officers broke down in spite of their best exertions.

Military authorities estimate that an army of 53,000 men requires 16,000 draught-horses and baggage-mules, together with 9000 commissariat mules for its due service; that is, nearly half as many horses and mules as men. In this ratio, the British army at Varna should have possessed more than double the number of animals which was actually available; for 25,000 men, they had about 5000 animals, instead of 12,000. Sir C. Trevelyan,

* Evidence before the Sebastopol Committee.

secretary to the Treasury, was at that time at the head of the commissariat department; and from his replies to a series of questions, it will be seen how lame was the organisation—each official placing blame on the shoulders of others, rather than bearing the burden himself.

'Did you ever form in this country a scheme founded on this calculation, of what amount of transport is required to move an army of 25,000 men in the field?—It was not necessary for us to do so. It is the business of the commissary-general to form the establishment required to move the army. Our system is to draw on the resources of the country to the utmost extent, and to send from home only what the country will not supply.

Then, on this side, you never originated any plan, knowing the probable operations before Mr Filder could have known them, by which the commissariat could have provided sufficient transport for the army to have been fed?—We placed at his disposal the only means that could be provided—ample funds, and authority to purchase the means of land-transport in the country: this Mr Filder did to the extent of his ability; besides which, we sent from Spain and Malta what was required.

But you never formed any calculation here?—That was not our duty; it is the duty of the commissary-general, an experienced officer, acting under the general commanding, and possessed of full information, not only from treatises, but from his long experience, to determine what amount of transport is required for the army, and to provide that amount from all the resources the country can afford.

Then, here you had no general scheme?—That was not our duty.'*

That the English could not, if they had wished, assist the Turks at Silistria, has been shewn by a most competent authority, General Sir de Lacy Evans, who in his evidence said: 'When the Russians crossed the Danube, Omar Pacha applied for assistance; and the answer was, that the army had not the means of transport, which ought to have been provided long before. I think the government was still waiting for notes and protocols from Vienna, and no great exertions were made to put the army in a condition to move; for delay from this cause, of course, the commissariat department was not responsible. The Russians were carrying on the siege of Silistria, and still the army was not in readiness to move. Even eighteen miles from Varna there was the greatest difficulty in getting provisions; we had to send to Varna for them; and such was the state of confusion there, that a train of one hundred arabas would come back from the town without any supplies. At that time the deficient *personnel* of the commissariat was severely felt. Having been applied to, I lent one hundred non-commissioned officers and privates to help it; and on application to Lord Raglan, two volunteer officers were allowed to be detached to assist the commissariat, and he found great advantage from it.'

The Duke of Newcastle—at that time responsible in England for the management of the war—appears, from the evidence given before the Committee, to have been unaware of the fact that the army had insufficient means of transport. Without actually disputing the opinions of Captain Wrottesley and General Evans, he still thought that Lord Raglan and Mr Commissary Filder might, between them, have effected all that was necessary. No one wrote home to him officially to say that aught was wrong, and hence he inferred that all was right. His Grace spoke of the 'official reasons' which he had for believing that the unfavourable reports must have been erroneous—his reasons being, the non-receipt of official confirmation of those reports. The duke was at that time at issue with the Admiralty, concerning the proper superintending power over the commissariat; indeed, there were three current theories on the subject, advocating respectively the Treasury, the War-office, and the Admiralty, as the department to which the commissariat should look up for orders. The experience of everyday life will enable any one to comprehend that such conflicting views must necessarily have weakened the efficiency of the protégé thus trebly protected.

When the commissariat-officers at Varna were harassed by applications to which they could not adequately respond, and hurt by censures which they had not justly incurred, it was right that an eye-witness should say a word or two in their defence. The *Times* correspondent at that place wrote: 'A commissariat-officer is not made in a day, nor can the most lavish expenditure effect the work of years, or atone for the want of experience. The hardest-working Treasury-clerk—and, I must say, they all evince the greatest zeal and most untiring diligence in the discharge of their duties—has necessarily much to learn ere he can become an efficient commissariat-officer *in a country* which our old campaigners declare to be the most difficult they ever were in for procuring supplies. Let those who have any recollections of Chobham, just imagine that famous encampment to be placed about ten miles from the sea, in the midst of a country utterly deserted by the inhabitants, the railways from London stopped up, the supplies by cart or wagon cut off, corn scarcely procurable, carriages impossible, and the only communication between the camp and port carried on by means of buffalo and bullock arabas, travelling about one and a half mile an hour—and they will be able to form some faint idea of the difficulties of getting the requisite necessaries out here. Besides, here we are absolutely at war—obliged to carry enormous masses of ammunition, as well as tents and tent-equipage, provisions for the men, medical stores, all the various articles and means for cooking, &c., through a country which, to all intents and purposes, is held by enemies [in so far as the Bulgarians hate the Turks]. To give a notion of the requirements of such a body as this army of 25,000 men in the field, I may observe that it was stated to me on good authority the other day, that not less than 13,000 horses and mules would be required for the conveyance of

* Evidence before the Sebastopol Committee.

baggage and stores. About twelve o'clock to-day, just as all the officers were making preparations for their start to-morrow morning, orders were received countermanding those which had been issued for the march of the division; and it may be inferred, that the difficulties of which I was just writing when the aid-de-camp arrived have been found to be insuperable, and that the commissariat has not been able to provide the means of conveyance for the stores, either of Sir George Brown's or of the Duke of Cambridge's division. To continue my remarks on the nature of these difficulties: I may observe, that not only is it a work of time, labour, and money to find the horses, mules, and buffaloes, bullock and araba carts, required for our march, but that when we get them we cannot keep them. Buffalo and bullock carts and their drivers vanish into thin air in the space of a night. A Bulgarian is a human being after all.'

Again, the same well-informed writer wrote on another occasion: 'The report in the camp is, that the commissariat declared themselves unable to comply with the requisitions for moving the division, and that therefore we do not move to-morrow, or probably the next day. I regret very much to have to state, that for several days last week there was neither rice, nor sugar, nor preserved potatoes, nor tea, nor any substitute for these articles issued to the men; they had, therefore, to make their breakfast simply on ration brown bread and water. After breakfast, they were paraded and exercised for an hour or two in the hot sun—on one occasion, for more than four hours—and the result has been that illness increased rapidly. The dinners of the men, as long as the want of rice continued, consisted of lean ration-beef boiled in water, and eaten with brown bread, without any seasoning to flavour it. The supplies ran out, and it was no fault of the commissariat that they did so. Who was to blame, I don't pretend to say.' No one, it is remarked by the same authority, unacquainted with the actual requirements of an army, can form an adequate notion of the various duties which devolve upon an English commissariat-officer, or of the enormous quantity of stores required for the daily use of men and horses. In the middle of July, when most of the troops in the English army were quartered at distances varying from ten to twenty miles from Varna, there were required daily for the men, 27,000 pounds of bread, 27,000 pounds of meat, besides rice, tea, coffee, sugar, &c.; and for the horses, 110,000 pounds of corn, chopped straw, &c. Besides being responsible for the supply of these immense quantities, the commissariat-officers were burdened, by the strange organisation of the service, with the duty of providing horses, carts, saddles, tents, and interpreters. In addition to other reasons why the army could not have advanced to Silistria, little or no water is to be found on the first thirty miles of road from Varna; and the commissariat had neither vessels to contain water, carts to bear the vessels, nor horses to draw the carts. It is difficult to overestimate the amount of loss and suffering incurred by the British army in the East through the deficiency in means of transport.

Stern calamity of another kind visited the troops at Varna as the heats of summer approached—calamity more serious than mere irregularity in supplies. Disease and death visited the camps.

Strategical reasons having mainly determined the selection of Varna as a military position, the health of the place was not the first consideration. Nevertheless, this important matter had not been wholly forgotten by the authorities. The Duke of Newcastle sent out orders to inquire into the sanitary condition of the town and neighbourhood before the troops were removed thither; and he depended on the commander-in-chief and the commissary-general for the due fulfilment of this duty. Omar Pacha, when appealed to for his advice, said: 'If you disembark at Varna, by keeping clear of the lake of Devna, and encamping on the heights to the south of the town, you will find a healthy situation, surrounded by abundance of good water, with a fine climate to restore the men and horses after their sea-voyage; and the barrack in the town can be made use of as an hospital, if necessary.' Some of the troops were encamped close to the lake, contrary, in this respect alone, to Omar Pacha's advice; and it is possible that sickness may have been thereby occasioned.

In the middle of June, slight sickness appeared in the camp, but not to such an extent as to induce anxiety. When the next following month brought an increase of heat, however, the dreaded cholera accompanied it; and then, indeed, did the officers feel solicitude for themselves and their men. The French were attacked more severely than the English, and the Turks and Egyptians more severely than either. Numerous officers, being placed on the sick-list, returned home when able so to do.

All the romance of expectant warfare was dissipated when July heat, heavy storms, vermin, and disease attacked the camp. Mrs Young, in spite of her womanly endeavours to lessen rather than increase troubles, felt and wrote despondingly. 'The dews became very heavy, rain was common, and our storms of thunder and lightning were more frequent and more violent. To imagine anything more wretched than our tents now became, was scarcely possible. They had no time to dry under the hot sun before the rain recommenced; so that the atmosphere strongly resembled that which would be enjoyed by hanging a room round with wet linen, lighting a large fire therein, and spending the first half-hour on a stool in the centre, one's feet supported on a wet sponge; and if the reader will oblige me by trying to realise this idea, a very tolerable notion will be formed of our indoor comforts in the camp at Varna. Outside, matters were still more deplorable. The mud was of the kind adhesive; it clung about one with the tenacity of old prejudices; shaking it off was out of the

question. How the servants managed at all, I have no idea, sliding and sinking in all this weary mire; and how the tough old fowl, or the morsel of mutton, was ever boiled in the dirty water, or brought to us in that smutty pan, day by day, remains quite an open question.'* But the sickness was a more grave concern. It became necessary to convey one of the invalided officers from Devna to Varna. 'Now, it will seem extraordinary, no doubt, that an army should have been sent to Turkey, liable to all sorts of accidents, even if not actually employed in the field, and yet that no carriage for the sick was provided. Yet such was absolutely the case; and a poor officer from Devna with a broken limb had been sent jolting in an araba only a few days before, to the intense suffering, as may be supposed, of the unfortunate patient.' Arrived at Varna, our authoress, after infinite trouble, succeeded in procuring quarters for a sick officer, and found the town filled with people of all nations, in a frightful state of heat and disease, and overrun with vermin.

As the still hotter month of August approached, sickness increased at the camp. Many were afflicted with cholera; nearly all with diarrhœa. Scarcity of numerous comforts, and even necessaries, led the men to eat and drink too abundantly of such articles as were within reach, especially apricots; and thus the evil was augmented. When the general hospital at Varna became filled with as many sick soldiers as it could possibly accommodate, temporary hospitals were established in the neighbouring villages; and the surgeons became overburdened with their daily labours. The Duke of Cambridge was among the officers attacked with illness. The Light Division, when visited by cholera, moved on to Monastir, eight or ten miles beyond Devna, in the hope of finding a more salubrious place for encampment. The First Division had to bear the attacks, not only of cholera, but also of typhus; and the Third Division, encamped near Varna, was likewise severely visited. It became mournful work for the men to bury their dead companions by dozens and scores, and added to the causes of dissatisfaction at the position in which they were placed. It was upon the French, however, that the dread disease fell with the greatest severity; they sank under it at the rate of sixty or eighty per diem. A portion of their army, under General Canrobert, had advanced from Varna to the margin of the Dobrûdscha; to these were added 2500 Zouaves, who went by sea from Varna to Kustendji; and these hapless troops, passing through a marsh where the Russians had left dead men and horses, were swept off by whole companies. Canrobert left nearly 3000 of his poor fellows dead in that wretched district. In the midst of the tragedy, the French general issued a sympathising address to the troops, commending highly their endurance and devotion.

* *Our Camp in Turkey*, p. 251.

The hospital at Varna became a terrible place. It had been a barrack, and seems to have retained a certain amount of insalubrity from its occupation by the Turks—never a cleanly people when assembled in masses. The French, distrusting the place in cholera-time, abandoned it, and established tent-hospitals in the fields for their poor sick comrades.

Had this condition of affairs remained many weeks longer, the armies would have become nearly disorganised: officers were wearied and discontented; the men were reckless; the surgeons and the commissariat were worked almost beyond endurance. Great, therefore, was the joy when the end of August brought the end of cholera, and the announcement of a speedy and certain expedition to the Crimea, there to encounter hand to hand those Russians of whom so much had been said and so little seen.

The French generals are more prone to the issue of proclamations and manifestoes than the English, and their soldiers appear to derive exhilaration therefrom. Nothing could be more striking than the contrast between the documents put forth by Raglan and St Arnaud on the eve of departure for that expedition which was destined to be fatal to both of these commanders: the one, plain, short, and business-like; the other, glowing and dazzling. The following was one among many:—

'Soldiers!—You have just given fine examples of perseverance, calmness, and energy, in the midst of painful circumstances which must now be forgotten. The hour is come to fight and to conquer. The enemy did not wait for us on the Danube. His columns, demoralised and destroyed by disease, are painfully retiring. It is Providence, perhaps, that has wished to spare us the trial of these unhealthy countries; it is Providence, also, which calls us into the Crimea, a country as healthy as our own, and to Sebastopol, the seat of Russian power, within whose walls we go to seek together the pledge of peace, and of our return to our homes. The enterprise is grand, and worthy of you. You will realise it by the aid of the most formidable military and naval force that has ever been seen collected. The Allied fleets, with their 3000 cannons, and their 25,000 brave seamen, your emulators and your companions-in-arms, will bear to the shores of the Crimea an English army, whose high courage your forefathers learned to respect; a chosen division of those Ottoman soldiers who have just approved themselves in your eyes; and a French army, which I have the right and the pride to call the *élite* of our whole army. I see in this more than pledges of success. I see in it success itself. Generals, commanders of corps, officers of all arms, you will partake of the confidence with which my mind is filled, and will impart it to your soldiers. We shall soon salute the three united flags floating together on the ramparts of Sebastopol with our national cry, "*Vive l'Empereur!*"

A. DE ST ARNAUD.

Head-quarters, Varna, *August* 25.'

The enthusiasm of the French was further aroused by the following proclamation, sent to them about the same time, by the Emperor:—

'Soldiers and Sailors of the Army of the East!—You have not fought, but already you have obtained a signal success. Your presence, and that of the English troops, have sufficed to compel the enemy to recross the Danube, and the Russian vessels remain

ingloriously in their ports. You have not yet fought, and already you have struggled courageously against death. A scourge, fatal though transitory, has not arrested your ardour. France, and the sovereign whom she has chosen, cannot witness without deep emotion, or without making every effort to give assistance to such energy and such sacrifices.

The First Consul said, in 1797, in a proclamation to his army: "The first quality required in a soldier, is the power of supporting fatigues and privations. Courage is only a secondary one." The first you are now displaying. Who can deny you the possession of the second? Therefore it is that your enemies, disseminated from Finland to the Caucasus, are seeking anxiously to discover the point upon which France and England will direct their attacks, which they foresee will be decisive; for right, justice, and warlike inspiration are on our side.

Already, Bomarsund and 2000 prisoners have just fallen into our power. Soldiers! you will follow the example of the army of Egypt. The conquerors of the Pyramids and Mont Thabor had, like you, to contend against warlike soldiers and against disease; but, in spite of pestilence and the efforts of three armies, they returned with honour to their country. Soldiers! have confidence in your General-in-chief and in me. I am watching over you, and I hope, with the assistance of God, soon to see a diminution of your sufferings and an increase of your glory.

Soldiers! farewell, till we meet again.

NAPOLEON.'

Busy, indeed, were the armies during the last week in August and the first in September, preparing, with the aid of the Allied fleets, one of the most formidable armaments ever sent forth. Ships in almost countless number were assembled in the Bay of Varna, and off the coast for many miles north and south of that harbour; while every available kind of vehicle and animal of draught or burden was brought into requisition to convey baggage, stores, and camp-equipments of every kind, down to the beach. It was a time of intense excitement for all.

THE FLEETS IN THE BLACK SEA: 1854.

As a necessary condition of perspicacity in the narrative, the proceedings of the Allied armies have been traced without interruption by naval details. The present, however, is a convenient point at which to narrate the proceedings of the English and French fleets in the Straits and in the Black Sea. The mighty war-ships were about to take part in the struggle which was to engage the attention of the armies; the seamen were to share with the soldiers the honour accruing from any hoped for victories in the Crimea. The armies, as we have seen, had spent more than six months in a kind of negative position. The first regiments left England in February; they did not quit Varna for the Crimea until September had arrived; and in the intervening period of thirty weeks, they had been wearied with detention at Malta, detention at Gallipoli, detention at Scutari, and still more lengthened detention at Varna—hoping almost against hope, and striving to keep up their spirits by forming images of future glory. We have now to see how far the fleets were called upon to share in this forced inaction.

The two principal seas of Europe, the Mediterranean and the Baltic, are differently circumstanced in respect to the maritime powers. England and France always maintain fleets in the Mediterranean: never in the Baltic, unless special service is required. The Mediterranean is so all-important; it is a highway for so large and valuable a commerce; it is an outlet for the produce of so many fertile countries; it contains the outlying portions of the dominions of so many sovereigns; it is a region so jealously watched by those sovereigns, lest any one of their number should acquire too much power in it—that several nations are willing to bear the charge of maintaining fleets on its bosom. England is interested in the Mediterranean, on account of Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands, and the highway to India through Egypt; France is called upon to maintain free intercourse between her mainland, Corsica, and Algeria; Spain is washed along her southern coast by this sea, and derives thence a large proportion of her commerce; the Italian states are dependent on this sea for all their maritime influence, such as it may be; Austria touches salt water only at the Adriatic, the most northerly bend of the Mediterranean; Turkey, with her former provinces of Greece and Egypt, is especially a Mediterranean power; while Russia has ever sought to increase her influence in this important sea.

Frequent, though incidental, mention has been made in former chapters of the English and French fleets in Turkish waters, touching the delicate negotiations concerning Russo-Turkish affairs. Threats that those fleets would approach Constantinople, alternated with invitations that they might do so, according to the varying tone of politics. Admirals were recalled, and replaced by others; ships were sent home, to be superseded by others of newer build; but England and France never ceased to have fleets in the Mediterranean, anchored at spots which, though not giving umbrage to other powers, might yet be near enough to enforce the decisions of the two cabinets on any important question connected with the policy of the East.

Admiral Dundas, or, more precisely, Vice-admiral J. W. D. Dundas—there being two other admirals of the same name in the Royal Navy at that time—commanded the British fleet in the Mediterranean during the earlier stages of the war. About the middle of the year 1853, when war was becoming almost inevitable between Russia and Turkey, he moved towards the Dardanelles. Three months earlier, at the time when the Menchikoff mission was agitating Constantinople, Admiral Dundas was with his fleet at Malta; Colonel Rose, in the absence of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, called up the fleet to protect Turkey against the designs of Russia; but the admiral

did not feel himself justified in responding to this summons without instructions from the government at home. At a later time, however, when the political clouds further darkened, delay was no longer admissible; and the admiral received orders, on the 8th of June, to proceed from Malta to Besika Bay, there to place himself under the guidance of the British ambassador. This bay, situated near the mouth of the Dardanelles, was considered to be sufficiently near Constantinople to enable the fleet to render aid in case of urgency. There the admiral remained about five months, until, on the 30th of October, he received orders to advance to the Bosphorus. In the Constantinopolitan waters two months more of detention awaited him; until at length, in the beginning of 1854—after the tragedy at Sinope had driven the Allied governments to the adoption of something like a definite policy—officers and men were alike delighted by an order to advance to the Black Sea, yearning, as they had been, to exchange listless inaction for enterprise and possible glory. It is to this period, and this region, that the Earl of Carlisle's *Diary* chiefly relates; the attempts to 'kill time' on board the ships; the impatient desire for change to active service; the pleasure-trips up and down the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; the visitings and dinner-parties between the officers of the English and French fleets—all are depicted by the earl; and they suffice to shew that the last six months of 1853 were months of complete inaction on the part of the Allied fleets, at a time when Turkey, driven into war by the intolerable aggression of Russia, was bravely fighting her own cause on the banks of the Danube.

At that time, our admirals possessed as little trustworthy knowledge of the strength of the Russian fleets, as our generals of that of the Russian armies. Admiral Dundas received from the Admiralty a rough outline of the supposed state of the czar's fleet in the Black Sea; but neither this outline, nor the information possessed by the British ambassador at Constantinople, was very definite. The French fleet, which throughout the second half of the year 1853, had been anchored in near proximity to the British, was equally destitute of authentic details concerning the naval resources of Russia.

The first day of the New Year found the Allied fleets busily preparing in Beicos Bay for more active service. This bay is in the Bosphorus, on the eastern or Asiatic side, about midway between the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea; whereas Besika Bay, where the fleets had previously anchored, is a little south of the Dardanelles; the distance between the two bays being about 180 miles. On the 4th of January 1854, the fleets entered the Black Sea. Among the principal English men-of-war were the *Britannia, Albion, Jupiter, Vengeance, Sanspareil, Rodney, Bellerophon, Trafalgar, Agamemnon, London, Queen,* and *Terrible;* while the French sent out the *Bayard, Ville de Paris, Jena, Henri IV., Valmy, Friedland, Charlemagne, Descartes,* &c. The most important of these vessels were steamers; and in this respect the Black Sea in 1854 introduced a new era in the history of naval warfare.

A signal was hoisted on the flag-ship—'Turks are to be protected from all aggression by sea or land!' This was the first formal declaration that the Allies would employ the force of arms against Russia, if necessary. The fleet, joined by a Turkish flotilla, bent round eastward, and coasted Asia Minor towards Sinope. The sight here was miserable. Although many weeks had elapsed since the Russian attack, mutilated bodies were still lying about the beach; several hundreds had been covered with earth, but again uncovered by ferocious dogs and vultures. The town was nearly destroyed; the beach was covered with masts and spars; the tops of sunken ships appeared in the water; and the wretched inhabitants of the few remaining houses were nearly in a starving state. On the 8th, the *Agamemnon, Sanspareil, Charlemagne, Terrible, Mogador, Sampson,* and *Descartes,* were ordered to get up steam, and to escort several Turkish vessels, containing powder and stores, to Trebizond and Batoum—Turkish ports on the southern and south-eastern shores of the Black Sea. This done, they returned to Sinope. England and France not being yet at war, the admirals were not authorised to attack Russian ships; they were to defend Turkey and Turks from Russian attacks; and in the performance of this duty, they shielded the six Turkish steamers appointed to convey munitions of war to Turkish ports on the Black Sea. It was small work, however, for such fine ships. Sir Edmund Lyons' 91-gun screw-steamer *Agamemnon,* the *Sanspareil* screw of 71, and such like noble vessels, were powerful forces for such a service. Rumours were afloat that a Russian squadron of four line-of-battle ships and four steamers had been seen off Batoum; the Allies loaded and shotted all their guns in readiness; but no Russians appeared, to the evident disappointment of those who would willingly have had a brush with the czar's ships. It was, however, ascertained, that three Russian steamers had been off the coast three days before the Allies arrived, trying the range of their guns at some of the Turkish forts; hence it may be inferred, that the Allies exerted a preventive, if not an active influence, by appearing in this quarter as defenders of the Turks.

The fleets returned to the Bosphorus after this short expedition, and resumed their course of inaction, not being empowered by the home authorities to make any active demonstrations against Russia. One event mortified the officers and sailors exceedingly. The Russians succeeded in capturing some Turkish coal-vessels, in spite of the proximity of the English and French fleets. The *Vladimir,* a Russian frigate, was painted like an Austrian vessel, and exhibited the Austrian number for the *Ferdinando Primo;* it approached three Turkish vessels; the Turks regarded it as

belonging to a friendly power; but the mask was speedily thrown off, and the ships taken. The captured crews were put on board the smallest vessel, and allowed to return home; while the other two ships, with the captains, were carried off to a Russian port. This achievement by Captain Bougatoff was a bold one—to elude twenty-four sail of the line, and to carry off two trading-vessels; it greatly elated the Russians, and equally mortified and irritated the Allies, who felt humbled in the eyes of the Turks by such an event.

The coal-ships here referred to had taken in their cargoes at Heraclea. The mines near this place became of considerable importance to the Allies, considering the large number of steam-ships employed by them in and near the Black Sea. When the news of the actual declaration of war by England and France reached Constantinople, coal at that place was 65s. per ton; the coal-ships from England had not now back-freight in corn; hence a price was charged for the coal which would cover the expense of a double voyage. It was at that time that the attention of the admirals was drawn towards the Heraclea coal-fields, where the seams were worked by Croats, Montenegrins, Bosnians, and other workmen drawn from the quarries near Constantinople; the coal, when dug, was carried in baskets from the mines to the surface by labourers from the neighbouring villages; and from thence it was transported to the coast by mules. The whole operations were conducted in the rudest and most primitive manner; but when a few English engineers were sent to superintend the workings, the system underwent improvement. It was in consequence of a visit to these mines by the officers of the *Spitfire* steamer, that the arrangement was made, mentioned in a former page, whereby the Allies might obtain coal at about 20s. per ton. A certain district was ceded by the Porte, at a specified rental, to be worked by English skill and capital, for the benefit both of the English and the French steam-fleets. Many difficulties, however, occurred in the carrying out of this plan. So much in its infancy is commercial enterprise in Turkey, that any attempt to conduct large enterprises on European principles encounters many obstacles.

Early in March, Admiral Dundas despatched Captain Jones, in the *Sampson*, on a reconnoitering cruise along the coasts of Anatolia, Georgia, Circassia, and the Crimea, from which he returned to Beicos Bay about the 18th of the month; and soon after the Allied fleets left the Bosphorus, and took up a position in Kavarna Bay, a portion of the Black Sea a little northward of Varna. An earlier removal to this position had been contemplated, but the steamers had been delayed by reason of a difficulty in obtaining coal —the arrangements at Heraclea being yet very incomplete. The fleets at that time comprised ten English and eight French line-of-battle ships, with six English and six French steamers of smaller size; other additions were made afterwards.

The Russian coasts of the Black Sea, at the commencement of the war, were very little known to the English and French admirals; the jealousy between the various powers having restricted the facilities for the entrance of ships of war into that sea. The Russian portion of this coast commenced at the easternmost extremity of the sea, marked by Fort St Nikolaïa, near which, on the Turkish border, is Batoum. This point is about 330 miles eastward of Sinope. From thence the Russians held all the coast to the Sea of Azof, the entrance to which is formed by the Straits of Yenikalé or Kertch; then, all the coast of the Crimea; and, lastly, the north-western coast of the Black Sea, from Perekop past Kherson and Odessa to the mouths of the Danube. Silently and indefatigably had the czars built fort after fort along this extensive line of coast; and it became essentially necessary, on the breaking out of war, that the Allies should know something concerning the number and strength of these posts. At that period, the chief of the forts eastward of the Crimea was at Anapa, distant a few miles from the Straits of Yenikalé. This important fortress, originally constructed by the Turks to protect their commerce with the tribes of the Caucasus, had been afterwards converted by the Russians into a strong military position. Commercially, it is of little account, for the harbour is open to every wind, and can only be used in the fine season. The western chain of the Caucasus commences at Anapa; and this was practically the eastern limit of Russian power on that sea; for the Circassians laid claim to all the coast, and the Russians have never succeeded in establishing any first-class forts beyond Anapa. The forts further east have always been isolated; the garrisons being in danger of annihilation if they left the protection of stone walls. At a short distance from the coast are mountains and forests, among which the Circassians and other tribes find a home; the Russians have seldom yet been left by these tribes in quiet possession of the north-east shores of the Black Sea. At the period of the commencement of the war, the first Russian fort eastward of Anapa was Soudjuk Kalé (Sudjuk Kaleh), defended by three redoubts; it was at this place that a Russian squadron captured the British ship *Vixen*, causing thereby great diplomatic excitement in 1837. Next to this was Ghelendjik (Gelendshik), possessing a fine and safe harbour, and regarded by the Russians as a place of much importance: a flotilla being there located, to watch the movements of the Circassians. A few miles further east is the Bay of Pchiat, at the entrance of which the Russians built a fort in 1837. Numerous little bays then occur, fringed with villages, the inhabitants of which have succeeded in repelling all hostile attacks of the Russians. After passing Kavakinskoi and Gagri, there were presented Pozunda and Bomborai in Abasia; and then Soucoum Kalé (Suchum Kaleh), possessing one of the best bays on this part of the coast. At the

mouth of the small river Ingour was Fort Anaklia. Redout Kalé and Poti, at the mouths of two other small rivers, were also provided with Russian forts. The last Russian fort was at St Nikolaïa, near the boundary between the ancient provinces of Mingrelia and Gouriel. The Russian forts, from the Straits of Yenikalé to the Turkish frontier, were about sixteen in number.

During the summer, many a cruise was made to these Circassian coasts, first as a matter of reconnaissance, but after the declaration of war, as a means of conquest or destruction. Fort after fort was visited, and the exact state of all ascertained. Dotting the coast at intervals of ten or twenty miles apart, these forts were found to present a general family-likeness: they were mostly situated at the mouths of small mountain rivers, so as to command the valleys through which these streams find their way to the sea. The country intervening between the forts is for the most part hilly and rugged, matted with impenetrable forests. The forts were found to be mostly constructed of sandstone, brought from Kertch; they were square, loopholed for musketry, provided with towers at the

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angles, and mounted with a few large traversing-guns, with a mortar or two in the centre; the walls were somewhat lofty, to frustrate escalade by the Circassians. Each fort had a garrison of 500 to 1000 men, living in wooden barracks. A strong stockade on the outside enclosed a few outhouses, a small vegetable garden, and a small number of cattle and horses. If, on the one hand, the Russians commanded the whole coast by means of gun-boats cruising from fort to fort, they were, on the other hand, restricted entirely to the coast; for even in an expedition of a few miles in search of fodder, it was necessary that the troops should sally out in battle-array, lest they should be cut off by the Circassians.

Most of these forts were blown up by the Russians, after removal of the garrisons, to prevent capture by the Allies. When Sir Edmund Lyons was engaged on one of these expeditions in May, he allowed the officers to go on shore to inspect the blown-up fort at Gagri, situated at the mouth of a deep gorge. The place had evidently been evacuated in a hurry; for the ordnance stores were strewed about, including thirteen guns, several 10-inch mortars and howitzers, iron-balls to be fired from the mortars, shells, and canister-shot. The fort was square, with bastions at the angles; and there was a block-house at some distance from it up the valley, to command the passage. At another spot, the voluntary destruction took place under the very eyes of the Allies. Sir Edmund Lyons, with the *Agamemnon*, *Charlemagne*, *Highflyer*, *Sampson*, and *Mogador*, appeared off Redout Kalé on the 19th of May; he saw Russian officers on the parapet of the fort, and Cossacks galloping at full speed from the beach towards the town; he sent a flag of truce, demanding the immediate evacuation of the place. The Russians remitted an evasive answer, to gain time; and just before the ships were about to open fire, masses of smoke began to ascend from the town—the Russians had fired it. The conflagration became very striking; houses and trees burned together during the whole night; and fierce flames and lurid smoke illuminated the

decks of the ships. Redout Kalé was the most important of all the Russian forts between Anapa and the Turkish frontier; it was on the Georgian coast, commanding the communication between Tiflis and the Black Sea; and was the place of landing for many of the troops of the Russian army of Asia. Redout Kalé, or what remained of it, was handed over to the keeping of the Turks as soon as their Allies had frightened the Russians from it; the Turks proceeded immediately to repair some of the fortifications; while the *Sampson*, under Captain Jones, remained in the harbour as a protection.

About the middle of March, just before the actual declaration of war, but when war was inevitable, the Emperor Nicholas had ordered the abandonment of all the forts, except the three of greatest importance—namely, Anapa, Soudjuk Kalé, and Redout Kalé; and thus it arose that the forced evacuation of the last named was regarded as important by the Allies. Sir Edmund Lyons, in the course of this expedition, examined the Straits of Yenikalé, opening into the important Sea of Azof; but the result of his examination was to deter him from any immediate operations in that quarter, owing to the shallowness of the water. One of his ships grounded in water marked 'deep' on the Russian charts, and was with difficulty set afloat again; this, and many other events during the war, induced a belief in some quarters, that the Russian authorities had purposely sanctioned the dissemination of erroneous charts, so as to entrap their enemies.

Viewed in relation to the immediate necessities of the Turks, the east end of the Black Sea was regarded by the Allies as of more importance than the northern coast; and it was on this account that one or two ships of war remained for several weeks off Redout Kalé. Nor was the precaution superfluous; for the Russians, in June, returned to the place from the heart of Georgia, and would perhaps have besieged it but for the presence of a couple of formidable war-steamers. The English officers were glad to have something definite to employ them; but the swampy region, in a hot season, occasioned much visitation of ague. The officers of the *Sampson* were one day agreeably surprised by the appearance of that much-coveted luxury—London porter; a commodity little to be expected then at Redout Kalé, in the midst of the confused nationalities of Russians, Turks, Circassians, and Georgians. It appeared, from investigations subsequently made, that a French trading-vessel, laden with London porter and other commodities, had entered Kertch about the time of the declaration of war, but was not allowed to land her cargo; she then tried Soucoum Kalé, where, by a manœuvre not altogether creditable, a native chieftain contrived to possess himself of the bottled luxury without paying for it. Ultimately, the beverage was offered to Captain Jones as a free gift; but he insisted upon paying for it, at the legitimate London prices of eightpence and fourpence per bottle, according to the size.

Before tracing the naval operations of the Allies in other parts of the Black Sea, during the spring and summer of 1854, it may be desirable to notice how far, and in what manner, the Turks were enabled to take part in these operations, by aiding those Allies who had come to aid them.

The Turkish fleet underwent a re-organisation soon after 1770, in which year the Turks had received a signal defeat from the Russians in the Gulf of Tchesmé. Hassan Ghazi, the commander of the principal Turkish ship in that engagement, was one of the few survivors; he was appointed Capudan Pacha, or chief admiral, by Sultan Mustapha, and immediately commenced a reform of the Turkish navy. The duty of the fleet, up to that time, had been chiefly to make summer trips to the different pachaliks, to collect the tribute payable by the pachas to the sultan; and, in a smaller degree, to hunt down the pirates in the Greek waters. The ships were heavy, unmanageable, and slow. Subsequent to the battle of Tchesmé, Hassan caused lighter ships to be built, but was unable to effect reform in armament, stores, or crews. After him, another naval reformer appeared, in the person of Kutchuk Hussein Pacha. Appointed Capudan Pacha by Sultan Selim, he sent to France and Sweden for skilful shipwrights; adopted the terms employed in the French naval service; established, or rather re-organised, a mathematical school for marine officers and engineers; subjected the crews to repeated and strict disciplinary exercises; felled immense quantities of ship-building timber in the vast forests in the southern chain of the Taurus; and in six years built twenty sail-of-the-line at Constantinople, Sinope, and Rhodes.

The French traveller, D'Olivier, who visited Turkey during the reign of Selim, found an efficient fleet of about forty war-ships, mostly constructed by Kutchuk Hussein. Speaking of the state of things which had existed shortly before, he said: 'Ships of war were not long since fitted up in such a manner, that each Turk had his berth, and everything necessary for his cooking and other arrangements. The between-decks were so encumbered, that it was frequently very difficult to make use of the great guns, and the Mussulmans might receive several broadsides from the enemy before they were in a condition to repel an attack. The guns themselves were of different calibres, and served without order or preparation; the shot which were brought for loading the cannon, were frequently either too large or too small—rendering a ship of great power unable to cope with one much smaller.' Of the sailors he observed: 'The Turks, in general, are not fond of the sea. They cannot conform to the active life which a seaman is obliged to lead; they cannot accustom themselves to the privations which that profession entails.

They commonly prefer making use of the Greeks, who display in this line, as in every other, an intelligence and an activity of which the Turks are incapable. The Greeks manœuvre tolerably well, and conduct their little vessels with much skill in the seas with which they are acquainted; but they have not the smallest theory of navigation: almost all of them navigate without a compass, steer only by their knowledge of the mountains and coasts, bear up for every wind that blows somewhat strongly, and wait for fine weather in the nearest port.'* In short, the navigation of ancient times was retained even in modern days.

The period to which D'Olivier's description relates was about 1798. Soon after this, many improvements were made. The Turks introduced order into their ships, kept the spaces 'tween-decks more clear, acquired more skill in gunnery, and organised the daily duty with more intelligence. The sailors were Turks of the maritime villages, or Greeks of the Archipelago, and received regular pay; the marines were all Mussulmans, who received pay only so long as their ship was in commission. The Greek sailors were intrusted with the working of the ships: the Mussulmans with the defence. In certain state exigencies, the sultan had the power to summon merchant-ships and merchant-seamen to his service. After the death of Hussein Pacha, the improvements were checked, and the Turkish navy fell again into a very depressed and inefficient state. During the first quarter of the present century, the fleet was weak; the disastrous battle of Navarino, on October 20, 1827, nearly annihilated it; and the establishment of the independent kingdom of Greece, deprived the Porte of the aid of Greek sailors from the Morea and its islands. The Turkish navy had to be created almost anew. This duty was intrusted by Sultan Mahmoud to Tahir Pacha, the grand-admiral; he, being a clever and earnest man, worked sedulously at his task, and in ten years raised Turkey to an honourable rank among the second-rate maritime powers. In 1840, during the contest between the sultan and his rebellious vassal Mehemet Ali of Egypt, the Turkish admiral, Achmet Fezir Pacha, treacherously betrayed his fleet into the hands of Mehemet; but a restitution was subsequently made. The steam navy, which had been commenced in 1837, made rapid progress between 1840–50; and all the elements of a naval armament received steady improvement. At the time of the breaking out of the war in 1853, the Turkish navy comprised two 3-deckers of 120 to 130 guns; two of 74 to 90 guns; ten sailing-frigates, of 40 to 60 guns; six corvettes, of 22 to 26 guns; fourteen brigs, of 12 to 20 guns; sixteen schooners and cutters, of 4 to 12 guns; six steam-frigates, of 450 to 800 horse-power; and twelve steam-vessels of smaller dimensions—making a total of about seventy vessels.

* *Voyage dans l'Empire Ottoman, l'Egypte, et la Perse.*

The navy was under a Capudan Pacha, or grand-admiral, assisted by an Admiralty; and the general organisation of the fleet bore a resemblance to that of the fleets of the Western Powers—except in this, that the crews were divided into companies, analogous to the military companies of a regiment of the line. The sailors were about 34,000; the marines, 4000; and in the bravery of the men, and the construction and management of the ships, the Ottoman navy had attained a creditable position.

The sanguinary but cowardly attack by the Russians at Sinope weakened the Turkish navy and exasperated the Turks. In the subsequent naval operations in the Black Sea, the Turkish ships seldom acted alone, but usually formed component elements in the Allied fleets. Sometimes the English officers and seamen looked down with a little contempt on their Ottoman allies; but there is no proof that this was justifiable, for the Turks shewed themselves ever ready to bear their share of enterprise and danger.

During the early part of the year 1854, the Turkish fleet was not applied to much use by the Allied admirals; but on the 4th of May, it left Constantinople for the Black Sea, after a long detention in the Bay of Buyukdere. It was a fine fleet of 22 ships, comprising one first-rate of 124 guns, the *Mahmoudié;* three of 104 guns; two of 90; two of 84; and one of 74. One of the 84-gun ships, the *Techrifié,* was commanded by an Englishman, who had been many years in the Turkish service—Admiral Slade, under his Oriental designation of Mouchavir Pacha. The fleet also comprised three large frigates, two brigs, and seven or eight steamers. The fleet was inspected before its departure by Mehemet, the Capudan Pacha. Admiral Slade, combining his experience as an English naval-officer with his knowledge of Turks and Turkey, was a valuable coadjutor in the fleet. This fleet, after conference with the Allied admirals, was bound for the Circassian coast, to aid in those operations already described. It appears, however, that little as the English and French fleets effected in the Black Sea during that year, the Turks were permitted hardly any share even in that little. A correspondent at Constantinople of one of the journals, writing in August, thus commented on the matter: 'With all deference to nautical men, it may be allowed to regret that this squadron, strong in the number and size of its vessels, and in, at least, the valour and determination of its crews, was not turned to a better use during its last visit to the Black Sea. To hear the contemptuous manner in which the English officers have spoken of it, and of the necessity of keeping it quiet for fear of its impeding the operations of the Allies, one would think that a succession of Trafalgars had occupied the last few months, and that these inexpert Mussulmans had been condemned to Baltschik Bay that they might not interfere with the activity and brilliancy of our own operations. But where nothing is

done, the Turk stands as high as his supercilious critics. No doubt the Ottoman sailors, though capable of obstinate resistance in a fight like that of Sinope, are not sufficiently skilful for elaborate evolutions; still, they might have been made more serviceable than they were during their two months in harbour, where they died of starvation and scurvy, and were as useless as if they had remained within the Bosphorus. . . . . The unhappy Turks were left, without money or necessaries, to starve in the sight of plenty, and perish with disease close to crews in perfect health. They saw provisions bought up and taken to the Allied fleet, while they had nothing but their wretched allowances; they became demoralised and dispirited, and out of their moderate squadron they lost 1000 men.' The Turks had, indeed, no great reason to be delighted with their Allies, who failed to come to their aid during the critical exigencies of the Danubian campaign and the siege of Silistria, and neglected their willing and well-meant co-operation in naval matters.

It is now time to trace the small achievements of the great fleets—for in such terms they must in candour be characterised—in the western half of the Black Sea, during the spring and summer of 1854.

The news of the declaration of war reached the combined fleets at Varna on the 9th of April, and immediately threw officers and men into a state of heroic excitement. They felt ready to attack the Russians anywhere, everywhere; and impatiently waited for orders to that effect from their commanders. Already, besides the preliminary expeditions to the Circassian coast, there had been a few hasty trips to the neighbourhood of the Crimea and Odessa, intended as a means of picking up a little information concerning the strength of the Russian land and sea forces in those quarters; but an English consul remained at Odessa so long as hostilities had not actually commenced. When, however, the news of the declaration of war arrived, the steamer *Furious* was despatched from Varna to Odessa to bring away the consul. With a flag of truce flying at her mast-head, she anchored in the bay, and sent off a boat, also carrying a flag of truce. A delay in obtaining an answer induced the lieutenant in command of the boat to return towards the steamer; but no sooner did he do so, than the Russians opened a fire from the batteries; five or six shots were aimed, but fortunately none hit the boat. This breach of all the rules of honourable warfare aroused much indignation in the fleet, which immediately advanced, and anchored before Odessa on the 20th of April. An explanation was demanded of General Osten-Sacken, military commander of Odessa. The general had before this date written to Admiral Dundas, expressing his surprise at the report that a British flag of truce had been fired upon; stating that the boat had not been fired upon at all, and that the batteries had only opened upon the *Furious* when she came with hostile intention within range of the guns. To this letter the admirals returned the following reply from the fleet before Odessa on the 21st:—

'Sir—Inasmuch as the letter of your Excellency, dated the 14th of April, which has only reached us this morning, only sets forth erroneous statements to justify the indescribable aggression committed by the authorities of Odessa upon one of our frigates and her boat, both carrying a flag of truce;

Inasmuch as, notwithstanding this flag, the batteries of the town fired several shots on the frigate, as well as on the boat, at the moment when this boat was leaving the quay of the mole, to which it had repaired with confidence;

The two Vice-admirals commanding the combined squadrons of France and England think themselves entitled to demand a reparation from your Excellency.

Consequently, all the British, French, and Russian vessels now at anchor near the citadel, or the batteries of Odessa, must forthwith be delivered up to the combined squadrons.

If, at sunset, the two Vice-admirals have received no answer, or a negative answer, to this communication, they will be compelled to resort to force to avenge the flag of one of the combined squadrons for the affront offered to it; although the interests of humanity induce them to adopt this alternative with regret, and they cast the responsibility of such an act on those on whom it belongs.

Hamelin, Vice-admiral.
D. Dundas, Vice-admiral.'

No adequate response to this demand having been received, the admirals prepared to bombard Odessa.

The celebrated commercial seaport thus about to be placed in peril, is situated at the north-west extremity of the Black Sea, about 125 miles north-east of the Sulina mouth of the Danube, and 200 miles north-west of Sebastopol. It is at the head of a small inlet, called the Bay of Adschai. When, in 1791, the Empress Catherine obtained from the Turks possession of the district around this spot, Odessa was a mere village, passing under the name of Kodschabeg. Intensely desirous as Russia had long been of obtaining a good seaport on the Black Sea, Catherine immediately began to give effect to this wish by converting the humble Kodschabeg into the imperial Odessa. She employed several regiments in digging the foundation, and in constructing public works. The site was well chosen; for although there is no river, the bay is deep even close inshore, and is rarely frozen except in intense winters. The work steadily progressed, and Alexander completed what Catherine had begun: he appointed the Duc de Richelieu, a French emigrant nobleman, governor; and under the duke's auspices the town and port rapidly acquired importance. At first inhabited only by a few Greek families, its population rose to 15,000 in 1804; and in 1854, the inhabitants probably numbered 100,000. The town is regularly built in the form of an oblong parallelogram, on a declivity sloping towards the sea. The harbour, formed by two large moles, and defended by strong works, will accommodate 200 vessels. Near it, are a citadel, a quarantine

harbour, a light-house, and the Admiralty port; and facing the centre of the harbour are extensive barracks. The streets of the city are broad, and well paved; the houses of stone, and generally two stories in height. The sea-front, on either side of the harbour, is adorned with several magnificent houses, belonging to Prince Woronzoff, the highest officials, and the rich merchants; and a splendid walk or boulevard, planted with rows of trees, and occupying a broad space between the houses and the cliff, is a favourite spot for promenaders. A flight of steps—one of the finest in Europe—leads up from the beach to the cliff; and the city contains many pleasant squares and colonnades. Commercially considered, Odessa is by far the most important town in Southern Russia; its exports of corn, tallow, wool, and other articles of domestic produce, are very large; and it is the *entrepôt* of extensive stores of European manufactures for Russian use. In the few years immediately preceding the war, Odessa sent out 1500 laden ships annually. One who knew the town well, has thus described Odessa and its inhabitants as they appeared in 1853: 'Odessa is a very peculiar town, in



Odessa.

which nearly every nation in Europe is represented. Through this variety in the population, it bears a great resemblance to Tiflis, except that here the confusion of peoples is still more confounded, and is more visible, through the publicity of living in the East. In Tiflis, too, the Asiatic element is more fully represented; while in Odessa, Europeans are most numerous. Odessa is certainly a Russian commercial town; but it possesses the Russian character in so slight a degree, that it can hardly be considered so. The number of actual Russians is in no proportion to that of Greeks, Italians, and Germans. The military, and swarms of officials, are alone Russian; but even among the latter there are many non-Russians, principally French and German. Odessa possesses something obtained from nearly every part of Europe. Externally, and principally in public life, in the Opera, and buildings, we recognise the South European town, with a prominent Italian character. The shops of the first class are imitations of the French; but they do not equal them in elegance, though their owners are principally Frenchmen. The artisan class, as nearly through the whole of Russia, is German; German gardeners from the adjacent districts supply the market with vegetables. Although society is generally regulated after the French model, and that language is principally spoken, still a yearning for English manners may be traced. This is very evident in the clubs. The cause may be found in the circumstance, that Prince Woronzoff was educated in, and always displays a preference for the customs of, that country.'* But Odessa, like all other showy Russian towns, loses its attraction immediately beyond the barriers: 'It can scarcely be credited that a town, which is entirely dependent on the interior provinces, and has grown rich through their produce, has done nothing at all to facilitate the mode of communication for the poorer inhabitants of New Russia and Bessarabia. As far as I am aware, the streets of Odessa are only

* Koch. *The Crimea; with a Visit to Odessa.*

macadamised, but not paved; and even this roadway ceases after the barrier is passed. As long as it is good weather, and the ground is dry, all goes well, for it is quick travelling on the illimitable steppe; but wo to the traveller who is compelled to proceed into the interior of the country during a rainy season! Bottomless roads prevent his progress for days.'

Such is the Russian port which, towards the close of April, was bombarded by the Allied fleets. It appears that, immediately after the firing upon the flag of truce, Osten-Sacken, apprehending that serious consequences would follow, issued a proclamation to the inhabitants, advising or ordering them to remove into the interior. Immediately on the approach of the Allied fleets being observed, he sent off telegraphic messages to St Petersburg and to Sebastopol, and prepared for resistance. After a few merchant vessels had been captured, twelve war-steamers opened fire on Odessa on the 22d; and in a few hours destroyed the fortifications, the batteries, and the military stores; blew up two powder-magazines; sank several ships of war; and carried off about a dozen ships laden with munitions of war. No attempt was made to capture or destroy the town, or to injure the commercial harbour and the merchant shipping which it contained; nevertheless, many of the principal buildings, including the Woronzoff palace, were destroyed, the steeples of many of the churches, and nearly all the windows in the town were broken. Odessa had been strengthened, in the early part of the year, by seven batteries, mounting altogether about fifty guns; and these batteries kept up a brisk fire during the ten hours the bombardment lasted, but with little injury to the Allies. The Russians suffered much more considerably; about 200 were killed, and a much larger number wounded. The *Terrible* fired red-hot shot, which worked great destruction. The bombardment was commenced by the *Sampson*, *Furious*, *Vauban*, and *Mogador*, which were joined about two hours afterwards by the *Tiger*, *Terrible*, *Retribution*, *Arethusa*, and three or four French steamers. The dockyard, fired by 24-pounder rockets, remained burning for two days and nights, the flames consuming all the ships and stores.

'Why spare Odessa?' was a question frequently asked in England, when the news of this bombardment arrived. The admirals had issued orders to spare the town, the people, and the commercial harbour and shipping, as much as possible, aiming the shot and shells and rockets so as to destroy the government works and property. Probably, this course of proceeding was in accordance with instructions from home, and a sentiment of humanity may possibly have suggested it; but forbearance in time of war is not always humane in its results. The fleets made no lodgment, maintained no blockade, at Odessa; they departed the next day towards the coast of the Crimea. The inhabitants of Odessa, scarcely crediting the fact that they were to be thus released, set energetically to work in restoring the defences, and strengthening the town; and the Allies afterwards suffered severely from the resources which the Russians were enabled to obtain by making Odessa a depôt. It is in this enlarged sense that the policy of having spared Odessa may be questioned.

Shortly after this event, the *Tiger*, *Vesuvius*, and *Niger*, were detached from the Allied fleets, and ordered to reconnoitre Odessa, concerning which the admirals appear to have remained in some anxiety. A dense fog speedily led to the separation of the three ships; and on the evening of the 12th of May, at about six o'clock, the *Tiger* ran aground, four or five miles from Odessa, near a light-house, and under a high cliff. The crew immediately got out her boats, laid the anchor astern, and lightened her by throwing the guns overboard. The Russians, on the look-out above, did not fail to take advantage of the situation of the unfortunate ship. The seamen were annoyed with musketry while employed in endeavouring to relieve their vessel; and about nine o'clock, the firing became still more determined, by the employment of field-pieces. The luckless *Tiger*—a steamer of sixteen guns, and about 1270 tons burden—resisted until Captain Giffard had received desperate wounds, and a midshipman and two seamen were killed, and one wounded. The captain, seeing his hopeless condition, struck his flag, and the Russians took the crew prisoners. At this critical time, the *Niger* and *Vesuvius* hove in sight. The Russians thereupon ordered the prisoners to hasten on shore, or they would again fire; and when the two steamers came within gunshot, the prisoners were placed in front of the Russians on the beach. Captain Giffard and his poor fellows were then marched or conveyed to Odessa, where they received every kindness from the inhabitants: Giffard himself being lodged in the governor's house. They were allowed considerable liberty; were permitted to write to their friends; and were visited, under a flag of truce, by the first-lieutenant of the *Vesuvius*. Care seems to have been taken, on this occasion, that the Russians should not be open to any charge of dishonouring a flag of truce. The news speedily reached St Petersburg; and the *Invalide Russe*, on the 19th, contained a dispatch from General Osten-Sacken to Prince Paskévitch—stating that the *Tiger*, when too much injured to be preserved, was purposely burnt by means of red-hot shot; that the flag and Union-jack had been kept as trophies; that some of the guns had been secured, and taken to Odessa; and that the prisoners, besides Captain Giffard, numbered 24 officers and warrant-officers, and 201 seamen and marines. Mrs Giffard, wife of the unfortunate captain of the *Tiger*, went to Odessa early in June in the *Vesuvius*, with the determination to share the captivity of her husband; she reached that place on the 9th, but found that he had sunk under his sufferings a week

previously. She was allowed to land for a few hours to visit his grave, and to converse with some of the captured crew of the *Tiger;* and she received much consideration from the authorities.

An episode of a remarkable kind is connected with this fate of the *Tiger*—the production of a volume, narrating the kind treatment and liberation of one of the prisoners. In this volume,* everything Russian is so highly praised, that its tone became subject to much commentary. Since gentleness has seldom been a characteristic of the Russian government, a supposition has been put forth that the treatment of the crew of the *Tiger* was a special affair, intended to produce a particular effect in Western Europe. Be this the case or not, it would be difficult for the most ardent admirer of Russia and the Russians to overpass Lieutenant Royer in the use of adulatory words and phrases. Apart from the tone of the book, however, the facts of the imprisonment were simply as follow:—When the prisoners were landed on the grounds of M. Cortazzi, chief magistrate of Odessa, the wounded received immediate attention; and the rest, guarded by

Destruction of the Tiger.

a large body of troops, and gazed at by half the population of Odessa, were marched off to the quarantine-station near the city. Here they were comfortably housed, well fed, and kindly treated—being allowed also to receive letters, clothes, and money from English ships, which, as just stated, approached under flag of truce for that purpose. They were perhaps the first body of English prisoners ever made by Russia; and were treated somewhat as pets or phenomena accordingly. Early in June, the decision of the czar was received concerning the destination of the prisoners: the chief officer was to proceed to St Petersburg; and the other officers and men to Riazin, a town about 100 miles south-east of Moscow—the officers to travel in carriages, the men to proceed by easy marches on foot. An offer, however, having been made by the English admiral for an exchange of prisoners, this was accepted; and nearly all the crew were liberated at Odessa in July. The officers remained more like guests than prisoners in that city; but on the 8th of June, Lieutenant Royer started for St Petersburg, in obedience to the emperor's rescript. This officer describes his long journey in terms very similar to those employed by other travellers in Russia, but with more of the *couleur de rose*. He appears to have been provided with a good travelling-equipage, for he reached Moscow on the 15th. He then started by rail for St Petersburg, having for his especial use a carriage, 'about ten feet square, furnished with two sofas and chairs, a small card-table, and two side-tables.' Arrived at St Petersburg, the lieutenant was lodged in a good hotel. The emperor commanded his attendance at Peterhof, a few miles from St Petersburg. The lieutenant had an interview with the Grand-Duchess Alexandra Josefovna, wife to the Grand-Duke Constantine; and then with the Grand-Duke himself: he was delighted with both, and describes minutely all the details of his reception, his tea, the dresses of the ladies, &c. On

*Royer. *The English Prisoners in Russia.* 1854.

the 25th, he was introduced to the emperor, who, after a short but courteous conversation, announced his intention of giving the lieutenant his liberty. On the 29th, after being much fêted by officers of the court and the army, the lieutenant departed for England.

The loss of the *Tiger* was one of the mortifying incidents of the war for the Allies. Another was the death of Captain Parker, which occurred a few weeks afterwards. During the closing scenes of the Danubian campaign, the Russians were driven by the Allied fleets from the Sulina mouth of the Danube; but in order to complete the expulsion, a small expedition was sent to destroy some Russian batteries, stockades, and buildings, and it was then found that the Russians had not been so fully dislodged as had been imagined. Commander Powell of the *Vesuvius*, wrote a dispatch to Admiral Dundas on the 8th of July, giving an account of the exploit which had that day caused the death of a favourite officer. The following are the chief points in this description:—'Captain Hyde Parker directed a strong party of boats from the *Firebrand* and *Vesuvius* to accompany him up the Danube, for the purpose of destroying some works which were occupied by the Russians. At two P.M., the boats entered the Danube, Captain Parker's gig in advance. At the bend of the river, opposite a number of houses on the right bank and a large stockade on the left, a sharp fire was opened upon him, and his boat was nearly riddled. Some of his men were wounded. The heavy boats were coming up, and Captain Parker at once pulled back to them, hailing me to land the marines, and be ready to storm. This order was executed by the marines and a detachment of seamen in the same gallant spirit with which it was given. Captain Parker then dashed on shore in his gig, and at once advanced with a few men. He was in front, and greatly exposed. A tremendous fire was soon opened by the enemy upon them, and a few minutes after landing, a bullet passed through their leader's heart, and in a moment this gallant sailor ceased to live..... The command of the force then devolved upon myself. I directed the gun-boats and rocket-boat at once to be brought to the front; the storming-party was formed by Lieutenant Jull, R.M.A.; the gun-boats commenced a most effective fire upon the houses and battery, and in a short time the enemy's fire was silenced. I directed the storming-party to advance, and the place was entered at a run by a detachment of marines and sailors, headed by Lieutenant Jull, R.M.A., and Lieutenant Hawkey, R.M. We found that the enemy had already retreated at the rear, and so thick was the cover, that pursuit was in vain. The work that we had taken was a gabion-battery, the guns of which had been taken away, and the embrasures filled up. It consisted of a front along the river, raised about 15 feet high, and 400 yards in extent. In the rear was a morass, and the two flanks, which were not 30 yards in length, were defended as in front. This work enclosed about fifty government houses, stables, storehouses, and a magazine. The works have been entirely demolished, the houses destroyed, and nothing now marks the spot but a heap of ruins. Part of the town of Sulina, whence the enemy had opened fire, has been burnt; the principal street I have thought it proper to spare. There was no means of computing the enemy's loss, although they were seen to fall inside the intrenchments. I am disposed to think that they were assisted in carrying off their wounded, and even defending the place, by some Greeks, as men in the dress of that country were seen intermixed with the Russian troops. From the heavy fire that was opened upon us, and from the number that were seen afterwards collected at a distance, the enemy must have been in great force before they retreated.'

The bravery of Captain Hyde Parker cannot be in dispute; but it may be doubted whether his valuable life was not thrown away by reckless daring, unneeded for the object in view. His loss was much deplored in the fleets.

While military operations were yet in progress between the Turks and Russians on the banks of the Danube, Lieutenant Glyn of the *Britannia*, with Prince Ernest of Leiningen, and a body of petty-officers and seamen, were detached from the fleet, and placed at the disposal of Lord Raglan. They were sent, with a party of sappers—the whole body amounting to about 150 men—overland from Varna to Rustchuk on the Danube. Lieutenant Glyn expected to find some Turkish gun-boats at that place, which he proposed to man with some of his sailors. Through some unaccountable delay or neglect, the Russians had all this time been permitted to maintain a small steam-flotilla in the Danube; and the supposition now was, that by occupying the Sulina mouth of the river, and by manning any Turkish gun-boats that might happen to be lying at Rustchuk or Giurgevo, the Russians would be caught between two fires. The sappers were to be employed in building a military-bridge for the Turks over the Danube at Rustchuk. On the 8th of July, Lieutenant Glyn and most of his 150 men set out from Varna, all on horseback. They returned about six weeks afterwards, overgrown with beards and moustaches, covered with dirt, and quite willing to get back to their own ships—the expected application of their services at Rustchuk not having been realised. The sappers remained behind, however, to assist the Turks.

The achievements yet noticed in the Black Sea, were far too trivial to satisfy the aspirations of men who entered upon the campaign with such ardour as the British naval-officers and seamen. The tars wished to distinguish themselves by daring and successful exploits; to do something which should give them renown when they returned to England. They were tired of mere excursions to the Circassian coast; of escorting Turkish ships; of firing shot and shell into a town without any definite object or result. The bays

at Varna, Kavarna, and Baltschik, were places of rendezvous for the fleets in the intervals between the periods of active service—intervals too many and too long to be welcome. The state of inaction was found more injurious to discipline than the most fatiguing work; insomuch that the officers had difficulty in maintaining good order among men whose only fault at that time was that they would have preferred occupation to inactivity. When Lord Raglan sent word to Admiral Dundas of his plan for the overland expedition to the Danube, noticed in the last paragraph, and applied for a body of seamen, the excitement of the men knew no bounds—every one wished to go, as a means of exchanging listlessness for enterprise; petty-officers came forward, begging to be disrated to able seamen, and offering to forfeit all their petty-officer's pay if their respective captains would only send them on this service. No other arrangement could be devised than that of drawing lots; and many an officer envied Lieutenant Glyn and Midshipman Prince Ernest, both of the *Britannia*, when they were chosen to conduct the expedition. At a later period of the war—when the lieutenant had become a commander, and the midshipman a lieutenant—these two officers and thirty of the seamen received honorary medals from the Turkish government.

Reference has been made in former pages to Sebastopol and the Crimea. It was known that the principal stronghold in the southern part of the Russian Empire was Sebastopol, near the south-west corner of the peninsula of the Crimea; it was felt that a blow in this quarter would be a serious demonstration against Russia; and it was from the first seen that preparations might judiciously be made for such an expedition. But the English government was very ignorant of the internal state of the Crimea; not only was there nothing of the cunning system of espionage which prevails so largely in Russia, but the authorities do not seem to have worked well together in obtaining even a small amount of information on this important subject. Curious illustrations of this fact were furnished, at a later date, by the evidence taken before the Sebastopol Committee. The Duke of Newcastle wrote to Lord Raglan, the Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and Sir James Graham to Admiral Dundas, requesting them to obtain all possible information respecting the Crimea and Sebastopol; but the three officials do not appear to have worked in concert to this end. The Duke of Newcastle, in exonerating himself from blame at a later period, considered that Admiral Dundas had not made a very energetic search for information. His Grace was asked by the Committee: 'Do you not recollect seeing in those dispatches any accounts of any steps which Admiral Dundas had taken, or urged to be taken, to acquaint himself with the strength of the Russian fleet and defences?' The answer was: "I don't say that he did not urge any to be taken, but I certainly do not think he stated that he had taken any. I recollect his stating what he believed to be the amount of the Russian forces in the Crimea at that time, which certainly was extremely inaccurate.' Admiral Dundas, himself giving evidence, quoted a private letter he had written, dated May 10, 1854, before Lord Raglan came to the Black Sea: 'Sebastopol is a second Gibraltar. We see many new works erected, and from prisoners we learn that the land-side is being equally strengthened. An encampment is seen, of large size, close to the south of the town; and we are told there are 120,000 men in the Crimea, 30,000 of whom are in Sebastopol. The ships—fourteen or sixteen sail-of-the-line—have their sails bent; and I expected, when we attacked Odessa, they would have come out, and drawn us off to protect the steamers; but now I fear we are doomed to a long blockade. I hope you have better information on Russian matters than I have been able to get.' The admiral, at the same time, disclosed the following brief but remarkable confidential note which he had written to Sir J. Graham:—'It is said all Russians are to be bought or bribed; if so, our diplomatic engines have failed.'

Whatever may have been the amount of information possessed by the government before the war, or obtained by diplomatic means at the commencement of the war, concerning the strength of the Russian forces at Sebastopol, the fleets certainly made many exploratory trips to the neighbourhood of the Crimea; on some occasions having a skirmish with the Russians, but generally returning without seeing an enemy. The combined squadrons left Kavarna Bay on the 17th of April for the Crimean and Circassian coasts, and returned on the 20th of May, after a cruise of about five weeks. Admiral Hamelin, writing to the French government an account of his proceedings, complained that the Russians would not give the Allies anything to do. 'It has not depended on us that the feats of war which have occurred from time to time during that month's cruise were not more numerous and more important; but the Russian naval forces have kept themselves so completely shut up at Sebastopol, and under the shelter of the thousand guns of that place, that during twenty days passed in cruising at a short distance from that port, we have not been able to induce a single vessel of the enemy to venture on a combat, even with our look-out vessels. On the other hand, our steam-cruisers were picking up throughout the whole extent of the Black Sea vessels bearing the Russian flag, which constitute a tolerably good number of prizes.' The Allies were able to make out, in the enclosed harbour at Sebastopol, from 14 to 18 Russian sail-of-the-line, 15 steamers, and 7 frigates. The steamer *Fury*, of 6 guns, was engaged in one of the very few smart encounters which fell to the lot of the seamen during this campaign. Cruising along the coast of the Crimea alone, a few days before the combined fleets started to those regions, the *Fury* espied two small merchant vessels coming out of

Sebastopol; while two brigs of war and two frigates were near the mouth of the harbour. She immediately tacked about, captured one of the merchant ships, took the crew on board, made fast the prize by a hawser, and then steamed away with all speed. An exciting chase ensued: four large ships in pursuit of one small war-steamer, for the frigates and brigs instantly set forth after the *Fury*. The little steamer had a start of three miles, but this distance became soon diminished; and she soon afterwards cut her prize adrift. Raise her steam as she might, and set forth every inch of canvas, she yet could not maintain her position; and she threw overboard nearly all her supply of fresh water, to lighten her load. After a time, one of the frigates gave up the chase, but the other and the two brigs maintained it. At length this frigate and the *Fury* came within long-shot of each other, and opened fire; but as the guns of the *Fury* carried better and further than those of the frigate, no great harm was received by the former. A Russian steamer, however, now approached from Sebastopol, and the *Fury*, satisfied with its achievement, steamed away rapidly out of danger, to the no small mortification of the Russians in pursuit of her.

In the St Petersburg newspapers of that period, occasional mention was made of the British and French fleets, but always under such circumstances as would imply that those fleets were afraid to meet the Russian ships. In one dispatch from Prince Menchikoff, it is stated that 'three enemy's steamers were sighted off Sebastopol on the 27th of June, but made off as soon as our division went out to meet them. The chase of our ships after the enemy, two English steamers and one French, was accompanied by a cannonade which destroyed one of the enemy's boats.... the enemy got off .... it is possible that they are the same steamers which, previous to shewing themselves off Sebastopol, made their appearance that same morning at Eupatoria, where they captured a coasting-trader, without crew or cargo: as she lay beyond musket-shot from the shore, she could not be defended.' If this account were corroborated, even approximately, by any evidence obtained from other quarters, or by antecedent probability, it would be satisfactory to present such a dispatch with the same degree of fulness as those from English and French commanders; but the frequent untruthfulness of the Russian dispatches, rendering them unworthy of reliance, was painfully displayed throughout the war. In the instance here noticed, Captain Darricau of the *Descartes*, writing to Admiral Hamelin, gave an account of a cruise made by that French vessel, accompanied by the English ships *Furious* and *Terrible*, along the coast of the Crimea. The Russian exploit seems to have been nothing more than an attempt on the part of six large steamers and three men-of-war to draw the three exploring-ships into the harbour by a cunning and deceptive device, and there battering them by an overwhelming force, after the example of Sinope: the device failed; the nine ships came out in pursuit of the three; the three hauled up, commenced firing, and did not retire until the Russians had gone back to their former quarters, behind the granite defences of Sebastopol. Such was Captain Darricau's dispatch. He further stated, that the three Allied steamers proceeded to Cape Chersonesus, a little southward of Sebastopol, and there offered battle to two Russian ships-of-the-line—one a three-decker, and two frigates; but that the invitation was declined. Admiral Hamelin, reporting on these occurrences to the French authorities, summed them up by saying that the three Allied ships could not persuade the Russians to measure strength with them. Analogy, furnished by subsequent experience, enables us to decide on the relative merits of these conflicting accounts of one and the same event.

On the 2d of July, the French squadron under Admiral Bruat joined that under Admiral Hamelin at Baltschik; bringing 9000 troops from Gallipoli to Varna, and strengthening the French fleet in the Black Sea. There were then, anchored off the line of coast between Varna and Baltschik, seventeen British ships-of-war—the *Agamemnon*, *Britannia*, *Queen*, *Trafalgar*, *Albion*, *Vengeance*, *London*, *Bellerophon*, *Rodney*, *Retribution*, *Sidon*, *Tribune*, *Diamond*, *Caradoc*, *Sanspareil*, *Simoom*, and *Spitfire*; together with fourteen French line-of-battle-ships and several steamers. This magnificent combined fleet remained, with very little to do, during a further period of two months. The officers interchanged visits, and astonished the Turks at Varna with a sight of the games of cricket and quoits; but they yearned for more stirring employment. On the 21st of July, the greater portion of both fleets sailed and steamed out of harbour, bound on another exploratory cruise, and carrying out some of the generals of the Allied armies. While progressing northward, the men were overjoyed with the report that 'twenty-three ships were in sight;' they formed visions of brisk actions and Russian prizes; and were not a little chagrined to find that the ships turned out to be trees, off the St George's mouth of the Danube. On the 25th, three of the steamers went ahead of the fleet, and cut across to Sebastopol; these steamers, the *Fury*, *Terrible*, and *Cacique*, had on board Sir George Brown, General Canrobert, Sir Edmund Lyons, and the chief pilots of the two fleets; their mission being minutely to examine Sebastopol and the adjacent coast of the Crimea. An officer in the fleet thus described what took place: 'The *Fury*, *Terrible*, and a French steamer, were purposely sent in somewhat ahead, so as to arrive at early dawn. The moment they shewed themselves, there were commotion and preparation in the harbour; steamers sent up tall columns of smoke, to help out the large ships, which unfurled sails, &c. But before they had sallied out to chase away these impertinent foes with an overwhelming force—to be recorded in a magnificent dispatch as a grand victory—the signalman on the hills above

descried the fleet coming in; so the steamers moved up into the dockyard creek, and put their fires out; the ships furled their sails; and we were tranquilly allowed to make a narrow examination of them and their prison from sunrise to sunset of a beautiful clear summer's day. Before we came up, the *Fury*, *Terrible*, and French steamer had ventured in rather near to the north side of the harbour, and several shots were fired at them. The distance might have been about a mile and a half, and the Russian fire was so good, that the rigging of the *Terrible* was cut immediately, and the little *Fury* was hulled just below the water; the ill-conditioned shot destroying two jars of the midshipmen's butter in their berth. Luckily, nobody was touched. The fire was returned, and the steamers moved on. The works on the northern shore have been much strengthened since my last look at the place, and the strength of the sea-batteries is undeniable. Inside, the Russians have, of course, a complete sense of security at present. No sea-force could damage them without exposing itself to destruction. With telescopes we could see the men bathing from the two or three liners behind the booms at the harbour's mouth.'

The fleets returned to Varna and Baltschik, after the generals and admirals had satisfied themselves by a close examination of the formidable Sebastopol; and then ensued another period of inaction. During the several expeditions to the north-west portions of the Black Sea, some of the ships had frequently approached near Odessa; and on those occasions the ladies could be seen, seated on the cliffs, shaded by their pink parasols, watching and sketching the English ships. When, however, late in the month of August, the Allied fleets and armies, after a wearisome period of sickness and detention, prepared for a vast expedition to the Crimea, the inhabitants of Odessa were thrown into a state of great trepidation. The following proclamation was posted up on the walls:—

'To the Inhabitants of Odessa.—The enemy is again seen, in greater force than ever before, at no great distance from our city. We are armed, and well prepared. Any attempt made by the enemy to land will be energetically resisted; but the guns of his vessels have a very long range. Do not lose courage, but keep wet cloths and hides of oxen prepared to cast over any shells which may be thrown into the city. Tubs full of water must be kept on the roofs of the houses, so that any fire may be at once extinguished. Should the enemy, however, carry on the war with obstinacy under protection of his guns, we will retire to Tiraspol, after having reduced the city to ruins and ashes, so that no asylum may be found. Wo be to those who may remain behind, or attempt to extinguish the fire!

Krusenstern, Governor.

August 30, 1854.'

This Moscow-like proclamation increased the consternation. Almost all the corn was removed to Tiraspol, a town on the Dniester, sixty miles from Odessa; the women and children were sent away; the pavement of the streets was taken up; the male population were drilled every day; and the defences were strengthened. No attack was, however, made; Odessa was again spared—for reasons which were not publicly known at the time, but which will require notice in a later Chapter.

At length, in the first week of September 1854, were completed all the arrangements for one of the most formidable enterprises of modern times—an attack on Sebastopol by the Allied naval and military forces, comprising, in effect, three fleets and three armies. This was to be the crowning reward for all that the soldiers and sailors had suffered from insufficient employment. The detentions at Malta, at Gallipoli, and Bulair; at Adrianople and Constantinople; at Scutari and Unkiar-Skelessi; at Varna and Aladyn and Devna—all were to be compensated to the troops by an immediate and important onslaught on the Russians. The delays at Besika and Beicos, at Varna and Baltschik—all were to be made up to the tars by a dashing attack against Russian ships or Russian granite forts.

CHAPTER V.

HOSTILITIES ON THE TURKISH FRONTIERS IN 1853-4.

WHILE the Turks were repelling, single-handed, the masses of Russian troops on the banks of the Danube; while the English and French armies were slowly creeping along towards the Crimea; while the Allied fleets in the Black Sea were engaged in small achievements quite disproportionate to the number and magnitude of the ships employed; while Europe was being inundated with protocols and notes, conferences and treaties, by diplomatists who were at war with each other while endeavouring to preserve or to restore peace—there were warlike proceedings in other parts of the neighbourhood of the Black Sea, arising either from actual hostilities between the Russians and Turks, or from intrigues of Russia among the Christian subjects of the sultan. It was only to a small extent, and in an indirect way, that the English and French allies of Turkey participated in these proceedings. Nevertheless, the plans of the war, in its larger operations, were influenced by this frontier warfare in 1853-4, preceding, as it did, in the order of time, the great expedition to the Crimea. The operations had relation to the position of Schamyl among the Caucasian mountains; to the campaigns on the Turkish frontier of Armenia; to the insurrections, fostered by Russia, among the Christian tribes of European Turkey; and to the irritating Russo-Greek irruption across the southern frontier of the sultan's territory.

SCHAMYL, AND THE CAUCASUS.

Schamyl, the 'prophet-warrior of the Caucasus,' has been a name dreaded by the Russians during a long series of years. Few great battles are recorded in connection with his career; yet has he, in a system of mountain-warfare, committed terrible mischief on Russia, and materially retarded the progress of that power towards the south-east. Against Schamyl, and chieftains of lesser fame who preceded him, the Czar Nicholas *in vain* sent powerful forces, under the best generals of his empire—Yermoloff, Paskévitch, Gortchakoff, the two Viliaminoffs, Rosen, Rajewski, Aurep, Golovine, Grabbe, Veidhadt, Woronzoff—all tried, and all failed in subduing the bold adherents of Schamyl.

The association of the name of Schamyl with Circassia and the Circassians, in many English works, is erroneous. Schamyl was not born in Circassia, nor were his military operations conducted with the aid of Circassians in so great a degree as that of other Caucasian tribes.

The Caucasus is a mountain-range extending from the Black Sea to the Caspian, in a line bearing slightly to the southward of east. It forms the south-eastern boundary between Europe and Asia, but is entirely unconnected with any other mountain-range belonging to either of those two divisions of the globe. It begins near Anapa, on the north shore of the Black Sea, and terminates at the peninsula of Abcheron, on the west shore of the Caspian—the distance between these two points being little less than 700 miles. The rugged mountains extend over a width, from north to south, varying from 60 to 120 miles. The highest peak of the Caucasus, always snow-clad, is Mount Elbruz or Elborus, 16,800 feet in height; the range thence westward to Anapa is comparatively of small elevation; but eastward, towards Abcheron, the general height is very considerable, including Mount Kazbek, 14,400 feet, and Shah Dagh, 13,000 feet. There are numerous offshoots from the main range, some of which stretch out south-west to the very shores of the Black Sea. No elevations other than mere hills connect the Caucasus with the mountains of Armenia and Kurdistan; while on the north, the Caucasus is bounded by plains or steppes of almost undeviating level: along the whole distance from the inner angle of the Sea of Azof to the Gulf of Kouma, in the Caspian, there is scarcely a mile of ground so much as 120 feet above the level of the Black Sea. The northern side of the mountains, however, has more offshoots than the southern; and these offshoots generally end abruptly in cliffs so steep as to be almost inaccessible. Instead of mountain-lakes, the Caucasus is distinguished for its naphtha-springs and mud-volcanoes.

Nothing can be more different than the aspects of the country north and south of the Caucasus. The range itself, marked by a thousand jagged

fantastic peaks, separated by profound ravines, constitutes the Caucasus proper, or White Mountains; but beyond this, to the north, is a lower range, the Black Mountains; and further yet to the north, are the rivers Kuban and Terek, forming together nearly a continuous water-line from the mouth of the Sea of Azof to the Caspian. Beyond this, from the Kuban to the Don, and from the Terek to the Volga, is the wretched steppe-country, all dust in summer, and all mud in winter, with marshes instead of rivers, and reeds instead of trees. South of the Caucasus, on the contrary, the rich hills and valleys of Mingrelia, Imeritia, and Georgia, represent Asian luxuriance in all its splendour.

So much for the general configuration of the Caucasus. The next subject for notice is the system of roads by which this mighty mountain-barrier may be crossed. There are only two such roads worthy of the name. One of these runs along the shores of the Caspian, at no great distance from the sea, in a narrow strip of flat country; it unites the town of Kizlar, on the Terek, with Derbend and Baku, where it joins the

Caucasian Provinces and Parts of Asiatic Turkey.

rich countries south of the Caucasus. Although unencumbered by mountains, this road is difficult to traverse on account of numerous rivers, which, after the melting of the mountain snows in spring, spread over a great extent of country; while, in the hotter seasons of the year, the district is very unhealthy. The second or more frequented road crosses the Caucasus nearly at the centre of its length, from Mozdok, on the Terek, to Tiflis, on the Koor. A mountain-pass constitutes a portion of this road, between the fortresses of Kazibeg and Passanaur; the pass is 8000 feet above the level of the sea, and is bounded by lofty mountains on either side, with the towering Kazbek not far distant. The fortress of Dariel gives its name to the pass. In some parts of the pass, the road runs along the edge of an abyss, which descends as far below it as the mountains rise above it. The road maintains the character of a pass almost to the fortress of Vladikaukas—'Lord of the Caucasus'—where the valley of the Terek may be said to begin. Not only is this road terrific for its permanent characteristics, but the difficulties of the traveller are frequently increased by the sudden fall of avalanches, or the sudden swelling of mountain torrents. Both of these roads are very ancient; they were known to the Persians and the Greeks at least as far back as the time of Alexander the Great. All the other routes across the Caucasus are mere mountain-paths, which few, except the hardy natives, would venture to use.

Such, then, is the formidable region familiarly known as Circassia, but more correctly designated Caucasia, or the country of the Caucasian tribes, of whom the Circassians are one. The region would be a difficult one to enter, to conquer, to hold, under any circumstances; but it is rendered yet more difficult by the extraordinary diversity among its inhabitants. It is supposed that no other country on the globe, of equal extent, contains such a number of different nations or tribes. Strabo spoke of seventy different dialects there even in his time. Some of these dialects bear a

resemblance to Persian, some to Turkish, some to Finnish, while some contain numerous Teutonic or German words. A letter of Schamyl's is said to have reached Constantinople, and to have puzzled all the interpreters, until an Armenian, learned in the Caucasian languages, took it in hand. The tribes or nations whose names are best known in Western Europe are the Tcherkeskaïa or Circassians, the Lesghes or Lesghians, the Daghestanes, the Ossetes, the Abasians or Abhasians, and the Kabardenes. The Mingrelians and Imeritians are inhabitants rather of the southern plains than of the mountains.

The Circassians inhabit chiefly the portion of mountain country south and west of the sources of the river Kuban—plateaux and gorges between the rugged peaks, scarcely accessible to any but mountaineers. The Lesghians, on the other hand, dwell principally among those mountains of the Caucasus situate east and south of the source of the Terek. As the Kuban rises near the foot of the Elbruz, and the Terek near that of the Kazbek, these two mountains may conveniently mark the limits of the respective countries of the two tribes. The whole country from the Kazbek to the Caspian is often called Daghestan, and it is here that the main struggles have been carried on between Russia and the mountaineers. The portion of Daghestan more immediately under the control of the Lesghians is described as being flanked on the north with dense forests of magnificent beeches; twining creepers bind the trees together; and vast boulders, stripped by thousands of winters from the granite and porphyry of the upper ranges, and borne along by the fierce mountain torrents to the valleys and passes which form their beds, afford every advantage to the lightly equipped mountaineer—every obstacle to an invading force. The interior of the country is yet more formidable; it is one mass of ridges and ravines, at the bottom of each of which a brawling stream, fed by the snows and rains of the upper regions, rushes down to the river Koissu or its affluents.

The origin of the Caucasian people is wholly lost in the mists of antiquity. The prevailing opinion is, that, instead of being a distinct race or tribe, they are remnants of various surrounding nations, who, during long centuries of misrule and devastating warfare, have taken refuge in the mountains. It is thus that may be explained the presence of Mongol, Arab, Cossack, Osmanli, and Persian elements among them. Although the whole are hardy mountaineers, they differ much in appearance, language, and religion. The Circassians—of whom there are sub-tribes of the Adighé, the Ubighé, and others—are Mohammedans, with a small admixture of Christianity; next to them are the Abasians, more zealous Mohammedans; next, the Ossetes or Ossetians, a small Christian tribe; eastward of these the Tchetchenes and the Lesghians—all fierce believers in Islam. The Circassians and the Lesghians, the two chief tribes, differ essentially in their form of government. The former is feudal: each clan having its chief, its nobles, its freedmen, and its serfs; but as there is much mutual jealousy between the several clans, they are ill fitted to combine for any important extensive operation. The Lesghians, on the contrary, were strongly democratic, until the day when Schamyl arose among them, and converted their democracy into a theocracy by claiming to be a prophet as well as a warrior. Another point of difference is in personal appearance: the Circassians have great beauty of form and feature, fair complexion, and an open European expression of face—indeed, the loveliness of the women has led to the notorious Circassian slave-trade at Constantinople; whereas the Lesghians exhibit more of the Asiatic element—darker skin, a deeply-seated eagle eye, and a fiercely passionate temperament.

In past ages, when Georgia was governed by a king, his dominions were frequently harassed by these mountaineers from the rugged Caucasus, who descended southward into the luxurious plains, and robbed all whom they encountered. The northern or Cossack plains, in like manner, were subject to raids from the Caucasians, although the country invaded presents far fewer attractions. A century and a half ago, the mountaineers were split up into an infinite number of clans or petty tribes, having no sort of national organisation, and professing a religion in which a morsel of Christianity was mixed up with a morsel of Islamism. It was Peter the Great that incensed them into unity of action. 'Russian aggression,' as has been well said, 'has caused Caucasian organisation.' Peter, when he established his line of military posts from the Volga to the Don, may have possibly adopted a reasonable course to protect his newly acquired territory from turbulent attacks; but when later czars sought to obtain the mountains from the Caucasians, the enterprise assumed a far different character. One incident in the history of the district is especially characteristic of Russian policy—the Ossetians are Christians; the czars, about a century ago, began to 'protect' them on account of their Christianity; and this protection has enabled Russia to bring the priests into her pay, as a means of Russianising the people.

It was about the year 1785 that the encroaching spirit of the czars was first met by fierce resistance on the part of the Mohammedan tribes of the Caucasus. When they saw that Georgia, and all the rich plains south of the mountains, were gradually falling under Russian domination, they readily comprehended that their own independence was in jeopardy—that the continuance of their freedom depended on themselves. Religious zealotry gave the war-cry, which thenceforward seldom ceased to be heard. The Dervish Mohammed, better known as the Sheik Mansur, appeared suddenly among the Tchetchenes, exclaiming: 'Ye have forgotten Allah and his prophet Mohammed; therefore he has given you over into the hands

of the Infidels.' Frugal, ascetic, learned, active, energetic, Mansur was well fitted to make an impression on the mountaineers, and rouse them to united action. After six years of active labour, he was captured and put to death by the Russians in 1791. Then succeeded a period of many years, during which Russia steadily strengthened her position in Georgia, disturbed by frequent but desultory contests with the Lesghians. Generals Zizianoff and Yermoloff, the first two governors of the Caucasian provinces of Russia, were able men, who strictly carried out the Russian policy: they established, from the Sea of Azof to the Caspian, a line of Cossack *stanitzas*, which combined the characteristics of villages and forts; the duty of the dwellers in which was to defend the northern plains from the mountaineers. To this day, the Caucasians and the Cossacks watch each other fiercely and untiringly on either side of this chain of posts; and if they chance to meet, indiscriminate slaughter ensues.

In 1823, there lived in one of the Lesghian *aouls* or villages called Jarach, Mohammed the Mollah, an Ulema learned in the Koran and in the

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law. Many pupils attended him; among whom was Khas Mohammed, a young man from Bokhara. This student, after he had returned to his home, with a high repute for the lore which he had acquired, became acquainted with a holy man of Persia, one Hadji Ismail, whose teachings created great excitement among the Mohammedans; and at the invitation of Khas Mohammed, Mohammed the Mollah went to visit the holy man. The two Mohammeds were earnest in their conference; they seem to have deeply imbued each other with zeal for Islam, and to have been fully aware of the designs of the Russian giaour against them and their faith. When Mollah Mohammed returned to Jarach, an anti-Muscovite feeling spread around him, more deeply seated and fiercely burning than had yet been exhibited; many young pupils or *murids*, drinking in enthusiasm from his teachings, acted as emissaries to spread the impulse around. General Yermoloff, when he heard of these things, took preventive measures; and there immediately commenced a system of warfare which met with little respite for thirty years. One of many daring chieftains whom the occasion brought forward was Khasi-Mollah: after some years of indomitable struggling against the Russians, he fell at Himri, with all his Moslem supporters dead around him, except one young murid or pupil, who, though pierced by bullet and bayonet, yet lived. This young murid was SCHAMYL.

From that eventful day, Schamyl never ceased to be a leader of the mountaineers, an inveterate enemy of the czars, down to the time when the

war of 1853 brought upon him the attention of the Western Powers. His characteristics were peculiarly fitted to render him a man of authority among the ardent tribes of the Caucasus. His recovery from the desperate scene at Himri had about it a mystery which to many seemed miraculous; and a halo of the supernatural surrounded him ever after. On a later occasion, he was again the only one preserved among many, in a contest arising out of a blood-feud among the mountaineers. So rapidly did his power increase, that soon afterwards, in 1834, he became—virtually, if not formally—imaum and sultan of the Eastern Caucasus. He was then thirty-seven years old—silent and earnest, intensely determinate, learned beyond those of his class and tribe, extremely sensitive of defeat or disgrace, sternly impassive, and undoubting in his faith that he was a favoured recipient of inspiration from Allah; in person, of middle stature, with fair hair, eyes overshadowed by well-defined brows, a well-formed nose, a small mouth, delicate hands and feet, skin fair and fine beyond most of those around him, an air noble and dignified, and an eloquence fiery and persuasive.

It was not until 1838 that Schamyl succeeded in putting down the pretensions of other leaders to supreme power; but from that date he had no competitor. The history of the Caucasus was a history of continuous struggle, from 1838 to 1853, between Schamyl and the Russians. He sent his murids or pupils, missionaries of Islam, from mountain to mountain, from village to village, rousing up the Lesghians to fight against the Muscovite infidels. He established his headquarters at Akhulgo, a place built upon almost inaccessible rocks, embosomed in the mountains; this he fortified with trenches, earthen-parapets, and covered-ways; and stored it with provisions and ammunition. In 1839, the Czar Nicholas, irritated at the fanatic audacity of Schamyl, sent against him a powerful Russian force under General Grabbe, with orders to attack Akhulgo, and to take Schamyl dead or alive. Grabbe twice defeated Schamyl—at Burtani and at Arguani—before the latter shut himself up in Akhulgo; and then commenced a fearful siege. After an enormous loss on the part of the Russians, and the destruction of almost the whole of Schamyl's force, Akhulgo was taken—but not Schamyl. The prophet-warrior again escaped, under circumstances almost incredible; and he was thence looked up to with more reverential obedience than ever.

Many a victory is fully as disastrous as a defeat to the victors. Such was the case in this instance. The Russians took Akhulgo, and slaughtered 1500 of Schamyl's followers; but they raised blood-feuds between themselves and every tribe in the Eastern Caucasus; and, moreover, they aroused increased hatred on account of their brutal conduct on the march towards tribes who would at the least have been neutral. Henceforward Schamyl's cause was strengthened; large numbers joined him; and, taught by experience that his mountaineers were not well able to stand against the Russian masses in regular battle, he resolved on the adoption of a guerilla-warfare—a system of tactics in which mountains and ravines play an important part. Russia tried in vain to cope successfully with this system. Year after year did Schamyl frustrate all the attempts of the generals to root him out of his fastnesses; they could never boast of a second Akhulgo. The prophet-warrior set up his standard at a new spot, Dargo—an unfortified village, deeply imbedded in a forest. Here he organised a system, which virtually converted the whole of Lesghistan into a vast military colony. He opposed no sort of obstacles to the approach of the Russians across the frontier of what he considered to be his dominions; rather did he encourage it, until the Russians found themselves entangled among thick forests, mountain ravines, and passes commanded by overhanging rocks—then did the half-wild Lesghians, climbing upon the steeps and crags, pick off the invaders one by one with their firelocks; until the Russian generals saw their forces greatly weakened, without the glory or pretension of a regular battle. Persistently did Schamyl adopt this system; losing many warriors, but causing a greater loss to his opponents. On one occasion, in 1842, General Grabbe made a formidable attack on Dargo; but was repelled with disgrace, and with a loss of 2000 men. On another occasion, in 1844, Schamyl, with equal success, repelled an attack by General Neidhardt.

The Czar Nicholas became greatly mortified and irritated; he saw that twenty years had effected little towards the subjugation of these audacious tribes. In 1845, he appointed Prince Woronzoff to the command in the Caucasus; the prince was a skilful and accomplished man, and ranked among the most respected of the Russian nobles. Much was expected from this appointment. He received powers more plenary than is customary with Russian governors, and became little less than a king in rank. Against his own judgment, as is alleged, but at the czar's command, Woronzoff made an attack on Dargo with a large force; he captured it, or rather he captured a heap of smoking ruins; while Schamyl and his followers, commanding all the heights and passes, intercepted the Russian convoys, compelled Woronzoff to retreat, and almost annihilated his army. Generals Wiktoroff, Passek, and Fock were killed; and the prince himself had a narrow escape from being taken prisoner with the remnant of his army. Russian ingenuity converted this capture of Dargo into a victory; but Woronzoff was urgent with his imperial master to avoid any more such victories. In the next year, 1846, Schamyl assumed the offensive; he made an irruption with 10,000 men into Kabardah, a region between the Caucasus and the river Terek, crossing the line which is marked by the chain of Russian fortresses. This he did

again in 1848, in 1850, and in the beginning of 1853; and it continued to require all the watchfulness and energy of the Russians to enable them to maintain these fortified posts.

Such was Schamyl; such the mountaineers of the Caucasus. The mischief he caused to the Russians is almost inconceivable. Schamyl's power extended over about 600,000 souls out of a total Caucasian population of 1,500,000; but his fighting-men never exceeded 20,000, available in one spot at a given time. Yet did the Russians maintain here a vast army of 80,000 to 150,000 men, of whom about 20,000 were swept off each year by disease or warfare. Woronzoff kept a better hold of the Russianised provinces south of the mountains; but it became a matter of equal importance and difficulty to command the military road over the Caucasus, by which Georgia is placed in connection with European Russia.

The Caucasians are said to retain a tradition that a sultan in the west is one day to arise who will finally deliver them from the aggressions of the Muscovite. The struggles of 1853–4–5 have brought this tradition to memory. Who is this sultan to be; and from what region in the west will he come? The Caucasians, mostly Mohammedans, are on friendly terms with the Turks; insomuch that when the European war broke out in 1853, men speculated on the possible participation of Schamyl and his followers in the contest. It is true that these mountaineers would as indignantly reject any compromise of their independence in respect to the sultan as to the czar; but the Padishah of the Osmanlis has reached beyond the days of all-grasping dominion; if allowed to hold his own, he will no longer be an aggressive neighbour to other nations or races.

In the case of Schamyl, as in that of many other heroes around whose names a halo of romance has formed, sober facts require a little diminution in the brilliancy of any delineation. Mr Duncan, who had opportunities of seeing the Caucasian mountaineers in time of war, formed an opinion that the ill-disciplined and badly-armed warriors, though invincible in their mountain fortresses, are of little account in the plains of Georgia. These hardy men, when their fields are sown, and until harvest-time arrives, have leisure and inclination for an exciting enterprise, which is none the less welcome to them if it involve a scene of plunder. They like to descend rapidly and secretly upon the Russian or Cossack villages—sack, pillage, burn, and either make slaves or commit butchery. It is true that Cossacks are equally ready to mete out the same doom to Caucasians, if they can catch them; and in this respect the relentless enmity is paralleled. But in relation to systematic warfare, Mr Duncan asserts that a single Russian dragoon regiment, backed by a troop of horse-artillery, would suffice to rout any force that Schamyl could have brought into the Georgian plains around Tiflis. A full knowledge of this fact was possessed by the chieftain himself, who displayed consummate wisdom in disposing of his materials according to their capabilities. In their own inaccessible recesses and wooded heights, the tribes of Daghestan are almost unassailable: their weakness begins when they descend into the plains. The real strength of Schamyl, during the early stages of the Russo-Turkish war, was exhibited, not in actual conflicts with the Russians, but in the fact that he occupied a spur of the mountains which juts down southward to within forty miles of Tiflis. He did not directly aid the Turks who were fighting in Asia Minor; but he indirectly assisted them by keeping the Russians in alarm concerning their safety on the mountain frontier of Georgia. The Russian generals, knowing that he might possibly stop their supplies and intercept their reinforcements, felt a necessity for keeping a watchful eye on his movements. He might at any time have threatened the capital of a disaffected province by a sudden surprise. It was physically possible for Schamyl to have reached Tiflis from his mountain stronghold in forty-eight hours; to have made a sudden irruption into that town; to have burned a considerable part of its buildings; and to have escaped back to the mountains with a vast booty —all this was attainable if the city had been left ill guarded; and the consciousness of this hypothetical catastrophe unquestionably exercised a moral influence over the Russians.

When the contest with Russia assumed larger proportions than a mere dispute with Turkey concerning a few old rickety buildings at Jerusalem, the Caucasian region became an object of interest on other than Turkish considerations. The sultan was chiefly interested in so far as the mountaineers might act as a barrier between him and the much-dreaded czar; but the Allies of the Turks, especially England, had additional motives to actuate them. The traditionary aggressive policy of Russia (traced in Chapter I.) affects England indirectly—in a way which it may be appropriate to notice here, since it involves the question of Caucasian independence.

Assuming, as an undisputed proposition, that Russia has long cast a wistful glance at the British possessions in India, there yet exists much diversity of opinion concerning her power to work mischief in that quarter. Mr Duncan, who spent many months with the Turkish army in Asia in 1854, in near proximity to the Russian forces in Georgia, insists strongly on the existence of this power of doing injury. He points out that Russia has maintained her power in the Trans-Caucasian provinces at an unparalleled sacrifice of blood and treasure, with the view of advancing from thence towards the Indus. The successive wars which she has carried on with her weakened and distracted neighbours, Turkey and Persia, have enabled her not only to secure a good strategic position in Georgia, but also to instil into the Oriental mind an admiration or an apprehension of her vast power: especially is this the case in Persia. 'Although I reject the idea of an

armed invasion of our Eastern Empire by some future czar, at the same time it is undeniable that a moral triumph, prejudicial alike to the interest of Great Britain and her ally the Sublime Porte, has been achieved by Russia in the East. The British Empire in India is governed no less by a moral force than by a physical rule; and should the first be weakened by Russian intrigues, and by doubts in the invincibility of our armies, the consequences at some future period may prove calamitous. It is certain that every fresh step taken by Russia in Asia, inflicts a moral injury on the interests of Great Britain.' *

On the other hand, such considerations as the following have been brought forward, in support of the opinion that a Russian attack on British India is not much to be apprehended. It is urged that the North-western Province is the only frontier on which India could be attacked; that this frontier is strongly guarded; that the countries next beyond—Cabul and Beloochistan—have irregular governments, ill-organised resources, no public economy, and little national strength beyond that comprised in a legion of mounted freebooters; that the next country to the west, Persia, though wretchedly weak, never sides with Russia unless England appear too heedless to defend her. In this view, all that would have to be effected is to maintain a moral influence over the court of Persia—a moral influence founded on physical greatness. An English army could as effectually reach the heart of Persia by way of the Persian Gulf, as a Russian army by the route through Georgia; and the advocates of the more hopeful theory urge, that if the court of Teheran be duly and frequently impressed with this fact, nothing more would be wanted to insure the closing of the route from Russia to India *vid* Persia. Contradictory as the two opinions may seem, they yet converge to this one point—that the maintenance of a *moral* influence by England in Persia is alone sufficient to insure the desired result. The chief divergence is in respect to the question, whether England has in recent years bestowed sufficient thought on her *prestige* among the Persians.

The considerations are in some respects different, concerning a route from Russia to India through Tatary. That strange region is inhabited by various tribes—some leaning towards Russia, some towards China, some in doubtful subjection to Turkey or to Persia, and the rest independent. The Kirghis Tatars north-east of the Caspian are about 2,000,000 in number; their occupation consists chiefly in tending their flocks, and hunting antelopes, boars, and wild horses; while their pleasure consists in plundering caravans, or attacking neighbouring tribes. This is one part of Tatary. Another is the independent province of Khiva, situated eastward of the Caspian; the city of the same name stands near the banks of the river Oxus, which flows from the hills near Cabul and Cashmere, and passes on its way near Bokhara. On this account, Khiva and the Oxus are regarded as important in connection with a Russo-Indian line of passage. But the difficulties of the route are frightful to a large army. There is a formidable region of parched desert between the Caspian and Khiva, which must be traversed before that city can be reached from Russia. It is certain that the Czar Nicholas had long meditated the conquest of Khiva, and had disbursed large sums of money in bribing neighbouring chieftains; but he did not live to see Khiva under his power, although he succeeded in sowing discord between the khan and the other Tatar leaders. The Tatars themselves, inured to desert-life, might work mischief as marauders on the Cabul frontier; but whenever a Russian army, or even a small body of European troops, has attempted to reach Khiva from Orenburg or from the Caspian, its sufferings have been terrific, from intense cold in winter and insupportable heat in summer. Russia possesses small steam-boats both on the Caspian and on the Sea of Aral, the one westward, and the other northward of Khiva: these have been constructed in the hope that they would furnish means of transport for Russian troops, from various points on the Russian frontier-coast, to the mouth of the Oxus, at which point a voyage up to Khiva would commence. Such is believed to have been the purpose held in view, after the abandonment of a land-route as too tragical in its consequences. The fixity of purpose displayed by the Russian government is unquestionably very remarkable, for immense trouble was taken to convey these small steamers to the Sea of Aral; they were built at St Petersburg, navigated up certain rivers and canals to the Volga; down the Volga to Astrakhan; across the Caspian to its eastern shore; and then conveyed to the Sea of Aral by some means which have not been clearly explained; for although a river or rivers once existed between the two seas, little else than sandy dried-up beds now remain.

If Russian pertinacity and Russian bribes were, however, to succeed in obtaining control over Khiva, how much would even then remain to be done! The distance from Khiva to the Indus by way of Balkh, the vast snowy range of the Hindoo-Koosh, Cabul, and Peshawur, is certainly not less than 1100 English miles, and the route is beset with difficulties of the most perilous kind, even if there were no British army on or near the Indus. Count de Biörnstjerna, one of the best modern writers on India, pronounces a Russian invasion of that country impossible; but an impartial estimate of the different views put forth by various writers seems to lead to this average or mean—that Russian policy is certainly a standing menace to British India; but that it is a menace which England, by moderate circumspection and activity, can render comparatively harmless.

At an early period of the war, two agents were despatched from Constantinople to Circassia,

* *A Campaign with the Turks in Asia.*

apparently from the British embassy, to make inquiries concerning the state, number, and feelings of the mountaineers in respect to the great objects of the war. They first visited such of the Russian forts as had been abandoned between Anapa and Batoum. The agents, Mr Sarrell and another Englishman, found, in the first place, that the inhabitants of Abasia, between the Caucasus and the north-east shore of the Black Sea, were willing to join in any operations against the Russians; and, in the second place, that they were under the authority of a naib, named Emin Bey, who was lieutenant, or deputy, of Schamyl. The great chief of Daghestan had thus extended his influence over Circassian tribes. In the course of about eight years, Emin Bey, invested with authority by the warrior-prophet, had worked a great change in the numerous tribes around him. Some had been little better than pagans; some Mohammedans, who had forgotten all but the name of Islam; yet the lieutenant had succeeded in working great results among them. His chief weapon of argument seems to have been, that the only hope of the mountaineers to remain permanently independent of Russia would depend on a united and holy faith in Islam—to conduct their struggle, indeed, on religious as well as political grounds. This was adding one more to the already large number of instances, during the war, of hot fanaticism being employed in aggravation of national hostilities. However friendly the mountaineers may have been to any hostile attack against Russia, it does not appear that the agents succeeded in establishing any definite arrangement or agreement with them.

CAMPAIGN IN ASIATIC TURKEY IN 1854.

Such, then, was Schamyl; such the mountaineers of the Caucasus; such the relations between them and Russia at the period when the war commenced. A collision between the Turks and Russians in Asia was certain, whether the Caucasians sided with the former or remained neutral; for the Asiatic boundary between the two empires is not less than 400 miles in extent, in the irregular line from Batoum to Mount Ararat. This celebrated mountain forms the meeting-point of three empires—the Russian, Turkish, and Persian; and from thence to the Black Sea at Batoum, the Russianised countries of Georgia, Imeritia, and Mingrelia, confront the rugged regions of Asiatic Turkey.

It may be well here to note that Asia Minor—the ancient name for the remarkable peninsula which is bounded on the north, west, and south, by the Euxine, the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, the Ægean, and the Mediterranean—is not a name adopted by the Turks. The peninsula is divided by them into pachalics or eyalets, such as Anadoli or Anatolia, Karamania, Adana, Erz-rûm or Erzeroum, Trebizond, Kars, &c. Armenia, like Poland, is now little more than a geographical name: as the latter unfortunate country has been partitioned between Russia, Prussia, and Austria, so has the former been appropriated by Russia, Persia, and Turkey. The name, however, is not unimportant in connection with any contest between Russia and Turkey; for Erzeroum, Kars, Erivan, and Bayazid, are all in Armenia, and the groundwork of the population is Christian Armenian, having more ties of sympathy in faith with the Muscovite than with the Osmanli, although in few respects better treated by the former than by the latter.

Irrespective of the forces in other provinces of the two empires, it becomes necessary to shew the relative strength of the opposing armies at and near the Asiatic frontier, at the breaking out of hostilities between Turkey and Russia. The following is on the authority of General Klapka, who went out to the East, apparently as an observer, on the commencement of hostilities, and who was in correspondence with Hungarian officers engaged in the war.*

The Turks, when the sultan declared war in October 1853, had, in accordance with the military system established ten years earlier, four army-corps or ordus in Asia—namely, those of Anatolia, Irak, Arabistan, and the Guards. Or, rather, such ought to have been the case; but the ordu of Irak was wholly absorbed in garrison duty; the ordu of Arabistan was only of half strength; and the ordu of Guards was mostly employed in European Turkey. Hence the effective force was far below the regulations of the system. It amounted to about 36,000 foot, 4000 horse, and 100 guns. In the course of the autumn, 24,000 Bashi-Bazouks and other irregulars joined the army; and, in addition, a fresh levy was ordered in Syria and Anatolia. These forces were distributed in unequal proportions on three different points. Two-thirds were encamped at Kars, under Abdi Pacha, the Mushir or Marshal of Anatolia; the larger half of the third part was at Batoum, under Selim Pacha, formerly commander of the Guards at Constantinople; and the remainder in the vicinity of Bayazid, under another Selim Pacha.

The Russian strength at the same time was somewhat as follows. The so-called army of the Caucasus was formidable in number—about 80,000 men; but the extent of territory which it was called upon to defend was immense. The forces were distributed on both sides of the Caucasian chain. One duty was to defend the frontier-line running along the base of the mountains, from the Black Sea to the Caspian; another, was to occupy the ports and fortified posts of the Crimea; a third consisted in the maintenance of the forts on the north-east coast of the Black Sea, such as Anapa and Soudjuk Kalé; a fourth, in the protection of the great military road over the Caucasus from

* Klapka: *The War in the East*, p. 37.

Vladikaukas to Tiflis; a fifth, in watching the movements of Schamyl up in the mountains; and a sixth, in guarding the frontier-line on the southern base of the Caucasus. These duties absorbed the services of so large a number of troops, that the Russians possessed but a small force to repel any hostile attack on the part of the Turks. This force amounted to about 25,000 men, and was disposed in five positions—namely, one portion, of 10,000 men, at Gumri, to protect the road to Tiflis against the Turks; another, in the Upper Koor valley; a third, in the province of Gouriel, on the road to Kutaïs or Kutaiah; a fourth, on the main road from Erivan to Bayazid; while the fifth was kept as a disposable reserve near Tiflis.

The Russian troops sent to the Caucasus comprised draughts from the various kinds of arm in the czar's service, and were about equal in courage and skill to their compatriots north of the mountains. But the Turkish regiments were mostly below the level of those in European Turkey: the further removed they were from Constantinople, the more did the Ottoman generals indulge in that system of official peculation which prevails so largely both in Russia and in Turkey, and which subjects the poor soldiers to such sad privations.

The motley group of officers belonging to the sultan's service at that time was distinguished by these two characteristics—that it comprised natives of various countries, nations, and religions; and that the true original Turkish or Osmanli officers were for the most part not only venal but unskilful. Many of those who gained renown in the war were not Turks, although in Turkish service. Omar Pacha was the Croatian Michael Lattas; Behram Pacha was General Cannon; Mouchavir Pacha was the English Captain or Admiral Slade. It was in Asia, however, that these Orientalised Europeans appeared in greatest number: some, men of unquestioned ability; others, merely adventurers. The abortive revolutions of 1848–9 had left large numbers of Poles, Hungarians, and Italians, hanging loose on society; and many of these, when war broke out in 1853, hastened to Constantinople to offer their military aid to the sultan. Officers as well as men being wanted, the Porte accepted the proffered aid without due inquiry into the merits of the applicants. As a consequence, questionable characters came into the receipt of Turkish money and Turkish titles. The good and the bad were equally hidden under high-sounding Oriental designations. Under the cloak of Kurschid Pacha was General Guyon, the distinguished Hungarian; Iskender Bey was Count Ilinski; Ismail Pacha, General Kmeti, the Hungarian; Fezzi Bey, General Colman; Ferhad Pacha, General Stein; Nevris Bey, Major Bonfanti; Sadik Bey, a Pole named Chyka; Shahin Pacha, General Brainski; Arslan Pacha, General Bystronowski; Emir Bey, Baron Schwartzenberg; Tophan Bey, Colonel Gotschiminski. To what extent these officers had been entitled to appropriate the rank of 'general,' the Turkish seraskier or war-minister did not take much pains to ascertain.

When the sultan declared war against Russia, the year 1853 was far advanced, and little opportunity occurred for hostilities in Asia. Klapka contends that the Turkish commander should have guarded his army against partial losses, by remaining strictly on the defensive in respect to the Russian main army opposite Kars; and should have struck a well-planned and rapid blow against Erivan, in Russian Armenia, as a means of obtaining the aid of the inhabitants of the Lower Koor, who are always ready to act against the Muscovites. Abdi Pacha adopted one of these plans, but not the other; he posted part of his army as a corps of observation near Kars, and placed the rest in winter-quarters at Erzeroum as a reserve. He received orders from Constantinople, however, to commence an active attack, leaving to his own judgment the selection of place and circumstances.

All around this neighbourhood is a region of rugged mountains. The pachalic of Erzeroum is the most important in Asia Minor, extending over a population of 800,000 souls, distributed in 1500 villages and a few large towns. The chief city itself, Erzeroum, is roundly estimated to contain 40,000 inhabitants, besides the garrison, of which number 30,000 are Osmanlis; for here, as in Asiatic Turkey, the real Turks are found mostly in the towns, while the villages are chiefly inhabited by Armenians, or other Christian nations. Erzeroum was once held by the Genoese, in the zenith of their power; and it then contained 100,000 inhabitants: even in 1828, it numbered 80,000, which number has been reduced one-half by pestilence and emigration. The town contains twenty-eight khans, thirteen public baths, seventy mosques and mesjids, and churches for the Armenian, Greek, and Latin Christians. Considered strategically, the town is unfavourably situated; for although it is at a considerable elevation above the level of the sea, it is commanded by a higher hill, called Palan Dukan, which would be formidable in the hands of an enemy. At the commencement of the war, Erzeroum was wholly unfortified, except in the possession of a shattered and decayed Genoese wall, a deep but overgrown ditch, and a few crumbling round and square towers. The western branch of the Euphrates, called the Kara-su, rises at a short distance from the town. This name, Kara-su, is applied to many Turkish rivers; it is equivalent to our Black-water, of which there are several among the rivers of England and Ireland. Kars and Tiflis are north-east of Erzeroum; Erivan and Bayazid are nearly east; and Trebizond north-west.*

While Abdi Pacha was preparing to execute the operations intrusted to him, Zarif Mustapha Pacha,

* It may be useful to note here the distances, along the usual but wretched roads, from Erzeroum to three of the towns named above—namely, to Trebizond, 180 miles; to Kars, 120 miles; to Tiflis, 250 miles. This is reckoned at 3¼ English miles to the 'hour'—the Oriental road-measuring being rather by time than by space.

governor of the province of Erzeroum, collected a body of Bashi-Bazouks, crossed from Ardahan into the district of Akhaltsik (Akhiska), and impetuously attacked a small body of Russians there posted. The Russians retreated, shut themselves up in the fortress of Akhaltsik, and were there besieged by Mustapha, aided by an additional body of troops sent to him. Meanwhile, the main Turkish army crossed the frontier near the river Arpachai, and established a camp upon Russian ground, as a base for an offensive movement against Gumri. The last-named fortress is an important defence for the city of Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, and was well looked after by the Russians during the war. It was a hostile attack in this direction which Klapka conceives to have been ill judged on the part of the Turkish commander. At first, the plan of Abdi Pacha seemed likely to be attended with some success; but he was without a siege-train; the winter set in with great severity, and his Bashi-Bazouks had devastated the country all around, rendering the labours of the Turkish commissariat exceedingly difficult. He was obliged to retreat from Gumri to Kars; the Russians followed him, overtook his army about midway between the two towns at a place called Gedikler, and utterly routed

Erzeroum.

them. The Russians, deeming a further advance imprudent, retreated to Gumri, where they fortified and provisioned themselves for the winter, while the Turks similarly retreated to winter at Kars. This was not the only discomfiture experienced by the Turks. While Abdi Pacha was thus sustaining a defeat at Gedikler, Zarif Mustapha Pacha was equally unfortunate at Akhaltsik; the Russian garrison of this place, receiving an augmentation of force under General Andronikoff, was enabled to attack and defeat the Turks who were besieging the fortress, and to drive them over the frontier back to Ardahan. These twofold defeats, at Gedikler and Akhaltsik, depressed the Turkish troops, annoyed the government, and led to the deposition of Abdi Pacha. The Turks in Asia Minor had no Omar Pacha among them; they were not well commanded.

Two circumstances combined to render these victories less advantageous to the Russians than might have been expected. A heavy fall of snow, presaging the immediate approach of stern winter, put an end to any further operations near Kars; while Schamyl, at a time when the Russians were engaged in another direction, suddenly descended from his mountains into the plains of Georgia at the head of 16,000 horse, fired 200 small villages, and carried away, as hostages, several Russian ladies who were residing in their country-houses near Tiflis. The Russians, to expel these intruders, found themselves called upon to confine their attention during the winter mainly to the vicinity of Tiflis and Gumri.

At the commencement of the year 1854, the Turkish army in Asia was in a thoroughly disorganised state, owing partly to defeat, but still more to mismanagement. While winter-snows yet enveloped the country, General Guyon (Kurschid Pacha) arrived from Damascus with an ill-defined commission from the Porte to reorganise the army. He was a favourite with the troops, but was viewed with jealousy by the Osmanli pachas;

and at no time during the war was he enabled fully to render the service which his abilities and his inclination prompted—being, as he was, thwarted by others, who envied where they could not equal. He proceeded, however, with great energy in his labour of re-forming the scattered materials of the army. Haïredden Pacha, minister of police at Constantinople, arrived about the same time at Erzeroum from the capital, as commissioner to inquire into the conduct of the Turkish generals. It was soon found that the poor troops had suffered dreadfully; they were almost without food or clothing during a period of typhus and fever; the pachas had appropriated to their own use the money in the military-chest, thereby leaving the troops without supplies. The men had on some occasions passed four or five days without regular rations. Even if the pachas had been honest, the troops would still have suffered; for the road from Kars to Erzeroum was blocked up with snow, insomuch that fifteen days, instead of five, were required to bring even the smallest amount of stores from the latter town to the former. The shoes of the poor soldiers were worn to tatters, at a season of intensely biting frost. At the best of times, the shoes are the worst part of the Turkish soldier's equipment. An eye-witness has said, that 'so long as the Turkish army is shod as it is, it *never can* march well. Behind stone-walls, in the breach, and in garrison, they are the bravest of the brave; but I verily believe they could not, if the safety of the empire depended on it, make a forced march, or continue one of fifteen miles a day for a week, either for the purposes of retreat or attack. While they were an army of cavalry, this practice did not matter much, particularly as the wide Turkish stirrup protected the foot; but infantry must knock up on hard roads and in bad weather with such shoeing. It would be curious to inquire how much the decay of the Osmanli may depend on the soles of their shoes since they ceased to be an equestrian army, and assumed European tactics and formation, without abandoning the most objectionable portion of their Mohammedan attire.' The disadvantages must, of course, have been all the greater when the shoes, such as they were, had become merely rags.

Guyon and Haïredden speedily effected improvements in the condition of the troops—the former by his skill as a general, the latter by virtue of the high powers intrusted to him. The offending pachas were either dismissed or sent to Constantinople for trial; clothes were provided; the troops received a month's pay on account; the contractors for provisions were detected and punished for fraud; and the army began to assume a regular shape. Haïredden executed justice on an offending baker in a style truly Oriental. The bread supplied to the troops had been black and gritty, although the contractor had received the government price for a better quality; whereupon Haïredden caused five large loaves to be brought to him, and, taking out all the filthy, black, coarse crumb, forced the contractor to swallow the whole quantity, until he was 'swollen to nearly double his usual breadth.'

A change of ministry in Turkey affects government appointments as in England, but much more grossly. Mehemet Ali Pacha, when minister of war towards the close of 1853, appointed as commander of the Asiatic army Ismail Pacha, who had just distinguished himself at Kalafat; but Riza Pacha, chosen successor to Mehemet, revoked the appointment of Ismail, and gave the command of the army of Asia to Zarif Mustapha Pacha, at that time governor of Erzeroum. Mr Duncan, who was with the Turkish army throughout the campaign of 1854, considers this to have been a selection very disastrous to the interests of the sultan—Zarif Mustapha being in no sense equal to the duties imposed upon him. Haïredden's commission terminated when Zarif's appointment became known; and it remained to be seen how far Zarif, with an acknowledged position, and Guyon in one more doubtful, could succeed in managing a campaign against the Russians. Guyon had not merely the enmity of Osmanli pachas to contend against; there were Polish officers also, in the sultan's service, who held the Hungarian in no good-will.

Among the many remarkable examples, furnished by the Russian war, of the untiring energy and unsparing liberality of the English newspaper press, were those connected with the military operations of the Turks and Russians in Asia in 1854. Sharing in all the vicissitudes and hardships of the Turkish camp were two Englishmen, who encountered snow and ice, dust and heat, rain and mud, privation and disease, in order that they might send to London regular accounts of the progress of the army. One of these was Colonel Thorne, special correspondent of the *Times*, whose health gave way under the hardships of a winter-journey from Trebizond to Erzeroum; the other was Mr Duncan, to whose pen the English public is indebted for a mass of curious information concerning Asia Minor, its people, and its warfare.* This part of Asia is in a frightful state in respect to roads; the travelling arrangements are of the most primitive kind; and Colonel Thorne and Mr Duncan were compelled to mark out for their own use routes of communication, through which their letters might be despatched. Little did the London readers of the letters from 'our own correspondent' know or think how much ingenious planning and costly working were required to secure the transmission of those letters. The two Englishmen, after many abortive plans—of which one, very expensive and not very successful, was that of employing mounted Tatars or couriers—decided on engaging three swift *sais* or messengers, to walk or run to and from Erzeroum and Kars. These messengers were gray-headed old men, whose powers of endurance as pedestrians were

* *A Campaign with the Turks in Asia.*

remarkable, and whose honesty and zeal were above suspicion. Two of these men were constantly on the road, one coming from, and the other going to, Erzeroum—Kars being the head-quarters. Every Tuesday morning one of the messengers started from Kars with the letters, consigned to the care of an Armenian merchant at Erzeroum, who sent back the messenger with any letters or newspapers which happened to have arrived from England. The letters from Kars were forwarded, under cover, from Erzeroum to Trebizond by a regular, or rather a very irregular post; from Trebizond to Constantinople they were conveyed by one of the Black Sea steamers; and from Constantinople to England by the ordinary mail. A whole month was consumed in the conveyance of the letters from Kars to London; they were consigned to six different authorities in succession; and the postage in the end 'reached a very pretty figure,' as Mr Duncan states. The 'mail' between Erzeroum and Trebizond was a mounted Tatar; and when this mail brought letters from England, he also brought from Trebizond a stock of coffee, candles, and other luxuries,

TREBIZOND.

for the two Englishmen—which luxuries were duly handed over to the sais for conveyance from Erzeroum to Kars. It was quite an event at Kars when these men arrived. Only two accidents occurred to them—an attack of snow-blindness on a dreadful winter-day; and a robbery by brigands, to whom the contents of the wallet from Kars could not have been very satisfactory. The third sais was retained in pay, in case of exigencies.

The relative distances between Trebizond, Erzeroum, Kars, and Tiflis, have already been given; but it is desirable to notice briefly here the route in question, because it is that by which all European supplies reached the Turkish army at Kars.

Trebizond, the ancient *Trapesus*, is a seaport on the south-east shore of the Black Sea. The ancient Trapesus was a colony from Sinope, which was itself a colony of Milesians. The town, in one or other of its several periods, was owned by Greeks, then by Pontians, next by Romans, afterwards by Byzantines, then by the monarchs of a Trebizond kingdom, and, lastly, by the Turks. The population may now amount to about 30,000, mostly Osmanlis, but including a few thousand Greeks and Armenians—the Mohammedans residing within the walls, and the Christians outside. After Odessa, Trebizond is the first commercial port in the Black Sea; it is the place at which European manufactures are landed, for inland conveyance through Erzeroum and Bayazid to the heart of Persia. Steamers are now engaged in this trade, bringing cargoes from Constantinople in three or four days. Mr Duncan sets down the imports in 1852 at the large sum of £2,100,000; the exports being about one-third of that amount: three-fourths of the imports were manufactured goods from England. The commercial importance of unrestricted trade to the south-east coast of the Black Sea becomes hence fully evident to English merchants.

Such is Trebizond. But the route thence to the scene of warfare and of commerce in the interior is surrounded with terrible difficulties. Khans or inns, with little to eat and no beds for the weary

traveller; pathways instead of roads, on which neither care nor money seems to have been laid out; mountain-passes, bounded on the one hand by lofty perpendicular rocks, and on the other by frightful abysses; slippery paths, down which the poor horses and mules are frequently hurled and dashed to pieces in the ravines far below; intermediate plains, which are sultry and feverish in summer, and converted into wild pathless solitudes when clothed with snow in the winter; ascents and descents, so steep that no wheel-vehicles of any kind can traverse them, while a whole day is required for ten oxen to drag a cannon four miles along them—these are the characteristics of the 180 miles which separate Trebizond from Erzeroum. The Turkish commissioner, Haïredden Pacha, followed this route in mid-winter; and, though provided with a formidable convoy, several of his baggage-horses perished, and two of his attendants were frozen to death. A caravan, laden with Persian goods for Trebizond, was about the same time overtaken by a snow-storm, which destroyed a score of horses and several men. At that very period, a caravan was passing from Trebizond to Erzeroum, comprising 200 horses laden with bales of Manchester cotton goods, two large bales to each horse; the cottons, in the white state, were intended, when safely deposited at Teheran in Persia, to be printed or dyed in various colours, for the surrounding markets—in this way does commerce mark out channels for itself, in spite of war and all other embarrassments. The road from Erzeroum to Kars is less difficult; but it presents scarcely a single khan or house of reception for travellers; insomuch that, unless a wayfarer carry his provisions with him, his wants are likely to be scantily supplied; the hospitality of the Turks in the villages would, indeed, be almost the only barrier between him and starvation.

Along this strange road, then, and through this rugged region, had to be conveyed most of the European supplies to the Turkish army, wherewith to commence the campaign of 1854; the other portion being landed at Batoum, nearer the Caucasian frontier. The Turkish government, roused to activity by the disasters of 1853 in Asia, sought to place its army on a better footing. The exertions of Guyon and Haïredden to this end have already been adverted to. Various regiments, distributed over Kurdistan and Arabistan, were ordered to advance to Kars; while the rédif or reserve troops, collected from their village-homes in the provinces of Tokat and Sivas, bent their steps in the same direction. Bands of Syrian and Arabian irregulars, also, were called up to swell the number of available soldiers on the bleak plateaux of Armenia. Munitions of war continually poured in from Constantinople *viâ* Trebizond.

The Russian forces in Georgia and on the shores of the Caspian, in the early spring of 1854, were ascertained with much exactness by Mr Duncan. The forts on the Black Sea—Soucoum Kalé, Redout Kalé, Soudjuk Kalé, &c.—were, as narrated in the last Chapter, destroyed by the Russians during the course of the spring and summer, in apprehension of threatened attacks from the English and French; but further east, whither those opponents had not penetrated, the forts were carefully maintained. Several such forts, of which the chief was at Derbend, dotted the western side of the Caspian; they were capable of offering a successful resistance to badly-armed mountaineers, but would speedily have fallen before a regular army. The regiments were frequently changed, but the strength of the garrisons was kept up. At the period now under notice, a regiment of chasseurs was at Grozno, a temporary fort situated in a plain washed by the river Sountcha; a second regiment of chasseurs at Nizapni, a stone-fort on a mountain near the river Andreievska, two days' march from Grozno; a regiment of the line at Temerhaulouré, a mud-fort in a plain two days' march from Nizapni; another line-regiment at Kazikoumik, near Derbend, five days' march from Temerhaulouré; a regiment at Kouba, a temporary fort, three days' march from Kazikoumik; a regiment of chasseurs at Harahatché, an unfortified spot, about eight days' march from Kouba and two from Tiflis; a regiment of Georgian grenadiers at Gori, a dismantled stone-fort, two days distant from Tiflis; the regiment of Erivan at Manglis, a day and a half from Tiflis; a regiment of dragoons in the district between the river Terek and the fort at Temerhaulouré; while a few regiments of Don Cossacks were employed in watching the Persian and Turkish frontiers. In addition to these forces, there were sixteen battalions of veterans spread over the country, either in small forts or in towns. Some of the chieftains of the districts over which Russia had a kind of protective control furnished also bodies of armed men, whom the Russian government took into its pay—namely, 1000 horse by Prince Andronikoff; 1000 by Prince Orbélianoff; 2000 by Ahmed Mehinlinski; 1000 by Kouminski Bey; and 3000 by the Alahdan or Aladin of the Kazikoumiks.

In the month of April, besides the troops stationed in the above-named forts, Mr Duncan estimated that the Russians had 30,000 men ready to meet the Turks in the field. These forces were thus disposed—15,000 at Gumri, under Prince Bebutoff; 8000 at Orzugheti (Urzughetti), under Prince Andronikoff; 3000 at Erivan, under General Wrangel; and 4000 at Akhaltsik. To oppose these, there were four bodies of Turkish troops, 37,000 in all—namely, 20,000 at Kars, under Zarif Mustapha Pacha; 13,000 at Batoum, under Selim Pacha; 2000 at Bayazid, under another Selim Pacha; and 2000 at Ardahan, under Osman Pacha. The reserve-depôt for the Russians was at Tiflis; and that for the Turks at Erzeroum. An intelligible idea of the hostile array may be formed by tracing the frontier, from its commencement at the eastern end of the Black Sea, in an irregular line south-eastward to Mount Ararat; four Russian armies or bodies of troops were on one side of this

line; four Turkish on the other: each of the one group confronted one of the other group; and each group was backed by its reserve-depôt.

When the news reached Kars that England and France had declared war against Russia, it was accompanied by a report that an English army was on its way to Kars *viâ* Trebizond and Erzeroum. The report gave extravagant delight, to be succeeded by gloom when the incorrectness of the rumour became evident. Mr Duncan, in this as in many other parts of his narrative, descants on the value of such a demonstration in Asia by the Allies. 'England could never have undertaken a campaign in which her interests were more at stake than in Georgia. By the expulsion of Russia from that province, and the destruction of her strongholds on the Caspian—which, in late years, has been a mere Russian lake—the influence of Russia in the East, and her covetous longings towards India, would alike have been dispelled. The fascination with which Russia, by her money or her intrigues, more than by force of arms, has enchained Persia and the vast regions bordering on the Caspian, would have snapped asunder, and the prestige of England have risen, if possible, still higher. At the same time, the difficulties to be overcome by force of arms were trifling, when compared with the largeness of the stake at issue.'* Mr Duncan, however, was forced to confess, that the topographical difficulties connected with the advance of an army from Trebizond to Tiflis *viâ* Erzeroum and Kars are tremendous. On another occasion, when the Turks had suffered a reverse, the same writer said: 'By this defeat, Turkey has lost much, but England has lost still more. And on whom lies the blame? A great deal certainly on the Turkish soldiers; but, I declare solemnly, still more on England. The British authorities in London and Constantinople were well aware of the doubtful condition of this army, and had only lately been warned by the defeat of the Batoum corps. The English consular body in this part of Asia had never ceased impressing upon their responsible head the necessity of the presence here of an English or French division, however small its numerical amount—3000 bayonets would have sufficed—for it was only needed to encourage the Turks by a brilliant example.' Any triumph of the Russians circulates with boundless exaggeration through timid Persia, and over the Caspian steppes, into the barbarous regions of Khiva and Bokhara. The nations and tribes of the East become visibly impressed with military success or greatness; and any renown of the Russians in Asia tends to lessen the moral hold of England over her Indian possessions. The expediency of affording aid to the Turks in Asia was frequently urged in parliament about that period. The Earl of Ellenborough on one occasion said: 'Any blow struck against Turkey in Asia paralyses the Turkish Empire. More than that—the whole commerce between Turkey and Persia is carried on by Trebizond and Erzeroum, and the occupation of those places by Russia puts an end to that trade, insulates Persia, and most materially affects her policy. But, notwithstanding these circumstances, we did not carry on war in Asia as we did in Europe, with army against army. We had in Asia nations at our disposal. We had nations conquered, but yet disposed to throw off the yoke. We had still more—a gallant nation which has been for years in arms, successfully defending its independence. We should make war with their army as well as by the troops we could detach for any operation of this kind; but this mode of action has been altogether neglected.'*

The plans of the Allies, whether judiciously or otherwise, did not comprise any expedition of English or French troops into Asia; and the Turks had to prepare single-handed for the forthcoming campaign. The year had opened somewhat auspiciously for them. About the middle of January, 3000 Russians issued from Orzugheti, and marched on to Chefketil or St Nikolaïa: the former is a small town in Georgia, north-west of Tiflis and Gumri, while Chefketil is situated on the sea-margin boundary of the two empires. Chefketil had belonged to Russia, but had been captured by the Turks in the autumn of 1853; and it was in the hope of effecting a recapture that the attack was now made. The Russians concealed themselves in a jungle near the fort, and prepared for a night-surprise. The Turkish pickets, however, gave a timely alarm; the Ottoman garrison issued forth, and attacked the Russians so fiercely as to drive them back in the utmost disorder. The Russian loss was severe, while the Turks suffered comparatively little. Selim Pacha was one of the few Turkish officers who distinguished himself in Asia; it was he who, starting from Batoum soon after the declaration of war by Turkey, had captured Chefketil, in an action which cost the Russians 1000 men and a large store of ammunition; and it was he who now defeated Andronikoff in the attempt to recapture the place. The main army from Kars, as lately narrated, had ended the year disastrously; the Bayazid army, under another Selim Pacha, had effected nothing; while Ali Pacha had been unfortunate in the neighbourhood of Ardahan and Akhaltsik. The success at the opening of 1854 was confined therefore to Selim Pacha's proceedings at Batoum and Chefketil. The Turks were enabled about that time to land troops at Batoum as reinforcements to the army, and also a supply of arms and ammunition for Schamyl, who had been prevented only by his limited stores from proffering active aid to the sultan. Schamyl's lieutenant in Abasia—a narrow strip of country between the mountains and the Black Sea—had been instrumental in obtaining these supplies from the Turks.

As the spring of 1854 advanced, the Turks

* Duncan: i. 279.

* Speech in the House of Lords, May 14, 1854.

strengthened themselves at Kars and the Russians at Gumri, each narrowly watching the other. Both received reinforcements, especially the Turks; but the sultan's forces unfortunately suffered in consequence of the wrangles between the officers; the Poles were in many cases jealous of the Hungarians, and the Osmanlis jealous of both. Had not the Russians been doubtful concerning the intentions of the vacillating court of Persia, an attack on the Turkish positions would in all probability have been made in spring; but, distrusting their own safety, they postponed their advance. By about April, there were nearly twenty pachas with the army at Kars, weakening it by conflicting counsels, and by peculation which no amount of supervision could wholly prevent; the troops, although increased in number and improved in discipline and supplies, suffered greatly from typhus, brought on mainly by previous neglect.

One of the earliest hostile encounters in the year was a petty affair. Towards the end of April, about 3000 Cossacks and Russian infantry, with a battery of guns, left Gumri, crossed the river Arpachai, and attacked an outpost of Bashi-

KARS.

Bazouks at the village of Engené; they killed a few, took a few more prisoners, and then returned to Gumri. During April and May, the Turks at Kars were regularly drilled, to fit them for an evidently approaching conflict with the Russians. In this necessary work, however, the best arrangements were certainly not made. None of the European officers were regimentally employed; they were appointed to the staff headed by Guyon, and were employed as inspectors of artillery practice, instructors in cavalry movements, and overseers of the commissariat; these services were valuable, in so far as the jealousy of the Turkish pachas permitted their development; but even then the troops lost the benefit of the aid that might have been derived from the Hungarian generals in all that related to regimental drilling. The army at Kars having at that time reached 25,000, Guyon advised a march across the river Arpachai, to be followed by the seizure of Erivan; and the troops were themselves eager to advance to action; but Guyon was outvoted by the Osmanli pachas at a council of war, and nothing was done. This council was held on the 18th of May.; and the few Englishmen who were then with the army were forcibly struck with the contrast between the men and their leaders, in all that related to courage, activity, and honesty. The sultan indeed, throughout the war, was inefficiently supported by his generals, except in a few instances.

Kars, thus likely to be the scene of a contest between the opposing forces, was at one period the capital of a petty Armenian kingdom of the same name; but it had fallen greatly in importance, and at the breaking out of the war, it was scarcely known to Europe. Merchants stopped there, on their road to and from Persia; but it was a poor, dull place; and hence the inhabitants, about 15,000 in number, became greatly excited when their town was occupied by the Turkish army. The inhabitants suffered before the troops advanced towards Gumri in October 1853; they suffered still more after the disastrous defeat; and the ensuing

winter and spring brought them little relief, for the pachas were wont to seize all the humble stores of the shopkeepers and peasants, leaving the question of payment in a very unsettled state. The town is commanded by an extensive castle, built while the Genoese were possessed of this district; the castle, now nearly crumbled into ruins, stands perched on a rocky hill, at the foot of which flows the little river Kars-chai. This hill is, however, overtopped by one still higher, on the opposite side of the river, the Kara-dagh or Black Mountain; and when Prince Paskévitch attacked Kars in a former war, he obtained control both over the town and the castle by occupying this higher hill with a few guns. One of the duties which the Turks undertook in the spring of 1854 was to crown this Kara-dagh with defences, which Guyon recommended should consist of eight redoubts, carrying 48 guns. The whole of the adult males of Kars were forced to assist in constructing these earthworks, which by degrees assumed formidable proportions.

Gumri, a similar place to Kars, in so far as it was occupied by an army watching an enemy not very far distant, had been rendered by the Russians much stronger than Kars by the Turks. Since the czar had acquired possession of this town and its neighbourhood in the previous war, he had wonderfully improved it; the streets and houses had been rebuilt in European style, in conformity with its change of name from the Oriental Gumri to the Russianised Alexandropol. Being situated on the banks of the Arpachai, which separates the two empires, it had been strongly fortified, far beyond anything that the Turks possessed in Asia; it having at least 150 mounted cannon, many of them casemated. The distance between Kars and Gumri is less than twelve leagues; the Russians knew all that was done at the first-named place, through the instrumentality of numerous spies; whereas the indolent and incapable Turkish commander made no efforts to obtain a knowledge of the state and strength of Gumri. Most of the emissaries sent by or to Schamyl, to concert measures with the pacha, were waylaid by the Russians; and Zarif Mustapha remained in ignorance even of the proceedings of Selim Pacha at Batoum.

At length, in the month of June, the antagonist armies approached nearer. On the 25th of the preceding month, 500 Russians, with four field-pieces, had crossed the Arpachai into the Turkish territory, pitched their tents and threw up a field-work—indicating an intention on the part of Prince Bebutoff to commence hostilities. On the 9th of June, four regiments of Russian cavalry, one of infantry, and fifteen guns, left Gumri, and took up a position at Technitz, on the Arpachai, six hours distant from Kars; here they encountered a body of Bashi-Bazouks under the Hungarian Kmeti, when a skirmish ensued, followed by the retreat of both parties to their respective camps. This was believed to be a feint, intended to draw off the attention of the Turks from a Russian attack in some other quarter. Kmeti, an old campaigner, had succeeded in bringing his Bashi-Bazouks into excellent trim; and their cavalry charge on the Russians greatly exhilarated the Turks, who seldom effect any successful achievements with cavalry. The Russians, about that time, exhibited symptoms of movement along their whole line from the Caucasus to Bayazid; concentrating a large body of troops near Gori. This town, situated in a plain about 40 miles from Tiflis and 150 from Chefketil, at the junction of the river Koor with a large stream flowing from the Elbruz mountain, afforded a favourable centre either for attack or defence, in respect to the opponent forces.

It was, indeed, full time that active service of some kind should commence; for the sword and the bullet would have been less disastrous to the Turks than other calamities which they were called upon to bear. In the seven or eight months from November to June, the Ottoman army in and around Kars had lost 10,000 men through typhus, hunger, cold, nakedness, and every kind of privation, most of which might have been avoided if the pachas had possessed a moderate amount of skill and honesty. The Russians, too, had suffered terribly. Two regiments of the sixth corps d'armée had been nine months marching from Moscow to Gumri, over the Caucasus, amid sore privations; and even those quartered near Tiflis had been swept off in large numbers by disease. At a council of war, held at Kars towards the end of June, General Guyon, believing that the Turks, notwithstanding all their losses, were still well able to cope with the Russians, proposed a bold and comprehensive scheme, in which all the four bodies of troops at Kars, Batoum, Bayazid, and Ardahan, might take part; the main object being a simultaneous attack upon Kutaïs (Kutaiah), Erivan, Gumri, and Tiflis. But the Turkish mushir or commander, Zarif Mustapha, was utterly unfitted to appreciate or execute such a plan; he had never before commanded even so much as a regiment in the field; he had been placed in command solely by virtue of favouritism. Where an army is so managed that the commander-in-chief himself bastinadoes a contractor for sending in half-baked bread—an event which really occurred at Kars—it may be imagined that petty details, rather than comprehensive schemes, would mark the course of public affairs. Guyon was overruled; nothing was done; and an army, now reaching 30,000, began to suffer from heat as much as it had before suffered from cold. Mr Duncan asserts, from the knowledge which he obtained on the spot, that had Guyon and Kmeti been in command, within two months Tiflis would have been captured, and the Russian forces either cut to pieces or driven out of Georgia across the Caucasus: so much larger at this time was the Turkish army near Kars than the Russian force at Gumri; for, with the regiments at Bayazid and Ardahan, the

Ottomans now numbered 40,000, with 120 pieces of artillery; while the Russian force was believed to be limited to about 20,000.

The month of July opened with active proceedings on the part of the Russians. The garrison of Gumri, 15,000 strong, sallied forth under Prince Bebutoff on the 1st, crossed the Arpachai, and took up positions near the villages of Kurekdere and Ingedere, at about one hour's march only from Sobattan and Hadgi-Velikoi, at that time occupied by the Turkish outposts. There is a small mountain near the two villages; and this mountain the Russians began immediately to fortify. On the 3d, Zarif Mustapha, vacillating between many plans suggested by his pachas, moved his army from Kars to Hadgi-Velikoi, and traced out an encampment. Here he was soon joined by Kerim Pacha, who brought the Turkish left wing from Ardahan, while Bebutoff in like manner received reinforcements which raised his army to 28,000; insomuch that there were now assembled nearly 70,000 Russian and Turkish troops, in the vicinity of the four villages above named. The Turks formed two camps, with Bashi-Bazouks in the van and on the flanks, and the cavalry and artillery in the centre. The advanced camp or division was placed under Kerim Pacha, while Zarif Mustapha himself took the command of the rear division. The Turks had a small mountain in front of them, like as the Russians; and these two mountains were occupied as observatories by the staffs of the respective armies.

The incompetent Turkish commander at length resolved on an attack. On the 12th, he left his position, and advanced to within two miles of the Russian encampment. The Russians also advanced, and formed in order of battle. Kmeti began to skirmish with his Bashi-Bazouks, while the cavalry manœuvred to the flanks, and the artillery advanced to the front. Just at this moment a storm broke forth, with a degree of fury hardly known before in that district; the ground was speedily converted into a deep morass; the Russians retreated to their encampment, and Zarif Mustapha ordered a similar retreat. This unexpected event greatly disappointed the Turkish troops; they had braced themselves up to a bold and soldierly achievement, and there can hardly be a doubt that they would have acquitted themselves well if their efforts had been efficiently directed by their commander. Many wet, stormy days succeeded, and the Turks became disheartened, while Zarif exhibited the utmost bewilderment in attempting to decide whether to advance or to do nothing. From the moment when the advance of the army from Kars was made, the unruly Kurds who inhabit the mountain districts began to make predatory excursions; the roads between Trebizond, Erzeroum, and Kars were rendered unsafe, and the unhappy villagers suffered greatly.

After this unwelcome check, weeks passed without any decided encounter, although the two armies were within five miles of each other. Bebutoff was awaiting further reinforcements; and Zarif displayed utter helplessness in respect to military plans. Disorganisation and treachery crept into the Turkish camp, while the Russians became so emboldened, that they came forth and reaped the corn in fields not far from the Turkish posts. On the 27th, a Russian force advanced to the village of Perghet, near the Turkish left flank, and cut and carried off a great quantity of wood; the Turkish soldiers indignantly waited for orders from Zarif to attack them; but no such order came. By this time the five villages which have been named — Kurekdere, Ingedere, Sobattan, Hadgi-Velikoi, and Perghet—had become mere heaps of ruins; the wooden houses had been destroyed for the sake of firewood; and every atom of corn and grass in the neighbourhood had been consumed by the men and horses of the two armies.

One of the few active operations during the month was a dashing achievement by General Kmeti and his Bashi-Bazouks. In the dead of the night, on the 16th, he divided his 1500 horsemen into three columns, and galloped round the extreme left flank of the Russians. Having got to their rear without detection, he advanced silently to Baindir, a village near Gumri, defended by a small body of Cossacks and Georgian militia. At daybreak, one column attacked the village, one attacked the redoubts manned by the Russians, while the third remained in reserve. The Bashi-Bazouks utterly routed the enemy, taken thus suddenly by surprise; but the main Russian army now shewed signs of approach; and Kmeti and his active band succeeded in returning by another route to the Turkish camp, bringing with them five prisoners and 400 sheep. This daring act greatly delighted the Turks. Kmeti had offered to take even Gumri itself with his Bashi-Bazouks, but his timid commander would not allow him to make the attempt. On the 22d, another night-attack was planned by the Hungarian, to which Zarif Mustapha promised the aid of the regular troops. Shortly before daybreak, Kmeti charged with his Bashi-Bazouks at the centre of the Russian camp, and penetrated into the very tents of the enemy, capturing the first line of outposts. Speedily was he surrounded by the whole Russian army, and then it was that he looked for support from the regulars. But where were these? Zarif Mustapha, as usual—timid, irresolute, incompetent—*did* nothing; no regulars appeared, although ardent and eager to be engaged; and Kmeti had no resource but to cut his way back to the Turkish camp, losing many by the way, and burning with indignation at the unworthy treatment which he had received from his commander. The Bashi-Bazouks, under this heroic man, had shewn themselves susceptible of orderly discipline; they had, indeed, acted as a light cavalry of an efficient kind, far better than Omar Pacha had been able to obtain for his Danubian campaign; and bitterly they lamented that the

mushir of the army of Asia was so utterly unequal to the duties of his high command. Little wonder that many of these primitive irregulars disbanded, and returned to their homes.

August arrived, and with it a conviction that unless the Turkish commander speedily attempted something definite, his army would melt away or become disorganised. On the 5th, a night-attack was resolved upon; Kerim Pacha to command the right division, Vely Pacha the left, and the mushir himself, Zarif Mustapha, to superintend both—or to spoil both, as the case might be. Guyon marked out the plan of the attack; but his plan was not practically carried out.

On Sunday the 6th of August, was fought a battle which covered Zarif Mustapha with disgrace, and undid all that the Turks had effected in Asia, whether much or little, during the year 1854.

In the dead of the night, the Turks left their encampment and began the march. The first error made manifest was, that the right division reached the enemy long before the left could come up to its support, in obedience to a stupid order by Zarif that the left should halt two hours, that daylight might assist its progress. The consequence was, that when the Russians—who were to have been taken by a night-surprise—saw that the right division was thus isolated, they at once concentrated all their troops upon it, and commenced active proceedings before the left could arrive. The Turkish forces comprised 12 battalions of Arabistan infantry, 20 of Anatolian, 16 of rédif, and 2 of rifles—making 20,000 infantry; together with 3700 cavalry, 1300 artillery, and 78 guns. The Russians counted 20 battalions of infantry, 26 squadrons of dragoons, 4000 irregular cavalry, and 800 artillery, with 64 guns. Each army consisted of about 25,000 men; but the Turks had also 8000 or 10,000 Bashi-Bazouks, who were, however, not engaged in this battle. If Guyon's plan had been followed, the two divisions of Turks would have attacked the Russians simultaneously, while a third Turkish corps would have obtained possession of the heights which commanded the enemy's encampment. But Zarif Mustapha ruined the scheme, and quietly smoked his chibouque while the right division was about to be attacked by nearly the whole Russian force. This division, under Kerim Pacha, numbered about 10,000 men. The artillery opened fire on both sides. The Russian infantry advanced, but were repelled by the Turks. The Russian dragoons then bore down at high speed, and with a loud cheer rushed upon the Turks, who, seized with a panic, turned and fled, leaving their artillery unprotected. This artillery then bore a series of terrific attacks from the dragoons; both sides behaved courageously, and the fire was murderous. The Russian infantry made a second attack in large force against battalions of rédif, who then witnessed fire for the first time; the result was disastrous, for the rédif turned and fled wildly towards Kars. The more disciplined Turkish troops seem to have been chiefly in the left division, unfortunately absent when most wanted. Meanwhile, the dragoons, after repeated attacks, captured the guns, the Turkish artillerymen remaining steadfast until nearly the last man was cut off. The dragoons, previously almost maddened with drink, then rushed indiscriminately at infantry, cavalry, and artillery; and the Turks, completely paralysed by the impetuosity of the onslaught, gave way in all quarters; the cavalry fled, the infantry were mowed down, the artillery-horses were shot, and the guns were captured. All the efforts of Kerim Pacha to re-form his division were vain. By this time the left division had arrived, and opened a vigorous cannonade on the Russians. For a time the tide turned. Kmeti attacked the Russian infantry vigorously; Tahir Pacha poured in a terrible fire from the artillery under his command; and Guyon bore down with 4000 cavalry on the Russian masses which began to waver. This was the critical moment—fatally critical for the Turks. The cavalry, coming suddenly upon a Russian infantry regiment at a spot where none was expected, were seized with so resistless a terror, that they fled panic-stricken, leaving Guyon alone with his personal staff. These cowardly horsemen communicated a panic to the Bashi-Bazouks, who in their turn threw the infantry into such inextricable confusion that the generals lost command over them. All fled together in wild confusion towards Kars, pursued by the grapeshot of the Russian artillery and the sabres of the dragoons.

Thus ended the disastrous battle of Kurekdere. The Turks lost 3500 in killed and wounded, and 2000 prisoners; while the Russians acknowledged a loss of more than 3000 in killed and wounded. The Russian dragoons and the Turkish artillery greatly distinguished themselves. Had the Turkish cavalry possessed any soldierly qualities, they might have redeemed even the disasters occasioned by Zarif Mustapha's folly; but they and the untried rédifs ruined all. The Russian officers were brave throughout, heading their men in all the charges, insomuch that no less than 111 of their number were killed or wounded; whereas the Osmanli officers lurked in coward fashion in rear of their troops, with a very few exceptions. Bitter must have been the anger of Guyon and Kmeti to witness such conduct. Kerim Pacha, second in command, was one among the small number of exceptions; he was a brave old man, and exerted himself indefatigably to keep up the courage of his troops. The defeat was most complete; for not only did the Turks lose 5000 to 6000 men, but 6000 more fled in dismay to their homes after the battle, while the remaining moiety returned towards Kars in a state of the utmost disorganisation.

Before noticing the close of this discreditable campaign in Asia in 1854, it will be necessary to trace briefly the proceedings of the subsidiary forces, in other parts of Armenia and Georgia.

Selim Pacha, it will be remembered, commanded

the Turks in the neighbourhood of Batoum. After Selim had obtained advantages at Chefketil and Orzugheti, in the previous winter, he might have effected yet more if he had well concerted his plans with Zarif Mustapha; but the latter proved himself incapable of forming any comprehensive schemes. Selim remained during the spring master of his position; but on the 9th of June, he deemed himself strong enough to assume the offensive. He sent forward a division of 3000 Bashi-Bazouks, and half a battalion of regulars, to attack two Russian redoubts, about six hours distant from Orzugheti, on the road to Kutaïs. It appears to have been a mistaken piece of strategy; the Turks were ignorant of the position and numbers of the Russians, and were defeated with great loss. This was followed by a still more serious defeat on the 16th. It was Prince Kristoff who gained the day on the 9th, while Prince Andronikoff bore off the honours on the 16th. Andronikoff advanced towards Orzugheti on the 10th, with 8 battalions of infantry and 10 guns; while Colonel Korganoff, with 4 battalions and 8 guns, advanced in the direction of Akty. They constructed a bridge over the little river Soupsu. On the 16th, Andronikoff, with the Russian force, now aided by cavalry, met Selim Pacha's army near Orzugheti, and defeated it. The Turks appear to have lost about 2000 men—a number swelled up in the *Gazette du Caucase* to 8000, according to a system frequently adopted by the Russian authorities. Selim was forced to retreat to Churuk-su; and Andronikoff was thus enabled to spare troops to swell the main army at Gumri. The Russians made another attack on Selim in the night between the 18th and 19th, on the banks of the Tcholok, and obtained some success, though nothing of great importance. Selim Pacha was summoned to Constantinople to answer for his ill-luck, and was succeeded by Mustapha Pacha, who had distinguished himself at Oltenitza, under Omar Pacha. It is a point of some difficulty to distinguish between the numerous Selims, Mustaphas, and Achmets in the Turkish service.

Another though smaller portion of the Turkish forces was at Ardahan. This was under the command of Kerim Pacha, and numbered about 5000 men. During the spring, Kerim's force had remained nearly inactive, watching the Russians on the other side of the frontier, and being watched in turn. Early in June, however, the Russians, about 8000 strong, started from Akhaltsik, and threatened Ardahan. The result was mere skirmishing, unimportant on either side. At Bayazid, however, near the frontier-line at Mount Ararat, the Turks met with a disastrous defeat. While Zarif Mustapha was wasting his strength and the fine summer weather in idleness at Kars, Prince Bebutoff was enabled to despatch strong reinforcements from Gumri to the army at Erivan, to enable it to attack the Turks at Bayazid. The Turks, 5000 in number, were commanded by Selim Pacha (not the general at Batoum); and, as they were weak, Selim was recommended not to make any attack on the Russians, but to retreat on Kars or Erzeroum if pressed by the enemy. This advice he neglected. On the 28th of July, General Wrangel advanced from Erivan towards Bayazid with 8000 Russians, and 13 cannon. Selim at once sallied forth to a place called Kara-boulak, to meet this attack; but his force being much smaller, he encountered a total defeat. The Turkish irregulars advanced against the Russian infantry, but were repelled, and were then pursued by the enemy's dragoons. The regulars then advanced, but could not contend against the more powerful Russian force: they turned and fled wildly towards Van, leaving 1500 dead, wounded, and prisoners. On the 31st, the Russians entered Bayazid, and seized a large amount of stores. This victory greatly aided the proceedings of the Russians in the battle of Kurekdere, fought by the main army a few days afterwards. The enormous exaggeration in which the Russian officers so frequently indulged during the war, was fully displayed in the dispatch announcing the victory at Kara-boulak. Wrangel asserted that the Turks were 15,000 strong; that 13,000 of these were engaged; that 5000 were cavalry; and that 3000 were left dead on the field: whereas Mr Duncan, pointing out the extravagance of that report, states distinctly that the total Turkish force was 5000; that the cavalry (irregular) were 2500; and that the killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounted altogether to 1500. It is painful to have to decide between two such utterly irreconcilable accounts; but the analogies furnished by the whole course of the war leave no room for doubt as to the relative trustworthiness of the two accounts. The battle of Kurekdere was a case in point; for Prince Bebutoff, in his dispatch relating thereto, sets down the Turkish force at nearly 50,000, and the Russian at only 18,000.

Schamyl's name has been mentioned but little in this section. The mountain-chief was not engaged in any regular actions, but yet he continually influenced and retarded the movements of the Russians; and, had he been supplied betimes with arms and ammunition by the Allies, there can be no question that he might have imparted a different aspect to the whole campaign. The cruising of a few English ships off the coast of Circassia was noticed in the last Chapter; it was one of many attempts made to open communication with Schamyl; but those attempts were not sufficiently energetic or skilful to command much success. One of the English officers who accompanied Sir Edmund Lyons in his expedition to the coast, had interviews with some of the natives, and has given an interesting sketch of their personal appearance. 'As for the native chieftains,' says he, 'they are glorious fellows—tall, magnificently dressed, and fine-featured; it is impossible to view them as savages. Among them, the naib (Enim Bey), Schamyl's lieutenant or representative, is the most powerful and the most thoughtful.

His will seems law along the whole coast, from Soudjuk to the Anakria river. Within those limits along the coast all are Mohammedans, and during the nine or ten years of his residence among the Western Caucasians—being a native of Schamyl's, or the eastern country, Daghestan—he has built mosques, created schools, and, in short, excited a revival of religion *à la Wesley*. "Before he came, we were beasts," said a chief to me lately; "and now, if he were to order us to march into the sea, we should go without question." Their hostility to Russia is inveterate and intelligible; but they know well how unfit they are to cope with the Russians out of their own mountains, and the Russians equally well know them. Nevertheless, I hope that they will not be altogether useless. The naib is dignified and stately; he moves with an escort of wild mountaineer horsemen, preceded by a red and buff banner; his white Circassian tunic, yellow vest, black cartridge-cases, and tall gray sheep-skin cap, admirably set off his dark strongly-marked face. In conversation, you at once find him a very superior man, clear in his views, thoroughly knowing his own position and that of his countrymen. All the natives of the coast, from Soudjuk to Anakria, are bitter against the Russians, with the exception of one or two chieftains, who have received money and honours from them; but these are isolated cases, and they have had no influence on the people.' The Circassians themselves, the main body of the people, are described by this officer as 'a remarkably good-looking race—tall and well made, and generally fair, some even of the older warriors having quite pink cheeks; and, odd enough, when one considers their roaming life, their feet and hands are remarkably small. They cut their skin-shoes to fit the foot exactly. In dress, they carry a huge affair on the head, of the calpac species; a high cone of yellow cloth rises from a forest of fur which encircles the head; their coats are principally made of a coarse woollen fabric, and reach far below the knee. The higher orders have this of brilliant yellow cloth; round the throat a linen under-garment buttons exactly, and over this is frequently worn a smart silk affair, shewing between the folds of the coat. In their breast they carry about a score of bone or ivory cases, filled with loose powder, having the ball at the top. Some of the better sort wear smart scarlet leggings, and yellow or red slippers; round the waist of all are fastened multitudinous knives and pistols upon a leathern belt; and slung over the shoulder, in a cloth-case, the rifle. They look altogether like a set of aristocratic savages.' The officers encountered Circassian maidens about to depart for Constantinople to adorn the harems of the wealthy Turks—an example of Oriental morality which has not yet given way to European customs. During the summer, Schamyl frequently threatened Tiflis, and so distracted the attention of the Russians, that if Guyon had commanded at Kars instead of Zarif, the Turks would almost for certain have fought a winning campaign.

When the disasters of August arrived, it was unquestionably Schamyl who prevented the Russians from following up their advantage. He threatened Tiflis with 16,000 men; and Prince Bebutoff was forced to send back a large portion of his army from Gumri to repel this attack. On the 1st of September—with part of his force at Akhalgori; part at Gori, on the river Koor; and part at Mycht, near Tiflis—Schamyl surprised and beat off the Russians, took much booty and many prisoners of high rank, and rendered it imperative that Bebutoff should suspend all further operations in Armenia. Advantages were gained by the Lesghian chieftain also at Pekhalon, Tavi, Childi, Alazan, Kavril, Zaktala, and other places whose names are scarcely to be met with on the maps, over the Russian generals Wrangel and Tchartchatz. In short, Schamyl, although his name appears in a flitting, meteor-like way, assisted the Turks more effectually than their English and French allies had up to this time done. The Emperor Napoleon sent him 12,000 muskets in September; but those muskets would have rendered better service if despatched earlier.

The year 1854 closed in Asia thus-wise. The Turks, utterly broken and disorganised at the battle of Kurekdere, could do nothing more than remain on the defensive at Kars; while the Russians, afraid of Schamyl and his mountaineers, durst not advance westward of Gumri, lest their rear should be attacked. Kars and Gumri remained the head-quarters of the two armies at the end of the year, as they had been at the beginning; but the Turks had been weakened in the directions of Bayazid and Ardahan, while the Russians had become masters of the roads between Turkey and Persia.

The state of the Turkish army had now become deplorable. Complete anarchy reigned at head-quarters. Zarif Mustapha, unable to appreciate the strategic plans of General Guyon, had ruined them at Kurekdere, and then turned round and accused Guyon of being the cause of all the disasters. Knowing the ill-will entertained by many of the Poles towards Guyon, he induced them to sign a paper demanding the dismissal or recall of the Hungarian. Guyon had remained a Christian, and, on this account, in accordance with a rule in the Ottoman service, he had no direct command; he might advise, but was forced to succumb to the Osmanli pachas. Had he become a renegade in his faith, like many of the Hungarians and Poles, he would probably have received high powers. Under the existing state of feeling in the army, it would have been useless for Guyon to remain, however unjust the charges against him, and however incompetent those who made them: he was recalled. But Zarif Mustapha could not altogether blind the eyes of the Porte to his conduct; although supported by the seraskier, Riza Pacha, he was summoned to Constantinople to explain his conduct. Here, however, favouritism carried the day. Zarif succeeded in obtaining an acquittal from all

blame in respect to the disaster at Kurekdere, and so bribed his judges as to procure condemnation to fall upon Guyon. The Hungarian was dismissed from his post, reduced to half-pay, and left to retire into private life. The weak sultan was powerless through all these scenes; kind, but indolent, he exerted little influence on those around him. Nor could the British ambassador at Constantinople stem the course of intrigue which led to the discomfiture of an able officer.

Perhaps no Englishman had better opportunities than Mr Duncan of forming an estimate of the qualities of the Turkish private soldiers. 'By the introduction,' he says, 'of a strict discipline; by an equitable system of promotion, and under the command of brave and honourable officers, the Turkish army could be raised to a point of excellence *second to no* European force. The sobriety of the men, their simple wants, unfailing patience, and power of resisting fatigue, offer the most splendid materials for creating an irresistible infantry. The men are both intelligent and courageous. A commander, in whom they possessed confidence, they would follow without hesitation or regret. And this confidence is facile to obtain. A few kind words, a display of interest in his welfare, and honesty of purpose, suffice to gain the poor Turk's heart for ever. The Turkish artillery is excellent, even in its present state, but is susceptible of great improvement. In the management of this arm, the Turkish soldiers shew great aptitude; and the pride of the men in their batteries, and the affection they display for their respective guns, is admirable.'* The honesty of this opinion is tested by the impartial way in which Mr Duncan speaks of the cavalry; he condemns it in unmitigated terms, as being in its present state almost utterly worthless. But the greatest drawback is presented by the Osmanli officers. 'The causes that have largely contributed to weigh down the existing virtuous elements in the Ottoman army, are the corruption and incapacity that prevail among its higher ranks; and the disgraceful ignorance which distinguishes its subaltern officers. The Turkish private soldier, if well directed, is capable of great deeds; but the corps of officers and non-commissioned officers are alike inefficient and unsusceptible of improvement. Promotion by merit alone is unheard of in the Ottoman service. The subaltern ranks are filled by the personal slaves or domestics of the pachas; and such commissions are often the wages of disgrace. Promotion to the superior ranks is obtainable only by bribery or intrigue; the grade of colonel or pacha is purchased by the highest bidder; who subsequently recovers the sum he has disbursed by defrauding his regiment, or robbing the government. The simplest military rules are ignored by the officers, who are often withdrawn from a civil appointment to occupy a high military position. This was the case with the commander-in-chief of the army of Anatolia, Zarif Mustapha Pacha.'

General Williams, an English officer of engineers, was appointed British Military-Commissioner to the Turkish army in Asia. As a sort of authoritative adviser on military matters, he might possibly have exerted some influence over Zarif; but he did not reach Kars until September, when the mischief had been already achieved. He was a man who knew well the Turks and the Turkish language, and was much liked among them; on this account, his presence a month or two earlier would have been especially valuable. But in this appointment, as in many other particulars, the movements of the Allies were tardy.

INTRIGUES IN NORTH-WESTERN TURKEY.

Attention must now be directed towards Europe. The hostilities and intrigues on the Turkish frontiers in 1853–4, to which the present Chapter relates, were partly displayed in the Slavonic provinces which bound the more purely Mohammedan part of European Turkey. There were turbulent proceedings in those regions, which call for a brief notice here, not because they were Slavic or Slavonic, but because they were Russo-Slavic—a development of that system which had rendered Russian interference intolerable to Turkey, and which imperatively called for a check from the Western Powers.

Religion is the key to this system. Constantinople, when held by the Byzantine emperors a thousand years ago, gave Christianity—in a very perverted form, it is true—to the barbarous Russ; and now that the Russ have become a powerful nation, they look to the acquisition of dominant control over that same Constantinople, at the expense of the Osmanli who at present govern it. Moreover, when the Ottomans made their conquests in Europe, the country now called Turkey was mostly inhabited by tribes of the Slavon or Slavonic race, the same as that from which the Russians are sprung; and these Slavons professed the same religion as the Russians—that is, Christianity of the Greek Church. Hence there has been for 400 years a sympathy between Russia and the Christian provinces of Turkey—a sympathy which would command respect, had it not been employed as a tool by ambitious czars. In those cases where the authority of the Christian czar has been substituted for that of the Mohammedan sultan, liberty of conscience, liberty of thought and speech, liberty of action and of movement, the sacredness of domestic life, the development of manly independence—none of these have been furthered, while many of them have been compromised. Laying aside the officials and the priests, the inhabitants of Russianised provinces have had little reason to congratulate themselves on their emancipation from the sultan's rule. In what manner Russian

* Duncan: i. 189.

audacity brought about the Turkish troubles in Moldavia and Wallachia, has been shewn in former Chapters; but there were equally active, although less obvious, intrigues in progress by Russian agents in other parts of the Turkish dominions.

Bulgaria, Servia, Bosnia, Turkish Croatia, Herzegóvina, Montenegro, all are among the Turkish provinces in which the majority of the inhabitants are Christians—some of them members of the Latin or Romish Church, but by far the larger number adhering to the Greek faith. Of the great Slavonic race, there are probably 60,000,000 (including 10,000,000 Poles) under Russian rule, 12,000,000 under Austrian, and 8,000,000 more or less under Turkish domination. These are nearly all Christians, but not of the same church; the Poles, most of the Austrian Slavons, and a few of the Turkish, are Roman Catholics; while all the rest, constituting by far the larger number, are members of the Greek Church. It is quite lamentable to witness the bitter hatred between these two great bodies of Christians in the south-eastern region of Europe. Much as the Mohammedan may have crushed and spurned the Christian in past ages, yet in intensity of hatred he is more than paralleled by the Christians themselves—Greek against Latin, Patriarch against Pope. There are not wanting grounds for believing that Poland owes much of its misfortune to these contests between the rival churches. When Poland and Hungary were large and independent kingdoms—the one more powerful than Russia, and the other than Austria—Romanism was the authoritative religion in both countries, although the Greek faith was professed by millions of subjects; and so relentless was the persecution which the one body of priests maintained against the other, that many of the Polish adherents of the Greek Church were driven into the arms of Russia, while many of the Greek Church subjects of the kings of Hungary sought shelter even under the banner of the Crescent. This occurred many centuries ago; in later ages, the Greek Church, backed by the czars, has possessed more power of persecution over the Latins.

Without duly considering this triplicate of religious discord, the strange condition of Turkey, and of Russian influence within it, cannot be understood. There are, besides the Osmanlis or true Mohammedan Turks, Slavons who have become Mohammedans, Slavons of the Greek Church, and Slavons of the Latin Church; and these hate each other for their diverse religions, more than they love each other for their common race or Slavonic blood. The sultan has the sympathies of the first, the czar of the second, while Austria endeavours to become the 'protector' of the third. If Roman Catholics were more numerous than they are in Turkey, the intrigues of Austria would probably be nearly as mischievous, though not so grandly audacious, as those of Russia have proved to be. Austria has long coveted a portion of the triangular north-west corner of European Turkey, in which the Roman Catholic subjects of the sultan chiefly reside, and which borders on the Illyrian and Dalmatian provinces of the Austrian Empire. Herzegóvina and Turkish Croatia are the extreme portions of this triangle. Whatever may have been the predilections of the Austrian court, however, the machinations of Russia are those which Turkey and her Allies were called upon to unmask and to repel.

Glancing round the provinces which fringe European Turkey on the north and west, we first meet with Bulgaria, a region already described in connection with the Danubian campaign of 1853–4. Its inhabitants—a peculiar admixture of the Slavon with the Roumani—mostly profess the Greek faith; and the events of the campaign abundantly shewed that the priests of the villages, high and low, were hand and heart with the czar, ready to have furthered the least success obtained by the Russian troops. When Prince Gortchakoff caused his flaming proclamation to be translated into the Bulgarian language, and disseminated throughout the province, he well knew the aid which the priests of the Greek communion would be ready to afford. In the large fortified towns, such as Widdin, Silistria, Rustchuk, Varna, and Shumla, where Osmanli officials and Osmanli soldiers are always placed, the influence of the Christian priests is less apparent; but the country districts contain few Turks; and there the Bulgarian peasant is at the mercy of his *papa* or priest, in all that concerns belief and reverence. Many of the peasants' houses, during the war, were found to contain coloured daubs of the Emperor Nicholas, as wall-decorations. The emissaries of the late czar, both lay and clerical, had represented him to the simple Bulgarians as their Great Protector —one who would avenge the harsh usage which they have unquestionably received from the Osmanlis in past ages: the peasants had not yet learned to know that the czar might be a harder taskmaster than the sultan. So far as regards actual hostilities, the Russians did not succeed in this war in raising an insurrection in Bulgaria; the achievements of Omar Pacha, and the presence of the Allies at Varna, prevented this.

Passing westward from Bulgaria, we come to one of the most remarkable nations in Europe—the Servians. A great Slavonic state in the fourteenth century, Servia has passed through many fluctuations of liberty and tyranny. Sometimes she has been under an oppressive Ottoman yoke; at other times, an independent kingdom under her own *krals* or sovereigns; and then, a sort of republic under a bold but tyrannical adventurer; while at the present day her position presents an intermediate aspect. Servia is now as nearly free as a tributary state can well be. The sultan receives an annual tribute, and occupies Belgrade and a few other fortified positions; but in other matters the Servians are almost wholly independent of Turkish control. A sort of parliamentary government exists; schools are numerous; literature is rising; the country is fertile and

prosperous; and there are many circumstances connected with it interesting to Englishmen. The attitude of the Servians during the war was excellent. They had to steer clear of three powers—Turkey, Austria, and Russia. The Turkish yoke has become so light as hardly to be felt, and the Servians shew no great desire to throw off what yet remains. Austria is not quite at ease, in contemplating a rising Servian state, in which liberty of speech and writing and action is more observable than in the Slavonic provinces of her own empire. Many occasions have presented themselves in which Austria has shewn a desire to pick a quarrel with Servia, or to interfere in the internal government of that state. At the outset of the troubles between Russia and Turkey, when the course of events could not be clearly foreseen, Austria assembled an army near the Servian frontier, as if to avail herself of any favourable conjuncture in the progress of the dispute. The Servians, however, exhibited no tendency either to quarrel or to coalesce with the Austrians: they simply wished to remain quiet and neutral. Russian influence was more considerable in Servia, on account of religious sympathies. The Servian princes are in some sense constitutional monarchs, but the principle of hereditary succession has not yet become determinately established; and the czar has had an influence in the election of the princes. At the commencement of the war, Russian intrigue was busy in Servia; emissaries endeavoured to embroil the Servians with the sultan. There was a spirit of nationality, however, exhibited. Servia refused to permit a Turkish army to traverse the province on its way from Bosnia to Widdin; she warded off the entrance of an Austrian army; and she had a sufficient insight into the nature of Russian protection to keep on her guard against the mischievous intrigues of the czar. Servia remained unmolested. At the end of December 1853, the sultan issued a hatti-shérif, confirming, in a formal manner, all the internal constitutional privileges of Servia; acknowledging the position of Alexander, Prince of Servia; and rendering the rule of the Porte so light, as to leave little inducement to the Servians to wish to throw it off.

The province adjoining Servia is more strangely circumstanced. Although mainly inhabited by Slavonians, these Slavonians have in great number become Mohammedans. Renegades in faith are frequently violent haters of their old religion; and, in accordance with this tendency, the Mohammedans of Bosnia are more bigoted even than the Osmanlis, more rooted to the old Oriental usages of the Turks, and opposed to the useful reforms which Abdul-Medjid and his minister Reshid Pacha endeavoured to effect. Bosnian Mohammedans entertain a hearty hatred for the Greek Church; and Austria has been enabled to avail herself of this circumstance to obtain considerable influence in the province. Most of the commerce is in the hands of Austrians; Austrian ducats, zwanzigers, and bank-notes, pass current; and Latin ecclesiastics in the interest of Austria have not been slow to win the good-will of many of the Bosnians, by pandering to their dislike of the Greek Church. The same may, to a considerable extent, be said of the adjacent provinces of Turkish Croatia and Herzegóvina; these contain a greater relative number of Roman Catholics than any other Turkish provinces, and on that account there is a kind of natural religious sympathy between the inhabitants and the Austrians. Not that the Austrian government is viewed with much admiration by any of them; the ties that assist in binding the dwellers on opposite sides of the frontier are those of religion and commerce. Throughout this region, it is Austria, rather than Russia, whose movements require to be watched by those powers which would fain maintain the integrity of Turkey. The wishes of Austria have long been known to statesmen; and in the remarkable conversation between the Emperor Nicholas and Sir Hamilton Seymour in January 1853, as well as in the secret discussions of 1844 (Chapter III.), it is rendered manifest that Austria was ready to take part in the dissolution of the Turkish Empire; to side with the czar in such a contingency, if the coveted 'Illyrian triangle' were made over to her. In a geographical and commercial sense, this triangle might perhaps be more fittingly Austrian than Turkish; but this was not the question which the Allies of the sultan were called upon to consider in 1854. So far from this Austrian tendency being a counterbalance or frustration of Russian aggressive schemes, it was in reality an encouragement; for Russia, if potent at Constantinople, would have allowed Austria—for a time at least—to obtain the Illyrian triangle. In this sense, Russian schemes were dangerous, even in provinces more likely to become Austrian than Russian in the event of a break-up of the Turkish Empire. Many revolts and turbulent insurrections occurred in Bosnia and Herzegóvina in 1850–1–2; but as they were less connected with the czar's intrigues than others which the sultan was called upon to meet, they may be passed without notice here.

In Montenegro, however, the case was different. Here Russian tendencies were most manifest; and it becomes necessary to acquire a clear notion of this extraordinary patch of country, in connection with the coherency or otherwise of the Turkish Empire.

Whether the province be called Montenegro, Tchernegora, Mail-Zéze, or Kara-dagh, the signification is the same; for these four are, respectively, the Venetian, Slavonian, Albanian, and Turkish equivalents of 'Black Mountain,' a general name for the district. Nothing in Europe, perhaps, excels this extraordinary spot as a mountain fastness. Approached from any side, from Albania, or Bosnia, or Dalmatia, it presents to view an almost perpendicular wall of rock, jagged with peaks rising to a height of 6000 or 8000 feet, separated by ravines of the most rugged character.

From this boundary of mountains converge numerous minor chains, which divide and subdivide the included area into deep valleys. The area is scarcely as large as an average English county, yet is it most difficult to enter, and nearly as difficult to traverse.

This savage region has been the abode, the refuge, of hardy mountaineers for unnumbered centuries—attacked by various surrounding nations in turn, but never thoroughly subdued by any. The basis of the population is Slavonic. The sultans have claimed Montenegro as part of European Turkey for four centuries past; but the claim has never been wholly admitted; and hence has ensued terrible bloodshed. Being almost close to the Adriatic, Montenegro has been regarded with wistful eyes by Austria; being of Slavonic race and of Greek Christian faith, Montenegro has long been 'protected' by Russia; and thus the mountain-state has been brought into a degree of political importance which it would not otherwise possess.

In one among many contests to which the Montenegrins were exposed in past times, they

Montenegro.

were left without an acknowledged chieftain; as a substitute, they gave temporal power to their *vladika* or chief-priest, constituting him a sort of warlike pope. This affords a clue to the hold maintained by Russia over the sympathies of Montenegro. Since the time of Peter the Great, the czars have claimed to be the head of the Greek Church; and although this claim may not have been formally admitted, a power has been virtually exercised in conformity with it. The priests of the Greek faith in all the Turkish provinces, as has been more than once explained, very generally admit this claim, covertly if not openly. The czars have been lavish to the vladikas, and have bid highly for power in Montenegro through the influence thus acquired.

Captain Spencer, writing in 1851, speaks thus of Montenegro, in respect to the sympathy between the vladika and the Russians: 'The present vladika received his education in Russia. . . . . The principal revenue of the vladika arises from a pension given by the court of Russia, amounting to about 30,000 florins—an enormous sum in a country like this, where luxury is unknown, and where, in the absence of a metallic currency, commercial transactions are carried on by barter. In addition to this, he possesses certain hereditary lands, fisheries on the Lake of Scutari,* and some trifling benefits as a dignitary of the Greek Church. So large a portion of his income being derived from his pension, some travellers, unacquainted with the democratic character of this people, consider the vladika to be an imperial Natchalnik, and Tchernegora a Russian dependency.'

The consideration last named is one of much significance. Attracted as the Montenegrins may be towards the czar by the ties of race and religion, there yet remains a strong contrast in all that concerns government. The mountaineers retain a warm love of liberty, a scorn of such despotism as that under which the serfs of Russia live; they could ill brook an exchange of their

* It is necessary not to confound this with the Scutari which forms one of the suburbs of Constantinople.

highland freedom for Muscovite repression. M. Golovin, after asserting that no other Slavonian tribe is so devoted to the Russians as the Montenegrins, proceeds to observe: 'But in reality, they are republicans and socialists. The greatest equality prevails amongst them; and never could the Russians establish amongst their warriors any discipline or subordination. A Russian traveller, M. Chijof, told me that on his visit to the vladika, letters were brought and tea was served: the postilion took tea with them.'* The same writer adduces many examples in support of his assertion concerning the general leaning of the mountaineers to Russia in other than political or governmental matters. 'A Russian feels himself at home at Montenegro. The houses are built in the same way as the cabins of the Russian peasants; the holy images are always to be seen in the corner of the rooms; the host treats the Russian as a friend, with true ancient Slavonian hospitality, which goes even so far as the washing of his feet. Montenegrin women kiss the hand of the guest, and are kept in a state of inferiority, serfdom, and contempt, which, however, may be accounted an Eastern rather than a Slavonic custom. . . . . The portraits of the Russian czars are held in almost the same veneration as the holy images, and are also kissed by the people.'

The boundary between Montenegro and Austrian Dalmatia was settled by a treaty in 1840; the boundary on the Turkish side has never been determined, for the Ottoman Porte still insists that Montenegro is a state tributary to the sultan, while the mountaineers will not admit any such subjection. In respect to religion, they are not more opposed to the Turks than to the Austrians or the Venetians; for their Greek faith is of that intensity which leads to a bitter hatred of Roman Catholicism. The numerous contests between the armed bands of the sultan and those of the vladika have been rather national than religious, although 'Death to the Infidel!' has too often been the war-cry on both sides.

To what extent the Montenegrins were incited by Russia, is imperfectly known; but shortly after the declaration of war by Turkey, and before England and France had formally commenced hostilities, the vladika, Prince Daniel, shewed indications of an intention to invade the neighbouring Ottoman provinces; and the pachas of Herzegóvina and Albania were ordered to keep a watch over his movements. Collisions frequently occurred, in February 1854, in the rugged district east of Montenegro, between those who braved and those who defended the sultan's authority: they were, however, rather raids or predatory excursions than regular hostilities; and the Turks experienced no great difficulty in repelling the Montenegrins. Towards the end of March, when the Greeks on the southern frontier of Turkey had risen in rebellion, the vladika made a bolder move; he issued a proclamation to all the Montenegrins, dated March $\frac{16}{28}$, from Cettina or Zettinye, the chief town of the mountain state, calling upon all the mountaineers to declare whether they would join him in a hostile attack upon Turkey, 'to shed their blood for the Holy Cross, the orthodox faith, and their country'—language precisely similar to that used about the same time by the czar and his generals. The movement was said to be fostered by Colonel Kovaleffsky, an emissary from St Petersburg. Four thousand men came forward in a crusading spirit, such as had animated Europe seven centuries earlier; and 20,000 armed men, in all, were ready to join in any pressing exigency. A plan was formed whereby the vladika would enter Herzegóvina; while the voivode, George Petrovitch, with another force, would enter Albania; and the two were then to endeavour to cause a rising among all the Christian villages against the Ottoman authorities. To what extent this movement might have aided the designs of Russia, it is now impossible to say; but the jealousy of Austria was aroused—she feared the growth of a Russianised power within cannon-shot of the Adriatic. An arrangement was concluded between Turkey and Austria, to the effect that, if the vladika's plans were put in practice, an Austrian force should enter Herzegóvina, and there check the progress of the mountaineers. This decision was effectual; the Montenegrin inroads became insignificant; and Russia shewed much irritation at the interference of Austria.

* *The Nations of Russia and Turkey*, p. 50.

GREEK ATTACKS ON THE TURKISH BORDER.

The rapid sketch just given will have rendered intelligible the peculiar relation—to Turkey on the one hand, and to Russia on the other—borne by various provinces inhabited mainly by the Slavonic race. The sultan, while harassed and insulted by Menchikoff's demands, and while driven into a war rendered inevitable by Russian arrogance, was at the same time called upon to meet and subdue rebellious risings in many of his frontier provinces. In the whole extent, east and west, from the Black Sea to the Illyrian boundary; and thence north and south, nearly parallel with the Adriatic—all the border provinces contain far more Christians than Mohammedans; and of these Christians, the members of the Greek Church far outnumber those of the Latin or Roman Catholic. Hence it happened, that when hostilities commenced between Turkey and Russia, the czar calculated on great assistance from the sympathy of these Christians of the Greek Church. If this assistance did not reach the expected degree, the falling-off may be attributed in great part to religious antagonism—the ill-will between the Greek and Latin Churches. The intrigues caused worry and

anxiety to the Ottoman government, but no large expenditure of forces or ammunition.

Far more serious were the events which occurred on the southern frontier of Turkey, the boundary between the Turkish and Greek kingdoms. The Greek religion has been many times mentioned in this Chaper, but not the Greek nation. There is a perplexity about this which sometimes leads to error. The religion of Russia and of many Slavonic provinces is called Greek, because it was established by the Greek or Byzantine emperors of Constantinople fifteen centuries ago; whereas the Greeks, as a nation, occupy the chosen land of the great republicans of classic times, and speak a language but slightly different from the classic Greek. The nation whose capital is at Athens, is Greek in name and Greek in religion: if it has sympathy with Russia, this sympathy is due to religion, and not to race; for the Greek race differs as much from the Slavonic as from the Osmanli.

Greece was part of the Turkish Empire from the date of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople down to the year 1827. But the Greeks never coalesced with the Osmanlis: race and faith kept them asunder. Grecks are and have been spread about in all the towns of European Turkey, carrying on many of the manufactures and branches of commerce, but always maintaining their characteristics as a distinct people. Never, at the worst of times, did they relinquish the hope of one day being again a free people. Their hope was realised, so far at least as in the formation of a petty kingdom, composed of the southern provinces of Turkey. The Greeks began to revolt about the year 1820; and a certain heroic tinge thrown over the events of the movement excited the admiration of Western Europe—of the people, if not of the governments. The success of the Greeks on the coasts of the Morea and the islands, due to their sea-faring capabilities; the demand by the sultan of assistance from the pacha of Egypt; the devastating warfare on land and sea that thence ensued, and lasted many years—at length attracted the attention of other powers. A treaty was signed, by virtue of which English, French, and Russian fleets fought for the Greeks against Turkey and her vassal. On the 20th of October 1827 was fought the battle of Navarino—an 'untoward event,' as the English minister truly designated it: an event which nearly annihilated the Turkish navy, and greatly increased the power of Russia to interfere in Turkish affairs. True, Greek independence of Turkish rule was advanced thereby; but the elements of disorder still remained.

It is now known that the English government of that day, when it took a part in Turkish affairs, did not at first contemplate the formation of a Greek kingdom distinct from Turkey.*

Between the years 1827 and 1833, Greece was a scene of discord; severed politically from Turkey, but unable to settle down into a regular state. At length the allies of Greece offered the crown of that newly formed kingdom to the king of Bavaria, for his younger son Otho, then a minor; and the offer being accepted, Otho, accompanied by a council of regency, entered his dominions. Otho, who came of age in 1835, professed the Roman Catholic religion, as did likewise his queen, a princess of Oldenburg; but a clause in the constitutional charter enacted, that the children of the marriage should be brought up in the Greek faith, conformably with the religion of the country.

The formation of this new Greek kingdom led to the aggressive movements of 1853–4 in this wise. Many Turkish provinces, containing more Greeks than Osmanlis, were left out of this repartition; they remained subject to a Mohammedan sultan, instead of coming under the sway of a Christian king; the Greek population exhibited a turbulent tendency on many occasions; and when the czar of Russia saw that a movement in that quarter might aid his schemes, he spared neither influence nor promises, neither gold nor honours, to obtain a control over the king and court of Greece. Epirus and Thessaly—Turkish provinces having a marked preponderance of Greek inhabitants—were not included in the new kingdom. This mode of establishing a Greek kingdom has been characterised as 'one of those unfortunate half-measures, which, instead of solving a difficulty, only lead to further and more serious complications.' The establishment of the new kingdom, far from being regarded by the Greeks as a final measure, was only looked upon by them as the first step towards the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and as the sanction of Europe for the establishment of Greek rule on the ruins of Islam. A kind of secret society was formed in Greece, having in view a dreamy project for the re-establishment of a Greek empire, with Constantinople as its capital; and the emissaries of this society, spread throughout Epirus and Thessaly, kept the Greek-Christian inhabitants of those Turkish provinces in a fever of expectation, by holding out to them hopes of being one day freed from the Ottoman yoke. When Greece was formed into a kingdom, the boundary-line was ill chosen; it left both sides open to incursions, and could only be guarded at an immense expense.

* The Earl of Aberdeen, foreign minister at the time, explained this matter twenty-five years afterwards. 'I have already, I think, referred in this House to the fact, which your lordships well know, that at the beginning, and during the progress of the Greek revolution, Mr Canning never contemplated the existence of Greece as an independent kingdom; neither did I nor the Duke of Wellington ever contemplate the existence of Greece as an independent kingdom, but solely as a vassal state under the *suzeraineté* of the Porte, somewhat similar to Wallachia and Moldavia; but when the Treaty of Adrianople was signed, it appeared to me, and my noble friend then at the head of the government agreed with me, that the condition of the Turkish Empire was so perilous in itself, that it would be extremely unwise to create a state, and place it under the protection and suzeraineté of an empire which itself was exposed to extreme peril, and the existence of which was not to be counted on for any time with the least degree of certainty. Therefore we proposed to our allies to convert that vassal state into an independent kingdom. Our allies agreed, and the Porte at last assented to it also; and hence the existence of Greece as an independent kingdom is due to the impression produced on us by the terms of that treaty.'—*Speech in the House of Lords, June* 26, 1854.

This circumstance afforded great facilities for predatory attacks on the Turkish territory from Greece. Moreover, the new government proved to be singularly unfitted for the development of a healthy nationality. The young king took with him the notions of petty despotism which too often belong to the German princes. Instead of leaving the Greeks their local institutions, he sought to subject everything to a courtly rule, ridiculous in so small a territory, and unsuited to the peculiar characteristics of the Greeks. A camarilla, or court-party; a centralised system of government, in which all honours and offices were bestowed by the king; a large military force, where an efficient police would have sufficed; a grand parade of courtiers, of lords and ladies of the household, for a state which could scarcely pay any of its debts; a sumptuous palace at Athens, built at a cost which should have defrayed the legitimate expenses of the government—such were the means whereby King Otho misgoverned the country intrusted to his keeping. The Greek character deteriorated as a consequence; a certain natural tendency to cunning, craft, deceit, was fostered; while the nobler qualities were repressed. The queen, too—a woman of great decision of character—belonged to one of those German families which almost worshipped the Czar Nicholas, as the incarnation of that despotic power which they so much wished to imitate in their own humbler sphere; and this Russian tendency led the queen to advocate measures which would have rendered Greece a tributary to Russia, rather than an independent state. Athens became to a considerable extent a resort of needy adventurers from various countries; European shops and coffee-houses, hotels and billiard-rooms, French perruquiers and milliners, Italian confectioners, German pipe-makers, English drapers, Armenian money-lenders, Oriental bazaar-keepers, Jewish clothes-salesmen, kilted Albanians—all mingled with the native Greeks in the once famous city of Theseus.*

A society, called the *Heteria* or *Hetæria*, laboured for many years to bring about the establishment of a new empire, which should comprise the Greeks, the south Slavonians, or those of the Danubian provinces, and the Wallacks or Roumani, with Constantinople as the capital, and Greece as the chief member of the state. This was on the ground of community of religion. Another principle, busily disseminated during many years by men more zealous than observant, was that of *Panslavism*—the bringing into one whole of all countries inhabited by Slavonians. This was on the ground of community of race. While, as a third variety, there were *Hellenists*, who desired that all whose veins contained the true Greek blood should form one state, independent of the Osmanlis on the one hand, and of the Slavonians on the other, although allied to the latter in faith. These three moving forces occasionally coalesced, and occasionally met in opposition; and it is not always easy to see which was most active in producing the turbulent proceedings of the Greeks on the Turkish border. It is possible, even, to name a fourth source of disturbance; for the Russian sympathies of the court did not correspond exactly with the yearnings of the Heteria, or of the Panslavists, or of the Hellenists.

Petty annoyances frequently occurred on the part of the subjects of King Otho towards the Turkish government between 1835 and 1853; but the Menchikoff mission was the signal for something more daring. There is abundant evidence that the court of Athens was petted and flattered by the Czar Nicholas, as a part of his deep-laid scheme concerning Turkey. If the Greek Christians of Thessaly and Epirus could be roused into rebellion against the sultan, the weakening of the Ottoman power, 'the sick man,' would have facilitated Russian machinations. True, the Greeks themselves might have done this on the inspiration of nationality, the sympathies of the Hellenic race on either side of the border; but the result would not the less surely favour the prosecution of his plans.

Prince Menchikoff, it will be remembered (p. 16), delivered his credentials at Constantinople on the 2d of March 1853. At that very time, other Russian officials went to Athens, and were soon busily engaged with King Otho and his court. Admiral Korniloff was one of these; he had a private interview with the king; and soon afterwards much political agitation was observable at Athens. Early in April, the fruits of this appeared. Mr Wyse, British minister at Athens, wrote home a dispatch (April 7) stating that 1200 men, with four pieces of artillery, had just departed for the Turkish frontier; that the English, French, and Turkish envoys had not been informed of the movement or its objects; and the Greek government gave evasive answers concerning the intent of such a proceeding. Mr Wyse's language was full of significance, regarding the sleepless activity and unshrinking audacity of the Russian agents. Speaking of this sudden movement of Greek troops, he said: 'Some connect it with the events of Montenegro, others with the Russian mission of Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople, Admiral Korniloff's arrival and supposed interviews with the king here, &c. Both regard it as little less than the commencement of another "War of Independence," in which all the Greek race will ere-long be called to share, and which is to terminate, not in a kingdom of Greece, but in the Hellenic Empire of the East. Of course the Greek government officially deprecate these extravagances, and the Russian legation cannot give them their avowed support; but neither is of much consequence: the Russian government need do nothing, for everything is done for them by the Russian party, of which there is a large section in the ministry and the court, it is believed, at its head. If official documents are silent, their organ, the

* Golovin.

Aiōn, speaks in a tone which no Greek misunderstands. It abounds of late in unmeasured denunciations of the Christian powers who alone keep alive, it is alleged, the anti-Christian and monstrous tyranny of Turkey; it calls upon them to break up the decrepit iniquity at once; it points out the Hellenic Empire which is inevitably to replace it under the invincible arms of Russia, and already designates (with little heed to the reigning Bavarian dynasty) the Russian prince (brought up by a Greek nurse) who would be so well fitted to preside over its destinies. . . . Whatever may be the causes or pleas of this military movement, one thing is certain, that it has eminently contributed to keep alive, if not rouse, the antipathies, passions, and expectations of the Greeks; in other words, to prepare more and more the materials and instruments, in a Russian sense, for the crisis (to which all are now looking) whenever it shall come. This explains why there was such silence here until the arrangements were carried out, lest by any chance we should have impeded the execution.' *

There appears to have been a dispute about that time, concerning the position of two villages, whether they were on the northern or on the southern, on the Turkish or on the Greek, side of the ill-defined frontier-line. The court of Athens pretended that the warlike movements were intended simply to enforce the Greek claim in respect to those two villages; but this pretension was merely a screen to other objects. Besides this approach of Greek troops to the Turkish frontier—acknowledged, but not with a truthful explanation, by the court of Athens—there were repeated acts of brigandage, which the court disclaimed, but adopted no measures to prevent. The state of Athens was at that time peculiar. The Russian party had its newspaper organ, the *Aiōn*, while the independent or Hellenic party had the *Athena*; the former advocated the placing of Greece under Russian protection, while the Hellenists and their newspaper desired to see a true nationality arise—Greeks governed by Greek institutions in a Greek spirit. Had the king been worthy of his position, the Greek nationality might possibly have been fostered into healthy action; but he was swayed by a narrow spirit of petty despotism; he was greatly influenced by his queen, who, in her turn, was influenced by the promises and projects of the Czar Nicholas. She had day-dreams of being one day a queen, perhaps an empress, at Constantinople. While the diplomatists were discussing the propriety or impropriety of the Greek intrigues on the Turkish border, the queen went to Germany, stopping at Trieste and Vienna on her way; and at those places she called upon the Greek merchants to contribute towards the efforts which their compatriots were making to throw off the Ottoman yoke. The king and queen were doubtlessly affected by varying motives in their conduct, as the tide of events flowed on; but the Russian agency in Greece, as in many of the Turkish provinces, was mainly carried on through the medium of the priesthood. 'The real secret of Russian strength in Greece,' it was observed at that period in the *Times*, 'is, that it lies not in the cliques or coteries of Athens, but in the hearts of the people—in the deep fanaticism which forms the basis of the Greek character. It is not generals and senators who form the agents of the czar, but needy and ill-fed priests, sprung from the ranks of the people, the brothers and cousins of the savage borderers who have precipitated themselves on the Thessalian towns. So far from the higher classes having urged on a Russian propaganda, it is the fact that they have been forced into dependence on the Muscovite by the pressure of a priest-led people.' The czar, it appears from a dispatch written by Mr Wyse on August 14, had about that time distributed a large quantity of church vestments to various churches in Greece; he also sent a Russian priest, who made a tour through the Morea, 'for his health and pleasure,' as he said; but the priest, says Mr Wyse, 'is also chaplain to the Russian legation, and the period is singularly chosen.'

The English and French ministers at Athens protested so strongly against the tendencies of King Otho's government, that no military inroads upon the Turkish territories were made during the summer, other than mere brigandage. As autumn advanced, however, more troops were sent from Athens to the frontier; and M. Païcos, the Greek minister for foreign affairs, gave, in this as in numerous other instances, a hollow and disingenuous reply to Mr Wyse's demands for explanations on the matter. Collateral information from another quarter, about the same time, shewed in a remarkable way how little likely the court of Athens was to respect the southern provinces of Turkey. Bavaria, it has been explained, was the native country, the family home, of King Otho; and the court of Munich had never ceased to take a deep interest in the welfare of the court of Athens. Sir John Milbanke, British minister at Munich, wrote a dispatch, in which he stated that the Bavarian ministers had openly sounded him on the desirability of taking Epirus and Thessaly from Turkey, and giving them to Greece—a proposal which, whatever might have been the case when the kingdom of Greece was first formed, came with an ill grace at a time when Turkey was weighed down by troubles brought on by Russia.

The year 1854 opened in the midst of great excitement in the south-western provinces of Turkey. Emissaries from Athens, whether instigated by the court or otherwise, endeavoured to arouse the Greek inhabitants of Epirus and Thessaly to revolt. These endeavours continued throughout the month of January. The influence of Russia was unquestionably displayed during these movements, whatever may have been the case in respect to the unworthy occupant of the Greek throne.

* Parliamentary Papers on Greco-Turkish Affairs, p. 3.

In February, the following proclamation and form of oath were distributed in the neighbourhood of Arta, one of the principal towns in Epirus :—

'PROCLAMATION.

We, the undersigned, inhabitants and primates (elders) of Radobitsa (Radovitzi), in the province of Arta, sighing under the pressure of the exorbitant taxation which has been imposed on us by Ottoman conquerors, who are not only incapable of civilisation, but, besides, violate the chastity of our maidens, do renew the struggle of 1821, and swear by the name of the Almighty and by our sacred fatherland, in no case, and under no plea, to lay down our arms until we have obtained our liberty.

Now, at the commencement of the struggle, we hope to rouse the sympathy of our brethren, of the free Greeks, and of all those groaning under the Ottoman yoke, so that they may take up arms to renew the holy war of 1821, and fight for faith, fatherland, and our inalienable rights.

The war is holy and just, and no one who considers the weight of our burden and the rights of nations will utter a word in defence of our barbarous oppressors, or advocate the cause of the Crescent, which is planted on the summit of our sacred church.

Up then, brethren; rush to battle; throw off the hated yoke of our tyrants; and with us loudly proclaim to God and the world that we do battle for our fatherland, and that the Most High is our shield of defence.

JOHANN COSOVAKIS,	DEMETER KOKAS,
COSTI KOSMA,	BAS NAKOS,
NTULAS BASOS,	COLIOS MAVROMATI,
K. C. STUMA,	DEMETER SCALTRIOJANNI,
GEORG CALZICGAMI,	C. MEREKAS,
K. KATZILAS,	KONST.
ZEGARIDES,	

THE OATH.

I swear by the Holy Gospels, by the Holy Trinity, and by Him crucified, that I take up arms which shall not be cast aside until our oppressors are driven from the homes of our fathers, and my fatherland is free. I also swear by an Almighty God to be faithful to my flag; and, if necessary, to shed the last drop of my blood in defence of my comrades.'

It is believed that these high-sounding documents must have emanated from a more influential source than an insignificant village, whose name hardly finds mention in any maps. The ferment which arose was not confined to the two provinces above named, but extended also into Macedonia, Rumelia, and Albania; the Turks were forced to abandon the towns of Arta and Janina (Ioannina), in which the Greek element was too strong for them. One Spiridion Karaiskaki, lieutenant in the Greek army, was said to be at the head of the insurgents; and although the government, consequent on the hints and threats of the British and French ministers, ordered him to return to Athens, many circumstances tended to shew that the court were with, rather than against, the insurgents. The Russian emissaries had everywhere declared, in the country districts, that the Western Powers were favourable to them; that all the Christian states were longing for the downfall of the Ottoman race; and that an insurrection among the Greek subjects of the sultan would be regarded by the potentates as a righteous act in a righteous cause. Many months elapsed before the Greeks discovered how grossly they had been deceived in this matter.

When once the rising had commenced, it proceeded rapidly. Revolutionary committees, so called, went from village to village, urging the inhabitants to rebel against the Turkish authorities. Guns were distributed gratuitously to all who expressed their willingness to join the insurgents. In many cases the Turkish inhabitants of the towns, terrified by what was passing, fled for refuge into the interior provinces; and one or two of the pachas shut themselves up in strong fortresses. Prince Gortchakoff was at that time preparing to cross the Danube; and the Turkish authorities obtained possession of a secret letter, by which two or three leaders of the Greek insurgents were shewn to be in direct communication with the prince. So little did the king and court care to repress this movement, that criminals let loose from Athens and Chalcis, vagabonds from all the towns, and hot-headed young students, set off for the frontier to join the rebels, headed by Generals Grivas and Tzavella; they were well supplied with money, which, it was afterwards known, came from Russia; and a secret council sat at Athens, to direct the movements. When these proceedings became known to Turkey and her Allies, the necessity for prompt interference was at once seen; a small English and Turkish flotilla sailed from Constantinople to the Gulf of Volo, to watch the movements in Thessaly; while Admiral Dundas sent a few ships to the Gulf of Arta, to protect Prevesa and other parts of the coast of Epirus. The two gulfs here named mark, respectively, the east and west termini of the boundary-line between the two kingdoms. Ships, however, could render little aid to the towns and villages in the interior. The insurgents obtained possession of the defile of Pente Pegadia, on the only road from Janina to Arta; and hence the Turkish pacha of the former place experienced much difficulty in sending any reinforcements to Arta, which was one of the foci of the insurrection. In the port of Arta itself, a Greek gun-boat sank the Turkish guard-ship, before the English vessels arrived. An action took place near Arta, on 23d February, in which the insurgents defeated the Turks; and hence the latter, although retaining the citadel of Arta, lost possession of the town.

A double aspect was displayed throughout these strange transactions. The ardent, and perhaps sincere, insurgents were really Hellenists, desirous of forming a nationality which should include all the Greeks; while Russia was watching, ready to foster the Hellenism up to a certain point, and then convert it into a species of Russianism. Mr Wyse informed the Earl of Clarendon, in one of his dispatches, that of the seven cabinet ministers at Athens, Païcos, Vlachos, and Soutzo were vehement supporters of Russia; while Kriezis, Ambrosiades, and Pellika would follow where the others might lead; leaving only one, M. Privilegio,

minister of finance, almost powerless as an advocate of more national views. It hence became impossible for Mr Wyse, and the ministers of other powers in alliance with Turkey, to credit the assertions of Païcos, that the Greek court was not responsible for the insurrection. Officials of almost all ranks left Athens for the frontier, week after week—some with the intention of forming a provisional government in the revolted provinces; for there seems to have been a project to erect into separate states the provinces which they might conquer, and afterwards vote their annexation to the kingdom of Greece, so as to avoid implicating the Greek government openly in the insurrection.

The proceedings in Epirus were rendered doubly deplorable by the conduct of Arnaout soldiers, mountaineers of Albania, employed by the pachas to repel the insurgents; these men, having offered to serve one month without pay, made no hesitation in avowing that plunder was their principal object; and, as a consequence, the peaceful villages became completely devastated, and the inhabitants forced to seek safety in flight. Another wretched consequence of the anarchy was, that vagabond adventurers from various countries bent their steps towards Epirus, and engaged in a species of brigandage, under colour of assisting the Greeks in establishing their independence; and thus the poor villagers suffered from all parties.

Athens, as spring advanced, was in a state of wild excitement. 'All the streets,' said an eye-witness, 'are full of groups discussing the actual state of affairs, indulging in the wildest schemes and hopes, and using their loud voices as proofs of their assertions. The coffee-houses and gin-shops resound in the evening with the *Parisienne* and the *Marseillaise*, both of which have been quite naturalised in Greece, and become national melodies, with suitable words adapted to them. Outside of the town, some forty or fifty patriots are drilling under the superintendence of a sergeant; while in the town, the soldiers as well as the sailors of the two men-of-war cutters, which would be more appropriately called *boys*-of-war, are treated with marked regard. Even the rising generation seems to be roused. The excitement has taken with them a purely artistic turn, and shews itself in sundry chalk-portraits of the Emperor Nicholas on the walls.'

Matters had now arrived at a pitch too serious for the Turkish government to remain longer quiet. Until the month of March, the Turkish chargé d'affaires, Nesset Bey, remained at Athens, complaining and protesting in vain against the proceedings of the Greek government. He demanded, on the part of his court, the prosecution of those who had crossed the frontier, should they ever return within it; and the exercise of control over one or two newspapers, which systematically promulgated the most violent doctrines respecting the extermination of the Osmanlis and their religion. The king refused his assent; the Porte withdrew its representative from Athens about the end of March; the chargé d'affaires of Greece was withdrawn from Constantinople; and diplomatic relations ceased between the two countries. One consequence of this series of events was most disastrous. Turkey contains a vast number of Greeks, and the Porte ordered the departure of such of their number as were subjects of the king of Greece. Constantinople itself contained at that time 25,000 or 30,000 of such Greeks, who had sore reason to deplore the weak folly of their sovereign. They were all ordered to quit Turkey within a specified time. A resident at Constantinople, in April, said that every steamer which left that city for the Archipelago was crowded with human beings, so thickly wedged together that to walk the decks was impossible. Most of these wretched creatures had been reduced to the depths of poverty; and when thrown ashore, friendless and destitute, in Greece, three-fourths of the men went to swell the ranks of the Thessalian insurgents, or took to their old trade of piracy in the Ægean. Numbers of the shops in Pera were shut up by the expulsion of their owners. More than thirty medical men, the most skilful in the capital, were forced to leave it. Hotel-keepers, dragomans, domestic servants, both male and female, all were comprised in this sweeping edict. Of the Greeks in Constantinople, but a small number possessed the means of transporting themselves to Athens and seeking another occupation. They sold everything to obtain the passage-money for their families; and when disgorged by the steamers on the shores of Greece, they became as destitute as if thrown on the beach of a desert island. The upper classes of Greeks in Constantinople were comparatively less affected, for most of the Greek commercial firms had partners who were under French or Austrian protection, and who were still enabled to carry on the business of the firms. To the poor, the extradition was most desolating. The Allies of the Turkish government regretted the mode in which this expulsion, possibly necessary in a time of hostilities, was managed; for, while burning hatred was infused into the minds of the Hellenists thus expelled, the much larger number of Greek rayahs (Greek subjects of the Porte) left behind were in no degree rendered more favourably disposed than before to their Turkish masters.

The rupture with Turkey seems to have impelled the Greek court on its headlong course. The connivance of the government became no longer merely overt. The queen not only permitted many of her domestics to join the insurgents, but promised them fifty drachmas per month each during their absence. At an interview which the English and French ministers demanded with the royal couple, the king expressed great irritation at the interference of the Western Powers in the matter. 'The queen,' Mr Wyse remarked, in his dispatch relating to the interview, 'was if possible more excited. She indulged in the strongest invectives. . . . . Whenever the king appeared to waver, her majesty interfered, and with powers of

persuasion which could not be resisted, and which shewed against what influences he had to contend, overbore every chance of return to calmer and wiser conclusions.'

The insurgents were at no time formidably numerous; their power consisting rather in their mischievous audacity. Hence the warfare that ensued was scarcely of a character to admit of definite description. A few hundred insurgents would attack, or be attacked by, a few hundred Turks, with results varying according to the circumstances of each case, but in every instance attended by a vast amount of excitement, rumour, and exaggeration. A Turkish force of 1700 men, sent in April direct from Constantinople to Arta, under Fuad Effendi, was really formidable as against the insurgents. Fuad defeated them completely at the town of Peta, not far from Arta, and succeeded in capturing a mass of correspondence which proved the complicity of the Greek government in the insurrection. It also proved that there was disunion among the leaders; that the misguided soldiers suffered much privation and exhibited much discontent; and, moreover, that the Greeks of Epirus and Thessaly shewed far less sympathy with the emissaries from Athens than the latter had expected. The principal names among the leaders of the insurgents at that time were Theodor Grivas, Karaiskaki, Tzavella, Zaho Milio, Ralli, Vaja, Rangos, Zerva, Kucsonika, Papa Costa, Panuria, Hagi Petro, Kalamaras, Zachas, and Kataracha; such a list, with a prefix of 'General' to many of the names, has an imposing appearance; but each leader had a few hundred men only under his command; and this command was in many instances little more than that which a brigand holds over his followers.

After the defeat at Peta, many of the insurgents departed to their own homes in a sort of panic; and it required all the address of their leaders—by promises of arms, ammunition, money, and military instructors—to induce them to re-form. At the eastern scene of operations, in Thessaly, the insurgents met with a little more success. On the 11th of May, at Kalabaka in that province, the Greeks under Petros defeated a body of Turks commanded by Selim Bey; the affair, though small in magnitude, afforded opportunity for a Greek dispatch, written in an inflated style, imitative of those by the Russian generals. The Turkish troops, in respect to soldiers' pay and commissariat supplies, were in a neglected state at the time in Thessaly; and were ill fitted to meet an enemy in the field, ill supplied as that enemy may also have been. The consequences to the unfortunate Thessalians were fearful. It was difficult to decide who committed most ravages—the Greeks in the insurgent ranks, or the Albanians who acted with the Turks. Plunder, murder, violation, burning, raged all around; no fewer than 700,000 sheep—belonging not only to Thessalians, but to the neighbouring mountaineers of Epirus and Macedonia—were carried off by the insurgents. This, be it remembered, was effected by men who professed to have come to liberate their brother Hellenists from the Turkish yoke.

The Greek court, infatuated by Russia, proceeded further and further in aid of the insurgents; until at length the English and French governments deemed strong measures necessary. Even so early as the first week in April, the Earl of Clarendon gave a significant warning to M. Tricoupi, Greek minister at the court of St James's, telling him 'that the court and government of Greece were deliberately aiding the cause of the emperor of Russia, with whom England and France are at war, and injuring the sultan, whose cause England and France are supporting; and that these being acts of direct hostility against two of the protecting powers of Greece, the king and queen of Greece must be prepared for the consequences.'*

The instrumentality of Russian agents, in fostering the insurrectionary movement, became more evident than ever. Mr Wyse, writing to the home government on the 27th of April, said that King Otho had promised to take part openly in the movement, only on certain contingencies; one of which presented itself in a wrangle for precedence among the chieftains. 'Six hundred thousand drachmas are understood to be reserved in the hands of M. George Stanoros, director of the National Bank, to meet the contingency. It is believed, on the old Byzantine plan, that when the disappointed chiefs, with their hungry followers, shall reappear, they can be bribed into tranquillity by the expedient. Prince John Soutzo, son of the Hospodar Michel Soutzo, domiciled here, and Secretary of Legation at St Petersburg, has just arrived from that capital, charged, it is said, with the same counsel from the emperor, and provided with means to carry it out. Far from the insurrection having ended, he asserts that it has only begun, and that for two years at least, despite of any coercion from the Allied powers (whose threats and means to enforce them he regards with contempt), the Greek government can carry on a most successful war in the interior of the Turkish Empire. A subordinate portion of the plan is to represent Prussia and Austria as favouring, and England and France as likely to quarrel from the incompatibility of their respective interests. In this mission he works with a zeal and unscrupulosity not unworthy of his Greek and Russian masters.'

In the middle of May, the English and French governments determined to send a combined military force to Greece, a small number of English, with a larger number of French: the whole to amount to 6000 or 7000, and to be placed under the French General Forey. This force was to proceed to the Piræus, the port of Athens, to take

* Parliamentary Papers on Greco-Turkish Affairs, p. 149.

possession of that port, and there to sojourn until the effect of the measure on the weak and infatuated king should have become apparent. In accordance with this determination, a few thousand troops and a small flotilla proceeded to Greece, and took up the proposed position in the vicinity of the capital. The effect was immediate. The king awoke from his dream of ambition. The great czar was far away, unable to send troops and ships to his aid; Russian intrigues and Russian money were no match for the immediate presence of the Western Powers; and the king, despite the passionate tears and disappointment of his consort, promised to discountenance the insurgents, and to aid in restoring peace on the Turkish border. Shortly before this transaction, three Russian ships at Trieste were bought by the insurgents, and paid for by means of money from the National Bank at Athens; these had to be given up, immediately on the arrival of the expeditionary force. One salutary step taken by the king, consequent on the pressure applied to him, was to change his ministry, appointing another under Mavrocordato, empowered to recall the insurgents, to change the members of the royal household, and to dismiss the functionaries who had been implicated in the insurrection. The king, however, hated the work which he was thus compelled to perform; and viewed with dislike the ministers whose appointment was thus forced upon him. He felt the bitterness of knowing that the enthusiasts, who had expected to found a new Byzantine empire, had ended their exploits by laying waste and plundering the Christian provinces of Turkey; reducing thousands of Greek families to the verge of starvation, without seriously damaging the Ottoman authority; while those who objected to the insurrection, but wanted spirit and resolution to oppose it openly, now experienced the mortification of seeing their country coerced into good sense by foreign powers.

The new ministry issued a decree of amnesty for all the officers who had joined the insurgents, provided they returned within a month. Three commissioners—Colonel Packmore, on the part of Greece, and Mr Merlin and M. Guerin, belonging to the respective consulates, on the parts of England and France—were despatched to Thessaly, to make this decree as widely known as possible, and to support it by their personal and official influence. The insurgent chiefs quickly accepted the offer, seeing the uselessness of further attempts in their so-called patriotism. Their submission was the more readily obtained, on account of two defeats which the insurgents had suffered from the Turks—one about the end of May, at Radovitzi, a few hours' march distant from Arta; the other in the middle of June, at Kalabaka, in Thessaly. The last-named contest was of serious import; for Kalabaka had been regarded as the stronghold of the insurgents, who, by holding that place, interrupted the direct communication between Thessaly and Epirus, and spread a panic through the surrounding districts. Fuad Effendi, the general who had before given the insurgents a check in Epirus, crossed the Pindus range from Janina to Thessaly, and thoroughly routed the insurgents at Kalabaka.

No particular date can be assigned for the termination of this Greek, or rather Russo-Greek, attack on the southern frontier of Turkey. From the day on which the Anglo-French troops landed in the vicinity of Athens, May 26th, the struggle was virtually at an end. The months of June and July witnessed the gradual withdrawal of the insurgents from the Turkish territory, and the gradual restoration of peace to the distracted and impoverished provinces of Epirus and Thessaly. The last scenes of this episode were nearly coincident, in time, with the raising of the siege of Silistria; with the evacuation by the Russians of the Danubian Principalities; with the transference of the English and French armies from Scutari and Constantinople to Varna; with the assembling of the Allied fleets at Kavarna and Baltschik; with the hostile manœuvres of the Russian and Turkish forces in the region around Gumri, Bayazid, and Kars; with the suppression of the Russo-Montenegrin attacks on the western frontier of Turkey; and with the vain attempts of the diplomatists at Vienna to bring about such a peace as would render unnecessary an expedition of the Allies to the Crimea.

CHAPTER VI.

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH IN 1854.

IMPELLED as the Western Powers were, by every principle of honour and international justice, to make a bold stand against the pernicious ambition of Russia, the warlike operations necessarily spread over a wide area. No longer could the struggle be regarded as a mere means of protection for the sultan's dominions. It is one among the many miseries of war, that towns and provinces, far distant from those wherein the contest began, are made to suffer in a cause which the inhabitants perhaps regard with little sympathy. The hardy Finlanders of the north know little and care less for Turks or Crimeans; yet were their homes and sea-side chattels certain to be placed in peril by the results of a quarrel which in the first instance affected the south of Europe only. It has already been pointed out (p. 76) that, so long as Russia remains at peace with all the continental states except France and Turkey, there are only four regions in which she can be practically assailed by the Western Powers. These are indicated, respectively, by the Black Sea, the Baltic, the White Sea, and the extreme northern part of the Pacific around Kamtchatka. How far the warlike proceedings in the southern or Black Sea regions, in 1854, were aided by any achievements of the Allied Powers further north, it is now necessary to consider.

RUSSIAN POWER IN THE BALTIC PROVINCES.

The Baltic, by far the most important sea in the north of Europe, is touched by a larger number of states than the Black Sea; on whose shores Russia and Turkey alone hold dominion—unless, indeed, the Caucasian tribes can be said to possess any of the coast-line. The Baltic provinces belong —some to Russia, some to Prussia, others to Sweden, others again to Denmark, while two of the minor German states touch this sea at the south-west corner. Taken as a whole, the Baltic is strangely shaped, affording many more nooks and corners, headlands, deep bays, narrow straits, isles and islets, than the Black Sea; and its contiguity to England renders its geographical characteristics especially interesting to us in time of war.

A map of Northern Europe will shew that the North Sea or German Ocean is bounded on the west by England, Scotland, and the Shetlands; and on the east, by Holland, Denmark, and Norway. This sea, from Shetland in the north, to Ostend in the south, extends about 700 miles; while its width in the central portion, between England and Denmark, may average about 400 miles. In carrying the eye along the east boundary of this sea, a broad opening will be seen, corresponding in latitude with the part of Scotland between Aberdeen and the north boundary of the Moray Firth; this opening, the Skäger Rack, is the mouth of the Baltic—the only place at which the waters of this sea, and of the rivers Neva, Düna, Niemen, Vistula, Oder, &c., can escape to the ocean. It follows, from this position, that the Baltic is nearer to Scotland than to England—about 140 miles nearer to Leith than to London, on the lines of route taken by ships. The Skäger Rack is a broad strait, extending nearly east and west for about 150 miles. At its inner or eastern end begins another strait, called the Kattegat, of about equal length, but extending north and south. The Skäger Rack is bounded on the north by Norway, and on the south by Denmark; while the Kattegat has Sweden on the east, and Denmark on the west. The Kattegat communicates on the south with the Baltic by three narrow straits—the Sound, the Great Belt, and the Little Belt. The 'Sound dues,' frequently a subject of diplomacy and discontent, are an impost collected by Denmark upon all ships engaged in the Baltic trade, on their passage past Elsineur or Helsingör in the Sound. The Sound, between Sweden and the Danish island of Zealand, is the chief passage for ships; although use can also be made of the Great Belt, between Zealand and Funen; and of the Little Belt, between Funen and Schlesvig.

Once within the intricate entrance to the Baltic, the waters extend nearly in a north-east direction, but not without many deviations. At the northern end is the Gulf of Bothnia; on the east, those of

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Finland and Livonia. In one direction, from Tornea to Stettin, a line of 900 miles can be drawn, nearly north and south, with scarcely any interruption from land. The Gulf of Bothnia runs 400 miles north of the main body of the Baltic, with a width varying from 30 to 100 miles; while the Gulf of Finland stretches 280 miles eastward, with a width varying from 40 to 70 miles. The Gulf of Livonia is much smaller than either of the others. All the rain that falls on one-fifth of the area of Europe flows into the Baltic through the medium of numerous rivers, five of which have just been named. Nevertheless, the Baltic is among the shallowest of large seas, owing in part to the quantity of mud brought down by the numerous rivers; this mud cannot find an outlet into the German Ocean, and hence the Baltic is yearly becoming more and more silted up. The navigation by a large fleet is difficult and dangerous, owing to this as well as to other causes. If, practically rather than geographically, we consider Copenhagen to mark the beginning, and St Petersburg the end of the Baltic, the serpentine ship-route from the one to the other would be about 800 miles in length.

This maritime region, considered in relation to the political ownership of its coasts, and to the chief ports enriched by its trade, presents the following features:—All the north-western portion of coast belongs to Sweden and Norway, marked by the tortuous line of the Skäger Rack, the Kattegat, the Sound, the west side of the main portion of the Baltic, and the west side of the Gulf of Bothnia. Christiansand, Gothenborg, Landskrona, Malmö, Christianstad, Karlskrona, Stockholm, Umea—these are the chief towns or ports along this line of coast; while Gothland and Öland are the chief of the Swedish islands. Further east and south-east, the mighty power of Russia displays itself; the east shore of the Gulf of Bothnia, both shores of the Gulf of Finland, the whole of the Gulf of Livonia, the coasts of Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland—all belong to Russia; as do the Äland Islands, at the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia; Cronstadt Island, near St Petersburg; Ösel and Dago, at the mouth of the Gulf of Livonia. On this long and irregular line of coast are established the towns and ports of Tornea, Uleaborg, Vasa, Abo, Helsingfors, Viborg, St Petersburg, Peterhof, Revel, Port Baltic, and Riga; while on islands near the coast, are the formidable fortresses of Cronstadt, Sveaborg, and Bomarsund. On the south and east, the waters of the Baltic wash some of the Prussian and German provinces, with the ports of Memel, Elbing, Dantzig, Stralsund, Wismar, Lübeck; and on the west, the Danish town of Kiel.

Little is needed, besides the mere naming of these towns, to suggest an idea of the vast importance of the Baltic, both politically and commercially; and of the necessity, during war with Russia, of maintaining a strict blockade of such of the ports as belong to that power.

The course of the narrative in Chapter I., aided by the coloured map, will have shewn that Russian domination on the shores of the Baltic is comparatively of modern growth. Peter the Great's first port was Archangel. How he and his successors struggled until they obtained ports in the Black Sea, has been narrated; but this was not all. The Muscovites desired to obtain access to the Baltic, to share in the commerce and influence of that region: a reasonable wish, if carried into effect by no unfair means. Russia had, or professed to have, a slight claim to Livonia, a province on the eastern side of the gulf of the same name; the claim was indeed loosely founded, but it served as an incentive to Peter's ambition. There were also two provinces, Ingria and Carelia, which Sweden had won from the Muscovites in former wars, and which Peter yearned to regain. In the contest which followed, the great generalship of Charles XII. prevented Peter from reaping many advantages; but still Russia succeeded in planting a foot on the shores of the Baltic; and the city of St Petersburg, built near the confluence of the Neva with the sea, gradually rose into distinction as the representative of Russian dominion in those parts.

The great event for Russia, having regard to her power in the north, was the acquisition of Finland. At various times during the eighteenth century, strips of country bordering on the Baltic came under the sway of the czars; but it was reserved for the nineteenth century to witness the rise of Muscovite rule on the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia. The Fins inhabited the northern parts of Europe earlier, as is supposed, than the Slavonians of Russia, or the Scandinavians of Sweden and Norway. There is no record of a king of Finland having ever existed; the Fins were a wandering rude race, who fell under the rule of their more organised neighbours. Hence the Muscovites subjected the Fins as far as the White Sea and the Frozen Ocean; the Norwegians obtained control in Finmark; while the Swedes took possession of the Finnish provinces adjacent to the Baltic. Six hundred years have now elapsed since Lapmark, Finmark, and Finland, were thus conquered by the three states just named. When the Treaty of Tilsit was signed between Alexander and Napoleon, in 1807, the two emperors treated the map of Europe as a toy, which they might cut up and partition at pleasure. Constantinople was saved from the clutches of Alexander, only because Napoleon deemed the treasure too precious to be thus appropriated. Poland, Prussia, and the several states of Germany, all came under the remodelling influence of the two emperors. A secret article foreshadowed the destruction of the Swedish monarchy, and the partition of that country between Russia and Denmark: unless Sweden should choose the alternative of joining France and Russia in a war against England.

Hostilities became inevitable, as a consequence of this treaty. The English government, fearing

that the Danish fleet was about to be employed with unfriendly intent, sent out an expedition with great speed; bombarded Copenhagen for three days; destroyed a great part of the city, and forced a surrender of the Danish fleet (September 7th). Whether England was justified or not in this proceeding, it afforded a pretext for Russia to declare war against her, and to demand that all Swedish ports should be closed against English ships. Sweden resisted the applications of Russia, France, and Denmark to this end; and went so far as to conclude, on February 8, 1808, a new treaty with England. Denmark at once declared war in a formal way against Sweden; but Alexander suddenly sent a powerful Russian force to take possession of Finland, without such a declaration, as if to anticipate any military or naval defence on the part of Sweden. It was a mode of obtaining a 'material guarantee,' analogous to that which his brother Nicholas adopted in Moldavia and Wallachia forty-five years afterwards. The king of Sweden caused the Russian ambassador to be placed in confinement; and the emperor, who simply wanted some pretext for a decision long before made, thereupon declared that such an insult justified him in retaining possession of Finland, 'and uniting it for ever to his empire.' Hostilities ensued. The Swedes obtained a few partial successes at Gothland, Äland, Vasa, and Roggerwick; but suffered defeats of more importance at Ormais and Lokalar. Russia, during this campaign, adopted a course which has frequently been followed by the czars—that of watching and fomenting discord in a neighbour's country; knowing that there were malcontents in Finland, the Russian generals, as if to encourage them, issued orders not to receive any letters or any flags of truce which were sent in the king's name, but only such as proceeded from the Swedish generals. In November, a truce for the winter was signed by the two antagonist commanders, Kamenskoi and Adlercreuz. In June of the next year, 1809, a revolution deposed Gustavus IV., and placed Charles XIII. on the throne of Sweden. Alexander, on being applied to, refused to treat for peace with a government which he chose to consider in an insecure state; hostilities recommenced, and lasted until September, during which the Swedes suffered defeat in various parts of Finland. The Treaty of Fredrikshamn, signed on the 17th of September 1809, put an end to the contest, and at the same time deprived Sweden of some of her most fertile, valuable, and populous provinces. A glance at the coloured map will shew how serious this loss must have been to Sweden; the provinces in question occupying nearly the whole peninsula, washed on two sides by the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland; and when it is considered that these provinces were entered and occupied before any declaration of war between the two states, the grasping spirit which prompted the movement becomes sufficiently manifest.

After the incorporation of Finland with the Russian Empire, the czar adopted the plan of furthering special Finnish interests and Finnish nationality, in opposition to the Swedish element, as a means of weakening the hold of Sweden on the affections of the people. Severity against the Swedes, clemency towards the Fins; rigorous exclusion of Swedish books, with a comparatively liberal encouragement of Finnish literature—these were the tactics adopted by Alexander. In the years which elapsed between the Peace of Fredrikshamn and the war of 1853, the Finlanders gradually formed themselves, politically speaking, into three parties. One group, small, but influential on account of social position, looked back with regret to the severance of the old Swedish ties: this was the Swedish party. Another group, comprising nearly all the public functionaries, dazzled by the splendour of Russia, felt, or affected to feel, proud of the annexation of their country to the czar's dominions: this was the Russian party. The third group, comprising the main body of the nation, although more favourably disposed towards Sweden than towards Russia, did not desire a return to their former condition as dependents on Sweden; they would rather form, if it were practicable, a state governed by themselves, a nationality of Fins: this was the Finnish party. Another peculiarity in the relations between the several countries north of the Baltic needs to be noticed. Norway, although joined politically to Sweden since 1814, is jealous of any superiority in the latter power; Norway is not a province of Sweden, but both are kingdoms under one king; and the Norwegians would object to the acquisition by Sweden of Finland, because it would disturb the balance between the two countries, rendering Swedish power too preponderant over Norwegian. Norway has its own constitution, its own parliament or *storthing;* and even so late as 1854, its legislature voted the abolition of the office of stadtholder, because such an office seemed to imply that Norway was a province of Sweden, instead of being an independent country, attached to Sweden only by the personal union in the crown. When the union took place in 1814, Finland did not belong to Sweden; and the Norwegians have ever since regarded with uneasiness any prospective strengthening of Sweden that might invest her with too great a predominance over Norway.

These Swedish peculiarities have had their due effect. When England and France declared war against Russia in the spring of 1854, and planned a Baltic campaign, it was natural to inquire what part Sweden would take in the contest. Prussia and Denmark, it was speedily evident, would remain neutral as long as possible; but Sweden, remembering how Russia had deprived her of so valuable a portion of her dominions, might possibly have desired to aid in humbling her proud neighbour. On the other hand, the Swedish party in Finland, as we have just seen, is limited

in number; the Norwegians would afford no countenance to the spread of Swedish power, unless it could be regarded as Norwegian power also; while the king and the court had little personal inclination for a contest with the great czar. The crown-prince, it is true, was with the Allies in sentiment; while the Swedish people felt a sympathy with the liberal ideas of the West, rather than with the degrading serfdom of the East; but this was not enough to induce the Swedes to draw the sword. If Sweden had joined the Allies, and the Allies had failed in bringing Russia to moderate terms, the full vengeance of the czar might afterwards have fallen on his Scandinavian neighbour. In April 1854, when the question of peace or war was in every Swede's mouth, a Stockholm newspaper, the *Aftonblad* ('Evening Sheet'), replying to some timid arguments urged by another journal, the *Svenska Tidning* ('Swedish News'), maintained that Sweden might reasonably and advantageously side with the Western Powers against Russia, and gave a few particulars concerning the state of the Swedish army at that time. Sweden, without including Norway, had upon the war-footing 85,000 infantry, 5564 cavalry, and 4416 artillery—making a total of 94,980 men; to which was added 8000 militia in Gothland, and 13,000 reserves—raising the total to about 116,000.

The Swedish government, however, remained neutral; and the year 1854 was destined to witness the sailing of a formidable English and French armament to the Baltic, with hostile intent against Russia, but on terms of amity—or at least neutrality—with three other Baltic powers, Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia.

FLEETS DESPATCHED BY THE WESTERN POWERS.

The fleets of 1854 differed from any the world had yet seen, in the vast employment of steam-power. The mighty agency which the genius of Watt had brought to so much perfection, was applied to the commercial marine before the governments of Europe thought proper to bring it into requisition for ships-of-war.

The interesting, though barely successful, experiments with small boats aided by steam-power, by the Comte d'Auxeron in 1774 on the Seine, by Perier in 1775 on the same river, and by the Marquis de Jouffroy in 1781 on the Saône; the humble attempt at steam-navigation on the Delaware by Fitch, in 1783, with paddles instead of paddle-wheels; the experiment of Rumsey on the Potomac, in 1787, by forcing a stream of water in at the bows and out at the stern of the vessel; the miniature steam-voyage, with one paddle in the middle of the boat, in Dalswinton Lake by Patrick Miller in 1788; the duck-feet paddle steam-boat tried by Earl Stanhope in 1795; Symington's steam-tug on the Forth and Clyde Canal in 1802; Fulton's small steamer on the Seine in 1803; Evans's steam-dredger, tried on the American rivers in 1804—all served as preparations for the *commercial* era in the history of steam-navigation. This commercial era may be said to have commenced when, in 1807, Fulton conveyed passengers 150 miles on the Hudson, from New York to Albany. Then ensued Stevens's voyage from New York to the Delaware in 1807, the first steam-voyage on the open sea; the achievement of Henry Bell's little *Comet* steamer, which plied between Glasgow and Helensburgh in 1812; the plying of the first steam-boat on the Thames in 1813; the gradual establishment of river-steamers on the Dee, Tay, Trent, Humber, Mersey, Avon, Severn, Orwell, Forth, Blackwater, and other streams; the extension of this wonderful maritime improvement to nearly all the principal countries in the world; the commencement of the Irish Channel transit by the *Rob Roy*, in 1818, between Greenock and Belfast; the first trip of the *Great Western* across the Atlantic; the rapid extension of ocean-steaming; the improvements consequent on the use of the screw-propeller—these were the successive steps in the commercial history of steamers; and it was not until a great advance had been made in the system, that governments ventured to apply steam-power to their men-of-war.

The screw-propeller can be used as an auxiliary to sails; it leaves the centre of a ship less encumbered by machinery than paddle-wheels; and for these, as well as other reasons, the screw has gradually acquired an ascendancy over the paddle in the English navy, except for small steamers. The steamers-of-war alone, besides the sailing-vessels, constitute a formidable fleet. On the 1st of January 1854, just before the declaration of war, the *Navy List* gave a table of 301 sailing-ships in the royal navy, carrying 11,397 guns; 77 screw-steamers, of 26,534 aggregate horse-power, and carrying 3328 guns; and 113 paddle-steamers, of 27,820 horse-power, and 518 guns. To these were to be added 14 sailing-ships and 21 steamers building, to carry respectively 1092 and 1038 guns. The grand total gave more than 520 ships-of-war, carrying not less than 17,000 guns—about 33 guns each on an average.* The *Navy List* recorded, at

* The distribution, in respect to sizes of ships, built and building, was as follows:—

Guns.	Sailing-ships.	Screw-steamers.
131	0	2
120	12	4
116	5	0
100 to 104	7	3
90 " 92	5	17
80 " 84	26	1
70 " 78	22	1
60	6	4
50	35	16
40 " 46	41	1
30 " 40	3	4
20 " 30	23	10
10 " 20	55	15
Less than 10	49	19

The paddle-steamers carried a relatively small number of guns, not above 5 each on an average—being employed to a considerable extent as transports and dispatch-boats.

the same time, as the number of effective officers in the navy (excluding half-pay and retired officers), 35 admirals, 41 vice-admirals, 207 rear-admirals, 652 captains, 1082 commanders, 1952 lieutenants, 589 masters, 315 mates, besides surgeons, chaplains, instructors, &c. The officers of marines numbered 802 effective in different grades. The manning for the actual fleet, according to the Budget of 1854, comprised about 43,000 seamen and boys, and 8000 marines, besides a reserve body of marines in depôt; but this was afterwards considerably augmented.

Shortly before the commencement of the war, the English government had instituted an inquiry into the customary mode of manning the royal navy, with a view to the introduction of such improvements as might be practicable. Under the plan until then followed there were certainly many defects. Sailors were accustomed to be entered on the books of particular ships selected by themselves, nominally for five years', but practically for three years' service—except when on foreign service, where the duty was sometimes of more than three years' duration. After the expiry of the period, the ship was 'paid off,' and the men disbanded, notwithstanding the expense, time, and trouble bestowed in training them. Many of the men thus discharged never returned to the British navy; some entered foreign service; some abandoned the seafaring-life altogether. The remainder, returning to duty in the Queen's fleet, did so at periods dictated by their own inclination or convenience, and not by any regard to the wants of the service. This desultory system, or rather want of system, became a cause of much embarrassment and expense in conducting the ordinary duties of the naval service; creating uncertainty as to the period at which ships might be expected to be ready for sea; and involving danger in the event of any political necessity for the sudden equipment of a fleet. On the 26th of July 1852, the Admiralty appointed a committee to consider this subject. The committee—consisting of Admiral Sir William Parker, Admiral Fanshawe, Captain Dundas, Captain Richards, and Captain Shepherd—made a Report on the 14th of February 1853, in which the results of the inquiries were embodied.* Their inquiries ranged over eleven subjects—the entry and training of boys and seamen, and the periods of service for which they are engaged; whether, and by what means, the periods of service could be advantageously extended; the practicability of *permanently* retaining the services of boys and seamen, as is the case with the royal marines, instead of discharging them after three years' service; whether a period of service abroad might usefully be followed by a period of service at home, in the coast-guard, dock-yards, or home-ports; whether a reserve of seamen could be organised to remain in England; whether the means exist of raising a large body of seamen suddenly, if any exigency arose; whether the rates of pay, prize-money, and bounty, might not advantageously be raised; whether the treatment of petty-officers and seamen-gunners might not be improved; whether any extension might be made in the award of good-conduct badges and of pensions; whether there could be an entry of seamen into the coast-guard and the dock-yards; and whether the privileges of Greenwich Hospital might be made more acceptable to the men. In short, the practical question was—how to induce seamen to enter, and to remain in the royal navy, in which the advantages to the sailor are less than in those of some foreign countries. On all these points the committee reported at considerable length, making a large number of suggestions for the future manning of the navy. The principal result arrived at was, that the navy should be permanent, like the army and the marines. Increased pay and advantages being necessary to induce seamen to consent to longer service, a larger outlay would be called for. The Admiralty, therefore, in approving the plan, applied to the Treasury in March 1853 for their sanction to this increased expenditure. This increase, for a certain specified number of officers and seamen, was estimated at about £140,000 per annum beyond the expenditure of previous years. An Order in Council was issued on the 1st of April 1853, giving effect to the greater part of the recommendations of the committee. One recommendation had been, that the chief-gunners, chief-boatswains, and chief-carpenters in the royal navy, on account of their responsible positions and faithful service, should be placed on the same footing as non-commissioned officers in the army—that is, should be eligible to the rank of commissioned officers for gallant conduct.*

These new arrangements connected with the manning of the British navy, were being gradually carried into effect at the period of the commencement of the Russian war.

* Parliamentary Papers, 1853. No. 173.

* The following list, from the Order in Council above mentioned, shews how large is the number of gradations and designations under the rank of chief-gunner, chief-boatswain, and chief-carpenter, in the British navy:—

Chief Petty-officers.

Master at Arms.	Chief-quartermaster.
Chief-gunner's Mate.	Chief-carpenter's Mate.
Chief-boatswain's Mate.	Seamen's Schoolmaster.
Chief-captain of the Forecastle.	Ship's Steward.
Admiral's Cockswain.	Ship's Cook.

1st Class Working Petty-officers.

Ship's Corporal.	Captain of the After-guard.
Gunner's Mate.	Captain of the Hold.
Boatswain's Mate.	Sailmaker.
Captain's Cockswain.	Ropemaker.
Captain of the Forecastle.	Carpenter's Mate.
Quartermaster.	Calker.
Cockswain of the Launch.	Blacksmith.
Captain of the Main-top.	Leading Stoker.
Captain of the Fore-top.	

2d Class Working Petty-officers.

Cockswain of the Barge.	Painter.
Cockswain of the Pinnace.	Musician.
Captain of the Mast.	Head Krooman.
2d Captain of the Forecastle.	2d Captain of the Fore-top.
2d Captain of the Main-top.	Yeoman of the Signals.
Cockswain of the Cutter.	2d Captain of the After-guard.
Cooper.	Captain of the Mizzen-top.
Armourer.	Sailmaker's Mate.
Calker's Mate.	

When the despatch of a formidable fleet to the Baltic was ordered, the command was given to Admiral Sir Charles Napier, whose long and brilliant services in various parts of the world had won for him a high reputation. Indeed, the delight with which the appointment was hailed was rather perilous to the veteran himself; since the disappointment would be the greater if circumstances should prevent him from achieving any great results. During a period of no less than fifty-four years, Napier had been battling either against human antagonists or against winds, and waves, and storms. As a volunteer in the *Martin* and the *Renown;* as a midshipman in the *Greyhound;* as a lieutenant during a short period; as a commander in the *Pultusk* and the *Recruit;* as a captain in the *Furieuse* and the *Euryalus*—the gallant officer had seen service in almost every part of the world, even before the peace of 1815. Fourteen years of peace left him without employment; but in 1829 he commenced a new career; he was for three years captain of the *Galatea;* he then commanded Don Pedro's fleet in the contest against Don Miguel concerning the crown of Portugal;

Sir Charles Napier.—From a Photograph by Mayall.

and next as commodore, he rendered brilliant service under Admiral Stopford off the coast of Syria. This last achievement won for him the honours of a K.C.B. and an aid-de-camp to the Queen, and insignia from Russia and Prussia. In 1846, Commodore Napier became rear-admiral, and in 1853, vice-admiral.

Seamen and Others.

Leading Seamen.	2d Head Krooman.
Yeoman of Store-rooms.	Captain's Steward.
Yeoman of Tiers.	Captain's Cook.
2d Captain of the Hold.	Ward or Gunroom Steward.
Sick-berth Attendant.	Ward or Gunroom Cook.
Shipwright.	Subordinate Officers' Steward.
Sailmaker's Crew.	Subordinate Officers' Cook.
Blacksmith's Mate.	Ship's Steward's Assistant.
Armourer's Crew.	Ordinary Seamen.
Stoker and Coal-trimmer.	Cook's Mate.
Carpenter's Crew.	Barber.
Cooper's Crew.	2d Class Ordinary Seamen and Kroomen.
Able Seamen.	Boy, 1st Class.
Bandsmen.	Boy, 2d Class.
Tailor.	
Butcher.	

The rank and the pay descend gradually, from 'Master at Arms' to 'Boy, 2d Class.'

A trifling incident, just before the departure of Sir Charles Napier for the Baltic, was a subject of much comment at the time, and a cause of mortification at a later period. On the 7th of March, the Reform Club gave a dinner to Sir Charles and to Her Majesty's ministers. During the customary health-drinkings and speech-makings, Lord Palmerston proposed the health of the admiral. In replying, Sir Charles said: 'I suppose we are very nearly at war. I suppose that when I get to the Baltic, I shall have an opportunity of declaring war.' Sir James Graham, in a eulogistic speech concerning Sir Charles, used these words: 'My gallant friend

says that when he gets into the Baltic he will declare war; I, as First Lord of the Admiralty, give him my free consent to do so.' It must be remembered that war had not at that time been declared by England and France against Russia. The matter was noticed in parliament, as involving an anachronism, if nothing worse; and the minister was forced to take shelter under the privileges of an 'after-dinner speech.' The indiscreet oratory of the evening was bitterly remembered at a later period, when wrangling had succeeded to amity between the two persons chiefly concerned.

During the winter of 1853–4, when it became evident that England and France would be involved in war with the czar, all the British naval arsenals were placed in a state of activity, to fit out a fleet for service in the Baltic. Deptford, Woolwich, Chatham, Sheerness, Portsmouth, Devonport, and Pembroke, resounded with the labours of the artificers who were preparing the huge vessels for sea; while the Admiralty was incessantly engaged in manning the ships as quickly as they could be placed in commission. The naval resources of England were never more strikingly displayed. While the utmost difficulty was experienced in sending a small army to Turkey, the early spring witnessed the completion of one of the finest fleets the world had ever seen; and this, too, in addition to the large fleet sent to the Black Sea, and to the ships reserved for home-defence and other service.

The vessels destined for this Baltic war assembled at Spithead; and the review of the fleet by Her Majesty was a spectacle worthy of the queen of a maritime nation. A review on the same spot in the previous August had produced a great impression, as a manifestation of the naval power of Britain; but the display in March was yet more grand. Sir Charles Napier's fleet was to consist of about 44 ships-of-war, manned by upwards of 22,000 seamen, mounting about 2200 guns, and propelled by 16,000 horse-power of steam. Only six out of the whole number were to be sailing-vessels—the *Neptune*, 120; *St George*, 120; *Prince Regent*, 90; *Boscawen*, 70; *Monarch*, 84; and *Cumberland*, 70—all the rest being either screw or paddle steamers. It was arranged that some of these should form a first division, to start under Sir Charles Napier; that others, as a second division, should follow under Admiral Corry; and that the rest should be subsequently despatched. Sir Charles's division consisted entirely of steamers, sixteen in number: comprising 8 screw line-of-battle ships, 4 screw-frigates, and 4 paddle-steamers.* The *Duke of Wellington* and the *Royal George* were three-deckers. Sir Charles's flag floated on the *Duke of Wellington*, Admiral Chads's on the *Edinburgh*, and Admiral Plumridge's on the *Leopard*.

* *Screw Line-of-battle Ships.*

	Guns.	Men.	Horse-power.
Duke of Wellington,	131	1100	780
Royal George,	121	990	400
St Jean d'Acre,	101	900	650
Princess Royal,	91	850	400
Blenheim,	60	660	450
Hogue,	60	660	450
Ajax,	58	630	450
Edinburgh,	58	630	450
	680	6420	4030

Of all the ships borne on the bosom of the ocean in 1854, the flag-ship of Sir Charles Napier exhibited in the most marked degree the characteristics of modern science as applied to marine architecture. This vessel may be said, indeed, to have altered her very principle of growth during her progress towards maturity, that she might be adapted for the reception of the fruits of invention and discovery. Originally laid down at Pembroke as a man-of-war of 120 guns, she underwent three changes—she was cut in two at the middle, and lengthened by 23 feet, for the reception of 11 additional guns; she had a screw-propeller fitted as an auxiliary to the power of the sails; and her launching, occurring as it did about the time of the death of the great warrior, led to a change of name from the *Windsor Castle* to the *Duke of Wellington*. Thus was produced the majestic three-decker of 131 guns—having an extreme length of 278 feet, extreme breadth of 60 feet, and a total weight, when fully equipped for sea, of 5600 tons. Such a leviathan had never before ploughed the seas, for it possessed large steam-power in addition to the usual fittings for a sailing man-of-war of the first class. The problem was yet to be solved, how far a vessel necessarily drawing so great a depth of water would be fitted for active service in a closed, shallow, intricate sea like the Baltic.

Exciting was the day when Queen Victoria witnessed the departure of the fleet for Russian waters. On the 11th of March 1854, the shores of Hampshire and of the Isle of Wight were crowded with thousands of eager spectators, who then for the first time witnessed the departure of a large fleet destined to a possible career of war and destruction. The various ships being assembled at Spithead, the Queen came from Osborne in the *Fairy* yacht, steamed up to the gigantic flag-ship, received all the principal officers on board the yacht, and bade them farewell and God-speed. Early in the afternoon the signal was given, and the ships weighed, and sailed or steamed forth. The *Royal George* led the way; then followed the *St Jean d'Acre* and the *Tribune;* to these succeeded the *Impérieuse, Blenheim, Amphion, Princess Royal*, and the other ships in succession. Her Majesty

Screw-frigates.

	Guns.	Men.	Horse-power.
Impérieuse,	50	530	360
Arrogant,	47	450	360
Amphion,	34	320	300
Tribune,	30	300	300
	161	1600	1320

Paddle-wheel Steamers.

	Guns.	Men.	Horse-power.
Leopard,	18	280	560
Dragon,	6	200	560
Bull-dog,	6	160	500
Valorous,	16	220	400
	46	860	2020

literally headed the fleet; the little *Fairy* darted on in advance of all, insomuch that, when returning westward, the Queen passed the stately ships in succession. Nearly all the seamen were enabled to catch a glance of their sovereign, as she stood upon the deck of her yacht; and the recognition was not likely to be forgotten either by seamen or sovereign. No such sight had been witnessed, perhaps, on English shores since Queen Elizabeth's parting visit to her defenders at Tilbury, 266 years earlier, on occasion of the Spanish Armada.

The fleet—or rather the one division of the fleet under Sir Charles Napier—passed the Downs at mid-day on the 12th. It pursued its majestic course up the German Ocean, through the Skäger Rack, thence to Helsingör, at the mouth of the Sound, and onward to Copenhagen, where Sir Charles landed on the 20th to pay his respects to the king of Denmark. The paddle-steamer *Hecla* had previously been sent out, on the 19th of February, to make a preparatory survey of the Baltic, carrying several masters and pilots; she was absent about five weeks, during which time



Duke of Wellington Screw War-steamer.

a run of 3000 miles had been made—sounding and examining very carefully all the shoals and doubtful spots connected with Baltic navigation. The *Hecla* met the fleet off Dover; when Sir Charles took on board the masters and pilots who had thus gained practical experience, and distributed them among the various ships of his fleet.

No sooner had the naval authorities at Portsmouth despatched the first division of the fleet under Sir Charles Napier, than arrangements were made to send off the second division under Rear-admiral Corry—an officer who had seen nearly half a century of active service, although his name was not associated in a marked degree with any special achievements. On the 16th of March, the Queen visited Corry's squadron at Spithead, as she had before visited that of Napier. The ships ready at that time were few in number, not exceeding six or seven; they sailed in the following week—to be succeeded by other vessels as rapidly as the equipment and manning could be completed. Admiral Corry in the *Neptune*, 120 guns, was accompanied in the first instance by the *Cæsar*, 91; *Prince Regent*, 90; *Boscawen*, 70; *Frolic*, 16; and *Bull-dog*, 6.

One arrangement was highly characteristic of an age in which steam-power and engine-machinery were about to be brought in aid of naval warfare. The *Volcano*, steam-frigate, was converted into a *floating-workshop*, by Mr Nasmyth, of Patricroft, to afford speedy means of effecting repairs in the steam-machinery of the Baltic fleet. Instead of taking a damaged ship to the workshop, the workshop would be taken to the damaged ship. The first deck was converted into an engineering-shop, 104 feet long, 30 feet wide, and 10 feet high; provided with a 12 horse-power steam-engine, and with turning-lathes, planing-machines, boiler-plate punching and shearing machines, drilling and boring machines, forges, blowing-fans, a cupola-furnace, a Nasmyth's steam-hammer, and all the tools and implements necessary for ordinary engineering work. This floating-workshop was

in itself an epitome of the history of progress in the mechanical arts; and as thus applied to the necessities of a fleet in actual service, it presented a marked contrast to anything which the annals of naval warfare had before supplied.

The day which witnessed the declaration of war by England and France, nearly coincided with that on which the fleet reached the Swedish and Danish shores. The two divisions joined on the 23d of March, at Wingo Sound, near Gothenborg; they passed through the Great Belt, anchored off Nyborg on the 27th, and sailed on the 28th to Kiel, in Holstein. Dispatches reached Sir Charles Napier by mail-route from London; and consequent on the information thus received, the following characteristic address was issued to the fleet by its commander:—

'Lads—War is declared. We are to meet a bold and numerous enemy. Should they offer us battle, you know how to dispose of them. Should they remain in port, we must try to get at them. Success depends upon the quickness and precision of your fire. Lads, sharpen your cutlasses, and the day is your own.'

The fleet left Kiel Fiord on the 30th, and sailed to Kiöge Bay, near Copenhagen, at which point the intricate navigation between numerous islands may be said to terminate, leaving an open sea for the subsequent course of the ships. When the month of April opened, the fleet, now numbering twenty-two ships-of-war, was at anchor in Kiöge Bay. The *St George, James Watt, Cœsar, Nile, Majestic, Boscawen, Odin, Miranda, Rosamond*, and several steam-sloops, had not yet joined it at that spot.

Having thus traced the British fleet to the Baltic, it becomes necessary to notice the maritime contingent furnished by our French ally for the same service.

France, as a military nation, has paid far more attention to campaigns on land than to encounters at sea. Her shipwrights and engineers, however, have not failed to watch and to profit by the improvements introduced in England; and during the long peace, a fleet of considerable power was gradually formed. At the beginning of 1854, the naval forces of France comprised 290 sailing-ships and 117 steamers; presenting an aggregate of about 13,000 guns, and 30,000 horse-power for the steamers.* Of this force, about 30 vessels were set apart to share in the Baltic expedition; comprising 9 ships-of-the-line, 12 frigates, 4 brigs and corvettes, and the remainder smaller vessels. They did not sail in a body, but started for the scene of operations as soon as equipped and manned. The fleet was placed under the command of Admiral Parseval-Deschênes. He left Paris for Brest on the 20th of March; and the ships began to leave Brest for the Baltic on the same day.

Great and powerful as were the fleets thus assembled at the entrance of the Baltic in April 1854, the next inquiry is—What were the naval forces against which they were called upon to combat?

Russia began her navy (p. 4) under Peter the Great, who, as is well known, studied the art of ship-building in other countries to qualify himself for this self-imposed duty. The Russian mercantile marine has never been extensive; nor are her ports numerous, considering the vast area of the czar's dominions: hence many difficulties have stood in the way of the formation of a powerful navy. Until the time of Catherine II., the Russian ships of war had only been employed in cruising about the Baltic; but that empress sent a few of them by way of the Atlantic from the Baltic to the Black Sea; since which time Russia has always maintained a fleet in the Constantinopolitan waters. Russia was slightly engaged in naval hostility with England in 1801 and 1808; while in 1827, the two powers fought side by side at the ill-omened battle of Navarino. The Russian naval forces at the beginning of 1854, appear, from the figures furnished by Haxthausen and other writers, to have comprised about 60 ships-of-the-line, ranging from 70 to 120 guns; 36 frigates, of 40 to 60 guns; 70 corvettes, brigs, and brigantines; and 40 steamers—the whole carrying about 9000 guns, and requiring a force of 40,000 seamen. Somewhat later in the year, it was known that at Helsingfors (Sveaborg) and Cronstadt the Russians had not less than 30 ships of 74 guns or upwards each;* with an aggregate armament of 2468 guns; besides 3 steamers of 400 horse-power each, 2 of 120 horse-power, and 1 steam-corvette of 450 horse-power—the six steamers carrying collectively 56 guns. The numbers could not have deviated much from this in April, at the time when the English and French fleets entered the Baltic.

There are many peculiarities in the Russian navy. The officers and sailors are not so much

* The details were nearly as follows:—

Sailing-vessels.

Guns.	
120	9
100	14
90	19
80 to 82	11
50 " 60	42
40 " 46	16
Corvettes,	39
Brigs and Cutters,	101
Smaller vessels,	39

Steam-vessels.

Vessels-of-the-Line,	3
Frigates,	20
Corvettes,	30
Dispatch-boats and other small vessels,	64

* *At Helsingfors.*

	Guns.		Guns.
Russia,	120	Brienne,	74
St George the Conqueror,	112	Arsis,	74
Pultava,	84	Ezekiel,	74
Prochor,	84	Andrew,	74
Vladimir,	84		

At Cronstadt.

	Guns.		Guns.
Emperor Peter I.,	120	Finland,	74
* * *	112	Katzbach,	74
Enigheten,	84	Ingermanland,	74
Krasnoe,	84	Culm,	74
Ganule,	84	Pourgat Azofa,	74
Volga,	84	Sisoe the Great,	74
Empress Alexandra,	84	Villajath,	74
Narva,	74	Natron-menga,	74
Beresina,	74	Frère Champenoise,	74
Borodino,	74	Michael,	74
Smolensko,	74		

seamen, as soldiers afloat; for the discipline partakes rather of the military than of the naval character. Many of the generals are admirals also; and the ships are under the control of the commandants of the respective fortresses, to an extent not observable in England or France. It is remarkable that the Russians have never fought a great naval battle, in the sense in which the Nelsons and Howes would have understood that term. When Peter the Great almost annihilated the Swedish fleet in 1715; when Orloff inflicted similar ruin on the Turks at Tchesmé in 1770; when the Russians, as one of the allies, crushed the Turkish fleet at Navarino; and when they made the ruthless attack at Sinope in 1853—it was in each case a crushing onslaught with a superior force, rather than a battle on equal terms fought out at sea. It is stated by Mr Oliphant,* as the result both of his reading and of his personal observations, that the Russian ships-of-war are not durable; that peculation prevails from the highest to the lowest among Russian officers; that while sound timber is paid for by the government, green pine and fir are largely used, the difference in value finding its way into the pockets of nefarious contractors and officials; and that the vessels, imperfectly built of imperfect materials, become rotten in a few years —insomuch that Russia possesses very few ships-of-war that could venture on a voyage round the Cape. The worm called the *teredo navalis* infests much of the timber with which the ships are built; but it is believed that this worm is made to bear the blame, not only of the rot which it really produces, but of that more disgraceful rot which results from official dishonesty. The Emperor Nicholas expended such enormous sums on his armies, fleets, and fortresses, that the national exchequer could not support the pressure of an adequate remuneration for personal services; almost all the officials, in the various grades, were underpaid in respect to emolument; they could not maintain a position as gentlemen on the recognised salaries of their respective offices, and were hence driven to the adoption of crooked means to enhance their incomes. Jobbing and official dishonesty were almost inevitable consequences. Wherever such is the case, the lowest grades, the unofficial, ultimately bear the severity of the burden; and thus, in Russia as in Turkey, the common soldiers and the poor peasants suffer incalculable miseries from the peculations and tyranny of their superiors. This is one of the few points in which the dominion of the czar and that of the sultan approach to parallelism: neither despot is so fortunate as to be surrounded by honest officials.

Anterior to the commencement of the war, the whole naval force of Russia was divided into the Blue, Red, and White fleets or squadrons—the first stationed in the Black Sea, the second in the Baltic, and the third in the White Sea. The few ships near Kamtchatka were too limited in number to be separately grouped. The Black Sea and the Baltic fleets were each in two divisions, and each division comprised two vessels of the first class, six of the second, six frigates, two corvettes, and several steamers. So far as organisation went, the fleets were strictly disciplined; and if the ships and the seamen had been effective, the naval forces of Russia would really have been formidable. Of the ships, a little has just been said; of the seamen, there is much evidence against their efficiency. 'Russia wants the first vital element for a navy —seamen. The reason of this is simple enough—she possesses [comparatively] no merchant-navy. The population of Finland, Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia does not amount to more than 1,500,000 inhabitants; that of the Black Sea provinces does not exceed 500,000: it is therefore only from this limited number—most of whom, too, devote themselves to agriculture—that Russia can raise her levies. Even those who are sailors are engaged in the coasting-trade, which they follow in the daytime alone, sheltering themselves at night behind the girdle of islands and eyots which line all the Russian coast. To man its ships, the Russian government is obliged to fall back upon the inhabitants of the interior of the country. In this way it has, up to the present time, formed an army of sailors, who are frightened at the sea, which the majority of them never saw before. The levies for the navy, like those for the army, are composed of the strangest and most heterogeneous elements; and it is therefore a very difficult task to prepare them for the rough calling for which they are intended. Neither the whip nor the knout will ever be able to bend the Russian to this kind of service: the cold and fanatical indifference of the Russian soldier on land, before hundreds of cannon belching out death, abandons him entirely on board a ship. Like the Arab and the Persian, the Cossack and the Tatar, he has a profound feeling of horror for the sea. Besides this, he is destitute of vigour, idle, and without muscular strength; for the muscles beneath his flabby skin, so often lacerated by the rod, are not capable of any great exertion. An Englishman or Frenchman is two or three times stronger, and more active in his movements. A Russian ship, consequently, requires twice as many men as one of our vessels does to make up its full complement. Again, it is not on board a number of pontoons, imprisoned in the ice or laid up in dock for the greater part of the year, that sailors are formed, or crews receive the practical instruction which it is necessary for them to acquire. Every year the Baltic is blocked up by the ice from the month of October to the end of April, at least; even the Black Sea is not always free from a similar obstruction; while, during the summer, the navigation of both seas is so dangerous and so difficult, that there is a ukase punishing with degradation and death every officer who has not returned with his vessel before the equinoxes, or who happens to lose it from stress of weather.

* *Russian Shores of the Black Sea.*

In addition to all these considerations, good sailors are formed only by long voyages; and, I repeat, the Russians of the Black Sea, as well as those of the Baltic, are employed merely in the coasting-trade.'*

It remained to be seen whether the naval encounters of 1854 in the Baltic would tell in favour of the soldier-sailors who manned the Russian fleet.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ALLIES IN THE BALTIC.

Although the Allied fleets entered the Baltic early in April, the sea was not yet fitted for navigation by large ships, owing to the length of time during which the ice of winter clings to the ports and inlets. Cronstadt, the island-fortress which guards St Petersburg and the Neva, was naturally the point to which the attention of the two admirals was mainly directed; and this island, together with the mouth of the Neva, were known to be encumbered with ice at the time. A table, published in 1854,† shews for a period of 136 years—from 1718 to 1853—the dates of the opening and closing of the river Neva. The dates are in the Old Style, according to Russian usage; but by adding twelve days, they are accommodated to the New Style, as used in England. In no case did the opening of the Neva occur till April; most of the openings were in the third or fourth week of that month; while some were retarded until May. The closing begins generally some time in November. The ice lingers around Cronstadt nearly a week later than at the mouth of the Neva, insomuch that the month of May is in most years fairly advanced before the vicinity of that fortress can be safely approached by large ships. This icy fringe-work is present during about 150 days in each year.

Slowly and cautiously did the Allied admirals advance, watchful of shoals in one part, and of ice in another. Of the enemy, there was rather a fear that he would *not* be met with; the seamen were eager for an encounter; but it began already to be suspected that the Russian ships would shelter behind stone-fortresses. To many, even among the educated officers, the expedition partook of the nature of a voyage of discovery, or at least of exploration in a little-known region. 'The Baltic had entered little into our speculations as a seat of war, and was to ships of the navy almost a *mare ignotum*. Merchant-vessels had traversed it backwards and forwards, and visited all its different ports with their cargoes; but the professional knowledge of its waters and shores was very small, and derived chiefly from foreign charts. The men of the last war, depending chiefly on their seamanship and enterprise, had added little to our scientific information on the subject, and left, as the result of their experience, only the warnings of disaster and a few oral records. The high hopes, therefore, which followed the departure of the first Baltic fleet, must have been dashed by a fear that some of those magnificent ships might return no more.'* The merchants engaged in the Baltic trade do indeed know the perils of that region—taught, as they have been, by costly experience. In a series of years immediately preceding the war, the vessels which passed the Sound, either inwards or outwards, numbered no less than 15,000 annually, of which nearly one-fourth were British. Never did a year pass without many of these ships being wrecked. The Baltic navigators have found the most dangerous points, in so far as regards wrecking on the coast, to be —Sandhammer and Falsterbö, near the southern extremity of Sweden; the east coast of the island of Gothland; the Aland Islands; the Dager Ort, near the entrance to the Gulf of Finland; and a hazardous shoal between Christiania and Gothenborg. Any criticism on naval manœuvres in the Baltic would be unjust, which did not take into account the perils of such a sea to bulky ships drawing so great a depth of water as those in Sir Charles Napier's fleet.

The Czar Nicholas, naturally expecting that the Gulf of Finland, containing Cronstadt and the approach to St Petersburg, would be visited by the English and French fleets, was not slow to prepare defensively for such a contingency. As early as November in the previous year, the formation of twenty Finnish battalions of troops had been ordered—to be dressed and equipped by the districts which provided them, but armed from the arsenals at Sveaborg. At the same time, defensive works were commenced at various points along the coast, where a landing might be apprehended; and hospitals and lazarettos were established at a distance of a few miles inland. The military road from St Petersburg to Helsingfors, which crosses much marshy ground, was supplied with formidable batteries at certain points—insomuch that the swamps and the guns together might check the progress of an invading army along that route. The wonderful defences at Sveaborg and Helsingfors were still further strengthened. The Grand-Duke Constantine, second son of the czar, visited all the strong positions in the gulf in February 1854, in order that, when the expected declaration of war should arrive, no weak points might be left to the mercy of the enemy.

It was a Swedish and Danish holiday-trip to steam forth and witness the passage of the mighty fleets into the Baltic. Lines of steamers ply between different ports on the Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and Prussian coasts; and many of these steamers bore extra numbers of passengers, incited by curiosity to see the novel and imposing display. On some occasions, a party of visitors, from Malmö or Gothenborg, or other port, would be admitted

* Germain de Lagny.
† *Almanac of the St Petersburg Academy of Sciences.*

on board one of the gigantic ships, where they were speedily lost in admiration at the wonders of a modern war screw-steamer; and on all these occasions, good wishes for the Allies accompanied the admiration.

Early in April, a report obtained currency that a Russian squadron had been seen somewhere near the centre of the Baltic; and this report had the effect of hastening the movements of Sir Charles Napier and his fleet from Kiöge Bay towards the east. If such a squadron had really put to sea, however, it must have returned to port in good time for its own safety: the Allies saw nothing of it. Rear-admiral Plumridge, with the *Leopard*, *Impérieuse*, *Tribune*, and *Amphion*, was detached from the main fleet, on a reconnoitring expedition up the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland as far as the ice would permit. He was enabled to send back word to Sir Charles, that seven Russian line-of-battle ships and one frigate were frozen in at Helsingfors. On the receipt of this intelligence, April 12th, Napier set sail with fifteen vessels in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. The courts of Sweden and Denmark had by that time announced clearly the course they would follow in the delicate state of Baltic affairs, whereby the British admiral knew to what extent he might approach their shores; the two courts, having determined to remain strictly neutral, forbade the entrance of either hostile fleet behind the defences at Waxholm, Raholm, Karlskrona, and other specified places; but facilities were to be afforded in all the ports of the neutral powers for the purchase of provisions and stores by the fleets, except articles contraband of war.

When Sir Charles Napier thus began to move eastward, in the middle of April, his armament had accumulated to nearly forty ships, of which more than half were screw-steamers. The whole had on board about 1700 guns and 18,000 men; with Corry, Plumridge, and Chads as the three admirals under Napier. But from that time, it was seldom that all the ships were assembled at or near one spot; special expeditions being always in progress, by detached portions of the fleet.

The French fleet, commanded by Vice-admiral Parseval-Deschênes, comprised about twenty-four vessels.* The commander hoisted his flag on the *Inflexible;* while Rear-admiral Penaud, second in command, sailed in the *Duguesclin.* Unlike the English armament, this French fleet took out a small body of infantry and another of artillery, ready for prospective land-service. These various

	Guns.		Guns.
* Tage,	100	Trident,	80
Austerlitz,	100	Semillante,	60
Hercule,	100	Andromaque,	60
Jemmappes,	100	Vengeance,	60
Breslau,	90	Poursuivante,	50
Duguesclin,	90	Virginie,	50
Inflexible,	90	Zenobie,	50
Duperré,	80	Psyché,	40

Small Steamers.

Darien, Souffleur, Lucifer, Daim, &c.
Phlegethon, Milan, Aigle,

ships joined Sir Charles Napier's fleet at different times and different places.

When the huge vessels had become disentangled from the intricacy of Kiöge Bay, they passed the island of Bornholm to the larger island of Gothland. Here the bulk of the fleet remained some time, while detached vessels sailed or steamed on particular service—mostly to reconnoitre the coasts and the various ports. At the extreme point of the peninsula, which may be said to separate the Gulf of Bothnia from the Gulf of Finland, is the promontory of Hangö Udd or Hango Head; this, as in some sort guarding the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, had been fortified by the Russians, and, as a matter of course, attracted the attention of the Allies. Towards this important headland, Sir Charles moved his fleet early in May, despatching single ships north and east of it. A smart affair occurred on the 19th, under the management of Captain Yelverton in the *Arrogant*, and Captain Hall (who had won distinction a few years earlier in the Chinese War) in the *Hecla*—both steamers. The two vessels steamed up a small firth which bounds the Hangö peninsula on the east, and which is marked at the entrance by the town of Ekness or Eknas. Yelverton and Hall determined to capture one, at least, of three large laden Russian merchant-vessels which were lying at anchor in Ekness Bay; but the whole coast was bristling with defences—a sandbank-battery in one place, a stone-battery in another, a masked-battery behind a wood near the shore, infantry armed with Minié-rifles at one place, and a troop of horse-artillery in another. Shot and shell and Minié-balls flew about in all directions; the *Hecla* had several shot through her funnel, steam-pipe, and hull, and both vessels were studded with Minié-balls. Nevertheless, in the midst of a torrent of shot, Captain Hall ran into the harbour at Ekness, captured a bark, and towed her away, much to the astonishment of the inhabitants. The little *Hecla*, a 6-gun steamer, bore most of the rough usage; the *Arrogant*, of 46 guns, was too heavy to approach the shoal water as closely as Captain Yelverton would have wished. It was, indeed, an extraordinary fight thus maintained by the *Hecla;* for the Russian infantry, cavalry, and artillery moved along the coast parallel with the steamer's course, dodging its movements, and firing incessantly. This was the first among many examples furnished in the Baltic, that vessels of light draught are better fitted to render useful service in that sea than first-class men-of-war.

Another subsidiary expedition was intrusted to Captain Cooper Key, with the *Amphion* (34) and the *Conflict* (8), both screw-steamers. The destination was the coast of Courland, not far from the Prussian frontier. Arriving off the port of Libau, Captain Key learned that several Russian merchant-vessels lay in the port, and that the place was defended by 500 or 600 soldiers. He resolved to capture the vessels, some or all. Having steamed within gunshot of the town on the 17th

of May, the governor was summoned by Captain Key to surrender; a refusal led to the manning of all the boats belonging to both ships—those of the *Amphion* being commanded by Captain Key, and those of the *Conflict* by Captain Cumming. The boats had to pull a mile and a half up a small creek or river to reach Libau; and as the river was only fifty yards broad, the captains deemed it fortunate that the Russian soldiers did not appear on the banks, else might the fate of the boat-expedition have been doubtful. The invaders were 130 men in all only, against a population of 10,000, aided by 600 soldiers. Nevertheless, so judiciously did Captain Cumming manage a conference with the magistrates, that all the ships were given up, without a shot being fired on either side; and the *Amphion* and *Conflict*, before nightfall, steamed forth with eight new Russian merchant-vessels in tow. The achievement was fully as remarkable as that due to Captain Hall, about the same time, in another part of the Baltic. Captain Key, in his dispatch to Sir Charles Napier, said: 'The private property found on board was restored to the owners on application for it. Although I had the opportunity of destroying a large amount of the enemy's property—such as their houses, vessels on the stocks, and vessels repairing—I did not consider it right to do so, as the troops had left the town so pitifully to its fate, and the people had assisted in getting the vessels out by opening the bridge, which would have detained us some considerable time had we been obliged to blow it up.'

A capture of somewhat analogous character was effected by Captain Wilcox in the *Dragon*, a paddle-steamer of 6 guns. While cruising in the Gulf of Finland, he reconnoitred the port of Revel, situated on the coast of Esthonia, nearly opposite Sveaborg. Seeing two vessels at anchor there, he made a dash at them. Regardless of the shot poured towards his little steamer from the batteries, he ran in close ashore, captured both of the ships, and towed them into Hangö Bay on the following morning.

During the whole of the month of May, Sir Charles Napier, with the principal portion of the fleet, remained in the region between Gothland and Hangö, ready to take advantage of any opportunity to attack the Russians, but cautious as to the adoption of any rash enterprise. It was known that a large Russian fleet remained safely hidden behind the fortified islands of Sveaborg, and that a yet larger force was ready at Cronstadt. Supposing that, by a great exercise of skill and daring, the ships at the island-fortress could be drawn into action and defeated, there yet remained the question, how far the Cronstadt fleet might, at some critical moment, come out and take the Allies at a disadvantage. It was not a matter which British admirals were likely to view with much timidity; but still it was incumbent on a commander to take all the data into account. Aid from the Swedes could not be expected, for reasons already stated. The Swedish newspapers freely discussed the subject: the *Aftonblad* and the *Götheborgs Handels og Sjöfarts Tidning* ('Gothenborg Commercial and Maritime News') took the part of the Allies, while other papers advocated a neutral policy. The first-named of these journals urged, that a bold policy on the part of Sweden might induce the Finlanders to rise against their Muscovite masters, in aid of the Allies. 'A people's sense of independence may be lulled asleep; it can never be destroyed. The Fins are aware that, united to Sweden, they obey law, and not arbitrary power, and that their sons will not be sent away to Siberia without previous sentence. Supported by a friendly population in the country, by a powerful fleet on the coasts, which would scatter the forces and the attention of the enemy, the Swedish army, inflamed by the enthusiasm of a just cause, by the ardent desire of avenging at last the former treachery and violence of Russia, would, before long, chase them from every corner of Finland, and once more dictate peace.' These high-sounding words, conveying much truth and some exaggeration, failed of effect: Sweden did not join the Allies, nor did the Finlanders rise against Russia. Napier, knowing these facts, was aware that he could count upon no material aid on Finnish shores, and it behoved him to weigh well his proceedings. Mortifying was it to him, and to all his officers and men, to know that the English newspapers began to be impatient, and to ask why, the month of June having arrived, no signal achievements had been recorded. This is one of the penalties paid by a distinguished man for his reputation; he is expected to strew his path with great deeds, whether the aggregate of circumstances be favourable to him or not. Hasty admirers at home felt so assured that Russian power was to be annihilated by Sir Charles in the Baltic, that pleasure-trips were planned to go and see the brave work done.*

Admiral Plumridge, during the greater part of the month of May, and the first week in June, was engaged in a special service—a service not so acceptable to a brave officer, perhaps, as actual fighting—since it involved the destruction of property: one of the painful necessities, if necessity it be, of a state of warfare. The duty intrusted to him carried him up the Gulf of Bothnia, to its extreme northern limit. On the eastern or Finnish shores of this gulf, Admiral Plumridge, between the 5th of May and the 10th of June, destroyed 46 vessels, afloat or on the stocks, amounting to 11,000 tons burden; 40,000 barrels of pitch and tar; 60,000 square yards of rough pitch; and a vast quantity of timber, spars, plank, deals, sails, ropes, and other naval stores—roughly estimated to amount in value to £300,000

* Two or three advertisements, such as the following, appeared in the London newspapers during the summer:—'Seat of War.—Trip to the Baltic.—The Advertiser, being desirous of visiting the scene of operations in the Baltic, is anxious to meet with some gentlemen who would join in hiring a screw-steamer to proceed thither and attend the motions of the fleet. Any gentleman anxious to join in the expedition may obtain further information by applying by letter addressed to ——.'

or £400,000. He did not lose a man during this scene of destruction.

The object of this northern expedition seems to have been, in the first instance, mainly an examination of the intricate channels between the Aland Islands, which form a kind of rugged barrier at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia, and which, possessed by Russia, give her virtually the command of that sea. Admiral Plumridge, in the *Leopard*, accompanied by the *Valorous*, *Vulture*, and *Odin* steam-frigates, after ascertaining that the Aland Archipelago could not be safely navigated without a native pilot, directed his attention northward. The vessels moored at a certain distance from the shore, while the ships' boats rowed into several small ports, to make manifest to the unfortunate Finlanders that their Russian master could not protect them from the naval power of England. Brahestad, Uleaborg, and Tornea, were three of the ports thus visited, all near the northern extremity of the gulf. It was nearly the close of May before the admiral reached those regions; but a few days then sufficed to finish the work. On the 30th of May, 14 vessels and a great quantity of stores were destroyed at Brahestad; on the 1st and 2d of June, 23 vessels were similarly treated at Uleaborg, 3 at Ukovaryakka, and 5 at Killoncrusit, two places near Uleaborg; while another vessel was destroyed on the 8th at or near Tornea, on the Kemi River. At all these five places, naval stores in large quantity were destroyed as well as vessels. On the occasion of the admiral approaching Uleaborg, four merchants went out to meet him, under a flag of truce, and begged him to spare the town. He announced that all private property would be spared, and that only government buildings and stores would be destroyed; but he, at the same time, gave a warning as to the result which might follow any resistance on the part of the townsmen. At Brahestad, a refusal on the part of the authorities to surrender some gun-boats led to a landing of the English, in more hostile array than at Uleaborg. It was only because government ships and stores were kept at those places that the attacks were made; and the burning was unquestionably intended to be confined to such imperial property: but the wind has a voice in such matters; and it is unfortunately true that private property suffered from the flames, as well as that which belonged to the Russian government. At Tornea, close to the Swedish frontier, the inhabitants procured the destruction of the government barracks and warehouses before the arrival of the English; they were backed in their entreaties by the inhabitants of Haparanda, a small town on the opposite or Swedish side of the frontier; and the English, after an examination of the town, left it with only a small amount of injury. An attempt was made in parliament, a few weeks afterwards, to shew that the rules of honourable warfare had been in some degree departed from in these attacks; but the charge was not substantiated.

The destructive expedition of Admiral Plumridge was closed by an encounter in which defeat, instead of success, attended him. On the shore of Finland, a little south of Brahestad, are two small towns named Gamle (Old) and Ny (New) Karleby. The *Odin* and the *Vulture* arrived off Gamle Karleby on the 7th of June; and sent out several boats at eleven o'clock in the evening—at which hour there is still a little daylight in the summer of high latitudes. A summons to surrender any stores contraband of war, made two hours earlier, seems to have been refused. The boats approached the shore, and attempted a landing. Two pieces of artillery, and two companies of infantry, resisted the attempt; and a brisk interchange of bullet and ball ensued for nearly an hour. The boats were ultimately obliged to retire, carrying away a few dead and wounded, and leaving a few prisoners in the hands of the Russians. The water is so shallow at that part, that the steam-frigates could not safely come within four or five miles of the shore; and this circumstance prevented them from assisting the boats. Whether the insignificance of the place (comprising less than 2000 inhabitants) rendered the admiral indifferent to a second attack, certain it is that the result of the hour's fighting greatly elated the Russians, and gave occasion for highly coloured accounts in the *Journal de St Petersburg* and the *Invalide Russe*, in which the Russian loss was set down at 'four men slightly wounded.'

Soon after these occurrences in the Gulf of Bothnia, the French fleet arrived, and joined the English. Admiral Parseval-Deschênes made his appearance off Hangö on the 13th of June; on the following day, Sir Charles Napier, accompanied by Admirals Corry and Chads, made a visit of ceremony to the French admiral; and on the 15th, Parseval-Deschênes made a similar complimentary visit to his brother-officer on board the *Duke of Wellington*. It was a novel and exciting scene; for never before had English and French fleets met in amity in the Baltic; and the crews, when once they had learned to rub off early prejudices, cheered each other right heartily. The blockade of all the Russian ports, in the three Gulfs of Livonia, Finland, and Bothnia, had been formally effected by Sir Charles Napier before the French arrived, and was officially notified in the *London Gazette* on the 16th of June. Sir Charles had delayed his advance up the Gulf of Finland, partly to await the arrival of his French allies, and partly by reason of numerous difficulties which had to be encountered. Dense fogs for many days rendered the navigation dangerous to large ships; the Russians had removed various buoys and beacons which marked the proper channel; and, moreover, they had removed the light-house which served as a landmark at Hangö. A Swedish newspaper about that time stated that the governor of Sveaborg had been dismissed, on

account of the discovery by the czar, during a visit of inspection, of nefarious practices; the governor had stolen the copper roof of the fortress, had stolen guns and ammunition, and had provided black-painted wooden balls instead of cannon balls—appropriating to his own use the difference in value. All this might have been true; but it remained not less true that Sveaborg was a formidable place, which would require much study on the part of the admirals before any attack could safely be attempted.

Sir Charles Napier took up a position in Baro Sound, a little way within the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, about twelve miles from Sveaborg, and fifteen from Revel. In the third week of June, there were anchored in that sound at one time no less than 51 ships-of-war, comprising 28 ships-of-the-line, 5 first-class frigates, and 18 steamers—such a fleet as had never before been seen in the Baltic, irrespective of the novel union of the English and French flags. The guns, of large calibre, were about 2700 in number, and the seamen and marines nearly 30,000. Early in the month, a cannonade of the forts commanding Hangö had taken place. The forts might have been taken without much difficulty by a renewal of the attack; but the headland was not regarded as sufficient in importance to warrant this display of force, especially considering the strength of the Russian position at Sveaborg, a few miles further east. Day by day, while in that vicinity, the men were waiting impatiently for the signal to advance to the great stronghold. They believed that what any admiral would dare, Sir Charles would dare; but they could not know to what extent his movements were controlled by instructions from London. One of the sailors, in a letter addressed to his relations in England, said: 'Here we are, like dogs tied by the neck, all ready to fight when let go!'—an expression which well conveyed the feelings and hopes of most of the crews at the time. On one occasion, to lessen the tedium of the men, private theatricals were performed on board the *Duke of Wellington*, the quarter-deck being the stage, and seats being raised for the whole of the crew. The common seamen were the performers; and if their *Charles II.* and their *Fortune's Frolic* were of homely merit; if the bronzed arms and neck of Lady Clara contrasted oddly with her white dress and embroidered handkerchief—there was abundance of merriment, and therein the object in view was sufficiently attained.

Instead of, or in preference to, any attack on Sveaborg, the Allied admirals resolved on an advance up the Gulf of Finland to Cronstadt, the island which constitutes virtually the fortress in defence of St Petersburg. This advance was made during the last week in June. When within ten miles of the island, three small paddle-frigates, the *Lightning*, *Bull-dog*, and *Magicienne*, were sent on ahead to sound and reconnoitre more closely, and especially to search for any 'infernal machines' or submarine explosives, the existence of which in those parts was apprehended. Three larger vessels, the *Impérieuse*, *Arrogant*, and *Desperate*, followed them at a short distance to afford protection. No 'infernal machines' were found; but the reconnoitring vessels approached Cronstadt sufficiently near to render manifest a formidable array of granite batteries, and a large fleet sheltered within the harbour. The admirals had heard of certain destructive machines, which had been made at a government establishment near Moscow early in the year—copper vessels, capable of holding 700 pounds of powder, to be exploded either by percussion or by galvanic current: the knowledge obtained was vague, but sufficient to induce a cautious examination of all the approaches to Cronstadt, lest any such submarine apparatus should endanger the hulls of the ships. So far as could be discerned, the Russian fleet within the harbour nearly equalled in number—about thirty—the Anglo-French ships on the outside; but made no attempt to emerge from the hiding-place behind stone-walls. Some of the English officers landed at the small island of Tolbuken, or Toll Beacon, westward of Cronstadt, ascended to the summit of a light-house, and there inspected, in the distance, such a tremendous range of granite batteries as astonished all. A general impression was made, that the place could not be taken by a naval attack; and thereupon, after a careful examination of the vicinity, the fleets returned early in July from Cronstadt to Baro Sound.

This famous stronghold receives the same designation as the island on which it is situated; indeed, bay, island, town, port, and fortress, alike bear the name of Cronstadt in English maps. The island, however, is called Rétouzari by the Fins, and Kotlin-Ostrof (Kettle-Island) by the Russians. The Gulf of Finland narrows eastward of Styrs Point and Dolgoi Ness: this narrowed portion forms the Bay of Cronstadt; a further narrowing occurs at Lisi Ness and Peterhof, eastward of which is the Bay of St Petersburg; and at the extreme eastern point of this bay, where the Neva flows into the sea, stands the imperial city of St Petersburg. Now, the island of Cronstadt—a bed of chalk, seven miles long by about one in average breadth, and familiarly compared in shape to an ox-tongue—lies near the inner end of the bay of the same name; and the town, at the south-eastern extremity of the island (the root-end of the 'tongue'), is thirty-one miles' distance from St Petersburg. At the entrance of the harbour, on an islet opposite the citadel, is the strong fortress of Cronschlott, between which and the town is a deep channel of approach to the port. Cronstadt is not only the great naval station for the Russian Baltic fleet: it is also the harbour of St Petersburg; for all vessels proceeding to the capital are searched here, their cargoes sealed, and transhipment made to vessels intended to ascend the Neva. Cronstadt port has three harbours—an outer one for ships-of-war, an inner one for merchant-ships, and an intermediate harbour for fitting and

1 Fort Constantine
2 Citadel Battery
3 Fort Alexander
4 Citadel
5 Fort Cronslott
6 Fort Risbank
7 Risbanksia Battery
8 Lighthouse & Fog Bell
9 Man-of-War Harbour
10 Dock & Wood Depôt
11 Central Man-of-War Harbour
12 Fort Menchikoff
13 Merchant Harbour
14 Battery with heavy Ordnance
15 Customhouse & Exchange
16 Church of St Nicolas
17 Church of St Andrew
18 Mole with 5 Batteries
19 Kasel Battery
20 Fort Peter
21 Michael Redoubts
22 Katherine Fort
23 Alexander fort
24 Village of Systerbach
25 Cape Lisi Ness
26 Village of Noëlla
27 St Petersburg
28 Great Neva
29 North Passage obstructed by sunk vessels & blocks of Granite
30 Only Passage to St Petersburg
31 Two large Sandbanks

CRONSTADT.

repairing vessels. A deep and broad canal or basin runs half a mile into the town, between the middle and inner harbours; and near it is an immense range of dock-yards. The town presents the aspect rather of a government arsenal than of a commercial port, so numerous are the structures belonging to the imperial navy. This stronghold was one of the mighty works of Peter the Great; but even he could hardly have anticipated the stupendous strength which it would acquire under one of his successors. Not only are the town and harbour defended by granite batteries of formidable character, but every islet, every passage, is similarly guarded; insomuch that, if an enemy's vessel attempt to sail up to St Petersburg, whether northward or southward of the island, it would have to pass between two bristling arrays of batteries, to brave which would be almost certain destruction. The whole is a stern picture of strength, unmarked by beauty. Although six miles intervene between the island and the mainland on either side, this portion of sea is so encumbered by islets, shoals, spits of land, and mud-banks, that the practicable channels are narrow, and the approach rendered all the more difficult. One of the most extraordinary features of the place is the conversion of small islets into strong batteries; and another, still more remarkable, is the construction of forts built on piles driven into the mud. Thus, although Cronstadt Island is very low, it is armed at all points. Cronschlott, Risbank, Fort Menchikoff, Fort Peter, Fort Alexander, Fort Constantine—all are strongly fortified posts south of the island; while the northern side is defended by many forts and redoubts, in addition to six or seven batteries on the mole. It was not possible for the Allies to approach sufficiently near to ascertain details; but there is reason to believe that the town and island, when visited by the Anglo-French fleets in the midsummer of 1854, were defended by 1200 or 1500 guns of large calibre, besides those belonging to the Russian fleet.

Irritating must it have been to the English admiral to know that he was censured in England, by hastily judging persons, for leaving Cronstadt without a bombardment and a capture. Never before had English ships been called upon to attack, or to bear an attack from, such stupendous granite batteries; the admiral was responsible to the nation for the safety of a fine fleet; and none so well as he could judge at what point heroic bravery would become reckless hardihood.

The Allied fleets returned to Baro Sound early in July, after the reconnaissance at Cronstadt. They remained at anchor during many days; and in this interval, the admirals weighed maturely the probabilities for and against the success of any great enterprise. Subsidiary expeditions were sent out in many directions; but the problem to be solved was, whether the fleets in a body could achieve any signal triumph. Attention was at length directed to Bomarsund and the Aland Islands.

Äland or Åland, pronounced 'Oland,' the 'Land of Waters,' is the archipelago before adverted to as guarding the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia. It consists of one island, which gives its name to the whole group, and a considerable number of smaller islands, bearing the names of Ekerö, Föglö, Vordö, Lemland, &c. No less than eighty of the islands are by some authorities said to be inhabited. The largest, Aland, is about 18 miles long by 14 broad; it has an excellent harbour, Ytternäs, on the shore of which is its chief town, the metropolis of the whole group, Bomarsund—'Bar' or 'Boom Sound.' The Alanders, about 15,000 in number, are an interesting people. They refuse to be identified with Swedes, Fins, or Russians: claiming to have a nationality of their own. Employed in farming, grazing, fishing, and piloting, they lead an industrious life, and interest themselves little in the politics of their neighbours. Aland boasts of having once had its own kings; but, be this as it may, the island was in the fourteenth century an earldom. Afterwards it became a kind of fief belonging to the Swedish princes. At various times, during the eighteenth century, it was taken by the Russians; but after each seizure, restored to the Swedes. In 1807, the Alanders themselves expelled a Russian force. The year 1809, however, witnessed the final conquest by Russia, to whom the whole group has since belonged. During the later years preceding the war, a steamer which plied between Stockholm and Finland was wont to moor for one night at Sattunga, one of the easternmost of the islands, and proceed at early dawn to thread a way through the intricate channels which lead to the Finnish coast. An eye-witness, speaking of the general appearance of the archipelago, says: 'The passage between these islands, with their deeply-indented bays, is more like an excursion on a lake than on the open sea. It is seldom possible to see far, either ahead or astern; the view is either bounded by fresh green meadows, with short-legged cattle and sheep feeding on them, by nice-looking villages, surrounded by kitchen-gardens or by bare desert cliffs of red granite, abounding in felspar, among which there stretch hazel-shrubs or thin stunted woods of pine.'

About the middle of June, while the main portion of the English fleet was yet in Baro Sound, an attack on Bomarsund was planned by Captains Hall, Scott, and Buckle, in the *Hecla*, *Odin*, and *Valorous*. On the 21st, the three steamers took up a position in front of the town, about 2000 yards distant, and opened fire. The fortress was heavily mounted, and was defended also by two companies of riflemen. A brisk cannonade was kept up for several hours. The English account of the transaction was—that two strand-batteries were soon silenced; that scarcely any of the Russian shot reached the ships; that all the houses, vessels, and ships' stores were burnt or otherwise destroyed; that the ships left when, during the night, the fortress was in flames in several places; that the loss of the enemy must have been

severe; and that the Allies had none killed and only five wounded. According to the Russian version, however, a red-hot ball from the fort set fire to one of the ships; the English did no serious damage to the fortress; they were obliged to give up the contest and retire during the night; the English loss must have been considerable; while the Russians had only two killed and fifteen wounded. Such contradictory accounts would be embarrassing, were it not that the *Journal de St Petersburg*, during the war, presented so many instances of untruthfulness and glaring exaggeration. A gallant act was performed by Midshipman Lucas on this occasion; one of the bombs fired by the Russians having fallen on the deck of the *Hecla*, Lucas boldly picked it up, and threw it into the sea before the fuse had ignited the explosive compound within: it was a question of life or death for him in either case, whether he touched the dread missile or not.

When Napier and Deschênes sailed westward from Baro Sound, there was an evident intention to effect something more formidable against Bomarsund. Just before leaving this anchorage,

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the splendid fleet of forty-four ships-of-war (eight or ten other vessels being employed on special service in different spots) was moored in four lines; all the men were kept in practice; and when, on a signal being given from the flag-ship, 'Man and arm boats' was denoted, 180 boats, all fully manned and equipped, would in a few minutes speckle the sea, in readiness for any enterprise. It was by these means that Napier drilled and educated many raw sailors, with whom, in the first instance, he was little content. The boat-practice was especially attended to. All the ships' boats—pinnaces, barges, cutters, launches, and gigs—were marshalled into three squadrons of three divisions each; each division comprising a certain number of boats, half of which were armed with howitzers. The whole boat-flotilla was placed under the command of a senior officer; while each squadron and each division was headed by an officer belonging respectively to that squadron or division of ships. It was, indeed, a fleet of boats, separate from, but subordinate to, the fleet of ships; having its own organisation, and being planned in anticipation of any exigencies which might render a bold attack by such a force expedient.

On the 18th of July, the fleets weighed anchor, left Baro Sound, and steered for Aland—leaving some of the ships behind, however, to watch the movements of the Russians at Sveaborg and Cronstadt. They reached Led Sound, south of the Aland Islands, on the 21st. On the 22d, the *Edinburgh*, *Blenheim*, *Hogue*, *Ajax*, *Amphion*, and *Alban*, arrived off the forts of Bomarsund, passing beautiful scenery by the way, but requiring delicate handling to prevent them from going on shore. As it was fully expected that Russian troops were hidden behind the woods on shore, preparations were made to guard the ships from a sudden attack; shot and shell were brought up ready on deck, the men were placed at the guns, 10-inch guns were loaded with canister-shot, and a screen of hammocks was fitted up; for the ships sailed and steamed so close to land on some occasions, that 'a biscuit might have been thrown ashore.'

The precaution was not unnecessary, for shot and shell speedily began to pour forth from Bomarsund, which would have wrought great injury if better aimed. The admiral, in accordance with instructions from home, suspended active operations until military reinforcements should arrive; he therefore ordered the ships to retire beyond reach of the guns at Bomarsund, but continued a very careful survey of the intricate channels between the islands. Two or three of the ships went on shore in the narrow passages, and were with difficulty liberated. The officers, by the aid of their glasses, could observe that the great fort or battery at Bomarsund had a double range of casemates; it was built in a curve, commanding the whole sweep of the harbour, and had a bomb-proof roofing, covered by a layer of sand four feet in depth. Besides this, there were two round towers or forts, built on elevated spots of ground. A temporary strand-battery was also visible on the beach.

A military reinforcement is adverted to in the preceding paragraph. When the admirals had fully ascertained, by personal inspection, the formidable nature of the granite batteries at Cronstadt, Sveaborg, and Bomarsund, and had reported their observations to the home authorities, the English and French governments resolved on affording military aid, in order that land-attacks might co-operate with those made by sea. England being less extensively a military nation, it was agreed that France should send an army to the Baltic, in addition to the small body of troops originally sent with the fleets; and that England should provide ships in which to convey this army. Accordingly, during June, and the first half of July, preparations were busily made in France; an army being despatched from the interior to Calais, and provided with all the paraphernalia of war. The emperor issued a proclamation to his troops on leaving Paris, which was posted up extensively in the metropolis, and read eagerly by crowds of gazers: it contained the usual kind of appeals to the military ardour of the nation; but it also referred in graceful terms to the fact—a fact so novel that the Parisians could barely realise its importance—that English ships would convey the French troops to the Baltic. During the second week in July, Calais was a scene of excitement. Regiments of soldiers, stores of gunpowder, trains of cannon, wagons of baggage and military stores, poured into the town, and went successively down to the harbour, where the ships were ready to receive them. The transports were anchored in the Calais Roads, and received their quota of men, horses, guns, and military stores through the medium of steamers, which loaded either at the port or at the basin. The force to be embarked, under the command of General Baraguay d'Hilliers, consisted of two brigades, led by Generals Hugues and Gresy; with General Niel in command of the engineering department. During the brief sojourn at Calais, where French soldiers, Calais citizens, and English sailors speedily learned to 'fraternise,' the troops exhibited their aptness and tact in managing the regimental cookery. Selecting a part of the ramparts protected from gusts of wind, they dug furrows in the earth, six feet long, nine or ten inches deep, and five or six in width; tin mess-pots, containing meat, potatoes, cabbage, and soup, were placed in rows upon a fire of dry chips in the furrows; and the open-air cookery was conducted with much success. The incident, a trifle in itself, was valuable as exemplifying a truth frequently made manifest during the war—that French soldiers have been better schooled than English in the apt little contrivances and arrangements necessary for outdoor encampments. On the 15th of July, all embarked on board the steamers *Garland*, *Violet*, *Princess Clementine*, *Princess Helena*, *Faun*, *Passe-partout*, *Cocyte*, *Corse*, *Fearless*, *Wildfire*, *Lizard*, *Adder*, *Sprightly*, *Fire-queen*, *Avon*, *Dasher*, *Lucifer*, *Echo*, *Douro*, and one or two others. Most of these belonged to the English navy, but some were French, and others chartered from a mail-company. The embarkation was superintended by Captain Lefebvre, of H.M.S. *Dasher*. The steamers carried out the troops to the English war-ships, which then received them for conveyance to the Baltic. The emperor of the French, in the screw steam-yacht *La Reine Hortense*, witnessed the departure. A slight accident to one of the ships, in the Downs, led to the landing of French troops for a brief period at Deal; where the inhabitants enjoyed the novel pleasure of welcoming the soldiers of a nation against whom England had so often fought.

On the 30th of July, from the mast-head of the *Duke of Wellington*, Sir Charles Napier's flag-ship, at Led Sound, the ships which brought the first division of the French troops were descried. General Baraguay d'Hilliers came in the *Reine Hortense;* while the *Algiers*, 91, *Royal William*, 120, *St Vincent*, 104, and other large ships, brought the troops. Courtesies and congratulations speedily followed; visits of ceremony were paid; admirals and generals, English and French, vied with each other in friendly demonstrations; and all felt that now, at least, somewhat ought to be achieved to give *éclat* to a campaign which had hitherto been deficient in stirring incidents. Admiral Parseval-Deschênes issued an order of the day on board the French portion of the fleet, intended chiefly to prepare the sailors to welcome their military associates. In the midst of much enthusiastic and over-strained compliment to the fleet for what it had effected, the order adverted to the military contingent in the following terms:—

'The Russian fleets in their own seas appear to have decided not to accept the offer of combat made by the Allied fleet.

Before Cronstadt our task seems to have reduced itself to the blockade of 500 leagues of coast.

The Emperor determined that this should not be the case. His Majesty has chosen and pointed out an important object to which our cannon and our efforts

should be directed. I am happy to announce that object to you.

The brave General Baraguay d'Hilliers comes at the head of 10,000 of our valiant troops.

The Emperor sends his eagles to join our vessels, to shew to the regions of the north what can be effected by the powerful will of France armed for a noble cause—the right of the weakest, and the liberty of Europe. The navy and the army have long been accustomed to rely upon each other, having no other rivalry than the desire to be foremost in doing good.'

The commanders, military and naval, immediately commenced arrangements for an attack on Bomarsund; they steamed up to the vicinity of the fort, to make such reconnaissances as might determine the nature of the plan to be adopted. Three Russians, escaped from Bomarsund, gave information that the fortress contained two round towers and a long battery, 1000 troops of the line, 350 irregulars, 100 armed convicts, and 550 artillerymen; while on various parts of the island were 500 riflemen, 700 irregulars, 80 Cossacks, and 4 field-pieces. The statements of deserters, however, are to be received with caution; and the Allies simply made use of this information as one among several means of arriving at the truth. Some of the ships were so placed as to form a cordon round the islands, to remain at signal-distance to watch the movements of the troops on shore, and to cut off all supplies of provisions and ammunition; while others entered the straits or fiords leading up to Bomarsund.

The first week in August witnessed the commencement of operations. A spot was selected at which to land the troops for a little relaxation after their confinement on ship-board; and the paddle-box boats and ships' cutters were speedily engaged in this duty. The scene was one of great excitement; for nearly all the ships furnished a contingent of boats for this duty. The French troops carried their tent and cooking equipage in a compact form: the tent-mess being divided among six, each man carried one-sixth part of the fittings, including canvas, tent-stick, pegs, tin saucepan, kettle, drinking-cups, water-bottles, &c. As seven or eight ships-of-war only could bring their large guns to bear upon the fortifications of Bomarsund, the military arrangements were made in conformity with this limitation. The Russians concealed their strength as much as possible: no men being seen but sentinels relieving guard. The only obvious facts were, that large towers, which mainly defended the place, were erected on the summits of two rocks, each surrounded by a ditch; that at the foot of the one tower was a long circular front, half occupied on the left by barracks, and the other half on the right by casemated batteries; that a second line of strand-batteries had been commenced under the second tower, but not brought to completion; that a third tower was visible on an adjacent island; and that a single earthen battery of five pieces of cannon was placed under the trees, about a mile in advance.

The actual landing took place on the 8th of August, at two points on the island, near Bomarsund. The main body of French, 9000 or 10,000 in number, landed south of the town, and rounded the head of a creek, so as to approach on the land or inner side of the fortifications; while a smaller division landed on the north, and wound round the head of another creek, which brought them into near proximity to their allies. Nearly opposite the town, the *Penelope*, *Valorous*, *Hecla*, *Stromboli*, *Amphion*, &c., took up a position; while other portions of the fleet anchored north and south. It was not known whether any vessels larger than brigs and schooners had ever before threaded the intricate channels leading up to Bomarsund; hence the necessity for great caution in steering the majestic war-ships into those waters. The town itself, with its fortifications, occupies the end of a peninsula jutting eastward, and thus has water on the north, east, and south. The name of Lumpar Bay or Fiord is given to the surrounding waters; but the Bay of Bomarsund itself, open to the south, is a semi-circle about half a mile in diameter—the shores around being for the most part high and well wooded. The operations had been delayed some days by the non-arrival of the siege-train from France; several French transports, however, arrived on the 5th with the guns; and the ships' carpenters, having been previously engaged in constructing strong platforms, provided the means for landing and moving the guns: insomuch, that when, on the 8th, the troops and sappers and marines were ready, the guns were ready also. Meanwhile, the Russian commandant, true to the spirit which had dictated the burning of Moscow in an earlier war, fired most of the villages around, and changed the neighbourhood to a scene of desolation, apparently with a view to reduce to a minimum any advantage derivable by the Allies from the possession of those villages. The policy was, perhaps, intelligible in another sense also: the siege-guns of the French, weighing 45 hundredweights each, had to be dragged two or three miles on sledges, over alternations of rocky and marshy ground; and it was important to the Russians that the district should afford no aid to the enemy's soldiery in this heavy work.

By nine o'clock on the morning of the 8th, the disembarkation had been effected, and the troops began their preparations for a march to the forts. Sir Charles Napier, in the meantime, was busily moving from place to place, from ship to ship, reconnoitring the shore, and signaling orders to the various ships of the fleet, of which nearly fifty were in the immediate vicinity, four-fifths of the number being steamers. The small steamers were employed in carrying ammunition and provisions on shore; while the larger vessels were preparing to bring their broadsides to bear upon any assailable points.

To understand the busy operations of nine days,

from the 8th to the 16th inclusive, it will be necessary to trace them day by day.

As each French regiment landed, on the morning of the 8th, it quickly fell into line, and marched through a thick pine-forest and over the heights, taking up a camping position for the night at a spot about two miles distant from the westernmost or inner fort. The fort reared its crest at a majestic height, and was evidently well calculated to command a wide range of country. Napier visited Baraguay d'Hilliers that evening at the newly formed camp, and returned to his ship before nightfall. The fine brass siege-guns belonging to the French were carefully landed one by one, as rapidly as the movement of such ponderous masses could be effected. The northern expedition, or the one which effected a landing north of the forts, had, in the meantime, made good progress; it had been intrusted to Admiral Plumridge to effect this landing; and the troops, when on shore, were placed under the command of Brigadier-general Jones: they comprised about 2000 French troops, aided by British marines, artillery, and sappers and miners. They speedily attacked a redoubt of five guns, which defended the road, the French in front and the marines in rear, and captured it at once. They took up a position about two miles from Bomarsund, where they encamped, and where, notwithstanding the precautions of the commandant, the Aland villagers brought them an abundance of provisions for sale. The ships were not idle during these hours. The *Amphion* and the *Phlegethon* were employed in destroying a mud-fort, which, from its commanding position, might have annoyed the troops during the landing; on being captured, however, it was found that the Russians had deserted it. The work was so quickly achieved, that the admiral hoisted the signal: 'Well done, *Amphion*.' The block-ships, *Edinburgh*, *Blenheim*, *Ajax*, and *Hogue*, having covered the landing of the troops, returned abreast of the principal fort, anchoring within range, and preparing for an encounter as soon as the military arrangements should be completed. The *Amphion* and *Phlegethon*, after taking the mud-fort, passed near the formidable granite casemated battery, whence a hot fire immediately proceeded; and during the day, the ships endeavoured to attract the attention of the forts as much as possible, that the landing of the troops might be unmolested.

The dawn of early morn on the 9th witnessed the active exertions of the soldiery to render their temporary encampment comfortable, and to prepare everything for an approaching bombardment of the forts. The shores were lined with boats, carrying ammunition and provisions for Baraguay d'Hilliers's troops, most of whom were encamped inland, while the rest had bivouacked during the night on the beach. Guns, carriages, boxes, casks, strewed the beach; peasants' carts and horses —all of them that could be found—were put in requisition for the conveyance of baggage up to head-quarters; and all the ducks and geese, pigs and sheep, which the Alanders had to sell, the French eagerly purchased. The encampment of the main body for the night had been near the village of Skarpan, built on an eminence situated rather less than two miles from the fortress. A valley, and a long pond or small lake, intervened between the camp and the fortress; while a range of rocks or elevated ground furnished shelter to the troops until such time as the breaching-batteries could be formed. The French had shewn wonderful alacrity in bringing their camp into tidy order. 'The tents of the soldiery were scattered around the village in every direction and position,' said an eye-witness, 'upon rocks and mounds, in fields and gardens, in the copse and on the heath, on the village-green, and even beneath the windmills. Troops of men were marching about to the relief of guards and out-posts, and foraging-parties were going out in search of cattle. A good bakehouse and slaughter-house had been already established; and the *vivandières* had opened their tents, with a guard to protect them, for the sale of little luxuries to the soldiers.' It is everywhere the same with the French troops: no sooner do they become bivouacked or encamped, than they make themselves fairly at home. The other military division, under General Jones, was encamped not far distant—the marines and artillery in a ravine, in the midst of a young plantation of fir and juniper; and the rest in the vicinity, within half a mile of the nearest fort. The fleets, on this day, were watching for any opportunity to aid the troops, or to protect them during the progress of the land-works. Information having been received that the Russians were about to send reinforcements to the island from the Finnish shore, a good watch was kept; boats, manned and armed, were despatched to intercept them; and the gun-boat *Cuckoo* was ordered to assist. The reinforcements were compelled to take shelter on a small intermediate island, where they were soon afterwards captured.

On the 10th, some of the 'blue-jackets' were employed on shore-service. It was determined to send six guns on shore, to enable General Jones to form a breaching-battery: the guns being 32-pounders, of 42 hundredweights each. The carpenters of four of the ships belonging to Admiral Chads's squadron set actively to work to make eight sledges, six for the guns and two for the carriages and gear. On the 10th, three of the guns were safely deposited, with their appendages. Four sledges were manned, each by 150 seamen, headed by a senior lieutenant; and the whole commanded by Captain Hewlett of the *Edinburgh*. The situation selected for the battery was four miles and a half inland, over wretched ground—partly steep rocky hills, and the rest ploughed fields. At five o'clock in the morning, the boats, with the men, guns, sledges, &c., left the ships; the armament landed; the men erected sheers to hoist the guns: they pulled heartily over

the terrible region; and by one o'clock they had reached the camp. Admiral Chads, in describing this exploit in a dispatch to Sir Charles Napier, said: 'The exertions and good-will of the officers and seamen created much astonishment in the encampment of the French troops, who cheered them in passing, and, on some of the most difficult ascents, went in voluntarily and most cheerfully to the drag-ropes, and gave them assistance. On arriving in camp, the men were much exhausted, and lay down to rest and prepare their dinners; when an order arrived that they were to embark immediately, as the *Penelope* was on shore under the fire of the enemy, and their ships might be required. The order was received with cheers; and, forgetting dinners and fatigue, they rushed down to their boats in three-quarters of an hour by a short route, but close under the enemy's fire.' The perilous position of the *Penelope*, here adverted to, was one of the many consequences of the narrowness of the channels through which the vessels had to steer. In endeavouring to thread a labyrinth between Prastö and Toftö, she got on a rock in dangerous proximity to Bomarsund. The

Bomarsund and Neighbourhood.

Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 6 are French batteries; No. 2, an English battery; No. 5, a Russian sand-battery.

great fort immediately opened fire, and continued to pour a fierce hot shower for more than two hours. The *Gladiator*, *Hecla*, and *Pigmy* immediately went to her assistance, together with boats from the *Trident* and the *Duperré*; the *Hecla* and *Gladiator* took her in tow, but found her immovable. The position was becoming serious; for the enemy had got her range, and was pouring a shower of iron hail both upon her and the *Hecla*. The *Edinburgh* and *Valorous* thereupon began throwing shells into the fort, to effect a diversion; while Sir Charles Napier ordered all the guns of the *Penelope* to be thrown overboard, as a means of lightening her. This proceeding fortunately had the desired effect: the *Penelope* floated, and was towed away—not, however, until upwards of a hundred shot, a few of them red-hot, had been fired at her from the great fort, many striking either her hull or rigging.

Each day now brought matters nearer to an inevitable crisis. Each day effected something towards the completion of the military arrangements on shore. On the 11th, Captain Hewlett finished the work he had commenced on the preceding day, by conveying on shore and to the camp the remaining three siege-guns with their carriages and gear. On this occasion, he had 200 men to drag each gun—the experience of the 10th having shewn that 150 were scarcely equal to the severe labour. The ships' bands accompanied the men, to cheer them at their labour; and, to use the amusing sailor-like language of Admiral Chads, 'the spirits of the men were occasionally excited by a dropping shot from the enemy.' While this was in progress, Sir Charles Napier went on shore, drove through the encampment, and concerted arrangements with General Baraguay d'Hilliers. The troops were engaged in making gabions and filling sand-bags, to form a breastwork for the batteries of long guns. Skirmishing commenced between the French and the Russians; for the chasseurs, actively jumping and climbing upon every accessible spot, came within fighting distance of the Russian outposts; while

the guns from the landward fort poured forth a fire whenever a chance presented itself of working mischief. A Russian spy, dressed as a woman, was detected in the French camp this day.

On the 12th, the artillerymen of the chasseurs were busily employed in filling their shells for the mortars: three or four hundred of these shells having been accumulated and ranged under the shelter of the rocks. The men carried heavy planks up to the proper position, laid them horizontally on beds of sand, and placed the guns upon the platforms thus made. The gabions, too—large cylinders of light wicker-work—were filled with earth for the defences. During the evening, the chasseurs worked up so close to the fortress, that a formidable encounter became imminent. So little was previously known of the topography of the district, that General Niel, engineering commander, had to form his plans from his own reconnaissances; he scrambled from rock to rock, and from tree to tree, with a few soldiers accompanying him, and shaped his plans according to the observations which he was enabled to make in person.

Attack on Fort Tzee.

Before narrating the stirring events of the 13th and 14th, it may be well to describe a little more minutely the fortifications of Bomarsund. Omitting minor batteries or redoubts, they may be regarded as four in number, which, from their relative positions, may be called the shore, south, north, and Prastö defences. The great or shore battery commanded the harbour by its formidable convex frontage, casemated for a number of guns which the attacking party could not at first correctly estimate; but it was afterwards found that this work was defended landward as well as seaward, having a moat on the land-side, and being pierced altogether for 180 guns. The casemate—a bomb-proof chamber immediately behind and around each gun, for the protection of the artillerymen—gave great additional strength to this work. The southern fort, called Fort Tzee, consisted of two rows of circular casemated batteries, one above the other, each pierced for fourteen guns. The diameter of the fort was about 100 feet. Above the bomb-proof roof was another roof or shed of zinc, pierced with small holes, through which riflemen could command a great sweep of country. The fort was constructed of pentagonal blocks of granite, fitted with great nicety. The northern fort, called Fort Nottich, was analogous in character to the southern, though differing in details. The Prastö fort was on the small island of the same name, immediately opposite Bomarsund.

Such were the formidable defences on which the French opened fire on the 13th. The forts, except the great battery on the shore, were a kind of sturdy, low, round towers; and it was evident that they would be capable of offering a stubborn resistance. How far cannon-balls could avail against granite fortifications, remained to be proved. The batteries brought to bear upon the works were numbered, to identify them. Battery No. 1 (French), for four 16-pounders and four mortars, was placed at about 600 yards from Fort Tzee, to dislodge the zinc roof and riflemen, and to damage the embrasures below. Battery

No. 2 (English) was composed of the 32-pounders brought from the ships, and was placed only half as far distant as the first. Battery No. 3 (French), of 30-pounders, was distant not more than 150 yards from the same fort. A battery, consisting not only of guns, but of mounds of earth to protect the gunners, could at that spot only be constructed by means of sand-bags and earth-filled gabions; of which many thousand were needed. As approached from the land-side, the two round forts or towers were encountered before the great shore-battery; and it was necessary to silence them before the last named could be safely attacked.

Shortly after daybreak, on the morning of the 13th, the French, having been actively employed since the 8th in bringing up and planting their siege-train, and having finished their battery No. 1, opened fire on Fort Tzee, and continued with very little interruption throughout the day. The effect was tremendous, although the guns and mortars were few in number; the shells burst in the embrasures and on the roof; and the face of the stone-work was shattered to fragments. Towards evening, the Russians exhibited, not for the first or the last time during the war, a disregard of the honourable principle which usually regulates an agreement under flag of truce. A flag was hoisted; General Baraguay d'Hilliers went up with a small escort; a request was made that the firing should cease for two hours, that the Russians might have an opportunity to bury their dead; and he so far assented as to yield one hour. It is understood, in such matters, that the time shall be really appropriated in the manner specified; but the Russians, on the contrary, sent down to the great fort, and brought up a new store of ammunition wherewith to continue the struggle. This breach of honour greatly exasperated the French commander; insomuch that he refused a second flag of truce, when signaled at a later stage of the proceedings. The contest became very severe as night approached; for, on the one hand, the French chasseurs, clambering upon the rocks, poured a destructive fire of bullets into the embrasures of the fort, striking down the Russian gunners where they stood; while, on the other hand, Fort Nottich rendered aid to Fort Tzee, by sending shells completely over it into the French camp.

The first conquest of any of the forts was effected on the 14th. The vigorous firing by the mortars and the chasseurs told so severely on Fort Tzee, that it surrendered during the forenoon, and about fifty men became prisoners. The nimble chasseurs appear to have taken the place by surprise. General Jones's battery was not at that time finished, and could render no aid in capturing the first fort; but as the great fort and Fort Nottich maintained a vigorous fire, it speedily became necessary to attack them.

During many hours on the 15th, the French, secure in the possession of Fort Tzee, were busily engaged in erecting on an adjacent elevated spot a battery for breaching the great fort. The state of Fort Tzee itself had encouraged the Allies to persevere in a similar attack on the other forts; for, during a bombardment of about twenty-four hours, the granite face of the tower was jagged and splintered in all directions, and the sides and edges of the embrasures were thickly marked by the bullets which the deadly aim of the chasseurs had poured into them. The English battery was by this time finished, and presented a formidable appearance, with its array of sand-bags nine or ten feet in height. Although Fort Tzee was only 300 yards distant, and Fort Nottich 750, yet, as the former had just been taken by the French, the English turned their guns against the more distant fort, and in eight hours succeeded in breaching the side opposite to them. The battery was manned by seamen and marine-artillery from the *Hogue*, *Edinburgh*, *Ajax*, and *Blenheim*, under the direction of Captain Ramsay of the first-named vessel. Sir Charles Napier, in his dispatch relating to the capture, summed it up in these brief words: 'Their fire was beautiful! At six P.M., one side was knocked in, and the tower surrendered.' It appears that by three o'clock the interior of the tower or fort had been laid open, and its guns silenced. At six o'clock, a white flag having been hoisted, Brigade-major Ord was sent to take possession; he did so; but finding that it would not be possible for him to maintain his communications with the English advanced-posts after daylight, in consequence of the proximity of the great fort, he left the place, bringing away with him 3 officers and 115 soldiers. In the fort he found sixteen 18-pounders, and two 32-pounders. The two forts, the second of which was thus taken, so much resembled towers, that they were described indifferently by either name. Meanwhile the ships were preparing to take part in the attack on the great fort, which, from its proximity to the shore, was more within their reach. The *Asmodée*, *Phlegethon*, *Darien*, *Arrogant*, *Amphion*, *Valorous*, *Driver*, *Bull-dog*, *Hecla*, *Trident*, *Duperré*, *Edinburgh*, and *Ajax*, kept up a well-directed fire of shells, which worked much mischief on the stern granite fortification. Captain Pelham, of the *Blenheim*, landed a large 10-inch gun, and planted it on the earthen battery which the Russians had been forced to abandon a few days before; and there he bore with wonderful coolness an attack of a formidable character. The crew raised a high defence, and kept up a steady fire with their one gun against the south-west end of the large fort, while the enemy, with a double range of heavily shotted and shelled guns, returned the fire with far greater force; shells burst over and around the solitary gun, but the blue-jackets took matters very cheerfully, throwing themselves on the ground until the shells had burst. Captain Pelham maintained his position, despite the formidable antagonist against which he had pitted himself. In another part of the scene of contest,

Fort Tzee, warm work of a different kind was in progress during the day. After this fort had been taken by the French, and before Fort Nottich had yielded to the English, the commandant of this latter fort, knowing the danger to be apprehended from the presence of the French in the other, maintained a fierce fire against it; and at length a shell, falling apparently on a magazine, blew up the greater part of the fort with a tremendous explosion.

At length came the day, the 16th of August, when the final conquest of Bomarsund was to be achieved by the capture of the formidable strand-fort. While dawn had yet hardly broken, a force was despatched to Fort Nottich, to take the prisoners who had surrendered to Captain Ramsay at six o'clock on the preceding evening. The marines and seamen, when they entered the place, found three officers and about 100 men; and these prisoners were marched down three miles to the beach, there to be placed on board one of the ships: the commandant was a colonel in the Russian army. As day advanced, the land-batteries and the ships' guns kept up a deafening roar, maintaining an incessant cannonade against the great fort. The arrangements, however, called for much caution; the narrowness of the slip of ground on which the French had established their breaching-battery, circumscribed the operations, else might the ships have fired upon the French troops in the endeavour to hit the great fort; while the limited space in the anchorage before Bomarsund, and the intricacy of the navigation, prevented the ships from making so near an approach as could be wished. The fort, replying to the ships and to the land-batteries with some of its guns, had still a few to point to the audacious *one gun* which Captain Pelham had maintained in position during the preceding day; his situation becoming perilous, the ships were ordered to increase the rapidity of their fire. Seven of the ships, which happened to be within range with their 10-inch guns, were ordered by Sir Charles to 'give them a shot and shell every five minutes'—as if he were speaking of pills and powders for a sick man. This iron torrent, in conjunction with that which was being poured out by the French breaching-battery, was too much to be borne long: a flag of truce was held out, and the place surrendered. It was the opinion of Sir Charles Napier, expressed in his dispatch, that if the fort had not surrendered on the 16th, the whole place would have been reduced to ashes on the 17th, so terrible was the power of the breaching-battery which General Niel had judiciously placed within 400 yards of the fort, and so heavy the weight of metal poured in from the ships. Admiral Plumridge, during this busy day, was rendering service north-east of the town and forts; he placed his squadron so as to prevent reinforcements from being thrown in from the Finland coast—a contingency which might else have happened; for the Allies had reason to believe that two Russian admirals had been sent among the islands, to determine the practicability or otherwise of aiding the beleaguered forts. It had been intended that Plumridge's squadron should aid the attack by shelling the north side of Bomarsund; but finding that he could not do so without endangering the men in the French breaching-battery, he directed his attention to the Prastö fort. Admiral Plumridge, who had the *Leopard*, *Hecla*, and *Cocyte*, at his disposal, described, in characteristic language, in his dispatch to Sir Charles, the tactics he adopted: everything is 'beautiful' to a professional man which exhibits efficiency in his own particular avocation. He moved his three ships 'into a delightful sequestered position, screened from observation by the trees on the neck of land to the eastward of the tower; having the great Bomarsund fort and it in one [in a right line], so that our over-shot and shell should fall to the lot of Bomarsund. The simultaneous opening fire from the three broadsides was the first intimation the tower had of our movements; and I had the satisfaction of seeing at times, from aloft, the steadiness and precision with which the shot and shell were delivered from each vessel. I only regret that the trees alluded to obscured us all from your view, as I feel almost assured this bit of service would have been deemed worthy of better notice than it becomes me to give at so short a distance from your flag.'

Meanwhile, Prastö was the scene of separate operations. The tower or fort, mounting 20 guns in two casemated tiers, and 6 *en barbette* on the roof, had been invested by a combined force of French and English marines, with some field-pieces, on the 15th; and on the 16th, it was attacked both by this force and by Admiral Plumridge's squadron. When it was known that the great fort had yielded, the commandant of Prastö hoisted a white flag. The Allies approached; the gates were thrown open; the garrison marched out; and the whole became prisoners of war. These prisoners, numbering three officers and about 150 men, were removed in one of the ships.

When the flag of truce was held out from the great fort, the admiral sent Captain Hall on shore; and he, in company with an officer from Admiral Parseval-Deschênes, and two staff-officers from General Baraguay d'Hilliers, entered the fort, and received the surrender of the place. The three commanders, Napier, Parseval, and Baraguay, then went to receive the submission in form. The governor, General Bodisco, attempted a parley in the first instance; but nothing less than an unconditional surrender being admissible, he gave up his sword, and yielded himself and the garrison prisoners. Chasseurs poured down from the batteries on one side, marines and artillerymen from the other; the place was entered, the magazine secured, and the prisoners taken. The victors demanded the arms, which were brought and piled up in the square, near the furnace in which

so many of the shot had been made red-hot. All the principal generals and admirals on the part of the Allies were drawn up in a brilliant group; the troops formed a line of about half a mile from the entrance of the fort to the mole or landing-place; and the Russians, care-worn, dispirited, and, in some few cases, frenzied with drink, were marched down to the place of embarkation. From a statement made by Governor Bodisco, it appears that the Russians had been as much annoyed by Captain Pelham's single gun, placed on their own abandoned mud-battery, as by whole ranges of guns elsewhere—so fatal had been the shots aimed through the embrasures. The loss of this great fortress was the first defeat of consequence the Russians had suffered in the Baltic, and they were deeply mortified; for it was not simply a surrender of the place, but a yielding of all the men as prisoners of war. The victors captured 112 mounted guns, 3 mortars, 7 field-pieces, and 79 unmounted guns. When all had surrendered, and had been fairly shipped for England, the prisoners amounted to the following numbers—323 shipped in the *Hannibal*, 420 in the *Algiers*, 764 in the *Royal William*, 207 in the *Termagant*, and 521 in the *St Vincent;* making a total of 2235, of whom 51 were officers, 28 women, and 13 children.

Thus fell Bomarsund. The capture was important, not only as giving to the Allies a command over the whole of the Aland Islands and the Gulf of Bothnia, but for two other reasons—the one military and the other political, each of which deserves a brief consideration.

The fall of Bomarsund was, to military engineers, a subject of interest, inasmuch as it tended to throw some light on a disputed question. Whether granite batteries or earthen mounds are better calculated to resist the fire from guns of large calibre, is a problem which has much engaged the attention of military men in recent times. The various defensive operations at Kalafat, Oltenitza, Giurgevo, and Silistria (Chapter II.), had, in the latter part of 1853 and the first six months of 1854, shewn how wonderfully the Turks were able, when posted behind hastily constructed earthen breast-works, to repel repeated attacks from large bodies of Russians; and now the fall of Bomarsund seemed to shew that hard granite could not maintain its soundness against an iron torrent from great guns. General Niel, the engineering commandant in the French force, formed a high estimate of the powers of iron against granite. He said: 'All the parapets are built of large blocks of granite found on the spot; from a considerable distance a cannon-ball is crushed against these walls, but in the end the walls themselves are shaken and broken. The results obtained by the 16-pound guns at 550 metres, and by the 32-pounders at 750, remove all doubt that at smaller distances a breach may easily be made in walls of this description.' The validity of this opinion was much canvassed when, at a later date, the admiral was inconsiderately reproached for not effecting more in other parts of the Baltic. True it was, however, that the effects wrought surprised even the engineers themselves. The breach made in Fort Nottich by the English battery was frightful; although from a distance of 750 yards, the balls and shells had literally knocked down the west side of the fort, clearing a space through which eight men could have entered abreast. The *Ajax* and the *Edinburgh* threw 84-pound shot with amazing power; but the distance—nearly two miles—was too great to effect a large amount of destruction. An officer who was present at the siege, writing a letter concerning it, said: 'I saw the effect of some of our 68-pound and 84-pound shot. The blocks of granite in the face of the walls are, on an average, about four cubic feet thick. These were backed by four more feet of solid brick-work. In many places, when our shot struck from a distance of 1700 yards, one of these blocks would split in all directions, and be driven back an inch into the breast-work, that was cracked and forced into the interior of the fort. You can hence readily understand how it is that a continued repetition of such blows as the foregoing will soon crumble down the thickest masonry. Nothing can withstand the iron storm of a ship's broadside. I do believe its effect is tremendous, and stone-work powders before its force.'

The political significancy of the fall of Bomarsund consisted in the evidence thereby afforded of the deeply hidden, long-enduring ambition of the Czar Nicholas. Greatly as the Allies were surprised at the strength of the place, they had yet more reason to wonder at the vast works which were evidently planned. Documents fell into their hands which tended to shew that the Bomarsund of 1854 was an insignificant fortress compared with that which it had been intended to become. There were plans and drawings to shew that the complete scheme comprised ten or twelve forts as large as those actually constructed: the foundations of many of which had been begun, and a large expenditure incurred. What could have been the purport of such a gigantic scheme? What enemy could Russia fear in a sea of which half the coast was in her own possession? These questions were of grave moment for Europe. The evidence was incontrovertible, that the works were intended—not to defend conquests already made—but to serve as a stepping-stone to the acquisition of more; not to repel enemies already existing, but to crush any who might oppose an intended additional course of conquest. Bomarsund commands the Aland Islands; the islands command the Gulf of Bothnia and the vicinity of Stockholm; and it is impossible to avoid seeing how powerful an instrument would thus be obtained to aid in the future conquest of Sweden. The Allies, it is true, obtained no evidence that such a project was entertained; but the silent way in which the great fortress had been reared, almost unknown to the Western Powers, afforded ground for suspicion that a wide

scheme of conquest or acquisition on the Baltic shores lurked in the bosom of the ambitious czar. Among the numerous dispatches sent to the Allied governments respecting the capture, one dwelt in forcible terms on the importance of Bomarsund as a military post. 'Judging from the nature of the works existing, those partly erected, and the foundations of others which have been laid, it was evidently the intention of the Russian government to have erected a first-rate fortress. The position of Bomarsund at the entrance of the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia, with a beautiful and extensive anchorage, well sheltered, points it out as a position of the most favourable nature; and no expense apparently has been spared in the construction of the works already built; while the walls of those partly erected are of the same substantial nature.' Brigadier-general Jones at the same time pointed out that the position of Bomarsund is naturally very strong, and favourable for defence: bold and rocky, with a fine command of the ground in its immediate front. If occupied with suitable advanced works, and if fully garrisoned, its capture would have required a long course of siege-operations and a large military force. Indeed, the speedy fall of Bomarsund surprised the Allies themselves, when they became acquainted with the formidable strength of the place; the injury sustained by the great fort, unbreached, well casemated, and sufficiently garrisoned, was comparatively so small, that the governor might unquestionably have held out for a considerable length of time; but, on the other hand, the arrival of reinforcements was effectually stopped; the gradual destruction of the greater part of the garrison was nearly certain; and Governor Bodisco appears, unlike many other Russian generals, to have considered that honourable surrender was better than a hopeless struggle. At a later date, the British minister of war, while claiming credit to the Allies for an achievement in which the whole garrison had been defeated with a loss of little more than twenty French and English, characterised Bomarsund as a fortress 'to which, in a few years, Sveaborg and Cronstadt would have been as nothing; in its harbour and under its guns, the whole fleet of Russia would have been able to lie in security. Had Bomarsund not been destroyed, in a few years the Gulf of Bothnia would have become a Russian lake, and Stockholm would at any moment have been at the mercy of Russia.' The destruction of such a stronghold was not the only important result of the capture: it was little less important to open the eyes of Europe to the gigantic but stealthy steps of the northern potentate.

The arrival in England of most of the Russian prisoners taken at Bomarsund excited a lively interest. Forty years had elapsed since the popular talk had been of war prisons and prisoners; and the novelty was rendered none the less striking by the circumstance that the prisoners on this occasion were Russians, or partly Russians and partly Finlanders. It was a subject of comment, as marking the national characteristics of the two bodies of men, that the Russians and Finlanders kept aloof from each other during the voyage from the Baltic to England: each appeared to regard the other with a feeling compounded of dislike and contempt. As the ships came to anchor at Sheerness, it was seen that the humanity which lessens the horrors of modern warfare had not been forgotten; the wives of the officers had been permitted to accompany their husbands, and all had been treated as kindly as circumstances would allow. They were retained off Sheerness until preparations had been completed for their reception—some at Plymouth, in military barracks, converted for a time into a war-prison; and the remainder at Lewes, in a building formerly the county House of Correction. The Lewes division attracted much attention in England. The men were mostly Finlanders; while their officers—comprising a major, three captains, five lieutenants, and four 'younkers' or cadets—were Russians descended from German or French families, and were mostly, like the Swedes and Northern Germans, adherents of the Lutheran Church. The largest apartment in the building was appropriated as a dining-room, and as a church on Sundays; the smaller rooms were set apart as dormitories, three prisoners to each; a few rooms were fitted up for some of the men skilled in useful handicraft trades; while a large shed was constructed for those—many in number—who could carve out ingenious toys and trinkets for sale to visitors. Most of the men could speak a little Swedish and Russian, besides their native Finnish; and they exhibited generally an amount of education, in regard to reading and writing, superior to that possessed by English soldiers—a characteristic which, little flattering to our credit as a nation, imparts an additional interest to the country of the Fins, placed as it is on a perilous border-land between the Russian and Swedish territories, and exposed to the certainty of much devastating war in any collision between those two monarchies. The prisoners, during their detention in England, behaved for the most part with steadiness and order.

While the captives from Bomarsund were on their way to the land of their captors—while the English and French nations were exchanging congratulations on the important achievement—the Allied generals and admirals were called upon to decide on the line of conduct to be pursued towards the Aland Islands and their inhabitants. There is no evidence that the Western Powers had previously agreed on the course to be adopted in such a contingency; unity of plan was difficult of attainment where two governments claimed to have an equal voice in all important proceedings; and on this account, at Aland, as well as at other parts of the seat of war, the commanders were frequently at a loss to interpret faithfully the wishes of their respective governments. After the

fall of Bomarsund, the Allied commanders issued the following proclamation to the Alanders:—

'We, the undersigned Commanders-in-Chief of the combined naval and land forces, hereby authorise the authorities of these islands to continue in the administration of their respective duties, and we rely on their doing so with zeal and circumspection.

In times of tumult and war, it devolves upon every well-disposed citizen to do his utmost in maintaining order and peace; the lower classes must not be led away with the belief that no law or order exists, for these will be enforced with as much rigour as heretofore.

Since the late events, which have changed the aspect of these islands, the blockade has been raised, and the public are informed that they are at liberty to trade with Sweden on the same conditions and privileges as heretofore.

Each and every one is cautioned against holding any communication or intercourse with the enemy or Finland; and if any one is found aiding them in any way, he will be punished most severely.'

During these transactions in and near Bomarsund, small detachments of ships were cruising in various parts of the two gulfs; either watching for any traces of movement on the part of the Russian fleet, or ascertaining the bearings, soundings, and defences of Russian ports on the coast. One such duty devolved on Captain Scott. This officer received orders, on the 18th of August, to cruise around the islands, as a means of obtaining information concerning troops, gun-boats, or other forces belonging to the Russians. The *Odin*, *Alban*, *Gorgon*, and *Driver*, under his charge, had full experience of the difficulties of Aland navigation; they all went on shore, two of them frequently, and were not without much trouble extricated: their boats and their sounding-lines being in constant requisition. When cruising near Kumlinge, Asterholm, and other small islands, he could learn nothing respecting troops or gun-boats, but received information that a small steamer from Abo was somewhere in the vicinity. Abo is on the Finland coast, not far from the point which separates the two Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland, and in a direction nearly east of Bomarsund, whence the distance is about 70 miles in a straight line. The ships, extricating themselves from the narrow channels, struck across to Abo, where Scott saw a small steamer, and a body of troops in several gun-boats. Having approached within 3000 yards, the *Alban* stood in to sound, and there found the harbour closed in an ingenious way—by a chain laid on a floating platform, a range of stakes and booms, nearly twenty gun-boats placed at intervals, and four steamers under shelter of the headlands. The ships opened fire, which was speedily returned by the gun-boats, and by masked batteries which had not before been detected. The object in view being to make reconnaissances rather than a capture, Captain Scott returned to Led Sound, to report his observations.

A military force being in the Baltic waters, the Allies felt that a speedy decision concerning other operations was necessary; for neither on a conquered island nor on shipboard could an army earn glory or obtain advantages. The demolition of the forts at Bomarsund was the first work to be done. The vast constructions on which Nicholas had spent so many millions of rubles, and so many years of time, were doomed to destruction. All the fortifications of Bomarsund were to be reduced to a shapeless mass of stone and brick. It was about a fortnight after the conquest that the demolition commenced. The fort which Admiral Plumridge had attacked, Fort Prastö, and which, from its position, had had little influence on the progress of the struggle at the main stronghold, was blown into atoms by a large store of powder placed beneath it. The other three forts, nearer the town, had already suffered severely; the work of destruction was already half effected; nevertheless, they were blown up by a succession of explosions, and many a scene of terrific grandeur was presented—granite blocks flying up, timbers blazing, and unspent shells bursting. The wives of about a hundred Russian officers and men were safely conveyed by the *Alban* to the coast of Finland near Abo. The poor Alanders were benefited in some degree, in their forlorn desolation, by receiving all the stores of corn and meal which, in immense quantity, had been found in the forts; the peasants were allowed to come and take it away in carts, as a reserve against possible starvation in the ensuing winter. A part of one of the forts was left standing for a time, that Admiral Chads might have an opportunity of trying the power of his guns against it; the *Edinburgh* was brought up, with its broadside about 500 yards distant, at which range the shot made a thorough breach in the walls, knocking several embrasures into one, and splintering the granite in all directions; the ship then retired to a distance of 1000 yards, a change which materially affected the potency of the shot. When the work of destruction was completed, the soldiers embarked in the various troop-ships, and returned to Led Sound; guns and trophies being carried away, some by the French, and some by the English, and only a few ships remaining for a time at Bomarsund.

The time had now arrived for the military commanders to assist the admirals with their judgment concerning the possibility or impossibility of capturing Helsingfors and its great fortress Sveaborg (Sweaburg). The army was too large to be profitably employed in cruising about among unimportant places: was it powerful enough to capture a second of the czar's strongholds, in size and in strength more formidable than Bomarsund? Many of the ships belonging to the fleet had passed and repassed Sveaborg frequently during the summer, partly to examine its fortifications, and partly to tempt the Russian fleet to emerge from its granite hiding-place. Rear-admiral Martin, with a squadron of twelve or fourteen ships, was, at the time of the siege of Bomarsund, employed in a double service: his larger ships were anchored off the island of Nargen,

in the Gulf of Finland, blockading the port of Revel; while his smaller steamers were cruising between Revel and Sveaborg, offering a tempting bait for the Russian ships to come out and attack them—a bait, however, which failed in its purpose, both here and in every other part of the Baltic throughout the year. Later in the month, Martin assumed the command of a flying squadron in the Gulf of Bothnia; while Plumridge brought a large reinforcement to the blockading squadron in the Gulf of Finland. General Baraguay d'Hilliers, Brigadier-general Jones, and the two admirals-in-chief, went in a steamer to examine carefully Sveaborg and the Finnish coast. Abo, as Captain Scott had before reported, was found to be well defended, both by gun-boats and by land-batteries; the ships of the Allies were amply powerful to destroy or take it, could they have approached sufficiently near; but this was one among many examples furnished during the year in which gun-boats would have rendered more service than ponderous ships-of-the-line; the channel for deep-draught shipping into Abo was too narrow to warrant an entry by vessels-of-war drawing so many feet of water. As the reconnoitring steamer rounded Hangö Head, on the way from Abo to Sveaborg, the Allied commanders found that the Russians had destroyed the fortifications which defended that headland, fearful lest the enemy might capture and retain it. Fort Meyerfeld had first been blown up; next, Fort Gustaf Adolf; and, lastly, the main defence, Fort Gustafsvarn: the entire garrison, and many country-people, having been employed in this work of demolition. The Allied commanders then advanced to Sveaborg, the inspection of which was long and earnest; for they knew that they would be called upon to justify their proceedings, whether those proceedings involved or not an attack on the island-fortress.

This famous stronghold—rendered famous by the knowledge acquired in 1854, for it was little known to the Western nations before that year—is in effect a group of islands. To understand its arrangement, the distinction between Helsingförs and Sveaborg must be clearly apprehended. Helsingförs, the capital of the Russian government of Finland (Abo was the capital when Finland belonged to Sweden), is situated at the mouth of the river Vanna or Wanna, on the north coast of the Gulf of Finland, at about one-third of the distance from Hangö to Cronstadt. The town was built by Gustavus I. of Sweden; it was burned during the war with Russia in 1728, but rebuilt. When Finland was ceded to, or rather forcibly taken, by Russia in 1808, Helsingförs was selected as the site for a powerful naval station. The town underwent a remodelling in 1815—masses of rock being blown up, and inequalities levelled, to obtain space for new buildings. The governor's residence, the barracks, the university, and the assembly-rooms, are all spacious and elegant buildings. The defences are of a formidable nature, and have evidently engaged much attention on the part of the Russian government. There are two forts on the mainland—Braborg and Ulricaborg, defending and partly enclosing a port in which sixty line-of-battle ships might safely lie at anchor. The outer works, built on a series of islands, bear the collective name of Sveaborg; the islands are seven in number, all fortified in immense strength, and some of them connected by bridges. The forts altogether mount nearly 1000 guns; while complete accommodation is provided for a garrison of at least 12,000 men. Some of the most formidable of the



Map of Sveaborg.

works have been constructed in the solid rock; and the barracks, arsenals, and magazines are on a complete scale.

The scrutiny of Sveaborg by the Allied commanders, from such a sea-distance as could be safely maintained, resulted in a decision that the stronghold could not be advantageously attacked. Between the islands which constitute Sveaborg, only one war-ship can pass at a time; and any hostile vessel, sailing up to Helsingförs, would encounter the muzzles of 300 or 400 large pieces of ordnance, which would effectually riddle the hull, if not set the ship on fire, ere the perilous passage had been completed, unless some unforeseen and fortuitous occurrence aided the adventure. It seemed to the commanders that a powerful army, landing at a short distance, and encircling Helsingförs, could alone, by drawing off much of the defensive power in that direction, enable the fleet to succeed in an attack sea-ward: an opinion analogous to that which had before been formed concerning Cronstadt. At a later date, Sir Charles Napier, indignant at accusations which, somewhat hastily and ungenerously, had been brought against him concerning his want of success in the Baltic, communicated to the *Times* a plan and a letter, in which the danger of the region

around the fortress, by reason both of the shoals and the batteries, was forcibly depicted.*

Entire unanimity of opinion was not manifested; but the weight of judgment, on the part of the Allied generals and admirals, tended towards the abandonment of any plans of attack on Sveaborg or Cronstadt, and of any further military operations in the Baltic. General Baraguay d'Hilliers came from France with an army; he aided the admirals to achieve one conquest; he earned for himself a field-marshal's baton; and then the army returned to France. This decision, made during the first week in September, dashed the hopes of many of the eager spirits left behind, who foresaw that no other great conquest was likely to mark the close of the summer or autumnal operations. On the 9th of the month, the *Hecla*, *Driver*, *Gladiator*, and *Asmodée*, with five troop-transports, reached the Sound from Bomarsund, bearing a portion of the French army; the steamers towing the transports. About 1600 men reached Cherbourg on the 14th; others followed in a few days; and thus ended the military expedition to the Baltic.

When the troops had gone, Admirals Napier and Parseval-Deschênes moved their main naval force from Led Sound to Baro Sound and Nargen Island, guarding the Gulf of Finland. During the whole of August, a squadron of nine English and two French liners had been anchored off Nargen, blockading Revel, but without any active service; while the steamers *Impérieuse*, *Euryalus*, *Arrogant*, *Magicienne*, and *Rosamond*, had been cruising about the gulf, watching for any tokens of the enemy, in the shape either of merchantmen or ships-of-war. Some of the war-steamers, when at anchor, practised at targets in the absence of any more formidable opponents, and proved the wonderful force of the 68-pound shot, when vomited forth by 10-inch guns, even at a distance of a mile and a quarter. The whole of September passed as August had done, witnessing this large squadron in stationary inactivity near Nargen; with this exception, that the equinoctial gales commenced about the middle of the month, and presented a foretaste of the qualities of the stormy Baltic. On the 21st, Sir Charles Napier arrived from the anchorage at Led Sound, with the greater part of the ships there stationed. Admiral Chads's squadron had been at and near Led Sound during a period of nine weeks; Admiral Plumridge's squadron had occupied the Nargen anchorage seven weeks; and it now became evident that many of the ships were on the eve of departure, some for England, and some for France; the rest would remain, cruising and watching, until ice and snow, storms and wind, should render further sojourn in those seas perilous. The Aland Islands, in accordance with instructions from the English and French governments, were left to be re-occupied by the Russians, after the complete destruction of all the defences —even down to the granite slabs which had been shaped ready for building.

October opened amid some dissatisfaction in the fleet that more prizes and more honour had not been won, and much complaining in England that more Russian fortresses had not been taken or destroyed. Admiral Plumridge's squadron had already departed for England; while the ships yet in the Gulf of Finland began to experience daily indications of winter in biting winds and driving sleet. Most of the departing ships stopped awhile in Kiel harbour; until, by the middle of the month, a really formidable fleet had there accumulated. The Danes and Holsteiners marvelled at this proceeding; they saw the great armaments return to the place whence they had sailed and steamed just six months before; and they could hear of nothing further than the destruction of one single Russian fortress, as the summer's work of the largest fleet ever borne on the bosom of the Baltic. The old men among them remembered that Nelson had bombarded Copenhagen with a fleet scarcely so large as that which now lay at anchor in Kiel harbour, and which was only one section of the Allied force. The Danes received the English kindly and heartily when the latter went ashore; nevertheless, they wondered much, and asked themselves and others whether the governments or the admirals were responsible for the paucity of achievements.

While the bulk of the fleet was yet at Nargen, several English seamen arrived who had been taken prisoners by the Russians. As their treatment had been kind, a brief narrative of the imprisonment is due to the Russian officers and to the Finlanders. When the attack on Gamle Karleby was made (June 7th), one of the boats belonging to the *Vulture* having run foul of a sunken vessel, the men in her were captured and taken ashore. All who had been wounded in the strife were carefully attended to in an hospital at Gamle Karleby, while the rest were sent on to Helsingfors. The invalids were abundantly supplied by the inhabitants with coffee, tea, bread, butter, seed-cake, beef, fish, rice, and potatoes; and when the poor fellows found the black rye-bread distasteful, one of the officers caused white bread to be made for them daily at his own expense. General Wendt, the commandant, came or sent to

* 'I send you a chart of Sveaborg and Helsingfors, and a plan of their fortifications, shewing the adjacent islands and sunken rocks.

Shew them to any naval officer, young or old (and you must know many), and ask him if it is possible in winter to place buoys and beacons on those rocks and shoals; to conduct a fleet alongside the batteries of Sveaborg, having neither gun-boats nor mortar-boats to cover the approach of the vessels and boats; to place the buoys on the sunken rocks, all of which are within range of the enemy's batteries. It will require several days for this operation, and they will be under fire night and day.

The Russians themselves could not navigate these seas without beacons, and they are all removed.

During the time the process of buoying is going on, the fleet must lie at anchor among the outer rocks.

Imagine to yourself, sir, a south-west gale coming on (and in the winter without warning), and judge what would become of your fleet and gun and mortar boats. A great number of the former would be driven on the rocks, and the latter would either be swamped or obliged to take refuge in the enemy's harbour.'

them every day, and furnished supplies of wine, pipes, and tobacco. When the men had somewhat recovered, they were supplied each with a new blue cloth suit, new shoes, woollen socks, and a cap. Those who died of their wounds were buried in the church-yard—the funeral being attended by the officers and principal inhabitants. After staying at Karleby five weeks, kindly treated in all things, they were suddenly removed to Imola, about seventy miles inland, on account of the approach of the English steamer *Leopard*. While at Imola, they wore an hospital-dress and had soldiers' rations, but were allowed to mingle freely with the kind-hearted peasantry. On the 21st of September, consequent on an arrangement respecting exchange of prisoners, they were sent in light spring-carts from Imola to Abo, whence they were despatched to Led Sound in a small steamer, and thence by one of the larger vessels to Nargen.

The admiral-in-chief received a dispatch, about the middle of the month, ordering him to send the principal part of his remaining ships to Kiel, on their way to England. Consequent on

RIGA.

this order, the *Duke of Wellington*, *St Jean d'Acre*, *James Watt*, *Princess Royal*, *Blenheim*, *Hogue*, *Edinburgh*, *Royal George*, *Nile*, *Cæsar*, *Majestic*, and *Cressy*, weighed anchor, and commenced their westward journey on the 19th. During several days, the weather was boisterous, insomuch that the ships were scattered, and each captain steered towards Kiel without waiting for the others: it was not until the 28th that all assembled in the rendezvous off Kiel. A squadron of steamers, including the *Impérieuse*, *Euryalus*, *Arrogant*, *Magicienne*, *Desperate*, *Basilisk*, *Bull-dog*, and *Dragon*, under Captain Watson, was left to maintain the blockade in the Gulf of Finland down to the latest date the season would permit. In respect to the Gulf of Bothnia, the blockade was formally raised during the last week in the month.

The gloomy month of November arrived. A fleet of great power was anchored off Kiel; but as the officers had few duties to perform, they asked and obtained permission to land and visit Hamburg, Berlin, and other places within accessible distance. Invalids and supernumeraries were sent home. Every ship at Kiel was provided, by stores sent out from England, with rations and all other necessaries to last until the end of December; and the admirals and officers, marines and soldiers, had little further occupation than to think of home. The numbers on board the fleet equalled the entire population of Kiel; hence it is not surprising that the prices of everything purchased at that town rose enormously, rendering it a costly place to those whose pay was so applied. The winter set in unusually early, insomuch that the head of the bay exhibited a considerable surface of ice, even by the middle of November, and skating had commenced on the ponds on shore. About the third week in the month, the ships at Kiel were thirteen in number, mounting more than 1100 guns, and containing 10,000 men; while seven steamers were still blockading the ports in the Gulf of Finland. From time to time, telegraphic dispatches arrived from England;

consequent upon which the large ships, two or three at a time, left Kiel homeward-bound.

The last month of the year witnessed the final separation and departure of this great armament. In the first week of December, Captain Watson announced that the state of the ice in the Gulf of Finland was such as, in virtue of his instructions, warranted him in steaming away towards Kiel; which he accordingly did. Some of the larger ships about the same time steered towards the Sound, ready for orders to take their final departure. Those orders speedily came; and Christmas-day witnessed the presence of all, or nearly all, the ships and crews on English shores. Sir Charles Napier himself landed at Portsmouth on the 18th of December, where he was received kindly and heartily by the inhabitants. On the last day of the year, the *Duke of Wellington*, *James Watt*, *Hogue*, *Blenheim*, *Impérieuse*, *Arrogant*, *Penelope*, and *Locust* were at Portsmouth; the *St Jean d'Acre*, *Princess Royal*, *Nile*, *Cæsar*, and *Euryalus* at Devonport; the *Edinburgh*, *Cruiser*, *Archer*, and *Magicienne* at Leith; the *Odin* at Woolwich; the *Cressy*, *Majestic*, *Royal George*, and *Amphion* at Sheerness; the *Conflict* and *Desperate* at Hull; the *Bull-dog* at North Shields; the *Dragon*, *Rosamond*, *Basilisk*, and *Vulture* at Cromarty; and the *Driver* at Harwich.

Thus ended the operations in the Baltic in 1854—operations which had involved large military and naval arrangements; which had called into use a larger fleet than had ever before entered the Baltic; which had been commenced amid the most extravagant anticipations, by the English nation, of great results; which had entailed a vast outlay; and which had ended in much disappointment to the nation, the officers, and the men. It will be necessary to touch briefly here upon two points—the effects produced on Russia and her dominions; and the nature of the discontent produced at home.

When the Allied commanders resolved to abandon the Aland Islands, the Russians lost no time in regaining possession. The last English ships having withdrawn towards the close of October, the Alanders became somewhat dejected, knowing that their old masters would soon return. This return took place about the middle of November; and the postal communication between Stockholm, Aland, and Finland, was also re-opened. One of the local authorities from Aland was summoned to Finland, to justify or explain a too favourable tendency which he was supposed to have exhibited towards the invaders; and it was with difficulty that he escaped punishment. Evidence was afforded that spies in the Russian service were near Bomarsund during the occupation of the Allies, disguised in various ways: their duty consisted in watching not so much the English and French, as the Alanders and Swedes. In so far as concerned the Aland Islands, the Allies gained nothing and the czar lost nothing by the campaign of 1854, except the destruction of the works at Bomarsund. There was just time, before the ice set in, to import merchandise from Sweden into Finland, after a stoppage of all trade for many months: the blockade was somewhat too early raised in this particular; and the Russians, or the Finlanders in their service, neglected not to avail themselves of such an advantage. At Revel, when the inhabitants found that the blockade was stopped and the hostile ships gone, they were overjoyed; the authorities sent out to the island of Nargen to ascertain in what the Allies had been employed during their sojourn; small trading-ships brought cargoes of tar, firewood, salt, herrings, and other commodities; and the townsmen were in a position to congratulate themselves that the enemy had wrought but little harm upon the town and port, except that which had arisen from stagnation of trade. They could scarcely believe that they had really escaped, for that year, the horrors of a bombardment: rejoicings and festivities marked their sense of the release. The military commandant at Riga, during the summer, had sunk at the entrance to the port several vessels laden with large blocks of granite; and it became evident that the Allies would have encountered much difficulty in forcing a passage into that port through such obstacles. The Russian fleets at Helsingfors and Cronstadt emerged cautiously from behind their granite screens as soon as the Allies had departed, to reconnoitre and possibly pick up a few of the enemy's smaller cruisers; but some of these war-vessels received considerable damage, owing to the tempestuous condition of the Gulf of Finland; and all speedily returned, to lie up for the winter. Large numbers of labourers were set to work, in repairing the road between Abo, Helsingfors, and St Petersburg, to facilitate the transport of heavy stores. The military and naval commanders were summoned to the capital, to report minutely on all that had occurred, and to receive instructions concerning new defensive works at Cronstadt, Sveaborg, Helsingfors, Abo, Revel, and Riga. In short, exception being made of the destruction of Bomarsund and the interruption to trade, the Emperor of Russia had not much cause to lament the presence in the Baltic of the fleets from the West.

Proportionably great, however, was the disappointment felt in England. A severe punishment to the czar was that for which the English nation had hoped, and, as was considered, had paid; insomuch that, when the punishment was found to have been light, the nation felt as though there had been a breach of contract, a departure from a fair bargain. The disappointment found vent rather in newspapers than at public meetings or in parliament. It was asserted that our wooden-walls, during the old wars, had proved sufficiently powerful to cope successfully with strong fortresses; that impregnability had never been admitted in our former attacks; that the finest fleet which ever left our shores should have

effected more than simply coming safe home again; that almost every single ship, consequent on the vast mechanical appliances of our age, was a more terrible engine of destruction than any possessed by Nelson or Howe; that if Sveaborg and Cronstadt were too formidable, the Allies might at least have taken or bombarded Riga, or Revel, or Abo. One brilliant debater, in parliament, speaking of the inaction of the stupendous fleets of the belligerents, drew a comparison with a transaction which has been made the subject of an epigram.* On the other hand, arguments were employed to shew that the advantages resulting from the campaign ought not to be lightly passed over. It was urged, that the czar had been humiliated by the fall of a fortress on which he had expended so much time and money; that he had himself destroyed his own works at Hangö; that his commerce had been ruined for the year; that the operations at Bomarsund had shewn that our sailors and marines had still the old mettle left in them; that the Russian fleet had been driven to proclaim itself, if not cowardly, at least undignified; that we defied the enemy at the very mouth of his guns, but that he would not respond; that we had ascertained some important facts concerning the power of iron shot and shell against masses of granite; that we had acquired a thorough knowledge of the intricate navigation of the Baltic, and of the kind of craft which could best thread its mazes; and that the prestige of Russia had been considerably shaken, in the eyes of surrounding powers, by the timid course adopted by her fleet.

The discussions on this subject led to a further inquiry—Whether the admiral-in-chief had been duly supplied and supported by the government? Many contended that the force placed at his disposal was at once too strong and too weak: too strong to justify the Russian fleet in emerging, and thereby hazarding a naval engagement; too weak to capture or destroy Cronstadt or Sveaborg. Even if the Russians had consented to fight in open sea, a smaller fleet could have grappled with them. On the other hand, there was a deficiency of vessels of light draught, which could have approached shoal coasts and ascended creeks and rivers; bulky old 74 and 90 gun ships were in abundance, while gun-boats and small light-draughted vessels were few. The admiral, early in the year, had represented the advantage derivable from steam gun-boats; but none were ready until the autumn work was ended. Twelve thousand troops, although more than were needed for the capture of Bomarsund, were less than would have been called for at Cronstadt or Sveaborg; hence the military spirit of the French was as little satisfied as the naval pride of England, by the arrangements made on the part of the respective governments. As to the naval operations, so little were the first-rate sailing-ships—those unprovided with steam-power and screw-propellers—suited to the service required, that they fired very few shotted guns throughout the year: the vessels which rendered most service being those of smaller size. Another circumstance told unfavourably upon Sir Charles Napier, without involving any blame either to himself or to the government. An announcement by electric-telegraph was made throughout all Europe, during the last week in September, that the strong fortress of Sebastopol, in the Crimea, at that time besieged by the Allies, had fallen; the news was received as true both by nations and governments; and while the excitement lasted, the name of Raglan was placed in comparison with that of Napier on men's lips, to the evident disadvantage of the admiral. A few days sufficed to prove that the report was false, and that the time for glorying in achievements at Sebastopol had not yet arrived; nevertheless the public did not easily recover its good-humour concerning the admiral.

When the year's operations in the Baltic were ended, it speedily became known that a feud existed between the admiral and the government, or some members of the government. Sir Charles, although not openly condemned, was coldly laid aside; and this coldness wounded his professional pride. On an occasion when civic hospitality was displayed towards some of the officers engaged in the war, he expressed his grievances in bitter language.* He asserted, that he had had a fleet under his command which, though magnificent in amount and force, was handed to his keeping badly manned and disciplined; that he had, perforce, to steer his course with insufficient aid from charts and pilotage; that 'he was quite aware, when he went out, that not one-tenth part of what was expected could be performed;' that he had divided his fleet, as a temptation to the Russian ships to emerge from their hiding-places, but they would not yield to the temptation; that an examination told him how fruitless an attack on Cronstadt would have been; that he could have taken Bomarsund with his fleet and a few troops, even had there been no French army in the Baltic; that when a council of war, held at Led Sound, determined that no further military conquests could be achieved, the Admiralty was dissatisfied with the decision; that he wrote to the Admiralty, proposing a mode of attacking Sveaborg; that his language was perverted, and himself insulted, in letters thereafter received from the government; and that the first lord of the Admiralty, after warning him against rash attempts upon granite fortresses, had reproached him for leaving those same fortresses unattacked. The general tenor of the speech shewed, not only that a quarrel had arisen between the government and the admiral-in-chief

* The deplorable mismanagement of the English fleet and army at Walcheren in 1809:

The Earl of Chatham, with his sword drawn,
Stood waiting for Sir Richard Strachan;
Sir Richard, longing to be at 'em,
Stood waiting for the Earl of Chatham.

* Speech at the Mansion House, Feb. 6, 1855.

in the Baltic, but that the naval and military commanders had experienced difficulty in reconciling conflicting opinions; and that the cabinet minister who had so especially complimented the admiral some months earlier was the same who had now given him deep offence.

A speech such as this could not escape attention: it formed a subject of debate in the House of Commons a few days afterwards.* The ministers stated, in reply to a question, that Sir Charles Napier had neither been dismissed from his command, nor censured for the mode in which he had exercised it; that he had been placed upon half-pay; and that great licence may properly be allowed to the free expression of opinion on the part of an officer so placed. In regard to the specific allegations, Sir James Graham stated that the correspondence which had passed between the government and the admiral could not be made public without detriment to the public service, since it involved the discussion of matters pertaining to another Baltic campaign yet to come. It was implied, however, that the coldness of the government had arisen, not so much from the admiral's proceedings in the war, as from this circumstance—that 'in his correspondence with the Admiralty he had recourse to the use of comments and expressions which were considered to be inconsistent with the deference due to the authority he was serving.' On the 8th of March, an attempt was made, in the House of Commons, to obtain copies of such official correspondence as might throw light on the causes of the disfavour into which the admiral appeared to have fallen; and on this occasion, the member who advocated Sir Charles's cause made use of official documents without the sanction of the government, and of Sir James Graham's private letters without the writer's consent. This proceeding was severely censured by the ministers; the motion was rejected without a division; and the ministers repeated their former declaration, that the admiral's well-earned fame as a naval officer remained unspotted; but that his mode of treating the Admiralty, in matters for which that department is responsible, could not be borne without injury to the public weal. As a proof that the government did not wish to imply any disapproval of the conduct of Sir Charles Napier in his purely naval duties, he was summoned to court in July to receive an honorary reward by an Order of the Bath; and, on the other hand, as a proof that the admiral would not acquiesce in the ministerial view of the whole question, he declined the honour. At a later date, when parliament had risen, and when there was no official opportunity for publicly noticing the subject, Sir Charles Napier adopted the unusual course of publishing, through the medium of the London daily newspapers, a series of official letters which had passed between him and the first lord of the Admiralty during the year 1854. These letters, whatever else might be left in doubt, demonstrated that collisions of opinion among the commanders in the Baltic commenced immediately after the fall of Bomarsund: thereby lessening the probability of adding to the list of great achievements.

* Proceedings of the House of Commons, Feb. 16, 1855.

PROCEEDINGS IN AND NEAR THE WHITE SEA.

While a powerful English and French armament was confronting Russia in the Baltic, an operation of a much humbler kind was in progress in another of the seas which wash that empire—the White Sea.

So difficult of access are the White Sea and its chief port, Archangel; so unpicturesque and inhospitable are its shores; so few the objects that can afford pleasure to a visitor—that the region is almost unknown in England, except to the captains and seamen of trading-ships. That all ships from the more flourishing parts of the world must pass through a portion of the Arctic Ocean to reach this sea and this port, is a circumstance which alone seems to place it almost beyond the pale of everyday civilisation. In the early part of the present Chapter, the position of the Baltic is described in reference to the German Ocean; it will be necessary now to appreciate the relation between those waters and the White Sea.

Northward of the Skäger Rack, the rugged coast of Norway presents itself, deeply indented with fiords or inlets, fringed with a succession of small islands, and marked by the towns and ports of Bergen, Trondjem, Tromsö, and Hammerfest. Passing the Arctic Circle, and bending gradually round to the north-east and east, the coast at length reaches the North Cape, about latitude 71 degrees; and here, at the northernmost point of Europe, the Atlantic may be said to terminate and the Arctic Ocean begin. At this spot the coast takes a new direction; it bends south-eastward, passing the mouths of the Porsange Fiord, Tana Fiord, and Varanger Fiord, to the mouth of the river Kola, and so defining the limits of Finmark and Lapland. At Sviatoï Nos begins a broad estuary, bounded on the opposite or eastern side by Kanin Nos, belonging to the country of the Samoïedes: this estuary leads to the White Sea, or Bieloé-Moré.* The sea is in effect a sound or large gulf, nearly semicircular, and having a mouth towards the Arctic Ocean about 100 miles in width. The sea expands towards its southern end into the two Gulfs of Dvina and Onega, called Dvinskaïa and Oneskaïa; west of the Onega Gulf, the sea terminates in an inlet, about 100 miles long by 25 in mean breadth. Generally speaking, the sea has a good depth of water, except on a sand-bank off the mouth of the Onega River: it is, however, subject to much fog; and as the ice lingers about the entrance to that river from the end of October to the beginning of

* See Map of Russia.

May, the facilities for maritime trading are limited to about six months in the year. This sea, more richly supplied with fish than most European seas, was not known to western Europeans until 1553; in which year Richard Chancellor, returning from a vain attempt to discover a north-east passage to Cathay or China round the north coast of Europe and Asia, anchored in the White Sea; consequent on this voyage, an arrangement for maritime trading was made between the Czar of Muscovy and a company of English merchants. A course of trade with the White Sea rapidly sprang up, the Dutch and the Hanse Towns, as well as the English, carrying thither European and tropical products and manufactures in exchange for the fish and produce of Northern Russia. The foundation of St Petersburg put a check to this trade, by diverting a portion of it into a new channel; and throughout the whole of the eighteenth century the commerce of the White Sea languished; but under the Emperors Paul, Alexander, and Nicholas, during the first half of the nineteenth, it revived and became considerable.

Archangel, or Gorod Arkhangelskoi ('the city of St Michael the Archangel'), is the chief town in which this trade centres. It is one of the most ancient towns in the empire, having been in existence somewhat over a thousand years; and is the capital of a province of the same name, one of the nineteen governments which constitute 'Great Russia.' The port is the principal outlet for the fish, caviar, pitch, tar, tallow, train-oil, linseed, hemp, flax, bristles, skins, fur, and timber, which the northernmost regions of European Russia, and the north-west part of Siberia, export to other countries. Archangel extends for about two miles along a low flat on the right bank of the Dvina (there is another river Dvina, more properly called Düna, which falls into the Gulf of Livonia at Riga), forty miles above the point where that river enters the White Sea. Vessels of large burden cannot come up close to the town, on account of a sand-bar a little lower down; but the roadstead, in the summer season, is alive with smaller craft of every description; the great road from Siberia is busy with travellers and laden carts; while a combined canal and river system, connecting Archangel with Moscow, and even with Astrakhan, brings varied produce from Central and Southern Russia. The inhabitants, somewhat under 20,000 in number, are mostly engaged in maritime trade or in small handicrafts: few large manufactures being carried on. There is a peculiarity in the town, combining some of the characteristics of an Oriental bazaar with an English market; this consists in the establishment of several open spaces, on which merchants and dealers erect their stalls, and range their goods in successive rows, each row containing one kind of merchandise. Besides these, there is a caravansary, the Gostinnoi-Dvor, an extensive mart for the exhibition and sale of goods; this is defended by high walls, six towers, and a ditch. The town is ill built, comprising two crooked streets parallel with the river, connected by narrow lanes; but its buildings, in great part of wood, are somewhat relieved from dinginess by being painted externally.

The stern requirements of war brought an enemy into that remote scene of peaceful commerce. To capture or destroy any government establishments, or to stop the export trade of the place by blockade, or both, were among the plans formed by the English government in 1854. The importance of the place, however, as a naval or military establishment, and the extent of the commerce, were so far inferior to those of the ports in the Black and Baltic Seas, that offensive operations were commenced at a later date, and on a very limited scale.

In the first week of June, the English frigate *Eurydice* (26 guns), the screw-corvette *Brisk* (16), and the *Miranda* (15), anchored off Hammerfest, in Norway, the most northern town in Europe, and the last of any importance met with on the sea-route from England to the White Sea; here they remained for awhile, and then proceeded eastward, on the look-out for Russian men-of-war or large merchant-ships. Late in the same month, the entrance to the harbour of Archangel was reached; and from that time an almost continuous process followed of boarding trading-vessels, to ascertain whether their ownership or their contents were such as to render them liable to capture. The *Miranda* was especially busy at this work, having boarded no less than 300 vessels, large and small. Before any account of the proceedings of the small squadron reached England, the *Journal de St Petersburg* gave a highly coloured picture of the (alleged) ruthless conduct of the English in the White Sea, accusing them of 'committing acts wholly unworthy of brave and honourable seamen.' The *Journal*, after asseverating that the proceedings of the English in the Black and Baltic Seas were, 'in the opinion of all enlightened men, no matter what may be their country, little calculated to reflect honour on the nation or its flag,' adverted to the operations in the White Sea as a worthy pendant to the rest. 'Thus we have found them stopping even the craft loaded with fish, in order to possess themselves of such poor spoils, after which they burnt or sunk the fishing-boats themselves. As to the masters and the crews of larger vessels (when their bravery exercised itself upon such), they have been left to gain the shore by traversing the swelling waves in frail boats and without provisions. They have also seized various vessels laden with corn, and bound for Norway from ports in the White Sea, in violation of the solemn pledge made by their government to that of Sweden—a pledge which guaranteed entire liberty of commercial intercourse between Russia and Norway: the latter, as is well known, receiving from us all her supplies of wheat.' This statement, full of glaring and unblushing falsehoods, was analogous to others which the official Russian

newspaper frequently inserted, and which were intended to convey distorted views, both of the objects of the Allies, and of the means whereby those objects were sought to be attained. The English ships brought away scarcely any prizes, and destroyed little private property, except in cases where they were resisted in their search. No instructions appear to have been given to blockade Archangel until later in the year. An arrangement was made between the English and Swedish governments, that as the Finmarkers, inhabiting a desolate region, are almost wholly dependent on trade with Archangel for a supply of food, Russian luggers should not be molested while engaged in that trade: the motive was humane; but the Russians took advantage of it to ship produce from Archangel to Hammerfest under a colourable pretext; and if the cargoes were seized, while being thus surreptitiously conveyed, it was no more than in accordance with the ordinary European rules of war. Indeed, the English government met with much censure in parliament for delaying the blockade to so late a season. Although Russian ships were not allowed peacefully to leave Archangel (except those bound for Finmark), yet those of other nations were free to arrive and depart so long as a blockade was not declared; and thus the Danish, Dutch, and Hanoverian vessels were driving a brisk trade—going into Archangel in ballast, and coming out laden with corn: the Russians selling their corn at a good price, and the shipowners obtaining good freights. It is sad to think of disturbing honourable trade by warlike checks; but such checks are among the inevitable concomitants of war; and many circumstances afford ground for an opinion, that the resources of the czar would have been more crippled had the blockade been commenced earlier on all the seas with which his ports communicated.

When the small squadron arrived off the mouth of the Dvina, the feasibility of ascending the river was considered. Inside the bar or shoal were a 16-gun Russian brig, two steamers, two schooners, and nineteen gun-boats, each of these last mounting two large 36-pounders. The weather was stormy for many days; but as soon as the storm abated, the depth of water in the bar was carefully sounded, and it was then found that the vessels in the squadron drew too great a depth of water to enable them to pass. A cruise to Archangel hence became impracticable. Information was received that at Linsli, half-way up to Archangel, was the strong fort of Navjorin, mounting 80 heavy guns; that strong batteries had been thrown up at Solombol, an imperial dockyard near Archangel; and that the town itself was well defended, both by batteries and by troops—hence the squadron, if the bar could have been passed, would still have had rough work to encounter. A telegraph, erected on a light-house near the bar, was actively engaged in signaling up to Archangel; and the Russians had evidently prepared themselves for any probable contingencies. Meanwhile, the English had a taste of the stormy gales, thick fogs, and swift currents, which beset the White Sea, and could with difficulty manage their cruising in safety. On the 4th of July, while some of the boats were sounding, the Russians brought down a body of horse-artillery to the shore, and opened a smart fire upon them; the gun-boats and the steamers also made a display of activity, but without emerging from the river to cross the bar.

The small squadron, unable to reach the enemy at Archangel on account of the Dvina bar, turned in another direction, and sought active service in other parts of the White Sea. On the 7th of July, the ships sailed and steamed forth in the direction of Cross Island, one among many in that region. After anchoring here several days, they sailed to Solovetskoi, an island at the entrance to the Gulf of Onega. Here, while the *Miranda* and the *Brisk* were passing, the officers observed a number of soldiers with several field-pieces, in a wood about half a mile inshore. A few shots were fired from the ships, and returned from the island with grape and canister, many of which struck the two steamers. A flag of truce was sent on shore, demanding the unconditional surrender of the monastery of Solovetskoi; but this surrender being refused by the archimandrite, the firing recommenced. After a smart exchange, the Russians retired into the wood, and the English anchored off the monastery for the night. On the morning of the 19th, the two steamers resumed fire, aiming now, however, at a temporary battery which the Russians had hastily constructed during the night; shot and shell from the one side were smartly answered from the other, from two towers of the monastery, and from muskets by troops on the shore. The contest became more determined as it advanced, until at last the *Miranda* began to pour in red-hot shot, which effectually drove away the Russians. The walls of the monastery, however, were so thick, that the firing wrought little damage; nor does it appear that much resulted from the enterprise. On various days subsequent to this attack, the ships sent landing-parties on shore at different spots, to destroy such buildings and works as might be regarded as public property; two of these places were Liamitskaïa and Kyia.

Towards the close of August, the cruising brought the little squadron near the town of Kola, situated at the junction of the rivers Kola and Toulom, in Russian Lapland, a considerable distance north-west of the White Sea. Kola was the extreme north-west fortress of any importance belonging to Russia, being within a short distance of the Norwegian frontier, and often regarded with uneasiness by Norway, as a fulcrum for the Russian lever of conquest. Kola became a fortified town in the time of Peter the Great; and, being situated some distance up a river not easily navigable, it has always been regarded by the Russians as beyond the reach of probable capture. Understanding that the creeks adjacent to the Kola River

were likely to conceal vessels belonging to the enemy, and knowing that Kola was so far a place of importance as to be the seat of government for Russian Lapland, and to have a military garrison, Captain Ommaney of the *Eurydice*, commander of the squadron, determined that the place should be reconnoitred, if not attacked. This duty he intrusted to Captain Lyons, in the *Miranda;* and on the 21st of August the enterprise commenced.

So great are the difficulties of the Kola River, in the thirty miles of distance from the sea to the town, that five miles of it are laid down in the charts as unnavigable; and the river is in some places so narrow that a ship can scarcely turn in it; in fact, Kola had been hitherto regarded as inaccessible to anything but boats. Captain Lyons, therefore, had abundant call for the exercise of judgment. By sending boats ahead to sound, he succeeded on the first day in reaching to within two miles of the town. At one point, the steamer had to pass within fifty yards' distance of a precipitous cliff, which, if defended, might have seriously checked her progress; but nothing interfered with her anchoring for the night. On the 22d, the *Miranda* resumed her course upwards amid incessant difficulties—running aground repeatedly, owing to the narrowness and intricacy of the channel, and the violence of the spring-tide. At six in the evening, she anchored within 500 yards of the town, which was found to be defended by a 2-gun battery, built of stone and faced with turf, an extensive stockade, with blockhouses at the corners, and loopholes in the houses for musketry. Lieutenant Buckley was sent on shore, under a flag of truce, to demand surrender; the letter which he conveyed is given in full below in a note, to shew the nature and form of the demands made on such occasions.* The night having passed without any response to the summons, and early morn on the 23d having shewn that the battery was manned and the defences made ready, Captain Lyons saw that the Russians intended to resist; and he accordingly began active operations immediately. He hauled down his flag of truce, and opened fire on the battery, stockade, and loopholed houses; the battery-guns were soon dismounted, and the battery reduced to a heap of ruins; but, nevertheless, the musketeers in the stockade and the loopholed houses bravely resisted for a considerable time a storm of shells. Captain Lyons then felt himself compelled to fire the town itself; he poured in a storm of shells and red-hot shot, which set it on fire in various places. The *Miranda* herself was not free from peril at this time; she grounded during a brisk wind and violent tide within 300 yards of the burning town, and only avoided destruction from the burning fragments which were blown on her by having her sails, rigging, and deck, kept constantly wetted. Captain Lyons now sent the pinnace and the two cutters ashore, with a party of marines, marine-artillery, and seamen, to drive out the enemy, who had returned to the battery, and to destroy some government buildings and storehouses, which, being apart from the town, had hitherto escaped the flames: this was effected. Lyons found that the defensive arrangement had been made in anticipation of a boat-attack only; that such an attack would have resulted in serious damage to the boats attacking; but that the Russians, not expecting that the *Miranda* would have the hardihood to steam up such a river, had neglected such precautions as might easily have been adopted; for, although the whole of the male inhabitants had been armed, drilled, and enrolled, the town was destroyed without the loss of a single man on the side of the English. Concerning the destruction itself, Captain Lyons thus wrote, in his dispatch to Captain Ommaney: 'As we steamed out on the morning of the 24th, the flames, having destroyed the rest of the town, were just communicating with a small suburb, the only remaining part. However melancholy the utter destruction of the town may be, the nature of the defence, and the obstinacy with which the enemy persisted in firing from various parts of it until destroyed, rendered it imperative on me to do so; and it is satisfactory to think that no non-combatants can have been hurt, for besides the extension of the term allowed in the summons, women and children had been seen leaving the town during the whole of the previous day, with baggage.' So difficult was the work which the *Miranda* had to perform, that she grounded no less than eight times during her progress up and down the river; for while she was engaged before Kola, the Russians took up all the buoys which the sailing-master, Mr Williams, had skilfully laid down during the upward passage, insomuch that his work of sounding had to be performed anew during the descending voyage.

This service being accomplished, Captain Lyons next steamed on to Litscha Inlet, sixty miles westward of Kola River, where several Russian merchant-vessels were believed to lie concealed; and on that same evening, the 24th of August, he captured two schooners and four luggers: the schooners, laden with salt-fish, were sent to England as prizes; the luggers were destroyed. A similar expedition was then made to the Gulf of

* 'The undersigned, Captain of Her Britannic Majesty's Steam-ship *Miranda*, hereby demands the immediate and unconditional surrender of the forts, garrison, and town of Kola, with all arms, cannon, and ammunition, and every article of whatever description belonging to the Russian government.

If these terms are accepted, the garrison are required, at the expiration of one hour from the receipt of this communication, to pile their arms on an open space without the town, the officers at the same time delivering up their swords, and the whole surrendering themselves as prisoners of war. The arms of the male inhabitants who have been enrolled must (having been previously collected by the garrison) also be delivered up at the same time.

If these terms are strictly complied with, the town will be spared and private property respected, but the forts will be destroyed, and all government property either destroyed or embarked.

In the event of the above terms not being accepted, it is recommended that all women and children should immediately leave the town. One hour will be allowed from the receipt of this communication for an answer to be returned; if at the expiration of that time no reply is sent, or if, being sent, it does not contain an unconditional acceptance of the above terms, hostilities will commence. E. M. Lyons, Captain.

Dated on board Her Britannic Majesty's Steam-ship *Miranda*, at anchor off Kola, the $\frac{10\text{th}}{22\text{d}}$ of August 1854.'

Motow, and to Kilduin Island, during which two more luggers were captured.

A few other small achievements of this character terminated the year's proceedings in the White Sea. No Russian ships-of-war were encountered; and as Archangel could not be reached on account of the shallowness of the water, no town of any importance suffered from the Allies, except Kola. The expedition was without political importance; yet was it justifiable, in the existing ignorance of the nature and extent of Russian power in that remote region. Here, however, as at Aland, the Allies departed too soon; for at the end of October and the beginning of November, the port of Archangel was full of shipping, busily engaged in exporting and importing during the few remaining days of an unusually favourable autumn.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE NORTH PACIFIC AND KAMTCHATKA.

Still more remote, more bare and dismal, more difficult of access from Western Europe, was another region, necessarily brought within the terrible embrace of war. Situated many thousand miles from Odessa, from St Petersburg, from Archangel, and washed by the Pacific, is a peninsula belonging to the same gigantic power as those three widely separated cities—a power which holds uninterrupted dominion over 240 degrees of longitude, grasping just two-thirds of the circumference of the earth's surface. The peninsula here adverted to is Kamtchatka or Kamtschatka.

It must ever rank among the most remarkable of political achievements, that the czars of Muscovy, without any large expeditions, became virtually the possessors of the whole of Northern Asia, from the Ural to the Pacific, from the Arctic Ocean to the sands of Tatary. And never since that acquisition have their successors lost a single acre of the region thus obtained; but, on the contrary, they have encroached more and more on the Tatar border in one part, and on the Chinese border in another. Siberia, the general name of this little known territory, is not less than 3600 miles in length, by 2000 in its greatest breadth, containing an area nearly equal to that of the whole of Europe; yet is the entire population only a little in excess of that of London. If the possession of such a vast waste be politically important, therefore, it cannot be from the number of subjects which the czar thereby acquires. Down to so late a date as 1580, Europeans were without knowledge of this desolate region. The Cossacks, during a raid across the Ural Mountains in that year, captured a town called Isker, but which they named Sibir; and this Sibir became afterwards a general designation for all the country discovered further east. The conquests extended to the river Irtish in 1584, to the Obi in 1604, to the Sea of Okhotsk, on the Pacific, in 1639; and the whole region may be said to have fallen by the year 1660. The most noteworthy circumstance is, that the czars took but little trouble and expended but little treasure in these acquisitions: the conquests being made for them, rather than by them. Nearly all the expeditions were undertaken and brought to successful issue by private adventurers, mostly Cossacks, who were influenced mainly by a desire of plunder; nay, they proceeded in their undertakings without any pre-concerted plans—mere rovers, seeking any advantage at the expense of their neighbours. This career of easy conquest shews that the tribes inhabiting Siberia must, besides being poor in actual numbers, have been without such a bond of union as would have enabled them to present a bold front to the invaders. The tribes or nations were numerous; comprising Samoïedes, Ostiaks, Bashkirs, Buriates, Tungoosses, Yakutes, Koriats, Kamtchatdales, &c. The Cossacks and Muscovites found most of these tribes to be leading a nomadic life, roaming from one district to another, and cultivating only small and widely separated patches of ground. The conquerors soon saw that, by acknowledging the czar as their master, they might obtain offices, control, and emoluments in the newly acquired territories; and in this way did the ruler of Muscovy become the ruler of the whole of the vast region forming the north of Asia. As the power consolidated, so did commerce arise; insomuch that, at the present day, Siberia trades with Europe by a road which, after leaving Tobolsk, crosses the Ural Mountains to Perm; with China, by a caravan-route from Kiachta; with the Tatar nation of Khokan, by caravans starting from the Irtish, and crossing the steppes of the Kirghis Tatars to Khokan and Tashkend, whence goods are distributed to Kashgar and Yarkand; and with Bokhara by caravans which start from Orenburg, and cross the country of the Little Orda or Horde of Kirghis. These trading relations are small, compared with those between European nations; but if Russia should, as many statesmen have feared, ever acquire power in the south-east of Asia, the caravan trading-routes may possibly become channels of conquest.

The only part of Siberia that could interest the Western Powers in 1854 was that which, being washed by the Pacific, is accessible to ships. As to the northern coast, it is a sealed region: nature has there placed an unconquerable barrier. Magnificent rivers, the Obi, Yenisei, and Lena, flow northward into the Arctic Ocean; but the ice-bound coast is fatal to all navigation, except for short distances during a few summer weeks. At Behring's Strait the Arctic Ocean joins the Pacific; and from that point to the mouth of the river Amur or Amoor, where the Chinese Empire begins, Russia commands the Pacific coast. A very tortuous coast this is—first rounding a peninsula to the Gulf of Anadyr; then marking the south-east side of the large peninsula of Kamtchatka; and, lastly, forming the boundary of the

extensive Sea of Okhotsk. Immense as is this range of coast, it is marked by only two towns of any importance, Pétropaulovsk (St Peter and St Paul) and Okhotsk; the one situated near the southern extremity of Kamtchatka, and the other in the north-western corner of the Sea of Okhotsk. In Europe, these two towns would be regarded as very small and insignificant; yet are they the capitals of their respective provinces, and of the eastern end of Siberia. Besides this Asiatic coast, Russia possesses the north-west corner of America, washed in like manner on one side by the Pacific, and on the other by the Arctic Ocean: it is a vast territory, one-fourth as large as European Russia; yet it has only one small town, Sitka; it contains little more than 60,000 inhabitants, and has no trading importance except in furs and fish.

When war broke out, the proceedings of the Western Powers, besides expeditions on land, of course comprised the adoption of plans against Russian ships-of-war, in whatever part of the world they might be. In this sense, and in this sense only, was the North Pacific worthy of the attention of the English and French governments. Pétropaulovsk, Okhotsk, and Sitka, might have been left untouched, had it not been necessary to keep a watch on all ships belonging to the Russian navy. The czar was known to possess three or four men-of-war in the Pacific at that time, which might have wrought great injury to English commerce in the Chinese and Australian seas if left unmolested; hence the necessity for active interference. Admiral Price, in command of the British squadron in the Pacific, was off Callao when he received news, early in May, of the declaration of war. The nature of the instructions sent out to the admiral may be gathered from the 'general memorandum' which he immediately issued to the squadron.* The squadron sailed in a few days to the Marquesas Islands, situated nearly in the centre of the Pacific, almost due west of that part of the coast of South America marked by the port of Callao. At one of these islands, Nukahiva, the French had a settlement consisting of a small fort of three guns, storehouses for salt provisions, a few neatly built houses for the governor and officers, and barracks for about 150 soldiers belonging to the French colonial regiments; a French ship-of-war was stationed there, the captain of which acted as governor. The settlement was kept up, partly as a means of retaining a place of rendezvous for French ships in that region of the Pacific, and partly as a rich storehouse of bananas, cocoa-nuts, guavas, and numerous fruits and vegetables with which to victual either war or trading ships. Near this remote settlement at the Marquesas, several English and French ships-of-war remained at anchor during the greater part of the month of June. Thence, when another ship had arrived from Rio Janeiro, the whole sailed northward or north-westward to Honolulu, one of the Sandwich Islands; the English and French nations here, as elsewhere, taking equal part in the enterprise. Honolulu is in the direct route from the Marquesas to Kamtchatka; and being a very fertile island, it was a convenient spot at which to complete the arrangements necessary for the due victualling and watering of the ships.

The admirals and seamen, while thus employed, had ample opportunities of observing the wonderful advance made by the Sandwich islanders during the present century; and the more thoughtful among them could not but have speculated on the probability that those islands would one day be eagerly sought as a prize by one or more of the European powers, and by the United States: perhaps becoming a cause of war, unless temperate councils prevail on all sides. Honolulu, the name of the town as well as the island, had arisen in thirty years to the condition of a well-built town, containing 15,000 inhabitants; and those very Sandwich islanders, who were barebacked, unlettered savages early in the century, had become a community boasting of three newspapers. It may be doubted whether the modern history of society presents any contrast more striking than that associated with these islands at the beginning and the middle of the nineteenth century. Let any one, familiar with the recitals of French and English navigators at the former date, compare those recitals with the tone of the Honolulu newspapers in 1854, and estimate in imagination the immense social interval between the two dates.*

* 'H.M.S. *President*, at *Callao, May* 9, 1854.

The Rear-admiral Commander-in-chief desires to inform the captains, commanders, officers, seamen, and marines, serving on board Her Majesty's ships and vessels under his command, that he has received directions from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, to comply with the orders contained in a letter received from Her Majesty's principal Secretary of State for the Colonies, conveying the Queen's commands that we should forthwith commence and execute all such hostile measures as may be in our power, and not at variance with the orders passed by Her Majesty in Council, against Russia, and against all ships belonging to the Emperor of Russia, or to his subjects, or others inhabiting within any of his countries, territories, or dominions.

In carrying out these instructions, the Rear-admiral desires to record his opinion that there will be much to be done upon this station by the squadron under his orders; that Great Britain has a right to expect from it a proper account of the Russian frigates that are known to be now upon the station, as well as of the numerous privateers that it is known soon will be.

The Rear-admiral relies with confidence upon the assistance that will be afforded by each of the officers, seamen, and marines of the squadron, towards fully and effectually carrying out all that their gracious Queen and country will expect of them; and as the time is now close at hand when some of the squadron may calculate upon being in action with some of the enemy's ships-of-war, he feels assured that all will unite in taking such steps as are necessary, by daily practice and other means, which, added to their characteristic bravery, will be calculated to render them not only superior to their enemy, but inferior to none in the world.

D. Price,
Rear-admiral, Commander-in-chief.

To the Captains, Officers, Seamen, and Marines, serving in the squadron on the Pacific station.'

* The Honolulu newspaper *Polynesian*, of the 22d of July, contained the following, imitating in all points the court-gossip of the London newspapers:—'An audience was given by His Majesty on Friday, the 21st inst., to Rear-admiral David Price and Rear-admiral Fevrier des Pointes, on which occasion they were accompanied by the representatives of Great Britain and France; by the commanders of the several English and French vessels-of-war now in port; and by numerous other officers of the squadron; and also by Bishop Maigret, with a number of his clergy. Each admiral addressed His Majesty to the effect, that they visited the islands to refresh and recruit their vessels, and that they were happy to find His Majesty's kingdom in a state of peace and order. They were gratified with the present opportunity of meeting His Majesty, and of offering

The king, Kamehameha, at the time of the admirals' visit, kept up a full court; had his palace guards and ministers of departments; a queen, and princes and princesses, all surrounded with the attributes of royalty; an aristocracy, and representatives from the British and French courts. How much of this apparent civilisation was hollow, time only could shew; his majesty was reputed to be inordinately fond of drink; and there were not wanting fears, on the part of English and French, that he might, in an excited moment, be brought to sell his islands and his people to the United States. The central position and the splendid natural gifts of these islands render the great maritime powers (England, France, Russia, and the United States) adverse to any appropriation which might shut them out from a share in the advantages; hence the watchfulness of the four powers, each upon the other three. The islands are invaluable to ships stopping there for a season; cattle, sheep, vegetables, fruit, coal, water—all are procurable in abundance; insomuch that three hundred of the South Sea whalers make Honolulu a central station to refit and take in supplies.

The Allied squadron remained at Honolulu from the 17th to the 25th of July. It comprised eight ships, four English and four French. The English division, under Rear-admiral Price, consisted of the *President*, frigate, 50 guns, Captain Burridge; *Pique*, frigate, 40 guns, Captain Nicolson; *Amphitrite*, frigate, 24 guns, Captain Fredericks; and *Virago*, steamer, 6 guns, 300 horse-power, Commander Marshal. The French division, under Rear-admiral Fevrier des Pointes, consisted of *La Forte*, frigate, 60 guns, Captain de Miniac; *L'Eurydice*, frigate, 32 guns, Captain Lagrandière; *L'Artemise*, corvette, 30 guns, Captain L'Evéque; and *L'Obligado*, brig, 16 guns, Captain Rosenavat. The French guns were more numerous, but the English of heavier metal. All the ships left Honolulu on the 25th; but the *Amphitrite* and the *Artemise* were detached on the 30th, to sail east or north-east to San Francisco; while the remainder of the squadron proceeded on their northern route to the rugged seas around Kamtchatka.

To what extent the Russians had anticipated and provided against these hostile movements, the Western Powers had yet no means of determining. It was known that Russian ships-of-war were in the Pacific; but their locality and manœuvres were uncertain. It was known that two Russian ships in those waters, the *Aurora*, of 44 guns, and the *Dvina*, of 20 guns, were well fitted and manned: indeed, one of them had been repaired at the royal dockyard at Portsmouth, shortly before the commencement of hostilities—an exhibition of friendliness which was much criticised at the time, seeing the almost inevitable approach of war. The *Dvina*, Captain Lessoffsky, had left Honolulu on the 1st of June, but returned to it again on the 10th; and being then joined by the *Aurora*, from Valparaiso, the two proceeded northward—whether to escape the approaching Allied squadron, or to attack English and French whalers near Kamtchatka, remained to be ascertained. It was ultimately discovered that the two ships reached Pétropaulovsk, in Kamtchatka; while a third, the *Pallas*, lay at anchor off the mouth of the Amur, in the Sea of Okhotsk. So immense is the distance between St Petersburg and Pétropaulovsk, whether overland through Siberia, or round Cape Horn, or round the Cape of Good Hope, that, although war was declared in the last week of March, the fact was not known at Pétropaulovsk until past the middle of July. Rear-admiral Zavioko, governor of Kamtchatka, immediately on receipt of this intelligence made the best arrangements in his power for the safety of the scantily inhabited region intrusted to his keeping. The garrison had been considerably increased about a month earlier by reinforcements which had marched through Siberia to the mouth of the Amur, whence steamers had conveyed them across the Sea of Okhotsk to Pétropaulovsk. The town, situated on a sort of inner bay, is protected by a long sand-bank running parallel with it, leaving only a narrow entrance from the outer to the inner bay. The Russian governor dismantled the *Aurora* and *Dvina*, and moored them, broadsides on, as a sort of battery to defend the entrance of the harbour—they being sheltered behind the sand-bank. The town was also defended by three batteries—a 5-gun battery at the extremity of the peninsula forming the harbour; a well-constructed fascine-battery of 11 heavy guns at the water's edge on the opposite shore; and a 3-gun battery at some distance on the same side. With these defences, aided by a small force of troops and seamen, the governor awaited the approach of enemies who had never yet brought the din of war into those remote regions.

It was on the 29th of August that the Allied squadron arrived off Pétropaulovsk, after five weeks' voyage from Honolulu. The admirals speedily formed a plan of attack, which was to be made on the 30th; when suddenly the English squadron was thrown into consternation by an announcement of the suicide of Admiral Price.

their best wishes for his prosperity. His Majesty replied, reciprocating the pleasure expressed at meeting the British and French admirals, and was glad to find his islands afforded the necessary refreshments for ships-of-war, which he should be happy to welcome to his ports, of all nations. He alluded to his neutrality, which he should enforce, and which he desired to be respected. He also expressed his wish that the present war might be brought to a speedy conclusion, and that peace might again pervade the nations of Europe.

His Majesty availed himself of the offer of the *Virago*, by Admirals Price and Des Pointes; and on Saturday, July 22, at eleven o'clock, embarked with Her Majesty the Queen, Princes Liholiho and Kamehameha, Princess Victoria, the Kuhina Nui, Ministers of State, members of the Privy-council and of the House of Nobles, &c. The representatives of Great Britain, France, and the United States, and a large company of ladies and gentlemen of Honolulu, were also on board, which gave the whole excursion a social and agreeable character. The fine bands from the English and French flag-ships discoursed sweet music during the whole trip, and added not a little to the enjoyment of those on board. As the *Virago* passed out among the squadron, the yards of every ship were manned, and His Majesty was saluted by both the admirals' ships at the same moment: and again on returning, the yards were manned; and every honour paid His Majesty which could have been paid the greatest sovereign of Europe.'

An overwrought brain not unfrequently leads to such a calamity when failure has attended the exertions of one placed in a responsible position; but it is rarely that, on the eve of a great enterprise, a hardy and experienced man sinks under the pressure of his responsibility. Hence the suicide of that lamented officer has never been well accounted for. Just as the action was about to commence, Admiral Price went down into his cabin and shot himself: this was the beginning and the end, so far as his brother-officers knew. He was no raw and inexperienced seaman, likely to be rendered timid by the horrors of war; neither was he unacquainted with the burden of command. Some of the best officers in his squadron were not yet born when Price entered the royal service. He served as midshipman on board the *Ardent* at Copenhagen in 1801; as midshipman in the *Centaur*, he assisted in the capture of four French frigates in 1806; he witnessed further active service in and near the Baltic in 1807 and 1808; he was twice made prisoner by the Danes; he served on board the *Hawk*, as lieutenant, when the French frigate *Amazone* was destroyed, and when a French convoy and three armed brigs were captured; he commanded the gig of that ship in a bold attack, bringing off some transports and a 10-gun brig in the face of a heavy fire from the shore, and receiving the second of two severe wounds which his gallantry had drawn upon him; and he served in various seas until the conclusion of the war in 1815. The long peace presented him with few opportunities for active service; but his appointment to the command of the South American or Pacific station shewed that the government placed confidence in his abilities. His suicide may perhaps be regarded as the result of a sudden mental failure, acting on a frame which had weathered seventy winters. The officers in the English squadron kept this catastrophe as quiet as possible for a time, to prevent undue excitement either on the English or the Russian side; nevertheless, the death cast a gloom over every one, for Admiral Price was much liked; and this gloom was not lessened by the fact, that the approaching battle was fought with the dead body on board. Captain Sir F. W. E. Nicolson, senior officer of the squadron, now became commander and responsible head of the English division; and it devolved upon him to concert plans with Admiral des Pointes. Price and Des Pointes had agreed upon a certain mode of attack, which Nicolson and the French admiral now determined to carry out.

On the 31st of August, the weather being calm, the three English frigates were placed in position by the steamer, broadsides on towards the batteries outside Pétropaulovsk. The marines from the *President*, under Captain Parker, were transferred to the *Virago* steamer, and landed to take possession of the 3-gun battery, which was expected to give much annoyance. Although greatly impeded by brushwood of an almost impenetrable character, the marines, aided by English and French seamen, soon reached the battery, which they found deserted: the guns of the battery being rendered unserviceable, the party returned to the *Virago*, but not without receiving some damage from the heavy fire of the Russian frigate *Aurora*, anchored in the inner harbour. The 5-gun battery, at the extremity of the peninsula enclosing the harbour, being most exposed to the fire of the ships, was soon silenced. There then remained the strongly constructed fascine-battery of 11 heavy guns, at the water's edge, on the mainland opposite the peninsula. A breeze springing up in the afternoon, enabled *La Forte* and the *President*, the two outer ships, to take up fresh positions nearer to this battery. The guns of all the ships now kept up a fire in this direction, which at length silenced the battery, but without driving away the gunners. No attempt appears to have been made to follow up the advantage on this occasion; for the ships ceased firing, and were moved out of range for the night. There is reason to believe that the movements of the two commanders were disturbed by the painful feeling which the suicide of the British admiral had produced; there was uncertainty in the councils, insomuch that no further active measures were taken during the three following days. The Russian official account of the action spoke of 'a hesitation in the ranks of the enemy,' while on shore near the 3-gun battery; and that, on seeing this hesitation, a body of Russian seamen 'rushed in advance, and overthrew the French, who retreated to the shore in great disorder.' It also asserted that 'night alone put an end to the combat: the damage suffered by the enemy must be considerable, for he required three days to repair it.' Both of these assertions are doubtful—more than doubtful—but it is quite true that 'during this time we also [the Russians] repaired our batteries.' On the following day, the 1st of September, the *Virago* steamed to the Bay of Tarinski, near at hand, and landed a party whose melancholy duty was to inter the body of their hapless commander; a tree, with 'D. P.' cut on its trunk by a knife, became the simple memorial of the interment.

On the 4th of September,* the contest was renewed. Several consultations were in the interval held between the English and French commanders, who, having obtained a little knowledge concerning the position of certain batteries not visible from the ships, and concerning the condition of the town and garrison, formed an opinion that an attack upon the north end of the town by a landing-party would probably meet

* In the English and Russian accounts of these transactions, there is a remarkable discrepancy, equal to *one day*, in the dates assigned, after making allowance for the diversity between the Old and New Styles. This is probably due to variations in the 'reckoning' of time, as estimated by longitude. In travelling eastward, the days, from noon to noon, are shorter, and in travelling westward are longer, than when the observer remains on any one meridian. The authorities at Pétropaulovsk had possibly travelled eastward from St Petersburg, whereas the Allied commanders had come westward round Cape Horn—a difference of one day in the reckoning would hence arise.

with success and lead to important results; while, with a view to occupy the enemy's attention as much as possible, it was determined to make a simultaneous attack on a battery of five guns placed on the low part of the peninsula; and in addition to this, a party of marines and seamen were to land near a round fort at the north end of the peninsula, and endeavour to obtain possession of the batteries and the heights which surrounded the town. Pursuant to these arrangements, about 800 men, equally selected from English and French, were placed on board the *Virago*, which steamer was then lashed alongside *La Forte;* the boats for the disembarkation being placed on the opposite side, and the *President* being taken in tow astern. No sooner did the ships come within range, than the Russian batteries opened a heavy fire, and wrought much mischief against the masts and rigging of the frigates, especially *La Forte;* the commanders, too, were in anxiety concerning the *Virago*, crowded as her decks were with men. The *President* anchored within 600 yards of the peninsula which guarded the harbour, and here attacked one among many batteries, which obtained the names of the Saddle, Gorge, Point, Inner, Path, Snake-in-grass, Parker's, Garden, and Citadel Batteries—these names being apparently given by the English, to distinguish the batteries one from another, by slight circumstances connected with their respective forms or positions. The Saddle Battery, of seven guns, attacked by the *President*, returned the fire resolutely; the gunners retiring occasionally for an instant under shelter of the sloping platform on which the guns were placed, and then springing forth, loading and firing again: the resistance was indeed vigorous, and a considerable time elapsed before the *President* could silence this battery. Meanwhile, *La Forte* anchored at a further distance from the end of the peninsula, opened fire on the Round Fort or Gorge Battery, of five guns, and speedily silenced it. These two preliminary operations being effected, the marines and seamen were enabled to land from the *Virago;* the force, comprising a large portion of the crews of all the ships, was commanded—the English seamen by Captain Burridge, the French by Captain Lagrandière, and the marines by Captain Parker.

This land-expedition had a disastrous result. The plan was—that the marines and the French seamen should ascend Nikolaïska Hill, which commanded the town on the north; and that the English seamen should proceed by a road to the left, with a view to storm certain batteries in the town which commanded the passage of the Gorge. Immediately on the landing of the force, the Russians, strong in position and in numbers on the hill, opened fire on them. The marines, supported by part of the seamen, ascended the hill as well and as quickly as they could; but they were sadly impeded, not so much by the steepness of the hill as by the thick jungle which covered it. The Russians, however, were driven back, and the Allies succeeded in outflanking some of the batteries; but their loss was most severe; for the Russians were in considerable force on the brow of the hill, while other parties kept up a harassing fire of musketry from log-houses at a short distance. When, struggling against these difficulties, the Allies reached the top of the hill, Captain Parker was killed while gallantly leading on the marines, and Lieutenants M'Callum and Clements wounded. The men, losing their commanders, began to give way; and after many rallies, they were compelled to yield to the incessant fire maintained against them. They retreated to the boats; but even here further loss attended them, because the boats had to be brought within range of the enemy's musketry. Besides Captain Parker of the Royal Marines, Captain Lefebvre of the *Eurydice* was killed; and in addition to Lieutenants M'Callum and Clements, Lieutenants Howard and Palmer were wounded. It was a mortifying termination to the enterprise. Captain Burridge, in his dispatch relating to the movement, said: 'The difficulties of the land and the jungle were more than they could contend against, while an unseen enemy was firing upon them from all sides.' The numerical strength of the garrison was greater than the Allies had been led to expect. The left attack, by the road, was frustrated by the strong defences of the Gorge, in musketry and field-pieces; while the right attack, up the hill, was checked by the dense jungle, which at once impeded the advance and covered the defenders.

Whether the advance up the hill to the jungle was justifiable, depends on the amount of information which the commanders possessed at the time; but it put an end to the contest and to the whole expedition. All the eye-witnesses, whether engaged or not, described the contest on land as terrible; and all bore evidence to the bravery with which the Russians defended their positions. One sentinel attracted especial admiration: sixty rifle-shots were aimed at him; but he never ceased for an instant to pace to and fro at his post, regardless of the balls which whistled around his head: he escaped untouched. The marines on the hill were exposed to a succession of perils; when, impeded by the thick bush of underwood and brambles, they were compelled to retreat, many of them came to the edge of a precipice seventy feet deep; deadly volleys were pouring in upon them from the rear, and they had the alternative of being shot as they stood, or of jumping down the precipice: many took the leap, and were either maimed or killed.

The 5th of September was a mournful day to the Allies. Instead of renewing the attack with a hope of victory, they buried their dead. In their official returns, they were obliged to include 'killed' and 'missing' in one entry; for they remained in ignorance of the real fate of many of their companions. The totals presented in the

two squadrons were—Killed or missing, 4 officers and 48 men; wounded, 6 officers and 148 men: upwards of 200 in all, among whom, however, many were merely contused.

As it was felt that the force, thus reduced, had not strength sufficient to take or destroy either the town or the two Russian frigates, preparations were made to leave the place. These preparations being completed on the 6th, the two squadrons took their departure on the 7th—the English to Vancouver, and the French to San Francisco. The Russian commander congratulated his garrison, and rightly so, on the repulse of the enemy; he acknowledged a loss of 40 killed and 75 wounded; but when he put down the Allied loss at 300, 'besides the killed and wounded on board the ships,' he indulged in the usual Russian exaggeration on such subjects.

Immediately on leaving Pétropaulovsk, the Allies encountered two vessels outside the harbour. One, a small Russian government schooner, the *Anadis*, was captured by the *Virago;* the other, the *Sitka*, a merchant-ship of 800 tons, with a valuable cargo of stores and provisions from Hamburg for Pétropaulovsk, was taken by the *President*. The *Anadis* was emptied, dismantled, and burnt;

Map of Kamtchatka and Neighbouring Seas.

while the *Sitka* was taken away as a prize; and there can be little doubt that the Russians at Pétropaulovsk afterwards suffered severely by the loss of the stores contained in the latter vessel. The French squadron, arriving at San Francisco early in October, remained there several weeks to repair damages, before proceeding southward to winter-quarters. The Allied fleet was short of provisions and stores; and this appears to have influenced the commanders, in some degree, in abandoning any further operations after the conflict on the 4th. The object of the Allies was not so much to destroy Pétropaulovsk, as to engage and capture the Russian fleet in the Pacific, be it large or small; but it was not until after conversation with the prisoners taken on board the *Sitka*, that the Allied admirals ascertained particulars respecting certain Russian ships-of-war safely harboured at the mouth of the river Amur, at the south-west corner of the Sea of Okhotsk. Had this knowledge been possessed earlier, it is possible that the Allies would have steered in that direction; but the unfortunate encounter at Pétropaulovsk had unfitted them for further enterprise.

A singular parallelism is observable in all the naval operations of the English and French against the Russians in 1854. In all the four seas, the Russian ships either slipped out of sight altogether, or sought the shelter of stone walls: it was so in the Black Sea, in the Baltic, in the White Sea, and in the North Pacific. In all four seas, too—whether resulting from this cause, or from a combination of other circumstances—the operations of the Allies were disproportionate to the naval forces placed at the disposal of the commanders. A few forts were dismantled on the Circassian coast of the Black Sea, and armies were transported from place to place; the fortress of Bomarsund was destroyed in the Baltic, and a

series of storehouses and magazines burned; the town of Kola was destroyed in the White Sea, and small Russian vessels were scuttled or burned; the town of Pétropaulovsk, in the North Pacific, was bombarded, but rendered little the worse by the infliction. All the achievements were trifling, measured by the vast maritime resources of the Western Powers. One useful lesson, however, was learned by the year's proceedings—that rapid steamers, and gun-boats or floating-batteries of light draught, would render more service in those seas than the ponderous ships-of-the-line, whose real home is on the broad and open ocean.

Destruction of Kola, White Sea, by H.M.S. *Miranda*—24th August 1854.

W. & A.K. Johnston, Edinburgh.

W. & R. CHAMBERS, LONDON & EDINBURGH.

CHAPTER VII.

CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEA IN 1854.

THE peninsula which, in the autumn of 1854, became the theatre of one of the most remarkable warlike contests of modern times, is in itself full of interest to the historian, the naturalist, and the observer of social life, apart from any temporary struggles which may blast its peace or waste its resources. Had there been no cause of quarrel between Russia and the other states of Europe—had the maintenance of naval superiority in the Black Sea been no question between the East and the West—the Crimea would still be worthy of study, on account both of the extraordinary diversity of nations by which it has at different times been possessed, and the physical contrasts presented by its northern and southern regions. But when to these sources of interest are added those belonging to a scene of terrific struggle; when the events there transpiring convulse the whole of Europe, and create a wild excitement among the nomadic tribes of Asia; when the question to be there solved is the failure or the success of boundless ambition—then does the Crimea become invested with a character of extraordinary importance. All the other warlike proceedings of 1854 would have been small in significancy, had not the tremendous campaign in the Crimea occurred. The struggles on the banks of the Danube, so honourable to the unassisted energies of the Turks, simply left to that nation the provinces they already possessed, without involving a formal withdrawal by Russia of the pretensions so haughtily put forward in 1853. The occupancy by Austria of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, avowedly in the interest of Turkey, was shorn of much of its value by doubts concerning the sincerity of the court of Vienna in any measures hostile to the czar. The commotions in the northern and western provinces of Turkey, though irritating and exhausting to the Ottoman Divan, were of minor European importance, since they arose from a multiplicity of circumstances which in many instances counteracted each other. The struggles of the petty court of Athens to raise a great Greek Empire on the ruins of the Osmanli power, under the shadow of the mighty czar, could at any time be rendered nugatory by a few ships and a few regiments belonging to the Western Powers. The encounters in Asia Minor and in the Caucasus, important as they must necessarily be in reference to the extent of Russian dominion, were inconclusive in 1854—the relative positions of Turks and Russians at the end of the year being nearly as they had been at the beginning. The achievements of the great fleets belonging to England and France, in the Black Sea and in the Baltic, cannot be regarded as grand in their character or productive of decisive results, however readily allowance may be made for difficulty in fighting an enemy who would not come forth to a close encounter. Lastly, the small expeditions to the White Sea and to the regions around Kamtchatka, whether successful or not in attaining the immediate objects aimed at, could not, under any circumstances, have vitally affected the issue of the war. Hence, by a sort of exhaustive process, the field for really important operations—operations which might possibly bring matters to a crisis—became circumscribed; and the eyes of Europe were turned to the Crimea, as the probable theatre of struggles which, for good or for evil, might produce vast results on the future tranquillity of surrounding nations.

THE CRIMEA, PAST AND PRESENT.

The Crimea is remarkably situated, relatively to the mainland with which it is connected. Southern Russia, from Asia on the east, to the Austrian and Prussian dominions on the west, is little else than a vast plain, swampy in some parts, sandy in others, fertile in the rest; and this plain appears to have been a pathway along which rude hordes roamed westward, at different periods of early history, in search of the natural and acquired riches for which the West was held in repute. The Crimea lay not directly in this path, but constituted a sort of recess, shelter, or retreat, appended to the mainland by a little thread of isthmus, but bounded in all other parts by the waters of the Euxine and the Sea of Azof. Into this recess many of the early rovers penetrated, and settled down in peaceful occupation of the soil. The enterprising nations of the West,

on the other hand, seeking for whatever conquest or commerce could give them, worked a way for themselves into the Crimea—either across the Pruth, the Dniester, and the Dnieper, or by a voyage across the Euxine; hence the establishment of settlements by the men of the West; and hence that remarkable mixture of the Oriental with the Occidental which the Crimea to this day exhibits. So difficult of access to strangers are the Russian dominions, that the Crimea was little known to western Europeans before the war; it was regarded simply as a part of Russia, and nothing further. The year 1854, however, gave a new interest to the peninsula; all that had ever been written concerning it was eagerly read, and much was ascertained which had never before been written. The ancient Greeks, the Byzantine Greeks, the modern Greeks, the Genoese, the Jews, the Gipsies, the Tatars, the Circassians, the Armenians, the Turks, the Russians—all, it was found, had impressed their national characteristics on this comparatively small spot. Asia and Europe, it was ascertained, too, had mingled their agricultural and commercial systems in the Crimea, where horses are employed for draught in one place, oxen in another, buffaloes in a third, and camels in a fourth.

The migrations of early tribes, into and out of the Crimea, have been but slightly recorded; and even the few records existing are hazy and doubtful. The Greeks were the first people to establish towns and erect buildings which are still visibly represented by crumbling fragments. It is supposed that the Ionian Greeks, and especially the inhabitants of Miletus, began to form settlements in this peninsula at so early a date as the seventh century before the Christian era; they built Theodosia, now called Kaffa; and in the neighbourhood of Kertch are still to be seen the extensive ruins of the ancient Panticapæum. The Greek colonists especially selected the extreme eastern portion of the Crimea, near the Straits of Yenikalé, on account of the richness of the soil; indeed, this district was at one time regarded as the granary of Greece, especially of Athens, whose numerous inhabitants were unable to grow corn sufficient for their consumption. Not merely was the Crimea a colonised territory; it became an independent state in the fifth century B.C., having its own sovereign and its own laws. The ancient kingdom of Bosphorus was one of the smallest of kingdoms, extending only sixty miles in length, from Theodosia to Panticapæum, forming the south-east portion of the Taurica Chersonesus (Crimea), near the Cimmerian Bosphorus (Straits of Yenikalé). The Cimmerians were rude barbarians, who entered the Crimea from the north, and who were regarded with horror and detestation by the Greeks, as shewn in the mingled history and fable of that people; the Tauri, also, were another mythical or real Crimean nation, connected with whom is the story of Iphigenia. Theodosia and Panticapæum, in the time of the Bosphorians, had good ports; and between them was a third, Nymphæum: the king, too, possessed Phanagoria, now Tmutakaran, on the eastern side of the straits; and there are some indications that his power gradually extended over the greater part of the Crimea. The names of twelve sovereigns of this small kingdom have been recorded, from the year 430 B.C. to 304 B.C. Neither scholars nor travellers, neither statesmen nor journalists, heeded much this remote corner of classic land, until a comparatively recent period; when Russian explorers began to search among the relics of the ancient kingdom of Bosphorus, and to select specimens to be deposited in the Hermitage Palace at St Petersburg—a proceeding analogous to that adopted by the British government in regard to the Elgin marbles, and defensible on this ground—that the Tatar and Turkish races value ancient sculpture and architecture only as targets to be shot at, or as heaps of stone to be quarried.

Another stage in the history of this remarkable peninsula was that during which the Crimea formed part of a larger kingdom, ruled by the great Mithridates. When the Romans conquered Greece, the Bosphoric kingdom in the Crimea began to decline; for the market with Athens and other towns in Greece, on which the Crimeans had largely depended, fell away. Consequent upon these circumstances, the weakened state became an easy prey to Mithridates. This formidable opponent to the Romans obtained possession of nearly the whole of Asia Minor about 70 or 80 B.C.; and subsequently of the Crimea, where his surname, Eupator, became afterwards perpetuated in the names of certain places. He is supposed to have died at Panticapæum, where numberless fragments still remain to attest his power. A kingdom of Bosphorus, in which Greek blood and half-barbaric blood became more and more commingled, existed during many centuries: indeed down to the fall of the Roman Empire; for the same cause destroyed both—the inroad of rude tribes from less fertile and less civilised regions. Thus the Alans or Alani, a rude nomadic people who despised fixed residences, overran the Crimea in the first century of the Christian era; the Goths made a similar irruption in the second century; and the Huns, during their passage westward in the fourth century, roamed over the Tauric peninsula for awhile, and drove the Goths into mountain-fastnesses. In later centuries, the Khazars, the Petchenegues, and the Comanes, each in turn occupied the Crimea. There was a Byzantine period, too, in the history of the Crimea; during which Greeks from Constantinople established colonies on the southern coast, at or near the spots now occupied by the towns and domains of Alushta, Alupka, Oreanda, and Yalta. Of the ancient Heracleotic colony, in the south-west of the Crimea, near the modern town of Sebastopol, notice will be taken in a future page.

The most thoroughly Asiatic period, so to speak, in the history of the Crimea, was that during

which it was in the hands of the Tatars, who conquered it in the thirteenth century, converting it into the khanate of Crim Tatary, with a capital called Eski-Crim.* When the Turks obtained control over the peninsula in the fifteenth century, the Genoese also possessed flourishing colonies at Kaffa and elsewhere. As centuries advanced, the commingling of races became more remarkable. But the glory of the Crimea, in its medieval stage, may be considered to have departed when the Genoese colonies were destroyed by the ruthless conqueror of Constantinople; when 40,000 Genoese were compelled to depart; when boys and maidens were torn from their homes; when the inhabitants who were left behind were forced to give up half their property; and when the treasures with which Genoese industry and commerce had enriched the Crimea were transferred to Stamboul, the once Christian Constantinople. The Crimea never recovered from this blow. After the Genoese had departed, the Tatars and Turks, with their semi-civilisation, could bring but little that would supply a substitute; villages declined, roads and paths became deserted, fields went out of cultivation, and the Crimea became something worse than Asiatic.

That Russia obtained power in the Crimea by treacherous means, has been already briefly intimated (p. 5); but it is necessary here to notice the transaction more in full, inasmuch as it defines the relative positions of Russians, Tatars, and Turks in that peninsula since the time of Catherine II.

The Crimea, about the year 1770, still remained, as it had long been, a Tatar province or khanate under the Ottoman sultan; a state midway between dependence and independence, analogous to that observable in Servia, Moldavia, and Wallachia. The Tatars, and the country generally, were governed by their own khans, hereditary, but tributary to the higher power which ruled at Constantinople. During the war between Russia and Turkey in 1770, Sahim or Selim Gherai, khan of the Crimea, assisted the Turks to repel the Muscovite invaders. The Russian prince, Dolgorouki, however, forced the Turkish lines at Perekop, the isthmus which connects the peninsula with the mainland, and overran the whole of the Crimea, obtaining possession of nearly all the strongholds. The surname of Krimski, conqueror of the Krimea or Crimea, was given to him for this achievement. The lines at Perekop had been regarded by the Turks and Tatars as the Chinese regard their Great Wall—a bar to all invaders: they consisted of a ditch 70 feet broad and 40 feet deep, bordered and backed by a broad embankment of earth, extending across the isthmus from the Black Sea to the Sea of Azof; nevertheless, Dolgorouki forced these lines, against an army stronger than his own. For awhile the empress retained the Tatar khan as a puppet; the Crimea was not formally incorporated with Russia, but was placed under the empress's 'protection'—the suzerainty of the sultan being declared at an end. The sultan did not regain his power in the Crimea; the khan became independent of Constantinople. Flattered and tempted by the empress, the Tatar chief renounced the national costume of his people, glittered in a Russian uniform, wore the decorations of the Order of St Anne, and received the title of a lieutenant-general in the imperial Russian Guards. The fall of the khanate was foreshadowed in these proceedings. Prince Potemkin, at that time all-powerful with the empress, obtained complete control over the khan, weaning him more and more from his subjects, and bribing him to become an instrument in the hands of Russia. Years passed on, during which the power of the empress in the Crimea increased, but not her hold over the good-will of the people; until at length, in April 1783, a bloody massacre took place, during which Paul Potemkin, cousin of the minister, caused many thousand Crimeans, of all ages and both sexes, to be put to death, as a means of removing all obstacles to the assumption of supreme power by Russia over the Crimea, and to the suppression of the khan's rule as well as the sultan's.

Enough has been stated, even in this brief outline, to shew how probable it is that indications may be found in the Crimea of Greeks, Byzantines, Tatars, Genoese, Turks, and Russians, either in the remains of buildings or in the names of places. But besides these, other nations have crept in, by express arrangement or by individual choice. Germans, Italians, modern Greeks, Armenians, Circassians, and Jews, are to be met with among the colonists of this remarkable country. Leaving unnoticed for the present those towns and fortified spots—Sebastopol, Inkerman, Balaklava, Eupatoria, Perekop, Simferopol, Kertch, Yenikalé, &c.—which have acquired celebrity on account of events in the Russian war, and which will be described in connection with those events—it may be useful to notice here a few examples illustrative of the diverse races or nationalities of the Crimea.

When the Prussian traveller Koch was at Kaffa or Theodosia, shortly before the commencement of the war, he was struck with the variety of the costumes and nationalities there exhibited. 'The officials are, with few exceptions, Russians; but the richer merchants are Greeks and Armenians, at times Italians; the poorer traders are Jews; and the artisans generally Germans. Besides these, a few gipsies are visible now and then. The original inhabitants of the Crimea, the Tatars, wander about with their sheep and oxen to the last moment [of summer], and pass the winter in wretched villages. Since the Russians have taken possession of the Crimea, the Tatars have given up a portion of their land—and that generally the best—to foreign settlers.

* In some maps this name is rendered Staro-Crim or Staro-Krim. The meaning is the same, however; for *Eski* is the Turkish, and *Staro* the Russian name for 'Old.'

Then, among others, a number of Jews have been deported from the interior of Russia; and these poor fellows—who fancy that they are only born to trade, and in Russia shun any manual labour even more than is the case among ourselves—are forced to devote themselves to agriculture, an occupation for which they entertain the greatest reluctance. . . . . In the neighbourhood of Theodosia, a few German colonies exist, which have only recently begun to flourish; they can always be recognised at a distance by their carts, which appear really graceful when seen by the side of the clumsy native wagons.' *

Now, these comments by Koch may serve as a text wherefrom we may illustrate many of the nationalities mentioned by him. The Tatars are the groundwork of the present population; although it is not quite correct for Koch to designate them the 'original inhabitants.' It is remarkable, however, that the Tatars in the north of the Crimea differ much from those in the south. The former are a simple, pastoral people, leading an active life, wandering from place to place in search of herbage for their cattle, and exhibiting the rough hospitality of nomadic tribes; whereas the Tatars near the southern coast, who in past centuries traded and perhaps intermarried with Genoese and Levantines, are more indolent, satisfied with the natural produce of a rich soil and climate, and imbued with a mingled cunning and polish observable in many Mediterranean nations. The former have the Mongolian cast of countenance, with high cheek-bones, wide eyes, and flat noses; while the latter exhibit that regularity of features and that fairness of complexion which tell of a commixture of European with Asiatic blood. The northern Tatars, or those who occupy the larger portion of the area of the Crimea, present characteristics which are favourably noticed by most travellers. Yet are they gradually becoming extinguished, like the red races in North America. Mr Oliphant, while passing from one Tatar village to another in 1852, was oppressively reminded of the indications that those villages are declining under the blighting influence which Russia appears to exercise over her Moslem subjects. During the last few years the Tatars have been rapidly diminishing, and in 1852 numbered only 100,000, although still the main stock of the population. Their energy, too, is said to be declining with their numbers; whole tracts of country, susceptible of a high state of cultivation, and at one time producing abundantly, are now lying waste; manufactures are deteriorating, territorial property is becoming valueless, and noble families are becoming extinct; the poor are ground down by Russian tax-gatherers, and are further wronged by the dishonesty of sub-officials. Thousands of acres of magnificent soil are now remaining uncultivated: no sufficient influx of labourers from other regions having yet filled up the gap left by the decline of the Tatar population. By a Russian ukase of late date, no person can hold even a rood of land in the widely extended dominions of the czar without first becoming a naturalised Russian subject; and this is a condition to which the natives of other countries are but ill disposed to submit. A remarkable comment is made by Koch on the erroneous information conveyed by maps of the Crimea. Nearly the whole of such maps represent the country as being much more thickly dotted with villages than it really is at the present day. It is recorded that when Catherine II. acquired this important territory, and paid a visit to it, the sycophants by whom she was surrounded took a geographical liberty with the Crimea, by laying down upon maps villages which did not exist, as a means of enhancing the apparent value of the new acquisition: this fraud, coupled with the imperfectly known decay of early villages, perpetuated the names of places no longer in existence; while a further source of error arises from the fact, that the Tatars of the plains, in accordance with their nomadic habits, change their places of residence after a short interval, whenever there is a lack of pasturage for their flocks and herds. Koch asserts that the modern maps contain the names of many of these temporary stopping-places, as if they were established villages; and that many names, to which nothing now corresponds, remain on the maps—having been applicable only to the times when the whole of the Crimea was under Tatar dominion.

The villages, then, present a picture of the modern or present Crim Tatars. There are towns, on the other hand, which speak forcibly of the Tatars of other days, when the khans maintained great state over their subjects. Baktchéserai (Bagtché-Serai, Baktchi-Serai, Bacthi-Serai) is one of these: its name signifying 'Seraglio of Gardens.' In this town, near the south-west corner of the Crimea, a great kiosk rears its head, the portal of which gives entrance to the immense quadrangle of the palace of the khans. 'Here are the frailest of minarets and the tallest of poplars; here the dome-capped temple of Mohammed, and the solemn sepulchres of the khans; and long rows of buildings, now lower, now higher, with light balconies and verandas, painted in light arabesques of red and blue, and shaded by their wide overhanging roofs: their line of high decorated chimneys even forming ornaments. Here, too, is the great octagonal tower or kiosk, with its far-spreading eaves; and here gushing fountains pour forth their limpid streams, while the atmosphere is redolent of flowers. This, then, was the last domicile of those Tatar chiefs whose word, some few centuries ago, was sufficient to make the earth tremble.' * A second court has an entrance, called the 'Gate of Iron,' over which is an inscription, in the Tatar language, to this effect: 'The master of this gate, who has acquired this province, is the very exalted sovereign

* *The Crimea*, chap. 2.

* Scott: *The Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Crimea.*

Mengli-Gherei-Khan, son of Hadji-Gherei-Khan. May the Lord God over all deign to bestow supreme felicity on Mengli-Gherei-Khan, and also on his father and mother!' Below this is another inscription: 'The erection of this portal was ordered by the master of two seas and two provinces, the Sultan Mengli-Gherei-Khan, son of Hadji-Gherei-Khan, in the year 959.' This Mohammedan date corresponds with 1552 A.D. From this portal a flight of steps affords ascent to a great vestibule, whence passages lead to all parts of the palace. In the vestibule are two fountains, over one of which is an inscription rich in the hyperbolic language of the Orientals: 'Glory to God the highest! The face of Baktchéserai is gladdened by the beneficent solicitude of the luminous Krim-Gherei-Khan. He has, with a plentiful hand, quenched the thirst of his country; and he will endeavour still to shed other blessings around, if God will assist him. After difficulty and care, he has opened this excellent spring of water. If there exist another fountain equal to this, let it shew itself! We have seen the towns of Damascus and Bagdad, but we have nowhere found a fountain comparable to this. The author of this inscription is called Cheiker. Let the man who is parching with thirst read these words through the murmuring waters, which escape by a tube thin as the finger; and what say they to him?—Come, drink of this limpid stream, which bursts from the purest of sources, and it will give thee health.' The fountain on which is recorded this passionate expression of the Eastern love for cooling streams, is only one among many in the old palace of the khans. Softly lighted apartments; kiosks with golden ceilings and marble floors; terraced gardens, with sparkling cascades appearing beneath the shade of roses; the audience-chamber, galleries, saloons, and the great judgment-hall; the closely guarded rooms of the harem, with small windows of lattice-work, thickly shaded by luxurious plants—all speak of days which are associated with Asiatic luxury. Adjoining the palace are the tombs of the khans, enclosed in a walled garden; each tomb consists of a sort of domed temple, containing a plain sarcophagus, with a turban placed on a vertical stone at the head; and the inscriptions on many of the tombs are full of fervent poetry. Such is the deserted palace of the khans. The late Emperor Nicholas caused many parts of it to be refurnished in exact conformity with the original plan, with gorgeous carpets and divans and hangings in rich velvet and silk. This proceeding was not unworthy of the emperor; for Baktchéserai has still 8000 Tatars in a population of 11,000; and one would not willingly lose the memento of those ages when khans were greater than czars, and when this city was the capital of Crim Tatary. The Spanish court, it may here perhaps be suggested, would not be regarded with less esteem by reasonable men if the wonderful Alhambra were more reverentially treated, as a memento of those yet earlier days when the Moors were all-powerful in the south-west of Europe.

Another of the nations of the Crimea, the Jews, may be regarded in connection with the strange fortress of Tchoufout Kalé. Little have the soldiers of Western Europe thought, during their warlike proceedings, that they were near one of the centres of Judaism, a community of the followers of Abraham in the midst of Tatars, Russians, Greeks, and Genoese. Kirkor, the ancient name of Tchoufout Kalé, was the Tatar capital for a century or upwards, down to about the year 1480, when the khans became tributary to the Ottoman sultans, and when they abandoned it for a new capital at Baktchéserai; but Tchoufout was a sacred city among the Jews, both prior and subsequent to that removal. It is supposed that the Jews resided principally at Mangoup Kalé during this Tatar occupation of Tchoufout: be this as it may, however, they have been the chief inhabitants of Tchoufout during a period nearly as long as that which has marked the Turkish occupation of Constantinople. This place presents the aspect of a fortress rather than a town, built upon an elevated limestone rock, of difficult access; its walls resting in stern solidity upon the very brink of a precipice. The Jews, who regard it as their cherished home, are called Karaïtes; and their chief rabbi told Mr Oliphant, in 1852, that the synagogue was more than 1000 years old, and that the Karaïtes came to the Crimea before the birth of Christ. This startling degree of antiquity may not perhaps be quite correct; but it is at least known that the residence of this tribe at Tchoufout may be traced back to very early times. There is now a tomb, outside the town, bearing a date equivalent to 640 A.D. The Karaïtes differ from ordinary Jews in this—that the former maintain the written law of Moses; whereas most other Jews accept the Talmud, a commentary or interpretation made by the rabbis: a difference in some sort analogous to that observable between Protestants and Catholics among Christians. The Karaïtes are, indeed, a small section among Jews: agreeing with the Talmudists in this—that each thinks the other a dissenting body from true Judaism; nevertheless, there are considerable numbers of Karaïtes scattered over Russia, Poland, and Egypt; and it is remarkable that the whole of these look up with reverence, as to a second Jerusalem, to a town situated little more than twenty miles from the great military and naval stronghold at Sebastopol. The rabbi at Tchoufout Kalé is acknowledged as the spiritual head of all these Karaïtes, wheresoever they may dwell. The Karaïtes maintain a very high reputation for probity in all their dealings; insomuch that they are trusted in countries where other Jews are regarded with suspicion; the Russian government has bestowed upon them many privileges, including that of the entire management of their own town of Tchoufout Kalé—perhaps the only instance in modern times of unmolested Jewish municipal government. Whether the name Karaïte be derived from two words signifying 'black dog,' a name very likely to be applied to a

Jew by a Mohammedan; or whether it be traceable to a word signifying 'written,' and indicating Jews who adhere to the written instead of the Talmudic Books—appears to be a disputed point. The Karaïte town, be the meaning of the name what it may, is ascended by a zigzag path from Baktchéserai up a stony mountain; at the summit of which a small door, in a thick stone-wall, affords entrance to the town. The streets are narrow; the houses are low, built of stone, and rendered gloomy by having all the windows turned towards the inner courts, in the custom of Asiatic houses. There is another door or gate, at the opposite end of the town; and both doors are closed at night, when the Karaïtes have returned from the transaction of the day's business at Baktchéserai. Outside the town or fortress—for it may be called by either name—is the Karaïte cemetery, called by them the Valley of Jehoshaphat, where all Karaïtes, from all climes, desire that their remains may be deposited. Tchoufout Kalé is, indeed, rather a city of the dead than of the living; for the cemetery contains thousands of tombstones and inscriptions, reverentially regarded by this interesting tribe.

It will suffice for the present to advert to one more of the medley of nations to be found in the Crimea—the Germans. Shortly after the Crimea passed under the dominion of Russia, the government offered certain advantages to colonists who would there settle, to improve the country by their industry. Three villages, bearing the thoroughly German names of Neusatz, Friedenthal, and Rosenthal, and situated about sixteen miles from Simferopol, are filled with German colonists descended from those who accepted this invitation. The villagers have a grant of the land from the government; they have an inspector or judge chosen by themselves, whose decision settles all disputes; and they possess other safeguards against Russian interference. They belong to the Western churches—either Protestant or Roman Catholic; they intermarry among themselves; and they retain the costume, language, and manners which had belonged to them in their original fatherland. Being an agricultural people, they keep large farms and large herds of cattle; supplying the towns with vegetables, animal food, milk, butter, and other provisions. Their houses are substantially built of stone, and their gardens are tastefully arranged. Not only are these Germans industrious agriculturists, but they are becoming the most serviceable of artisans in Simferopol and other towns.

It will be seen, therefore, that while the Crimea retains indications of Greek, Bosphoric, Pontine or Mithridatic, and Genoese rule, it presents, at the present day, a remarkable mixture of Tatar, Russian, Jewish, and German nationalities; and a further inquiry of a similar kind would shew how singularly the Circassian, Turkish, Armenian, French, and Italian elements—to say nothing of the gipsies, here, as elsewhere, an isolated race—have been added to this composite people: not amalgamated, but in juxtaposition: not, as science might term it, a chemical compound, but a mechanical mixture. If observant men, when the Crimean campaign began in 1854, had speculated on the probable disposal of that peninsula in the event of its capture, the diverse nationalities would have presented a subject of considerable difficulty.

After this brief historical survey, it becomes necessary to notice the topography of the Crimea; for the strategical plans of the Allies were intimately dependent on the directions and heights of the mountains, the courses of the rivers, the connecting-link with Southern Russia by the Isthmus of Perekop, the coast-line on the important Sea of Azof, and the relation between the hilly districts of the south and the barren steppes of the north.

The Crimea, having an area a little in excess of that of Wales, presents an irregular quadrilateral figure, with the corners directed nearly to the four cardinal points, and with a peninsula attached to its eastern extremity, called the peninsula of Kertch. The greatest distance north and south, from Perekop to a cape near Balaklava, is about 125 miles in a straight line; while the extent east and west is 200 miles. On three sides it is washed by the Black Sea, and by the Sea of Azof on the fourth. The Isthmus of Perekop (called Orkapi by the Tatars), by which the Crimea is connected with the mainland, is about twenty miles long by four in its narrowest part: it is washed on the west by the Black Sea, and on the east by the Sivach Moré or Putrid Sea, an arm of the Sea of Azof.

No country in the world, perhaps, presents a greater contrast, within the same number of miles, than the Crimea, so far as concerns the natural features of the surface. Three-fourths of the area constitute an arid plain or steppe, occasionally interrupted by hollows, but for the most part flat, dull, and dreary, having a soil in which sand is a principal constituent. In the neighbourhood of the two seas, this plain is dotted with numerous small lakes, shallow and salt: separated from the beach by low narrow strips of land, and surrounded by soil impregnated with salt. In this whole extent—as large as Yorkshire—the Crimean plain is almost entirely destitute of wood and water, although it has a little green-sward; as a consequence, its inhabitants are few, and its appearance desolate. The inhospitable nature of the region has rendered it a task of much difficulty for the Russians, since their occupation of the Crimea, to send supplies inland to Sebastopol and Simferopol, either from Perekop, or from Arabat or Genitchi, or other places on the shore of the Sea of Azof. One of the most remarkable features in this uninviting waste, is the Kosa Arabatskaïa or Kotche, a tongue of land, beginning at the town of Arabat, where the peninsula of Kertch joins the larger section of the Crimea, and extending northward till it nearly touches

the mainland of Russia at Genitchi; it cuts off the Putrid Sea from the Sea of Azof in every part except the Strait of Genitchi. This tongue, although more than sixty miles long, is little more than a quarter of a mile in general width; it is low, sandy, salt, and marked by several small lakes or ponds of salt water; a road, extending along its whole length, contains a few inns at distant intervals; and these inns present the only relief to the oppressive monotony of the region.

Far different is the southern part of the Crimea, with its bold hills and fertile valleys. A mountainous tract extends nearly parallel with the south-eastern coast, from Cape Chersonese, near Sebastopol, to Kaffa, whence to Yenikalé it is hilly, if not mountainous. This mountainous tract, in some parts forty miles wide, has an average width of about twenty miles; between Balaklava and Alushta, past Alupka and Yalta, it rears its head like an immense wall near the sea, interrupted by bold headlands, fearful precipices, and small sheltered inlets. As the crest of the mountain-ridge, generally about 2000 feet in height, is not far distant from the sea, the streams which descend to the coast are short and torrent-like. The summit of the ridge presents, not a series of peaks, but an undulating plateau or table-land, relieved at intervals by bolder elevations; the plateau is enriched with good herbage for cattle during the short hot summer; but the snows, which remain during a somewhat lengthened winter, render it for the most part unfitted for permanent habitation. The gradually sloping ground, from the plateau to the northern plain, and the strip of beach along the southern shore, constitute the most fruitful, habitable, and valuable portions of the Crimea; indeed, the lateral ridges and the smaller hills north of the plateau, enclose valleys of the most exquisite character, which draw forth encomiums from every traveller; and when it is considered that a few hours' ride will change this lovely scene to one of depressing monotony and dreariness, the diversified character of the Crimea will be sufficiently understood. The most elevated part of the Crimea is the Tchatir-dagh, 'tent-mountain,' having a flat top surmounted by a number of tent-like elevations, the highest peak being 5000 or 6000 feet above the level of the sea. The rivers Alma and Salghir flow from the Tchatir-dagh; the Katcha, the Belbek, and the Tchernaya, from the more western plateau; while the Tchuruk-su and other rivers take their origin further to the east.

The southern coast of the Crimea gradually became, during the first half of this century, the Ventnor or Bonchurch for wealthy Russian families; it possesses all, and more than all the beauties of the Isle of Wight during the summer months; and, as a consequence, it became studded with the holiday mansions of the Galitzins and the Woronzows of the empire. The tourists' road, if so it may be called, runs along the coast from Alushta to Yalta and Alupka, and so through the small valley of Baidar to Balaklava, traversing a scene of varied beauty from end to end. Mr Scott speaks thus concerning it: 'The last eight miles of the journey to Yalta is through a lovely country, where the mountains again recede from the coast, giving place to a series of valleys, over which nature has spread some of her choicest blessings—unrivalled position, soil, aspect, and climate; and man has not altogether forgotten to acknowledge these generous gifts. The fairest flowers and fruits of the earth are there cultivated, and the châteaux of the nobility are studded about. We seemed once more to have reached civilisation: elegant private carriages, gentlemen on horseback, and well-dressed women, were to be seen as we dashed through a village of villas.'* If this description renders intelligible the delight of the Russians in spending a summer or autumn in the Southern Crimea, Mr Danby Seymour's account of the Northern Crimea in winter will bring vividly before us the terrific nature of the steppe, and the stupendous difficulties necessarily encountered in the transport of an army, of provisions, or of commodities of any kind, across such a country in such a season: 'During the winter, the ground is covered with snow, which at times lies several feet deep. Unimpeded by mountains, forests, or rising-ground, the winds from the north-east, passing over many hundred miles of frozen ground (in the country around the river Don), blow with resistless violence, and often uninterruptedly for several weeks. When the frost is severe, and the snow in a dry powdery state, the wind drifts it about and obscures the air. These snow-storms are called by the inhabitants "metel" or "boura," and have often proved fatal to the half-frozen, blinded, and bewildered traveller, who, having lost his way, is wandering over the dreary icy steppe in quest of refuge. Detached houses and whole villages are sometimes buried by the drifting snow, through which the inmates are obliged to cut their way. At times the traveller looks in vain for the solitary post-house at which he is always anxious to arrive, and learns that he has reached his temporary resting-place only by a slight rise in the snow, and by his sledge being overturned into a hole, through which he creeps down into the cottage, which is sometimes thus buried for several weeks. When the wind blows with violence, and the snow is drifted about in eddies, the storm has a singularly bewildering and stunning effect; the inhabitants themselves lose their way; and the herds of horses, cattle, and sheep that happen to be surprised by it, become seized with a panic, and, rushing headlong before the gale, defy every obstacle that presents itself to their wild career—they are then inevitably lost.'† The experience of the Russian armies during the war verified most fearfully this character of the Crimean steppes when covered with snow and blasted by wintry winds.

* *The Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Crimea.*
† *Russia on the Black Sea.*

THE GREAT ARMAMENT—VARNA TO THE CRIMEA.

To this Crimea—to this home of so singular a variety of nations and tribes, and the scene of such diversified natural characteristics—did a mighty warlike force proceed in the autumn of 1854: a force which might be called the modern Armada, were it not that such a designation would be suggestive of an invasion prevented, an invader defeated, and a fleet destroyed.

That three large fleets, belonging to the Allied English, French, and Turks, were assembled off the ports of Varna and Baltschik; that three armies were encamped on the Turkish shores of the Black Sea; and that the armies and the fleets were ready to depart for the Crimea in the first week of September—was narrated in a former Chapter.*

The views entertained by the British and French governments concerning the best manner of conducting the war, were but imperfectly known at the time, either by the public or by the commanders. The 'Sebastopol Committee,' however—which has already been adverted to, and which will require more detailed notice in the next Chapter—was the means of eliciting valuable information on this point. In the Report of the Committee, read before the House of Commons on the 18th of June 1855, proof is afforded that the British government knew very little concerning the military strength of the Russians in the Crimea in the summer of 1854.† Sir James Graham, First Lord of the Admiralty, had an interview in London with a Crimean authority—whose name he deemed it proper not to reveal to the Committee—concerning the Russian forces in the Crimea; and the information thus obtained was sent to Lord Raglan and Admiral Dundas in August; but those officers do not appear to have placed much reliance on it. Inquiries were made, both at that time and at a later date, whether it would be practicable to occupy the Isthmus of Perekop; thus cutting off the Russians in the Crimea from any communication with the mainland. The Duke of Newcastle—Minister at War—requested the opinion of Lord Raglan on this matter; the commander-in-chief thought it was neither practicable nor desirable; and events which subsequently transpired tended to shew that such an occupation, unless aided by other manœuvres, would have failed to realise the objects intended—for the Russians, quite unknown to the British at the period, had constructed a bridge some miles eastward of Perekop, by which a good though circuitous road was obtained over one of the shallow lagunes or limans of the Putrid Sea. It is certain that neither Lord Raglan nor Lord Stratford de Redcliffe succeeded in obtaining much information concerning the state of the Crimea in the summer of 1854; nor did Admiral Dundas meet with much better success. The Duke of Newcastle, in the exercise of his office, was overwhelmed with plans for the capture of Sebastopol, by means of balloons and other contrivances; but these plans were a sorry substitute for veritable information respecting the defences and military positions of the Russians in the Crimea. In regard to Perekop, a glance at a map might lead to a fallacious opinion; the isthmus is narrow and flat; but it does not thence follow that the place would be easy either to capture, or to hold when captured. The rude trench and ridge which constitute the 'lines' of Perekop, would, as was estimated by the Allied officers, require 20,000 men and a heavy park of artillery for their defence; the surrounding country offers no supplies, and affords no shelter; while the water is brackish and the climate inhospitable, sickly hot in summer, and intensely cold in winter. Whether a naval attack would virtually have commanded the isthmus, was a question for naval men to determine; and Admiral Dundas, when questioned on this point, declared that the vessels at his disposal were too heavy in draught to approach the shores of bays so very shallow as those which wash the two sides of the isthmus. If, therefore, the defence

* Chap. IV. p. 119. The coloured map of Russia, and the small chart in the corner of the map of Turkey, will illustrate the voyage from Varna to the Crimea.

† 'The responsibility of the expedition to the Crimea rests upon the Home Government. The Duke of Newcastle, in his dispatch addressed to Lord Raglan on the 10th of April 1854, "directs careful but secret 'inquiry' to be made into the present amount and condition of the Russian force in the Crimea, and the strength of the fortress of Sebastopol." And his Grace further observes that, "before the siege of a fortress so strong can be attempted, it is necessary that information which can be relied on shall be obtained upon many points on which little or nothing is at present known." A second dispatch, dated the 29th of June, directs that the safety of Constantinople having been secured, whatever might be the movement of the Russian forces, no campaign in the Principalities should be undertaken, but that measures should be at once concerted for the siege of Sebastopol. "There is," it is added, "no prospect of a safe and honourable peace until the fortress is reduced, and the fleet taken or destroyed." The dispatch leaves to Lord Raglan a discretion only "in case of some insuperable impediment, such as a want of ample preparation by either army, or of the possession by Russia of a force in the Crimea greatly outnumbering that which can be brought against it."

The Cabinet appear to have been confident of success. Lord Aberdeen states it to have been their impression that Sebastopol would fall almost immediately by a *coup de main*. The Duke of Newcastle says that he expected the army, after capturing Sebastopol, would winter there, or else, after destroying the fortress, would return to winter on the shores of the Bosphorus. Sir James Graham has the strongest opinion that the order for the expedition was given at the right time, and was executed at the right time.

This report shews the results which ensued upon the frustration of these expectations. Your Committee have inquired what information the Government had obtained which induced them to order this expedition. In regard to this matter, it may be observed that the Duke of Newcastle had, in his dispatch of the 10th of April, estimated the Russian forces in the Crimea at 30,000 men, and he believes that when the expedition was ordered, no more reliable accounts had been received. Sir James Graham says, however, that at a later period—namely, the last week in July—he had obtained "from a Crimean authority a complete account of the Crimea, its localities, its harbours, its roads, its productions, and supply of water, and, what was most important of all, a statement of the force, which was estimated by his informant at 70,000 men, 8000 of which were cavalry; 40,000 constituted the garrison of Sebastopol, and the remaining 30,000 were dispersed through the Crimea." Vice-admiral Dundas had, on the 10th of May 1854, written to Lord Raglan a letter, in which, relying upon information which he had obtained, he estimated the Russian forces in the Crimea at 120,000 men. The embassies at St Petersburg and Constantinople were unable to furnish any information upon these important subjects.

Lord Raglan, in his dispatch of the 19th of July, states that "the descent on the Crimea is decided upon more in deference to the views of the British Government than to any information in the possession of the naval and military authorities, either as to the extent of the enemy's forces or to their state of preparation."'

of the Isthmus of Perekop would have required a larger force than the military commanders could spare; if an attack from the sea were impracticable without lighter vessels than the naval commanders possessed; and if the Russians had a bridge of approach which rendered them in great part independent of the isthmus—then would a conquest in that quarter be more difficult and less valuable than a first consideration might appear to render probable.

With such imperfect knowledge as they could collect, the commanders, in obedience to instructions from their respective governments, prepared to make a descent on the Crimea. The town of Sebastopol, with its magnificent harbour, fortress, arsenal, and fleet, being the principal object of attention, there arose an inquiry whether a landing should be made on the western or the southern coast. Many military authorities were of opinion, both before and after the achievement, that a happier selection of a landing-place might have been made; but the commanders having resolved on a descent upon some point on the western coast, northward of Sebastopol, the only question now to determine was—how far distant should this point be? The rivers Belbek, Katcha, and Alma flow into Kalamita Bay, north of Sebastopol, and all are commanded by rising-grounds on their southern banks; and if these slight elevations were defended by the Russians, a landing would be very difficult. On the other hand, if a landing were effected at Eupatoria, higher up the coast, the invading army would be enforced to traverse forty or fifty miles of waterless plains to reach Sebastopol, whether or not a Russian antagonist might appear. There was a choice of difficulties; and circumstances afterwards proved that the commanders had not arranged their plan even when the vast armament had reached the Crimean shores.

Never in modern times had such an armament been seen—never such a display of war-vessels, and transports laden with troops, speckling one sea at one time: bright pendants flying, bands playing, the scarlet of the soldier contrasting with the blue of the sailor, the steamers vomiting forth their curling smoke, and the guns booming forth their signals or their courtesies. The admirals conferred with the generals on the formation of a plan for supplying ships to transport the troops, and for the establishment of such rules as might obviate danger and confusion during the voyage and the landing. It was arranged that each division of the army should have a complete division or fleet of transports at its service, and that each of these fleets should be convoyed by a squadron of war-ships—thereby establishing a bond of connection between the troops, the transports, and the men-of-war, and between the generals, admirals, and captains. The last week in August and the first in September were weeks of incessant movement: English and French soldiers, and English artillery (the French artillery came by another route, without being landed at or near Varna), being brought down to the beach, and there embarked on board the transports, several hundreds in number. That the transports were indeed numerous will easily be imagined, when it is considered that 60,000 or 70,000 troops were about to be conveyed from the shores of Bulgaria to those of the Crimea, a distance of not less than 300 miles. The smaller transport-vessels were appropriated to the conveyance of the infantry, the artillery, and the immense stores required by a large army; but the British cavalry were for the most part conveyed in the magnificent steamers which had already acquired a reputation more than European—the 8th Hussars and the 17th Lancers in the *Himalaya*, the 4th Dragoons in the *Simla*, the 13th Dragoons in the *Jason*, the 11th Hussars in the *Trent*, &c.

Considering that the slightest misapprehensions of orders received or plans to be executed might have thrown the fleets of transports into ruinous confusion, instructions of a very precise character were drawn up by Sir Edmund Lyons, to whom this arduous duty was intrusted by Admiral Dundas. Sir George Brown, on his side, acting under Lord Raglan, issued instructions for the guidance of the military officers in marshalling, embarking, and landing their men. How the boats were to draw up to the shore, the troops to enter them, the adjustment to be made, the rowing to be effected, and the arrival at the ships' sides to be conducted; how the troops and the cavalry horses were to be disposed on shipboard, the ships to be grouped into divisions, the divisions to be placed under chosen commanders, and the commanders to place their divisions in relative positions one to another; how the towing-steamers were to be placed at the service of the transports, and the route and speed of the voyage to be chosen; how the approach to the Crimean coast was to be managed, the disembarkation to be effected, and the assumption of military order on the beach to be insured—were the subjects of a series of 'General Orders,' issued on the 3d of September. A short extract will suffice to convey an idea of the instructions concerning the landing of troops from the ships by boats, on reaching the Crimea.* The fleet appointed to convey the British army was grouped in six divisions, distinguished by flags of particular colour or shape, and corresponding in some respects to the divisions of the army; namely, light division, checkered flag at the foremast; 1st division, blue triangular flag at the fore; 2d division, white

* 'Care is to be taken not to overcrowd the boats; room is to be left to pull the four foremost oars in the boats that are towed; strict silence to be observed; on no account to break the line by advancing out of it. The advance to be steady in line abreast. The cutters towing are to sheer to starboard when close to the beach, to allow the boats astern of them to take the beach on their port hand. If anything render it necessary to pull short round for retreat or alteration of movement, boats are always to pull to starboard, never going round to port unless ordered by signal. The instant the boats are clear of infantry, they are to make the best of their way to ships of the next division they are told off for, to land the troops. The boats, on receiving the troops of each division, will form without loss of time.'

triangular flag at the fore; 3d division, red triangular flag at the fore; 4th division, red, with white fly, triangular flag at the fore; and 5th division, blue, with red fly, triangular flag at the fore. One division of boats was to consist of Turkish pinnaces and launches from the sailing men-of-war; a second, of paddle-box boats from the war-steamers; a third, of boats belonging to the transport-service, and so on; and each division was placed under a divisional commander, with the steamers designated by their proper names, and the transports by their numbers. The English transports were nearly all connected with the British mercantile marine; whereas the French consisted of a miscellaneous assemblage of French, Italian, and Levantine vessels, all small, and insufficient, in the aggregate, to convey their whole army at one time.

On the 5th of September, the French portion of the immense armament began to move; and the British on the 7th—troops and seamen being glad to escape from a spot where cholera had thinned their number and depressed their spirits. The sight was a magnificent one; every part of the bay or roadstead in front of Varna and Baltschik was speckled with the ships, presenting an aggregate little less than 700 in number—of which 400 were appropriated to the British army. They passed near the Isle of Serpents, a small island opposite one of the mouths of the Danube; a French naval officer, dating a letter from that position, characterised the sight as 'such a spectacle as no sailor has ever before witnessed;' and an English officer, engaged in the embarkation, said: 'It was certainly a grand and imposing spectacle, this immense fleet of men-of-war and transports literally extending as far as the eye could reach, all in tow of steamers, and, of course, sending up dense masses of smoke.'* The British fleet reached 120 miles out by noon on the 8th; and after anchoring for awhile on the 10th, to form a junction with the French and Turks, the whole sailed and steamed eastward—between thirty and forty splendid line-of-battle ships, besides frigates, steamers, small vessels, and the immense fleet of hired transports.

By this time it had become suspected, if not clearly understood, that the Russians had defended all points of the coast on which a descent might reasonably be anticipated; and the Allied commanders were left with no other determination than that of effecting a landing at any spot which, convenient in other respects, might be sufficiently free from interruption. A conference took place on board the *Caradoc*, at sea, soon after the departure from the Bulgarian coast, between the generals and admirals of the Allied forces; the result of which was, that a commission was appointed, preliminary to any determination concerning the place of disembarkation, to examine the western shore of the Crimea, and to ascertain what preparations for defence had been made by the Russians. Lord Raglan, General Burgoyne, Sir George Brown, Sir Edmund Lyons, General Canrobert, with six other French military and naval officers, set out in the *Agamemnon*, *Caradoc*, *Sampson*, and *Primauguet*, to perform this important duty. On the morning of the 10th, the four vessels approached the shore of the Chersonese, the peninsula at the extreme south-west corner of the Crimea, where they observed a Russian camp on the heights southward of Sebastopol. Thence they steamed northward, keeping pretty close to land, to the mouth of the Alma; they found that a considerable strengthening of positions had been effected since the reconnaissance some weeks earlier: large encampments of troops being observable on all the more important points, numbering in the whole not less than 30,000. They then progressed further north, from the Alma to Eupatoria, a small seaport near the northern extremity of Kalamita Bay; and observing, at a part of the coast about midway between these points, a beach which appeared favourable for the landing of troops, the officers forming the commission agreed, after due consideration, to the following recommendations:—1*st*, That the landing, in place of being effected under the fire of the enemy, at the mouths of the Alma or the Katcha, should take place on the beach between those rivers and Eupatoria, at a spot called Staro-Oukeplenie or Old Fort. 2*d*, That on the same day as this landing, Eupatoria—a town having few or no defences, and no garrison, so far as was then known—should be taken and occupied by a force consisting of 2000 Turks, a French battalion, an English battalion, and three ships-of-the-line. 3*d*, That Eupatoria being secured, and a landing effected at Old Fort, the main body of the Allied army should march southward near the shore, in the direction towards Sebastopol; and 4*th*, That a powerful squadron of ships should take a sea-route parallel with this land-route, affording all possible aid to the army in case of a hostile encounter, and carrying the food and supplies. These recommendations, after the return of the reconnoitring squadron to the main fleet, were submitted to Marshal St Arnaud, Admiral Dundas, and Admiral Hamelin, and were approved by them.

On the 13th, the captains of the numerous ships, necessarily scattered over many miles of sea, received formal instructions in conformity with these regulations: some being required to prepare for Eupatoria, while a much larger number turned their prows towards Old Fort. The officers and men, whether sailors or soldiers, appear to have been much puzzled during these few days concerning their probable place of disembarkation; the doubt was unavoidable, since the commanders themselves could not settle the question until the exploring commission had returned: but it appeared like the absence of

* The view from Baltschik, p. 119, shews a small portion of the fleet, shortly before the departure.

any plan whatever to those who were not admitted to the consultations. The main body of the fleet had arrived in sight of Eupatoria on the 12th, and anchored on the 13th; Cossacks could be seen riding about on the shore, watching the movements of the fleet, and telegraphing information into the interior. A correspondent of one of the London journals, writing while the fleets were thus at anchor, and describing what he saw, without yet knowing the plans of the commanders, said: 'Having displayed all the vastness of our armaments before the eyes of the astonished natives of the town (Eupatoria), our chiefs would appear to have changed their minds, if they ever intended to land at that spot. All the vessels were drawn up in immense lines, and with an unknown depth—for the rigging and sails of the distant transports belonging to the expedition were lost far below the horizon; and after we had anchored, stragglers arrived every hour for two or three days. We were all expectation of a gun from the *Agamemnon*, and signals for landing; thousands of telescopes were earnestly directed to the shore. No gun was fired, however,

Landing at Old Fort.

and no signals made to let loose the expedition on Eupatoria.' The orders received bore relation, as just noticed, not to Eupatoria, but to Old Fort. The naval officers were instructed, by orders sent from the flag-ship, to make arrangements for the following manœuvres:—One division of the fleet of transports to be under-weigh by one o'clock on the morning of the 14th, another by two o'clock, another within an hour, and the rest by four o'clock: all to steer S.S.E. to latitude 45 degrees, and there to rendezvous in not less than eight fathoms' water. The French captains received like instructions.

The morning of the 14th of September broke on a scene of amazing activity and excitement: it ushered in a day on which the Allied troops were at last to land on Russian territory. While night yet overspread the sky, the ships were all in movement; and before night again arrived, the whole of the British infantry and some artillery, together with most of the French troops, had been disembarked. The English landed in a small bay northward of Old Fort, in front of a neck of land separating Lake Kamitchti from the sea; while the French effected a landing a little further to the south, and the Turks somewhat southward of the French. The 23d Royal Welsh Fusileers were the first British troops to touch Russian soil. The neck of land was a favourable spot for the disembarkation, and the landing proceeded rapidly hour after hour; insomuch that by nightfall the camp-fires were seen blazing over a stretch of country five or six miles in length—the left resting upon the Tatar village of Bagaili. The only enemy encountered, except a few Cossacks, who galloped off to Sebastopol to give information of the landing, were vast flocks of water-fowl, which studded the borders and surface of the brackish shallow lake.' The neck, isthmus, or causeway, between the lake and the sea—formed, probably, by the throwing up of shingle by the surf—led by a gentle ascent to a slightly elevated plateau on the south, which plateau the troops had to gain when making

arrangements for further progress. The day opened brilliantly, but clouded over as noon approached, and ended in gloom, rain, and discomfort. Steadily, nevertheless, did the disembarkation proceed, until 27,000 British troops had landed. The first officer to land was Sir George Brown, a brave active veteran, who superintended the military arrangements with all the alacrity of one who had passed only half so long a life: he was, indeed, nearly taken prisoner as a consequence of his hardihood; for the Cossacks on shore espied him before he was aware of their vicinity, and planned a capture, which was only frustrated by the hasty advance of a few soldiers to his defence. The chief officers landed with their respective divisions; and the regiments, after forming into brigades and columns, marched off southward from the neck to the plateau.

As one of those who landed on the forenoon of this day, Mr Russell was in a favourable position to notice the process of disembarkation. 'A gig or cutter, pulled by eight or twelve sailors, with a paddle-box boat, flat, or Turkish pinnace in tow—the latter purchased for the service—would come up alongside a steamer or transport in which troops were ready for disembarkation. The officers of each company first descended, each man in full dress; over his shoulder was slung his haversack, containing what had been, ere it underwent the process of cooking, four and a half pounds of salt meat, and a bulky mass of biscuit of the same weight: this was his ration for three days. Besides this, each officer carried his great-coat—rolled up and fastened in a hoop round his body—a wooden canteen to hold water, a small ration of spirits, whatever change of under-clothing he could manage to stow away, his forage-cap, and in most instances a revolver. Each private carried his blanket and greatcoat strapped up into a kind of knapsack, inside which was a pair of boots, a pair of socks, a shirt, and, at the request of the men themselves, a forage-cap; he also carried his water-canteen, and the same rations as the officer, a portion of the mess-cooking apparatus, firelock and bayonet of course, cartouch-box and fifty rounds of ball-cartridge for Minié, sixty rounds for smooth-bore arms. As each man came creeping down the ladder, Jack helped him along tenderly from rung to rung till he was safe in the boat, took his firelock and stowed it away, patted him on the back, and told him "not to be afeard on the water;" treated the "sojer," in fact, in a very kind and tender way, as though he were a large but not very sagacious pet, who was not to be frightened or lost sight of on any account; and did it all so quickly, that the large paddle-box boats, containing 100 men each, were filled in five minutes. The same attention was paid to getting the "sojer" on shore that was evinced in getting him into the boat: the sailors, half or wholly naked in the surf, standing by at the bows, and handing each man and his accoutrement down the plank to the shingle.'* The beach was partitioned off by flagstaffs, with colours corresponding to that of each division, in compartments for the landing of each part of the force. The *Minna* and *Brenda*, small steamers, were especially useful, each landing a whole regiment at a time. Sir Edmund Lyons, in his noble ship, the *Agamemnon*, was incessantly in movement, watching and controlling all the operations; his ship was handled in so masterly a manner, and threaded between and among the transports with so much facility, that it obtained the jocose appellation of 'Lyons's brougham' among the soldiers and sailors. Sir Edmund received marked encomiums from all parties for his service on this day.

Meanwhile, the French were conducting their disembarkation in conformity with a plan laid down by themselves, and displayed still more promptness and alacrity than the British, although their transport-service was less efficient. No enemy appeared on shore; yet it was deemed prudent to place four launches at anchor a little southward of the place of landing, provided with guns and rockets, to repel any Russians who might possibly interrupt the operations; and to afford a further cover by a frigate and two steamers. At a little after eight o'clock in the morning, the disembarkation commenced. A small body of troops landed first, and eagerly ran to plant the French tricolor and eagle on Russian soil; flags were also placed on shore to mark the compartments for the respective landing divisions. In the short space of four hours, nearly the whole of the French infantry was disembarked, together with some of the artillery: the cavalry, officers' horses, and remaining artillery being brought to shore later in the day. Marshal St Arnaud, who had watched the proceedings from the quarterdeck of the *Ville de Paris*, landed about two o'clock: Lord Raglan and the marshal, the Allied military commanders, on this day set foot on a land which they were destined never to leave alive. One of the latest of many proclamations or addresses which St Arnaud issued to his troops during his sojourn in the East, was dated on the day of this landing.† The French force destined for the Crimea was much larger than the English; but the portion which landed on this day numbered only about 24,000 against 27,000 English: the rest having been left on the

* *The War:* reprinted from the *Times*.

† 'SOLDIERS—For the last five months you have been anxious to meet the enemy; at last he is before you; we are about to shew him our eagles. Prepare yourselves to undergo the privations and fatigues of a difficult but short campaign, which will raise in the eyes of all Europe the reputation of the army of the East to a level with that of the highest military glories of history. You will not allow the soldiers of the Allied army, your companions-in-arms, to surpass you in vigour and steadiness before the enemy, nor in constancy during the trials which await you. You will bear in mind that we are not come to wage war on the peaceable inhabitants of the Crimea, who are so well inclined towards us, and who, confiding in our excellent discipline, our respect for their religion, their manners, and their persons, will not fail soon to join us. Soldiers, at the moment that you plant your colours on the soil of the Crimea, France looks to you with hope; a few days more, and she will look on you with pride. *Vive l'Empereur!*'

Turkish shores, to be conveyed by another fleet of transports.

Two other operations were in progress on this busy 14th of September—one bearing relation to Eupatoria, northward of Old Fort; and the other to the mouth of the Katcha, about an equal distance to the south. These must be briefly noticed, as component elements in the great scheme.

When the armament appeared off Eupatoria, Lord Raglan sent a flag of truce on shore, to demand possession of the place. The town was found almost wholly undefended, the inhabitants being neither able nor apparently willing to make any resistance. Eupatoria, called Genlev by the Tatars, and Koslov by the Russians, was at that time a thriving commercial town, with probably 10,000 inhabitants, chiefly Tatars and Karaïte Jews, but comprising also Greeks, Armenians, Russians, and natives of other countries. There are a few low hills encircling the town, but beyond these is the monotonous steppe, fit only for pasturage, diversified occasionally by a few wind-mills. The houses present a picturesque appearance from the sea, with their red-tiled roofs, relieved here and there by pointed minarets. The harbour is shallow, and affords insufficient shelter for shipping; but it serves to accommodate the small vessels which carry wool, corn, and salt to Odessa and other places. When the flag of truce was sent in, backed by the formidable support of the *Spitfire*, *Caradoc*, *Fury*, *Retribution*, *Sidon*, *Sampson*, and *Tribune*, the Eupatorians rushed down to the beach in crowds—Tatars, Russians, Jews, Greeks, Armenians, all being anxious to look more closely at a force which would be harmless so long as the flag of truce was flying. Any idea of defence being out of the question, the place surrendered at once; all the stores of corn and cattle were placed at the disposal of the Allies, to be purchased and paid for at a fair price; and arrangements were made for landing the small combined force of English, French, and Turks on the following morning: a few ships being kept off the port, to render such aid as might be prudent. The whole affair was so quietly managed as to attract little attention, although the capture proved afterwards to be one of some importance.

The other minor achievement, at the mouth of the Katcha, was intended rather to draw off the attention of the Russians from the proceedings at Old Fort, than to make a lodgment or effect a capture. While the disembarkation was proceeding, the *Sampson*, *Fury*, and *Vesuvius*, together with five French ships, having one of the French divisions of troops on board, proceeded to a spot near the mouth of the Katcha, where they espied a Russian camp of 5000 or 6000 men established about a mile from the shore. The steamers opened fire with shell; some of which, especially from the *Sampson*, dashed in among the tents and soldiers, causing the latter to make a precipitate retreat. This effected, the squadron returned to the main fleet, and the French division landed as the others had done.

Miserable was the night between the 14th and 15th of September—miserable to men who, wearied with long inaction and decimated by cholera, had yet to know the privations incident to warfare on an enemy's land. The day for the disembarkation had opened auspiciously; but rain and wind, utterly comfortless and disheartening, marked its close. All the British regiments marched on, as they were landed and formed, to the plateau, except those comprised in the 4th division; and thus, while the bulk of the army bivouacked in various ways on the upper ground, this division was left to pass the night on the narrow strip of beach which separates the lake from the sea. The men took up their positions, piled their arms, and lay down to take their first night's rest in the Crimea; but it was poor rest they obtained: some of the men died during the night from the effects of cholera, while the rest were drenched to the skin with rain, which fell in torrents. Officers and men alike huddled around the huge fires which they made of planks and broken barrels, trying to compensate for a soddening on one side by a roasting on the other. Lieutenant Peard, who belonged to this division, afterwards wrote: 'Of all the miserable nights I ever spent in my life, this was the most wretched: its discomforts it would be impossible to describe. It gave us a little foretaste of the comforts we were likely to enjoy in the Crimean campaign. Shelter there was none, for officers or men: I believe Sir George Brown was fortunate enough to sleep under a bullock-wagon. A misty exhalation arose from the lake, which caused much sickness among our men.'* Nor were the rest of the troops in much better plight; for although lifted somewhat away from the raging surf and the unhealthy lake, they had to bear heavy rain on a plateau without trees and without tents. The quickness of the landing, and the deficiency of land-transport and animals, led to the neglect or abandonment of tents; the tents were for the most part left on shipboard, and the troops suffered great misery in consequence. The question was afterwards warmly discussed among military men, whether this disregard of tents was justifiable; as a plain matter of fact, however, the troops had full cause to remember that few tents accompanied them. Old generals, young noblemen accustomed to the luxuries of life, veteran guardsmen, raw troops who had never yet seen war—all alike were driven to try the powers of a blanket and a greatcoat in opposing a pitiless flood of rain: if it were any solace to the privates to know that their officers fared nearly as ill as themselves, such solace was theirs. A naval officer, who had been busily engaged all day in aiding the disembarkation,

* *Narrative of a Campaign in the Crimea.*

wrote: 'On the first night after the landing we had awful weather, blowing and raining in bucketfuls. I did not get on board my ship till an hour after midnight; but, though wet and cold myself, I could not help thinking myself luckier than the soldiers, who had not even got their tents on shore, and of course had nothing to lie down upon but the wet earth.' The French and the Turks had a share of the discomforts attendant on this inhospitable night, but both nations have a reputation for aptness in tent-making and bivouacking.

The 15th and three following days were days of labour and activity, applied to the disembarkation of the vast array of guns, ammunition, stores, baggage, and provisions for the army. The commanders established temporary head-quarters at convenient spots on the plateau, while the beach presented an animated and ever-shifting scene. As the plateau was without fresh water and without wood, the troops were subjected to great inconvenience from the want of drink and fuel; and the formation in military order on shore was delayed thereby. Fortunately, no Russians interrupted them; while the Crim Tatars, who timidly approached, soon found that they could obtain ready customers and prompt payment for all kinds of provisions and stores: the commanders, in obedience both to their instructions and to their own inclination, treating the natives with all fairness. The sea, during these four days, was frequently stormy, the surf high, and the beach in a state ill fitted for the landing of cavalry and artillery. Several of the horses were drowned, and several of the boats staved, in this service. The great steamers *Himalaya, Simla, Jason,* &c., laden with cavalry, approached the beach as nearly as safety would permit; and a whole fleet of cutters, launches, paddle-box boats, and horse-rafts, was speedily in requisition; the sailors and marines assisted with due energy and heartiness; and the horses themselves, sufficiently tired of their voyage, although in splendid steamers, turned out with more docility than had been anticipated. The landing was thus managed: The horse-rafts and paddle-box boats being towed up to the ships' sides, the horses were lowered, twelve or fourteen to a raft, and six or eight to a boat; a few troopers went with the horses, to steady and control them, while the rest went in row-boats; a steam-tug pulled several such laden rafts and boats to the beach; the sailors then jumped into the water, laid down sloping platforms to the dry land, and by mingled persuasion and force got the animals on shore. Several tents were landed, to guard against an inclement visitation similar to that on the night of the 14th. The only fresh water was at least a mile from the nearest part of the camp, consequently the road thither was thronged with men engaged in the necessary duty of fetching water—a service so exhausting, that it could not have been long continued without a deterioration of the force. The subordinate officers were left to supply themselves with such conveniences and comforts as might be at their command; and thus it arose that mules, asses, ponies, saddle-bags, pack-saddles, supplies of under-clothing and extra boots, coffee-mills, and little delicacies in the provisioning department, were very unequally distributed among them—some men exhibiting more tact and more means than others in making such purchases.

Amid these varied scenes, in which the incidents of camp-life were singularly mixed up with those pertaining rather to maritime affairs, did the armies of the Allies effect a landing on the czar's territory between the 14th and the 18th of September; thence to advance according as plans might determine, and to be aided in subsequent manœuvres by the powerful fleets which hovered on the coast.

THE ADVANCE TO THE ALMA—THE BATTLE.

A thorough knowledge of the topography of the south-western part of the Crimea was an essential condition in the formation of any strategical plans likely to be attended with success. The great object being the capture of Sebastopol, the question arose how best to approach that stronghold from the point at which the landing had been effected? The rivers and the roads were obviously the data whence any conclusions on this matter could be drawn. Four rivers flow into Kalamita Bay, between Old Fort on the north, and Sebastopol on the south, all of which must be crossed in succession if the armies advanced southward, near the coast; these are the Bulganak, the Alma, the Katcha, and the Belbek; to which may perhaps be added the Tchernaïa or Tchernaya, which in effect separates Sebastopol into two parts. Next, in regard to the roads, it was a matter worth knowing, that the three principal towns in the western half of the Crimea—Eupatoria, Sebastopol, and Simferopol—form the three angles of a triangle, nearly equilateral, and measuring about forty miles in a straight line along each side; and that the principal road from Eupatoria to Sebastopol traces two sides of this triangle, *viâ* Simferopol; the shorter route along the coast being more interrupted, and less fitted both for commerce and for military operations.* The generals were divided in opinion concerning the best point of disembarkation in the first instance, and the best route of march in the second; but they ultimately determined, the landing being effected at Old Fort, that the line of march should be along the coast; seeing that the sea would protect their right flank, and would afford a ready means of conveying all the heavy

* The following list of approximate distances by road may be useful, for occasional reference:—Simferopol to Eupatoria, 46 miles; to Sebastopol, 39; to Perekop, 90; to Karasubazar, 30; to Eski-Crim, 60; to Kaffa, 75; to the mouth of the Bulganak, 25; Eupatoria to Sebastopol, by the coast-road, 50 miles.

portion of the baggage and stores; while, in the event of the enemy offering battle in the course of the march, the whole Allied army could be rapidly concentrated at one spot. Urgent indeed was the necessity for putting in execution some definite plan; for the autumnal equinox was just at hand—a most unfavourable period for commencing an arduous campaign against a powerful enemy, in a country of which the invaders knew little. It was now that the effects of the reprehensible delays during the summer became apparent. Although the British army began to leave England in February, it did not march upon the enemy's ground until the third week in September: although the necessity for a siege-train was apparent, the French army did not receive its great ordnance at the Dardanelles until the close of August, whence a further voyage of many hundred miles was required; and, moreover, the men in both armies had been weakened in numbers and lessened in health by the unfortunate detention in and near Varna. The *Britannia* had 100 men struck down by cholera on a single afternoon, while the preparations for the embarkation were in progress: a calamity which may well explain any tardiness in the completion of the vast arrangements. However, the difficulties were to be surmounted; and the commanders, like good generals, sought to make the best use of the season yet left to them.

On the night of the 18th, Lord Raglan issued orders that the British army* should strike tents at daybreak on the 19th, and prepare to march.

* The hand of death wrought such havoc with this small but heroic army in the short space of seven weeks, that it becomes desirable to name the elements of which it was composed at or near the time when the march to the Alma commenced. There were five divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, thus constituted and thus commanded:

FIRST DIVISION.

Duke of Cambridge.

Major-general Bentinck.		*Sir Colin Campbell.*	
Grenadier Coldstream Scots Fusileer	Guards.	42d 79th 93d	Highlanders.

SECOND DIVISION.

Sir de Lacy Evans.

Brigadier-general Pennefather.	*Brigadier-general Adams.*
30th Regiment,	41st Regiment,
55th " ,	47th " ,
95th " .	49th " .

THIRD DIVISION.

Sir Richard England.

Brigadier-general Eyre.	*Brigadier-general Campbell.*
1st Regiment,	44th Regiment,
28th " ,	50th " ,
38th " .	68th " .

FOURTH DIVISION.

Sir George Cathcart.

Brigadier-general Goldie.	*Brigadier-general Torrens.*
20th Regiment,	63d Regiment,
21st " ,	46th " ,
Rifles, 1st battalion.	57th " .

LIGHT DIVISION.

Sir George Brown.

Major-general Codrington.	*Brigadier-general Buller.*
Rifles, 2d battalion,	19th,
7th (Fusileers),	77th,
33d,	88th (Connaught Rangers).
23d.	

The French marshal issued like orders to the troops under his command. A striking difference in the arrangements of the two camps was observable in this particular: that the French carried their tents with them, whereas the British re-embarked theirs on board ship. The French conveyed their tents in pieces, each man bearing a share of that which would cover him at night; whether it was that the British tents were too heavy, or so constructed that they could not readily be separated into portions, the result was unquestionable—that the British troops had thereafter to pass many a comfortless night without shelter, while their companions in arms were under canvas. It may have been that, as the Cossacks and Russian cavalry were known by this time to be employed in laying waste the country, sweeping off the supplies, and burning all the houses that lay between Old Fort and the Alma, the march was ordered too hastily to permit the tents to be taken. Be this as it may, however, the tents were ordered to be conveyed down to the beach; the boats came from the ships to re-embark them, and one brigade of the 4th division remained on the spot until this duty was performed.

The march began in early morn. Officers and men scrambled up after their hasty night's rest, and made such arrangements for equipping and breakfasting as circumstances permitted. The scarcity of water was a sad evil; it limited the power of obtaining an early repast, and it prevented the men from filling their kegs preparatory to a march over ground where water was nearly unattainable. Some of the officers breakfasted on cold roast pork and 'a pull at the water-barrel,' while large numbers of the men started without a morning-meal of any kind. The wagon-trains and the commissariat-carts having joined the divisions, the start was made. Three cavalry regiments formed the van; next came the artillery, flanked on both sides by infantry; next, more cavalry and the commissariat-train; then the rest of the infantry; and, lastly, the rear-guard. For fifteen miles they traversed a monotonous country, without seeing a drop of fresh water or a single tree; while, as a troublesome compensation for the boisterous wet nights they had endured, the

CAVALRY DIVISION.

Earl of Lucan.

LIGHT DRAGOONS. *Earl of Cardigan.*	HEAVY DRAGOONS. *Brigadier-general Scarlett.*
4th,	2d (Scots Greys),
8th Hussars,	4th Dragoon Guards,
11th " ,	5th " " ,
13th,	6th (Enniskillens).
17th Lancers.	

Sir John Burgoyne and Brigadier-general Tylden had the chief control of the ordnance and engineering operations; while other officers were attached to the staff of Lord Raglan. Some of the regiments above named were not quite complete at the time of the march to the Alma. The artillery mounted about 60 field-guns. Although in the original plan the French were to have numbered double the English, and did so at a later period, the actual numbers at and before the battle of the Alma preponderated on the side of the British—about 27,000 against 24,000. There were two reasons for this inferiority on the part of the French—they suffered many more deaths by cholera than the British, and they had insufficient means of transport.

sun's heat struck down upon them with great force, causing many a poor fellow to drop whose frame had previously been weakened by illness, and many others whose only malady was intolerable thirst. Frequent were the inquiries whether the boats might not have managed to bring them fresh water from the ships. The lamentable confusion which prevailed at that time in the commissariat and medical departments of the British army shewed itself, among other ways, in this—that there were few or no ambulance-wagons to convey the sick. Lieutenant Peard, who bore his fair share of officer's duties during the march, said: 'It was certainly much to be lamented that we had no ambulance-wagons for these poor sick fellows who fell out on the march; for had they been carried a mile or two, or had a drink of water, I have no doubt half of them would have rejoined their companies. Ambulance-carts ought surely to have attended each brigade, and each should have carried some medicines, particularly where the cholera was likely to affect the army. The medical officers in general carried a small bottle of brandy and cask of water, which they gave the men, and were thus enabled to do much good. Some of our poor fellows actually came to me, and on their knees besought me for a drink out of my flask.' The tragic results that followed the want of vehicles and of animals to draw them, in the operations of the British army, will fill many sad paragraphs in the following Chapter. During the march, the route was mostly over a dreary plain, with irregular hilly ridges running at intervals down to the sea. The men occasionally halted, took off their packs, and lay down for a little rest; and as division after division reached the Bulganak, the parched soldiers eagerly ran to obtain a draught of water, where it was clean and fresh enough for drinking.

It was on this day that the troubles of the British commissariat began to assume such proportions as to afford anxiety to the commanders, and surprise and indignation at home. Already, on the shores of Bulgaria, the commissaries had been harassed, and the officers and troops disconcerted, by the imperfect organisation of that important branch of the military system;* and now, when an enemy's ground was under foot, the effects began to be still more severely felt. Not only were the commissaries called upon to provide food and beverage for 27,000 men in this foreign land, but also means of transport—a much more difficult duty, as events afterwards shewed. The French, from first to last, managed this department more successfully. Sorely must the British troops and the commissaries have been vexed: carts of a peculiar construction, provided at Woolwich, to contain a reserve of small-arm ammunition, had been left behind at Varna, because they were too heavy; and an ambulance-train corps, with accommodation for the sick and wounded, had been left at Varna, because there were not animals to draw it. There was this matter, too, to take into consideration—that if any water, or forage, or fuel, were procurable on the march, the claimants for it would be 60,000 or 70,000 in number: since the French and the Turks took part in the expedition. About 24,000 French, under Marshal St Arnaud, Prince Napoleon, and Generals Canrobert, Bosquet, and Forey, were early on the march from Old Fort to the Bulganak; while 7000 Turks, under Suleiman Pacha, took a parallel route at a short distance. Good soldiers were not likely, at such a time, to make the worst of any defects in commissariat matters: they accepted what was offered, and looked forward to a speedy encounter with the foe.

It was a grand sight. Stretching far and wide, presenting a martial front from east to west, and advancing in columns separated by small intervals, this army of more than 60,000 chosen men formed a gallant body. Here, the red coats of the line regiments, the bear-skin caps of the Guards, the picturesque dress of the Highlanders, relieved by the sober darkness of the riflemen; there, the simple caps or shakos of the French, the bulky red trousers of the Zouaves, the flowing costume of the other African regiments, and the nimble tirailleurs; further on, the Turks, Europeanised except in relation to the red fez; and each—British, French, and Turk—anxious to stand well in the eyes of the others. The artillery, too, threw its bright specks into the picture. Each British division of infantry was attended by a division of artillery, consisting of eight 9-pounder guns, and two 24-pounder howitzers; and with the cavalry division was a troop of 6-pounder horse-artillery. As the artillery maintained a position at the right of its respective division, it threw a diversity into the scene. Turks close to the beach; French next; then English; then cavalry; and Rifles and light skirmishers furthest inland—presented a magnificent front; while behind these, came the trains of horses carrying the reserve ammunition, the baggage-animals, the arabas with sick men and commissariat stores, the droves of oxen and sheep—which the commissaries had with immense difficulty collected—and the rear-guard to bring up the whole. The moving mass covered several square miles, and carried with it the hopes of three nations. Nor was even this the limit of the picture: a splendid fleet steamed and sailed southward as the army marched and rode southward—each, fleet and army, watching and admiring the other.

An encounter was not far distant. On the afternoon of this day (the 19th), before the expedition had reached the Bulganak, curling wreaths of smoke on the south and east could be seen, marking the spots where villages and farmsteads had been fired by the Cossacks, and where the poor Tatars were rendered homeless by this characteristic specimen of Russian tactics.

* See pp. 101-104.

Next could be seen, hovering upon and around the distant hills, dark bodies of cavalry, disposed as if to check the advance of the Allies by harassing attacks on their left flank. The Allies were well disposed to meet these assailants in the open field. The infantry and artillery being detained by the crossing of the Bulganak, a portion of the cavalry dashed on, to make a closer survey of the Cossack lances which glittered in the distance. These cavalry, about 500 in number (belonging to the 8th and the 11th Hussars and the 13th Light Dragoons), commanded by the Earl of Cardigan, galloped onward to meet the Cossacks. The Cossacks in sight were at least thrice the number of the English, and, as they commanded the brow of a hill, the question presented itself whether the little band should make a bold uphill attack upon them: the earl was willing to attempt this; but Lord Raglan deemed the odds, both in numbers and in position, too unfavourable. The order was given to call in the skirmishers, and to retire slowly. Here, however, a new scene opened. The Cossack squadrons separated so far as to give play to some pieces of artillery, which poured forth a succession of shot upon the small body of slowly retreating British cavalry: the concealment of these guns having probably been part of a plan for enticing the British up the hill. By this time a troop of horse-artillery had arrived, under Captain Maude; a smart exchange ensued, in which the English had the advantage, indicated by the Russians retiring from the scene of contest. Had the 500 British cavalry ascended the hill in the first instance, it is doubtful whether half of them would have returned alive. It was the first actual contest in the Crimean war; a few limbs were shattered; but the hussars and dragoons were proud to shew that they could bear pain without wincing. The work was not left wholly to the British; for a body of French wound round the hill, and scattered a squadron of Russian cavalry by a few 9-pounders. Prince Menchikoff's dispatch relating to this affair comprised the following particulars:—That when, on the 13th of September, the Allies appeared off Eupatoria, he at once resolved to take up a defensive position on the Alma; that during their sojourn at Old Fort (a sojourn the length of which equally surprised and pleased him), he was enabled to fortify his position; that when they crossed the Bulganak on the 19th, he sent the 6th division of Russian light cavalry, nine *sotnias* of Cossacks, and a battery of horse-artillery, to check them; and that, after a slight skirmish, the one party retired to the Bulganak, and the other to the Alma. The prince did not impart quite the same colour to these respective 'retirings' as was given by the English officers; but as the skirmish was only a trifle, neither side sought to make much of it. When the Allies—the Russians having retired to the Alma—had all crossed the Bulganak, preparations were made to bivouac for the night. The commissaries opened their stores, and served out rations; while the men gathered nettles, and weeds, and grass, to aid with broken casks in making up their camp-fires for cooking and for warmth. The night was cold, damp, and comfortless, sufficient to take the heart out of a man who had not other thoughts to cheer him. Mr Russell states, that he could tell of 'the sorrows of a tentless, baggageless man, wandering about in the dark from regiment to regiment, in hope of finding his missing baggage,' if he had wished to dwell upon such trifles; and Lieutenant Peard, who was ordered on outlying picket for the night, says: 'I shall not easily forget my vain endeavours to find the bridge over the river in the dark, and walking up to my knees in the water; this little casualty did not, as may be imagined, tend to make me more comfortable for the night: sleep was out of the question, for the sentries had to be visited every hour; and when the morning dawned, it found us wet through with the dew, which was heavier than I had ever before experienced.' These are common incidents in a soldier's life; many poor fellows, however, who had been weakened by cholera, sank under their trials during the night: it was not their lot to share in the approaching victory.

Morning broke on the 20th of September—the day of the BATTLE OF THE ALMA—amid a busy camp, a buckling-on of accoutrements, a harnessing of horses, and a hasty breakfasting on the part of those who had time and materials for obtaining that welcome repast. Many expected, though none could know, that the dawn would usher in a day on which the first great battle would be fought by the English and French armies during this war—the only contests worthy of note before that day having fallen to the lot of the Turks, on the banks of the Danube and in Asia. Lord Raglan had made his head-quarters at a little post-house on the banks of the Bulganak, which the Cossacks had not succeeded in quite destroying by fire; whether the other officers had aught to cover them is doubtful: the supper, the sleep, the breakfast, were all *al fresco*, leaving few domestic chattels to be disposed of when the morning's march commenced. The distance from the Bulganak to the Alma is between four and five miles; and as it was by this time known that the Russians had strongly posted themselves on the banks of the last-named river, the Allies prepared by proper equipment for an encounter as soon as the Alma should be reached. The French had bivouacked during the night nearest to the sea; next to them the Turks; and the English further inland—the three camps forming a line nearly three miles in extent, at right-angles with the sea-shore. In this same order did they commence their march southward to the Alma: the line being now much more than three miles in length, owing to the skirmishing outposts of rifles and light cavalry, scattered far and wide inland to keep a keen watch on the enemy.

To understand the military operations of this momentous day, it becomes necessary to notice—first, the topographical features of the river's banks; then the arrangements made by the Russians in defence of those banks; and next, the plans of the Allies in relation to the forcing of a passage.

The river Alma, formed by the junction of several streams which have their origin in the Tchatir-dagh, flows north-west to the road leading from Sebastopol to Simferopol, being crossed by that road at a point between Baktchéserai and the last-named town. From this point a course nearly westward takes it to the sea: its banks being dotted with several villages, of which those nearest to the scene of action are Kanitchkoï, Tarkhantar, Bourliouk, Almatamak, and Akles. The river, cutting through a soft red clay soil, is in most places shallow enough to be forded; but there are occasional depths which render fording dangerous. The highest bank is sometimes on the right, sometimes on the left of the river; but for a considerable distance near the mouth it is on the left or south side; and thus the Allies, coming from the north, found themselves on the banks

Prince Menchikoff.

of a stream commanded by higher ground on the other side. Small rivulets force their way into the Alma on the south bank, forming miniature ravines, or lateral valleys, which separate the southern bank into hillocks, knolls, or detached heights. The road from Old Fort joins the road from Simferopol at a point near the village of Bourliouk, and is carried over the Alma by a timber bridge. The knolls near the river's bank become united further inland into a plateau, which is commanded by a hilly ridge 600 or 700 feet in height, extending quite to the sea, where it presents an abrupt cliff: this ridge, like the lower plateau, being cut up by lateral gullies into isolated hills.

Such being the topographical features of the river and its banks, there was an obvious advantage on the part of the Russians over the Allies, both in the possession of higher ground, and in the defences they had had a whole week to form since the Allies made a landing at Eupatoria. Prince Menchikoff, who commanded in the Crimea at that time, did not fail to make use of these precious days. He took possession of all the heights which commanded the gullies, the river, and the northern bank: planting formidable batteries at every salient position; some were earthworks, hastily thrown up, but armed with 24 and 32-pounders; while others were field-batteries, further aided by howitzers. The chief of these batteries was an earthen redoubt, whose face formed two sides of a triangle, with the apex pointing towards the little bridge over the Alma, and the sides directed to two reaches or bends of the river, one above and the other below the bridge: this single work, therefore, commanding

an extensive portion of the river's course. Not only was this redoubt rendered formidable by its position near the brow of a hill, but the ascent to it was enfiladed or commanded by three or four batteries placed on neighbouring heights, the guns of which swept the slope of the hill leading up to the redoubt, or could readily be made to bear upon the bridge and the village. The various batteries and the redoubts were heavily armed with ordnance, mostly brass guns of fine workmanship. Further to defend the ridge, and to prevent an ascent up the slopes which led to it, masses of skirmishers, armed with rifles, were placed; insomuch that it would, in every sense, be an uphill struggle on the part of an enemy attempting to gain the ridge. The redoubt, being placed near the spot where the high road from Eupatoria to Sebastopol cuts across the ridge, was virtually the key to the whole position: whoever retained that redoubt, when the battle was over, would be the victor of the day. A large force of Russian lancers and heavy dragoons, and a formidable body of infantry, were ready to defend these batteries at all points, and to descend upon the Allies if any favourable opportunity should offer. The right wing was on the east of the main road; the centre on the west of the same road; while the left wing extended from the centre some distance towards the sea, from which the important point occupied by the redoubt was two and a half miles distant. An additional defence lay in this: that although the river is shallow, and generally fordable, the banks are extremely rugged, and in most parts steep; the willows along the margin were cut down by the Russians, to prevent them from affording cover to the attacking party. Lord Raglan, in his dispatch relating to the battle, shews how much he was impressed with the strength of the Russian position, the defences of which he estimated at not less than 45,000 or 50,000 men, besides the formidable artillery. Marshal St Arnaud reported to his government that the Russian forces included the 16th and 17th divisions of infantry, a brigade of the 13th division, a brigade of riflemen, a force of about 5000 cavalry, and four brigades of artillery.

The plans which the Allies formed for forcing a passage through these tremendous obstacles were as follow:—On the morning of the 20th, before the battle, the extreme right of the Allies was in the rear of the village of Loukoul, a short distance from the mouth of the Alma: it consisted of General Bosquet's or the 2d French division, with the Turks in the rear; both being within a short distance of the sea, where the combined fleets could be seen in majestic array. The centre consisted of the 1st French division, under General Canrobert, and the 3d under Prince Napoleon, with the 4th division and the artillery in reserve. Further inland still, forming the left wing of the Allied army, were the 2d and light British divisions, under Sir de Lacy Evans and Sir George Brown; behind these were the 3d and 1st divisions, under Sir Richard England and the Duke of Cambridge; and to bring up the rear, the 4th division under Sir George Cathcart, and the cavalry division under the Earl of Lucan. About 65,000 men were thus placed in splendid order, with a frontage of nearly four miles, and a depth of half a mile. The system of operations determined on by the Allied commanders consisted principally in this—that the French right should assail the Russian left by crossing the Alma at and near its junction with the sea, and climbing the steep rugged cliffs to the heights above; that the French left and the English right should cross the river at or near the bridge, and ascend the heights immediately opposite; while the English left should operate on the landward flank of the enemy. In view of the formidable position of the great redoubt, the English would appear to have had the hardest work cut out for them; but this could only be judged by the result. Boats had, on the previous day, ascertained that the Alma was fordable near its mouth, and that one of the French divisions could easily cross it. Admiral Hamelin, it was arranged, should place eight French steamers off the cliff which forms the sea-side end of the ridge, to pour in a storm of shells upon any battery or battalion of the enemy which might attempt to interrupt the crossing of the troops.

It fell to the lot of General Bosquet to commence the battle, aided in a remarkable manner by the French steamers. The heights descend to the sea so abruptly and steeply, that Menchikoff appears to have relied mainly on natural defences at this part, placing most of his men and guns further inland, near the high road. The Allied commanders had not failed to notice this circumstance; and Bosquet's attack was part of a plan for taking advantage of it: it was hoped that he might be able to ascend the rugged cliff-like steep, to gain the plateau, to outflank the left of the enemy, and thus distract them from the main attack in front. Rapidly but steadily did the French and Turks advance, crossing the Alma very near its mouth, and sending ahead a party of skirmishers and light troops to clear the gardens and brushwood of any opponents; but none such appeared; for either the Russians did not regard the movement as one of importance, or they had no available batteries or battalions to bring to bear on that point. With inconceivable activity the French climbed the cliff: the Zouaves being especially agile at this work—running, leaping, crawling on hands and knees, surmounting all obstacles of bush and gully. They gained the plateau; and then, and then only, did the Russians open upon them. A smart interchange of firing took place, and Bosquet advanced by degrees towards the central position, although no fewer than five batteries were pouring forth their missiles.

During the single hour, from half-past eleven to half-past twelve, in which Bosquet was thus

employed in obtaining possession of the heights between the enemy and the sea, Canrobert, with the 1st and part of the 4th divisions, was making arrangements to afford him aid at a time when he was becoming severely pressed by the Russian batteries. The river was boldly crossed by a ford at the village of Almatamak; and Canrobert and Prince Napoleon found a small path which led up to the heights; artillery was dragged up the opposite slopes in face of the Russian batteries and sharp-shooters; and Bosquet, this diversion being made, was enabled to maintain his advantageous position. In order still further to assist Bosquet, Marshal St Arnaud sent to him the remaining moiety of General Forey's division, the 4th; and thus there were two streams of French troops crossing at different points, to aid Bosquet in maintaining his advantageous position.

Now commenced a most exciting struggle. As Bosquet advanced by one oblique route, and Canrobert by another, they met on the heights near an unfinished octagonal tower, which was probably intended for a telegraph; and around this spot the Russians had assembled a formidable power of infantry and field-batteries. Again and again did the French attack; and each time did the Russians repel the onslaught. The Zouaves, more Arab than French in appearance, fought with all the ardour which Algerine campaigning had engendered; bullets were forgotten as soon as the men came within bayonet-distance; hand-to-hand contests were maintained on all sides; and it became at length difficult for the batteries on either side to fire without hitting their own men. When at length the French obtained command of the position, and the Russians retired, the vicinity of the tower was found to be covered with an unbroken mass of wounded and dying men, the opponents intermingled one among another. The French fleet afforded valuable aid during these operations; the steamers ran in as close as they could to the bluff cliff, and shelled the heights in amazing style—pouring forth these terrible missiles, which passed over the crest of the bluff, and fell among the Russian batteries and battalions, at a distance of 3000 yards from the ships.

Hot work this had been for the French. In the centre of the line, too, the exertions were immense, and the success great. The general movement of Marshal St Arnaud, with the chief of his forces, commenced at the moment when Bosquet with his division appeared on the heights. Infantry and artillery pressed on towards the river, pouring out volleys against the Russian sharp-shooters, and forcing them to retreat up the opposite slope. The French dashed into the river, each man crossing where he could or where he liked, re-formed on the other side, and pressed onward and upward with irresistible force: the infantry and guns in the lower position gradually gaining an ascendancy over those in the upper. The marshal and the officers were on the alert during this period, galloping about from point to point, to render aid where aid seemed to be most required; and the troops behaved with the ardour and courage which the French are wont to exhibit. The same men who would have cried '*Vive la République!*' at one time, now cried '*Vive l'Empereur!*' for the glory of France was in either case the sentiment which animated them: the cry was a battle-cry, an outpouring of enthusiasm.

Few but terrible were the hours during which the British were engaged in fighting on this day of blood, and trying was the ordeal to be passed through by the men, very few of whom had actually seen war; but Lord Raglan trusted in them, and his trust was not in vain. When the movement began, the light division, strengthened by horse-artillery and the 2d division, fronted the enemy, and were likely to be the first to fire and to receive fire; the 1st and 3d divisions were in their rear; while the 4th division and the cavalry were still further from the river, to act as a reserve, and to protect the left flank and rear against large bodies of the enemy's cavalry which had been seen in those directions. The advance having commenced, and the banks of the river nearly attained, the Allies were thrown into some confusion by the well-timed burning, by the Russians, of the village of Bourliouk, directly opposite the centre of the Russian position: it was well-timed, because such a manœuvre, among the sad but inevitable concomitants of warlike tactics, created a continuous blaze and smoke for 300 yards, obscured the Russian position, and obstructed the plans of the British for crossing the river. The advance was to be made when the French right had gained a certain position on the heights; and, awaiting this moment, Lord Raglan ordered his troops to lie down, to escape in some measure the murderous hail; there they lay, balls and shells falling into, and upon, and among them; until at length the general, brooking no longer delay, ordered a rise and an advance. Sir de Lacy Evans's division thereupon separated into two brigades, one of which forded the river above the burning village, and the other below: the fording-places being deep and dangerous, and a destructive fire being maintained against them by the infantry and artillery on the opposite bank. And now did the execution become indeed tremendous; for the Russians had placed twigs and sticks to mark the exact angles at which their ordnance would command the banks of the river at various points. Missiles whizzed over the heads of the British troops, ploughed in among their columns, rebounded, dashed up the soil in clouds, and carried death into every regiment. The disadvantages were rendered still more obvious by this circumstance: that, owing to the steepness and ruggedness of the banks, the artillerymen found it almost impossible to transport their guns to the opposite side of the stream; insomuch that the

battle was far advanced ere two guns were successfully brought over by Captain Dickson.

It was the light division, under Sir George Brown, that crossed the river under the most trying circumstances; for this division was directly in front of the hill on which the formidable redoubt was placed. The banks of the river at that spot, rugged and broken, offered serious obstacles; and the vineyards through which the troops had to pass, as well as trees which the enemy had felled, created additional impediments, which prevented the men from forming in compact order. The noble fellows bore a fierce torrent of shot, shell, and musketry, while wading through the Alma; and then scrambled up the slopes, through thickets and vineyards, scattered and dispersed, and exposed to a terrible fire in front and on both flanks. They were mowed down with fearful rapidity; but, on the other hand, the English artillery wrought yet more fatal execution on the dense masses of Russian infantry, posted on various parts of the slope of the hills. Lord Raglan and his staff plunged into the river, and crossed near the bridge; three of his staff-officers were struck down by the side of their commander, and the contest became most deadly. The veteran Sir George Brown saw his division cut down by fifties at a time; but he never wavered; he headed his men; he was unhorsed, but rose again, shouting 'Twenty-third, I'm all right!'

Now came the time when the 1st division, under the Duke of Cambridge, was to do its work: it consisted of splendid troops—Guards and Highlanders. Grandly it advanced, crossing the river, and ascending the slopes in defence of the light division, advancing in line as if on parade, and regarding with superb disdain the batteries and dense columns high above them—arriving gradually nearer and nearer to the redoubt, but having its ranks thinned at every instant by the incessant fire from the various batteries. An immense and compact body of Russian infantry was now seen approaching, to aid still more in the defence of the main redoubt. The crisis approached. Unless the redoubt could be taken, the passage of the ridge could not be forced, nor the victory gained; while, unless the Russian phalanx could be broken, the British could hardly hope to reach the redoubt. A few large guns were therefore brought to bear upon the dense mass; and these, by a well-directed fire, broke it, and forced the infantry to retreat in various directions. Then came the moment for the grand charge of the Guards and the Highlanders; the former approaching the redoubt on the right, and the latter on the left. Cheered on by their commanders, they dashed up. Sir Colin Campbell, leading his Highlanders, and reminding them in a few terse exclamations of the old glories of the regiments, rushed up, ordering the men not to fire a shot until they came near the redoubt, when the musket and the bayonet were to work in rapid succession. The Duke of Cambridge cheered on the Guards, who, however, needed little prompting to do their duty at such a moment. Up they went, Guards and Highlanders, through thickets, across gullies, over *abattis* of sharp-pointed branches, and amid the firing of batteries and battalions on all sides. They met the Russians muzzle to muzzle: they entered the redoubt; and the 1st, 2d, and light divisions speedily commanded the hill and its defences, and virtually achieved the victory; but not before the vicinity of the redoubt had become strewn with slain. The French by that time had attained a position which enabled them to pour in a destructive fire upon the retreating masses; if they could have advanced somewhat further on the plateau, they would have seriously impeded the retirement of the Russians; but the battle had been fought chiefly by infantry on the part of the Allies, and there was no cavalry in a position to pursue the enemy. Hence Menchikoff was able to retire in tolerable order, and to carry off his guns: this, however, he could not effect until he had brought up his reserve cavalry and artillery to cover the retreat.

So many concurrent movements were made during the battle, that it becomes difficult to recognise their relative bearings one upon another; but, expressed in brief, they may be understood as follows:—General Bosquet's division succeeded in turning the enemy's left flank, by the clever ascent of the bluff near the sea; General Canrobert's division, with some field-pieces, crossed the river about a mile higher up, ascended the opposite bank, relieved Bosquet, and enabled him to maintain his commanding position; Prince Napoleon's and Sir de Lacy Evans's divisions crossed the river at various points near the centre of the scene of operations, and surmounted the numerous obstacles presented on the opposite banks; while Sir George Brown's and the Duke of Cambridge's divisions crossed above the bridge and burning village, and maintained the fearful struggle on the ascent to the heights. The artillery was brought effectively to bear on such points as it could command, and contributed materially to the success of the day's achievements. The cavalry was not called upon for active service; but its position was important, keeping in check the lancers and the dragoons whom Menchikoff despatched to the left flank of the Allies. Sir George Cathcart's and Sir Richard England's divisions were not largely engaged; though called partially to the front, they constituted rather a reserve force available in any contingency which might present itself. The Turks are scarcely mentioned in connection with the operations; they were with Bosquet—martial in appearance, proud of taking rank beside their Allies, and eager to be employed; yet they were nearly neglected. General Bosquet, it is true, spoke in his dispatch of the 'prodigies of rapidity' which the Turks executed in their march toward the Alma; but little mention is made of any duties subsequently assigned to them. It can scarcely be said that the English and French rendered justice to the Turkish

soldiery during the war; appellations, partly in pleasantry and partly contemptuous, were thrown at them; they were condemned and abused if any of their manœuvres terminated unfortunately, while few opportunities were afforded them to display soldierly qualities. This course of proceeding was neither wise nor generous; for, when well commanded, the Turks shewed many heroic qualities on the Danube and in Asia. Omar Pacha understood them well; and where he commanded, they fully maintained their ancient military reputation.

Numberless were the tales which all, officers and privates, had to tell of this eventful day. Lord Raglan, in a dispatch which scarcely described with sufficient clearness the operations of the battle, pointed out the disadvantages* with which his officers and men had to contend. In naming the officers—always an invidious duty—who had distinguished themselves, he somewhat dissatisfied those whose names did not appear; but this is one of the natural consequences of the system—a system of questionable utility, because, as the subordinate officers are rarely mentioned by name, even-handed

Battle of the Alma.

justice cannot be rendered, however kind and conscientious the general may be. The etiquette of the English army renders still less possible the naming of any sergeants, corporals, or privates, who may have performed heroic deeds. It was not until the numerous 'soldiers' letters' appeared in the public journals, that the minute and wonderful details of the battle of the Alma became known. An opinion has at times been expressed, that such letters constitute the best description of a battle, coming as they do from men who were plunged in the thickest of that which they describe; but it should be considered that soldiers do not know the plans of their commanders, neither can they see what is transpiring in distant parts of the field; the letters are valuable as elucidations of minor matters, which each man may feel acutely, but which become buried among the more important incidents of the day. Many of them, thus regarded, are valuable. They are full of eloquence: the thoughts of home, and the heroic determination of the soldier, are mingled together in a narrative which derives force from its simplicity and truthfulness. The passages here given,† written by a

* 'My anxiety to bring into the country every cavalry and infantry soldier who was available, prevented me from embarking their baggage-animals, and these officers have with them at this moment nothing but what they can carry, and they, equally with the men, are without tents or covering of any kind. I have not heard a single murmur. All seem impressed with the necessity of the arrangement; and they feel, I trust, satisfied that I shall bring up their bât-horses at the earliest moment. The conduct of the troops has been admirable. When it is considered that they have suffered severely from sickness during the last two months; that, since they landed in the Crimea, they have been exposed to the extremes of wet, cold, and heat; that the daily toil to provide themselves with water has been excessive; and that they have been pursued by cholera to the very battle-field, I do not go beyond the truth in declaring that they merit the highest commendation. In the ardour of attack they forgot all they had endured, and displayed that high courage, that gallant spirit, for which the British soldier is ever distinguished, and under the heaviest fire they maintained the same determination to conquer as they had exhibited before they went into action.'

† 'I ought to be very thankful to God for sparing me to write to you this night, when so many of my brothers in arms are lying dead around me. . . . . I have to inform you that we met our enemy yesterday, and they shewed us a full front, with, I believe, a much more powerful force than we were. The first shot was fired at half-past one o'clock, I believe, from our fleets; then one from the Russians. There was a very large village between us and them, which they set fire to as soon as the fight began, which

sergeant in one of the regiments, will serve as an example of the letters here adverted to.

A melancholy time was that when the muster-roll was called over, to ascertain who had been killed, who wounded, at the battle of the Alma. All knew that it would be a fearful list; and a feverish anxiety prevailed in every part of the United Kingdom, from the date of the first telegraphic dispatch, to know which beloved father, husband, brother, son, had fallen. It was soon evident, from the peculiar tactics of the battle, that the officers had been very much exposed, and that many families in the higher grades of society would have to join with those of humbler rank in mourning over the events of the day. They had, indeed, fallen thickly. Captain Monck of the 7th, after felling a Russian near him, was shot dead by another; Lord Chewton was severely wounded; Captain Drew fell while serving one of the batteries; and in all the regiments which had been most warmly engaged, the ratio of officers killed or wounded was seriously large. The *London Gazette* of the 8th of October contained the names of all the officers killed and wounded; while that of the

Plan of the Battle of the Alma.

17th was crowded with columns of names, those of the non-commissioned officers and privates; and never, perhaps, were gazettes more keenly perused by those who, hoping almost against hope, ran the eye down the column with a wish that a cherished name might *not* be there. The first return contained the names of 26 officers killed, and 76 wounded; the second comprised 327 non-commissioned officers and men killed, and 1557 wounded or missing—a total of 353 of all ranks killed, and 1633 wounded. To this list, however, must be added those, many in number, who died subsequently of wounds received on this day. The inequality of loss among the different divisions was very striking, shewing in what different degrees they had been exposed to danger during those three fatal hours; the light division, with which Sir George Brown crossed the river,

caused us great disadvantage, as we could not see them for the smoke; but as soon as the smoke cleared off, we soon shewed them what the English could do. I do assure you they were completely mowed down by dozens by our artillery, who did their work to the satisfaction of all. I must tell you that when we came up the Russians held a fine position—one which the English with half their number would have held against the whole world. It was on the side of a very high hill, with the whole face of it covered with intrenchments and strong batteries. They fought well for about three hours; then they began to fall back completely paralysed, as our men began to get close up to them; at one time, some of our regiments were only twelve paces from them, and such daring courage completely astonished them. Then they began to throw away their knapsacks, and run as fast as their legs could carry them, and our army cheering in all directions. . . . . After they ran over the top of the hill, our regiment, with five others that were in reserve, were ordered to follow them; but owing to their throwing away their things, they were able to run well, so they got off; but our cavalry soon overtook them, and used the sword to them, and made heads and arms fly in the air; and our artillery soon gained the hill and threw a few shells in among them. I can assure you it was an awful sight to see the dead lying about; in some places we could not walk without walking over them. I will not attempt to describe the sight, as it is too disgusting, but I never wish to see the like again. It certainly looked very grand from the distance; when it commenced, I was a long way in the rear, but as we advanced and came among the dead, it became awful. I cannot describe my feelings at seeing so many poor souls lying dead, and the cries and groans of the wounded. . . . We are all in the open air, and shall be now for some time. I have a slight cold; but that I must expect, as very heavy dews fall at night, and the sun is very oppressive by day. I forgot to tell you that we have taken a great many big guns from them. They had 100. Just fancy the noise of 100 guns; then ours and the French besides. Believe me, I shall never forget the 20th day of September 1854. I hope the people of England who complained of our delay are satisfied now.'

and ascended the hill under such a murderous fire, had no less than 987 brave fellows struck down, either killed or wounded; the 2d division, 498; and the 1st division, 439; while the 3d, the 4th, and the cavalry division, the engineers, and the artillery, had less than 100 killed and wounded altogether. The 7th, 19th, 23d, 33d, 77th, and 88th regiments, together with the second battalion of the Rifle Brigade, forming collectively the light division, suffered unequally among themselves, according to the particular points at which they were called upon to bear the awful storm of ball and bullet; the 7th, 19th, 23d, and 33d, each lost more than 200 of its number —a fearful gap; the 77th, 88th, and Rifles, suffered less severely.

Painful was the inquiry, how to deal with the wounded. Both from the want of surgeons and surgical appliances, and the dangers of an enemy's country, it became necessary to transport the sick to other shores, after a hasty attention to some of the more urgent cases. Constantinople and Scutari were the places chosen; and trying work was it, to surgeons and commissariat officers, to convey the poor fellows down to the beach. It was a dreadful office to walk among the dead and wounded on the field of battle, to bury the one and pick up the other; for many old Peninsular officers averred that never, excepting, perhaps, at the battle of Talavera, had they seen so many dead and wounded bodies around one spot as had fallen near the redoubt on this day: especially Russians. The Allies made no distinction of race or creed; they buried men of all the four nations, and carried wounded men of all the four nations to Constantinople. The French found their loss to be about 260 killed, and 1100 wounded—equal to about two-thirds of the number lost by the English. Their arrangements were, however, admirable; they had covered hospital-vans, to contain ten or twelve wounded men each, drawn by fine mules. Three French steamers conveyed the French wounded, and some of the Russian wounded, to Constantinople. A soldier in the 38th English regiment, writing two days after the battle, said: 'We were employed yesterday burying the dead, and have been at it all this morning, but we have not buried half of them yet. I saw the colonel, major, and three other officers, lying together yesterday, dead, belonging to the 23d Fusileers.' All the medical officers in the British fleet, excepting one in each ship, were placed by Admiral Dundas at the service of Lord Raglan in this trying emergency; all the boats, together with 600 seamen and marines, were at the same time sent to assist in carrying off the wounded. This was an arduous duty; for the spot where most of the troops had fallen was four miles distant from the beach where the boats waited to receive them; but the marines and seamen worked unremittingly in this distressing service. The Duke of Newcastle, while adverting at a subsequent period to the aid afforded by the fleets to the armies, said: 'After the battle of the Alma, when heaps of our wounded lay on the field for miles, and when the means for conveying them were not sufficient, the navy assisted to bring them to the ships, and treated those soldiers, during their passage in the ships to the hospitals, with that same tenderness which has distinguished them towards their comrades in cases of cholera, attending upon them with an interest and a kindness which reflects immortal honour on the service.' The boats and seamen were employed on the 21st and two following days in this service: the *Vulcan* and the *Andes* sailed on the 22d with 800 wounded soldiers; and the *Orinoco* and *Columbo* on the 23d with 900. The *Avon* transport took charge of several hundred wounded Russians to Odessa. Nothing can better shew the gallant and kindly spirit which dictated this latter proceeding than Admiral Dundas's letter to the governor of Odessa.*

But the lamentations for the dead and wounded could not drown the spirit which rejoiced that the victory at the Alma had been won. When the first dispatch concerning it reached England, great were the excitement and delight. The Minister at War sent copies of the dispatch to the London newspapers for publication; guns were fired, and bonfires lighted; the tenants on the Raglan estate assembled to do honour to the name of the military commander; the news-rooms and places of public resort were crowded; the managers of the theatres became warlike for a few moments; the lord mayor announced the victory, first at the sheriff's inaugural dinner, within a few minutes after the arrival of the dispatch, and then to an assembled multitude outside the Royal Exchange, in conformity with an ancient custom; and, on the following day, being Sunday, clergymen touched on the topic from the pulpit. Soon afterwards, when the names of the officers engaged became familiarly passed from lip to lip, the old Etonians pointed proudly to the names of those who had once sat on the forms of the celebrated school; Harrow and Rugby, Winchester and Westminster, roused by the occasion, sought to shew that they also had claims to partake in the glory of the victors at the Alma; while classical students, catching an idea from the collegiate usage of the word 'Alma,' sent

* '*Britannia, off the Katcha, September 26.*

SIR—I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, in consequence of the advance on Sebastopol of the Allied armies after the battle of the Alma on the 20th inst., a number of wounded Russian officers and soldiers were left in the rear, in the small villages near the places where they had fallen; and by the request of his Excellency General Lord Raglan, I have collected as many as I could (about 340).

In order to shorten the sufferings of these gallant soldiers, which a long sea-voyage must necessarily increase, I have sent them to Odessa, rather than to Constantinople, the distance to the former being so much less.

Commander Rogers of the Royal Navy has charge of them, under a flag of truce, and I trust your Excellency will, in the same feeling of humanity, receive and consider them as non-combatants until regularly exchanged, granting to the officer in charge an acknowledgment of the number and grades of the prisoners delivered over by him to your Excellency.—I have, &c.,

J. W. D. DUNDAS,
Vice-admiral and Commander-in-chief.

His Excellency the Aide-de-Camp General Annenkoff.'

scraps of Latinity to the newspapers.* And then, when it was found that imperfect organisation had left our gallant fellows ill provided with those necessaries and comforts which they so richly deserved, large-hearted kindness was exhibited on a scale rarely paralleled in any other age or country. How this kindness made itself manifest, and how it happened that the miseries to be relieved became so severe, a future Chapter will tell. Although a period of five weeks elapsed before the army received from the Queen a recognition of its distinguished services; yet when it did arrive, the terms employed were grateful to the hearts of men who had so bled and suffered.† And when the Sovereign expressed a hope that 'such of her subjects as have been plunged in grief by the loss of relatives, will find some consolation in the reflection that those who have not survived to share in the triumph of their comrades have fallen in a just cause, and that their names will henceforth be inscribed in the annals of their country's glory'—all felt that the hope was well founded.

An attempt was made some time after the news of the battle of the Alma had reached the Russian capital, to lessen the disgrace of their countrymen and the glory of the Allies, in connection with that encounter. The government organ, the *Journal de St Petersburg*, commenting on the estimates of numbers made by Lord Raglan and Marshal St Arnaud, asserted that those estimates were exaggerated; that the Russian infantry comprised only forty-two and a half battalions, equal to 30,000 men; that the cavalry consisted only of sixteen regular squadrons and eleven sotnias of Cossacks, together about 3000; that the fighting-men were thus only 33,000; that the Allies had nearly 70,000; that the Russian artillery did not exceed eighty-four guns; and that the batteries were less formidable and numerous than had been represented. The Russians acknowledged that Generals Goguinoff and Stchelkmioff had been wounded and taken prisoners. The ratio of losses was disputed. This was a subject on which the Russians felt sore; for Prince Menchikoff had asserted in a dispatch to the emperor, that he could hold the heights of Alma against 100,000 men for three weeks; and it was generally believed among the Russian officers impossible for the Allies to force a line of heights so intrenched, armed, and defended: even ladies from Sebastopol, it was reported, came out to view the battle from the heights, as though the result would be a certain and speedy repulse of the enemy who had dared to invade the czar's dominions; and yet this enemy mastered the entire position in less than four hours. Marshal St Arnaud, in his dispatch relating to the battle, said: 'It is difficult for us to estimate the loss of the Russian army; but it must be considerable, if we may judge by the killed and wounded that they could not take off, and who remained in our hands: in the ravines of the Alma, on the plateau in front, and on the ground forming the position taken from the enemy by the English troops, the earth is strewn with more than 10,000 muskets, haversacks, and other articles of equipment.' In another place, he states that the Russians lost 5000 or 6000 men; while in a third occurs this passage: 'The field of battle is covered with their dead, and our field-hospitals are full of their wounded; we have counted a proportion of seven Russian dead bodies for one French.' The Russian journalist, commenting on certain discrepancies in these evidently hasty estimates, asserts that the English lost 3000, and the French 1800; but it is remarkable that the real Russian loss is not mentioned. The official organ acknowledges that the Allies attended humanely to the wounded Russians whom Menchikoff left behind; but that, as the deficiency of surgeons in the English army was publicly notorious, the English wounded would naturally have the preference, and that hence large numbers of the Russians were wholly neglected. 'Another very sad testimony to the little care bestowed on our wounded is the state of suffering and exhaustion those were in who were landed at Odessa by the English steamer on the $\frac{16\text{th}}{28\text{th}}$ of September, 353 in number. Having been carried, after the combat, to the banks of the Alma, they remained there for six days without shelter, almost without help; a few of them only had their wounds dressed, and even then with hay and straw instead of lint, which could but render their state worse. When, therefore, they arrived at Odessa, almost all the wounds presented symptoms of gangrene; and by $\frac{\text{Sept. 23d}}{\text{Oct. 5th}}$, thirty-one of the number had already succumbed.' An attempt might possibly be made by Englishmen to dispute the correctness of this latter statement, were it not that our own wounded soldiers, at that very time, were being conveyed to Constantinople under circumstances of the most deplorable misery.

One curious item in this Russian comment on the battle of the Alma bore relation to the alleged capture of Prince Menchikoff's carriage. Such a capture was distinctly mentioned in many English and French accounts of the battle. One officer wrote that the carriage was left behind on the

* IN ALMAM FLUVIUM
VICTORIA CRUENTA A.D. XII. CAL. OCTOB. A.S. CIↃCCCLIV.
NOBILITATUM.
Mater es, Alma, necis; partæ sed sanguine nostro
Pacis tu nutrix, Almaque Mater eris.

† 'The patience with which the regimental officers and men bore, without a murmur, the unusual privations to which they were necessarily subjected after they landed in the Crimea, has elicited Her Majesty's warmest sympathy and approval. Their sufferings from disease before that time were such as might have subdued the ardour of less gallant troops, but have in their case only proved that in the hour of battle they remember nothing but the call of duty.

Her Majesty feels additional pleasure in thus recognising the noble daring of her soldiers, and sympathising in their victory, when she reflects that that courage has been evinced, and those triumphs won, side by side with the troops of a nation whose valour the British army has in former times admired and respected in hostile combat, but which it has now, for the first time, tested in the generous rivalry of an intimate brotherhood in arms. Her Majesty trusts that the blood of the two nations, so profusely shed on the banks of the Alma—a subject of deep regret to herself and her people—may consecrate an alliance which shall endure for the benefit of future generations, when the remembrance of this battle-field is hallowed by gratitude for the consequences, as well as the glories of victory.'

heights; that it contained boxes and portmanteaus full of splendid uniforms, arms, watches, jewellery, and other valuables; and that the carriage further contained that which is an unusual accompaniment of a military officer's equipment—a pair of white satin slippers. Another stated, that the prince's carriage and coachman were taken; that the former was sent to Constantinople, and publicly exhibited at Tophané; and that in the carriage were found documents explaining the full particulars of the English army, its strength, &c., shewing that there must have been spies in the Allied camp. Marshal St Arnaud was still more definite in his dispatch: 'My tent is on the very spot where that of Prince Menchikoff stood in the morning, and who thought himself so sure of beating us that he left his carriage there; I have taken possession of it, with his pocket-book and correspondence, and shall take advantage of the valuable information it contains.' On these statements the Russian comment was as follows:—'Prince Menchikoff lost no carriage, nor any correspondence belonging to him. Every equipage belonging to head-quarters had been previously taken to a place of safety. The only capture that could, therefore, have fallen into the enemy's hands was a clerk attached to head-quarters, who left Sebastopol on the very day of the battle to rejoin the prince; this clerk was the bearer of a certain number of route-papers in blank, and a few other papers of no great importance. Nothing has been known hitherto respecting his fate; the probability therefore is, that it is his capture that has occasioned the mistake.'

Proper as it may be to attend to arguments on both sides of any disputed question, there is an inequality in the testimony above adduced, owing to the disregard of truthfulness on the part of those officially engaged by the Russian government in public affairs. It was a strong assertion for a British prime-minister to make,* that the Russian diplomatists in 1853-4 had 'exhausted every modification of untruth, concealment, and evasion, and ended with assertions of positive falsehood;' but support was given to the accusation by numberless incidents during the war—insomuch that Western Europe remained in a state of painful suspense whether to believe or disbelieve Russian asseverations.

ALMA TO BALAKLAVA—THE FLANK-MARCH.

A question for grave discussion arose among the Allied commanders after the battle of the Alma. The strongly fortified port of Sebastopol being that which, if conquered, would give the Allies a virtual command of the Crimea, the problem to be solved was—how best to insure that conquest; whether to advance southward to the formidable heights on the northern side of Sebastopol Harbour; or to advance by another route, round the inner angle of the harbour, and assail the town on the south. The decision was likely to be affected by the line of retreat the Russians had taken, and by the tactics they might have been adopting at and near Sebastopol.

Concerning the retreat, the Russian official papers of course made the best of it. In Prince Menchikoff's dispatch relating to the battle of the Alma, he stated that, seeing the Allied armies and fleets too powerful for him to contend against, he withdrew across the river Katcha on the evening of the 20th, and took up a position before Sebastopol on the 21st, preparing to offer a warm opposition to the enemy. Other accounts support this; with the addition that the Russians, during their retreat, burned such villages and hamlets as lay in their way, that nothing but desolation might be left to meet the eye of their opponents. Another Russian dispatch stated, that after Menchikoff had reached the northern shore of Sebastopol Harbour, wishing to bring his troops into order, and to replenish their stock of ammunition and provisions, he crossed over by the bridge of Inkermann on the 21st, and entered Sebastopol, where he remained three days. An advanced-guard, sent out towards the Katcha, under Lieutenant-general Kirikoff, having ascertained some particulars concerning the movements of the English and French, the prince resolved on making a movement towards Baktchéserai, about twenty-four miles north-east of Sebastopol, as a means of checking any advance of the Allies towards the centre of the Crimea, and as a means, also, of commanding the high road from Simferopol, by which important route all supplies were brought from the mainland. Accordingly, on the 24th, leaving at Sebastopol about eight battalions, together with the sailors and marines of the fleet, he departed with the rest of his army, including all the artillery; in the dead of the night he crossed the Tchernaya, ascended the heights to a place called Khutor Mackenzie or Mackenzie's Farm, and reached the banks of the Belbek at a point about half-way between Sebastopol and Baktchéserai, where the high road crosses that river. After resting here twenty-four hours, near the village of Otarkoï, he continued his route till he struck the Katcha at a point about three miles from Baktchéserai: leaving at Otarkoï a reserve of troops under Major-general Jabokritsky. This movement was described in the dispatch as having three objects—to obtain provisions which were on the road from Perekop to Simferopol; to obtain reinforcements from Kertch under General Khomoutoff; and to attack the English and French on their rear and left flank, in the event of their marching to the north side of Sebastopol.

The particulars of this movement were not known to the Allies at the time. The direction in which Menchikoff had retreated from the Alma could only be surmised, although there could be

* See p. 71.

little doubt that Sebastopol would be the chief object of his solicitude. The generals, therefore, became anxious to obtain such information concerning the state of the great stronghold and its harbour as the fleets could gather.

Admirals Dundas and Hamelin, while the struggles were in progress on the banks of the Bulganak and Alma, had kept a watch on the coast near the Katcha and Sebastopol, to report on any observable proceedings in those directions. These observations were continued immediately after the battle, when, from the decks of the *Terrible* and *Sampson*, the Russians could be seen burning the villages during the retreat to the Katcha. Captain Jones, of the *Sampson*, was ordered to scrutinise the mouth of Sebastopol harbour closely, to ascertain whether any marked changes were made consequent on Menchikoff's retreat. He had not long to wait for such evidence. On the night of the 21st, great alterations were made in the position of the Russian fleet. On the morning of the 22d, Captain Jones saw moored across the entrance of the harbour, one 3-decker, four 2-deckers, and two large frigates, ranged in line; while at the head of the harbour were two 3-deckers, and five 2-deckers, lying with their heads down the harbour, having on the previous day had their broadsides in that direction. Besides all these, four or five other sailing war-ships and twelve steamers could be seen, all evidently subject to some manœuvre. The land-defences were seen to be rapidly strengthening; new batteries on both sides of the harbour had been constructed, defending the entrances and line of coast; and one of these batteries, on the north side, had guns of such calibre and range that they could throw to a distance of 4000 yards, more than two and a quarter miles: two shots having passed over the *Sampson* at that distance. On that same day, the 23d, was executed a manœuvre of a most extraordinary kind: the sinking of a fine fleet, as a means of preventing another fleet from entering a harbour with hostile intent. As soon as symptoms appeared, on the afternoon of that day, that the Allied fleets were about to approach Sebastopol, Prince Menchikoff ordered the sinking of the men-of-war which had been moored across the mouth of the harbour. A deserter from the Russian fleet had, on the 22d, told Admiral Dundas that the crews of these men-of-war, except a few hands, had been landed from the ships; that the ships had been perforated and plugged ready for sinking; that the guns and heavy stores were all left on board; that the other ships were moored on the south side of the harbour, to defend it from any attack on the north; that the battle of the Alma had greatly dispirited the Russians; and that the whole Russian force in and near Sebastopol barely exceeded 40,000 men. Credence to a limited extent was placed on this man's statements; and he was, at Lord Raglan's request, sent to the army at the Alma, to act as a guide on the march to Sebastopol. Touching the sinking of the ships, the truth of the statement was soon made manifest. Captain Drummond, examining the mouth of Sebastopol Harbour on the morning of the 24th, found that the ships were sunk, the lower mast-heads just appearing above water; and that the whole passage was thus closed, except a small space near a shoal off the north battery. The ships thus sacrificed comprised one of 120 guns, two of 84, two of 80, and two of 40. Unexampled, perhaps, was such a proceeding; but it was most effectual in reference to its immediate object, for it rendered impossible any entry of hostile ships into the harbour. Captain Drummond at the same time ascertained that there were two strong booms inside the line of sunken ships; that eight sail-of-the-line were moored east and west just within the booms; and that three of these ships had been heeled over, to give their guns elevation sufficient to sweep over the land northward of the harbour. The Allied soldiers were much astonished at this sinking of the ships; but the seamen were more than astonished—it damped their hopes of coming to close quarters with the enemy's fleet.

These items of information, picked up by the fleets, reached St Arnaud and Raglan in due course, and had the effect of modifying very considerably the plans of the generals. In the first instance, the southward march was resumed, from the Alma to the Katcha, with an intent to approach the northern side of Sebastopol: a deviation from this manœuvre was not contemplated until a day or two afterwards.

After the terrible battle on the 20th, the French were ready to move before the English—as was the case, indeed, in most of the operations, on account of the imperfect organisation of many departments in the British army. The French removed all their wounded to their ships in a few hours, and St Arnaud proposed to march the next day: this, however, Lord Raglan declined, on account, probably, of the lamentable deficiency in his means of providing for the wounded. It is difficult to estimate the value of the two momentous days thus lost; had the Allies proceeded at once to Sebastopol, while the Russians were disordered and dispirited, the whole aspect of the campaign might have been changed; and if the French chafed a little at the inaction thus forced upon them by their ally, they might justly be pardoned. On the evening of the 20th, on the whole of the 21st and 22d, were the British—bandsmen, soldiers who had not been much engaged during the fight, sailors, and marines—employed in burying dead British and Russians, and in conveying wounded British and Russians down to the beach; and even then, distressing as it must have been to the kind heart of Lord Raglan, numbers of wounded Russians were left behind on the hills—the necessity for marching being now extreme. The surgeons worked night and day, amputating shattered limbs and binding

up wounds. The wounds were such as are only to be seen on a battle-field. One of the surgeons, writing concerning the 'pluck' of the British soldiers at the Alma, said: 'They laugh at pain, and will scarcely submit to die. It is perfectly marvellous—this triumph of mind over body. If a limb were torn off or crushed at home, you would have them brought in fainting, and in a state of dreadful collapse; here they come with a dangling arm, or a riddled elbow, and it 's "Now, doctor, be quick, if you please—I'm not done for so bad but I can get away back and see!" And many of these brave fellows, with a lump of tow wrung out of cold water wrapped round their stumps, crawled to the rear of the fight, and with shells bursting round them, and balls tearing up sods at their feet, watched the progress of the battle. I tell you as a solemn truth that I took off the foot of an officer, Captain ——, who insisted on being helped on his horse again, and declared that he could fight now that his "foot was dressed!"' The surgeons attended the Russians, too, on the 21st; but 700 of these miserable relics of Menchikoff's army still remained where they had fallen, and where they had lain sixty long hours, the victims of unspeakable suffering and privation. That the poor fellows might not actually rot to death where they lay, Lord Raglan, on the eve of his departure, sent to a village up the valley, to entreat the Tatar inhabitants to render what assistance they could to the wounded Russians. In order to attend to their wounds, Dr Thomson, of the 44th regiment, and his servant, were left behind. Seldom, perhaps, during war has there been a position more peculiar and more honourable than that in which this medical officer was thus placed; cast adrift, as it were, undefended and unarmed, in an enemy's country, solely to render succour to that enemy's wounded troops; he was provided with a flag of truce, and with a small store of provisions and medicines. A wounded Russian officer addressed the men who were lying around, explaining the mission of Dr Thomson, and his claim upon their good-will; and thus did the surgeon remain among the prostrate gray-coated occupants of the bloody field, with nothing above him but the sky, and nothing to cheer him but the thought that he was nobly fulfilling a duty suggested by the humanity of his commander. His career, alas! was soon ended; cholera carried off Dr Thomson soon after he had rejoined the army at Balaklava.

In early morn on the 23d, the Allied armies took leave of the Alma, a name never thereafter to be forgotten. The French, up and ready before the English, assembled to the sound of drum and trumpet, and began their march southward to the river Katcha, distant about seven miles. The British had not all in readiness until eight o'clock, at which hour they started. The fleet out at sea, too, made a parallel advance from the mouth of the Alma to that of the Katcha, continuing to maintain its character as a support to the united army. The route was barren and uninteresting, over hills or hillocks which presented little but thistles; but when the river was approached, the ground declined gently to the stream, and the banks were seen to be fringed with trees and luxurious verdure, vineyards, and gardens, dotted here and there with white cottages. Crossing this river, the small village of Eskel was reached, deserted, but affording a little fodder for the horses. There were sad evidences that the inhabitants had hastily withdrawn, and that the Cossacks of the retreating Russian army had ransacked and pillaged everything which tempted their cupidity. A short day's work was this. The armies rested for the night near the village, the French under tents, and the British under none—our tents were uselessly stowed away on board ship, instead of being in the right place at the right time. The 1st, 3d, and light British divisions bivouacked on the heights south of the river; while the 2d and 4th divisions took up a resting-place on the side of the hills close to the river, Lord Raglan occupying the best house in the village. The French encamped at the village of Mamaschai, about a mile lower down the stream. On that same day, the *Himalaya*, conveying a portion of the Scots Greys to the scene of war, witnessed first the sinking of the Russian ships at the mouth of Sebastopol harbour, and then the march of the Allied armies over the hills from the Alma to the Katcha. The majestic steamer anchored off the mouth of the last-named river, and landed the cavalry, which at once joined Lord Raglan's army. This vessel shared with the *Agamemnon* the admiration—almost the affection—of the whole fleet. 'Though the *Himalaya*,' wrote one of the seamen, 'was the largest ship, Captain Killock handled her as if she was a small boat; he even offered to beach the *Himalaya* gently, so as to lower the horses into the sea, and then let them walk on shore; but this was declined.'

On the 24th of September, Prince Menchikoff determined on his flank-movement from Sebastopol to Baktchéserai. On the 24th of September, Lord Raglan and Marshal St Arnaud determined on *their* flank-movement from the Katcha and the Belbek to Balaklava. It was the most remarkable day for strategy, perhaps, throughout the war; each army was ignorant of the movement of the other, each attempted to frustrate the supposed plans of the other, and each would necessarily cross the path of the other, at some point near Khutor Mackenzie—a name derived from a Scotch admiral in the Russian service, who had made at this spot a plantation for trees for the imperial navy, and had built a guard-house for a few soldiers to watch the plantation. As the Russian movement has been explained by the terms of Prince Menchikoff's dispatch, so may we look to the Allied commanders for the best account of the motives which led to their own movement. Lord Raglan's dispatch stated that, when the Allies reached the Belbek on the 24th, from the Katcha, it was found that

the enemy had established a work which commanded the entrance to the first-named river, and debarred its use for the disembarkation of troops, provisions, and materials of war; 'and it became hence expedient to consider whether the line of attack upon the north side should not be abandoned, and another course of operation adopted. It having, after due deliberation, been determined by Marshal St Arnaud and myself that we should relinquish our communication with the Katcha, and the hope of establishing it with the Belbek, and endeavour, by a flank-march to the left, to go round Sebastopol and seize Balaklava, the movement was commenced on the 25th.' It thus appears that the Allied commanders were chiefly induced to this step by the difficulty or impossibility of obtaining their indispensable supplies by way of the Katcha or the Belbek. Admiral Hamelin, in a dispatch to the French government, dwells rather on the closing of the harbour of Sebastopol as the cause of change in strategy. It had, he states, been determined that the armies should take the northern forts; while the fleets, after destroying the booms, should enter the harbour, and assist the army in battering and capturing the southern half of the town. This plan, however, having been frustrated by the sinking of the ships, 'the generals-in-chief decided upon turning Sebastopol by the east, and throwing themselves upon the south of the town, after they had placed themselves in communication with the fleets at Balaklava, and obtained provisions and munitions.' Whether advantageous or not in other respects, and apart from the boldness and brilliancy which characterised the manœuvre, there can be little doubt that this flank-movement was in a manner forced upon the Allied commanders by the defensive Russian arrangements at the mouth of the Belbek and at Sebastopol.

The flank-march itself may be considered to have commenced at the Belbek, though there can be little doubt that the commanders arranged their plan while yet on the Katcha, on the morning of the 24th. The Allies were on that morning strengthened by the arrival of the Scots Greys, an infantry regiment, and 9000 French, all of whom had been landed at the mouth of the Katcha. The sun's heat was great on that day, and the troops became much wearied by remaining exposed during the forenoon. About mid-day, however, they moved and marched to the Belbek, which they crossed by a small bridge, near the village of the same name, four miles from the sea. On reaching the southern bank, and ascending the hill, the officers could espy, with the aid of their glasses, that city which had during so many months occupied men's thoughts—Sebastopol; the houses and windows were distinctly visible, about four miles distant: much of the intervening ground being covered with trees and brushwood. Near this bridge the armies encamped for the night, some on the hills, some in the hollows between the hills, and the officers in the village.

The morning came: the morning of a day distinguished by a march, since become as celebrated as the battles preceding and following it; celebrated not for its length, but for its boldness and difficulty. The distance from Belbek to Balaklava, difficult to measure by the route actually adopted, does not exceed fourteen miles in a straight line; yet was the flank-march one of peril and trying responsibility. Even those who condemn the Allied governments for sending too small a military force, ill provided with cavalry, artillery, and stores, all agree in admiring the energetic character of this movement—a movement which changed the base of operations from the west to the south coast. 'Such a change could only have been effected while a steam-fleet was off the coast, and could re-open its communications with the army as soon as it had appeared on the opposite side of Sebastopol; this daring measure has demonstrated one of the many immense advantages which steam confers upon an invading force. The flank-march having been resolved upon, was executed with considerable skill, and with that determined spirit which is so characteristic of British troops. It was a bold and hazardous undertaking. The country was difficult and unknown. Thick woods, deep ravines, and precipitous hills, only crossed by mountain-tracks, were to be traversed by the army. Had the enemy learned our intentions, we might have been exposed to the most fatal disaster.' *

The 25th was indeed a day to be remembered by all in the army; for two-thirds of the distance, from the Belbek to the Tchernaya, were accomplished on this day, in the midst of the most complicated difficulties. The 4th division was left behind until the following day, to guard the rear and to convoy numerous invalids down to the ships; but all the rest advanced south. At five o'clock in the morning they set forth. The instructions issued were virtually little more than this—'Enter the forest or jungle before you; traverse it by compass S.S.E.; emerge at the other margin in the best order you can; and rendezvous near Mackenzie's Farm, on the Simferopol and Sebastopol road.' Every officer and soldier had his story to tell how this daring scramble was effected—now diverging too far to the west, and coming in dangerous proximity to Sebastopol; now losing the track altogether, and dashing through a labyrinth of trees and underwood; now hemmed up in a pathway, where a few Russian cavalry, or a gun or two, would have made sad havoc among them. In some places the jungle was so thick that the men could hardly see each other; one brigade became mixed up with another, Guards with Highlanders, Rifles with soldiers of the line, in an apparently inextricable mass of confusion; each man threaded a path

* *Quarterly Review*, No. CXCI.

as best he could, and many thousand infantry emerged from the jungle about two o'clock.

It was at this time that occurred the most extraordinary incident in this extraordinary march. Lord Raglan rode at the head of the British army, the French and Turks being at some distance on the flank. He was one of the first to emerge from the wood upon the high road, and suddenly found himself close to a portion of the Russian army! The two lines had intersected. The opponent commanders had commenced their flank-marches nearly at the same time: Menchikoff having the start by a few hours—the Allies south-east from Belbek towards Balaklava, the Russians north-east from Sebastopol towards Simferopol; each planned a flank-march, which was really cleverly conceived; each was entirely ignorant of the other's movement; each took Mackenzie's Farm in the line of route; and the two encountered at this spot. Not on equal terms, however, for the van of the British came upon the rear of the Russians; and although the surprise was perhaps equal on both sides, the terror was on the part of the Russians, who had been greatly dispirited by the battle of the Alma, and who had formed an exaggerated estimate of the strength of the Allies. A few cavalry only, Scots Greys and others, were near Lord Raglan at the time; yet did the Russians, entirely ignorant of the extent of the force thus suddenly coming upon them, lose all presence of mind. The British brought a few guns, a squadron or two, and a battalion of Rifles, to bear on the spot; a volley and a charge followed; and the Russians, after a brief stand, rushed pell-mell along the road to Simferopol, leaving everything behind that might have impeded their flight, and strewing the road for two or three miles with wagons, carts, tumbrils, provisions, ammunition, the military-chest, baggage, officers' uniforms, personal ornaments, and a countless array of miscellaneous articles. Some portions of this captured booty were placed under guard by Lord Raglan's orders, but much also was left as a prize to the men—a prize which not a little pleased them as a relief from the laborious work of this day. 'Our gunners,' said one of the artillery officers, 'got hold of the baggage of some general officer and his staff, for they were soon laden with embroidered hussar jackets, pelisses, and garments of various kinds; they also got a quantity of jewellery and watches; and some, more lucky than the rest, got hold of the general's luncheon-basket, and feasted on wild-boar, washed down with champagne.'

As the stragglers came up, by dozens or twenties, a halt was made for an hour or two, on the heights near Mackenzie's Farm. This farm is about six miles in a straight line from Belbek Bridge, whence the flank-march had commenced; and another straight line of four miles marks the distance from the farm to Tchernaya Bridge, or the Traktir Bridge over the Tchernaya, on the way to Balaklava; but the real distances traversed by the troops were much greater, and the necessity for a little mid-day repose became evident. From time to time, the right flank of the army approached so near the eastern end of Sebastopol, that the red-coats must unquestionably have been seen from the houses and public buildings; yet not the smallest attempt was made to check the march. From evidence afterwards obtained, it appears certain that the town contained few troops; troops and inhabitants were alike in a terror-stricken state; and it remains a fair problem, whether the Allies might not, on the night of the 25th or the early morn of the 26th, have forced the few defences at the upper end of the harbour, and entered Sebastopol. With the uncertain knowledge possessed by the Allies at that time, however, concerning the movements of Menchikoff, and with a natural anxiety to establish a line of communication with the fleet, such a venture was not made; Balaklava, and not Sebastopol, was the goal towards which eyes were on that day turned. When the men had rested for awhile on the heights, Lord Raglan resumed his march, taking the steep winding road from the farm down to the Tchernaya. On the banks of that river he rested for the night: he and his officers being so completely separated from their baggage, which was far in the rear, that a dry ditch served as a bed for many of them. During the night, the baggage and stores arrived, as well as the 4th division, which had been left behind during a few hours as a rear-guard. On this day, and indeed ever since leaving the Alma, officers and men had been heavily laden. One officer wrote: 'Each man carries everything he possesses. We are allowed no tents and no baggage-wagons; so you may imagine the difficulty and delay in moving an army of this description. At the end of a march, each man is glad to hunt for wood, fill his little water-barrel—every officer and man carries one—cook his rations, lie down as near the bivouac-fire as he can, and get to sleep till daylight, should he be fortunate enough not to be for picket.' And in relation to the fourteen hours of incessant exertion on the memorable 25th, the same officer described the position of himself and his men when their water-barrels were emptied before the Tchernaya was reached. The whole truth is conveyed in these few words: 'I would gladly have given my last guinea for a drink of pure water that afternoon.'

On Tuesday, the 26th of September, the British army arrived from Tchernaya Bridge at BALAKLAVA—a place which on that day acquired a European reputation, and which was never afterwards to be forgotten, either by soldiers or readers. The route between the two places was nearly south-west, generally on an ascent, and at an average distance of six or seven miles from Sebastopol. The French adopted a more circuitous route, and did not reach the heights southward of Sebastopol until the following day, having encamped on the Mackenzie heights during the night.

A glance at the map will shew that a fleet off the mouth of the Katcha would be valueless to an army at Balaklava; it became a matter of urgent necessity that the admirals should know of the generals' movements, and should steam round the Chersonese from the one position to the other, to provide a new base of operations. The messenger on this occasion had a perilous duty to perform—that of galloping back, alone, and at night, through an enemy's country. Lieutenant Maxse, of the *Agamemnon*, reached the Tchernaya on the night of the 25th, at the same time as some of the later divisions of the army, having come from the admiral with dispatches for Lord Raglan; he immediately undertook to ride back, and fight his way through forests and Cossacks, to the Katcha. He did so; the message was delivered; and so prompt was Sir Edmund Lyons, that the steam-fleet appeared off the mouth of Balaklava harbour at the very hour when the army appeared on Balaklava heights: each greeted the other, in a position utterly new to both.

The whole of the district around Balaklava and Sebastopol will require a detailed description

Marshal St Arnaud.

in the next section; but before entering upon it, a few words may be useful here concerning two events, or rather a rumour and an event, connected with the closing days of September—namely, the alleged fall of Sebastopol, and the death of Marshal St Arnaud.

Seldom have governments and newspaper editors been more completely deceived than in reference to the rumour above mentioned. On the 30th of September, within a few hours of the receipt of authentic news concerning the battle of the Alma, the London evening newspapers contained a telegraphic abstract of an announcement in the Vienna newspapers of the same morning—that Sebastopol had fallen; that a steamer had been despatched from the Crimea to Constantinople with the news; that this steamer had met another on the route from Constantinople to Varna, whence the glorious announcement was transmitted to Omar Pacha, who in his turn sent it to Vienna, from which place the electric-telegraph conveyed it to London and Paris. London was in a fever of excitement on the next day, Sunday; and this excitement was not lessened when, on the Monday morning, the Turkish ambassador gave official importance to the rumour by transmitting to the newspapers, with an evident implication of his own belief in the matter, the information he had received.*

* 'The Turkish minister presents his compliments to the editor of the *Times*, and begs to transmit to him herewith a telegraphic dispatch which he has received to-day from the Turkish ambassador at Vienna, and which is an unquestionable confirmation of the fall of Sebastopol.

Bryanston Square, October 2.'

'Vienna, *October* 2.

The French embassy and the Austrian government have received

Paris was as credulous as London; the ministers believed the news, and forwarded it to Boulogne to the emperor, who read it to the troops encamped there. At Vienna, Count Buol communicated what he had heard to the French ambassador, who in his turn transmitted it to Paris: nay more—Baron Hübner, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, was charged by Count Buol to address to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the sincere congratulations of the Austrian cabinet on the brilliant exploit. Indeed the deception was most complete, nearly all parties for a time accepting the news as true. Day after day passed, however, without further details; suspicions arose; and at length the truth flashed upon a disappointed public, that the announced fall of Sebastopol was utterly untrue. Whether the Tatar or the telegraph were the more immediate instrument of deception, there arose and remained an opinion that speculators at one of the European bourses or stock-exchanges had planned the fraud, as a means of making profit by the sudden rising of the funds which always follows such announcements.

The death of Marshal St Arnaud was no mere rumour; it was a stern reality, occurring immediately after the flank-march to which the Allied generals attached so much importance. Born in Paris in the year 1801, St Arnaud was yet in middle life; but he had seen much rough service. He entered the Gardes du Corps at the age of fifteen; and next served as a sub-lieutenant in the line. After a few years' absence from the army, he re-entered it in 1831, first as a sub-lieutenant, and then as lieutenant. He was engaged under Marshal Bugeaud in various duties during the early years of Louis-Philippe's reign. The year 1836 took him to Algiers, where his reputation was chiefly established. As a captain, he distinguished himself at the siege of Constantina, for which he was rewarded with the decoration of the Legion of Honour. After engagement in many battles, he was placed, in 1840, in command of the 18th regiment of infantry; which he left some time afterwards to join the Zouaves. He was further raised to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in 1842, colonel in 1844, and major-general in 1847, incessantly occupied in military duties of various kinds. In 1850, he attained the position of commandant of the province of Constantina, where he was engaged in a hot contest with the Kabyles. Returning to France in the following year, after fifteen years of service in Africa, he was appointed to a command in the army of Paris. Being among the small number of distinguished generals who aided Prince Louis Napoleon to overthrow the French republic, and to become the Emperor Napoleon III., St Arnaud naturally rose in high favour at court; he was made Minister at War, then Marshal of France, then Senator, and then Commander-in-chief of the French army in the East.

Such was Marshal St Arnaud, who, on the 29th of September, sank under accumulated bodily sufferings, just at the moment when the Allies began to perceive that a formal siege of Sebastopol would be necessary. The declining state of his health had long been known; indeed, when he left Paris to join the army in the East his strength was already broken; and during the autumnal months his life was one continued struggle against fate. His determination and calmness were a matter of astonishment to those who, being near him, were aware of his sufferings. No doubt exists, however, that he was fully aware of his own condition; for on the 12th of September, when on board the *Ville de Paris*, making the voyage from Varna to Eupatoria, he wrote a dispatch to the French Minister of War, in which he said: 'My situation in regard to my health has become grave. Up to this time I have combated the malady with which I am affected with all the energy of which I was capable, and for a long time I had hoped that I was sufficiently habituated to suffering to be able to exercise the command without making known to all the violence of the attacks which I am condemned to suffer. But this struggle has exhausted my strength. I have had the pain of discovering lately, and particularly on the passage, during which I was upon the point of succumbing, that the moment was approaching when my courage would not suffice to enable me to support the heavy burden of a command which requires a vigour that I have lost, and which I hardly hope to recover. My conscience makes me consider it a duty to explain to you this position. I should hope that Providence will permit me to complete the task which I have undertaken, and that I may be able to lead as far as Sebastopol the army with which I shall land to-morrow on the coast of the Crimea; but that will be, I feel, a last effort, and I beg you to ask the emperor to allow me to appoint a successor.' Immediately after the battle of the Alma he wrote: 'My health is still the same. It continues between suffering, crises, and duty. All this did not prevent my remaining twelve hours on horseback on the day of battle. But will not my strength betray me?' When bivouacking on the Tchernaya on the 26th, during the flank-march, the last hour of command came. His last official dispatch contained these words: 'My health is deplorable. An attack of cholera has just been added to the evils from which I have suffered so long, and I am become so weak, that to continue the command is, I feel, impossible. In this position, and, however painful it may be to

from Bucharest, under date six P.M., September 30, the following telegraphic dispatch:—

"To-day, at noon, a Tatar arrived from Constantinople with dispatches for Omar Pacha; his Highness being at Silistria, the dispatches had to be forwarded to him at that place. The Tatar announces the capture of Sebastopol: 18,000 Russians were killed and wounded, 22,000 made prisoners; Fort Constantine was destroyed, and other forts, mounting 200 guns, taken. Of the Russian fleet, six sail-of-the-line were sunk, and Prince Menchikoff had retired to the bottom of the bay with the remaining vessels, declaring that he would burn them if the attack continued. The Allied commanders had given him six hours to consider, inviting him at the same time to surrender, for the sake of humanity. A French general and three Russian generals, all wounded, have arrived at Constantinople, which city was to be illuminated for ten days. We expect to-morrow the official report of the above intelligence from Omar Pacha."'

me, I feel it a duty of honour and conscience to place it in the hands of General Canrobert, whom the special orders of His Majesty indicate as my successor.' On the 29th he died, near Balaklava. His body was sent on board the *Berthollet* to Constantinople, where it was embalmed at the residence of the French embassy; and on the 11th of October, the *Berthollet* ended her melancholy duty by landing the remains of the deceased marshal at Marseille. Madame St Arnaud, who had resided at Constantinople during the expedition to Varna and the Crimea, returned to France in the same ship that contained the dead body of her husband. After a solemn service had been performed in the cathedral of Marseille, the body was transmitted to Paris, where, on the 16th, a military funeral on an imposing scale was performed: the body being interred in a vault in the Chapel of the Invalides. Thus terminated the career of one who, a roving actor and wild adventurer in his youth, afterwards shewed many of the qualities of an energetic military commander.

General Canrobert, on whom the command of the French before Sebastopol devolved, was a favourite in the army. Born in 1809, and entering the army early, he embarked for Africa in 1835, with the rank of lieutenant. He was speedily engaged against Abd-el-Kader; then in the expedition to Mascara; and then in various other services, which gained for him the rank of captain in 1837. He joined the Duc de Nemours and General Damrémont in an expedition to Constantina in that year, during which he was wounded. Returning to France in 1839, he received the decoration of the Legion of Honour, and an accession of rank. Another period of service in Africa then awaited him; from 1840 to 1850, he was engaged in an incessant scene of warfare in every part of Algeria, serving under Cavaignac and other generals, and executing many achievements requiring courage and address. In 1850, he came once again to France, receiving decorative honours, the rank of general of brigade, and various duties connected with the armies of France. In 1853, he became general of division; and in 1854, he was appointed one of the generals under St Arnaud in the war in the East. Raised to an onerous command at the age of forty-six, Canrobert briefly addressed his soldiers at the period of St Arnaud's death, and then set himself earnestly to the study of the arduous work before him.

SEBASTOPOL, AND ITS VICINITY.

Never was there battle-ground more requiring attention on the part of those who would read and understand the struggles which there occurred. The struggles were so numerous, so varied, so interrupted by hills and ravines, so dependent on surprises, that every little valley or eminence has acquired an historical interest. A district little less than a hundred square miles in area became, during the war, virtually one fortified town, post, or position, all the principal points in which were occupied by one or other of two hostile forces.

To define the region thus indicated, let the reader suppose a straight line to be drawn from the village of Inkermann to the village of Balaklava. This line, about eight miles in length, would run almost due north and south, and would cut off a peninsula from the rest of the Crimea. Inkermann, or the bridge near it, may be regarded as the head or upper end of the harbour of Sebastopol, while Balaklava stands on one side of the small landlocked harbour of the same name; so that the sea washes every part of this peninsula, except on the landward line above marked out. The westernmost extremity of the peninsula is a point or headland called Cape Chersonese, which forms the third angle of the triangle. The east side of this triangle is a rugged bare line of country, descending steeply to the Valley of the Tchernaya; while the other two sides are formed of coast-line, indented with many inlets or small harbours. Taking the inner end of Sebastopol harbour as a starting-point, where the river Tchernaya enters it near the bridge of Inkermann, we find the harbour to extend east and west, with a length of about four miles, and a breadth varying from half a mile to a mile. On the north side are several creeks, named Golandaya, Pianota, Soukhaya, &c.; while on the south shore are creeks or inlets which run somewhat further into the land, and which are familiarly known as the Careening Bay, the South Bay or Inner Harbour, and the Artillery Bay. Emerging from the harbour, and following the line of coast a little to the south of west, the coast is seen to be deeply indented with inlets, imparting a broken appearance to this side of the peninsula. First is an inlet called Quarantine Bay; then Chersonese Bay; next, Streletska or Arrow Bay, much deeper than the other two; and to this succeed, in order, Pestchanaya or Peschana Bay, Kamiesch or Cossack Bay, and Kazatch Bay, besides intervening bays of smaller magnitude and importance. The jutting promontory of Cape Chersonese being passed, the coast-line bends suddenly to the south-east, presenting a cliff so bold, rugged, and close to the shore, that no inlets worthy of notice are found until Balaklava is reached.

Now, the triangle thus delineated, the sides of which may be roughly taken at about eight, ten, and twelve miles in straight lines, corresponds nearly with the peninsula called by the ancients the Heracleotic Chersonese, or the Peninsula of the Heracleans. The Allies during the war, in forming their several trenches, earthworks, head-quarters, and other military works, came frequently in contact with mementos of those Heracleans of early days.

It must be numbered among the many remarkable features, historical and topographical,

presented by the Crimea, that the Heracleotic Peninsula was the home of a flourishing colony during no less than twelve centuries. Of the Bosphoric kingdom at the eastern extremity of the Crimea, a little has already been said; and it is now necessary to bear in mind that the south-western extremity was likewise the territory of a community of Greek origin, wholly distinct from the former. At the commencement of the sixth century B.C., a body of Heracleans, from the Greek colonial town of that name in Asia Minor, on the southern shores of the Black Sea, set sail across the sea to the Crimea, and established a sub or branch colony in the peninsula now under notice. They built a wall, remains of which still exist, between the two points now known as Inkermann and Balaklava, to mark the boundary between their colony and the regions inhabited by the Tauric semi-barbarians further east, and to defend themselves from inroads. The classical myths relating to Iphigenia and Orestes are connected with this portion of the Crimea. It was no myth, however, but an historical fact, that the Heracleans built a city on the westernmost part of the peninsula, the promontory washed on one side by Kazatch Bay, and sometimes called the Peninsula of Phanari. So ancient was this city, called Cherson or Chersonesus, that it was in ruins at the time Strabo wrote, about the commencement of the Christian era. Nothing now remains of this old city but scattered stones and the foundations of walls; yet has it been interesting to mark that the French, in forming their offensive and defensive works against the Russians, frequently made use of stones which had belonged to walls and houses on the same spot 2300 years earlier. Whether natural or political causes brought about the decay of old Cherson, there appears to have been another city built, having the same name, and situated a little to the west of the present Quarantine Harbour of Sebastopol, the distance between the new and old Chersons being five or six miles in a straight line. This second city became large, beautiful, and powerful. The Heracleans commanded most of the trade on the north shores of the Black Sea, and were enabled to resist many political storms which engulfed their neighbours. The Bosphoric kings, jealous of the Heracleans, or, as we may perhaps term them, the Chersonians, frequently attempted to crush their power; but unsuccessfully. Even when the Romans had subdued the Bosphorians, and had themselves yielded to barbarous tribes in the countries north of the Black Sea, the Chersonians still remained a united and trading people.

Relics of the works constructed by these old Chersonians are strewed over many parts of the peninsula. Portions of an ancient fortress, some old walls, and several beautiful Ionic capitals, were existing near Sebastopol at the time when the Russian war began. Near the remains of the newer or second city are many mounds in which pottery was found; while at another spot, near the head of the present Quarantine Harbour, are tombs excavated in the rocks. On the south coast between Balaklava and Cape Chersonese, on a rugged precipitous cliff overhanging the sea, was once the Temple of Diana, the temple in which Agamemnon's daughter officiated as priestess; the site is now occupied by the modern Greek monastery of St George. The wall of the second city, about two miles in extent, and built of lime-stone, was five or six feet in thickness, with three towers, a gate of great magnitude, and a guard-house; the French found on the ruins of one of these towers, inscriptions denoting that the tower had been restored A.D. 491. Lines of stone and earth still mark the site of the principal street and market-place of the city. There are also remains of houses running along the cliff next the sea, of steps cut in the cliffs from the houses down to the sea, of a landing-place, of an aqueduct, and of a well—all within a mile or two of the since celebrated Sebastopol. The remaining portions of the Heracleotic Peninsula were mostly occupied by gardens and orchards, the boundary-walls of which are yet traceable.

When the Roman, the Bosphoric, and the Chersonian powers declined in the Crimea, the interesting old city of Cherson became a prey to many other nations and tribes. During the Byzantine period, the emperors of Constantinople frequently afforded aid to the Chersonians, to protect them against the inroads of barbarians; but those inroads became at length too formidable to be resisted. The Goths occupied the peninsula during many centuries, but were not likely to leave many relics behind them. Khazars, Tatars, Turks, Russians, all have in turn exercised control over this small but important spot. Perhaps the most remarkable circumstance in the history of Cherson and its vicinity, since the time of the Greeks, is that the Russians held it at two periods nearly 800 years apart. Vladimir, the Grand-duke of Russia, during one of his wars with the Greek emperors of Constantinople, besieged Cherson A.D. 988, cut off the supply of water from a neighbouring spring, and forced the inhabitants to capitulate; in gratitude for this conquest, Vladimir became a Christian, converted Cherson into a Christian city, and built many churches and other handsome structures. The late Emperor Nicholas ordered researches to be made among the ruins of Cherson, regarded as an early Russian city; and as a result of the examination, there were brought to light the foundations and part of the walls of three Christian churches, one of which had evidently been constructed from the remains of a Greek temple, perhaps the Parthenon of ancient Cherson; for there were numerous Ionic columns, capitals, and bases, built into the walls. After this early Russic period in its history, Cherson was destroyed during a war between the Muscovites and their neighbours; and never since has the venerable city been other than a heap of ruins.

Such are the extraordinary associations which

SEBASTOPOL.

1. Fort Constantine. 2. Fort Catherine. 3. Star Fort. 4. Soukhaya Batteries. 5. West Inkermann Light-house. 6. East Inkermann Light-house. 7. River Tchernaya. 8. Careening Bay. 9. Harbour. 10. Russian War-vessels at Anchor. 11. English Head-quarters. 12. English Camp. 13. Malakoff. 14. Karabelnaïa. 15. Docks. 16. Dockyard Harbour. 17. Fort St Paul. 18. Fort St Nicholas. 19. Artillery Bay. 20. Redan. 21. Battery. 22. Fortifications of the Town. 23. Cemetery. 24. Battery. 25. Barracks. 26. Quarantine Bay. 27. Quarantine Hospital. 28. Quarantine Battery. 29. Fort Alexander. 30. Battery.

mark the spot where the English and French took up a military position in the month of September 1854. The French, partly by design and partly through inadvertency, carried still further the destruction which the old city had suffered. When the Turks took the Crimea about the year 1475, they found at Cherson empty houses and deserted churches, from which they removed the finest marbles for their buildings at Constantinople; but even a century later, there were vast remains of beautiful palaces, churches, and monasteries, belonging of course to the Christian period of Cherson. The Russian authorities, during the late war, expressed a real or pretended indignation against the French, on account of an explosion among the ruins of one of the churches—probably accidental, but which the Russians chose to attribute to a wilful design of insulting the orthodox faith. English writers, on the other hand, advert indignantly to the manner in which the venerable Cherson has been despoiled by the Russians. Mr Danby Seymour says: 'What the Turks and the Tatars had spared, was taken by the Russians when they built Sebastopol. Sailors were sent to collect materials, and no ancient remains were respected: the walls and fine gateways which still existed were pulled down to build the Quarantine; and when the Emperor Alexander issued orders to stop this vandalism, the ruin of everything precious had been already consummated. The last remains of works of art, which Lieutenant Cruse had collected with persevering industry, disappeared after a detachment of soldiers had been lodged in the ruins for a few years at the time of the plague.'* Of the same tenor are Mr Scott's remarks: 'One cannot walk among the ruins of Chersonesus free from profound regret and indignation that so many beautiful relics, which even the Tatar had spared, should have been utterly destroyed by the barbarism of the Russian soldiers. Much of this appears to have been done from sheer wantonness, and subsequent to the period at which the government had given orders to preserve what then remained.'†

One of the few structures on this remarkable plateau, yet remaining in a tolerably complete state, is the Greek monastery of St George, near which the Russian government erected a telegraph in recent years. This monastery, with its green-domed church, its terraces and gardens, is near the edge of a cliff several hundred feet above the level of the sea, and only to be approached by a zigzag path cut in the face of the cliff.

The inlet now known as the Harbour of Sebastopol, and called by the Tatars Kadi Liman, is by far the most important part of the coast of the Heracleotic Peninsula, in so far as concerns natural advantages. Yet it does not appear to have been occupied by any important town, until the Russians obtained possession of the Crimea in the last century; for we find no record of anything better than a collection of miserable huts, forming the Tatar village of Akhtiar, at the north-east corner of the harbour. The extraordinary natural advantages of this spot, as a great naval station, attracted the notice of the officers under Catherine II.; insomuch that in 1780, shortly after the Russian conquest, the foundation-stone of the new town of Sebastopol was laid. Having no other than military and naval objects in view at this spot, the government cared not for commercial or manufacturing arrangements; hence Sebastopol became entirely a government town, in which every proceeding had direct relation to imperial projects. In the first year of their occupancy, the Russians built houses for invalid seamen; and in 1794, when Pallas visited the town, and when it was only ten years old, he found that the Admiralty, the Arsenal, two churches, four ports or havens, with a number of defensive forts and batteries, had been constructed, and that a vast and complete plan was being steadily followed. The successors of Catherine worked out this plan year by year.

Sebastopol, or Sevastopolis—the 'august city'—was built on a chalky stratum, varying from 30 to 200 feet above the level of the beach. This elevation, with the steep coast on the opposite or north side, defends the harbour in a most complete way. The harbour, the length and breadth of which have been already noticed, varies from three to eleven fathoms in depth, having abundant water in several places for ships of the greatest magnitude. It has scarcely a rock or shoal throughout its whole area. At the extreme inner end, where the Tchernaya* and a small rivulet enter it, the depth is insufficient for shipping. The harbour, as well as the small inlets contained within it, is protected from all winds by the chalk-hills which surround it; insomuch that it is only during gales from the west that the shipping is exposed to any danger.

In describing the town and fortifications of Sebastopol, this peculiarity presents itself—that the description must be in the past tense. The bombardment by the Allies before the capture, the cannonade by the Russians from the northern side when the southern was held by the Allies, and the systematic destruction which followed, almost extinguished Sebastopol from the list of towns; while the Russian defences, enlarged incessantly during the siege, imparted to the fortifications almost a wholly new character. The best way, therefore, to render the details of the siege intelligible, will be first to describe the town and the fortifications as they existed shortly before the war, when additional defences had not yet been commenced. Taking the descriptions by Scott, Oliphant, Koch, Danby Seymour, Russell, and other eye-witnesses, we may be able to form a judgment concerning the arrangement and appearance of Sebastopol in the years 1853–4.

* *Russia on the Black Sea*, p. 161.
† *Baltic, Black Sea, and Crimea*, p. 329.

* The full name, Tchernaya Retchka, is equivalent to the Turkish Kara-su, 'Black-water' or 'Black-river;' but the abbreviated name of Tchernaya or Tchernaïa, is generally adopted.

The principal part of the town was built in the shape of an amphitheatre, between Artillery Bay and the inner harbour. It consisted of parallel streets running up the steep acclivity, and divided into sections or quarters by a few transverse streets. The town itself, though containing a large number of public buildings, comprised but a small portion of the whole area covered; for beyond its limits were the Seamen's Hospital, the Seamen's Barracks, the Magazines, the Garrison Barracks, the Artillery Barracks, and the Quarantine Station. The wide streets which ran up the incline from the water opened on a large square, separating them from the fortifications; here was the residence of the commandant of the town. Between the principal street and the harbour, were a church for the Russian sailors, the Admiralty, and the Arsenal. A prolongation of this street led to a landing-place for craft which crossed the harbour; and near this spot was a palace which had been hastily prepared for the Empress Catherine, on the occasion of her visit to the newly formed city in 1787. The principal church occupied a commanding position in the highest part of the town. Not far from this church, at a height of 240 feet above the level of the sea, was a telegraph, one of fourteen which established telegraphic communication between Sebastopol and Nicolaieff, another great naval station, 250 miles distant, on the river Bug. The houses and public buildings, being constructed mostly of stone, presented a fine appearance from a distance: indeed, some of them displayed considerable architectural effect—such as the Naval and Military Library, erected by the Emperor Nicholas for the use of the officers, and well furnished with books and maps; the Opera-house; the Club-house, with its brilliant array of ball-rooms and billiard-rooms; churches; the hospitals and barracks, &c. The impression produced on Mr Oliphant by the town is succinctly noticed as follows:—'The town is an immense garrison, and looks imposing because so many of the buildings are barracks or government offices. Still, I was much struck with the substantial appearance of many of the private houses; and, indeed, the main street was handsomer than any I had seen since leaving Moscow; while it owed its extreme cleanliness to large gangs of military prisoners, who were employed in perpetually sweeping. New houses were springing up in every direction; government works were still going on vigorously; and Sebastopol bids fair to rank high among Russian cities.' No two estimates agree concerning the number of inhabitants; but all alike admit that such traders and artisans only were admitted as were requisite to supply the wants of the soldiers, sailors, and government *employés*.

The inlets on the south side of the harbour, which tended to make Sebastopol so important as a naval station, were many in number, and appropriated to distinct purposes. The first, beginning on the east, was generally called Careening Bay or the Bay of Careenage; the *teredo navalis*, the terrible sea-worm which perforates and rots so many of the ships which sail on the Black Sea, renders necessary very frequent careening to the vessels—that is, cleaning, pitching, &c.; and much of this careening was conducted in the small bay here under notice. The next bay, the most important of the series, called South Bay or Military Harbour, and by the Tatars Kartali Kotche or Vulture's Bay, runs due south from the great or main harbour; it is about a mile and three-quarters long, from north to south, with an average width of about a quarter of a mile; it is rendered a splendid haven for shipping, by having a depth so considerable as to receive vessels of the largest size, and, by being so sheltered by hills on all sides, as to maintain the surface of its waters nearly always calm and unruffled. This, in the palmy days of Sebastopol, was the harbour in which the Black Sea fleet was moored in winter; the largest ships being able to lie, with all their stores on board, close to the quays; whereas the manned and equipped ships were in the great harbour: in the present work, it will be generally referred to as the inner harbour, a name which indicates its relation to the great or main harbour. At the furthest or southern extremity, was the station for the old men-of-war, used as hulks for convicts, thousands of whom were generally employed in the docks and other great works. Just within the bay, near its mouth or northern end, is a subordinate inlet, on the shores of which were constructed the Dockyard and Arsenal. The inner harbour was thus rendered a vast naval station, bordered on its steep shores by naval hospitals, marine and artillery barracks, and a *slobod* or suburb of small neat cottages, occupied by married sailors and their families. A general name for the civil or non-official portion of Sebastopol eastward of this bay was Karabelnaïa. A third bay, separated by the northern extremity of Sebastopol town from the inner harbour, and much smaller in size, is Artillery Bay, sometimes called Merchants' or Commercial Harbour; since it accommodated, on the west, ships for landing artillery and stores, and on the east, ships laden with general merchandise for the town, garrison, and fleet. The merchants' quay, on the east side of this bay, was finely constructed and ornamented with pillars of granite, which had been brought down the Dnieper from the interior of Russia; and near this quay were the principal shops of the town. The rocks on the western side of the bay had been blasted and allowed to fall into the water, to form a terrace whereon to construct buildings for the artillery and engineers. The only other bay on the south side of the harbour, necessary to be noticed here, is Quarantine Bay or Harbour, so named because the Russians built a lazaretto or quarantine establishment on its banks.

Perhaps nothing effected by Russia, during the

reign of the Emperor Nicholas, displayed the bold grandeur of that monarch's plans more strikingly than the docks at Sebastopol, and the aqueduct which supplied those docks with water. All the ships-of-war were built at Nicolaieff, up the river Bug; but the smaller ship-building, and the whole of the repairing and fitting, were conducted at Sebastopol; and to afford accommodation for this work, docks were planned. It must have been no inconsiderable series of docks that was required; for the Russian fleet at Sebastopol, when laid up for the winter 1853–4, comprised eighteen first-rates, seven frigates, thirty steamers, thirty-six smaller vessels-of-war, twenty-eight gun-boats, and thirty transports, with an aggregate register of 10,000 tons.* English engineers have been largely employed in past years in the service of the Russian governments; and it was the lot of an Englishman to construct those docks at Sebastopol which afterwards became so celebrated in connection with the events of the war. Mr Upton, before he went to Russia, was a surveyor, who assisted Telford in constructing the great mail-road to Holyhead; he displayed much skill in his profession; but having become amenable to the law, he hastily left England in 1826, and went to the Crimea as an engineer in the Russian service. At that date, the harbour at Sebastopol was in a very inefficient state, there being great difficulty in maintaining a sufficient depth of water for large ships. Upton took the management of the works; and during a period of nearly thirty years, he was engaged in constructing docks and other large works at Sebastopol and other parts of the Black Sea. The Emperor Nicholas conferred upon him the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the army.

The docks, the chief result of Upton's labours in the east, were formed in the inlet which branches out of the inner harbour, and which was on that account frequently called Dockyard Creek. The works constructed, during a long course of years, were of vast magnitude. A basin, 400 feet long, 300 broad, and 24 deep, was formed for the reception of vessels which needed repair; and connected with this basin were five docks—one for first-rate ships, two for second-rates, and two for frigates; three of the locks which connected these with the basin, were nearly sixty feet in width. The labour required in these works was prodigious; the basins and docks were cut in the solid rock, and lined with cement; the quays were well and strongly built of limestone, with granite copings. As the docks were above the level of the sea, ships had to be elevated into them by means of the locks, which effected a rise of ten feet each. Perhaps the aqueduct was still more remarkable than the docks themselves. With a hope of escaping the dreaded *teredo navalis*, the emperor determined that the basin should be filled with fresh water instead of salt; and Upton taxed his ingenuity for the means of attaining this end. He made the waters of the Tchernaya available. To form a great reservoir, and thus to insure a constant supply of water, he constructed an enormous stone-dike across a mountain-gorge, near the village of Tchorgouna, eight or ten miles south-east of Sebastopol; proper sluices being so placed as to prevent too great a pressure of water in the event of unusually heavy rains. The aqueduct, a beautiful work about twelve miles in length, brought the water into the docks, keeping on the left bank of the Tchernaya, passing the bridge at Inkermann, and winding round the heights near the upper end of the harbour. Near the Careening Bay, the ravines and hills oppose such obstacles, that the due level of the aqueduct called for the construction of a tunnel 800 feet in length, another of smaller dimensions, and three elevated works to carry the water over the valleys.

A great naval depôt, on which so many millions of roubles had been thus spent, was not likely to be left by the Emperor Nicholas in an undefended state. Forts of vast magnitude were constructed at points where the guns might command the entrances to the various bays and harbours. The Quarantine Bay, outside the harbour, was defended by a double battery of the same name, mounting fifty guns. Near that was Fort Alexander, sixty-four guns, off which the line of sunken vessels began. Next was a battery of fifty guns, guarding the entrance to Artillery Bay. Between the bay just named and the inner harbour was an immense work, Fort Nicholas, mounting nearly 200 guns, and threatening any ships which might approach. On the other or eastern side of the mouth of the same bay was Fort Paul, a small work of thirty guns. Beyond this point, higher up the harbour, no forts existed until the progress of the war suggested a further strengthening of Sebastopol. These various forts were of tremendous strength; most of them were casemated, and some in double tiers; and all were increased in power during 1854. The positions, too, were so chosen that a cross-fire could be maintained in almost every direction; insomuch that, should a hostile ship succeed in entering the harbour, it might encounter shots at every yard of its progress, and be completely riddled ere it reached the inner harbour or principal port. The arrangements were such, too, that guns might be accumulated on some of the forts, far beyond the nominal or usual strength.

Although so eminently important a place, Sebastopol was left entirely undefended on the land-side until a comparatively recent date: the

* At the time when the Allies appeared off Sebastopol, in September 1854, and before the sinking of the ships at the mouth took place, the harbour contained seventeen line-of-battle ships: the *Twelve Apostles*, 120 guns; *Paris*, 120 guns; the *Three Saints*, 120 guns; the *Grand-Duke Constantine*, 120 guns; *Vladimir*, 120 guns; *Sviaboslaw*, 84 guns; *Rostislaw*, 84 guns; *Uriel*, 84 guns; *Chabrie*, 84 guns; *Yagudiel*, 84 guns; *Selaphœl*, 84 guns; the *Three Hierarchs*, 84 guns; *Tro-Sviatitalia*, 84 guns; *Varna*, 84 guns; *Gabriel*, 84 guns; the *Empress Mary*, 84 guns; and *Tchesmé*, 80 guns. There were nine frigates, corvettes, and brigs: the *Cagul*, 60 guns; *Roulefgi*, 60 guns; *Kawarna*, 60 guns; *Medea*, 60 guns; *Calypso*, 18 guns; *Pylades*, 18 guns; *Ptolemæus*, 20 guns; *Theseus*, 20 guns; *Æneas*, 20 guns. To these were added six large and six small steamers, and a multitude of smaller vessels, transports, gun-boats, &c., to the number of seventy-five.


PORTION OF
THE CRIMEA
FORMING CHIEF SCENE OF WARFARE.
Scale of English Miles
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Inkerman
Karani
BALAKLAVA
Kamara
Duvanka
BAKCHI SERAI
Chuphut Kaleh
Wasp Fort
C. Constantine
Fort Constantine
Strelitzka Bay
Quarantine Bay
Careening Bay
Careening Creek
Careening Harbour
Victoria Harbour
Victoria Creek
Balaklava Harbour
Balaklava Creek
Ruins of Fishermans Tower
Ruins of Genoese Tower
Ruins of Genoese Fort
Ruins of Genoese Castle
Ruins of Genoese Church
Ruins of Genoese Wall
Ruins of Genoese Houses
Ruins of Genoese Gate
Ruins of Genoese Aqueduct
Ruins of Genoese Cemetery
Ruins of Genoese Chapel
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Ruins of Genoese Silversmiths
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Ruins of Genoese Tobacconists
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Ruins of Genoese Egg Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Poultry Dealer
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Ruins of Genoese Crab Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Shrimp Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Prawn Merchant
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Ruins of Genoese Mussel Merchant
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Ruins of Genoese Sea Urchin Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Starfish Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Jellyfish Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Seaweed Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Coral Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Sponge Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Pearl Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Amber Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Ivory Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Tortoiseshell Merchant
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Ruins of Genoese Isinglass Maker
Ruins of Genoese Parchment Maker
Ruins of Genoese Vellum Maker
Ruins of Genoese Paper Maker
Ruins of Genoese Cardboard Maker
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Ruins of Genoese Millboard Maker
Ruins of Genoese Strawboard Maker
Ruins of Genoese Woodpulp Maker
Ruins of Genoese Rag Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Waste Paper Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Old Iron Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Scrap Metal Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Old Clothes Merchant
Ruins of Genoese Second Hand Dealer
Ruins of Genoese Pawnbroker
Ruins of Genoese Moneylender
Ruins of Genoese Banker
Ruins of Genoese Stockbroker
Ruins of Genoese Insurance Broker
Ruins of Genoese Shipbroker
Ruins of Genoese Commission Agent
Ruins of Genoese Factor
Ruins of Genoese Auctioneer
Ruins of Genoese Valuer
Ruins of Genoese Estate Agent
Ruins of Genoese Surveyor
Ruins of Genoese Architect
Ruins of Genoese Builder
Ruins of Genoese Contractor
Ruins of Genoese Clerk of Works
Ruins of Genoese Foreman
Ruins of Genoese Labourer
Ruins of Genoese Navvy
Ruins of Genoese Hodman
Ruins of Genoese Bricklayer
Ruins of Genoese Mason
Ruins of Genoese Stonecutter
Ruins of Genoese Slater
Ruins of Genoese Tiler
Ruins of Genoese Plasterer
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Ruins of Genoese Glazier
Ruins of Genoese Plumber
Ruins of Genoese Gasfitter
Ruins of Genoese Waterfitter
Ruins of Genoese Electrician
Ruins of Genoese Telegraph Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Telephone Engineer
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Ruins of Genoese Radio Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Television Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Computer Engineer
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Ruins of Genoese Intranet Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Extranet Engineer
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Ruins of Genoese Proto Engineer
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Ruins of Genoese Tritero Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Tetarto Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Pempto Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Hekto Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Hepto Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Octo Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Ennea Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Deca Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Hendeca Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Dodeca Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Trideca Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Tetradeca Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Pentadeca Engineer
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Ruins of Genoese Octadeca Engineer
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Ruins of Genoese Icosa Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Hecto Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Kilo Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Myria Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Mega Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Giga Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Tera Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Peta Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Exa Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Zetta Engineer
Ruins of Genoese Yotta Engineer

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government never suspecting the possibility of a hostile army occupying the plateau south of the town. There was not in 1834 so much as a gate or the smallest rampart—the streets of the town ascending to the open country or plateau itself without any interruptions. It was not until after a dispute with the English government in 1837, concerning the ship *Vixen*, that the emperor thought proper to attend to the land-defences of this place; but even then the north side of the harbour, rather than the south, received his attention; for at the breaking out of the war in 1853 there were no other defences on the south than a short wall, loopholed for musketry, but without any strengthening by towers or bastions: a wall utterly useless against large ordnance.

The north side of the harbour, though but little inhabited previous to the war, presents natural facilities for a position of great strength—facilities which the military engineers in the service of the czar did not neglect. The ground is higher than on the south side. On those heights were constructed what may be considered the citadel of Sebastopol, the Sievernaya, North Fort,

BALAKLAVA.

or Star Fort, in such a position as to command the whole town and docks, while itself could be attacked only on the land-side. This fort was regarded as so important, that many authorities, before the siege of Sebastopol had far advanced, pronounced an attack on the south of Sebastopol useless until the Sievernaya were taken. Sir Howard Douglas considered it to be 'the key of Sebastopol.' On the heights were various minor forts; while near the water's edge, at the entrance of the harbour, was Fort Constantine, a vast work of 104 guns, which, fronting Fort Alexander, rendered it perilous for any hostile ship to attempt to enter the harbour. Sir Howard thought that, 'the North Fort being taken, the Telegraph and Wasp Batteries on the northern heights, Fort Constantine and the forts below, being commanded and attacked in reverse, must soon fall; while the town, docks, arsenal, and barracks on the south side of the harbour would be at the mercy of the Allies, who by the fire of their batteries might entirely destroy them all. On the contrary, by attacking the place from the south, the enemy holding the northern heights, although the works on the crest of the southern heights should be breached and taken, the town, the body of the place, with its docks and arsenals, will not be tenable by the besiegers till the great work on the northern side, and all its defensive dependencies, shall have been captured.'* It remained for the events of the siege to determine the justness or fallacy of these and other opinions expressed on the subject when the operations were about to begin.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE.

It was on the historically interesting peninsula described in the last section, that the Allied armies took up their position after the flank-march. From Inkermann to Cape Chersonese,

* *Naval Gunnery*, Fourth Edition, p. 619.

from Cape Chersonese to Balaklava, all became by degrees virtually one great camp, having the formidable Sebastopol on its northern margin. Death deprived the French of their leader at this critical moment; and it remained for Canrobert to assist Raglan in carrying out those arrangements which the latter had planned with St Arnaud.

When Lord Raglan arrived with his army on the heights above Balaklava, on the 26th, he expected little opposition in that quarter; but, as a measure of precaution, he sent on the Rifles to crown the heights, and arranged other battalions in commanding positions. On one of the heights was a small post of little value, an old ruined Genoese castle, that was soon taken by the artillery and the Rifles; but before this capture, Lord Raglan had a narrow escape from a shell discharged by the garrison. The villages of Kadikoï and Balaklava, the one on a small river two or three miles from the harbour, and the other on the eastern shore of the harbour itself, were taken and occupied; and the heights being also occupied, the British had secured a wholly new base of operations. A narrow defile constitutes the only approach to the harbour on the land-side; a small force of the enemy stationed here might have proved a formidable obstruction to the British; but the Russians, not expecting an attack in this quarter, had left the defile undefended. Lord Raglan entered the village about noon; the inhabitants presented to him fruit, flowers, bread, and salt; and he assured them they were safe from molestation. Small as the harbour is, the waters are deep, and the *Agamemnon* steamed in safely. Lord Raglan joyfully greeted Sir Edmund Lyons, who had arrived by sea; for a position had been now attained where the supplies from the fleet were immediately in the rear of the armies requiring that service.

It is asserted by Mr Danby Seymour, that no truer picture of this singular little harbour can be given than that presented by Homer of the port of the Læstrigons, which Karl Ritter identifies with Balaklava.* Europe presents scarcely another harbour similar to it, except, perhaps, among the fiords of Norway. The coast near it consists of chalk-cliffs nearly 1000 feet in height, and the opening which affords entrance to the harbour is so narrow as scarcely to be visible at a distance of two miles at sea—not so much on account of its narrowness, perhaps, as because it is somewhat oblique to the coast-line. The entrance gradually widens, until the little inlet forms a harbour in which fifty or sixty ships may moor, and in which the water is deep enough for the largest vessels afloat. Two ruined fortifications, constructed by the Genoese centuries ago, crown the heights on either side of the entrance; and whatever military force commands these heights must of necessity command the harbour: hence the opinion of the Allies, formed many months earlier, that a sea-attack on Balaklava would be useless unless accompanied by an attack on land. The width of the entrance scarcely exceeds 800 feet; and even the harbour itself is little more than 1200, resembling rather a large basin than a harbour. In some parts, the depth of water is so great as 100 fathoms. Whatever may have been the relation between the harbour and the mythic stories of the ancients, Balaklava was certainly known to the Greeks. The Genoese seized it during the middle ages, gave it the name of Cembalo, and built the two forts. After being occupied by Tatars and Turks, it passed in 1780 into the hands of a colony of Arnaout Greeks, who were encouraged by the Empress Catherine. A small population of trading Greeks continued to occupy the town or village down to the period of the war. Concerning the name, some writers trace it to Pallakium, a Greek fortress once standing here; others to Baluchlacca, a name which has something Oriental in its appearance; but the favourite etymology derives the name from *bella clava*, 'beautiful port.'

The seizure being effected, no further military movements could be made until the fleet had brought round the guns, provisions, and other stores to Balaklava. Immediately on the receipt of Lord Raglan's message, conveyed by the nocturnal gallop of Lieutenant Maxse, naval arrangements were at once made by Admiral Dundas and Sir Edmund Lyons. The whole steam-squadron, headed by the *Agamemnon*, and accompanied by several transports carrying siege-guns, left the mouth of the Katcha on the 26th of September, and arrived off Balaklava on the same day, doubling Cape Chersonese. The officers and men on board the slower-sailing ships watched anxiously this departure. They 'looked after the steaming squadron,' according to a writer belonging to one of the ships, 'with a heavy heart, seeing vanish with it their hopes of glory and prize-money. Especially since the battle of the Alma—which the fleet, sailing close to land, could witness very well—a wish to emulate the heroism of the land-troops has seized hold of the crews; and not all the horrors which the fatigue-parties, sent on shore the next day to help in transporting the wounded, saw on the field of battle have cooled their ardour.' The main body of the fleet remained at anchor several days off the Katcha, there being insufficient anchorage for so large a number at Sebastopol. At the request of Lord Raglan, the admiral supplied 1000 marines, who were sent round in the *Agamemnon* to take the place of an

* Within a long recess a bay there lies
Edged round with cliffs, high pointing to the skies.
The jutting shores that swell on either side,
Contract its mouth, and break the rushing tide.
Our eager sailors seize the fair retreat,
And bound within the port their crowded fleet;
For here retired the sinking billows sleep,
And smiling calmness silvered o'er the deep.
I only in the bay refused to moor,
And fixed without my hawsers to the shore:
From thence we climbed a point, whose airy brow
Commands the prospect of the plains below.
POPE'S HOMER, *Odyssey*, x. 101.

equal number of soldiers employed in guarding the heights that overlook the little harbour.

Busy were the hours and days at Balaklava. Ships found ingress and egress by a gap so narrow, that careful handling was necessary to prevent collisions; and these ships brought supplies of various kinds, not only from the main fleet at the Katcha, but from Constantinople and other depôts. The largest and longest steamers could not enter, on account of the tortuous direction of the mouth: they anchored outside, while the smaller steamers and transports entered the harbour. The tents for the army were among the first articles landed; during ten or twelve days, the soldiers had obtained but little covering at night, little shelter from rain, cold, and wind; and many a poor fellow was cut off by the sickness thus engendered. The landing of the siege-artillery was more formidable work; for Balaklava, being a mere village, had no quay worthy of the name, and hence the difficulties were serious in disembarking guns of great magnitude and weight: they were lowered from the ships into barges provided with a kind of drawbridge; artillerymen and seamen aiding in this labour, and strings of horses being then employed in dragging the guns up to the heights forming the plateau between Balaklava and Sebastopol. About sixty heavy guns of the siege-train were thus successively landed. Among the reinforcements which, together with supplies, arrived during the first few days, were the 4th and 6th regiments of dragoons; but it was speedily found that the medical department was defective in strength: many men fell daily under the influence of cholera, and medicines were too few for the wants of the surgeons, who were themselves also too few in number.

By the 30th, all the heavy guns having been 'parked' or collected on the heights above Balaklava, the time had arrived for arranging the march towards Sebastopol, and the selection of ground for head-quarters, divisional quarters, depôts, &c. On the 2d of October, the advance was made and the positions taken up; the six divisions of the army being disposed in conformity with the general plan whereon the siege was to be conducted; and posts of sentinels, pickets, vedettes, &c., established to watch the movements of the enemy. When the soldiers were thus removed from Balaklava, the 1000 marines pitched their camp on the hills bounding the harbour, made a road, and cut some intrenchments; the position was easily defended by musketry, and prevented any attack by the Russians on the ships in the harbour. A naval brigade or division was also formed, under Captain Lushington of the *Albion;* and the sailors, about 1000 in number, displayed great alacrity and delight in pulling up their guns to the heights, being well disposed towards any tactics which would afford them a scene of excitement and of possible glory. The position taken up by the head-quarters of the army was about half-way between Sebastopol and Balaklava, three to four miles from each in a straight line; but the advanced posts were much nearer the enemy, and received many a shot from the larger guns at Sebastopol.

Meanwhile, the French had been landing their supplies and siege-material at another part of the peninsula, west instead of south of Sebastopol. As the harbour at Balaklava, with all its advantages, can accommodate only a small fleet at once, General Canrobert soon decided on adopting a landing-place elsewhere; he selected the two bays near Cape Chersonese, generally called Kamiesch and Arrow Bays, between Sebastopol and that Cape. The French quickly formed a landing-place in Kamiesch Bay, established a little town or cantonment on the beach, landed their artillery and stores, despatched their regiments up to the heights, and commenced their arrangements for the attack of the formidable stronghold. The 3d and 4th divisions, under General Forey, were charged with the duty of besieging the left or west side of Sebastopol; while the 1st and 2d divisions, under General Bosquet, were formed into a corps of observation; to occupy the positions commanding the Valley of the Tchernaya, and to protect the siege operations against any attempt on the part of the enemy coming from the interior of the Crimea. The Turkish division, it was agreed, should form a reserve for either of these two French corps, as circumstances might render desirable. The landing having commenced at Kamiesch on the 30th of September, the advanced French pickets came, on the 1st of October, within 400 yards of the Cossack vedettes outside Sebastopol. On the next day, the 4th division took up a position about two miles from the town, its left resting on the coast at Arrow Bay, its right on a point about two miles further south, and its front commanding the west and south-west sides of Sebastopol. On the 3d of the month, siege-material continued to be landed in large quantity, while the generals and engineers made many and careful observations on the movements and defences at Sebastopol; thirty large guns from the ships were landed, to be worked by Captain Rigaud; and 1000 sailors were formed into a naval brigade, similar to that on the English side. On the 4th, the third division took up its place to the right of the fourth, and extending thence to a great ravine which runs down to the inner harbour of Sebastopol; and on many successive days, stores of all kinds were landed at Kamiesch, and carried up to the siege-camp.

Prince Menchikoff did not waste these momentous days in idleness. Having sunk the ships in the harbour, and having made the flank-march towards Baktchéserai, he awaited the manœuvres of the Allies as a guide to his future proceedings. His spies, numerous and alert, had ascertained both the numbers and the movements of his opponents; and having thus found that the north

side of Sebastopol was left entirely free from danger, he immediately planned measures for strengthening the defences on the south. On the 30th of September, he returned to the town, and set his engineers busily to work. At this juncture, reinforcements arrived westward from Kertch and southward from Perekop, effecting an immediate and important augmentation of the garrison. A brigade of light cavalry, under Lieutenant-general Ryjoff, took up a position near the high road over the Katcha, to maintain a communication with Simferopol; while light detachments were sent to the mountains near Tchorgouna, the Tchernaya, and the Valley of Baidar, between the Allies and the interior of the country. A detachment of regular cavalry, Cossacks, and field-pieces, was sent to the village of Baidar, to prevent the Allies from obtaining cattle, fodder, or provisions. Another detachment started for Eupatoria, to ascertain what the Allies had effected there; when it was found that the town had been put into a state of defence, and garrisoned by a small force of English, French, and Turks, backed by a squadron at sea.

Kamiesch Bay.

In order to observe the Allied position between Sebastopol and Balaklava, a force of cavalry advanced to the Tchernaya, and made a reconnaissance. During these movements in the field, which occupied the first week in October, pickets and bodies of skirmishers were planted wherever they might annoy the Allies during the progress of the siege-works. Meanwhile, the strengthening of Sebastopol progressed rapidly. Menchikoff obtained the valuable aid of an engineer named Todtleben or Todleben—a young man who, born of poor shopkeepers at Riga, had risen to the post of captain in the engineers at the age of thirty-two. When the siege was about to commence, Menchikoff is said to have asked the head-engineer how long a time it would require to place Sebastopol in a state of defence: the answer was 'two months;' whereupon young Todtleben stepped forward and undertook to effect the work in two weeks, if provided with a large number of men; his offer was accepted, and he kept his word. The energy and skill displayed in this enterprise won for him the rank of colonel; and from that time he had the direction of all the batteries and other works of defence on the margin of the town. Todtleben afterwards rose to the dignity of general and aid-de-camp to the emperor, and received distinguished attention from the grand-dukes and other high personages who visited the scene of operations. He appears to have well deserved the encomiums passed upon him, both by his opponents and his own countrymen.

At this point it becomes desirable to explain the meaning of a few terms employed in fortification and sieges. The history of a war does not necessarily involve a description of the military art; but the circumstances under which the siege of Sebastopol was carried on were so peculiar, that the details will be better understood if the nature of the *trenches* be previously known—those trenches which had so much concern in the miseries endured by the British troops in the following winter.

When a town or post is to be defended from external attack, a ditch is the primary obstacle interposed—a dry ditch fifty or a hundred feet in width, by twenty or more in depth: facilities being in many cases at hand for filling this ditch with water. Within the ditch are constructed elevated ramparts or works, of earth or stone, or both combined, with embrasures or square holes cut in the upper edge, through which cannon can be pointed at the enemy. Within the crest of this rampart is a platform or banquette, whereon musketeers or riflemen may stand, to fire over the crest at any of the enemy's soldiers who may approach within shot-distance. Various kinds of works under the names of bastions, barbettes, cavaliers, &c., within the parapet, further enable the garrison to strengthen their position against the besiegers. Besides these inner-works, are various outer-works, to shield the wall or rampart from the cannon-shot of the enemy, and to repel any infantry who may approach the ditch; these outer-works comprise ravelins, redoubts, glacis, abattis, palisades, covered-ways, &c., varying greatly in form and construction, according to the kind of service to be rendered, but each affording strength to all the rest. The outermost work is usually the glacis or slope, an inclined terrace, about fifty yards in width, terminating outwards at the natural level of the country; it serves to expose the approach of the besiegers, and to place them under the action of the guns of the fortress—the crest or upper edge of this glacis being frequently rendered more difficult to traverse by an abattis or barricade formed of sharpened branches of trees.

Now, an enemy, endeavouring to capture such a town or fortress, must consider how these various obstacles are to be overcome. Infantry must enter the place, to constitute a capture; but how can the infantry penetrate such difficulties? The ramparts are generally too far elevated above the ditch to permit soldiers to climb them, even if cannon and musketry had spared them during their advance; but these projectiles would certainly strike down the men before they could effect their approach. Cavalry are of little use in such operations; they can ward off the approach of an exterior force coming to relieve the garrison, but a siege affords them little other field for operations. There remains the artillery of the besiegers. This artillery, consisting of cannon, howitzers, and mortars, of various sizes, discharges either solid shot or hollow shells, the latter filled with gunpowder or with missiles, which scatter death all around them when the shell explodes. If the shells be discharged into the town, they may fire and destroy the various magazines and buildings; if the solid shot be hurled against the wall or rampart, they may batter it down or make a breach in its continuity. To effect this work of destruction, the guns are arranged in batteries of two, six, a dozen, twenty, or any selected number; if it be a field-battery, the guns, light, and on carriages, can be wheeled from place to place; if an earthen battery, the heavy guns are planted upon an earthen mound of great thickness, shaped according to the direction in which the fire is to take effect, with sand-bags, gabions, and fascines, to shelter the artillerymen. These sand-bags are of canvas, carried empty with the army, and held ready to be filled with any sand or earth that may be at hand; the gabions are large hollow cylinders of wicker-work, similarly to be filled with earth; the fascines are long bundles of tightly bound twigs or reeds, that may be placed in any convenient position to afford shelter. Even though a breach be made in the wall or rampart of the fortress by some or all of these contrivances, the infantry could not rush forward and enter the place without exposure to a destructive fire while crossing the glacis. Hence the necessity for *sapping* or *trenching*, to form a hollow or sunken road, along which the infantry may advance; and when this road is so far formed as to allow the men to occupy it, the besiegers are said to 'open the trenches.' To effect this, however, is a formidable work; the sappers would be picked off by the cannon and musketry if they worked in a straight line towards the fortress; and in order to avoid this, they work in a zigzag, advancing diagonally to the right and then to the left, that either one side or the other of the trench may form a shelter. The trench is wide enough to accommodate several men abreast, and deep enough to allow the men to pass wholly beneath the level of the ground. When one of these has been formed parallel with the front of the fortress, and at a distance of 600, 800, or 1000 yards from it, it constitutes the 'first parallel;' another and similar parallel, half-way between the former and the fortress, is the 'second parallel;' while another, at the very foot of the glacis, obtains the name of the 'third parallel.' The earth taken from these parallel trenches is thrown up on the side nearest the fortress, thereby affording additional shelter to the men in the trench, and enabling batteries of large ordnance to be placed in favourable positions for breaching the rampart. The zigzags serve as 'approaches' to the parallels; and each parallel serves as a base for other zigzags beyond it. Thus the works are continued until the besiegers' infantry are very close to the besieged place. The breaching-guns, when all is ready, pour forth a tremendous fire or bombardment, until a breach is effected, when a 'storming-party' rushes up from the trenches, and endeavours to enter the town or fortress by the breach, despite all the obstacles the defenders may have accumulated at that point. The defenders count upon many kinds of succours during these operations—that the soil may be too hard to permit the besiegers to dig trenches; that the trenches may be laid under water by sluices; or that the garrison may be sufficiently strong to make frequent 'sorties,' interrupting the trench-work.

Such, in brief, is the philosophy of a siege. In the case of Sebastopol, the first difficulty of the besiegers consisted in the hardness of ground, which rendered it a work of great labour to excavate the approaches. This difficulty was repeatedly and forcibly dwelt upon in the dispatches of the generals in command.

Sebastopol having no defensive wall of any account, it was left for Menchikoff and Todtleben to construct such towers, forts, redoubts, batteries, or lines of fortified trenches and ramparts, as might repel the Allies, or at least delay the capture. None of the great forts situated on the harbour commanded the southern land-side; hence new works had to be constructed. From the battery near Artillery Bay, a crenellated wall, or wall loopholed for musketry, was constructed, following the steep of the hill to the plateau, where it joined a large round tower or fort, mounting twenty guns on the platform, and surrounded by a battery at a lower level. Under the cannon of this round fort was a large fortified barrack, flanked and armed by several strong works. From this fort, a line of defence was constructed entirely round the south and east of the town, to the spot where the Careening Bay enters the harbour; making the whole circuit of defence, from Artillery Bay to Careening Bay, nearly five miles in extent, including sinuosities. This was not a perfect military wall or rampart, but a sort of ridge about three feet in thickness, with a ditch in front, the earth from which was thrown outwards, to form a glacis between the besiegers and the besieged. The wall, if it may so be called, was not broad and strong enough for cannon; but on those points where, in a regular fortification, bastions would have been constructed, Todtleben threw up platforms whereon heavy guns could be mounted, to fire over the wall, many of which were the guns taken from the ships in the harbour. The centre of the line was defended by a large fort, raised on a high point at the upper or southern end of the town. The names Flagstaff Battery, Garden Battery, Barrack Battery, Great Redan, Little Redan, Mamelon Fort, Malakoff Fort—some belonging to a later period in the history of the siege—were all applied to works constructed in consequence of the commencement of the siege itself, and on various elevated spots outside of the town, and in most cases exterior to the 'lines' of trench and rampart.

The Allied position gradually assumed a definite character during the month of October, dependent in part on the defensive arrangements made by the Russians. The entire camp occupied a plateau six miles in length by four in breadth; but the siege-works of course grouped themselves near the town to be attacked. The plateau, bounded by an abrupt descent on the east, was defended along this edge by a breast-work, or earthwork breast-high, constructed by the French nearly from Balaklava to Inkermann, with batteries, redoubts, and redans, to defend the more assailable points—the last named of these, *redans*, being earthworks forming two sides of a triangle, like one tooth of a saw. This line of defence was intended to guard the plateau from an attack by the Russians on the east. The northern edge of the plateau, not much above the level of the highest part of the town, has several spurs, or hilly knolls, jutting out north-west towards the Karabelnaïa or eastern half of the town; and on these spurs the English constructed their breaching-batteries, while the French constructed their approaches and parallels on the south-west of the main part of the town. Between the spurs are gorges or ravines, running down towards the harbour. Various batteries were constructed by the British, none at a less distance than two-thirds of a mile from the town. In rear of the batteries, beginning on the right or north-east, was the 2d division, then the 1st, the light, the 3d, and the 4th, in order, each occupying such a position as should render its services most available when the siege commenced, or to repel any sortie of the garrison. Between the English and French positions was the longest and deepest of many ravines, running down to the inner harbour; and westward of this were the French batteries, not perched upon spurs between gorges, but occupying a plain almost on a level with the highest part of the town. The English approaches, zigzags, and parallels, were directed towards the forts that defended the Karabelnaïa; whereas the French approached gradually nearer and nearer to the main streets of Sebastopol, on the other side of the inner harbour.

The difficulty of dragging the heavy siege-guns up to the heights from Balaklava and Kamiesch, and of digging the trenches in very hard soil, retarded the progress of the siege, and afforded Todtleben time to construct his defensive works. The French established their first parallel on the 10th of October, at a distance of 700 or 800 yards from the place; while their allies were enforced to commence at a greater distance, on account of the obstacles afforded by the site.

Meanwhile the English and French nations, like spoiled children—spoiled by the battle of the Alma—could not repress their impatience at the slow progress of events at Sebastopol. The false rumour at the beginning of the month had first excited, and then annoyed them; and every day's telegraphic news was expected to tell of the fall of the great fortress. The newspapers sought to allay the impatience, by assuring the public that the capture, however long prevented, must at length occur; or they appealed to reason, by counting up the tons or kilogrammes which the siege-material weighed, and shewed how many days must necessarily be required to drag such ponderous masses up to the plateau, and place them in position. The soldiers, too, were burning to add another to their deeds of glory. Mr Russell comments on the difference between the English and French armies, in regard to the

means for maintaining cheerfulness among the men: 'The silence and gloom of our camp, as compared with the activity and bustle of that of the French, are very striking. No drums, no bugle-call, no music of any kind, is ever heard within our precincts; while our neighbours close by keep up incessant rolls, fanfaronnades, and flourishes, relieved every evening by the fine performances of their military bands. The fact is, many of our instruments have been placed in store, and the regimental bands are broken up and disorganised, the men being devoted to the performance of the duties for which the ambulance-corps was formed (that is, conveying the sick from the camp to the hospitals). I think, judging from one's own feelings, and from the expressions of those around, that the want of music in camp is productive of graver consequences than appear likely to occur at first blush from such a cause. Every military man knows how regiments, when fatigued on the march, cheer up at the strains of their band, and dress up, keep up, and walk on with animation and vigour when it is playing. At camp, I have always observed with pleasure the attentive auditory who gathered every evening at the first taps of the drum to listen to the music. At Aladyn and Devno, the men used to wander off to the lines of the 77th, because it had the best band in the division; and when the bands were silenced because of the prevalence of cholera, out of a humane regard for the feelings of the sick, the soldiers were wont to get up singing-parties in their tents in lieu of their ordinary entertainment. It seems to be an error to deprive them of a cheering and wholesome influence at the very time they need it most. The military band is not meant alone for the delectation of garrison-towns, or for the pleasure of their officers in quarters; and the men are fairly entitled to its inspiration during the long and weary march in the enemy's country, and in the monotony of a standing camp ere the beginning of a siege. Our neighbours have made the head-quarter camp quite lively by their vicinity and their excellent music.' There can be little doubt that these observations are founded on a due appreciation of the effects of martial music on bodies of men placed as the British were before Sebastopol.

The trench-work proceeded vigorously during the second week of the month. On one particular evening, after sunset, 2400 French took up a position in line, in front of the fortress, set to work with pick and shovel, and by daylight the next morning had dug a trench three-quarters of a mile in length, at a distance of about 1000 yards from the forts; the Russians, to their astonishment, saw a ditch, parapet, and banquette, where nothing had been visible on the preceding evening. Each French soldier dug and guarded in turn; and as each had about twenty inches of length intrusted to him to excavate, the whole number were enabled to accomplish this extensive work during the night: at a subsequent period, gabions and fascines were brought up, to face and strengthen the embrasures of this parapet, ready for the reception of a long row of guns. Such was the general plan on which the approaches were made by both armies: working-parties would go out in the dusk of the evening, and form as much trench, parapet, and banquette as could be accomplished during the night; returning to camp at daylight—wearied, cold, sleepy, hungry, and perhaps stricken with the beginnings of ague, cholera, or fever. The pickets, under the charge of a colonel or captain, were sometimes more trying than the trenches; since the men, throughout a night which might be piercingly cold or incessantly stormy, had no relief from the duty of keeping watch in the silent darkness, ever on the alert against the possible approach of an enemy.

The Russians shewed themselves worthy defenders of the place; they not only worked night and day to strengthen the lines and forts, but they poured out shot, shell, and bullet against all the men and batteries which the Allies brought within range. This torrent kept the besiegers ever watchful, and occasioned much loss. Sometimes a 56, or even an 84-pounder would plunge down into and plough up the earth within a yard or two of an officer's tent, or would even pierce the tent itself, and carry off some of the simple chattels with which it was furnished. To kill the men, to dislodge the guns planted upon the earthen batteries, to crumble the batteries themselves into fragments—all were objects aimed at by this firing from the garrison; and the nearer the approach of the besiegers, the more perilous became their position on account of the fire. The firing was mostly during the day; but when the Russians could guess at the position of the working-parties, it continued during the night also, maintaining a roar that rendered it difficult for officers or men to snatch a few hours' sleep.

The word 'attack,' in siege-works, is applied to all the guns, batteries, parallels, and zigzags, intended to aid in the bombardment of a particular part of the fortress; and one attack is distinguished from another, either by indicating the relative positions, or by the name of the chief officer in command; thus we hear of the 'right attack' and the 'left attack,' and of 'Gordon's Battery' and 'Chapman's Battery,' in connection with those attacks. Each attack was directed towards or against some particular fort or redan, which it was necessary to silence before a conquest of the place could be effected. Opposite the British portion of the works, were the Russian forts, termed by the Allies the White Tower, the Redan, and the Barrack Battery; while the French confronted the Garden Battery, the Flagstaff Battery, the Round Tower, and two or three smaller batteries not specially named. The White Tower, when greatly strengthened at a later date, became the famous Malakoff or Malakhoff; the Mamelon and Little

Redan defences were not yet in existence at the period under notice.

Not only were the besiegers visited by missiles in every part of the 'attacks,' but the garrison made occasional sorties: emerging from the fortress in large bodies, in the dead of the night, working as much mischief as possible to the besiegers, and then returning to the fortress in such a way as to permit no entrance to the enemy. On the night of the 11th, the Russians made so vigorous a sortie, and were so vigorously met by the British, that the affair presented all the noise, excitement, and confusion of a regular battle; field-pieces and infantry being employed on both sides. The sortie was successfully repulsed, with little loss to the British.

Day after day passed, marked—on the part of the Russians—by the reception of reinforcements, the steady construction of new works, and the outpouring of shot and musketry against the besiegers; and on the part of the Allies, by the landing of men and stores at Balaklava and Kamiesch, the dragging of the heavy guns up to the heights, the formation of trenches, parapets, and earthen batteries, the mounting of these parapets and batteries with heavy guns and mortars, and the encamping of the three armies —English, French, and Turkish—in convenient positions behind the lines and batteries. All this time passed without any firing on the part of the Allies; the commanders decided that no cannonading should commence until all was prepared for a formidable bombardment; and thus it happened that, during the first half of the month of October, the besiegers were the attacked party rather than the attacking—greatly to the astonishment of those who, at a distance from the scene of operations, and imperfectly acquainted with the arrangements necessary for a siege, longed impatiently for news of ramparts battered down, forts destroyed, breaches stormed, the fortress entered, and the flags of the victors floating over the captured town.

MANŒUVRES OF THE FLEETS.

Preparations having thus been made for the bombardment by land, it may be desirable, before narrating the events of that tremendous cannonade, to pay attention to the movements of the Allied fleets during the month of October, including the cannonade by sea.

The services likely to be rendered by the magnificent war-ships, in the general operations, were partly as carriers and partly as combatants. The naval officers and seamen, ardently desirous of maintaining the ancient British character for prowess on the high seas, of course hoped for something better than the duty of carriers, the office of conveying soldiers, horses, guns, small-arms, shot, shell, provisions, medicines, and stores for the use of the army; or the duty of convoying a fleet of merchant-ships engaged in such a duty. Still, the service they rendered in this respect was very marked: it has already been adverted to, in connection with the flank-march; but additional illustration may be found in the words of Lieutenant-colonel Hamley, who, attached to the army as an artillery-officer, was competent to form an estimate on this matter: 'The campaign differed from all campaigns with which the reader has hitherto made himself acquainted, in some essential particulars. According to the practice of war up to the present time, it was necessary for an invading army, on first entering an enemy's territory, to secure one or more defensible posts as depôts, from whence to draw supplies, to form hospitals, and as points to retreat upon in case of disaster. As the army advanced from these points, the lines of communication grew more assailable, and it became necessary either to leave a movable force to keep the road open, or to secure and garrison some other strong points on the line of march, from whence to oppose any attempt the enemy might make to throw himself on the line of communication. In advancing, it was also impossible to disregard any fortress or body of troops of the enemy stationed on the flank: the former must be besieged and taken, the latter attacked and routed; or a strong force must be detached to hold either in check, before the advance could be continued in safety; and each of these necessary operations, of course, called for a certain expenditure of time or material. According to the old conditions of war, in the invasion of the Crimea near Eupatoria, and the advance on Sebastopol, the right flank of the army would be secure by resting on the sea, but the left would be totally unprotected. In the first place, the army, after landing its stores, must have strongly intrenched and garrisoned the depôt on the coast selected for them. As it advanced, the communication with this depôt must have been rendered secure, by detaching a force sufficient to repel any Russian army appearing on the flank of the line of march, and strong escorts must have accompanied all convoys between the army and its depôt. In order to leave, after these deductions, a sufficient force to carry on the siege, the invading army must have been far larger than that which the Allies possessed. It would also have been necessary to attack the fortress on that side on which the landing of the army was effected; because, a complete investment being impracticable, to have passed round the place would have been to leave the communications at the mercy of sallies from the garrison. All these considerations were obviated by the presence of steam. The fleet, moving as the army moved, within sight of, and in constant communication with it, carried the supplies and received the sick and wounded; and had the Russians, advancing from the interior in overwhelming numbers, attacked the left or threatened the rear, the army, falling back parallel to the coast, might have fought, and, if necessary, re-embarked, with the advantage of an immeasurably more powerful artillery—that of the fleet—

than the enemy could possibly have brought into the field. Thus the calculations and provisions which so largely contributed to the difficulties of warfare, and its chances of mishap, resolved themselves into the simple measures necessary to keep the army in readiness for battle while marching on the point in view.'*

But this service rendered, the seamen longed for some enterprise in which they would more actively participate in hostilities against the enemy; for some opportunity of punishing those Russians who in so tantalising a manner hid their ships behind stone-walls. The main body of the fleet, especially the sailing-ships, remained anchored during about three weeks, after the beginning of the flank-march, off the mouth of the Katcha, while the steam-squadron was despatched on diverse expeditions, principally to and from Balaklava. The names of Odessa, Yalta, Eupatoria, and Sebastopol, point to four localities at which some of the ships of the fleet either engaged with the enemy, or were ready so to do if instructions to that effect had been issued.

Odessa was twice spared during the spring and summer of 1854.† It was in danger in April, and again in August; it was partially bombarded on the first occasion, and left wholly untouched on the second; and it was much strengthened by the Russians after each of these visits. The English public were greatly surprised and irritated by this inactivity: an impression was very widely shared that the capture of this important town, by cutting off the communication between the Crimea and the Principalities, would weaken the right flank of the Russians; and vehement accusations were brought against Admiral Dundas for avoiding or neglecting the bombardment. At a later date, when the conduct of the war formed the subject of warm debate in parliament, Mr Sidney Herbert, who was secretary at war during the year 1854, defended the admiral, by explaining the circumstances that had determined the line of conduct against Odessa. His statement was to the effect, that Admiral Dundas was eager for the attack; that he had provided means for it; but that he was deterred by the English and French military commanders, on the strategic ground that the destruction of Odessa would liberate Russian troops, who would immediately be sent to the Crimea, thereby strengthening the force against which the Allies had to contend; and that it was solely on this account Odessa had been spared.‡ Mr Herbert offered no opinion concerning the soundness of this judgment on the part of the generals; he simply exonerated the admiral: and as a proof that the Earl of Aberdeen's government had not been negligent of the importance of naval operations in the Black Sea, he produced, with the sanction of Lord Palmerston's government, a dispatch that had been forwarded by the Admiralty to Admiral Dundas, at the time when the generals were forming the siege-approaches before Sebastopol.*

Yalta was the scene of a small expedition, immediately subsequent to the flank-march of the Allied armies. The structure and appearance of this place are very remarkable. Situated on the south coast, between thirty and forty miles east of Balaklava, the ground whereon Yalta is built is one of the few places on this coast where alluvium has been deposited, rendering it possible to walk for a few hundred yards on perfectly level ground. The coast-range here recedes a little from the sea; and a short but rapid river brings down earth which has formed a delta. On this delta, Yalta has been built, a small town inhabited by Tatars, who chiefly live by supplying the Russian nobility along the south coast during the summer months. Koch states that the position of Yalta is exquisite: 'The few houses in the foreground; the precipices, rising to a height of 4000 feet, which surround it in the shape of an amphitheatre; and in the rear, between the two, the declivity, displaying every hue of vegetation, and which rises to a considerable height in the ravine, and is covered with detached villas—all this forms a beautiful picture, though too large a surface for an artist.' At this lovely spot the Allies appear to have suspected that the Russian government had collected some stores or provisions; and a squadron was sent, comprising the *Sanspareil*, *Tribune*, *Firebrand*, *Jason*, *Golden Fleece*, and other steamers, either to fight or to bring away stores. There was, however, nothing belonging to the Russian government which could be seized; and as the Tatars had very little to sell, the ships effected nothing of consequence by the expedition.

Eupatoria well repaid the Allies for the exertions bestowed upon it. When the resolution had been taken to land the Allied armies at Old Fort, and to leave only a small force at Eupatoria, that force, under Captain Brock, proceeded to throw up slight fortifications around the town, and to establish a commerce in food with the inhabitants —not only for the supply of the garrison, but for transmission by sea to the commissariat officers

* *Campaign of Sebastopol*, p. 17.
† See Chapter IV. pp. 114-119.
‡ Debate in the House of Commons, June 7, 1855.

* '*The Secretary to the Admiralty to Vice-admiral Dundas.*

ADMIRALTY, *October* 13, 1854.

SIR—I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, with reference to the operations of the fleet under your orders, to call your special and particular attention to the necessity of exercising the utmost vigilance and care in preventing the movement of craft of all descriptions proceeding out of the Bay of Cherson and the river Dniester; and I am to signify their directions to you to take every precaution in your power to prevent communication with the Crimea from ports in that direction. My lords are further of opinion that, whenever the means at your disposal will admit, proper measures should be concerted with your colleagues in command of the Allied forces for obtaining an entrance by the Gulf of Kertch into the Sea of Azof, with a view to interrupt the communications of the enemy with the eastern shores of the Crimea, to which their lordships have always attached the greatest importance. In concert, likewise, with your colleagues, my lords consider that no opportunities should be lost to occupy the attention of the enemy by frequent attacks upon all parts of the coast extending from the mouths of the Danube to the Isthmus of Perekop, and that any proper opportunity for the bombardment of Odessa should not be omitted.'

at Balaklava or Kamiesch. The vicinity contained vast flocks and herds, which the Tatars, when assured of the friendly disposition of the Allies towards them, willingly brought into Eupatoria for sale. The more important the place became to the Allies, the more desirous were the Russians to interfere with the peaceful occupation. The *Leander*, the *Firebrand*, the *Megœra*, and two or three French and Turkish ships-of-war, were placed off the port, to afford assistance in the event of an attack. Towards the close of September, and early in October, rumours were rife of an intended assault by the Russians; and, in verification of these rumours, a hostile force appeared near the town on the 11th of the last-named month. Lieutenant Hamilton was sent on shore from the flotilla, with about 150 seamen and marines, and one field-piece. On the following morning, the field-piece was placed in a commanding position at the back of the town, where a small redoubt was thrown up, to be manned by the seamen. Captain Brock and other officers went out to make a reconnaissance on the steppe or plain outside the town, when suddenly a body of Russian cavalry, about 600 in number, appeared, advanced towards them, opened ranks, and displaying four field-pieces, immediately fired shot and shell. The single gun, shortly before landed from the *Leander*, returned the fire, and sent a shell among the cavalry that wrought much mischief. This gun being one against many, however, Captain Brock ordered a retreat into the town; but the seamen and marines from the *Leander* and *Megœra* quickly advanced, resumed possession of the redoubt and the gun, and remained near the spot during the night. At three o'clock in the morning, while all was dark, Lord Edward Cecil, a midshipman of the *Leander* in charge of the gun, observed dim traces of a body of the enemy's cavalry advancing towards the redoubt: he opened fire upon them; while the seamen and marines, rushing out from their quarters, quickly lined the redoubt and its barricades. A brisk fire was commenced on both sides, and was maintained for some hours; shells, shot, and bullets, roared and whistled continually, for, though a small force, each side was active. The Russians at length retired. As the redoubt had proved itself to be an important defence, a party of marines were landed from the *Firebrand*, under Lieutenant Pym, to strengthen the party there placed, bringing with them another field-piece and a rocket-tube. A second redoubt was constructed; and the first was strengthened by having the ditch made wider and deeper, and the parapet or breast-work rendered more substantial. The enemy advanced again on the 15th, burning some villages north of the town, and carrying off all the corn and cattle they could seize. To check in some measure these proceedings, the *Leander*, *Firebrand*, and *Arrow* gun-boat, steamed along the coast, sending in shot and shell wherever the enemy could be reached; and a supply of rocket-tubes having been sent from the main fleet on the 19th, the small garrison was enabled still more effectually to repel the enemy. Day by day, skirmishes occurred; for the vedettes of the enemy were within three miles of Eupatoria, and as the cavalry was now estimated at 3000 or 4000 in number, the military and naval defenders of the town were required to be constantly on the alert. The defences gradually became considerable. A deep ditch, backed by a strong breast-work of earth, was cut across the level ground in front of the north and south entrances to the town, and defended by guns planted in advantageous positions; several strong redoubts were constructed at the back of the town, armed with field-pieces and rocket-tubes; the streets which debouched upon the steppe were closed by strong barricades; and Captain Brock felt confidence in his ability to hold the place against any moderate number of Russian cavalry or Cossacks. Thus matters remained at Eupatoria until the winter, when more formidable manœuvres were made on both sides.

Sebastopol, however—the great Sebastopol—was the object yearned for, the place towards which the thoughts of the admirals and seamen were chiefly directed. Occasionally, during the first two weeks in October, a steamer would approach to reconnoitre; or an audacious little gun-boat, proud of its one gun, would fire away at Forts Constantine or Alexander, to try the effect of iron against stone at a distance of a mile and a half or two miles. Admiral Dundas, in a dispatch to the Admiralty, dated the 13th of October, stated that Sir Edmund Lyons continued to be busily occupied with the steam-squadron, assisting the British army at Balaklava; that Admiral Bruat, with a French squadron, was aiding the French in their position at Kamiesch and Arrow Bays; that the *Sidon*, *Inflexible*, *Cacique*, and *Caton*, were off Odessa, preventing any communication by sea with the Crimea; and that the principal sailing-vessels of both fleets, under Admirals Dundas and Hamelin, were anchored off the mouth of the Katcha. Four days after this, the great bombardment commenced. About that period, the western governments and the newspapers were beset with suggestions for raising or removing the sunken ships at Sebastopol, as a means of permitting the entrance of the Allies into the harbour; one of these will serve as an example of many;* but

* 'As it will doubtless become a matter of importance, especially at this season of the year, that the barrier which the sunken ships oppose to the entrance of vessels into the harbour of Sebastopol be speedily removed, I take the liberty of suggesting a means of accomplishing this, of the efficiency and practicability of which there can be little doubt. Instead of attempting to raise and secure them, which would occupy too much time, or to blow them up by gunpowder, which might not effectually remedy the difficulty, let each sunken vessel be so lightened by means of floats as to weigh her slightly out of the sea-bottom: she might then be readily tugged out by steamers into deep water, and there left for the present, her position being indicated by the usual means. Should suitable floats—such as hollow tanks, gutta-percha bags, &c.—not be procurable, the want of them might easily be supplied. From what we read, there is still a sufficient depth of water above these hulks to float steamers and vessels of moderate size. Let these be used as floats. By attaching the outer ends of the cables of two

the sunken ships continued unmolested, a source of vexation and obstruction to the Allies. On the 16th, the night before the bombardment, a boat was sent in with muffled oars, to examine two shoals near Forts Constantine and Alexander; the boat rounded the shoals, and approached so near the forts that the sailors could overhear conversation: two small Russian steamers were outside the line of sunken vessels; but the crews either did not see the boat or mistook it for Russian. The boat-party ascertained that the small water-spaces left between the sunken vessels and the forts were too uncertain in depth to allow great ships to enter; and it became evident, as had long been suspected, that the fleets could effect little in the actual capture of the forts: they could only co-operate by creating a diversion in favour of the land-forces, and helping to reduce the place if the land-besiegers should be successful.

Morning dawned on the 17th of October, amid tremendous preparations for bombarding Sebastopol. The land-cannonade was to begin about six o'clock; and, at the urgent request of Lord Raglan and General Canrobert, the admirals agreed that the whole of the ships should assist the land-attack by engaging the sea-batteries north and south of the harbour, on a line across the port. In accordance with this arrangement, the magnificent fleets took up positions opposite the forts and batteries. The great sailing men-of-war were lashed to the smaller steamers, as a means of moving more readily from place to place; but the crew of each steamer regarded its bulky neighbour as an incubus, which retarded its own movements, and lessened the probability of obtaining a shot at the enemy. Meanwhile, the French had not been idle. Admiral Hamelin went from the Katcha to Kamiesch, in the *Mogador*, on the 13th; had an interview with Canrobert on the 14th; and arranged the plan of naval attack with Dundas on the 15th. According to this plan, the French fleet was to be placed southward of the harbour, at seven cables' length from the cliff, to operate against the Quarantine, Alexander, and Artillery forts or batteries; whilst the English were to be similarly engaged opposite the northern forts; and the Turks to anchor midway between the two. The magnificent array of ships thus drawn up, broadsides on toward the forts of Sebastopol, was little less than two miles and a half in extent, from the Wasp Battery on the north to the Bay of Cherson.

Few were the sentences in which the admirals described the events of the 17th in their dispatches. Admiral Dundas, after naming the ships and explaining the intended plan of attack, dismissed the naval bombardment itself in the following few words:—'The action lasted from about half-past one to half-past six P.M., when, being quite dark, the ships hauled off.' Admiral Hamelin described the operations somewhat more fully. 'On the morning of the 17th,' he said, 'the attack by the siege-batteries commenced; but, as the weather was calm, it was necessary to attach the ships-of-the-line to the steam-frigates before developing against Sebastopol the line of the twenty-six ships of the Allied squadrons. Nevertheless, in spite of this difficulty, and the separation which had taken place between the ships of the Allied squadrons, a part of which had anchored at Kamiesch, and part before the Katcha, I have the satisfaction to announce that the ships of our first line advanced about half-past twelve in the day under the fire of the batteries of Sebastopol, which they stood against at first during more than half an hour without replying. A few minutes afterwards, they replied vigorously to the fire, which did not fail to incommode them, from their small number. Afterwards, the other French and English vessels successively arrived, and the attack became general. Towards half-past two o'clock, the fire of the Russian batteries slackened; it was stopped at the Quarantine Battery. This was the exact object desired by the French squadron, but our firing was redoubled and continued without interruption till night. At the time I am writing, I am not aware of what was the success of our siege-batteries, whose fire had commenced before ours, and which attacked the Russian fortifications on the land-side. If the Russians had not closed the entrance to Sebastopol by sinking their ships, I do not doubt that the vessels of the squadrons, after the first fire, would have been able successfully to enter the port and place themselves in communication with the army. Perhaps they would not have lost many more men in doing this than we have now to regret; but the extreme measure which the enemy adopted of sacrificing a portion of his ships, forced us to confine ourselves to attacking for five hours the sea-batteries of Sebastopol, with the object of silencing them more or less, of occupying a great many men of the garrison at the guns, and of giving thus to our army material as well as moral assistance.'

But it was from other quarters, from volunteer writers connected or not with the newspaper press, that details concerning the bombardment were made public. It appears that the lashing or coupling of the ships was adopted, because the liners or great men-of-war would answer the helm better thus than when towed; and because the small steamers, having a huge bulk between them and the enemy, would be shielded from a destructive fire they were not fitted to resist; for this purpose, they were lashed on the off-side, or away from the shore; insomuch that some of the liners, when observed from the starboard side, completely hid the small steamers by which they were propelled. The steamers were lashed to the liners fore and aft by cables fastened on the lower-deck, and passing through the fourth port-hole from

floating vessels, properly stationed, to the ship below, a sufficient buoyancy might readily be effected; for it must be remembered that a ship under water loses more than half her specific weight by the submersion.'

bow and stern. They were coupled in the order mentioned in the note.* Instructions concerning this arrangement had been given to the officers of the several ships on the preceding night; and during the forenoon of the 17th, the seamen were working in the most buoyant state of excitement to finish the adjustments, their ardour being more and more heightened by the sound of the land-cannonade, which commenced early in the morning. On starting from the Katcha, when anchors were weighed, the French went first, then the Turks, and, lastly, the English; the *Napoleon*, and the *Henri Quatre* lashed to a steamer, led the way. The English fleet advanced in three lines, and proceeded southward to the parallel of the Quarantine Fort before it turned in to occupy the intended positions opposite the forts. Here a confusion and disarrangement took place. The smoke from the land-bombardment, blowing out seaward enveloped the cliffs and forts in a veil so black and misty, that the ships, ill-steered, departed from their proper positions; the French and Turks, instead of maintaining their line wholly to the south of the harbour, stretched out further to the north, and occupied the positions intended for the right or south wing of the British. Many of the English ships were thus obliged to seek new positions, in which they had little opportunity of firing at the forts. Hour after hour, this immense line poured forth shot and shell, aiming at the forts and batteries, but maintaining a definite distance from the shore.

The detached squadron, however, was that which passed through the fiercest ordeal on this day. The great liners, the sailing men-of-war, were coupled to small steamers in the way just described; but there were large steamers well able to thread their track to any desired positions, and to pour forth tremendous broadsides against the enemy. The *Agamemnon*, *Sanspareil*, *Terrible*, *Sampson*, and *Tribune*, with the gun-boat *Sphinx*, were the chief vessels in this detached squadron. The *Queen*, too, thrown out of her place of honour by the disarrangement of the French and Turkish line, resolved to disregard the prescribed minimum distance of 1200 yards, and dashed in to join the detached squadron—a movement which the *Agamemnon* answered by the signal, 'Well done, *Queen*;' and then the *Rodney* imitated the manœuvre. The magnificent *Agamemnon*, a 91-gun screw-steamer which was the pet of the whole fleet, and not the less so because she bore the flag of Sir Edmund Lyons, steamed on in a manner that must have astonished the Russians, whose fleets had hitherto shewn so little tendency to engage in the war. The *Agamemnon* and the *Sanspareil*, after trying the range of their long pivot-guns on the northern work called by the English the Wasp Battery, steamed down to Fort Constantine, the formidable defence at the north side of the harbour, anchored at a distance of half a mile, braved the tremendous fire from that fort, and returned it with vigour. The fire to which they were exposed was not merely from Fort Constantine, but also from the Star Fort, on the heights above, and from a range of batteries along the northern heights. It is astonishing how two ships could bear such a hot torrent for upwards of two hours, since a range of half a mile is very small for such guns as those wherewith the forts were armed. Two hours elapsed before the *Queen*, propelled by the *Vesuvius* lashed alongside, could extricate herself from the more distant line, and form one of the detached squadron; and even then her chance of distinguished service was small, for, having caught fire by red-hot shot when in only six fathoms' water, she was obliged to retire, to prevent being driven on shore. The *Agamemnon* and the *Sanspareil* would not and did not retire before nightfall. The *Sanspareil*, however, being more unwieldy, and answering less readily to her steam-engines than her companion, might have had a hard time of it; for as she would not keep out when she could, she could not get out when she would: she was rapidly assuming the condition of a target for the enemy, when the little *Shark*, a steam-tug of the humblest dimensions, that attended her as a planet does the sun, or a jackal the lion, steamed in, lashed itself to the huge vessel, and aided to tow her out, in the midst of the utmost peril from ball and shell. The commander of this tiny craft is said to have received this simple order from the admiral: 'Go in; you will find there a coffin or your promotion.' Meanwhile, the *Sampson*, leaving the *Agamemnon* and *Sanspareil* to effect their worst against Fort Constantine, swept majestically past it, regardless of a hot fire, and directed shot and shell against the Wasp and Telegraph Batteries, further north; but these batteries, silenced occasionally, were little injured by the steamers: they kept up a galling fire throughout the day.

In reviewing what was done, and how it was done, on this terrible day of roar, fire, and smoke, there appear to have been several circumstances that told against the Allies. In the first place, the line of battle, or rather line of broadside, was further from the shore than had been intended, probably on account of the confusion that followed the marshalling of the ships in array; many of the broadsides were delivered from a distance of nearly 2000 instead of 1200 yards. In the second place, many of the ships came into line so late in the day, owing to the confusion, that they had scarcely time to select their object and measure their distance: they fired under circumstances which rendered them harmless enemies. Then,

* Queen, lashed alongside the Vesuvius.

Vengeance,	"	"	Highflyer.
Albion,	"	"	Firebrand.
Britannia,	"	"	Furious.
London,	"	"	Niger.
Arethusa,	"	"	Triton.
Bellerophon,	"	"	Cyclops.
Rodney,	"	"	Spiteful.
Trafalgar,	"	"	Retribution.

The right-hand column contains the names of the steamers.

again, there was a want of concentration in the fire; if the line-of-battle ships had aided the *Agamemnon* and the *Sanspareil* more directly in battering Fort Constantine, that formidable post might possibly have crumbled under such a visitation. It is, moreover, evident that, from the want of skill in arranging the ships in the first instance, or from a disturbance the plan of arrangement underwent, some of the ships could barely get a shot at the forts; indeed, a dozen of the largest men-of-war were almost beyond shot distance.

When night had closed in and put an end to the firing, and when the morning of the 18th enabled the crews to look around them, it was found that the Russians had been severe opponents to deal with. The *Agamemnon* received sixteen shots near the water-line, but none had gone through; several had penetrated the main and lower decks; the masts, sails, and rigging, were perforated in all directions; and the main-sail had been three times on fire. The *Albion* and the *Arethusa* suffered severely; when anchored before the Wasp Battery, the cables by which they were lashed to the steamers were cut by shot, and they became unmanageable just when facility of movement was most desirable; the *Albion*, after being set on fire three times by the fierce cannonade from the battery, was on the point of getting on shore, when the *Cambria* steamer ran in and extricated her, suffering fearfully from deaths and wounds among her crew; the *Arethusa* was hulled in all directions by shot. The *Rodney*, lashed to the *Spiteful* steamer, went on shore close under the fort about dusk, and would there have been lost but for the assistance rendered by the *Orinoco;* through an unlucky mistake, this ship threw a shell that burst against the main-mast of the *Retribution*, sent it by the board, and disabled both the *Retribution* and the *Trafalgar* lashed to it. The *Sanspareil* and the *Bellerophon* also received some rough usage. But when the crews were counted up, the loss was found to be more serious than any which the injuries to the ships entailed. Admiral Dundas's dispatch told of 44 killed and 266 wounded in the British portion of the fleet; twenty-one vessels shared in this loss, whereof the *Albion* and the *Sanspareil* bore, the former 10 killed and 71 wounded, and the latter 11 killed and 59 wounded. The *Agamemnon*, owing probably to the fine steaming qualities of the ship and the masterly way in which she was handled, had only 4 killed and 25 wounded, although this was the vessel in which the greatest interest of the day's proceedings centered. The French had a fair share in the activity and the loss. The *Charlemagne* and the *Ville de Paris* were hotly engaged, giving and receiving shot during many hours; and Admiral Hamelin, in the latter-named ship, had a narrow escape; for a shell, bursting on the stern, shattered the poop to fragments, and killed one and wounded three of the four aids-de-camp who were by the admiral's side. The total loss of the French in killed and wounded was little less than that of their Allies.

And now, the eventful day having passed, the absorbing inquiry arose—whether any of the forts had fallen? whether Sebastopol had suffered much from a bombardment by sea? The response was not satisfactory to the Allied admirals; the forts and batteries stood where they had stood on the previous morn; and, although shaken and blackened, they presented little visible evidence of serious injury. They had seldom ceased firing during the day; and although two embrasures could be seen knocked into one, and the whole face of the forts pitted with ball-marks, the Allies could not flatter themselves that the enormous fleet had effected anything very momentous by this naval bombardment. The capture at Bomarsund was not followed by a similar capture at Sebastopol. Had the water near the mouth of the harbour been deep, the result might have been very different, for a reason which may easily be appreciated. When the soundings are so deep that a ship-of-war can approach near a fort, she gains two advantages: her broadsides batter the fort with more destructive power, while the guns of the fort cannot so easily be depressed to the angle for hitting her. On the 17th, for instance, the *Agamemnon* suffered less than the *Sanspareil* from this cause, while her own fire was more effective. Here, as in the Baltic, every day's experience shewed more and more how great would be the value of small strong vessels of light draught, carrying a few guns of heavy calibre; they can enter where great ships dare not, and every shot hits its mark. A few words contained in a letter written on board the *Sampson*, tell in a simple way of the trifling injury received by the forts from the cannonade, and of the mingled surprise and disappointment evidently felt by the cannonaders: 'Our liners were not close enough in, and therefore their shot did not tell with full force. The *Sampson* stationed herself right opposite a square fort mounting eight guns, and did her work by silencing it three times, knocking some good pieces out of it; but the worst of it was that, not being able to take possession of it, as soon as we turned our attention and guns to some other point, the fellows came running down into it again, and reopened fire on us.' The 'fellows' did indeed bravely defend Sebastopol, as our soldiers as well as seamen full well knew.

It now became the duty of the admirals to inquire, whether a naval bombardment should be continued day by day? The cannonade by land, as will presently be seen, had not been attended on the 17th by any marked success; and the result of deliberation was, that the fleets should not maintain a continuous bombardment. Indeed, it may have been that the enormous weight of ammunition expended had too far lessened the quantity in store. The admirals returned to the mouth of the Katcha with the main portion of the two fleets, leaving at Sebastopol, Kamiesch, and Balaklava, such steamers as might suffice for the

detached services there to be rendered. Admiral Dundas, writing a dispatch on the 23d, could only speak of these detached services, including those at Odessa and Eupatoria among the number. His reference to the state of the forts that had been cannonaded was anything but encouraging to the Allies: 'Since the action of the 17th, the enemy have been working incessantly in repairing their batteries, and in constructing new works on the north side of the harbour, commanding the approaches by sea and land.' When a seaman, writing on the 28th to friends in England, used these few words: 'I am sorry to say that Sebastopol is not yet ours,' he summed up succinctly all that could be said on the subject by the naval portion of the Allied force; for throughout the remainder of the year the fleets had no other opportunity to display formidable power. In the remaining portion of the present Chapter, and in that which is to follow, the fleet will frequently call for attention as the handmaid to the army; but to achieve brilliant results in any independent operations, was not the fortune of the war-ships during the few weeks of the year yet to elapse.

THE FIRST BOMBARDMENT BY LAND.

The narrative of the military operations may now with advantage be resumed.

The head-quarters of the generals, as has already been noticed, was near the centre of the plateau, affording the easiest communication that could be obtained with Balaklava, Kamiesch, the English right near Careening Bay, the French left near Quarantine Bay, the centre where the wings of both armies nearly met, and the defence-works on the eastern edge of the plateau; the distances were sometimes too great for the speedy transmission of orders, but it is doubtful whether any better locality could have been commanded. The French siege-divisions were for the greater part encamped north-westward of head-quarters, and the English north-eastward—an arrangement dependent on the outline of the two parts of the town about to be besieged.

It was one of the consequences of the peculiar inequality of the ground around Sebastopol that a ridge, or perhaps, more correctly, a range of knolls, intervened between the British camp and the forts which the British were to cannonade; hence it followed that the siege-material and working-parties had to be conveyed up from the camp to the ridge, and then down to a lower level to the trenches and siege-batteries. This conformation of the ground brought more labour and more danger to the English than to the French; for the further down these slopes the trenches were situated, the more completely were they commanded by the enemy, and the more necessary was it that the parapet of every trench should be higher than in ordinary sieges; and as the knolls were very stony and deficient in soil, the labour was immense of digging trenches and forming parapets in such a spot. Thus was to be explained the delay in opening the cannonade; a delay so little understood at the time in England. Every siege-gun, a ponderous mass of metal, when landed at Balaklava, was dragged up miserable half-formed roads to the plateau, over to the camp, and thence to the trenches—a distance, in some instances, little less than eight miles; and as the horses and mules to render this service were too few in number, and too wretched in condition, men's strength had to be added, and many a soldier was worn down in health by this severe service. Again, as the ground was hard and the covering of earth thin, the sappers were enforced to bring earth from a distance in baskets, to fill the gabions and sand-bags—an enormous addition to their ordinary labour. Had not many of the seamen from the ships been placed at the disposal of Lord Raglan, the hauling up of the monster guns could scarcely have been effected before the season of autumn had given way to stern winter; but the sailors worked unremittingly—now shouldering a gun-carriage out of the mire in the valley at Balaklava, now assisting a team of weakened horses to drag along a Lancaster gun, now piling up shot-cases in the ammunition-wagons—fiddling, piping, singing, joking with or at the astonished Tatars and Turks, and regarding the whole day's labour as a capital holiday.

When all was ready on the morning of the 17th of October, the British siege-train, divided into the right and left attacks, was constituted nearly as follows:—The extreme left of the left attack, nearest to the great ravine that separated the two camps, was a battery of three mortars; next, a battery of two guns; then one of six guns, near which was another with three mortars; further north, another of eight guns; beyond this, a powerful battery worked by the royal navy, and comprising two Lancaster guns and eight 24-pounders; and still further to the right, a 12-gun battery, comprising one Lancaster 8-inch gun, five ordinary 8-inch guns, and six 24-pounders. The other batteries were in like manner fitted to discharge shells in some instances, and shot in others. The 2-gun battery projected enormous shot of 68-pound weight, from guns brought from the *Arethusa*, which gave a name to the battery; and in like manner, Chapman's Battery, not quite ready for service by the 17th, sometimes received the name of the *Terrible* Battery, on account of its guns being brought from that ship—guns which, although weighing 95 hundredweights, or more than 10,000 pounds each, had been dragged into position over eight miles of difficulties. The right attack comprised a 21-gun battery, a 5-gun battery, a Lancaster battery, and a mortar-battery. The left attack was directed against the Barrack Battery and one face of the Redan, from which it was distant 1500 to 1900 yards; the right attack commanded the other face of the Redan and also the Malakoff,

at a distance of 1400 yards; the sailors-battery, on the extreme right, was 1800 yards from the Malakoff; a Lancaster gun, in the rear of the space between the right and left attacks, pointed down the Woronzow ravine to the harbour, where the *Twelve Apostles*, Russian ship of 120 guns, had been careened over to give her enormous guns a power of bearing upon the Allied camps and works. Lieutenant-colonel Dickson commanded the right attack, and Major Irving the left; the general command of the siege-train being intrusted to Lieutenant-colonel Gambier. These appointments, applicable to the day when the cannonade commenced, were speedily modified, by deaths, by promotions, or by changes of service.

The great day arrived—the day on which many hopes were entertained that Sebastopol might fall. Instructions were issued by Lord Raglan on the previous evening for the guidance of the siege-train and the army divisions. The principal points dwelt upon were the following:—That the cannonade would commence at half-past six in the morning, indicated by a discharge of three mortars; that all troops off duty would be ready for any immediate service in their respective camps, without knapsacks, greatcoats, or blankets; that horses would be attached to the field-batteries, to move the field-guns, if required; that each division would be provided with a body of sappers, supplied with picks, shovels, crow-bars, sledge-hammers, felling axes, scaling-ladders, and bags of powder, in the event of any assault being attempted; that each division would also have a corps of engineers provided with rockets and gun-spikes; that reserve musket-ammunition would be placed at ready disposal of the infantry divisions; and that the cavalry, together with all the regiments placed near Balaklava, would be held ready for action in any immediate need.

At the appointed hour on the morning of the 17th, the bombardment began—such a bombardment as the annals of war had seldom equalled. The troops of all the nations—British, French, Turkish, Russians—and non-combatants who were within sight and hearing—all appear to have been vividly impressed with the tremendous outburst. Lieutenant-colonel Hamley says: 'The silence was broken by such a peal of artillery as has scarcely ever before, in the most famous battles or sieges, shaken the earth around the combatants. One hundred and twenty-six pieces, many of them of the largest calibre, opened at once upon the Russian defences, and were answered by a still larger number, of equal range and power. The din was incessant, and the smoke in the batteries so dense, that after a few rounds the gunners laid their pieces rather by the line on the platform than by view of the object aimed at.' Lieutenant Peard, who had been ordered into the trenches at four o'clock on that morning, to unmask the guns by opening the embrasures, speaks thus: 'At daylight, the guns in the British batteries, and in the French presented their muzzles to the enemy. At 6.30 A.M., our batteries opened a tremendous fire, which was as sharply responded to by the Russians. It was now three weeks since we had been before Sebastopol, and it is impossible to say how relieved we were to be able to answer their fire. Our guns were loaded and fired as fast as it was possible to do it. The fire from the enemy was beyond all conception; and their shell and shot were accompanied with canister-shot, which, skimming the parapet, and coming through the embrasures, made a most unpleasant whizzing.'

It may be convenient to transcribe portions of the dispatches of the two commanders, giving an outline of the day's proceedings; noticing subsequently, somewhat more in detail, the chief particulars. Lord Raglan, in his brief outline, said: 'On this occasion, we employed about sixty guns of different calibres, the lightest being 24-pounders. It may here be proper to observe, that the character of the position which the enemy occupy on the south side of Sebastopol is not that of a fortress, but rather that of an army in an intrenched camp on very strong ground, where an apparently unlimited number of heavy guns, amply provided with gunners and ammunition, are mounted. The guns having opened as above stated (about a quarter before seven), a continuous and well-directed fire was carried on from the works of the two armies until about ten o'clock A.M., when, unfortunately, a magazine in the midst of one of the French batteries exploded, and occasioned considerable damage to the works, and, I fear, many casualties, and almost paralysed the efforts of the French artillery for the day. The British batteries, however, manned by sailors from the fleet, under the command of Captain Lushington and Captain Peel, and by the Royal Artillery, under the superintendence of Lieutenant-colonel Gambier, kept up their fire with unremitting energy throughout the day, to my own and the general satisfaction, as well as to the admiration of the French army, who were witnesses of their gallant and persevering exertions: materially injuring the enemy's works, and silencing the heavy guns on the top of the loophole (Malakoff) tower, and many of the guns at its base, and causing an extensive explosion in the rear of a strong redoubt in our immediate front. The enemy, notwithstanding, answered to the last from a number of guns along their more extended line.'

The more important part of General Canrobert's dispatch is comprised in the following words:—'Matters were proceeding favourably, when the explosion of the powder-magazine of a battery, which unfortunately was of a serious character, threw our attack into disorder. This explosion produced greater effect from the fact, that our batteries were accumulated round the point where it took place. The enemy profited by it to increase his fire; and, in accordance with the general commanding the artillery, I was of opinion that it was necessary for us to suspend ours, in order

to make repairs, and to complete towards our right, by fresh batteries connected with those of the English army, the system of our attack. This delay is no doubt to be regretted; but we must resign ourselves to it, and I am taking every necessary step to render it as short as possible. The place kept up the fire better than was expected. The works are of such a formidable development in a continuous line, and comprise guns of such large calibre, that it can prolong the struggle.'

The explosion of the French magazine was indeed a disastrous occurrence; it was the turning-point of the whole day's proceedings. When, at about ten o'clock, a tremendous explosion was heard, the British parapets were speedily crowned with soldiers, cheering and waving their caps; a rumour ran along the line that a Russian magazine had been blown up; but when the fact became known that the magazine formed part of the French works, the disappointment was great. The cessation of the French cannonade, consequent on the explosion, was a serious matter to the English left attack; since, during the remainder of the day, the Russians, relieved

PLAN OF SEBASTOPOL, with the Works of the Allies, October 17, 1854.

1. Armenian Church. 2. Barracks. 3. Theatre. 4. Marine Arsenal. 5. Cathedral. 6. Admiralty. 7. Church of St Michael. 8. Church of St Peter and St Paul. 9. School. 10. Girls' School. 11. War-office. 12. Barracks. 13. Magazine of Artillery. 14. Powder-magazine. 15. Exchange. 16. Arsenal. 17. Barracks. 18. Library. 19. Barracks.

on one quarter, were enabled to concentrate their fire on the English batteries. The fire from the Redan became very heavy; and shells from the Garden and Barrack Batteries flew over into terrible juxtaposition with the magazines in the rear of the British batteries. It was a trying time for the troops, too, engaged in trench-duty; for, in conveying ammunition from one battery to another, they were frequently obliged to appear out of cover, on account of the trenches being full of soldiers, and whenever the men thus presented themselves unsheltered, the Russians let fly at them with unceasing vigour. The cannonade about three o'clock, when 3000 army and navy guns are believed to have been at work on all sides, was probably never equalled in terrific grandeur in the previous annals of war.

The Allies were the first to feel a deficiency, however, in supplies; for so immense had been the difficulty of bringing shot and shell up to the plateau, that many of the British gunners, both in the military and the naval batteries, had the mortification of finding their store expended before the day's work had nearly done: they received the Russian fire, and had nothing to send in return. The magazines near the batteries being small, they required frequent replenishing from the rear; and the danger was imminent of bringing forward those supplies in face of the enemy's tremendous fire.

Conspicuous above all the rest of the firing was the noise of the Lancaster guns. These enormous cannon, of which the bore has a peculiar oval rifling, projected shot of 68-pound weight to a

Bombardment of Sebastopol,
Oct. 17, 1854.

distance of nearly three miles! The sharp crack of their explosion bears to the roar of ordinary guns some such relation as that of the rifle to the musket; the ball rushes through the air with a noise and a regular beat bearing some resemblance to that of a locomotive engine, insomuch that the men speedily applied the name of the 'express train' to these missiles. Yet, although the effects of the Lancaster shot were more destructive than those of ordinary guns when actual collision occurred, there were deficiencies, in accuracy of flight, that rendered these missiles less serviceable than had been expected.

When night closed in, and the gunners retired wearily from their work, the Allies could not conceal from themselves that the results were unsatisfactory. Hopes had mounted high during many days. Some authorities had pronounced that the Russian batteries would be silenced in three days; while others limited the time for such an achievement to a few hours. Many parts of the Russian works, it is true, were injured; the Malakoff Tower was deeply scarred by the heavy 68-pounder shot, and many of its guns dismounted, although at a range of more than 2000 yards; a magazine in the rear of the Redan was fired by a shell, and many guns silenced thereby; and all the defence-works were shaken and scarred by the tremendous force brought against them. Still, the damage was of small amount, considering that the works were mostly of earth, and that Sebastopol contained a large number of men wholly at the disposal of Menchikoff. Those Russians who, whether soldiers or civilians, had not worked severely during the day, were set to repair the parapets and embrasures at night; insomuch, that when morning next dawned, the Allies had the mortification of finding that the battering of the preceding day had left the Russians little the worse. Prince Menchikoff, in his dispatch to the czar, stated that in one of his forts nearly all the guns, thirty-three in number, had been dismounted; that Fort Constantine had been much damaged by the ships; but that most of the other works had suffered slightly. He estimated his loss at about 500 killed and wounded, among whom General Kornileff was killed, and Admiral Nachimoff and Captain Yerganyscheff wounded. 'As a new bombardment was expected to-day,' he wrote on the 18th, 'the whole night was passed at Sebastopol in repairing the damage, and all the dismantled pieces were replaced.' Everything conspired to render this remarkable fact evident—that the defenders strengthened themselves more rapidly than the besiegers. Raglan and Canrobert were scarcely in a condition to commence the bombardment on the 17th, so many of their heavy guns and mortars not yet being in a position to render full service; but, nevertheless, they saw that every day's delay would be more advantageous to the enemy than to themselves: the works of the defence advancing more rapidly than those of the attack. As it was, the Russian guns were more numerous than those of the Allies; and if the cannonade had been deferred for a week, the chances amount almost to certainty that the ratio would have become still more favourable to the Russians. The total loss by land and sea, English and French, appears to have been about 250 killed, and 860 wounded. Of the Russian loss no definite account has been given.

The progress of the siege, from that day onward, was governed by the circumstance that Sebastopol was never *invested*. In ordinary sieges, the town or fortified post is completely surrounded by the besiegers, to prevent alike any exit by the garrison or the reception of any succours from without: in siege-language, it is invested. The trenches are then dug, the parallels and zigzags made, the parapets built, the guns planted on the earthen batteries, and the siege commences; and if the relative strength of the two forces permit, the place falls. At Sebastopol, however, the place was not invested, and this imparted a new character to the siege. The assailing force being insufficient to enclose the whole place and its works, the southern side of the harbour only was invested, leaving the formidable forts on the north unassailed, and the roads from Simferopol and Eupatoria free for the passage of supplies. Even had the Russian batteries been totally silenced, and the south side taken by assault, the great harbour, acting as a huge wet-ditch, would have presented a fresh obstacle, backed by a fresh line of batteries that would have required a new siege. The possession by the Allies of a powerful fleet did not much mend the matter; for as this fleet could not enter the harbour on account of the sinking of the Russian ships—a manœuvre which, judged by its results, must be regarded as masterly, however adverse to the ordinary ideas of war—it could not cannonade the batteries on the north side that commanded the south. Not only was the siege rendered a work of enormous difficulty by this non-investment, but many authorities contend that the Allies had not on the 17th force sufficient to warrant a bombardment even of the southern portion. 'We had brought with us a siege-train of sixty guns, including mortars, nearly all of a calibre inferior to those of the enemy. The French had a larger number, but they were of brass, and consequently inferior for all purposes to those of the besieged. In order to arm even three batteries, we were compelled to dismantle our ships and to employ our seamen. More than 800 rounds can rarely be discharged from one gun, on account of its liability to burst and the enlargement of the vent. Few guns, indeed, will bear much above 600 rounds. As during the first day we had fired above 100 rounds from each gun, if we had continued at this rate, in less than six days our batteries would have been disabled. The amount of ammunition available was so small, that it would have been completely expended in about five days. Some of the

most useful guns had been supplied with only 120 rounds each. The number of our artillerymen was so inadequate to the working of the siege-guns, that we were compelled to cease our fire during the night; and thus the enemy was able to repair unmolested the damage done to his earthworks during the day. Even to keep up a moderate fire from sunrise to sunset, and to leave the proper reliefs for night-work, the officers and gunners were only every alternate eight hours off duty, which, deducting nearly an hour, the time required to go from the camp to the trenches, left but six for food and repose—an amount of labour which human strength could not long endure.'* These strictures, so far as they are just, apply to the governments, who failed to send out sufficient force, and not to the generals, who effected their best with the means placed at their disposal.

The character of the siege, in the days following the 17th, is foreshadowed by the above facts and comments. On the 18th, after repairing much of the injury during the night, the Russians continued to meet boldly the fire of the Allies. They provided, too, incessant occupation for the troops left in camp; for Menchikoff sent a field-army into the valley on the east of the Allied position, to distract attention, and call away as many troops as possible from the trenches: the manœuvre so far succeeded as to render the Allies conscious that they were themselves liable to attack, and to compel them to keep up an exhausting system of vigilance. The French batteries, not having yet recovered from the effects of the explosion, were not in a condition to resume the bombardment on the 18th; and thus the Russians were free to direct all their force against the British, effecting quite as much mischief to the British batteries as the latter had wrought upon the former, chiefly the Malakoff, on the previous day. General Canrobert felt seriously the embarrassment of his work, although scarcely so great as those against which Lord Raglan had to contend. 'The difficulties with which we are met,' he said in a dispatch to his government, 'are of two kinds—those resulting from the nature of the soil, the solid stratum of which, although insufficient, diminishes in proportion as we approach the place; and those resulting from the number and calibre of the pieces of artillery the enemy plants against us, almost in a right and very extended line. In this respect, the resources he draws from his vessels stationed in the port, men as well as materials, are almost inexhaustible.'

One day was very like another at the camp, except that the firing of the Allies gradually lessened in vigour, while the work in the trenches became more and more severe to the soldiers, who were called upon to effect more work while their numbers were diminishing. On the morning of the 19th, shortly after daylight, Canrobert was enabled to resume his fire from the injured batteries, as well as from others he had constructed on the preceding day; and with these he was enabled to maintain a steady cannonade against the south-west part of the town. Lieutenant-colonel Hamley, who himself shared in the artillery duties at that time, sufficiently characterises the labour of the British on the 19th and following days in these words: 'The interest excited by a contest of artillery, without decided advantage on either side, soon languishes; and in a few days the thunder of the bombardment was almost unheeded. But the troops in the trenches and batteries were hardly worked, and exposed by day incessantly to a tremendous fire. The space in the magazines in our batteries was at first insufficient to hold ammunition for the day's consumption; and to take in fresh supplies formed one of the most trying duties which artillerymen can be called on to perform. Wagons filled with powder, drawn by horses of the field-batteries, were driven down the face of the hill for upwards of half a mile, in full view, and quite within range of the enemy's guns. A shell bursting in the wagons would have blown horses and men into the air; and to the risk of this were added the usual chances of being struck by shot or splinters; yet neither the officers—often mere boys—nor the drivers ever shewed the slightest hesitation in proceeding on their perilous errand. Several horses were killed by cannon-shot; and on one occasion a shell, lodging between the spokes of a wheel, exploded there, blowing off three wheels and the side of the wagon, and blackening the cases of powder without igniting their contents.'

Now would a day pass on which the Allies appeared to gain a little advantage; now one that was clearly favourable to the Russians: they varied in character, but the general result was a diminution in the intensity of the fire on both sides. When it was found, as frequently occurred, that the enemy fired three shots for every two on the part of the Allies, and that the guns in the garrison possessed enormous calibre and power, the anxieties of the Allied generals increased as the prospect of a speedy conquest became more and more doubtful. The cannonading was, on most days, diversified with smart skirmishes on the part of the troops, the riflemen on both sides approaching sufficiently near to be within range. On one occasion, these light troops nearly met at some quarries situated in front of the Redan; and when the British riflemen had exhausted their store of ammunition, nothing daunted, they picked up stones and hurled them at the enemy; the Russians, surprised at such a mode of fighting, resolved to imitate it, and then ensued a battery and counter-battery of these missiles; but the British proved more skilful, or at least more successful, than the Russians in the art of stone-throwing, and the latter retired. The danger attending the conveyance of ammunition

* *Quarterly Review*, No. CXCI.

from the magazines to the batteries, adverted to in the last paragraph, was frequently incurred under circumstances displaying great intrepidity. One of the batteries was so placed that the ammunition could be conveyed to it only along a road wholly exposed to the enemy, and the hazards there encountered led to the appellation of the 'Valley of the Shadow of Death' to that road. The Sailors' Battery being especially obnoxious to the enemy's shot and shell, the officers and seamen who managed it delighted in displaying their hardihood in that service. On one occasion, the Union Jack being shot away by the Russians from the naval battery, Captain Peel jumped up to the parapet, and waved the ragged fragment high aloft amid a torrent of bullets and balls, until another flag had been brought to replace it. Individual acts such as these, frequent in occurrence, tended greatly to excite enthusiasm among the men, at a time when the course of events generally was not very satisfactory. Sometimes rockets were sent as means of destruction against the ships in the harbour and against the dockyard buildings, but with only partial effect; the houses in the town, by express orders of Lord Raglan, were spared from direct fire, as a wish was felt to draw a line of distinction between the emperor's property and his unoffending subjects. When it became known, however, that an hospital had been fired, and that this hospital contained Russian soldiers who had been wounded at the battle of the Alma, much regret was felt; as there was certainly no desire to limit the few comforts those poor fellows could receive. One peculiarity annoyed the Allies much: their fleets could not get at the Russian ships, but a Russian ship managed to assail the British troops; for the *Vladimir*, anchored in the great harbour, by being heeled over, brought her mortars to bear upon the British siege-works, and killed and wounded several men by a skilful shelling: it was an enemy in a new direction, and a necessity for a new battery was speedily seen. But this was of little avail; the *Vladimir* quietly steamed out of the way of the new battery, and took up another position, where she could completely sweep the hill in front and rear of some of the British works. A storm of 13-inch shells from mortars, swung on the upper-deck, was terribly annoying: the sailors, who defended the battery chiefly assailed, although passing their pleasantries upon 'Whistling Dick'—a name given by them to the enormous shells on account of the peculiar noise made during their flight—were taxed to the utmost in their attempts to get behind shelter before the dread missiles exploded.

Day after day passed in this desultory struggle, each side labouring to repair injuries and to bring up more force. Two 68-pounders were added to Gordon's Battery, and two to Chapman's; a transport arrived at Balaklava laden with siege-guns and ordnance-stores; new batteries were constructed on the front and left of the left attack; and more troops were landed from England. But so severe had been the labour and sufferings of six short weeks, that, notwithstanding reinforcements, the British troops fit for service had greatly lessened in number—at a time, too, when the work to be done had largely increased by an extension of the siege-works. The French likewise suffered severely; they had more than one explosion; and the Flagstaff and Garden Batteries cut them up terribly. There was a reason for this not well known till afterwards: the plateau whereon the French works were constructed had been a practice-ground before the war; and hence the Russians well appreciated the range and distances of various points. The horses of the British were even in worse plight than the men, being wholly insufficient, in number and strength, for the enormous exertions required of them in dragging guns and stores from Balaklava up to the plateau. On one occasion, Lord Dunkellin, commanding a trench-party in a dreary misty night, advanced too far, mistook a company of Russians for friends, and was taken prisoner. On another night, a small party of Russians, approaching the French pickets, and hailing out: 'Ne tirez pas: nous sommes Anglais,' succeeded in working much mischief ere the deceit was discovered. Indeed, during the war, circumstances frequently placed the Russians in the character of deceivers, in many cases breaking the conventional rules of honourable warfare, but in others doing no more than the Allies would have done if similarly placed.

For the purposes of the present Chapter, the narrative of the siege need not be traced to a later date than the end of October. The Allied forces, it is true, remained before Sebastopol; additions to the siege-train continued to arrive; stores of ammunition were dragged up to the plateau; new trenches and parallels were dug around the southern half of the town; additional batteries of guns and mortars were planted; overworked troops continued to spend the dead hours of the night in the harassing duty of the trenches, some to dig, and others to watch. And then, on the other side, the Russians continued to repair by night what had been injured during the day; they formed new lines of defence within the Redan and the Malakoff, to afford further resistance, if those strongholds should fall; they brought more and more guns to their batteries, as if the available store were inexhaustible; they received frequent reinforcements of men, provisions, and ammunition, along the roads of arrival which the Allies could not control; and, armed with these powers and resources, they maintained against the besiegers a fire generally more powerful than the latter could employ. But, from the very nature of such proceedings, there is little left to narrate: the enterprise became, for the Allies, most wearying, laborious, and disappointing. A few brief passages from familiar letters, written by officers engaged, and afterwards published, will

suffice to convey a notion of the state of the Russian works at that time, of the picket-duty on the part of the British, and of the trench-duty. After adverting to the supposed disappointment of friends in England at the protracted duration of the siege, one officer thus speaks of the state of the town: 'We can knock the civilian part of the town to pieces; but the great difficulty is to get at the dockyards, arsenals, &c., which are completely protected from straight shooting by the high cliffs of the harbour; they, therefore, can only be reached by shells and rockets. Thus, in long range, it is very difficult to fire at exactly the right elevation; consequently, we pitch almost as many shells into the harbour as we do into the stores. Again, I suspect all their roofs are bomb-proof, as we have not succeeded in setting them on fire to any great extent, although there have been almost nightly blazes of small huts, &c., in the outskirts. It must ultimately be taken by assault, and, therefore, the sooner that takes place the better. We have had a great many deserters, and they all agree in declaring that the streets are strewed with dead; and they add, that as soon as resistance becomes useless, the troops will all go over to the other side, where they have immensely strong batteries, which, together with Fort Constantine, completely overlook the southern shores, and will, I suspect, prevent us from holding the place long.' Next comes the English side of the field of struggle. 'I am on picket. This is a duty that begins at four in the morning, and ends at four the next morning. Each regiment furnishes two companies of pickets daily; therefore it takes place every fourth day. A picket is an advanced-guard thrown out close to the enemy's lines, in order to protect the camp from a surprise; consequently the sentries can see each other, and we can see large masses of Russians manœuvring in the hollow all day. We command, from our position, a road which is a short-cut for the enemy into Sebastopol; and, as they often try to dodge past our sentries, hardly a day passes that we have not a brush with the enemy.' A Zouave in a French rifle-pit furnishes another phase of outpost-duty. 'I am almost like a poacher. I go out every day to shoot Russians. This is the way we do. As early as two o'clock in the morning, our toilet being completed—and that of a Zouave is not long—we leave, carrying with us ammunition and one or two biscuits. Arrived in the intrenchments, we take sand-bags, a spade, and a pickaxe; then, at a given signal, we leap from the parapets with the rapidity of deer, and establish our homes close to the forts. There we dig a hole, a sort of warren, to hide ourselves in. We place our sand-bags to protect us, and our residence is then furnished. We remain in these pits all the day, and it is not until night is rather advanced that we are permitted to leave them. This we often do in the midst of a shower of grape-shot. You will ask me what we do in the pits all day. Very good work, I assure you. We fire almost as fast as we can, and every discharge demolishes a Russian artilleryman.' The trench-duty had its own peculiar severities: 'We have five batteries, and these require a large armed guard and fatigue-party day and night—a fatigue-party to keep the works in repair after the enemy's fire, and a guard to defend them from sorties. This is the most dangerous of our recreations, and not a day passes that two or three fatal cases do not occur. At night, they shell us incessantly from the forts; but night-shells are not so dangerous as in the day, because we can always track their fiery course for half a minute through the air. . . . . Sometimes, after lying on the wet ground all *night*, my limbs are all pains, and my teeth quite loose in my gums.' When the same officer congratulates himself on having been 'lucky enough' to purchase two flannel-shirts for £2, and a tooth-brush for 8s., he just touched the beginnings of that terrible winter, the incidents of which will occupy the next Chapter.

BATTLE OF BALAKLAVA.

The siege-operations have been treated continuously to a certain point, that the relative tactics of the besiegers and the besieged may be better understood; but it now becomes necessary to attend to the underplot—an underplot subsidiary to the siege itself, but of tremendous character considered as a series of field-operations. All the available forces of the Allies were applied, directly or indirectly, to the maintenance of the siege; whereas Prince Menchikoff, being soon enabled to measure pretty accurately the nature and strength of the besieging power, felt at liberty to establish an independent army, resting on Sebastopol and Simferopol as a base of operations, and acting against the north-east and east of the Allied camps. The battles and skirmishes that attended these tactics formed a campaign distinct from, but contemporaneous with the great siege; and to understand them, it will be necessary to attend to the configuration of the valleys and undulating ground exterior to the plateau on which the Allies were encamped.

The river Tchernaya, as has already been explained, flows into the upper or eastern end of the great harbour at Sebastopol. From that point to the ruins of Inkermann, a distance of about a mile, the Tchernaya Valley has an average width of three-quarters of a mile, being narrowest just opposite the ruins; but higher up the valley, towards the south-east, the hills or heights on either side separate more and more widely, until at length, where the Simferopol road crosses the river by the Traktir Bridge, the valley has a width of four miles. Near this spot is a ridge, or rather cluster of hills, the Fedukhine heights, dividing the valley into two defiles; and these, meeting again, form a plain several miles in extent from east to west, leading to the gorge

of Balaklava on the south, bounded by the plateau on the west, and traversed by a range of small low hills. These hills were crowned by several small earthen redoubts, constructed by the Allies, and manned by Turks: the position had no reference to the operations of the siege; but, as the road from Balaklava to the interior of the Crimea crosses the hills, the security of the little port might have been endangered by any neglect of this spot. The easternmost hill, called by the Allies Canrobert's Hill, is near the village of Kamara, while the westernmost approaches the plateau above the village of Kadikoï. From the peculiar structure of the Tchernaya Valley, comprising, as it does, plain, dale, and defiles or ravines, an enemy may easily conceal his march from the interior towards Balaklava, until he has passed these hills; but the hills, if well defended, would render further progress difficult.

The Allied generals had full reason to believe that, while they were busily employed in the siege, Prince Menchikoff had been feeling his way round to this plain, if not by a winding road along the Tchernaya from Sebastopol, at least by the Traktir Bridge from the vicinity of Baktchéserai—hoping to attack his opponents in the rear of their camps and siege-works. Sometimes the flashes of the guns at night would render dimly visible a dark battalion of Russian infantry, moving at a distance that portended no immediate danger, but indicating the existence of some plan or scheme. On another occasion, an alarm having been given that the Russians were marching to attack the rear on the Balaklava road, Lord Raglan and his staff, with a body of troops, moved in that direction, and found that the Russians had taken advantage of a fog to creep up to the vicinity of the Turkish redoubts, but that their number had not been so large as to endanger the position occupied by the Turks. On another morning, signals having been given by the vedettes that Russian infantry were approaching, the Scots Greys and other cavalry, with the horse-artillery and the 93d Highlanders, quickly made ready for any encounter; and the Turks fired from their redoubts on small bodies of the enemy within sight: but the Russians, not calculating on so much alertness, retreated for the night. The next day witnessed a similar approach of Russian cavalry, a similar alertness on the part of Sir Colin Campbell and his Highlanders, and a similar retreat of the enemy as evening drew on. A body of cavalry would post itself on the Baktchéserai road, perhaps accompanied by artillery, and would then wind out of sight behind the hills. Thus matters continued day by day; until at length, on the morning of the 25th of October, General Liprandi appeared openly on the plain, having drawn from the defiles and behind the hills an army of 30,000 Russians, ready to meet the Allies in fair fight.

The incidents of this exciting day, varied and often confused as they may appear, resolve themselves into five struggles or contests, forming collectively the BATTLE OF BALAKLAVA—namely, the capture by Russian infantry of a series of earthen redoubts manned by the Turks; the heroic repulse by the 93d Highlanders of a furious cavalry charge; the defeat, by the British heavy cavalry, of a much larger body of Russian cavalry; the mistaken but wonderful onslaught, by a handful of British light cavalry, against a complete army of artillery, cavalry, and infantry; and a dashing charge of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, which finished the work of the day, and left the Allies victors—although with such a modification of defence-works as afforded Menchikoff a pretext for claiming, in his dispatch to the czar, a dazzling victory.

It was early in the morning, dim and dull, when the Russians began the day's turmoil. The low range of hills extending across the plain of the Tchernaya, north of Balaklava, but east of the plateau occupied by the Allied camps, was, as has been explained, crowned at different points by earthen redoubts, hastily constructed, and mounting only a few guns each. Unfortunate was it that these redoubts were manned by the Turks; for, while the soldiers of that nation are generally remarkable for their bravery in defending earth-works, the defenders in this case were raw recruits, who had not been treated by the Allies with that kind or amount of encouragement which would incite to heroic deeds; they had lately arrived from Tunis, and had never seen fire; and, moreover, the redoubts were too far in the rear of the Allied camps to receive proper support. It may have been that Liprandi was acquainted with these facts. Of the four redoubts, three were provided with a few guns; while on a higher hill, near the village of Kamara, was a work of somewhat more importance. It was the capture of these several redoubts that constituted the opening of the battle. Early in the morning, a Russian force debouched into the plain from behind the Fedukhine heights, and at once attacked three of these redoubts, designated Nos. 1, 2, and 3, in the official dispatches. It was very unequal work; for the three redoubts, each manned by about 200 Turks or Tunisians, contained together only seven 12-pounder guns; while the force brought against them comprised eighteen or twenty battalions of infantry, thirty or forty guns, and a large body of cavalry. Speedily was the capture effected; the positions being too far distant from the plateau to enable the British or French troops to avert this disaster. The Turks in No. 1 redoubt must indeed have had their courage severely taxed, when, at a distance of a mile and a half from the camps, they found themselves attacked by such a force; and if they abandoned their redoubt after a short contest, and this abandonment led to a similar procedure on the part of the troops in the other redoubts, it does not follow that they thereby deserved the storm of indignation with which they were visited by their Christian Allies. One English artilleryman was in

each redoubt, and by these men most of the guns were spiked before the abandonment of the redoubts.

Now commenced the second movement in the battle, the second act of the stirring drama. The 93d Highlanders was the only infantry regiment in the plain at the time; the other forces which were at hand to render aid comprised simply a detachment of invalids, little fitted for active service, a few guns belonging to the 3d division, and a party of marines on the heights near at hand. It was left for Sir Colin Campbell, to whom the command in this quarter had been intrusted, to make the best of these materials in a sudden emergency. Lord Raglan was apprised of the attack as soon as redoubt No. 1 had fallen; but the other redoubts were taken before aid could reach the Turks. The Highlanders, occupying a slightly rising plot of ground in front of redoubt No. 4, were attacked by the enemy's cavalry and artillery in great force immediately after these captures; and if the small band had wavered, disaster would have followed. Sir Colin ordered his men to retire behind the crest of a hill for a short time, while the batteries on the heights, manned by the marines, opened on the approaching Russians. A body of Russian cavalry, seeing the Highlanders without defence by other regiments, dashed forward to charge them; but the 93d, resolved to meet them half-way, rushed forward to the crest of the hill, fired, and checked them. The cavalry then tried to outflank the regiment on the right, so as to separate it from its supports; but the Highlanders instantly wheeled round, presented a new front, fired, and completely discomfited them, forcing them to retire. The 'thin red streak topped with a line of steel,' as the gallant regiment was designated—for Sir Colin Campbell, confident in his Highlanders, had ranged them in double rank only, scorning the safer formation of a hollow square—bore the cavalry charge, so far as the Russians ventured to make it, like a wall of rock, and then brought their two ranks of rifles to bear on the enemy with awful effect. The plateau is so much elevated above the plain, that all the manœuvres could be distinctly seen; and those who watched the bold stand made by the Highlanders were all the more strongly dissatisfied with the proceedings of the unfortunate Turks. At one point could be seen six compact masses of Russian infantry, marching towards the scene of conflict; at another was a strong line of artillery; near the redoubts were Russians advancing, Turks retreating, and clouds of smoke marking the brief encounter; between the artillery and cavalry were other massive bodies of Russian infantry, advancing in two lines, and presenting a formidable appearance; in front, and on the flanks of the enemy's army, were skirmishers and Cossacks, foot and horse. All these, seen from the eastern edge of the plateau, appeared like the forerunners of a great battle. Busy were the head-quarters when the intelligence arrived; orders were despatched to the 1st, the 4th, and the cavalry divisions, to prepare for action; and Lord Raglan requested General Canrobert to send him assistance. Sir Colin Campbell, however, felt the necessity of presenting a bold front before instructions from Lord Raglan could arrive: it was he who so disposed the 93d, the invalid detachment, and the marine-battery, as to check the advance of the Russians. Fortunate that he did so; for Liprandi was bent upon reaching Balaklava, if possible, and inflicting injury there before his opponent could bring up defensive forces; although, unless the Russians could have commanded the heights on either side, the little harbour could not have been held by them.

While this small band of Highlanders was thus employed in repelling the enemy, the British heavy cavalry entered the field, to confront the main body of the Russian cavalry, regardless of disparity in numbers. The British troopers turned out at an early hour, as soon as the attack of the Russians was known: indeed, so hasty was the summons, that they had time neither for breakfasting nor to water their horses; but, booted and saddled in a few minutes, off they went. Their first duty was to check, as far as might be, the advance of the Russians upon the redoubts; but these redoubts being taken, the British cavalry prepared to receive an immense body of the enemy's horse. As soon as the Russians were seen descending a hill, the Earl of Lucan ordered Brigadier-general Scarlett to attack them with the Scots Greys and the Enniskillen Dragoons, supported in a second line by the 5th Dragoon Guards, and on the flank by the 4th; all these belonging to the brigade of heavy cavalry. In a most determined manner, these troopers utterly defeated and routed thrice their number of Russian horsemen. Lord Raglan spoke in highly commendatory terms of this achievement: 'The ground was very unfavourable for the attack of our dragoons, but no obstacle was sufficient to check their advance, and they charged into the Russian columns, which soon sought safety in flight, although far superior in numbers. The charge of this brigade was one of the most successful I ever witnessed, and was never for a moment doubtful.' It was, indeed, a fine display of military prowess. Lord Raglan and a number of officers, English and French, were on the heights above, looking down on a scene that passed too rapidly for them to share. An officer in the Enniskillen Dragoons described his sensations in a few words which tell more of the contest than the most lengthened dispatch: 'Oh, such a charge! Never think of the gallop and trot which you have often witnessed in the Phœnix Park, when you desire to form a notion of a genuine, blood-hot, all-mad charge, such as that I have come out of. From the moment we dashed at the enemy, I knew nothing but that I was impelled by some irresistible force onward, and by some invisible and imperceptible influence to crush every obstacle which stumbled before my

good sword and brave old charger. I never in my life experienced such a sublime sensation as in the moment of the charge. Some fellows speak of it as being "demoniac." I know this, that it was such as made me a match for any two ordinary men, and gave me such an amount of glorious indifference as to life, as I thought it impossible to be master of. Forward—dash—bang—clank—and there we were in the midst of such smoke, cheer, and clatter, as never before stunned a mortal ear. It was glorious! I could not pause. It was all push, wheel, frenzy, strike, and down, down, down they went!' Now would the Russians try to encircle the much smaller number of British; now would the Scots Greys and the Enniskilleners, undeterred by numbers, charge with such fury as to cut completely through the serried mass, and emerge at the rear; now would they, without a moment's hesitation, advance to a second mass of the enemy's cavalry, dash into it, and resolve the contest into a series of hand-to-hand sword-conflicts: when the two masses had been broken by this wonderful charge, then would the other dragoon regiments gallop on,

Battle-ground of Balaklava.

and convert the retreat of the Russians into a disorderly pell-mell rout; and when all this was achieved, then did the hills echo such a cheer as they had never echoed before. At one time the bugle sounded a rally, but the men heeded it not; on they went, regarding only the enemy before them. One dragoon, when he found that his horse was wounded under him, dismounted, ran up to a Russian horseman, pulled him off by main force, killed him, vaulted into his place, and galloped off again to the fight. Another dragoon, having his horse shot, fell heavily, with his head on the ground, and was being dragged away in that position; a Russian lancer sought to run him through, but he extricated himself from the saddle and stirrups, and, with the aid of a companion, put a speedy end to the lancer's career. The whole enterprise was one that depended on the individual qualities of the men, for the other troops were so placed at the time as to be incapable of affording immediate aid; they could only look on, and admire.

At this point of the day's struggles commenced the fourth stage of the battle—that stage which, under the appellation of the 'Light Cavalry Charge at Balaklava,' became a subject of astonishment to French and Russians, of unpleasant controversy between the British officers, and of admiration to all who admire heroic courage under perilous circumstances. There was a mistake committed, in an order issued, or in the conveyance of that order, or in its interpretation when received; but the light cavalry dashed on brilliantly, without waiting to apportion the blame on whomsoever it ought to rest. The object of the movement, as explained by Lord Raglan in his dispatch after the battle, was this: 'As the enemy withdrew from the ground which they had momentarily occupied, I directed the cavalry, supported by the 4th division, under Lieutenant-general Sir George Cathcart, to move forward, and take advantage of any opportunity to regain the heights; and not having been able to accomplish this immediately, and it appearing that an attempt

was making to remove the captured guns, the Earl of Lucan was desired to advance rapidly, follow the enemy in their retreat, and try to prevent them from effecting their object. In the meanwhile, the Russians had time to re-form on their own ground, with artillery in front and upon their flanks.' Let us next see in what sense the Earl of Lucan, who commanded the whole of the cavalry, interpreted this order. In his dispatch or report to Lord Raglan, written immediately after the battle, the earl said; 'Being instructed to make a rapid advance to our front, to prevent the enemy carrying off the guns lost by the Turkish troops in the morning, I ordered the light brigade to advance in two lines, and supported them with the heavy brigade.' The words here used do not differ much from those employed by Lord Raglan; but the sequel shewed that the same meaning was not attached in the two cases.

Never before, perhaps, did a small body of light cavalry (Hussars, Lancers, and Light Dragoons) make such a charge at a well-appointed army of artillery, cavalry, and infantry. Most of the Russian infantry as well as cavalry had retired, except a small force in three of the redoubts—not from the field altogether, but to the reserve position, where the cavalry drew up in six solid divisions; with six battalions of infantry behind them, others on the flanks of the hills adjoining, and thirty pieces of artillery near them. Practically, therefore, a few hundred horsemen attacked a complete army drawn up in position. When the Earl of Lucan received the order to advance and retake the captured guns, he was surprised, seeing the interpretation which he put upon it; and when the Earl of Cardigan, as second in command, was instructed to put the order in execution, he was equally surprised, but hesitated not to obey it. 'It was late in the afternoon,' said the earl on a subsequent occasion, 'when I received an order to attack the Russian forces in the valley, consisting of a long line of guns drawn up in the form of batteries. I received that order, and I obeyed it.' There appears to have been entertained a feeling that the cavalry had effected little since the landing at Old Fort: many of the infantry freely criticised the horse—alleging that they should have foraged better for the army; that they should have manœuvred better at the Bulganak; that they should have pushed forward after the flying enemy at Alma; and that they should have pursued the Russians whom they encountered at Mackenzie's Farm during the flank-march. Some of these whispered censures were directed against the cavalry generals, some against the cavalry as a whole; but they created an indignant feeling, and a determination to shew what the cavalry could effect if opportunity should offer. It was a foolish criticism at best, and was also mischievous if it tended, as some think, to drive the cavalry into a reckless charge. The small band of barely 670 horsemen advanced; they proceeded for about a mile down and along a gentle descent, amid a volley of round and grape shot vomited forth by batteries of cannon on the right and the left, and passing through a cloud of Russian riflemen occupying the intermediate ground; they advanced to within fifty yards of the mouths of the cannon which they erroneously believed it was Lord Raglan's wish they should capture; and here they were indeed encircled in a very blaze of fire, from the front, right, and left. Stayed by nothing, they galloped on, and literally galloped through the battery itself, cutting down the artillerymen as they passed. But what an unequal contest! One sword was pitted against twenty swords, muskets, pistols, rifles, and cannon; and the wonder is—not that so many of the small British force were killed—but that any returned to tell of the fight. In two of the regiments, every officer, with one exception, was either killed or wounded, or had his horse shot or wounded under him. The heroic band not only reached and passed the battery of guns, but cut through a mass of cavalry estimated at 5000 men. It would scarcely appear possible that such a feat could be achieved, were it not that the Russians, utterly confounded by so daring an attack—an attack which set at defiance all the recognised rules of military tactics—did not at first make the most of their advantage. When the men found themselves in the rear of the great body of the enemy's cavalry, and began fully to appreciate the peril of their position, they attempted to cut their way back again to the place whence they started. Here the destruction of this miniature force began in earnest. Wheeling round, and fighting their way back through any gaps offered, they encountered cavalry, infantry, and artillery—sabres, bayonets, bullets, balls—every horse and rider being a special mark for a whole host of opponents; and when a small remnant reached the Allied position, the cheer which the men gave, at the thought of having ridden over a Russian battery and pierced through and through a phalanx of cavalry, was damped by the recollection of the comrades whom they had left behind them. The spectators on the heights had watched the advance in the first instance—Canrobert marvelling at the manœuvre as much as he admired the men, and Raglan perceiving at once that some mistake must have been made in the interpretation of his orders—and had paused in breathless anxiety during the brief period when the few British were hidden among and behind the Russian masses; but when they saw the Lancers, and Hussars, and Light Dragoons, return by twos and threes, and riderless horses rushing back wildly, then did the truth become painfully apparent that the little band had suffered greatly. General Klapka states: 'A French general, who witnessed that heroic scene, and who remarked the imprudence of it, and the total disregard of the commonest military rules, is said to have exclaimed: "It is very fine; but this is not war!" General Gortchakoff—not to be

confounded with the commander-in-chief on the Danube—having seen the annihilation of the English horse from the other side, expressed himself in less courteous terms on the following day to an English officer sent with a flag of truce to the Russian camp: "The charge you made yesterday was very fine, but permit me at the same time to observe, that it was very stupid (très bête)."' *

The narrations the survivors of this light brigade had to tell were full of marvels. One man fell with thirteen lance-wounds. Another had six lance-wounds, two sabre-cuts, a bullet in his cap, five in his saddle, his sword bent by a rifle-ball, and two horses killed under him. A third was surrounded by four Cossacks at once; he killed three with his revolver, escaped with stabs in the side and the arm, had those wounds dressed, and then wished to rejoin his comrades in the fight. Captain Nolan, who was concerned in the unfortunate misconception of Lord Raglan's order, was struck in the breast by a shell; he gave a loud cry; his horse turned and trotted off; and poor Nolan dropped from his saddle, to rise no more alive. It was a bitter moment (one officer writes), after they had broken through the line of Russian cavalry, to look round and see that no supports had been able to reach them, and that they must cut their way back again as best they could; and he adds: 'As we could not hold our ground, all our dead and badly wounded were left behind, and we know not who are dead or who prisoners. All this makes me miserable, even to write; but it is the naked truth.' One trooper speaks of thirty-five having started together, and of his little party being reduced to nine when they reached the camp. Another tells how that, when his regiment returned, there were so few officers left that it was doubtful who could command. All alike spoke of a mysterious mistake concerning the order; for none could believe in the veritable character of such an item in tactics. The Russians may reasonably have been 'petrified at the audacity of the attack;' but Liprandi could not have admired the generalship that had led to it. Somewhat under 700 went out; less than 200 returned; and this was the 'Light Cavalry Charge at Balaklava.'

The fifth and final stage in the battle may be regarded as that in which General Canrobert sent some of his active troops to aid the British. A charge by the Chasseurs d'Afrique, made against a gun-battery on the enemy's right, had the effect of drawing off some of the force that attacked the little band of British light cavalry, and of completing the final rout of the Russians. General Canrobert remarked, in his dispatch concerning the battle, that it was evidently the intention of Liprandi to entice the Allies into a desertion of their excellent position on the plateau, and a descent into the plain. 'I contented myself,' he adds, 'with uniting, at the request of Lord Raglan, my cavalry to the English horse, which occupied a position on the plain before Balaklava, and which had already executed a most brilliant charge against the enemy's cavalry. Besides this, and while Lord Raglan established two divisions of infantry before the port, I caused all the men that I could spare from my first division to descend to the foot of the slopes of our position.' Canrobert spoke of the light cavalry charge as one in which the men were 'led away by too much ardour:' he did not at that time know that a misconstrued order had occasioned it. Seeing the perilous condition of this small band, he sought how to render aid; he attacked, with his Chasseurs d'Afrique, a battery of Russian guns and several battalions of infantry, forced them to retreat, and thus removed part of the pressure weighing so severely on the small British force.

The remainder of the day's proceedings consisted in a series of minor attacks suggested by the divergent plans of the opponent generals. Liprandi wished, beyond anything else, to obtain possession of Balaklava, as a move that would render important aid to Menchikoff in defending Sebastopol, and to effect this, he sought to draw the Allies away to another part of the field of contest; but Raglan, knowing full well the value of Balaklava as a base of operations, contented himself with maintaining that position. The earthen redoubts abandoned by the Turks were much contested at later periods of the day; but each side regarded them as subsidiary to the more important post of Balaklava. As evening closed in, the Russians retired behind the hills, and the battle ended—a battle in which the Allies had acted throughout on the defensive, except in relation to the light cavalry charge.

In General Liprandi's account of the battle, transmitted by Prince Menchikoff to St Petersburg, and published by the Russian government in the *Invalide Russe*, nearly the whole of the Russian manœuvres are described as having been brilliantly successful. The principal officers under Liprandi, named in this dispatch, are Levontsky, Semiakine, Gribbe, Scudari, Ryjoff, Jabrokitsky, Yeropkine, Gversivanoff, and Willebrandt. Liprandi dwells with unction on the conduct of the 'terrified Turks' at the redoubts. After narrating the capture of the redoubts, he states that in No. 1 he found three rampart-guns, two in No. 2, three in No. 3, and three in No. 4, besides tents, engineers' tools, and powder-magazines. It is remarkable that Liprandi, though acknowledging a slight check received by his cavalry from the English cavalry, and a harassing fire from rifles on his flank, is entirely silent concerning the gallant stand made by the Highlanders. The dispatch is confused in those parts relating to the two charges by the British heavy and light cavalry brigades; but it tells of the 'brilliant success' of a flank-charge by three squadrons of

* *The War in the East*, p. 96.

Russian lancers; which charge would appear, from the context, to have been made on the retreating light brigade; for Liprandi claims to have killed 400 British, wounded 60, and captured 22, at that spot.

When the day's sanguinary work was ended, it was found that the cavalry—as may be inferred from the nature of the attacks—had suffered more severely than the infantry. There were about 40 cavalry and artillery officers killed or wounded, together with 400 non-commissioned officers and privates, and nearly as many horses. The infantry loss was trifling. Menchikoff acknowledged to a loss of 300 Russian infantry, without naming the numbers in cavalry.

Such was the battle of Balaklava. It became speedily evident that some misconception had led to the light cavalry charge. Lord Raglan, scrupulously avoiding all occasions of disagreement, passed the matter lightly over in his dispatch in these words: 'From some misconception of the instruction to advance, the lieutenant-general considered that he was bound to attack at all hazards; and he, accordingly, ordered Major-general the Earl of Cardigan to move forward with the light brigade.' It did not escape notice, however, that while praising the officers of the light brigade, the commander withheld praise from the Earl of Lucan. Time passed; the subject was much discussed at the camp; and at length the London newspapers containing Lord Raglan's dispatch reached the army. The Earl of Lucan, still retaining his position as chief of the cavalry, then addressed a long letter to Lord Raglan, which at a later date was read before the House of Lords and printed in the debates. After complaining of the serious nature of the 'misconception' attributed to him, the earl gave an account of the transaction.* Whether or not any correspondence immediately followed the writing of this letter, it became afterwards fully evident that each officer retained his own opinion, and that an estrangement existed between them as long as the earl remained at the camp. Lord Raglan deemed the letter one that ought not to have been addressed to him, and recommended its withdrawal: the earl declined; whereupon the commander wrote home to the Minister of War, enclosing a copy of the earl's letter, and giving such a version of the transaction as appeared to Lord Raglan to be correct. This imparted a more serious aspect to the discussion; for Lord Raglan now dwelt upon *two* misconceptions, instead of merely one, which he had to attribute to the earl.* Taking the two consecutive orders into consideration, and the periods of the battle at which they were issued, it appears to have been Lord Raglan's intention that the cavalry should aid in regaining the heights surmounted by the

* The chief parts of this letter are the following:—'Surely, my lord, this is a grave charge, and an imputation reflecting seriously on my professional character. I cannot remain silent. It is, I feel, incumbent on me to state those facts which I cannot doubt must clear *me* from what I respectfully submit is altogether unmerited. The cavalry was formed to support an intended movement of the infantry, when Captain Nolan, the aid-de-camp of the quartermaster-general, came up to me at speed, and placed in my hands this written instruction:

"Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of horse-artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left.
Immediate. R. AIREY."

After carefully reading this order, I hesitated, and urged the uselessness of such an attack, and the dangers attending it. The aid-de-camp, in a most authoritative tone, stated that they were Lord Raglan's orders that the cavalry should attack immediately. I asked him: "Where and what to do?" as neither enemy nor guns were within sight. He replied, in a most disrespectful but significant manner, pointing to the further end of the valley: "There, my lord, is your enemy; there are your guns." So distinct, in my opinion, was your written instruction, and so positive and urgent were the orders delivered by the aid-de-camp, that I felt it was imperative on me to obey, and I informed Lord Cardigan that he was to advance; and to the objections he made—and in which I entirely agreed—I replied that the order was from your lordship. Having decided against my conviction to make the movement, I did all in my power to render it as little perilous as possible. I formed the brigade in two lines, and led to its support two regiments of heavy cavalry, the Scots Greys and Royals, and only halted them when they had reached the spot from which they could protect the retreat of the light cavalry in the event of their being pursued by the enemy, and when, having already lost many officers and men by the fire from the batteries and fort, any further advance would have exposed them to destruction.

My lord, I considered at the time—I am still of the same opinion—that I followed the only course open to me. As a lieutenant-general, doubtless, I have discretionary power; but to take upon myself to disobey an order written by my commander-in-chief within a few minutes of its delivery, and given from an elevated position commanding an entire view of all the batteries and the position of the enemy, would have been nothing less than direct disobedience of orders, without any other reason than that I preferred my own opinion to that of my general, and, in this instance, must have exposed me and the cavalry to aspersions against which it might have been difficult to defend ourselves.

It should also be remembered that the aid-de-camp, well informed of the intentions of his general and the objects he had in view, after first insisting on an immediate charge, then placed himself in front of one of the leading squadrons, where he fell the first victim.

I did not dare so to disobey your lordship; and it is the opinion of every officer of rank in this army to whom I have shewn your instructions, that it was not possible for me to do so.'

* The following are the principal passages in this letter, as read before the House of Lords:—'The Earl of Lucan has referred to my dispatch; and, far from being willing to alter one word of it, I am prepared to declare that not only did the lieutenant-general misconceive the written instruction that was sent him, but that there was nothing in that instruction which called on him to attack at all hazards, or to undertake the operation which led to such a brilliant display of gallantry on the part of the light brigade, and, unhappily, at the same time occasioned such lamentable casualties in every regiment composing it. In his lordship's letter, he is wholly silent with respect to a previous order which had been sent him. He merely says that the cavalry was formed to support an intended movement of the infantry. That previous order was in the following words:—"The cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. They will be supported by infantry, which has been ordered to advance on two fronts." This order did not seem to me to have been attended to, and therefore it was that the instruction by Captain Nolan was forwarded to him. Lord Lucan must have read the first order with very little attention, for he now states that cavalry was formed to support the infantry, whereas he was told by Brigadier-general Airey "that the cavalry was to advance, and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights, and that they would be supported by infantry"—not that they were to support the infantry; and so little had he sought to do as he had been directed, that he had no men in advance of his main body, made no attempt to regain the heights, and was so little informed of the position of the enemy, that he asked Captain Nolan "where and what he was to attack, as neither enemy nor guns were in sight." This, your Grace will observe, is the lieutenant-general's own admission. The result of his inattention to the first order was, that it never occurred to him that the second was connected with and a repetition of the first. He viewed it only as a positive order to attack at all hazards (the word "attack," be it observed, was not made use of in General Airey's note) an unknown enemy, whose position, numbers, and composition he was wholly unacquainted with, and whom, in consequence of a previous order, he had taken no step whatever to watch. I undoubtedly had no intention that he should make such an attack; there was nothing in the instruction to require it; and, therefore, I conceive I was fully justified in stating to your Grace what was the exact truth—that the charge arose from the misconception of an order for the advance, which Lord Lucan considered obliged him to attack at all hazards. I wish I could say, my lord duke, that, having decided against his conviction to make the movement, he did all he could to render it as little perilous as possible. This, indeed, is far from being the case, in my judgment.'

redoubts taken from the Turks, or, in default of this, to prevent the Russians from carrying off the guns from those redoubts. In what sense the earl understood these instructions, his own letter explains. Whether Captain Nolan rightly interpreted and rightly conveyed the message intrusted to him, can never be known: he fell gallantly in the charge that followed. The Earl of Lucan, addressing the House of Lords on the subject, made a comment which seems to shew that a mere verbal error may in part have occasioned the sad misconception. Speaking of Lord Raglan's first order, he said: 'The order put into my hands was:

"The cavalry to advance, and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. They will be supported by infantry, which has been ordered. Advance on two fronts."

The original order did not say "to advance;" but it is possible that the word "to" may have been inserted by mistake in the copy which I furnished to Lord Raglan, and I therefore wish to impute nothing to his lordship with respect to it. There was a full stop after the word "ordered," there was no "to," and there was a large "A" to "advance." It would have made a great difference if "to" had been inserted and "advance" had commenced with a small "a," so as to make the whole one sentence. But the sentence, "Advance on two fronts," stood by itself.' If a small error like this led to the calamity, the occurrence is, perhaps, still more to be regretted. The earl, feeling more and more severely the position in which he was placed, demanded a court-martial, that the whole subject might be investigated: this demand was refused by Lord Hardinge, the commander-in-chief, with the sanction of the government; and the House of Lords shewed a disinclination to permit lengthened discussions on the matter during its sittings. The newspapers then became the vehicle of communications, together with pamphlets, and even volumes; and during many months a vehement, and often acrimonious, contest was kept up between the advocates on different sides. The controversy was never satisfactorily closed. It was never clearly shewn whether the blame were distributable between Lord Raglan, General Airey, Captain Nolan, and the Earl of Lucan; or in what proportions; or whether the earl and the captain, or the earl only, were responsible for the error. All that the nation fully knew was—that two-thirds of the numbers in a gallant body of men were struck down in attempting to achieve something, they knew not what, against a force that rendered success almost impossible.

When the Queen thanked her army for its conduct at the battle of Balaklava, she said: 'Her Majesty has learned with deep concern that the repulse of the enemy was not effected without a heavy loss of the division of cavalry, more especially of the light brigade; but the brilliancy of the charge, and the gallantry and discipline evinced by all, have never been surpassed even by British soldiers under similar circumstances.' There was reference to 'the distinguished service performed on this occasion by Major-general Sir Colin Campbell,' and to 'the gallant services of the Earl of Cardigan and the Honourable Brigadier-general Scarlett, who commanded the two brigades of cavalry, and so nobly sustained the honour of that distinguished and important arm of Her Majesty's service;' but the Earl of Lucan was only mentioned in connection with the good conduct of those who were under him—a distinction little likely to heal the wounds connected with this unfortunate affair.

THE TWO BATTLES OF INKERMANN.

The battle of Balaklava was only one among a series of occurrences arising out of the system of tactics adopted by Prince Menchikoff. Finding that the Allies, although making little progress in the siege of Sebastopol, were gradually enlarging and strengthening the siege-works, he determined on a plan, rendered possible by his command of the roads from the interior of the Crimea—that of harassing the besiegers in their rear, attempting to disturb their security at Balaklava, and wearing them down by imposing a necessity for incessant watchfulness. The battles of Inkermann were links in this chain. In familiar parlance, one battle only is spoken of—the truly great contest of the 5th of November; but the splendour of that achievement should not throw into oblivion the minor but still gallant struggle of the 26th of October near the same spot. In future pages, these two battles, if mentioned together, may conveniently be distinguished as the 'first' and the 'great;' but the 'Battle of Inkermann,' without further definition, will always refer to the wonderful encounter on the 5th of November—an encounter which, in many of its features, has perhaps had no parallel in modern times.

The contest on the 25th, let the opponents have shared the glory how they may, certainly gave the Russians possession of advantages not before held by them. It enabled them to hold a position on the left bank of the Tchernaya, within half an hour's march of the English lines, and an hour's of their head-quarters; and the Allies had not sufficient troops to dislodge them from this position without weakening too much the force before Sebastopol. Lord Raglan himself admitted this, in the following passage of his dispatch:—'The means of defending the extensive position which had been occupied by the Turkish troops in the morning, having proved wholly inadequate, I deemed it necessary, in concurrence with General Canrobert, to withdraw from the lower range of heights, and to concentrate our force—which will be increased by a considerable body of seamen, to be landed from the ships under the authority of Admiral Dundas—

immediately in front of the narrow valley leading into Balaklava, and upon the precipitous heights upon our right, thus affording a narrower line of defence.' In short, the plateau occupied by the Allies required for its defence all the available troops, without any descent into the plain watered by the Tchernaya. Prince Menchikoff was not ignorant of this fact; and when Liprandi arrived on the 15th at Simferopol with his reinforcements —most of whom had travelled 400 miles round from Moldavia, after the intervention of Austria: an intervention which in this way embarrassed the Allies incapable of successfully repulsing the grand attack of their enemy ten days later. Economy of forces had already become a duty of the first importance with the Allies, who were consequently right in not staking their armies on one cast of the die, except in case of dire necessity.'



Sir de Lacy Evans.

The minor battle of Inkermann, or skirmish and repulse, occurred on the day after the battle of Balaklava. It was not occasioned by an attack from Liprandi's army, remaining encamped near the Tchernaya — although there can be little doubt that this general held himself in readiness to take advantage of any contingency arising therefrom—it was the result of a sortie from Sebastopol. Lord Raglan touched very briefly upon this struggle in his dispatch: 'The enemy rather than assisted the Allies in the Crimea—the prince immediately assumed the offensive. General Klapka, who awards scanty praise to the Allied generals on most occasions, defends them from a reproach that they had not driven the Russians across the Tchernaya immediately after the battle of Balaklava. 'My belief is—and the hard-fought victory of Inkermann bears witness to it—that a precipitate attack upon the strong position captured by the Russians on the 25th of October, would most likely have led to a wanton sacrifice of the troops, and rendered moved out of Sebastopol on the 26th with a large force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery—amounting, it is said, to 6000 or 7000 men—and attacked the left of the 2d division, commanded by Lieutenant-general Sir de Lacy Evans, who speedily and energetically repulsed them, assisted by one of the batteries of the 1st division and some guns of the light division, and supported by the brigade of Guards and by several regiments of the 4th division, and in rear by the French division commanded by General Bosquet, who was most eager in his desire to give him every aid.'

In the detailed dispatch of Sir de Lacy Evans, however, the manœuvres were more fully noticed. The Russian infantry and artillery, emerging from Sebastopol, and preceded by a cloud of skirmishers,

advanced up the slope towards the British camp. It was the 2d division thus immediately attacked; but all the other troops mentioned by Lord Raglan advanced as quickly as they could from different quarters, to render aid. The Russians approached rapidly, but were kept at bay, with remarkable intrepidity, by pickets of the 30th and 49th regiments, although with the loss of Captains Atcherley and Bayley, and Lieutenant Conolly, all of whom were severely wounded. By this time, Sir de. Lacy Evans had brought eighteen guns into position; and these, served with great energy, in about half an hour forced the enemy's artillery to abandon the field. It was then that the columns of Russian infantry felt the force of the muskets and artillery of the British: 'they were literally chased,' says Sir de Lacy, 'by the 30th and 95th regiments, over the ridges, and down towards the head of the bay;' indeed, it was difficult to recall the men before they had advanced too near the Russian lines. The 41st, in a similar manner, routed and pursued the left wing of the enemy's infantry. The pickets were the heroes on this day: if they, a handful of men, had yielded to the enemy, the subsequent work for the Allies would have been more severe. The English loss was only 80, of whom, however, 17 were officers, killed or wounded. Sir de Lacy Evans estimated the Russian loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, at little less than 600; while Lieutenant-colonel Hamley raised the estimate so high as 1000. This latter-named officer, who held an artillery command on the occasion, dwells forcibly on the value of this (relatively) minor battle. 'Parties of the attacking force were observed to carry intrenching tools in this enterprise. The design of the enemy probably was, after driving back the troops in front, to throw up cover on the opposite ridge, from behind which they might afterwards attack the same point of our line with sufficient force to follow up any advantage and meet the Allies on the plains. Had they succeeded in intrenching themselves, we must either have dislodged them at once in a pitched battle, or have allowed them to collect troops and artillery there till it should suit their convenience to attack us with every advantage on their side. The value of the service done in repelling them with so inferior a force (there were 1500 men of the 2d division engaged against 8000 Russians), was perhaps not quite appreciated. It is scarcely too much to say, that the presence of a strong intrenched force upon that part of the ground would have been a more serious disaster than the loss of Balaklava. . . . . The Russian general probably calculated that the attack on Balaklava of the previous day would have induced us to strengthen that part of the position at the expense of the rest, and that we should be able to oppose but a weak force in an opposite quarter.'*

* *Campaign of Sebastopol*, p. 83.

A gallant achievement, quite characteristic of the British sailor, attracted much attention during and after this engagement. Captain Lushington commanded the naval brigade employed in the siege, and under him was Mr Hewett, acting mate of the *Beagle*, who had charge of one of the Lancaster guns. From a dispatch sent by Captain Lushington to Admiral Dundas, and forwarded to the Admiralty, it appears that when the Russians made their sortie in such force on the 26th, this gun was in jeopardy; indeed, Russian skirmishers approached within 300 yards, and poured in a volley of Minié bullets upon the gunners. An order was received to 'spike the gun and retreat;' but Hewett, surmising that some mistake might have occurred in the conveyance of this order from the officer of the picket, sent this simple reply: 'Such an order does not come from Captain Lushington, and I will not obey it until it does.' He then pulled down the earthen parapet of the battery on which the gun was placed, obtained the aid of some of the soldiers in swinging the gun round to a position it could not have occupied while the parapet remained, and poured a most destructive fire of grape-shot into a large column of Russians; and, on their retreating from the British, he followed them down the hill with 68-pound shot, fired with fatal precision into the Russian masses. The happy audacity which induced this disregard of an order, or supposed order, contributed materially to the success of the Allies on this day; and the Admiralty marked their sense of the service rendered by conferring on Mr Hewett the rank of lieutenant. About this period, the fleets had so few opportunities of rendering service in their own characteristic way, that such an adventure on shore as that of Hewett afforded great delight to the seamen. For the rest, the ships continued to be simply assistants to the armies. After the threatened attack on Balaklava on the 26th, the *Agamemnon*, *Sanspareil*, *Wasp*, *Cyclops*, *Vesuvius*, and other steamers, were sent to the little port, to render aid in the event of any more serious contingency; while the *Firebrand*, *Niger*, *Beagle*, and *Arrow*, performed the office of couriers between Balaklava and Katcha: carrying sick and wounded from the former place to the latter, and stores and ammunition from the latter to the former.

Lord Raglan's dispatches, at the end of October and the beginning of November, adverted to a visible accumulation of Russian troops—not only in Sebastopol, but in the valleys and plains north and east of the plateau. The attack on the 25th had been made by Liprandi's corps, newly arrived; the minor attack on the 26th was by a portion of the garrison; but it became now evident that new and important reinforcements from the interior of Russia had reached Sebastopol, and that personages of distinction had joined them, as if with the view of imparting greater dignity and importance to some intended attack. The

Russian force in the Valley of the Tchernaya was greatly increased, and was pushed on to the heights contiguous to Balaklava. The Allies immediately caused their lines of defence to be strengthened; but it is remarkable to observe that Lord Raglan made no mention of any strengthening at the point opposite the village of Inkermann, where the ascent from the valley is sufficiently easy to permit an attack if the heights be undefended. His lordship said: 'The movements of the Russians have induced me to place as strong a force as I can dispose of on the precipitous ridge in that direction (the plain of the Tchernaya), in order to prevent any attempt to get round to Balaklava; and the whole line is strengthened by a breast-work which has been thrown up by the Highland brigade, the royal marines, and the Turkish troops—thus circumscribing that part of the position; while immediately in front of the gorge leading into that town, a strong redoubt is in course of being constructed, which is to be garrisoned by the 93d regiment, and armed with several guns; and on the high ground behind and to the left is a battery manned by seamen, which terminates the position to be defended by the troops under the command of Major-general Sir Colin Campbell.' Still, no mention of the position at Inkermann, although this dispatch was written on the 3d of November. Lord Raglan watched Menchikoff on one side, and Liprandi on the other; and even in regard to those two opponents he said: 'I should be more satisfied if I could have occupied the position in considerably greater strength.' He appears to have been entirely ignorant of Dannenberg's movements at that time.

Knowing that his army was far too weak for the onerous duties imposed upon it; foreseeing that he had an anxious responsibility to look forward to; believing that the Russians, besides strengthening their works, had received considerable reinforcements—the British commander was still far from suspecting the tremendous nature of the preparations made by the enemy for the 5th of November, the day of the BATTLE OF INKERMANN: he did not know that priestly fanaticism and imperial encouragement were to be added to military ardour. Shortly before that day, General Dannenberg arrived at Sebastopol, *viâ* Perekop and Simferopol, with a well-appointed army of 30,000 men, to augment those already under Menchikoff and Liprandi: it was composed of the 10th, 11th, and 12th divisions, each consisting of sixteen battalions of infantry, two batteries of artillery, and a strong force of cavalry. To impart greater importance to this army and its mission, Dannenberg was accompanied by the Grand-dukes Michael and Nicholas, the third and fourth sons of the czar—young men who, it was doubtless hoped, would for the first time witness a splendid victory gained by Russian troops. On the 3d, at a council of war, it was determined that an attack should be made upon the Allied forces two days afterwards; the army was to advance towards Inkermann, take possession of the fortified works crowning the heights, and surround the plain or valley of the Tchernaya: this accomplished, the eastern defence-works of the Allies on the plateau and near Balaklava were to be attacked; while, at a concerted period, a vigorous sortie was to be made from the south-west of Sebastopol upon the French siege-works. Menchikoff took upon himself the command of the town and the management of the sortie; while one of the Gortchakoffs was intrusted with the command of the army of operation in the field—the two grand-dukes being placed upon the staff.

Extraordinary was the scene presented on the 4th of November. Bishops belonging to the Russo-Greek Church had accompanied the new army; and these performed a mass with all pomp and solemnity in the midst of the troops. One of the prelates then addressed the Russian soldiers. He reminded them of their duty to the czar; he pointed to the grand-dukes as the czar's representatives, who had come to participate in their labours and their glories; he smoothed down the recollections of the battle of the Alma; he spoke of the English soldiers as poor beings hostile to the cause of God, and of the French as merely the descendants of those who had been defeated in Russia in 1812; he told them that the English camp contained enormous riches, one-third part of which the magnanimous czar, their father and friend, had made over to them, in the event of their winning the approaching battle; he announced the czar's prospective gift of a month's pay and rations to every one who might be wounded in the battle; he bade them remember, that if they should gloriously fall in God's cause, they might by will dispose of their share in the booty; and he ended by invoking a blessing and distributing medals. Thus were fanaticism and cupidity appealed to, as means of exciting the men to frenzied exertions on the morrow; and to add to these, libations of ardent spirits were served out in the dead of the night, to render the men still more reckless when the hour for commencing the attack should arrive.

Sunday morning came. Dark, misty, murky, damp; all the discomforts of November combined, in a manner to render worn-out troops wistful of a day of rest. The offices of religion can be sparingly attended to at such a time, and amid such scenes; yet did the army-chaplains strive to effect something that might remind them all of the Sabbath. A clergyman, lodged at Balaklava, set out at an early hour to reach the plateau on which the 2d division was encamped; he rode onwards and upwards, doubtful whether his path were not a precarious one, in the immediate vicinity of the enemy; until at length he heard firing; then more firing; then a roar that plainly told of large bodies of men in deadly conflict. It was the battle of Inkermann,

already commenced, and turning a day of peace into a day of blood. The weeping mist drew a veil over the scene; but his eyes were soon saddened by the sight of poor shattered bodies brought to the rear: his priestly services were suddenly checked, or turned into a different channel.

Inkermann, where this terrible struggle was at that moment being carried on, is properly the name of a village adjacent to numerous remarkable caves in the face of a limestone rock nearly perpendicular, and many hundred feet in height; but the soldiers were accustomed to apply the name generally to the village, the valley, and the heights on either side. In passing along the valley, the cliffs on the north-east or right side are seen to be completely dotted over with hollows or caverns, supposed to have been human habitations at some remote period in the history of the Crimea. Cells, passages, and grottos of extraordinary character, still exist; though many ancient portions have been burnt into lime or built into the structures of Sebastopol. It is the opinion of Montpéreux * that these

Map of Battles of Balaklava and Inkermann.

Battle of Inkermann.
R Russian Route and Positions. B British Positions. F French Troops. A French Artillery.

Battle of Balaklava.
E Charge of the British Cavalry. D Charge of Chasseurs d'Afrique. F Neutral Redoubt. G and H Redoubts taken by the Russians from the Turks on 25th Oct.

mountain-caves at Inkermann were the work of the Taureans, at least as remote in time as the days of the Heracleans and Bosphorians; probably more so. On one occasion, the two nations just named joined their forces to repel a Tauro-Scythian chief; and Diophantes, the general sent by Mithridates, recognising the strength of the position now called Inkermann, built a fortress there, and named it Eupatorion, in honour of his sovereign. Thus Inkermann was a fortified post 2000 years before Sebastopol existed. Traces of occupation by later races are observable, and the wild beauty of the spot has attracted the attention of many travellers; but the Tatar village of Inkermann itself is small and insignificant.

It is scarcely too much to say that the battle of Inkermann resulted from an imperfect acquaintance by the Allied generals with the roads of approach to Sebastopol; or, if known, that the roads were not sufficiently attended to. When, after the celebrated flank-march, Lord Raglan and his principal staff-officers went out to make their first reconnaissance of the town, they stopped at the mound afterwards called Cathcart's Hill, opposite the small Russian earthwork soon to become the formidable Redan; then, and then for the first time, were they impressed with the unexpected and unwelcome truth that the place could not be taken by a *coup de main*, but that all the preparations for a formal siege would be necessary. Still, they believed that, commanding all

* *Voyage Autour du Caucase, &c.*

the roads leading to the southern half of Sebastopol, they could prevent ingress and egress of troops. One road, coming westward from Yalta and Baidar, and called the Woronzow or Voronzoff Road, after the name of the prince by whom it was constructed, crossed the plain of the Tchernaya close by the range of small hills whereon the Turkish redoubts, captured on the 25th of October, had been constructed; it was met, at the western end of this range, by another road coming from Mackenzie's Farm and Traktir Bridge, and then ascended to the plateau; after traversing which for about three miles, it entered Sebastopol near the Redan. Another road, following a southerly direction from Eupatoria, crossed the Tchernaya at Inkermann Bridge, ascended to the plateau near that point, and joined the Woronzow road at a windmill. Now, the British commander, disposing his troops on the plateau in a semicircle, or at least a curved line, commanded both these roads: the 1st and 2d divisions being encamped on either side of the Inkermann Bridge road; and the 4th and light divisions on either side of the Woronzow road. But the question still remained, whether there existed another road into Sebastopol? To come from Inkermann Bridge to that town by way of the plateau involved four or five miles of steep and fatiguing road; whereas the straight distance along the south side of the harbour was under two miles. It was believed by some of the officers in the Allied army that the plateau, or its outlying spurs and rocks, lie so close to the harbour as to leave insufficient space for a road along the beach: this being so, the Allies were in possession of the only avenues whereby stores could enter the town otherwise than by boats across the harbour; and it would, for the same reason, be impossible for the besieged to transport artillery along the south side of the harbour, and ascend the Inkermann heights, whereon the 1st and 2d divisions were encamped. On the other hand, many believed that the Russians had constructed a road in this disputed direction; that such a road would be quite hidden from troops on the plateau above; that any amount of reinforcements or ammunition could enter Sebastopol without hinderance at any hour of the day or night; and that, in like manner, battalions and artillery could emerge from Sebastopol, and, keeping quite out of sight from the heights, reach a point where the plateau could be ascended, nearly opposite the village of Inkermann, and then appear suddenly before the Allied encampment. It was afterwards known that this second supposition was correct; but the question was doubtful in the minds of the generals at the time, and hence a neglect of precautions, followed by the battle of Inkermann. But, even if allowance be made for the absence of information on this point, there yet remains an unaccountable remissness on the part of the Allies. The immense reinforcements received by the Russians were well known, for they had been seen; yet no additional defences were thrown up, no precautions taken on the night of the 4th, other than had been made when the enemy was much weaker. The attack at Inkermann in the early morn of the 5th appears to have been a surprise to those who ought not to have left room for such a surprise. It became afterwards known that the officers of the brigades encamped near Inkermann had from the first considered their position to be insufficiently defended, but that their representations to this effect had been overruled. The siege was maintained by British and French against Russians; but the Russians were planning a counter-siege on their own account, and in another way, which the Allied commanders should have foreseen.

In the dead of the night, when officers and men were endeavouring to snatch a few hours' repose from their weary work, the outlying pickets of the 55th heard bells ringing and multitudes chanting in Sebastopol: they did not then know what it meant. At two o'clock on the morning of the 5th, the same pickets heard a continuous low rumbling sound in the valley: they did not then know what it meant. It was only afterwards that the Allies comprehended the purport of these sounds—first a solemn religious service in Sebastopol, and then a conveyance of artillery from that town to Inkermann by way of the concealed road under the heights whereon the British were encamped. The sentinels reported what they heard, but without inducing any measures of precaution. Six o'clock approached, and then Russians appeared, at such a spot and in such a way as to capture some of the most advanced pickets, while other sentries stood their ground, and the rest hastened to alarm the camp. Immediately on the alarm being given, the commanders of the various brigades made arrangements to render assistance. Brigadier-general Pennefather brought the 2d division, with its guns, into position. Sir George Brown so arranged the light division that the 1st brigade, under Major-general Codrington, might occupy the long slopes on the left towards Sebastopol, to protect the right battery; while the 2d brigade, under Brigadier-general Buller, formed on the left of the 2d division. The 2d brigade of the 1st division, comprising the Highlanders, under Sir Colin Campbell, was guarding the important position near the gorge of Balaklava, and was not brought into active service during this battle; but the 2d brigade, consisting of the Guards, under the Duke of Cambridge and Major-general Bentinck, proceeded to the front, and took up a most important position on the extreme right—in 'alignement' or in the same right line with the 2d division, but separated from it by a steep and precipitous ravine. The 4th division in like manner had its two brigades separated; Sir George Cathcart placed the 1st brigade, under Brigadier-general Goldie, on the left of the road leading from the plateau to Inkermann; while the 2d, under

Brigadier-general Torrens, proceeded to the right of the same road, and to the ridge overhanging the Valley of the Tchernaya. The 3d division, under Sir Richard England, had various duties intrusted to it, among which was that of guarding the trenches; but it was not so placed as to incur severe loss on this bloody day. The artillery was brought into action at the most favourable points that could be selected, and rendered a terrible account of its day's doings. It did not fall to the lot of the cavalry to be called into active service.

Seldom in the annals of war has there been so small a body of men called upon suddenly to defend so important a position against a vast and complete army. Many of the British soldiers had been in the trenches or on picket-duty all night, and few or none had breakfasted, when, ere daylight had scarcely broken, the Russians appeared like a dark torrent, pouring in upon them in numbers not even to be guessed, and from a direction but imperfectly comprehended. No time was offered for consideration; no conference with commanders as to the best mode of defence to be offered: a sudden demand was made upon the heroic qualities of each individual man, for each had to be in many respects a general to himself. Strong as were the columns sent in by the Russians to the extreme right of the British position, the pickets defended the ground inch by inch, against an enemy whose masses would have been perfectly appalling to troops who stopped to consider numbers, but who at that moment thought of nothing but a defence of the posts intrusted to them. The morning was more than usually dark; a small, thick, blinding, drizzling rain was falling; and thus it happened that the troops engaged in deadly conflict could see little more of each other than was revealed by the flashes of artillery and musketry—an obscurity that augmented the dread terrors of the scene. As the fitful gleams of light became more and more vivid, the British began to perceive the tremendous nature of the attack made upon them. Under cover of a vast cloud of skirmishers, supported by dense columns of infantry, the Russians had advanced numerous batteries of guns of large calibre to the high ground on the opposite side of the Valley of Inkermann, facing the camp of the 2d division; while powerful columns of infantry had ascended the slopes, and commenced an attack on the British brigades. On the left, too, ranges of artillery were detected, until it became by degrees evident that the Russians had hardly fewer than ninety large guns in the field, besides those in the forts at Sebastopol and in the ships in the harbour, some of great calibre. When the skirmishers and pickets had had their first brush, and the latter had been driven in, the Russians, under cover of thick underwood, advanced in two heavy bodies, and attacked a small earthen battery which had been constructed for two guns, but was not armed. This memorable earthwork, called indifferently the Sand-bag Battery and the Two-gun Battery, was merely a wall or rampart of earth, about eight feet high, five feet thick, and thirty feet long; it was pierced for two 18-pounder guns, and was 'revêted' or faced with gabions and sand-bags; there was no banquette or raised step inside, whereon the men might stand to fire through the embrasures or over the crest—an omission that rendered the defence of the battery more difficult than it would otherwise have been. At this spot was virtually the commencement of the battle; and the defence there made was one of the most extraordinary recorded in military history.

It strikingly illustrates the delicate position of a commander, expected to award due honour to all who act worthily under him, that Lord Raglan gave deep umbrage to the brigade of Guards by the use of three little words in his dispatch. He said, in relation to the contest near the redoubt: 'The combat was most arduous; and the brigade, after displaying the utmost steadiness and gallantry, was obliged to retire before very superior numbers, until supported by a wing of the 20th regiment of the 4th division, when they again advanced and retook the redoubt.' All laudatory as was this, it yet contained the words 'obliged to retire;' and these words the Guards would not endorse. The men were a mere handful; barely 430 Grenadier Guards went into action that morning, with about an equal number of Scots Fusilier Guards, while the Coldstream Guards made up the number to about 1400; yet, contending against a vast army for several hours, this sprinkling of men would not listen to the words 'obliged to retire.' A 'memorandum' was drawn up several weeks afterwards, when the officers and men had had an opportunity of comparing notes, describing the exact nature of the contest wherein the Guards had been engaged; and from this memorandum, corrected in some of the details from other sources, it may be useful to string together a few particulars; for, from the very nature of the extraordinary contest, the Guardsmen only could know what they had to encounter before their brethren in arms came up.

The Guards, upon the first alarm being given by the advanced pickets of the 2d division, fell in, and marched off to the extreme right of that division—the Grenadiers leading, and the Fusiliers following. Advancing to the front, these 800 or 900 men perceived that the Russians had just taken possession of a sand-bag battery, out of which they had driven portions of the 55th, 41st, and 49th regiments, after a tremendous series of struggles, in which those troops had contended gallantly against overwhelming forces. Without waiting to measure numbers, the Grenadiers at once dashed at the battery and expelled the Russians. The little knot of bear-skin caps was now seen in position 700 yards in advance of the general line of the British troops.

The Grenadiers separated into three parties, one of which occupied the battery that had been recaptured, while the others formed into right and left flanks, nearly at right angles, so as to line the ridge of the long projecting tongue of land at the extremity of which the sand-bag battery had been erected. The Fusiliers then advanced, and extended the left flank just formed by their companions. Then commenced the memorable struggle. The Russians poured up the slope in dense masses—now attacking the battery, now attempting to turn the right flank of the Guards, now making a similar attempt on the left; but all in vain: the Grenadiers and Fusiliers maintained an uninterrupted fire of rifles against the advancing columns; and as soon as the Coldstreams could reach the spot, they joined their brethren in arms in this heroic defence of the little tongue of land. When the Russians were down below in the hollow, the Guards poured out a destructive fire upon them; when they ascended the slopes, the Guards charged them with the bayonet: and thus did these 1400 men—a portion of the 'Household Brigade' so often paraded in St James's Park and at courtly ceremonies—repel for some hours a force which may have been ten times as large; for of the 50,000 or 60,000 Russians engaged on this day, it is difficult to determine how many thousands took part in this attack on the battery and the Guards. It was now half-past nine, and, although other troops were approaching, none but the Guardsmen were yet at this critical spot. Their ammunition failed, through the incessant round of firing; and then the men took what they could find from the pouches of the dead British and Russians lying around them, to renew the struggle. Hour after hour thus transpired; what was passing at other parts of the field the Guards knew not; they kept near the battery, they kept their position on the tongue of land, and, regardless of cold, wet, and hunger, they met face to face the thousands of Russians who poured up the slopes. Thus they continued until the Grenadiers had become reduced to a force of little more than 100 strong; still they were not 'obliged to retire,' and did not retire: other regiments came up by degrees, and enabled the exhausted Guardsmen to obtain a little cessation from their wonderful work; but it remains upon record that these gallant fellows fought for six consecutive hours on one little spot, never allowing the Russians to remain long on the brow of the hill. The charges made by the enemy were numerous and fearful, and the battery itself changed owners several times during the day.

The memorandum drawn up by the Guards, or in expression of their opinions, does not correspond exactly with the narratives from other quarters; but the truth is, so extraordinary was the tumult, so unceasing the exertions, for many long hours, that officers as well as men were engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle for very life, and could not estimate the tactics of the day as a whole. It is remarkable that no two accounts of the battle of Inkermann agree; no man ventured to pronounce authoritatively on aught except that which fell under his notice; no man was certain that he even saw rightly what was going on immediately in his vicinity, so obscure was the atmosphere, and so terrible the confusion: generals who had issued orders were lying dead before the battle was over—and thus there were none who could tell precisely in what way each little band had assisted the others. This at least is certain—that the 55th, 20th, 47th, 41st, and 49th regiments fought desperately, and suffered terribly, around the earthwork or battery where the Guards were also engaged.

In what way the murderous conflict proceeded to the end, may perhaps be best narrated by tracing the chief movements of the several divisions; then describing the French share in the day's work; and, lastly, comparing these with the Russian version of the entire battle.

The camp of the 2d division was that which first met the fury of the Russian artillery, while other regiments were engaged in the hand-to-hand struggle. The pickets of this division, after maintaining their positions with indomitable courage as long as possible, retired and gave the alarm; and presently the tents were riven and shattered by the balls poured in upon them. Immersed in a gloomy, misty, rainy atmosphere, the troops were at first bewildered, scarcely knowing in which direction the unseen enemy was approaching. Sir de Lacy Evans, general of this division, by a fall from his horse about a week previously, had been so severely injured that he was forced to retire on shipboard at Balaklava, deputing the command to Brigadier-general Pennefather; and this last-named officer was suddenly called upon to exercise his command at Inkermann. Nevertheless, no sooner did the gallant general hear the sound of artillery on the morning of the 5th, than he left his sick-bed at Balaklava, hastened across the plateau to Inkermann, joined in the mêlée, and assisted Pennefather with his advice, without taking from him the command. Nearly all the generals of division and of brigade, indeed, were drawn into energetic action before Lord Raglan could reach a spot where the real nature of the struggle could be ascertained, and comprehensive orders given; and this duty was rendered the more perilous and anxious owing to the difficulty—almost amounting to impossibility—of seeing a way before them: they led their men through bushes and brakes, across gullies and over ridges, knowing that an enemy was somewhere near them, but painfully doubting where the point of greatest danger might be. The noise of musketry and artillery, and the dead and wounded bodies under their feet, were too often their only means of knowing that they were really close to the scene of bloodshed. It became a hot pell-mell struggle, hand to hand, and man to man, in which some

of the regiments especially suffered: indeed, the whole division was reduced to a few hundred men by the time the conflict was over. The anxious commander-in-chief, posted on a hill dangerously near the combatants, could issue few orders for aid; he could scarcely discern what was transpiring in the misty strife.

The 4th division was speedily called upon to mourn the loss of its chief, Sir George Cathcart. This division, encamped more than two miles from the chief scene of contest, was so considerably lessened by previous deaths, and by the employment of its men in the trenches, that it scarcely exceeded 2000 troops when the alarm was given; nevertheless, Sir George moved his fragments of regiments towards the front. Under the idea that he might make a strong impression by descending into the valley, and taking the enemy in flank, he moved rapidly forward. Seeing his men speedily disordered by the sudden fire of a large column of Russian infantry, and in danger of being outflanked by the overwhelming force, the gallant general galloped forward, down into the ravine where they were engaged; he saw at a glance that the enemy was gaining possession of a portion of the hill in rear of one flank of his division; he cheered his men on to the rally, and when ammunition failed them, he pointed to their bayonets. But now a new danger arose; a dense body of Russians appeared on an elevation in his rear, near the spot whence the descent had just been made; and Sir George had to lead his shattered regiments over rugged ground, hemmed in on nearly all sides by the enemy. A shot was fated to level him to the ground before he could bring his men back to the heights; he fell while almost close to a Russian column, and the 2000 men of his division did not regain their camp without a loss of 500 of their number. Poor Cathcart was afterwards found, dead, with a bullet-wound in the head and three bayonet-wounds in the body. Brigadier-general Torrens was severely wounded; and thus the division at once lost two out of its three generals.

At such a time, the veteran Sir George Brown was not the man to remain inactive. No sooner did the alarm sound through the camps, than he collected together the regiments of the light division; and presently the 7th and the 19th, the 23d and the 33d, which had been so fearfully cut up at the battle of the Alma, found themselves again in front of the enemy: they were not regiments, but mere fragments—the 77th and 88th being numerically stronger. Advancing in the terrible gloom, rendered more terrible by the flashes of guns and muskets, part of this division got so far ahead as to penetrate between the Russian columns; and it was not until after a murderous conflict that it could again emerge. Sir George Brown was struck by a shot—fortunately not fatal, but such as removed him at once from the field, and placed the burden of command in the division upon the two brigadier-generals. The fall among the officers was indeed tragical: Cathcart and Strangways killed; Brown and the Duke of Cambridge slightly wounded; Evans invalided before the battle began; brigadiers struck down by twos or threes; staff-officers killed or wounded by the very side of Lord Raglan—the British army presented, indeed, a woful diminution of chiefs when the battle ended. That the Earls of Lucan and Cardigan escaped, as well as Sir Richard England and his brigadier-generals, was probably attributable to the positions occupied by the cavalry and 3d divisions during the day: wherever the thick of the fight was, there did officers as well as men fall.

When, at as early an hour as possible, the artillery got into position, to bear a fair part in the battle, it was found that the Russian guns not only outnumbered those of the British, but were of heavier metal also—comprising field-guns, many of which were 12-pounders, and howitzers of thirty-two pounds per shot; whereas the British could oppose to them only 24-pounder howitzers and 9-pounder guns. The attacks made by the Russian infantry on the British artillery were tremendous, each being renewed by new columns: in one of them, the Russians, by sheer force of numbers, the momentum of a solid mass, drove back the British infantry so far as to gain the crest of the hill on which the field-batteries were posted, and reached the muzzles of the guns before the artillerymen could limber-up for safety. It was at this moment, however, that the British bayonets charged the enemy, and that the French advanced. Terrific was the result: so dense were the masses or columns in which the Russian infantry advanced, so difficult the deploying or change of position, that every cannon, musket, and rifle, fired by their opponents, wrought certain destruction; the artillerymen could sometimes see a clear gap made in the living mass by the felling of a whole file of men by one ball. The British artillery had to be withdrawn for a time, through scarcity of ammunition and loss of men; and when they returned to the battle, at a different spot, they were confronted by a tremendous force of Russian guns. Fortunately, at this juncture, two iron 18-pounder siege-guns, the only portions of the siege-train at disposal, were dragged up, and were so well served as to acquire gradually a commanding influence over those of the enemy. These two guns, under Lieutenant-colonel Dickson, contributed materially towards the victory.

In the account written by General Bosquet to General Canrobert concerning the share borne by the former in the day's proceedings, he commented on three points of attack selected by the Russians: namely, near the bridge of Inkermann; opposite the telegraph (where the Woronzow road ascends from the plain to the plateau); and further south towards Kadikoï. He formed an opinion that the two latter were mere feints, and that the serious point of attack would be at the extreme

right of the English. To this quarter, therefore, he sent assistance. He placed the whole of his troops under arms as quickly as possible; and sent to the scene of struggle portions of his Zouaves, Algerine tirailleurs, and chasseurs, together with battalions of the 6th, 7th, and 50th regiments. It was with these troops that Bosquet aided the heroic band of English to drive the enemy finally over the crest, and pursue them with a crushing fire towards the bridge. The time was indeed critical: the British had been fighting several hours, sinking rapidly in numbers and in physical strength, though not in moral determination. How much longer they could have maintained the unequal contest is doubtful; but when Bosquet brought forward his chasseurs and Zouaves, and when these nimble fellows dashed at the Russians with all the energy of ardent French troops, the repulse of the enemy became most signal and rapid. And when, in the afternoon, the enemy made one last grand attempt to regain the lost fortunes of the day, it was mainly the French who repulsed them, and drove them finally across the valley. It is the opinion of all, that without this aid the British must ultimately have given way, despite their heroism.

General Forey bore a share in the labours of this tremendous day, as commander of the French siege-army. It was he who was called upon to check and defeat the sortie from the town, constituting part of the Russian system of operations. At nine o'clock in the morning, while the British Guards were so fiercely engaged near the redoubt, he was suddenly attacked by a force of 5000 strong, which emerged from the streets of Sebastopol, crossed the lines of defence, and approached his siege-works—the force, according to Forey's dispatch, consisting of four battalions of the regiment of Minsk, one of the regiment of Volhynia, and a body of volunteers. The Russians left the town by the Quarantine bastion, and advanced along the ravine situated between that bastion and the French works: enveloped in a damp November mist, they approached unperceived, and threw their force upon the French batteries No. 1 and No. 2. The defenders of those batteries, apparently unable to contend against the large numbers opposed to them, retired to a short distance, as did likewise a portion of the troops placed in defence of the trenches. Forey speedily brought some of his regiments—including the 19th and 39th, with battalions of chasseurs and of the Foreign Legion—to the rescue; these advanced upon the Russians, who abandoned the two batteries, and retired beyond the ravine. Generals de Lourmel and D'Aurelle were sent forward in pursuit of the enemy, while General le Vaillant and Prince Napoleon held themselves in readiness to support these movements. Forey placed himself at the head of the chasseurs and the artillery, with a view to cut off the retreat of the enemy in case they should attempt to advance beyond the two batteries. The Russians speedily found themselves pursued in great force, besides being reached by a destructive storm of shot from artillery brought by the French up to the heights overlooking the Quarantine ravine; they were driven back into the town, and thus the sortie ended. General de Lourmel was wounded by a ball while pursuing them almost to the very walls of the place. Forey owned to a very serious loss, and estimated the Russian loss at 1500. The whole affair was simply a frustrated attack, leaving each side in possession of the same works and positions as before; the Russians spiked the eight guns in the two French batteries, but this mischief was soon afterwards repaired. The French had to mourn the loss of a favourite officer in General de Lourmel; for the wound received during the action proved fatal. When struck in the breast by a ball, the general betrayed neither emotion nor suffering, but told his orderlies to keep secret the fact of his being wounded. Half an hour elapsed before he would consent to be taken from his horse; when he did so, he attempted to walk, but his strength speedily failed him, and he submitted to be carried. Still, he required his attendants to stop every few moments, that he might look back at his troops, give orders, and correct movements. Arrived at his tent, and placed under the care of the surgeons, his wound speedily exhibited fatal symptoms: the ball had passed completely through the body; and after many hours of pain, borne with a soldier's fortitude, General de Lourmel ceased to live.

A third point on which the French were engaged was on the south-east margin of the plateau, where Liprandi made an attack, supposed to be intended as a feint, to draw off the attention of the Allies from the heights of Inkermann. It shews how alarming was the danger the Allies escaped on that day. Three distinct armies, in three different positions, attacked in three different places the plateau whereon the Allies were encamped, and this, too, with overwhelming numbers, and in a manner completely unexpected. Lord Raglan, speaking of the Russians actually engaged, said: 'I am led to suppose that they could not have been less than 60,000. Their loss was excessive; it is calculated that they left on the field near 5000 dead, and that their casualties amounted in the whole, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, to not less than 15,000. The number of British troops actually engaged little exceeded 8000 men; whilst those of General Bosquet's division only amounted to 6000, the remaining available French troops on the spot having been kept in reserve.'

When the *Invalide Russe*, one of the Russian semi-official journals, published the dispatches relating to the battle of Inkermann, much curiosity was manifested in England and France concerning the mode in which the defeat would be noticed. Prince Menchikoff, writing to the emperor from Sebastopol on the 6th of November, stated, that

early in the attack the 'English fortifications' on the heights were won; that the guns were spiked; that an unfortunate movement was made by the 10th division; that, as a result of this movement, the French were enabled to come to the aid of the English; that the siege-artillery of the Allies was then brought to the heights; that it was impossible for the Russians to contend longer against the superior forces of the enemy; that an orderly retreat over Inkermann Bridge was the result; and that the two grand-dukes, Nicholas and Michael, had exhibited during the day a coolness and courage worthy of their exalted rank.* On the 8th of the month, General Dannenberg drew up a more detailed account of the battle. Here the blame is thrown upon Lieutenant-general Soimonoff, who commanded the right wing, and who had been ordered to ascend the heights in great force at a particular moment, when Lieutenant-general Pauloff had succeeded in another manœuvre with the left wing; but Soimonoff made his attack at a point not intended by General Dannenberg; he thereby fought at a disadvantage, and when Pauloff came up, the British had already received reinforcements from the French. What would have been the reception of Soimonoff at St Petersburg, after the issuing of such a dispatch, is doubtful; but that officer was one among an enormous number who fell in the battle.

Towards the close of December, a remarkable account of the battle of Inkermann was published at Berlin, not professedly official, but bearing internal evidence of having been drawn up with the assistance of Russian officers; the anonymous writer had also made use of the dispatches of Raglan and Canrobert, and of the letters of the *Times* correspondent, to which he appears to have attached more importance than either. He puts down the Allied forces, about the middle of October, at 22,000 English, 32,000 French, 12,000 Turks, besides 4000 sailors and marines; and supposes that this total of 70,000 had been reduced to 63,000 by the morning of the 5th of November. Speaking of the battle of Balaklava, he is candid enough to say: 'The attempt did too little, inasmuch as it was not made with sufficient force; and at the same time too much, inasmuch as it roused the enemy out of his security, and pointed out to him the weak point of his position.' Coming to the battle of Inkermann, his account, although tinged throughout with a Muscovite hue, is not so glaringly extravagant as most documents of the kind. By a singular arithmetical process, however, the writer arrives at a conclusion that the forces engaged, during several hours of the day, were about equal—13,000 Russians against 13,000 English! The account throws light on the Russian tactics. Soimonoff, it appears, was to have marched along the west side of the ravine from Careening Bay, and attack the left wing of the British; while Pauloff was to ascend from Inkermann Valley, and surprise the right wing: these movements, with a feigned attack at Kadikoï to prevent the French from coming to the assistance of the British, and the sortie from Sebastopol, would, it was hoped, inflict a fatal defeat on the Allies. Dannenberg's powerful corps d'armée—leaving Odessa on the 19th of October, arriving at Baktchéserai on the 28th, and encamping near Tchorgouna about the end of the month—was confessedly powerful enough to insure these results, had the plan been well followed out. Soimonoff's division of Dannenberg's corps entered Sebastopol on the 3d of November; Pauloff's division encamped near Balaklava; and thus the two divisions were in the right places to commence the proposed attacks. The writer gives 16,000 as Soimonoff's force, and 14,000 as Pauloff's. Such was the plan; but Soimonoff is said to have mistaken the 'left' side of the ravine, mentioned in Dannenberg's instructions, and to have advanced along the east instead of the west side: in short, on a foggy, drizzling morning, he ascended the wrong slope, and arrived at the same heights as Pauloff's division. Thus it arose that the British were so fiercely attacked at this spot, being utterly confounded at finding Russians on both sides of them. 'The disadvantage of this false direction was, that from the confined nature of the ground, his troops were very much in the way of Pauloff's columns, and neither the one nor the other could find space to deploy.' The writer so twists his figures as to shew that, in the latter part of the battle, when the French arrived, the numbers actually engaged were 14,000 Allies against 6000 Russians. The bayonet-struggle is thus noticed: 'As the Russian soldiers gave themselves little time for firing, but rather, in the proud consciousness

* On the 12th of the month, Prince Menchikoff wrote again to the emperor, and enlarged upon this princely topic in the following terms:—'In my report, addressed to your Imperial Majesty immediately after the great sortie from Sebastopol on the 5th of November, I have already had the honour to bear testimony that their Imperial Highnesses, the Grand-dukes Nicholas Nicholaievitch and Michael, proved themselves, upon the field of battle, not only in every respect worthy of their high position by facing danger with coolness, but they also set the example of the true courage of the warrior. Their presence in the midst of the fire incited all and each to fulfil their sacred duties towards the sovereign and the country. The troops intrusted to my command were witnesses of this; and the intrepidity which they exhibited in the battle, so obstinate on both sides, was caused by the knowledge that the sons so dear to the Monarch and to Russia were in our ranks, and that every one ought to take example by their self-denial. In my order of the day of the 10th of November, I thought it my sacred duty to recall to the recollection of the troops these warlike virtues of the Grand-dukes, and I took the liberty of saying, that under the fire of the enemy they had shewn themselves to be brave Russian soldiers. After having exhibited upon the field of battle the full extent of their courage and coolness, the Grand-dukes wished on that very day to visit the bastions and the batteries, in order to bear in person to the brave sailors the thanks of the Monarch, in execution of your orders. At this moment almost all the batteries were in action, and particularly at the kourgan Malakoff the firing was so incessant, that the whistling of the balls, and even of the bullets from the carbines, was heard by the Grand-dukes along all the road leading to the bastion.

Your Imperial Majesty would fill with joy the whole army under my command by conferring upon their Highnesses the order of military merit which in thought has been unanimously bestowed upon them by us. The Order of St George of the Fourth Class, for bravery, if granted by your Majesty to their Highnesses, who have justly merited it, would be hailed as a high and inestimable mark of favour by all the troops under my command, who were witnesses of the courage and intrepidity of the Grand-dukes, in whose persons your Majesty and the whole of Russia have the happiness and the right to pride themselves and rejoice.'

It need perhaps hardly be said that the czar granted the prayer of this request.

of their valour, sought to reach the enemy as soon as possible with cold steel, it soon came to the most imbittered bayonet-engagement. With astonishment did the English see these attacks with the bayonet: they had flattered themselves with the delusion that no troops in the world could compete with their powerful well-fed men; and yet here did the Russians, whom they looked down on so superciliously, venture to challenge them to it, to attack them, and, what is more, several times put them to the rout; for the Russian's favourite weapon, ever since Suvaroff's time, has been the bayonet.'

Another portion of the Russian tactics—the sortie from the south-west side of Sebastopol—was described in the dispatches of Prince Menchikoff, who states that this movement, under Major-general Timofieff, commenced at ten o'clock, while the battle was raging on the heights eastward. After naming the troops forming the force engaged, the general states that they emerged by the gate situated to the right of bastion No. 6, crossed the ravine of Quarantine Bay, and approached the siege-works of the French. 'After having routed the enemy, even to his intrenchments, the battalions charged with the bayonet, and rushed upon the batteries; some pursued the enemy from one point to the other, and the rest made to his guns, fifteen of which were spiked.' But the French having received strong reinforcements, Timofieff deemed it prudent to retire, which he did 'so slowly, and in such perfect order, that not only all our wounded, but also some of the wounded of the enemy, including two officers, were carried off.' The French pursued them, but were met by such a fire of grapeshot from the guns of the place and of musketry from the wall, that 'they suffered an enormous loss, and took flight.'

If, amid these conflicting accounts, the reader obtains a general notion of the day's tactics, he will probably see that the Russian plan, whether due to Menchikoff or to Dannenberg, was skilfully conceived; it comprised three or four manœuvres, which, if successful, would have driven the Allies down to their ships at Balaklava and Kamiesch.

It may safely be asserted, that the records of war could shew few examples of so important a victory by such a handful of men. The light cavalry charge at Balaklava was a brilliant inadvertency, and must on that account occupy a place by itself: the three great actions have indeed been sometimes thus characterised—Alma, a battle; Inkermann, a surprise; and Balaklava, a mistake: but be the phraseology employed what it may, the defence of the redoubt at Inkermann was a wonderful military feat, fully successful in the result, and demanding from each individual soldier a personal heroism very rarely called for in the combined masses of modern armies. It may, perhaps, be an exaggerated use of language when Mr Russell characterises this contest as 'the bloodiest struggle ever witnessed since war cursed the earth;' but there can be no doubt of the vividness of his description of that which, nevertheless, he says it is almost hopeless to attempt to describe: 'It has been doubted by military historians if any enemy have ever stood a charge with the bayonet, but here the bayonet was often the only weapon employed in conflicts of the most obstinate and deadly character. We have been prone to believe that no foe could ever withstand the British soldier wielding his favourite weapon, and that at Maida alone did the enemy ever cross bayonets with him; but at the battle of Inkermann, not only did we charge in vain—not only were desperate encounters between masses of men maintained with the bayonet alone—but we were obliged to resist, bayonet to bayonet, the Russian infantry again and again, as they charged us with incredible fury and determination. The battle of Inkermann admits of no description. It was a series of dreadful deeds of daring, of sanguinary hand-to-hand fights, of despairing rallies, of desperate assaults—in glens and valleys, in brushwood glades and remote dells, hidden from all human eyes, and from which the conquerors, Russian or British, issued only to engage fresh foes, till our old supremacy, so rudely assailed, was triumphantly asserted, and the battalions of the czar gave way before our steady courage and the chivalrous fire of France. No one, however placed, could have witnessed even a small portion of the doings of this eventful day; for the vapours, fog, and drizzling mist, obscured the ground where the struggle took place to such an extent as to render it impossible to see what was going on at the distance of a few yards. Besides this, the irregular nature of the ground, the rapid fall of the hill towards Inkermann, where the deadliest fight took place, would have prevented one under the most favourable circumstances seeing more than a very insignificant and detailed piece of the terrible work below.'

The small insignificant battery for two guns, the attack and defence of which were so extraordinary, had been erected a few days before, for the purpose of silencing a Russian battery on the other side of the Inkermann Valley: this done, the guns had been removed, and there remained merely a heap of earth on the crest of a hill. But what a heap of earth was this! When the struggle was over, and officers hastened to take a glance at the sanguinary spot, they found all the ground near the battery literally covered with dead bodies, two or three in depth—Guardsmen, troops of the line, French, Russians; all strewed among and heaped upon each other, and so mutilated that no eye-witness dared to describe what he saw. All agree that for every English or Frenchman there were eight or ten Russians—so incessant had been the pouring in of fresh troops at this spot. Hence the almost unprecedented nature of the contest. If the combatants had maintained for nine hours a continuous

fighting, with like decay of strength on both sides, it would have been bad enough; but the small band of defenders was called upon to resist column after column, brigade after brigade, contending, with exhausted frames, against all comers. How the British escaped almost utter annihilation is a marvel. The wounded and captured Russians all smelled strongly of *raki* or *qvass*—denoting, as was afterwards more fully known, that they had been plied with ardent spirits to incite them to a more fierce attack. The Allies felt that the Russians never fought more vehemently, and this made the deadly struggle still more deadly. In short, to use the words of an officer present, 'it was a battle of position, not of manœuvre, for none was required; from first to last it was hand-to-hand bush-fighting—regular butchery.'

How the officers exerted themselves on this memorable occasion, was shewn in a mournful way when the list of killed and wounded was prepared. Nearly all the commanders of divisions and of brigades, engaged in the thick of the fight, were either killed or wounded. Sir George Cathcart, who had won a distinguished name while conducting the Kaffir war, and who at Inkermann commanded the 4th division, received his mortal wound; so likewise did Brigadier-generals Strangways and Goldie, the one in command of the artillery, and the other of a brigade of the 4th division; and so likewise Lieutenant-colonels Pakenham, Dawson, Cowell, Blair, Carpenter, Seymour, and Swyny, Majors Townsend and Wynne, and more than thirty officers of lower rank—all fell at Inkermann. The list of wounded was of course still more serious numerically; Sir George Brown, Major-generals Bentinck and Codrington, Brigadier-generals Adams, Torrens, and Buller, and nearly 100 majors, colonels, captains, and other officers, received wounds of greater or less severity.* The Household Brigade, the Guards who defended the redoubt during so many hours, underwent a lamentable loss. Even at the outset these troops were not merely limited to three regiments—they were weakened and shattered battalions only of three regiments; and when the sanguinary day's work was over, the brave fellows had indeed cause to mourn the havoc among them. The 3d battalion of Grenadier Guards had one colonel, three lieutenant-colonels, three captains, and two lieutenants, either killed or wounded; the 1st battalion of Scots Fusilier Guards, one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, four captains, and one lieutenant; and the first battalion of Coldstream Guards, one colonel, five lieutenant-colonels, three captains, and two lieutenants: this is a large total of twenty-eight officers in so small a force as 1400 men. Commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates—killed, wounded, and missing—numbered nearly 600 men.

So obstinate a conflict could not fail to supply numerous examples of personal hazards or escapes. A sergeant was left alone for a few minutes, in advance of his regiment, and five Russians were speedily on him; he shot one, bayoneted a second, and fell under the attacks of the other three, being wounded in five places: at this moment a horse's hoofs were heard; the Russians fled; a British colonel pulled up the sergeant by main force on his horse, and galloped off with him in safety. A shell fell among the staff by Lord Raglan's side, and burst in Captain Somerset's horse: one piece came out and killed the horse of Colonel Gordon; another struck General Strangways in the thigh, and in an hour's time the gallant old soldier, who was a great favourite in the army, died. A sergeant of artillery was seen alone in the midst of a body of Russians who had made an attack on a British battery; he had one arm round the muzzle of his gun, as if to guard it, and with the other was defending himself fiercely, sword in hand, against those around him: he fell at last, and when his body was found, it had received upwards of fifty bayonet-wounds. Lieutenant Crosse of the 88th was wounded and surrounded by four Russians: he shot the two in front of him with his revolver; Private Houlaghan rushed out of the ranks, shot a third Russian, bayoneted the fourth, took up the lieutenant in his arms, and ran back with him in safety to the rear of the regiment. When Captain Nicholson of the 77th was lying wounded on the ground, a dastardly Russian approached and bayoneted him; but the captain, getting at his revolver, shot the fellow dead on the spot. An English gun was on the point of being captured, when Major Townsend, in command at that spot, turned round to the few artillerymen near him, and cried out in an agony of soldier's pride: 'You won't disgrace me!' On the instant, a shell from the enemy's battery killed him on the spot; whereupon a young lieutenant drew his sword, galloped towards the gun, rode over one Russian, killed another, thrust several more aside, and the gun was recaptured. One of the Fusilier Guards describes his part in the terrific contest around the redoubt in language which, while it commands credence by its straightforward clearness and simplicity, illustrates the insensibility to pain exhibited by men at such moments.*

* The exact return made by the adjutant-general of the British loss at Inkermann was as follows:—

	Officers.	Sergeants.	Drummers.	Privates.	Total.
Killed, .	43	32	4	380	459
Wounded, .	101	121	17	1694	1933
Missing, .	1	6	0	191	198
	145	159	21	2265	2590

The total English and French loss, in killed, wounded, and missing, amounted to 4400.

* 'We had fought about an hour upon the high ground before I was struck. My front rank was shot dead. I took his place, and was firing away as fast as ever. In a few minutes, a musket-ball went through my right arm. It was just like a pin touching me at the time. I continued firing about five minutes; then I got a ball in the left breast. I never fell; but, thank God, the ball passed quick as lightning through my back, just below my shoulder. The wound is three or four inches higher before than it is behind, because the enemy were higher than we, they firing in a slanting direction. I thought at this time the ball was in my chest. I fired thrice after this—then I reeled like a drunken man. I could scarcely stand for the want of blood. I was not able to load the

A soldier of the 49th was engaged for four hours defending a battery of English guns before he was shot, during which he fired nearly a hundred times; a musket-ball at length struck him in the thigh, but as he could not retire without certain destruction, he simply tied a handkerchief round his wound, and resumed his duties. Presently he saw four Russian soldiers and an officer creeping through the brushwood and stabbing the British wounded—an atrocious proceeding so frequently adopted during the day as to excite the most intense indignation on the part of the Allies; the soldier fired his rifle, and struck down one of the Russians; three others rushed at him with the bayonet: he hurled his bayonet at one like a lance, and pierced him; then, picking up a revolver, dropped by some wounded or killed officer, he shot the two others, and took the officer prisoner. While carrying him off, and stooping to pick up a water-bottle to refresh them both, he received a cowardly stab from the officer, whom he speedily despatched for his treachery.—But, in truth, the soldiers' letters after the battle of Inkermann were full of exciting incidents. It is worthy of remark, that the men were enabled, after the battle of the Alma, to give, each in his own simple way, an account of the battle itself; but after the more deadly struggle of the 5th of November, the recitals were of terrific personal encounters, in which each man had to fight for very life: he had no time to understand or think of tactics.

fourth time after this shot. We were now within ten yards of some of the Russians, and every moment walking over their dead and wounded. We just got the word "charge bayonets" as I fell to the rear. I threw my firelock from me. I had my blanket and greatcoat on my back; I pitched them off. I was staggering down the hill as well as I could, when I was soon struck on the arm with a bit of shell. I had not time to say a word till another ball went through my left thigh. I got about twenty yards further down, and then fell on my face. I never got timorous till then. The balls were flying over me by wholesale. I tried to get up, and, with the help of God, I got to my feet once more. I was not one minute on my feet till a ball struck me on the first joint of the middle finger of my left hand, and broke it. I still kept my feet, and got to the bottom of the hill, where I fell, and lay for four hours before I was carried away. In my next, I will tell you how I got off the field.'

Mournful was the duty performed on the 6th of November—English, French, Russians, all were carrying away their wounded and burying their dead, so far as the possibility of doing so presented itself. Yawning pits were dug, thirty or forty feet deep by nearly as much in breadth, and in these the mutilated dead bodies were laid as closely as they could be packed—the only soldiers' grave practicable at such a time. It was a sad and painful duty to Lord Raglan to attend the funeral of his general officers—Cathcart, Strangways, Goldie, and others—who were interred with such military honours as the occasion permitted. But even at such a time of mourning, when the ferocity of combatants is usually allayed, the atrocities of the Russians were renewed. Ambulances, arabas, and vehicles of all kinds, were employed by the British to convey their wounded down to Balaklava; and upon these vehicles, as upon the British burying-parties, the Russian ships in the harbour maintained an unceasing fire of shells. Lord Raglan sent in a flag of truce to Prince Menchikoff, complaining of this departure from all the honourable rules of war, and also of the stabbing of the wounded, which the Russians had systematically adopted on the previous day. Prince Menchikoff sent a reply, partly denying, partly justifying, and partly deploring the alleged conduct; but it remained too evident that the Russian soldiery, roused to a state of maddened excitement by drink and by priestly fanaticism, had been encouraged to regard the Allies as infidels, whom it would be a merit in the eyes of Heaven to kill.

Thus ended the terrible Battle of Inkermann.

CHAPTER VIII.

WINTER AT SEBASTOPOL AND SCUTARI, 1854-5.

IN the first week of November 1854, an important crisis presented itself. Conviction was brought to the minds of all, that the Allied armies must pass the dread season of winter in the Crimea, despite the fact that few or no preliminary arrangements had been made for such a contingency. Politicians and generals alike arrived at this conclusion. It was on the 7th or 8th of November that the cabinet ministers in London decided a question long under discussion, whether to raise the siege of Sebastopol and withdraw the army, or to winter in the Crimea? they resolved on the latter course. Every dispatch from Lord Raglan rendered less and less probable an immediate conquest of the great stronghold; and even when the ministers yet knew nothing of the battle of Inkermann, they felt that the army was too small to effect an immediate and important capture. Meanwhile, Lord Raglan was placed in a position of great difficulty. His army, small at the outset, had been so reduced by cholera and fever, and by the battles of Alma, Balaklava, and Inkermann, that he had now barely sufficient men to guard the trenches; another great battle might have annihilated the remnant yet at his disposal. His companions in arms had been stricken down on all sides of him; his hospitals were full; his commissariat-officers became anxious concerning their means of maintaining supplies during the winter; and the future looked dark and gloomy to all in the British camp. The French, better provided for various contingencies, were in higher spirits; yet was Canrobert's position onerous and difficult. As to the Turks, few thought of them but to abuse them: their position in the Crimea was more painful than that of any of the other three nations engaged in the war. At home, the English and French nations, when the news of the battle of Inkermann reached them, felt unbounded astonishment and admiration, but not that enthusiasm the battle of the Alma had excited; the destruction of valuable life had been immense; the reinforcements sent out were known to have been few; the hopes that Sebastopol would speedily fall became weaker and weaker; accounts frequently reached England that the sick and wounded were in wretched plight, and that the soldiers were insufficiently and irregularly supplied with food; and the question passed anxiously from mouth to mouth—'How will our poor fellows bear the rigours of winter?'

THE SIEGE, IN THE CLOSING WEEKS OF 1854.

All weakened as he was, the British commander could yet not spare a single day to rest his army, or to wait for reinforcements. If he could not attempt a second bombardment of the beleaguered fortress, he was nevertheless enforced to maintain intact the trenches already formed, as a basis for future operations when better times should arrive—nay, as a precaution necessary for the very existence of his army. His responsibilities became day by day greater as his effective means became less. An enumeration, made shortly after the battle of Inkermann, revealed the terrible nature of the visitation to which the officers had been subjected; for it was found that, during the few weeks of warfare elapsed, 101 officers had been killed in action, 207 wounded, and 38 struck down by disease and fatigue. The embarrassment such losses occasion to a military commander, none but himself can know. Lord Raglan was created field-marshal immediately after the news of the battle of Inkermann reached England; the British government, too, made a very unusual departure from routine proceedings, by awarding ensigncies and cornetcies to some of the sergeants engaged in that wonderful 'soldiers' battle,' and small annuities and gratuities to some of the non-commissioned officers and privates;*

* '*Horse Guards, December* 9.

The Queen has been pleased to command that, as a mark of Her Majesty's recognition of the meritorious services of non-commissioned officers of the army under the command of Field-marshal Lord Raglan, in the recent brilliant operations in the Crimea, the Field-marshal shall submit, through the General Commanding-in-chief, the name of one sergeant of each regiment of cavalry, of the three battalions of the Foot Guards, and of every regiment of infantry of the line, to be promoted to a cornetcy or ensigncy, for Her Majesty's approval; and, with the view to render immediately available the services of these meritorious men, Her Majesty has directed that the Field-marshal do appoint provisionally, and pending Her Majesty's pleasure, the sergeants so recommended to regiments in the army under his command; and Her Majesty has

but these pleasing acknowledgments of services rendered could not induce forgetfulness of the anxieties and onerous duties of his position. Even the award of medals to all the officers and soldiers engaged in the Crimea, and of clasps bearing the inscriptions 'Alma' and 'Inkermann,' met with some discontent; for the cavalry felt neglected by the non-appearance of a 'Balaklava' clasp—an omission afterwards supplied, consequent on a debate in parliament.

The Russians, mortified as they must unquestionably have been by their signal defeat at Inkermann, remained in great force in and near Sebastopol. There appear to have been many distinguished generals among them at the time of the battle, including Menchikoff, one of the three Gortchakoffs, Dannenberg, Liprandi, Lüders, and Osten-Sacken, besides the two grand-dukes; and nothing was spared that might excite enthusiasm among the soldiery. How the Czar Nicholas encouraged his troops at Sebastopol, is sufficiently shewn by the tenor of a report transmitted to him by Prince Menchikoff, dated the 12th of November.* The firm stand made by Russia had evidently not been calculated upon by the Allied governments. The emperor of the French, writing to General Canrobert on the 24th of November, after expressing his admiration of the valour of the French forces, and his sympathy with their losses, said: 'After the brilliant victory of the Alma, I had hoped for a moment that the routed army of the enemy would not so easily have repaired its losses, and that Sebastopol would soon have fallen under our attacks; but the obstinate defence of that town, and the reinforcements received by the Russian army, have for the present arrested the course of our success. I approve of the resistance you made to the impatience of the troops who wished to make the assault under circumstances that would have entailed too considerable loss.' It was not at the time fully known how enormous had been the preparations at Sebastopol, although Napoleon appears to have approved Canrobert's decision in relation to the assault. The Russians had constructed an immense semicircular mound, mounting thirty guns, around the base of the small white-stone tower called the Malakoff; they had replaced the 32-pounder guns in the Redan by guns throwing solid shot of 110 pounds' weight; they had employed their women day and night in making sand-bags, and in filling them, as well as gabions and fascines; they had heeled over two of their largest ships in the harbour, covered the decks with a protective layer, five feet in depth, of sand-bags and fascines, swung immense mortars from the masts and yards, and pointed those mortars towards the English position; and they had brought an immense store of powder, shot, and shell, from Cherson, Kertch, Anapa, Yenikalé, and Nicolaieff, which had safely entered Sebastopol, despite the British forces encamped on the heights above. Indeed, the Allies, although they had too good reason to know that Menchikoff had been energetically employed in strengthening his position, did not know until afterwards the full extent and the tremendous nature of the operations conducted within and near the beleaguered city.

Discussions were at that time warmly carried on, at the camps as well as in England and France, on the question, whether the Allied generals had acted wisely in abandoning the north side of Sebastopol in order to attack the south? and on the further question, whether the south side could have been taken by a *coup de main* immediately after the flank-march? Some of the arguments adduced have already been adverted to; but it may be useful to give Mr Woods's summary of reasonings on the latter of these two questions. 'It is now generally admitted by authorities, that any immediate off-handed attempt upon the south side of Sebastopol was

further been graciously pleased to signify her intention that, on the several recommendations receiving Her Majesty's approval, the commission shall in each case bear date the 5th of November 1854.'

The chief points in the royal warrant, dated the 4th of December, concerning annuities and gratuities to soldiers, are the following: —'Whereas we deem it expedient to mark our sense of the distinguished, gallant, and good conduct of the army serving in the East under the command of Field-marshal Lord Raglan: our will and pleasure is, that one sergeant in each regiment of cavalry and infantry, and of each battalion of the Foot Guards and of the Rifle Brigade serving in the East, in the Crimea, or elsewhere, under the command of Field-marshal Lord Raglan, shall be selected by the commanding officer, and recommended to us for the grant of an annuity, not exceeding £20, provided that the aggregate of grants now made and to be made shall not exceed £4000 in any one year. The annuity so granted is to be at the disposal of such sergeant, although he may be still in our service.

It is also our will and pleasure to extend the provisions of our royal warrant of the 13th of April 1854, and with the special view of marking our sense of the distinguished service and gallant conduct in the field of our army now serving in the East, in the Crimea, or elsewhere, under the command of Field-marshal Lord Raglan, to order and direct that the commanding officer of each regiment of cavalry shall be allowed to recommend one sergeant, two corporals, and four privates; and the commanding officer of each regiment of infantry, and of each battalion of Foot Guards, and of the Rifle Brigade, shall be allowed to recommend one sergeant, four corporals, and ten privates, to receive a medal and a gratuity of—

For a sergeant,	£15
For a corporal,	10
For a private,	5

The gratuity to be placed in the regimental savings-bank, there to remain in deposit at interest until his discharge from our service, and to be deemed to be his personal property, in conformity with the terms of our royal warrant of the 13th of April 1854.'

* 'Independently of the flattering words of your Imperial Majesty to the army and the garrison of Sebastopol—words which I transmitted by a special order of the day, in execution of your orders—Prince Galitzin, aid-de-camp of your Imperial Majesty, has fulfilled with exactitude the mission confided to him. He went through all the bastions and all the batteries where the sailors are stationed and fight. The thanks and encouragements of the Sovereign, of which Prince Galitzin had the honour to be the bearer, addressed to these brave sailors in the name of your Imperial Majesty, not only redoubled their ardour, but also touched every one of them to the bottom of his soul. They listened with tears of emotion to the words of their Monarch and Father, full of solicitude for his well-beloved children, as your Majesty deigned to express yourself in the rescript with which you honoured me on the 31st of this month.

It was with an equal sentiment of pious and grateful veneration that the troops received the gift and the blessing of Her Majesty the Empress. After a religious ceremony, the image of the Saviour, brought by Prince Galitzin, was taken, accompanied by all the inhabitants of the town, from the Church of St Michael to the Nicholas Battery; and thence that holy image was carried, with appropriate religious ceremony, to all the bastions and all the batteries, to bless the defenders of them. All the men present, having listened with pious attention to the address of the priest, prayed with fervour, and went and kissed the holy image of the Saviour.

This image is now deposited in the locality prepared for it near the entrance-gate of the Nicholas Battery.'

almost certain to have been unsuccessful; and that, successful or not, it must have resulted in the destruction of the Allies before the winter was over. It is well known that when the Allies first appeared before the town, Menchikoff had left the greater part of his artillery and 10,000 regular troops inside the place as a garrison. In addition to this, were twelve complete regiments of sailors of 800 men each, with 3000 marines and three dockyard battalions of workmen—about 5000 strong—formed into troops, after the fashion of the English dockyard battalions, from whom the Russians took the hint five years ago. Long before the Allies landed, all the able-bodied men of the town had been enrolled into companies and drilled with rifles. These regular irregulars had their stations and points of rendezvous at different parts of the city, and were told off into brigades, to hold and defend certain houses from the windows, and to assist in extinguishing any conflagration which might break out. All but one or two principal streets in Sebastopol had been barricaded, and were defended with cannon. On the whole, therefore, the place was garrisoned by at least 40,000 men, and with this force, and the natural strength of the position, was impregnable to any sudden attack. After the havoc which Alma and continued sickness had made in the ranks of the Allies, and taking off the immense number of non-effective men necessary to guard Balaklava, Kamiesch, and rear-guard, commissariat, and hospital soldiers, the utmost strength in which the English, French, and Turks could have advanced to the assault would not have exceeded 40,000 bayonets. Between the garrison, as numerous as the storming army, the ditches to cross, walls to climb, batteries to be silenced, and street-fighting to be endured in a town of which we knew nothing—defeat was almost certain.' * Mr Woods proceeds to argue that, even if complete success be supposed to have attended the assault, and the south of the town to have fallen into the hands of the Allies, the ground could not have been held; because the numbers would necessarily have been reduced by the murderous conflict always attending any assault of so strong a place, at the very time when extended lines would need to be guarded, and the fire of the northern forts borne. 'Under such circumstances,' he asks, 'would the corps under Liprandi have been repulsed? and what would have been the result of the masses hurled against us at Inkermann? Our enfeebled and scattered troops would have been slaughtered in detail.' Mr Woods's conclusion is, in brief, that the prudent caution of Raglan and Canrobert, so much censured by many critics at the time, alone saved the Allied army from utter destruction during the winter; the blame, if any, is awarded to the governments that sent out means inadequate to the proposed end.

At a later date, when the inquiries by the Sebastopol Committee were instituted, most of the military officers who gave evidence dwelt forcibly on this inequality between means and end. Sir John Burgoyne, who planned the general outline of the siege-operations, stated that he had always felt the want of force at his command; his urgent demands for more men as working-parties had been met by declarations on the part of the adjutant-general, that there were no men to spare; the divisional camps had too few even to defend properly the eastern and northern margin of the plateau, and could ill spare companies to dig and guard in the trenches. Sir John worked as rapidly as his limited means permitted, and entertained a confident belief that the place would soon fall; but the first day's bombardment, on the 17th of October, dissipated this belief as completely as if it had been a mere dream: it was then that the real peril of the Allies, in his opinion, commenced; and it was not until then that he troubled himself concerning the state of the road from Balaklava to Sebastopol. This was all the more likely to be the case, because October had been a fine month, revealing few of the road miseries afterwards experienced. A perplexity then became doubled, or rather tripled; soldiers, too few in number to render two kinds of service, trench-duty and camp-duty, were now wanted for a third, namely, road-making. When Sir John was asked whether a road ought not to have been commenced early in November, he admitted the fact, but added: 'Our force was too small to do anything; a large force would have been necessary. The road is seven or eight miles long, over a bad soil, and the construction of a road would have required enormous means. It would, of course, have been better to have a good road, but we had scarcely men enough for the trenches. If we had withdrawn men from the trenches, we should have been in a much worse position; the enemy would have advanced upon the trenches and the rear, and we could hardly have kept our camp.'

That the force was too small for the work undertaken, was well known to the English government; their excuse was, that no one had contemplated the possibility of an Allied army wintering before a particular city in the czar's dominions. The force had been sent out in accordance with plans originally formed, modified from time to time as circumstances arose, but not susceptible of easy adjustment to the requirements of wintering. The English army at first consisted of four divisions of infantry, one of cavalry, and a train of artillery, numbering in all about 25,000 men; but an additional 6000 were sent out under Sir George Cathcart, to form a new division. Immediately on receipt of the news of the battle of Inkermann, the authorities resolved to despatch another reinforcement of 6500 men, comprising the 34th, 62d, 71st, 90th, and 97th regiments, together with another battalion of the Grenadier Guards: the whole to form

* *Campaign in the Crimea.*

an additional division of the British army in the East; but the depth of winter had arrived before most of these troops had reached the Crimea, and, therefore, the road-making necessities at Inkermann were but little responded to. As if to add one misfortune to others, the additional troops sent out on these emergencies were men least fitted to bear the labours and severities of stern winter. Lord Hardinge, commander-in-chief, when examined by the Sebastopol Committee concerning the preparations he had organised for the campaign, frankly admitted the fact. 'It has to a great degree been inevitable. Our peace establishment had been so very low indeed, that, after making the first effort, and sending out 25,000 men, we could do nothing more than send out young recruits. We made them pretty perfect in drill in a couple of months, but instead of sending out bone and muscle, they were, I may say, only gristle. Our peace establishment had been so low, that when the war broke out, we were obliged to raise men as fast as we could; and the great difference between the army under the Duke of Wellington on his going to the Peninsula in 1808 and the army in the Crimea is this: In 1808, we had for six or seven years previously a very large force of second battalions and of militia to resist invasion. All those men, from twenty to twenty-five years of age, were in the highest state of discipline, and when we drew upon them, we knew we should get soldiers whom we could rely on. But when we came in November and December, in the face of the winter in the Crimea, to send out those raw recruits—and we had no others to send—it was impossible to expect them to resist hard work and the inclemency of the weather so well as other and more seasoned men.' The splendid Guards, who had left London 3000 strong, had withered down to 800 weak and wasted men; the troops of the line had suffered diminution, though not in so great a ratio; and to replace these losses, raw young recruits could alone be found. The French, in every sense more of a military nation, were speedily in a position to send out reinforcements of well-tried men; more than 20,000 troops were despatched from Toulon and Marseille soon after the receipt of news of the battle of Inkermann, to swell the amount of force available for the siege of Sebastopol. Unfortunately, however, this increase was of little moment to the hard-worked English troops; for, whether by design or through inadvertence, the English had taken the most difficult portion of the plateau for their encampment and siege-works, although less fitted for it in relation to numbers.

There are certain ratios laid down by military authorities which, if correct, will serve to illustrate the relative weakness of the Allies. It is assumed that the number of men on duty in the trenches should always equal three-fourths of the strength of the garrison; that there should be at least three 'reliefs' of this number, in order that each guard may be on duty only eight hours out of the twenty-four; that the regular duties of the army, such as picket, camp, and escort duties, with four 'reliefs,' require about two-fifths as many as the whole number told off for trench-duty. Then, assuming that Sebastopol was defended by 40,000 men, the theory required that the Allies should have had at their command 90,000 men for trench-duty, and 36,000 for camp-duties, making 126,000—independent of any force disposable to meet Liprandi or other Russian generals in the open field. Whether a general possessing brilliant military genius would allow himself to be bound down by arithmetic of this kind, is a separate question; but, taking the estimate as it stands, the available troops were little more than half the theoretical number above given, during a considerable period subsequent to the battle of Inkermann.

When, after the battle, Lord Raglan looked around, and saw how many of his officers had been cut off, he must have painfully felt the bereavement; and when he found that yet another was about to leave him, the cares of his position became still more serious. Sir de Lacy Evans, a gallant soldier who had heroically struggled against bodily sufferings, was forced to succumb at last: he could bear no more. The heats and colds of the Crimea, the constant exposure by day and by night, the trying responsibilities of command over a division more dangerously placed than any other in the British camp, had shattered a frame over which nearly seventy winters had passed. He rose from a sick-bed to be present at the battle of Inkermann; but six days afterwards, while on board the *Britannia* at Balaklava, he wrote a letter to the commander, announcing the failure of his powers to fulfil the duties of a general: a letter frank, characteristic, but mournful. It appears that illness and exhaustion from other causes had been rendered more serious by a fall from his horse; and that it was against the wishes, even the command, of Lord Raglan, that Sir de Lacy appeared in the field on the 5th. Writing on his bed of sickness, he said: 'Five months without cessation under canvas, with some unavoidable privations and alterations of temperature, latterly at night not unfrequently severe cold, with the shock occasioned by my fall, have had their effect on one in his sixty-eighth year. Indeed, owing to the chances of the service, I believe no other officer of the same advanced age and rank has had the same continuous test to bear up against. . . . . During the occasional northerly winds, I was obliged sometimes to have my tent for twenty-four hours together wholly closed, and gave and received orders through my unopened tent-doors. Some of your lordship's staff will remember how often, in bringing me orders, they found me on my bed, or rather in my blankets, on the ground, when I ought rather to have been, if I could, on horseback.' To the regret of Lord Raglan and of the whole army, General

Evans was enforced to give up his command of the 2d division, and to return to England. One passage in the general's letter he himself pointedly referred to at a later date, as containing a record of the fact that he had repeatedly drawn attention to the insufficient means placed at his disposal for defending the important position overlooking the Valley of Inkermann. Speaking of that position, as held during the interval between the flank-march and the battle of Inkermann, he said: 'The post I was charged with during that long period was, I believe, deemed of the utmost importance to the safety of the French and English armies. Frequently but few troops remained to me for its defence, against sometimes tenfold our numbers of the enemy, within a short distance from our front. I had the honour of frequently submitting my opinion of the weakness and precariousness of the position of the 2d division to your lordship, and, indeed, also to General Canrobert, and of the small means at my disposal to place it in more security. Its liability to be suddenly attacked at all times, it was also my duty to represent. But the various exigencies to be provided for on other points at that time scarcely left it possible, I believe, to afford us any material reinforcement or means for the construction of defences. I have ventured into these details to account for the harassing nature of the duty alluded to, and of the anxious and almost sleepless nights and days it occasioned me.'

Weakened in the various ways above indicated, Lord Raglan prepared, after the battle of Inkermann, to carry on the siege in the best manner permitted by the resources at his command. His dispatches, written during the remaining eight weeks of the year, frequently met with a smile of derision at home, on account of their dwelling nearly as much on the weather as on the siege. But there was a cause for this, imperfectly known in England at the time: every cutting blast, every wet night, every addition to the miry state of the tracks, cost him many valuable lives; insomuch that he deeply felt the importance of changes in the weather to the welfare of those under his command. The operations comprised a steady advance of the siege-works, nearer and nearer to the beleaguered city, and an almost nightly series of sorties on the part of the Russians, intended either to destroy some of the siege-works or to pick off some of the English and French soldiers. On the 20th of November, a smart skirmish took place outside the lines; the Russian outposts advanced so close to the English left attack, that Lord Raglan deemed it necessary to dislodge them: about 300 had taken up a position in a few deserted caves, sometimes called 'ovens;' he, accordingly, sent a detachment of the 1st battalion Rifle Brigade, under Lieutenant Tryon, to effect this service; it was gallantly done, but at the cost of the life of the young officer who commanded.

The French, during the month of December, constructed extensive additional works in front of the south-west side of the town. The batteries were increased to nearly thirty in number, and armed with guns of large calibre, some newly arrived from France, and the others taken from the ships; about eighty guns were served by the artillery, and eighty more by seamen and marines. The trenches and parallels were little less than fifteen miles in extent, on the French side alone; the extreme left was pushed close to the Quarantine suburb: so close, indeed, that the Russians abandoned the Quarantine suburb, and left it to the French. Nevertheless, the Allies, throughout November and December, sent very few shot or shell into the town; they were busily engaged in extending and strengthening their siege-works. Not so the Russians, however. Menchikoff had a powerful army outside the town, near Inkermann; he had troops enough in the town to construct and maintain the defences; and, moreover, he possessed sufficient aggressive power to make frequent sorties with his infantry and frequent cannonadings with his artillery.

Liprandi's occupation of the plain of the Tchernaya, between Tchorgouna and Balaklava, had been advantageous to the Russians and embarrassing to the Allies; it materially aided the Russian attacks on the 25th and 26th of October and the 5th of November; and if the general had been more skilful, the English might have been placed in great peril. The Russians found, however, that this position must be abandoned, owing to the extreme difficulty of provisioning posts so far advanced to the south: they departed from this part of the plain about the middle of December. Canrobert thereupon sent a brigade of cavalry, under General d'Allonville, to reconnoitre; he thereby ascertained that, although a few Russian troops remained, the Allies had no longer any cause for anxiety in that direction. About the same time, too, a party of 1000 Zouaves and Highlanders explored the country eastward of Balaklava, and met with only one post of Cossacks between that port and the heights surrounding the fertile Valley of Baidar. Another reconnaissance was made on the 30th of December, by the second battalion of Rifles, the 75th, three companies of Marines, and a regiment of Zouaves, under Sir Colin Campbell; while a force of French cavalry and infantry, with six guns, advanced along the plain. Russians had made their appearance on the hills beyond the Tchernaya, and the Allied generals deemed it prudent to keep a watch upon them; no actual contest ensued, but a glittering mass of artillery, occasionally visible over the hill, shewed that the enemy was still hovering about in the vicinity of the plain, ready to take advantage of any weakness or neglect of watchfulness observable in the Allied camps.

Soon after the flank-march, Raglan and Canrobert had felt it necessary to decide upon the destination of the few inhabitants in the small villages south of Sebastopol. The poor villagers

would have been left unmolested if this could safely have been done; but the British commander speedily found the Greeks in Balaklava to be in league with the Russians in Sebastopol, and that the inhabitants in some other villages could not with propriety be suffered to remain. The evictions were saddening, but the commanders sought to lessen the evil as much as possible. Many of the inhabitants were conveyed by steamers to Yalta, on the south coast; others were collected and protected at Karani, about two miles westward of Balaklava; and others, again, at the monastery of St George, noticed in the last Chapter. As the poor people were utterly deprived of the means of subsistence, they were fed by the English and French. A French detachment and a portion of the English commissariat, quartered at Karani, maintained control over the villagers in that place; while a few Zouaves kept a watch over the monks and villagers at the monastery.

While the armies were struggling against accumulated difficulties, as winter approached, the fleets were troubled with few vicissitudes or calamities, except those resulting from the terrible storm noticed in the next section. Indeed, the officers and seamen, so far from being overworked, suffered through inactivity and want of excitement. The longing desire for some bold achievement, checked in so mortifying a manner on the 17th of October, was not gratified by any second opportunity during the remaining weeks of the year. Early in December, the Allied admirals were not a little surprised by a sortie made by two Russian steamers from the harbour of Sebastopol: shewing that there was a passage somewhere between the sunken ships, available for war-steamers; and shewing also, that the Russian admirals had not quite lost the resolute spirit belonging to their profession. On the 6th, a steamer, supposed to be the *Vladimir*, came out under cover of the batteries, while another remained hovering around the sunken vessels. The first of these, unheeded by or unheeding a French frigate near at hand, steamed round Fort Alexander, and brought-to at a point whence she could pour in a few shot and shell upon the French works near Quarantine Bay. The Allies, not a little astonished at this manœuvre, sent the *Valorous* and *Terrible* against her; but the Russian steamer slunk into her hiding-place behind the line of sunken ships, and eluded the chase. The commanding fire from the batteries had probably prevented the Allies from examining the mouth of the harbour so carefully as to determine the existence or non-existence of a passage for ships; but this adventure demonstrated that such a passage was practicable, outward for the Russians, if not inward for the Allies; and the sailors entertained therefrom a hope that the remaining Russian ships would really emerge and afford them an opportunity for a fair fight on the broad seas. Such was the state of mingled excitement and disappointment among both officers and men, that they would have accepted almost any odds, in an open naval encounter outside the harbour. It was not to be, however; the Russian ships, ready for a second Sinope, avoided the broadsides of their opponents.

The main fleet remained anchored off the mouth of the river Katcha several weeks after the battles of Balaklava and Inkermann; but towards the close of the year, the vessels weighed anchor, and took up various positions around the south-west coast of the Crimea. Many of the ships entered Double Bay, as it is sometimes called—the bay nearest to Cape Chersonese, consisting of two bays, those of Kamiesch and Karatch, having one common outlet. Kamiesch Bay had from the first been to the French what Balaklava was to the English, the place of rendezvous for vessels bringing troops and stores; and now many of the English ships of war found a convenient anchorage in the Karatch portion of Double Bay, better shielded than the mouth of the Katcha from the wintry blasts of the Black Sea. Being nearer to Balaklava, and about the same distance to Sebastopol Harbour, the new position was more advantageous than the old. They did not all remain at Kamiesch and Karatch, however; the fleets were divided into squadrons, available for various services. About the middle of December, the *Agamemnon*, *Hannibal*, *Algiers*, *Napoleon*, *Jean Bart*, *Panama*, *Primauguet*, and a few frigates, were off the harbour of Sebastopol, maintaining a blockade, and watching the operations of the enemy; the *Vauban*, *Caton*, and bomb-vessel *Vautour*, were in Arrow Bay, the bay nearest to Sebastopol; the *Montebello*, *Marengo*, *Alger*, together with several frigates and corvettes, were in Kamiesch Bay; while the main portion of the English fleet was divided between Balaklava and Karatch Bay. The French fortified the whole line of coast from Arrow Bay to Cape Chersonese, and established temporary light-houses at convenient spots, to serve as beacons both for the army on shore and the ships at sea.

A slight excitement was afforded to each fleet by a leave-taking, towards the close of the year. Admiral Hamelin returned to France, to receive promotion; and Admiral Bruat, on assuming the command, issued an order of the day to the French fleet, in which he said: 'We are about to lose our worthy chief; his illustrious services have received their reward. After having called on me to second him, the Emperor has called on me to replace him. Faithful to the traditions bequeathed to us by a glorious past, we shall continue to lend to our valiant army and to our brave allies that warm co-operation to which he has already rendered such flattering and cordial justice. On the day of combat, the same patriotic cry will still rally us round the flag of France.' In the same spirit, Admiral Dundas, in taking leave of the British fleet on the 22d of December, said: 'My term of service as commander-in-chief in the

Mediterranean and Black Sea having drawn to a close, I am about to return to England, and give up the command of this fleet. During the past year, many trying circumstances have occurred —pestilence in its most aggravated form, action with the enemy against land-defences such as ships hardly ever encountered, and a tempest of the most awful violence. In all those events, the good conduct and gallantry of the fleet have been evinced and proved. In taking an affectionate leave of the officers, seamen, and marines of the fleet, I can hereafter experience no higher gratification than the assurance that they preserve their high character for discipline, enterprise, and devotion to our Sovereign and country.' Sir Edmund Lyons, an officer much beloved in the fleet, was appointed as successor to Admiral Dundas.

The fleet became more and more limited to steamers, by the departure of the bulky sailing war-ships to England, and more and more a mere attendant upon the armies. Additional seamen were sent ashore, to strengthen the naval brigade; and these brave willing fellows were of infinite service to the overworked soldiers—manning the great guns, guarding some of the fortified posts, and acting as substitutes for mules—nearly all of which had died through toil, cold, and privations —in bringing stores and provisions from Balaklava up to the sailors' camp on the plateau. This latter was heavy work for the seamen—six miles down to the harbour, and six back again, each man with a bag of biscuits or a keg of rum; and this, too, along a track covered to a depth of several inches with unctuous slimy mud—such that at every step, according to one quaint narrator, 'the foot carried with it a mass of earth covering the extent of a small German principality.' Nevertheless, Jack Tar worked with untiring energy and cheerfulness, regardless of obstructions and discomforts.

THE NOVEMBER HURRICANE, AND ITS EFFECTS.

Stern as is the Black Sea in winter, murky its atmosphere, piercing its cold, violent its winds, and turbulent its waves, there has rarely been known a tempest equal in frightful fury to that which raged in those regions on the 14th of November 1854; bringing pitiless destruction to ships and mariners, strewing the coast with fragments of vessels and disrupted cargoes of valuable merchandise, and adding manifold to the discomforts of those who, by the exigencies of war, were living in camps and tents.

Early in the morning of that day, when light had barely dawned, the officers and men encamped on the plateau outside Sebastopol found the strength of their canvas tents exposed to a severe test. The night had been one of heavy rain; the surface of the plateau had been converted into a sort of slime, through which walking was difficult; and rivulets of muddy water found an entrance into almost every tent, and disarranged every man's bedroom comforts. Gradually the rain abated and the wind arose, rushing over the plateau with a roar as of a distant cannonade; until at length, overcoming all obstacles, the wind pierced into and under and around the tents, in many cases blowing them away altogether. The slimy compost on the outside, receiving the full action of the blast, was hurled into the faces of the tentless soldiers, producing a scene of unutterable discomfort. Some of the tent-poles snapping in the middle, the officers or men were for a time buried beneath a load of wet canvas; and when, rudely disturbed in their morning slumbers, and deprived of all shelter from the murky heavens above them, they looked around on the plateau, the scene presented was frightful, even though mingled in some instances with the ludicrous. The storm, having no respect for rank or office, had levelled alike the tent of the staff-officer and that of the subaltern: the strongest was on that day the best, by whomsoever possessed. Officers, high in rank, were to be seen wildly struggling with the flapping canvas of their overturned tents, or rushing about in the almost hopeless attempt to save their apparel, books, or other chattels, from the fury of the wind. There were a few huts near head-quarters; and such of these as escaped prostration were speedily sought by tentless officers, who—saturated with miry water, and almost riven by the piercing blast—rushed to find shelter from the storm.

The accounts published of this scene, by newspaper correspondents, officers, and privates, were full of strange incidents. 'The principal medical officer of the British army might be seen in an unusual state of perturbation, seeking for his garments ere he took to flight. Brigadier ——, with mien for once disturbed, held on, as sailors say, "like grim death to a backstay," by one of the shrouds of his marquée. Captain ——, in drawers and shirt, was tearing through the rain and through the dirt like a maniac after a cap, which he fancied was his own, and which he found, after a desperate run, was his sergeant's.' Many of the narrators say that the air was filled with blankets, hats, great-coats, little-coats, and even tables and chairs; that macintoshes, quilts, India-rubber tubs, bed-clothes, sheets of tent-canvas, went whirling like leaves in the gale towards Sebastopol; that the shingle roofs of the outhouses were torn away, and scattered over the camp; that large arabas or wagons and ambulances were overturned; that men and horses were knocked down, and rolled over and over; that a large and heavy table in one of the tents was lifted off the ground, and whirled round and round till the leaf flew off; that inside the commissariat-yard, overturned carts, dead horses, and groups of shivering men were seen, not a tent standing; and that 'Lord —— was

seen for hours sitting up to his knees in sludge amid the wreck of his establishment, meditative as Marius amid the ruins of Carthage.' The power of the hurricane was indeed great. Heavy commissariat stores were hurled down as if they had been light parcels; compressed masses of hay for the cavalry, weighing 200 pounds each, were whirled over the ground, and down the ravines towards Sebastopol; and a large flock of sheep was so utterly scattered, that, while some of the poor animals were driven to distant camps, others were almost literally hurled into the beleaguered city.

But what were these miseries compared with the privations of the common soldiers? Officers, though rendered tentless for a time, speedily found shelter with and among each other; but the troops in general, engaged in camp, picket, and trench duties, and ill provided even for fine weather, were plunged into indescribable wretchedness. The marines and riflemen on the cliffs overhanging Balaklava, lost tents, clothes, everything; the stern rock was rendered nearly bare by the whirl that carried off all rising above the surface, and the poor fellows had to cling to the ground in prostrate attitudes to avoid instant destruction. On the level ground between the ravines, where the camps of the several divisions had been pitched, the rows of neat white tents had almost disappeared, one after another having yielded to the force of the blast; until the whole plateau became speckled with ragged bits of flattering canvas, sticking in the black glutinous mire that had become deepened to several inches by the heavy rain. The men, with a kind of patient sullenness, stood near the spots where their tents had lately sheltered them, and bitterly commented on the tardiness, as it appeared to them, of the commanders: wishing rather to dare all the hazards and horrors of a possibly successful assault on Sebastopol, than to be thus destroyed inch by inch. Not only was the wind terrific in violence, but it was accompanied by rain and snow—a conglomerate of heart-depressing visitations. Hungry and faint, too, were the troops; for the morning repast had not been taken before the hurricane began; and the commissariat officers, each feeling himself in personal peril, and seeing all his stores whirling in confusion around him, was little able to issue the rations during its continuance. The men on night-duty, who had passed perhaps eight or ten hours as trench-guards, covering-parties, patrols, outlying-pickets, or sentries, staggered back to their camps in the dusky morn, worn and haggard with fatigue, and there found tents down, fires extinguished, food unattainable, rest impossible, comrades murmuring, everything disheartening: the trenches being very sloughs of mud and filth, the officers and men employed therein returned to camp in a state of personal discomfort calculated to add materially to the wretchedness. The hospital-tents were mostly struck down, and the poor maimed soldiers, heroes perhaps of Inkermann, were exposed to the pitiless storm; even the hospitals and storehouses built by the French, with stout planks and rafters, were scattered to the winds; and many a brave fellow succumbed under the trial, ending his brief career of glory too soon to hear the expression of admiration from the home-country. After the hurricane had endured about six hours, the temperature became colder, the falling snow became thicker, and the weakened men in all the camps were in much danger of perishing through so extraordinary an accumulation of inflictions. Many men died during the later hours of the day; whether starved or benumbed to death, it might be hard to say. A stable for the horses of Lord Raglan's escort became a choice rendezvous, in which English, French, and Turks, military and civilians, officers and privates, crowded and crouched down in fellowship with the horses. An orderly was sent off to Balaklava, to learn how matters were progressing in that quarter during the storm; but man and horse, after three-quarters of an hour's struggling, and many falls and overturnings, were driven back by the irresistible blast.

The soldiers' letters were full of such recitals. An Enniskillen dragoon wrote: 'I was on trumpeter's guard at the time the storm came across the plain, accompanied with hailstones and snow; and it blew all our tents down. The only way to keep still was to lie down; I had to do so for fear of being borne among the dirt. You may think in what sort of a state our tents were, as, after it was all over, we had to lie down that night on the wet ground without anything to eat, the cooks being unable to keep the fires in.' A private soldier wrote thus: 'Lieutenant —— had just come in from night-duty. I had got him to bed comfortably, when down came his tent, and left the poor fellow stark naked. I had to carry him away with only a blanket around him, and he remained in that state all day, but he bore it remarkably well. Lieutenant —— was blown away on his bedstead. The doctor's cocked-hat was blown right into Sebastopol, so we expect to find it on the head of Prince Menchikoff when we get there.' A rifleman, on the heights above Balaklava, thus records his experience of that memorable day: 'We had such a terrible gale that our tents were all blown down, and many blown over the cliffs into the sea; the one in which I stopped shared such a fate. . . . It was a fearful night that we passed; every now and again might be seen men rubbing one another as the cramps took them in different parts of the body. The night was long, but morning broke at last; and it was found that two of our poor fellows were dead from sheer exhaustion.' Another soldier said: 'In spite of all these misfortunes, every man made light of it until the hospital marquée went down: it was dreadful to see sick and

wounded men actually blown away.' An officer, after describing his brother-officers as wandering about, drenched to the skin, in search of shelter, as a consequence of the demolition of their tents, says: 'All the tents have been struck, as nothing could withstand the fury of the tempest, except the Turkish; these infidels understand tent-work better than we civilised folk.' Such, from various concurrent testimonies, appears indeed to be the case. The Turkish tent, although not constructed of such good material as an English bell-tent, resists the wind much more effectually and stands more steadily: on account, possibly, of a better proportioning of its height to its circumference; the men dig about a foot deep and throw the earth round on the sides, where it serves to steady the whole tent, and prevents at the same time the water from penetrating; in the officers' tents, there is also a raised settee of stamped earth, available as a couch.

Far more serious, however, were the disasters to the fleets on this fatal day. The soldiers, except a small number, surmounted the tempest, and began on the next day to repair the disasters, so far as their means permitted; but the ships on a furious sea are wholly at the mercy of the elements—one plank riven from its place, and hundreds of human beings may be consigned to a watery grave. To present a true picture of the maritime calamities, it will be necessary to attend to the harbour-arrangements adopted at Balaklava.

When this miniature haven became the depôt of the British army encamped on the plateau inland, two officers were appointed, Captain Tatham and Captain Christie; the one as harbour-master, and the other as superintendent of transports: the one to exercise a general control over the whole harbour, and the other to regulate the entry, anchorage, and discharging of the laden transport-ships. When, on the day of the battle of Balaklava, Lord Raglan deemed the harbour in some danger, he gave orders that led to the departure of many vessels from thence; and some of these suffered in the storm three weeks later from this cause: tug-boats drew out the larger vessels; commissariat and ordnance officers re-embarked many of their stores; and the whole harbour became disarranged. The orders to this effect appear to have been given by Lord Raglan to Captain Tatham, who, so far as the harbour was concerned, controlled Captain Christie and the transports as well as the vessels-of-war. During many days, the harbour remained nearly empty; the transports being admitted a few at a time only, lest the army of Liprandi should make a second attempt in that quarter. It was felt, however, by Captain Christie and others, that the anchorage outside the harbour was very insecure; and that, unless a re-occupation of the harbour were permitted, some other place of disembarkation should be chosen. When the *Sanspareil* screw-steamer took up a defensive position within the harbour, Captain Dacres became senior officer and harbour-master, under the controlling authority of Lord Raglan; and all the regulations concerning the admission or non-admission of tugs or transports were then made by him, subservient to the higher military authority.

Seeing that, after the battle of Inkermann, the British sick and wounded were carried down in hundreds, by means of ambulances, arabas, and any vehicles that could be obtained, to be shipped at Balaklava for the military hospitals at Scutari, a departure from the plan became absolutely necessary—the ships being required to enter the harbour in greater numbers, to permit the poor fellows to be embarked. Three days after that battle, the *Prince* arrived at Balaklava, bringing valuable supplies from England; it was a new screw-steamer of great beauty and value, and the stores contained were of the utmost importance to the wellbeing of the troops during the approaching winter. In articles of warm clothing alone, the cargo would have been precious; besides the varied stores of other kinds, specie for the commissariat, and several companies of the 46th regiment. Captain Dacres, as harbour-master, was within the harbour; Captain Christie, as transport-master, was outside the harbour, amongst the transports; and there appears to have been much tedious formality necessary in obtaining the authority of both officers for a ship to enter. The specie and the troops were landed by means of two steam-tugs, and the *Prince* anchored outside the harbour, with the store of warm clothing on board.

From this date, it is hardly possible to narrate in detail the occurrences in the harbour of Balaklava, without incurring a risk of doing injustice to some or other of the officers engaged. Calamities of a deplorable kind occurred in great number; soldiers suffered unspeakable miseries as a consequence of these calamities; accusations were brought by an indignant nation against those who were supposed to be in the wrong; bitter recriminations ensued between various officials; some charges were found to have been unjustly made; and death, resulting from wounded honour, carried off others too soon for the clearing up of their fair fame. Much of this confusion and disaster arose from the circumstances, that the transport-ships were controlled by the transport-agent in the harbour; that he was controlled by the harbour-master; that the harbour-master acted in obedience to orders from Lord Raglan; that his lordship was three or four miles distant from the harbour; that the road from the harbour to head-quarters was so wretched as to render the communication of messages difficult; and that there was thus no available machinery for settling promptly any embarrassments arising from conflicting or disputed authority. The quarter-master general, adjutant-general, commissary-general, artillery and engineering commanders, all of whom were looking out anxiously for supplies

from England, were connected with the army; whereas the transports, as well as the ships-of-war, were connected with the navy; and hence repeated collisions of authority arose. Very frequently the captains of the transports were at a loss whom to obey—the staff-officers, who sent urgent orders that the supplies should be landed at Balaklava as quickly as possible; or the harbour-master, intrusted with the duty of deciding what ships ought or ought not to remain within the harbour. This much it is necessary to mention at the outset, in explanation of the strange fact that many of the ships were on the outside of the harbour when the great storm arose.

On the 11th of November, a gale sprang up, sufficiently violent to place in some peril the ships outside Balaklava, and to give rise to irritating discussions between the various captains concerned in the unfortunate regulations within the harbour. The 12th and the 13th were in like manner rough days; but it was not until the 14th that the awful visitation came in full force. As the morning dawned, the wind howled and the waves lashed, but when forenoon approached, the gale increased to a hurricane such as none of the officers or seamen had before seen in those parts. A dark and gloomy sky aided in filling all minds with dread; and when the cables strained and the planks creaked, mariners felt that they were in the hands of a greater power than man. Inside the harbour were about thirty vessels; comprising four ships-of-war, eight steam and seven sailing transports, four tugs, and the remainder private ships chartered by or for dealers who had settled as shopkeepers at Balaklava village. Outside the harbour were rather more than twenty vessels; comprising the steam war-ships *Retribution, Niger, Vesuvius,* and *Vulcan;* the steam-transports *Prince, Melbourne, Avon,* and *City of London;* and the remainder sailing transport-ships and freight-ships. The ships on the outside of the harbour speedily became placed in great peril; they were in danger of snapping cables, and being hurled against the rocks. Many of the captains, seeing the danger, weighed and stood out to sea, knowing that a deep sea is better than a rocky shore during a storm. The hurricane increased in violence; the waves rose higher and higher in their fury; and the ships, one by one, felt the dread influence of the tempest. First one transport parted from her anchors, and was speedily breached and sunk, carrying her whole crew to a watery grave; then two others met equally rapid destruction, leaving only a few sailors, who were dashed high up against the rocks—they hardly knew how or where; then, amid the blinding spray and torn waves, might be seen other ships vainly struggling against a power too great for them, yielding one by one to the force, and following their predecessors to the fatal rocks which sternly bind the mouth of the harbour. The clouds became blacker, the wind shrieked more fiercely, and the warring elements raged with yet greater and greater fury. Transport after transport yielded; until at length the splendid *Prince,* laden with a cargo which raised the total value to at least half a million sterling, parted anchor, and was drifted towards the shore, despite all the efforts of the engineers to steam out seaward. The crew, hoping to save the vessel by cutting away the mast, expedited the approaching catastrophe; for the fragments became entangled in the screw, stayed its revolutions, and rendered null the power of engines and of helm. The noble vessel struck; then struck again; then parted midships; and then sank to the bottom—leaving only a few relics to tell of the once proud structure. With her sank all but seven of 160 persons who were on board.

The great loss on this tragic day was that of the *Prince;* but many other ships swelled the fearful list. The *Retribution* steam-frigate, the home at that time of the Duke of Cambridge, who had left Inkermann unnerved and invalided, was exposed for four hours to a tremendous infliction: she parted all her cables but one; then dragged that one nearly half a mile; then shipped 100 tons of water; and was only saved from dashing against the rocks by the energetic exertions of the crew in throwing all the heavy guns overboard. Even within the little land-locked harbour, though the waves were still, the wind whirled with such fury as to endanger the vessels there anchored: many ships were torn from their moorings and hurled against others; many were driven on shore; others, again, were heeled over almost upon their beam-ends; while all became injured to a greater or lesser degree. The iron paddle-box boat of the *Trent* steamer, weighing seven tons, was lifted bodily into the air by the force of the blast; smaller boats were hurled high up the gorge of Inkermann towards the plateau; and a boat containing two men was caught up, the men overturned, and the boat dashed against the wall of a house in Balaklava. Many affecting incidents occurred. The *Wild Wave,* a small but fine clipper-transport, was deserted by all her crew except three boys, and then left to float to destruction; many spectators, perched on the rugged cliffs, seeking to render aid, flung out a rope, at which one of the boys sprang, but a raging wave carried him away; they flung it again, and a second boy was lost in endeavouring to clutch it; a third time was the rope hurled out, and the remaining boy succeeded in reaching the shore, bruised and senseless, just before the hapless ship was dashed to fragments against the rocks.

When all was over, and night had given temporary rest to the worn mariners, the scene of devastation was frightful to witness. The *Prince, Resolute, Rip Van Winkle, Kenilworth, Wild Wave, Progress, Wanderer, Peltoma,* and a Maltese brig, were either sunk or had gone to pieces, losing all on board except twenty-three persons in the whole; while the *Vesuvius, Retribution, Melbourne, Mercia,*

Lady Valiant, Caduceus, Pride of the Ocean, Medora, and *Sir Robert Sale,* were seriously damaged, most of them totally dismasted. All this disaster had occurred within or near the mouth of Balaklava Harbour, but the whole coast exhibited a scene of wreck and ruin—there being hardly a spot upon the beach which was not covered with the fragments of some vessel or its cargo—masts, spars, sails, pieces of boats, oars, hatches, barrels of rum, cordage, bales of clothes, beds, blankets, rafts of timber, fragments of furniture, boxes and chests, trusses of hay, tents, and numberless sundries.

An inquiry, instituted by the government, into the circumstances under which the valuable stores in the *Prince* were lost, made public the curious diversity of the cargo, and the complexity of the official arrangements concerned in its management. The list of ordnance stores, in ammunition and clothing, was immense;* but this list by no means comprised all. There were sent out four complete sets of diving apparatus, four galvanic-batteries, eight miles' length of conducting-wire, a quantity of stores for subaqueous explosions, and men to manage the apparatus—all to be employed in blowing up the Russian ships sunk across the mouth of Sebastopol Harbour; then, besides these and the stores for the army, there was on board a considerable supply of ordnance stores for the navy, intrenching-tools and shot-boxes, medicines for the army, and 200 tons of provisions. A commission of inquiry had at a later date to thread a

* Cartridges, musket,	Pn. '1851,' . 2¼ dms.,	1,000,000
	Smooth bore, 4½ " ,	750,000
Shot,	Round, . . 9-pounders,	3,000
	Case, Gun, . 9 " ,	400
	Case, Howitzer, 24 " ,	140
Shells,	Shrapnel, Guns, . 9-pounders,	600
	Shrapnel, Howitzers, 24 " ,	800
	Common, empty, . 24 " ,	630
Carcasses, fixed, 24-pounders,		30
Cartridges, flannel, filled,	Guns, . 9-pounders, 2½ lbs.,	4,000
	Howitzers, 24 " " ,	1,600
	Bursters of sorts,	2,090
Fuzes, Boxers,	Common,	700
	Shrapnel,	1,540
Tubes,	Brass,	1,680
	Friction,	5,040
Portfires,		168
Match, slow, cwts.,		3

For Battering-train Reserve.

Shot, hollow, . 8 inch,		600
Shells, common, empty, 8 " ,		2,570
Carcasses, fixed, . 10 " ,		40
Cartridges, flannel,	Filled, Guns, 8 inch,	3,960
	Filled, Bursters of sorts,	7,116
	Empty mortars, 5⅘ inch,	1,000
Powder, L.G. lbs.,		4,560
Fuzes,	Boxers, 5⅘ inch,	2,800
	Common, 10 " ,	3,390
	Common, 5½ " ,	3,000
Match, lbs.,		170
Portfires,		230
Tubes,	Brass,	2,500
	Friction,	6,000

Clothing.

Frocks, woollen,	53,000
Stockings, half worsted, pairs,	33,000
" " Lambs' wool, pairs,	2,700
Drawers, " " " ,	17,000
Blankets, single,	16,100
Rugs, " ,	3,750
Palliasses, " ,	10,000
Cloaks, watch,	2,500
Boots, ankles, pairs,	12,880
Shoes, pairs,	1,000

perfect labyrinth of intricacy, in the endeavour to discover who had controlled the loading of this hapless vessel. The Minister of War, the Admiralty, the Horse Guards, the Ordnance Office, the Army Medical Department, the General Screw Company, and the captain of the vessel, had all possessed some control in the matter; but the limits of the control were ill defined. When the *Prince* arrived at Scutari, early in November, the medicines should have been landed, but were not; when it arrived at Balaklava, a few days afterwards, the clothing should have been landed, but was not: medicines and clothing alike went to the bottom of the Black Sea, entailing indescribable misery upon the sick soldiery at Scutari and the working soldiery outside Sebastopol. The cruel severity with which the blame was thrown upon Captain Christie will be noticed in a later portion of the Chapter; but this at least became at once evident, that the governmental machine was ill organised, after a European peace of forty years; insomuch that a break-down in some or other of the departments became morally certain—although every one mourned that the immediate consequences should have fallen on troops who had worked so hard, fought so well, and suffered so intensely.

The tempest, as has been said, was not confined to Balaklava and its vicinity; it raged all round the coast, and wrought sad devastation among the ships. The larger vessels of the combined fleets, still anchored off the mouth of the Katcha, were severely tried; there were nearly fifty sail, of all kinds, within about a mile of a lee-shore, exposed to a hurricane such as few of the seamen had ever before experienced. All the line-of-battle ships tried three, and even four anchors, and the steamers steamed full power against the gale, to prevent dragging; yet was the peril great. The flag-ship was anchored close inshore, and was with difficulty kept from sinking; the waves swept clean over her upper-deck, and, although all her hatches were battened down, she still shipped five or six feet of water. Among the smaller vessels of the two fleets, cables began to strain, and rudders to lose their command; then cables parted, and anchors were lost; then ships crashed against each other—spars snapped like rotten sticks: jib-booms, bowsprits, yards, masts, went to ruin; then two vessels, thus locked together, would be driven against a third, stripping it from stem to stern; and then would all three be driven together against the rocks, or grounded upon the beach. The *Sampson* was reduced almost to a wreck by one of these collisions. Ten transports, five English and five French, were on shore; two were riding out the remnant of the gale with their masts cut away; another had gone down in deep water; a Turkish two-decker, the *Muhbiri Surur,* with the Turkish admiral's flag flying, had nothing but mainmast and bowsprit left; the French ships *Ville de Paris, Suffren, Bayard, Montebello,* and *Friedland,* were much knocked about; and many of

the English ships-of-war had been rudely treated, but not sunk or driven on shore. If ever there had been a doubt concerning the brutal disregard by the Russians of the honourable usages of war, that doubt became certainty on the present occasion. The banks of the Katcha, it will be remembered, were abandoned by the Allied army after the flank-march, and the Russians resumed occupation of that district. These Russians hastened to the coast, during and after the storm, and prepared to destroy all that the storm might have spared: they brought down some field-pieces to the beach, and commenced firing on the wrecks and on any struggling seamen whom they espied; whereupon the *Fire-brand* went in, on the next morning, and dispersed them by a few broadsides. The captain of one of the disabled transports had been signaled by the Russians to save his crew by coming on shore; but he had seen enough to shew that some of the sailors had been handcuffed and carried off as prisoners, and avoided the snare. One of the French transports, having a body of soldiers on board, was wrecked; and while the poor fellows were clinging to the bulwarks, the Russians deliberately aimed at and shot them; firing even at a woman, a soldier's wife, who was on board.

The French squadron at Kamiesch, consisting chiefly of war-steamers with steam and sailing transports, suffered less than the ships at Balaklava and Katcha; in the latter case, the vessels were off a lee-shore, unprotected by any kind of haven; while in relation to Balaklava, the unfortunate mismanagement led to the anchoring of many ships without instead of within the harbour, and to the incurring of disaster that might in great part have been avoided. At Kamiesch, a bay or inlet afforded some shelter; insomuch that, although dismantling occurred, the amount of damage was small compared with that wrought in other quarters on this dreadful day.

Eupatoria was no more spared than other parts of this dangerous coast, during the awful hurricane. A few ships-of-war had been left there since the time of the landing of the Allies in the Crimea; and these ships felt the full effects of the tempest. The chief catastrophe of the day was the wreck of the *Henri Quatre*, a splendid French ship-of-war of 100 guns. No fewer than four anchors were employed to enable the noble vessel to maintain her place successfully against the raging tempest; but all in vain. The timbers of the ship creaked and groaned; the furniture and fittings were flung wildly from side to side; one cable snapped, then another; and the crew, watching at whiles the wreck of many smaller vessels on the beach, dreaded lest their own hour of trial should be at hand. As evening was about to close in, the two remaining cables yielded. The Abbé Bertrand, chaplain of the ship, in a letter written four days afterwards, described vividly what followed: 'It was but too true—the ship was on her beam-ends. There was no further hope; the sea and the wind were too violent for us to hope to get out to sea. We had only to resign ourselves to our fate. All that was left for us was to be thrown on that part of the coast where the bottom was sandy. You cannot have an idea of the anguish we all felt, expecting every moment the first shock when the ship touched the ground. We did feel the first shock, the second, the third, and yet the good ship held out. We were aground; but we knew not at what distance from the shore, as we were in darkness. The weather continued awful. At last the day dawned, and we found ourselves at 200 metres from the shore, and our ship had not a single drop of water in her hold. At some yards from us, a Turkish vessel had been wrecked at eleven o'clock at night, three hours after us. She drove on a bank, which threw her on her side, and the whole of the crew we saw clinging to the masts and shrouds, not being able to remain on the deck, which was completely under water. At last, after a night passed in indescribable anguish, fearing each moment that the ship was opening asunder, the day dawned, and we found ourselves so near land that, in the event of any great accident occurring, it would not be difficult to save ourselves.' Captain Jehenne, in charge of the *Henri Quatre*, wrote to Admiral Hamelin a more detailed account of the disaster, in which he stated that he had been forced to fire upon the dastardly Cossacks, who sprang like tigers upon any of his poor fellows on or near the shore. The *Henri Quatre*, it will be seen in a later page, had not yet quite finished her career of service. The French war-steamer *Pluton* suffered more severely than the ship just named; for a dismasted English transport was driven against her, snapped her cables, and caused her to be driven on shore and wrecked. The *Fulton*, French steam-frigate, was also wrecked. No fewer than sixteen vessels were destroyed on this spot; including the French war-ships just named, a Turkish war-ship of ninety guns, and the rest brigs and transports. The loss of life was not considerable; for a shifting of the wind enabled the crews of the more fortunate vessels to assist those which were stranded. The coast at Eupatoria being flat, there was no terrific dashing against rocks, as at Balaklava; and hence the destruction was less sudden and complete.

When the frightful losses occasioned by the November hurricane became known in England, great alarm was reasonably felt; for the very existence of the Allied army in the Crimea depended on the conveyance of supplies across this stormy sea during the winter months. The loss of human life during the tempest—English, French, and Turkish—was little under 1000 souls; the vessels wrecked or rendered useless were more than forty in number, besides many more seriously injured; the property lost was worth many millions sterling; but all these losses would sink into insignificance, compared with those likely to result from any inability on the part of the transport-ships to

convey troops and ammunition, food and clothing, huts and tents, fuel and medicines, to the armies encamped on the bleak, cheerless, inhospitable plateau between Balaklava and Sebastopol. And even if such voyages were possible, the calamity that had befallen the *Prince* shewed only too clearly how necessary would be some better organisation of the service at Balaklava, to insure a due reception of the reinforcements and supplies sent out from England.

WINTER-LIFE IN THE TENTS AND TRENCHES.

Whether we date the commencement of the miseries of the Crimean winter on the 5th of November, when the battle of Inkermann, by carrying off such fearful numbers, had left too few hands to effect the work to be done; or on the 8th, when the authorities appear to have become thoroughly convinced that the Allied army would be enforced to pass the bleak season on the elevated plateau outside Sebastopol; or on the 14th, when the terrible hurricane swept away such invaluable stores of ships, clothing, ammunition, and miscellaneous supplies—is a question of little moment. Practically, a chain of causes had been leading to an inevitable result; and this result was, the encampment of the troops for the winter, despite all the difficulties attending such a mode of life at such a time, and under such circumstances. The privations had already begun, as narrated in preceding pages; but they now assumed a sterner aspect. How the siege dragged its slow length along, we have seen; and it now becomes necessary to glance at the daily and nightly life of the poor soldiers during many successive weeks —in Balaklava; on the road thence to the camps; in the tents and huts; and in the trenches.

Balaklava became a very pest-house of filth, disorder, disease, and wretchedness of every kind. A small village at the time of its occupation by the Allies, it could not suddenly grow to meet the demand made upon it. One writer, attempting to describe the position of the little harbour with its border of lofty rocks, said: 'Suppose a basin one quarter full of water placed on the table, and drop a wafer into it, and then you have a good idea of the position of a ship in the harbour of Balaklava;' and if the wafers were increased to 150, they might serve to represent the crowded position of the ships during some of the winter months. This was bearable, however, so long as the ships were well handled: the miseries commenced upon landing. The houses of Balaklava were rather less than 200 wretched hovels, crowded to suffocation long before the British were enabled to run up a few wooden huts. The streets, or rather track-ways, were covered with slime such as eye-witnesses could barely find words sufficient to describe. One officer, going from a ship in the harbour to visit the camp on the plateau, said: 'I landed—my first step up to the very knees in mud; French, Turks, English, and camp-sutlers, in glorious confusion; such swearing, shouting, and row, you never heard in your life; artillery-wagons, six and twelve horses attached to each, others with half-starved camels; cavalry horses, whose riders and hard-worked steeds have probably not seen a comb or a brush for months together; with Turks every here and there bearing the dead upon stretchers—all wading through a sea of mud, complete this picture until you emerge from the town.'

Balaklava, considered as a town, consisted of the quay or wharf and one principal street; all else was irregular. Until the hard winter frost arrived, these were so deeply coated with mire that horses could with difficulty lift their legs after each step. On the quay were established the ordnance and commissariat stores, the military-chest, and various government depôts; and whether officers or soldiers came down from the heights for guns, ammunition, provisions, clothing, forage, specie, materials for huts, or camp-fittings, they were equally compelled to wade through this 'slough of despond:' in the midst of indescribable confusion; and in the midst, too, of the ambulance-wagons containing the poor mutilated and dying soldiers, waiting until opportunity could be afforded for conveying them by ship to the hospitals at Scutari. The dilapidated houses in the main street became by degrees occupied chiefly by dealers, who obtained stores of commodities from Constantinople, Varna, and elsewhere, to sell again at enormous prices to the officers and others. The dealers were in great part Greeks, Jews, and Maltese, who brought together a miscellaneous collection of spirits, wine, beer, ale, groceries, biscuits, butter, cheese, poultry, eggs, hams, fruit, jams, pickles, candles, soap, boots, overalls, cloaks, saddles, tobacco, pipes—everything for which a probable market appeared to exist; and the wretched street was, moreover, crowded from side to side with ordnance-carriages, strings of dragoon horses carrying forage to the camp, trains of mules bearing commissariat supplies, rows of high-wheeled carts similarly employed, flocks of sheep newly landed, packhorses bearing officers' kits and trunks, Turks carrying the dead bodies of their comrades to a neighbouring cemetery, and a menagerie of horses, donkeys, mules, and dromedaries, variously engaged as beasts of burden or of draught. Officers were glad enough to act as their own servants at such a time, if they could only effect purchases that might enable them to carry up a miscellaneous store of domestic necessaries or comforts in their saddle-bags and holsters to the camp. A still more miry alley, branching out of the miry street, led to the post-office—a tenement sought by many a beating heart, anxious for news from England. It frequently happened that provisions were landed in the wet, stacked in the mud, and remained until half spoiled, before hands

could be found to carry them up to the camp; and it was saddening to see the condition of those who occasionally acted as porters on such occasions; 'the very ragged, gaunt, hungry-looking men,' as one officer described them, 'with matted beard and moustaches, features grimed with dirt, and torn greatcoats stiff with successive layers of mud—these men whose whole appearance speaks toil and suffering, and who instantly remind you of the very lowest and most impoverished class of the Irish peasantry—are the picked soldiers from our different foot-regiments, strong men selected to carry up provisions for the rest of the camp.'

The deepest of miseries at this place were, however, those experienced by the Turks. Ever since the unfortunate affair of the redoubts at the battle of Balaklava, the few thousand Turks in the Crimea had been shunned and spurned by the British soldiery; the poor fellows having no favour or comforts to expect up at the camp, whenever necessity or opportunity offered, they made the little village a place of assemblage. Dirty in their personal habits, neglected by the Ottoman government, and despised by their allies, the Turks contracted the seeds of disease which rendered Balaklava a very pest-house; a typhoid fever of malignant character swept them down with desolating rapidity. The unhappy wretches crowded the fetid dens of the village, dying as they lay, unheeded and uncared for, except by their almost equally suffering countrymen, who could render little other service than that of carrying the dead bodies to the grave. How the Turks lived at all here is inexplicable; there was no commissariat for them at Balaklava, and they had little resource but begging and stealing, until the British saw the necessity of providing for them; but even then, as the hurricane had wrought havoc among our own supplies, there was little indeed to spare for those ill-used scouted beings.

If the village and quay of Balaklava presented the extreme of dirty squalor and confusion, the road thence to the camp exhibited the most humiliating examples of the state to which fine soldiers may be reduced by privation and overwork; if the quay at Balaklava was 'a canal of semi-fluid nastiness,' the plateau was 'a swamp accessible only by means of various quagmires;' and along these quagmires every article had to be conveyed to supply the daily wants of the entire British army, such as it was, encamped on the heights above. On some days, before the frost began, the men and animals were so utterly unable to carry up the supplies, that the camp would have been in perilous want, had not Canrobert lent some of his French soldiers and horses to Raglan; the Zouaves wrought actively, but not without many wrathful animadversions on the state of the road, a state so much worse than that of their own road from Kamiesch to the plateau. The heaviest work was that of carrying up ammunition; and yet it was essential, unless the siege were abandoned altogether. Hundreds of horses and mules were imported, as rapidly as the commissariat officers could obtain them; but, unfortunately, forage was deficient; and the poor animals, exposed at once to trying labour and scanty sustenance, died off rapidly, leaving the British commander in as much embarrassment as before. Turkish drivers were employed to conduct the trains of laden animals and arabas up to the heights; but these men were little more fortunate than the animals they drove: they sank under the combined effects of cold, wet, fatigue, and irregular or deficient food. In some cases, reinforcements of regiments landed without their medicine-chests, because there were no animals of draught or burden available for the transport of these very necessary adjuncts; and thus, when sickness attacked the raw and uninured troops on their toilsome march upwards, there were no medicines at hand to afford relief. The commissariat officers felt bitterly the difficulties in which they were placed; work as laboriously as they might, they could not get up the supplies as fast as needed; and too often the suffering soldiers laid upon them the burden of blame for the miseries endured. A field-officer, writing concerning the ill organisation of the army, and commenting strongly on the alleged inefficiency of the staff, said: 'The consequence is that everything is thrown on the commissariat; and if they could possibly do what is required of them (make roads, piers, wagons, stables, and storehouses; find transport for guns, ammunition, tents, baggage, huts, sick and wounded, fuel and provender for man and horse; load and discharge ships; with a thousand et ceteras), all the other field-departments, the doctors excepted, might be advantageously abolished. Our crying evil is the insufficiency of transport.'

The 63d regiment landed at Balaklava near the end of November, and was ordered up to the front immediately, to relieve the overworked troops in the trenches. The length and nature of their march were soon afterwards described in a letter by one of the officers.* Some of the other regiments, in like manner, were startled to find under what circumstances of discomfort they were called

* 'We marched up the road through the valley where the cavalry action took place on the 25th of October; the road was most dreadful, up to the knees in mud, and encumbered with dead bodies of mules, bullocks, and horses. What a sight this place would be for some enthusiastic member of the Humane Society! French and Turkish troops were marching in every direction, arabas laden with provisions to supply the wants of the immense army surrounding the place. Well, we proceeded on as best we could through the mud till dark, and to every inquiry as to how far the 3d division was, "Five miles" was the invariable answer. As it became perfectly dark, we began to suspect that our guide, an orderly of the 13th Dragoons, did not know much about the country. At last, we reached a French camp, and asked them where the English were. They guided us to a camp, and, to our great dismay, we found we were among the light division, on the extreme right of the whole position, about four miles beyond our camp. As it could not be helped, we turned to the rightabout, and again went on; out of 120 men, not more than thirty remained with us, and, if it had not been for shame, I should have lain down too. . . . . At last, we reached our camp about eight o'clock, after having, by our wanderings, converted a march of six miles into nearly twenty.'

upon to join their comrades at the siege of Sebastopol: all notions of glory were speedily dashed by such an ordeal of mire, wet, cold, hunger, and fatigue.

And now, supposing the state of Balaklava and of the roads to be understood, what was the condition of the troops at the camp? The lateness of the dispatch of clothing from England, and the lamentable loss of stores during the storm, had reduced the men to the most pitiable condition in their apparel. The numbers were, before reinforcements arrived, brought down to about 12,000 effective British troops, exception being made of those in hospital; and these 12,000, by the middle of December, had scarcely a sound garment among them. The uniforms worn since the troops left England, nine or ten months previously, had undergone such severe service as to be little other than rags: rent in all directions, pierced with shot-holes and sabre-cuts, they could scarcely have been resumed had the wearers been enabled to take them off at night, which, however, they were not. Trousers being in many cases completely destroyed below the knee, stockings in many more instances utterly gone, and boots and shoes too often with nothing but the upper leathers remaining, the gallant soldiers felt shame and humiliation in toiling along in a condition such as would excite pity even for a beggar. When the army landed at Old Fort in September, officers and privates carried little more than was absolutely necessary—the deficiency hence arising was, from various mishaps, never adequately supplied throughout the winter. Many of the officers endeavoured in vain to obtain their baggage from the ships; they lay down night after night in the clothes worn during the day, and became nearly as bespattered and unkempt, as patched and worn, as unlike smart military men, as the privates themselves. The inextricable confusion at Balaklava had contributed to this end in a mode as irritating as it was unexpected. Every soldier possesses what he calls his 'kit.' These kits, left on board ship when the troops landed, that the latter might begin battle unencumbered, were afterwards carried round to Balaklava. But with what result? When the kits were disembarked on the quay or wharf, there was no one appointed to take charge of them, and superintend the distribution to their proper owners; or, if such appointment were made, it was ill carried out; the wharf became a place of scramble; Greeks and Maltese picked up many a treasure belonging to others; officers and men succeeded sometimes in reclaiming their own; but in too many cases the men saw nothing again of their kits. To appreciate the loss hence arising, the contents of the kit must be taken into account; these contents were nearly as follow—two shirts, two pair of socks, one pair of boots, one shell-jacket, one pair of trousers, one pair of mitts, knife, fork, spoon, comb, shaving-utensils, and a few trifling articles. Here, then, had been many of these poor fellows from the middle of September to the middle of December (to say nothing of the still more lengthened privations of some of their number), absolutely deprived of the necessaries named in this list. What must have been the personal discomfort thus produced, any one may imagine, but soldiers only can appreciate. Newspaper readers were surprised to learn that, after the battle of the Alma, the English soldiers seized with avidity on the shirts contained in the knapsacks of the dead Russians: why they did so, became afterwards sufficiently known.

A mournful, but instructive paragraph might be made up by a selection from those parts of the soldiers' simple and truthful letters bearing upon their war-worn garments. A sergeant said: 'Half the regiment were in tatters; no one ever saw such miserable creatures in soldiers' clothes before, for trousers and everything were all sorts of patches, and many of the men had not had a clean shirt for a month.' One of the Guards, who had fought so gallantly at Alma and Inkermann, thus wrote to his mother: 'I am wearing my clothing that I had worn for two years; my red jacket I mended with a patch of black stuff; the trousers that I am wearing are my pipe-clay whites, and it is twice as cold as it is in England. Our officers pity us, to see the miserable state we are in.' A marine, on the heights above Balaklava, wrote: 'I have not had my clothes off to sleep since I have been here, and I shan't if we stop for six months. I should like you just to see my "mug;" I have not had a shave these ten weeks, and I get a wash once in three or four days.' A trooper in the light dragoons, writing to his mother, said: 'I am at this moment without a shirt to my back, and no boots to my feet, only a pair of highlows, and they are very little protection to my feet where there is much mud and water; and only one flannel shirt, one pair of drawers, and one pair of socks, and those I had to take off a dead man, or I should have had to go without: it was no harm, as the poor fellow would never want them again, or else, you may depend upon it, I should not have done it; at one time I should have shuddered at the bare idea.' A rifleman wrote: 'Our men are clothed in smocks made by themselves from blankets; leggings also ornament them, made from the same material, some from old sacking; and some have none of this, but still wear what is left of our old clothing. Fancy our regiment paraded in such different costumes: it would be a grand parade in Hyde Park!' With such details did the poor fellows fill their letters, written towards the close of the year.

If, quitting the troops for a moment, we glance at the condition of the horses in this terrible season, it happens, strangely enough, that a lady is one of our best informants. Mrs Duberly accompanied her husband, an officer in the 8th Hussars, to Varna and the Crimea; and her *Journal* treats of horses almost as fully as if

written by a cavalry-trooper. Immediately on departing from England in April, the authoress lamented the mode in which the cavalry-horses were stowed on board ship; and then sorrowed over the illness and death of her own 'Grey,' a horse with 'faultless action, faultless mouth, and faultless temper.' Mrs Duberly went to Varna —galloped over most of the country between that town and Shumla—steamed to Eupatoria in the *Himalaya*—remained there impatiently during the battle of Alma and the flank-march —went round to Balaklava—lived there through-out the winter months on shipboard, finding it impossible even for *her* to encamp with her husband on the heights—galloped up frequently to dine with the officers in camp, and back again in the evening—witnessed the battle of Balaklava from the heights—rode, with a glance and a shudder, over part of the terrible field of Inkermann—and bore all the indescribable horrors of the road from Balaklava to the camps during the winter. One of the wintry entries in her *Journal* runs thus: 'The gray horse "Job" died this evening of sheer starvation: his tail had been

Winter Scene between Port and Camp.

gnawed to a stump by his hungry neighbours at picket. Misfortune appears to haunt us, as this is the third horse we have lost since leaving England. . . . . Poor Job! he earned his name from his exhaustless patience under innumerable afflictions; he was an enormous, powerful, and hungry horse, and he sold his life by inches.' On an evening at the end of November, after dining with her husband at the Guards' camp, she returned to her ship at dark, 'along the rotten, deep, almost impracticable track: the dead horses lying right across the road, as they fell, and the dead and dying bullocks, filled me with horror, and the white pony with spasms of fear—now we trod upon the muddy carcass of a horse; now we passed a fallen mule and a huge bullock, sitting up, with long ghastly horns pointing upwards in the moonlight, awaiting his death.' Shortly before Christmas, her horse was brought down from the front, 'a mere skinful of bones, and with an expression of human wo and suffering in his large sad eyes.' On some occasions there is mention of the cavalry-horses having had one single handful of barley each as the day's ration, while on many other days no fodder whatever was obtainable. As winter advanced, the diarist exclaims: 'Truly our army is in a lamentable state. I have grieved until I have no power of grieving left. I think that if I knew I was going to die myself, I should merely shrug my shoulders and lie down quietly. We have no ambulance-wagons; they are nearly all broken down, or the mules are dead, or the drivers are dead or dead-drunk: as well one as the other, so far as usefulness goes. Our poor cavalry-horses, as we know full well, are all unequal to the task of carrying down the sick; and the French have provided transport for us for some time. . . . . O England, England! blot out the lion and the unicorn: let the supporters of your arms henceforth be Imbecility and Death!'

If the experience of an artillery-officer be appealed to concerning the appearance and condition of the horses, that of Lieutenant-colonel

Hamley will be amply sufficient. He states that the surviving horses of the Scots Greys, long-haired, bony, spiritless, and soiled with mire, preserved no trace of their former beauty. Dying and dead horses lay scattered around the artillery and cavalry camps, and on the Balaklava road—struck down by fatigue, cold, or starvation. Once down, a horse seldom rose again: after a few feeble attempts, he would lie still, nibbling at the bare ground; then he would fall over on his side, and, stretching out his legs, would so end his career, leaving a smooth space in the mud where his head and neck had moved slowly to and fro, or where his hind-leg had scratched convulsively before he died. Sometimes an ownerless horse, lame and unserviceable, would linger about the neighbourhood of an encampment; day after day he would be there, patiently waiting, wondering why no corn or hay was given him; getting thinner and thinner, he obtained no relief, for each trooper had insufficient fodder for his own horse; he dropped and died a lingering death, unless, perchance, a friendly bullet put a quicker end to his sufferings. Swollen and bloated carcasses would be seen at one spot; while at another would appear the remains of a horse, whence all but the bones and skin had been removed by ferocious dogs.

Returning to the more important subject of the troops themselves, it is saddening to know that, in addition to exhausting labour and deficient clothing, they were frequently exposed to privations in the more urgent department of food. Until the disastrous tempest in November had increased the confusion of a camp already disordered, the commissaries, by indefatigable exertion, kept the army moderately well supplied with daily rations; the bread was baked at Balaklava, and carried up day after day to the camp; beef, mutton, coffee, tea, rice, sugar, and rum; all were provided in large quantities. Yet, so difficult was the maintenance of a transport service, to carry these necessaries up to the plateau, that the soldiers were not unfrequently driven upon short rations; then, feeling their own privations, but not rightly judging the cause, they poured out their complaints against the commissariat—one only among many examples afforded during the winter, of hard-working officials being made responsible for deficiencies beyond their own control.

Although occasional lapses, as has just been stated, occurred before the storm of the 14th of November, the losses on that day, and the advent of bad weather, rendered the commissariat supplies much more precarious, owing chiefly to the immense difficulty of transport where horses and vehicles were so few and so weak. As long as it was possible to obtain cattle and sheep from Eupatoria and other places, the troops were supplied liberally with fresh meat; but deficient fodder brought down these animals to a miserable condition: they were too weak to be driven up to the camp, there were insufficient means of carrying up the killed meat, and there was little fuel for cooking it either at the camp or at Balaklava. Hence the distressing narrations that reached England of poor labour-worn soldiers eating raw salt-pork on their return from trench-duty: instances of this unquestionably occurred, few as they may have been in relation to the whole number of troops to be supplied. During the march from Old Fort to the Alma, and thence to Balaklava, most of the camp-kettles had been thrown away, as obstructions to free movement; the staff, forgetful or unable, did not, and perhaps could not, provide a new store in sufficient time; and thus it happened that stern December found the troops wanting in the means for duly cooking their rations. In order that fuel and food might be conveyed up to the camp in good time, the commissaries had proposed to establish depôts at all the divisional head-quarters; but unfortunately the animals and vehicles required for this service were appropriated by the engineers and artillery for dragging up shot and ammunition to the batteries: hence, when bad weather arrived, the commissaries had accumulated around them vast stores of food, fodder, and fuel at Balaklava, utterly beyond their means of transport along the wretched mud-track to the camp. As a consequence, the supplies in the divisional depôts were always small, whether or not the commissaries had been successful in providing a goodly store at Balaklava. It was heart-wearying to see and to know, as the troops too well saw and knew, that food for men and fodder for horses actually rotted in the rain and mud at Balaklava, owing to the sheer impossibility of conveying them to the camp. When, towards the end of November, cholera broke out a second time among the poor fellows, striking down nearly a hundred in one night, the miseries were redoubled; for increased comforts and necessaries were wanted, at the very time when fewer hands were obtainable as carriers; the depôts became so exhausted that the army was literally dependent, for its daily bread on Balaklava: if supplies had not been carried up every day without interruption, the privations must have been greatly augmented. The surgeons much wished to supply a little fresh vegetable food to the sick soldiers; but here again fatality went against them; for a cargo of onions, potatoes, and cabbages, brought by the *Harbinger*, remained stacked on the muddy beach at Balaklava until it rotted and infected the air: there were no means of conveying the vegetables up to the camp. Unutterably miserable were the scenes often presented: poor haggard horses and mules, worn to the bone, would sink on the road, and there die in the slough—the load of biscuit or of meat, transferred to the back of another animal, would overtask him, and lay him in like manner prostrate—and the food, soddened and bemired, would at length reach the camp on the backs of gaunt soldiers, hungry, sick, and

ragged. Soldiers and horses presented an aspect almost equally miserable at such a time. The cavalry had been lodged near the camp until most of the horses were dead or dying; and the troopers, a few dozens only of each regiment, ceased to be an army-division; they formed little more than a company employed in carrying food. Lank, feeble, and covered with sores, each horse was led to and fro between the camp and Balaklava, scarcely possessing strength to carry a bag containing eighty pounds of biscuit; the horse, and the trooper who guided him, needed to be fed rather than to carry food to others.

Bitterly did the officers and men read an occasional copy of the *Times*, telling of the munificent contributions made by the English nation for their comfort; of the money, the clothing, the solid food, the savoury comforts, the materials for a Christmas-dinner, the blankets and bedding, the medicines—noble were these gifts, but where? All that the sufferers really knew was that these acceptable treasures were not in the right place at the right time: it was not until a subsequent period that they learned how much of their wo had been due to the wretched management of Balaklava Harbour, and to the deplorable state of the road from the harbour to the camp. At Christmas-time, instead of enjoying the good cheer fondly imagined at home, two soldiers, perhaps even an officer and a private, would sling an empty cask upon a pole, bear the pole on their shoulders, flounder six miles through the almost impassable slimy mud, obtain a supply of beef, or biscuits, or rum, and labour wearily six miles back again; well knowing that rations would be wanting unless they or their comrades rendered such service. Of one article alone, rum, more than 1000 gallons per day were required at the camp, to aid in giving warmth and strength to the sinking soldiers; hence the urgency for incessant daily transport may be inferred.

Among various parliamentary inquiries, to be more fully noticed in a later page, was one concerning the use of unroasted coffee at the camp. The fact itself was unquestionable, however it might be explained. A sergeant in the Grenadiers, giving evidence before the Sebastopol Committee, stated that his comrades complained more concerning the coffee than any other item in their rations: seeing that the berry was unroasted, at a time and place singularly unfavourable, fuel, and vessels, and time, all being deficient. The poor fellows collected brushwood, kindled a fire, roasted or perhaps burnt their coffee in the tin-kettles, which were their only vessels, ground or rather broke it with the mallets used for driving in the tent-pegs, or with stones or cannon-balls, and made their decoction as best they might. Sometimes, in very despair at their difficulty in obtaining a draught of warm coffee, even when fuel was nigh, the soldiers would swallow the hot salt-water wherein their pork had been partially boiled. On a bitter winter's morning, a trench-party would be ordered out, often too hurriedly to permit these numerous processes to be effected, and the men would perforce depart without breakfast. One officer describes the events of a morning on which seventy soldiers were ordered down to Balaklava to bring up salt-pork and biscuit; many of them had been all night in the trenches and pickets, deluged with rain; and they departed without breakfast, because the wet brushwood would not kindle on the wet ground: indescribable in misery must have been such a day. When it became almost impossible to send up fuel from Balaklava, the soldiers—more like earth-men than British troops—grubbed up bits of roots and twigs from stunted oaks to make fires. It reads more like a passage in some romance or tale, than a plain narrative of an English campaign; but a dragoon wrote thus: 'We are sometimes three or four days without rations; but, take them in general, they are pretty regular. I think nothing now of subsisting for days upon a piece of raw salt-pork; we have very little accommodation for cooking, as the nearest wood is five miles off, and the water is very muddy. I blame the raw pork and water for so much diarrhœa. The French can make a very good meal off the rump of a shot horse, but I don't like such steaks.' Some of the officers, on Christmas-day and other selected occasions, endeavoured to prepare a special repast that might remind them, in however humble a degree, of home festivities—frying salt-pork in the lid of an old kettle; frying a lean fowl with the aid of the fat thus obtained; preparing an impromptu dish of bread, honey, and eggs; roasting potatoes among the embers; boiling tea in a coffee-pot; and dressing up for the occasion as smartly as their tattered and bemired uniforms permitted. In other instances, an officer, aided by his servant, would labour for hours together to produce a Christmas-pudding; which, probably, at eight or ten o'clock in the evening, would present itself rather as a potage than a pudding. Jocular narratives hence arose; but the stories of the common soldiers were too terrible in their stern simplicity to be matter of mirth.

The roads, the horses, the clothing, the food, the fuel, being thus noticed, it now becomes necessary to say a few words concerning the tents and huts—the means for affording a shelter, though imperfect, from the inclement heavens during the few hours when a little sleep might possibly be obtained.

The British troops, as explained in the last Chapter, marched from Old Fort to the Alma, and thence to Balaklava, without their tents; bivouacking at night under circumstances of discomfort that laid the foundation for many a fatal disorder. The tents reached them gradually on the plateau in front of Sebastopol; but these tents, too few in number, and often defective in quality, became wretched domiciles even before the rains and tempests of November began: what

they became afterwards, experience too painfully manifested. The French began to render their tented homes comfortable long before their allies had any materials for so doing; and shortly after the November storm, many of them ingeniously constructed residences partially underground—that is, they dug shallow pits, and thatched them over with twigs and branches. The British could not have adopted this plan, even if they had possessed the ingenuity so to apply their hands, for the ground on the part of the plateau occupied by them was too hard: they were dependent, in the first instance, on no other covering than that of the blue vault above them; then upon tents admitting the rain-water as through a sieve; and then, after a long interval, upon wooden huts. But here at once arose a difficulty lamentable and vexatious: the timber was near at hand, but means were wanting for conveyance up to the camp. After the hurricane, the shores were strewn with the remains of wrecked ships, available in many cases for hut-building; and towards the close of the month, supplies of prepared timber arrived; but in the one case as in the other, the deficiency of beasts of burden rendered it a work of enormous difficulty to transport the timbers to the necessary spots.

A wintering in the Crimea not having entered into the original plans or suppositions of the Allied governments, the provision of huts in sufficient time became a matter of utter impossibility; but the British, more in arrear in this as in most other army-arrangements than the French, would nevertheless have had their tents erected before the frost, had not the unfortunate difficulty of transport arisen. Orders for the supply of prepared timber reached Constantinople and Malta during the third week in November, and it was hoped that one month would suffice for the work to be done—a calculation sadly erroneous, as the event proved. Other huts were constructed in England, as soon as the urgency became known; but the winter was half over before these could reach their place of destination. On Christmas-day, nearly all the troops were still living under tents, torn and leaky, with an almost total absence of means for providing the smallest comfort: at that time, timbers and boards prepared for huts were lying at Balaklava—practically as useless as gold would be in a mine beyond the reach of workers. The French camp was, in every particular, better arranged and supplied: paved roads existed; huts and tents stood in regular rows; sign-posts marked off the camp into separate streets; a strict camp-police prevented the accumulation of rubbish; and baking-ovens were erected between the tents, supplying the soldiers daily with freshly-baked bread. Without waiting for the huts sent out from France, the men constructed a large number from drift-wood and odd pieces picked up in various quarters. Here the officers mixed with the men; and all kept up a joyousness of spirit by singing, playing, acting, and story-telling. In the British camp, the officers did *not* mix with the men; it is not their custom so to do; and dulness thus rendered the disasters still more insupportable. In the Turkish camp, placed between the English and the French, the Osmanlis had too few of their excellent tents to accommodate all; they sat quietly in the mud, smoked their chibouques, patiently bore everything, but wished, at the same time, that the English would treat them and speak to them a little more kindly.

Early in January, there was no less than 4000 tons of wood for huts at Balaklava—huts made in England, very substantial, but so ponderous that each weighed nearly two tons. Who could carry up such timbers to the plateau, at a time when the conveyance of food alone was such destructive labour? A terrible answer was given to this question, when biting frosts found the poor soldiers still without huts; when men, returning from trench-duty, huddled twelve or fourteen together under a ragged tent, with abundant loopholes for cutting blasts, and no fuel for artificial warmth. If a wretched mule succeeded, once now and then, in dragging up a few boards to the camp, the wood was likely to be burnt for fuel instead of built into a hut. In the middle of the month, some of the men were actually frozen to death in the tents.

Great as was the accumulation of disheartening miseries connected with road-fatigue, clothing, fuel, food, and tents, there was yet another to be added to the list of inflictions—trench-duty. The nature of this duty has already been described; but its horrors were not fully developed until winter approached. The trenches being in many instances less in depth than the height of a tall soldier, if a trench-guard stood upright, he was in momentary danger of a shot in the head from the Russian riflemen; and he was thus obliged to stoop or kneel in the mire, with water perhaps a foot in depth, and this for many hours continuously, without food or warmth, and with clothing all in rags. An officer who went out with the 63d from England, arriving at Sebastopol towards the close of November, has described his first night in the trenches; he marched down in a storm of wind and rain, found the trenches so flooded that he had to pass the night in muddy water a foot in depth, and when relieved at eight in the morning, was half dead with cold and damp: indeed, one of the privates in that regiment was struck down by death during the miseries of his first and only night in the trenches. It was not unfrequent for the men to be marched to the trenches at four o'clock in the afternoon, and there remain sixteen hours, exposed to rain or snow during the whole period; and to take this duty on alternate days. One of the regiments sent out to reinforce the army landed at Balaklava in the rain, marched up the wretched road in the rain, pitched tents in the rain, slept on the wet ground, and took trench-duty in the rain on the

next night: as a consequence, nearly one-third of the men were dead or disabled within ten days. Of the 46th regiment, seven men died in the trenches on the first night. The poor fellows engaged in these nightly duties compared their position with that of the French, and bitterly felt how unfavourable was the contrast.

The general tenor of the soldiers' letters, relating to the nights in the trenches and pickets, may be readily inferred. One, not a mere private, but an officer, wrote: 'I was myself on picket the day before yesterday, for twenty-four hours; this morning I was on a working-party in the trenches from four o'clock until the same hour in the afternoon; and to-morrow I am on picket again: now, what manner of man, think you, can stand this?' An officer of the Royals told how that, in one week, about Christmas, he was sent out to repel a Russian sortie towards midnight, and returned to camp at four in the morning on the next day; a few hours afterwards, he went on picket to a place against which the Russians maintained a warm fire during the night; returning to camp at seven in the morning of the third day, he went in the evening to guard the ammunition reserve, where he remained until ten o'clock on the following morning; at four o'clock on this, the fourth day, he was sent in charge of a working-party in the left siege-train; after nine hours' service, he returned to the camp in the dead of the night, saturated with wet, and then had to delay his rest until, in the early morn of the fifth day, he had read the burial-service over two unfortunates who had died in the trenches. Another officer in the same regiment wrote proudly but mournfully of his men: 'They drag on to the trenches while they can scarcely stand, and take a pride in never shirking or casting their duty on others.' Well might he say: 'It is very wearisome trying to walk about in slush for twelve hours at a time: indeed the young hands cannot do it; they sit or lie down in the wet, get cramps, and are carried to hospital, where they die; the old soldiers know their only chance is to keep moving about, which they do while they can stand.'

Lord Raglan's Head-quarters.

It is needless to multiply examples of these privations and sufferings: the above may be taken as representatives of all. No one can read the simple narratives of the soldiers without becoming conscious that those winter months—with the wretched track-way from Balaklava, the decay and death of the horses and mules, the laborious carrying of supplies up to the camp by men already overworked, the deficiency of food, the want of means for cooking it, the weather-worn tents as dwelling-places, the absence of stoves in those tents, the flimsy and tattered clothing, the days on the miry plateau and the nights in the still more terrible trenches—were indeed months of intense misery. And how did the noble fellows bear their privations? From all accounts, they appear to have deemed complaining unsoldierly; they told their sad tales in letters written to friends at home, but in the regiment they gallantly bore their share of this tremendous service. Officers, it was remarked, complained and censured much more freely than their men: the commander

received so many applications for leave of absence, that, had they been responded to, many of the regiments would have been left nearly unofficered. Whether ill-health or depressing anxiety were the cause, it appears from evidence on all sides, that Lord Raglan was rarely seen in the camp from the middle of November until towards the approach of Christmas. The troops, suffering from manifold afflictions, would have derived some comfort from the daily visits of their commander, such as Canrobert and Bosquet were accustomed to make to the various divisions of the French army. He could not, it is true, have given them an immediate increase in their supplies of food and clothing, of fuel and shelter; but he could have shewn how much he sympathised with their sufferings, and could have spoken cheeringly of better days to look forward to, and of the honourable position every Crimean soldier would occupy in the thoughts and hearts of all in the old country. This was not done; and, as a consequence, those who had no private means of knowing the uniform kindness of disposition on the part of their commander, freely and indignantly criticised his conduct. It unfortunately happened, too, that the staff did not possess the general confidence of the army; an opinion widely prevailed that the staff-officers, in many instances unfitted to fill properly the duties of their respective posts, did not bear their fair proportion of labour and hardships; while they obtained an ample ratio in any distribution of honours and encomiums arising from successful military achievements. These reproachful complainings were numerous in the letters of the regimental officers, the majors and captains and lieutenants who bore their share in all the hard duties of the camp during the bitter winter months. To what extent the dissatisfaction was justified, can only be imperfectly known; the hand of death struck poor Lord Raglan ere the time could come for his return to England; and many explanations which probably he alone could give were buried with him in the grave. The full weight of the defects in the governmental organisation of the army fell upon him, rendering him, in the eyes of the soldiers, responsible for privations he was perhaps powerless to remedy. It may have been that many agonising hours were passed in the humble abode constituting the British head-quarters.

The want of intimate association, mentioned in the above paragraph, between the officers and privates in the British army, results, obviously, from the great difference in social position. The officers are mostly gentlemen by birth, and extremely averse to the admission among them of persons of lowly station; whereas the privates have, in most cases, sprung from a humble grade in society. An Englishman becomes a military officer because he thereby occupies a status entitling him to mix in good society; he becomes a common soldier because he is too poor or too reckless to do better for himself: in neither case, except in individual instances, does he join the army through military enthusiasm. The gulf between the two classes is almost impassable: the youngest and most inexperienced ensign or cornet, the lowest of commissioned officers, is regarded as a 'gentleman;' while the most gallant and experienced sergeant, who has risen to be a non-commissioned officer through his faithful and soldierly conduct, is still no 'gentleman'—a truth he would probably be made painfully to feel if he attempted to mix with the commissioned officers. The departure from ordinary usage made after the battle of Inkermann, tends, by its exceptional character, to render the rule all the more obvious; it was regarded as a special mark of royal favour to render a few sergeants eligible for commissions as ensigns and cornets.* So far as regards increased pay, such rewards are just and proper; but a mere royal order to this effect cannot remodel the social classification arising from other causes: the sergeant of humble family and imperfect education cannot easily right himself in his new position as one of the commissioned officers of the army, entitled to visit county-balls and fashionable parties, to share in expensive mess-dinners, and to belong to a Pall Mall club. The bravery and daring of soldiers in the field are not necessarily affected by these distinctions; the officer and the private may each fight well, notwithstanding the gulf that separates them; it is at other hours, when no actual fighting is required, that the class-distinction tells unfavourably. A comparison was drawn between the English and French armies, in the *Constitutionnel*, during the Crimean winter, tending to illustrate the different usages of the two nations in these particulars.† Without assenting to all the

* The War-office announced, on the 6th of February 1855, that ten promotions to cornetcies, 'without purchase,' had been made in the cavalry, and thirty promotions to ensigncies in the infantry. All the non-commissioned officers so promoted had been sergeants, under the various grades of sergeant, sergeant-major, regimental sergeant-major, troop sergeant-major, quartermaster-sergeant, and colour-sergeant.

† 'The first thing that would strike a spectator arriving at Sebastopol is the great contrast which exists between the English and French armies. In the former are to be observed the reign of formality and the strict observance of rank and of social position. After the hour of combat, there are no longer any relations between the officers and the privates. Whilst the French officers, always mingled with their men, constantly occupy themselves with the means of supplying their wants, the English officers remain inactive, if not indifferent; this is the affair of the government. On the other hand, they have the highest possible sense of honour and of their duty, and will perform the most heroic actions. The English soldiers are somewhat of the same stamp as their officers; they fight admirably, but keep bad watch, and are not very good for work. They require to have paid hands for this latter purpose. It is an army splendid in combat, but it is not made for undergoing sufferings. The organisation is bad, because it is incomplete, and because proper administrative services do not exist. It is shewn that the French army, on the contrary, is essentially calculated to support suffering, and, consequently, war also; provided there be constant emotions to keep alive such excitable imaginations. A kind of familiarity exists in the relations of the officers with the men, and on the part of the superior officers, a kind sympathy which supports and encourages. There is a sort of solidarity in all the degrees of rank in the French army; but what appears most striking in that army is the ready aptitude of the French officers which is so remarkable. Many of them, it is said, are deficient in education; but the presence of mind natural in the nation replaces it, by transforming itself on the spot into a practical instinct which renders them skilful in drawing the greatest possible advantages from the most different elements. It is owing to this that so many men are found, who, after two months' service, make good

statements in this comparison, there is enough in them of truth to render evident the probability that the sufferings of our troops were rendered more dismal by the absence, or at least the insufficiency, of companionable sympathy between officers and men.

THE SICK AND WOUNDED AT THE CAMP.

Slight and incidental mention, only, has been hitherto made of the treatment of the sick and wounded soldiers; but it becomes now necessary to treat this matter, if not in detail, at least with some degree of system; for the military arrangements of the British, at the close of 1854 and the beginning of 1855, were seriously embarrassed by the deplorable number of sick, occasioned not merely by the ordinary contingencies of war, but by mismanagement and imperfect administrative arrangements. It will be convenient to treat, first, of the hospital proceedings at the camp, and then of those at Scutari.

In the long interval of peace following the battle of Waterloo, the medical department of the British army had been brought down to a very low condition; whatever extravagance may have prevailed in other departments, this at least was subjected to much paring and pruning, possibly to an injudicious degree. As a natural consequence, when war broke out in 1854, the medical department was enforced to make hasty arrangements for the succour of those who might become sick or wounded in the course of the war. The destination of the army being the Black Sea provinces of the Turkish Empire, hospital arrangements were made in some degree comformable thereto. Uncertain at first where best to establish the military hospitals, the government sent instructions to Mr Calvert, British consul in the Dardanelles, to make inquiries; he named Abydos, and several other places, some of which were subsequently adopted. While the army was at Varna, very imperfectly supplied with surgeons and medicines, measures were taken to establish an hospital at Scutari, for the reception of the soldiers who might be wounded in the approaching campaign. The Duke of Newcastle as minister of war, and Dr Andrew Smith as chief of the medical department of the army, had daily meetings in London during a considerable portion of the autumn, to concert measures relating to the hospital arrangements; but, as afterwards proved, Dr Smith became so perplexed by his divided responsibility to five or six government departments, that, not knowing which was paramount, and wishing to obey all, he failed to satisfy any; and, as a necessary result, the British army in the East remained insufficiently supplied and organised in its medical department. Had not the subsequent inquiries by the Sebastopol Committee and the Crimean Commissioners been made public, the disorganisation of the service would have been scarcely credible. Dr Smith's first instructions were from the Horse Guards, the commander-in-chief's office, to provide necessary medicines for an army destined to service in the East; but he had no control over the shipping of the hospital furniture and clothing for the sick, no bill of lading, no power of seeing that the articles were actually shipped off: this devolved upon the Board of Ordnance. Then, in relation to such medical comforts as wine, sago, arrow-root, &c., very important to an army in a season of cholera and dysentery, Dr Smith had to apply to the commander-in-chief, who applied to the Board of Ordnance, which applied to the Board of Admiralty, which had been accustomed to supply such comforts; but neither the minister of war nor the medical director, whatever might be ascertained by voluntary inquiry, had any official knowledge whether these supplies were ever sent to the East. In June, the medical director issued a memorandum to the surgeons in the army, giving a list of the medical staff and the medical supplies sent out, and requesting that any deficiencies might be reported to the inspector-general of hospitals, who would report to the medical director. About the time when the news of the battle of the Alma reached England, accompanied by painful narrations of the sufferings of the sick and wounded, Dr Smith sent to the newspapers a list of the supplies forwarded since February—comprising a staff of more than 250 medical officers, an immense store of medicines, instruments, and hospital fittings, 780 bearers or stretchers for the conveyance of wounded men, and 50 ambulances or wheel-vehicles for a similar service. Besides the hospital supplies, each corps was provided with a regimental and with a detachment medicine-chest, each chest amply furnished with medicines and surgical materials, according to the regulations of the service, and also with a box of apparatus for fractures and dislocations. The surgeon of each corps had a full set of capital instruments, the senior assistant a portable set, the surgeon and three assistants each a case of pocket-instruments and a case of lancets. Dr Smith at the same time stated, that the surgical staff with the army at the battle of the Alma was relatively much stronger than that with which the Duke of Wellington had been supplied during the Peninsular war. Whatever may have been the deficiencies afterwards discovered, there can be no doubt of the earnestness with which Dr Smith entered upon his arrangements; and it is due to him to quote one passage in his public announcement above adverted to. Speaking of his predecessor in the medical directorship, Sir James M'Grigor, Dr Smith stated

sub-officers, and in twelve months, efficient officers. It is remarked that the natural vanity of the French serves them in this respect. A wish to attract attention is the occasion of acts of valour and jokes, which cause laughter and support the mind. Each man wishes to outdo his comrades. There is the same rivalry in cooking their food as in firing their musket, or in giving proof of intelligence.'

that Sir James made, when 'chief of the medical department of the army in the Peninsula, repeated efforts to have an ambulance corps similar to what he saw in use with the French, attached to the British force, but without success. I feel it imperative on me to state this fact; and further to record, that the army now in Turkey, which Her Majesty's government has permitted me to supply in the most liberal manner with everything likely to prove advantageous to the interests of such sick and wounded as may occur, has actually been furnished with many of the most important articles at the recommendation of my venerated predecessor, who, though in the eighty-fourth year of his age, has afforded me, during the last four months, the advantage of his fifty-eight years' experience in the public service, and so made me feel more at ease under the important and responsible duties I had to discharge, than otherwise I should have done.' The medical director's public statement was wound up in the following distinct and positive terms:—'Dr Smith is happy in being able to state confidently, that the medical officers at Scutari (he believes twenty-one in number) have at their command everything necessary to the treatment of the wounded soldiers; hence there is no necessity whatever for any effort being made by the public to send out to Constantinople lint, old linen, &c.' Never did facts afford a more bitter commentary on a statement than in this instance; although there is no doubt that the medical director believed the army had received the supplies named.

Of the sickness at Varna, and the defective arrangements for its amelioration, enough has already been said.* When the troops landed in the Crimea in the middle of September, it became speedily evident that, whatever might be the state of the hospitals at Scutari, and whatever the intentions of the medical director, the army was ill supplied with surgeons, medicines, comforts, and ambulances. Cholera and fever had prostrated hundreds of men, and, as these could not be carried with the army, they were shipped off to Scutari. Here the miseries began at once: the ships selected were not hospital-ships; and neither the army nor the navy could spare surgeons sufficient in number for the required attendance: hence the harrowing accounts of the condition in which the poor fellows crossed the turbulent Black Sea, too often with nothing but bare boards under their emaciated limbs. After the battle of the Alma, while the French were quickly carrying down their wounded to the ships at the mouth of the Katcha, the British sailors, and the bandsmen of the various regiments, were laboriously conveying the British wounded down to the same spot in miscellaneous vehicles ill adapted to the service—ambulances being wanting. Letters from army-surgeons, about that period, contained strongly condemnatory remarks on these matters; such as the following:—'The arrangements for the sick are most awfully bad: there are no ambulance-vans (these having been left at Varna), and the poor fellows are stuck into crazy carts, drawn by bullocks or dromedaries, and sent jolting on to be thrust into transports, often without a medical man. The army is wretchedly supplied with drugs, and scarcely a regiment has an hospital-tent. I cannot too much reprobate the authorities for making the men go without tents; no one gets good rest, and there is a constant system of worry kept up on the march, &c., which altogether exhausts the men so much that the army is being very seriously crippled. "England wins her battles, but cares not for the cost," is a sentence than which no truer, I think, was ever spoken; and I have seen enough the last few days to shew me the reckless loss of life there is in the British army.' When the flank-march brought the troops to Balaklava, cholera unhappily accompanied them; but as the same difficulty was experienced in conveying medicines as other stores, many men sank through want of the simplest necessaries. Hospital-tents were established on the plateau; and the surgeons worked assiduously in their sad duties, curing disease first and wounds afterwards, so far as their limited numbers and means permitted. In the middle of October, Lord Raglan, who seldom censured any one, passed severe condemnation on certain medical officers who had neglected to provide hospital arrangements for the troops at Balaklava; several sick men had been sent down from the camp to the village, and detained in the streets during several hours of inclement weather, there being no roof to cover them: it was simply one among many results of ill-organised service, but it told cruelly against the poor fellows who suffered. Towards the close of the month, when the battle of Balaklava was on every one's lips, but before the yet more terrible struggle at Inkermann had occurred, the army was thinned to the extent of 100 men per day, on an average, by diarrhœa and other complaints, irrespective of wounds; and these men, sent to the hospital-tents on the bleak plateau or at Balaklava, accumulated under the care of surgeons too few to tend them, and ill supplied with medicaments. Not unfrequently it happened that the medical authority at Balaklava, wishing to send off numerous sick and wounded soldiers to Scutari, under the reasonable belief that they would there be well cared for, would apply for a ship, and would meet with a refusal from the harbour-master, who possibly doubted how far his authority extended in this direction, and who dreaded censure from the Admiralty if he overstepped the limits of his command; and thus, in this as in all other directions, the troops were the first to suffer from the miserable disorganisation of the government departments. No fewer than 3500 men were sent, shattered and stricken nearly to death, from Balaklava to Scutari, between the middle of October and the middle of November—

* Chap. IV. pp. 93-106.

victims of the first bombardment, of the battle of Balaklava, of the two battles of Inkermann, of the hurricane, and of many severe disorders—shewing how great was the necessity for efficient arrangements for shipment in Balaklava Harbour.

Among many causes tending to aggravate the sickness at the camp, was the fact that, when the troops first came to Balaklava, they found abundance of fruit, vegetables, and honey, which they ate so injudiciously as to bring on many disorders, diarrhœa and cholera especially—thus augmenting the difficulties in which the surgeons were placed. Mr Woods, a newspaper correspondent, possessed a small stock of rice at Balaklava: the surgeons eagerly begged a little of it, as they had none to give to sick men who would have been poisoned by salt-meat; for the medical comforts, and even the commonest drugs, were sometimes deficient. One surgeon, after writing to England concerning the condition of the poor invalids on the bare ground, the deficiency of drugs and of fresh meat, and of the almost entire absence of such hospital comforts as tea and arrow-root, adverted to the delight with which he had obtained a little oatmeal for the making of gruel. Mr Woods states that the marines' camp, on the heights above Balaklava, was for some weeks attended by two surgeons only; that these surgeons, during three weeks, had no drug whatever, except alum; that, at a time when 300 men at that spot were sick day after day, pills made of this drug were their only medicament; and that when, thrown almost into despair by this want of proper supplies, they applied for more at Balaklava, they found either that none were present, or that no officer felt empowered to issue what might have arrived—so great was the uncertainty at that deplorable place concerning the relative liability of different officials. If the daily labours of the two surgeons at the marines' camp, towards the close of October, were at all equalled by those of the other surgeons, the situation must indeed have been onerous: they visited each day the men stationed at the respective batteries, wading through the mire along a distance of three miles; then descended to Balaklava, to prepare the simple medicaments at their disposal; and then returned to their huts after an exhausting labour of ten hours, to hold themselves in readiness for any sudden call for exertion during the night.

The camp was not without ambulances at this time; but, as the horses belonging thereto shared the fate of the commissariat and cavalry horses, dying through hunger and fatigue, the ambulances became nearly useless: hence, as the means were wanting for conveying the sick down to Balaklava, the camp-hospitals became crowded to repletion. At the commencement of the war, a new experiment had been tried for the first time—that of employing a number of Chelsea pensioners to serve as an ambulance corps and to attend on the sick: the attempt utterly failed, for the old men required to be nursed rather than to nurse others; and, as a consequence, they died off rapidly at Gallipoli and Varna. At the camp outside Sebastopol, Lord Raglan had no such aid, if aid it would have been; and had not General Canrobert offered the use of some of the French litter-mules, the sick would have infested the whole British camp. Even with this accommodation, the poor men were carried down six or eight miles to Balaklava, with nothing but a blanket to shield them from wind, rain, or snow, during a journey occupying the mules two or three hours along the miserable track-way. Even in the first week of January, by which time many efforts had been made in England to remedy the defects, a surgeon at the camp wrote thus: 'I often look back at the misery and wretchedness I have witnessed in England in my attendance on the sick poor; but, on comparing these with my present everyday experience, their condition was Elysium itself; for when I tell you that the sick in this place have no other couch than the bare ground, itself saturated with wet, and a dripping canvas only between themselves and the clouds, you will perfectly comprehend that the veriest hovel would be a palace in comparison, so that it were provided with the ordinary defence of either mud or stone walls, and with thatch for its roof. We do all in our power to send away the sick from the camp on board ship as speedily as possible, yet—mark the difficulty—there are no means of transport, or rather, I should say, that the means we have at our disposal are totally inadequate to the emergency. It is true that our ambulances are on the ground, where they are likely to remain, for all their mules are either dead or useless, and the only means at our command is a Flanders wagon, which goes to Balaklava daily for forage. Can you fancy a poor fellow, who may be struck down from disease of a most prostrating character, being either jolted along in a wagon without springs or covering, or placed across a horse, for three hours, exposed to an atmosphere which may be many degrees below the freezing-point? Far better would it be to let the poor invalid remain, in even his comfortless tent, than to subject him to such torture.' There were days on which 600 or 800 hapless men would be thus transported, many becoming stiffened corpses ere the village was attained. At Balaklava, a building which had been the government village-school was converted into an hospital; and two or three vessels in the harbour were fitted up as hospital-ships; but the arrivals, as mentioned in a former paragraph, were sometimes too numerous for the accommodation. If an immediate voyage to the Scutari hospitals were determined on, there were no ships available but the transports; and these, even if ready to depart, were in most instances unprovided with requisite accommodation for sick and wounded men. In too many cases, the soldiers were laid in rows,

on the bare deck, with no bedding or covering save their blankets; and the vessel, putting to sea with a few overworked surgeons and a scanty store of medicines, would lose a fearful proportion of her mournful burden before reaching the Bosphorus. There was the same deficiency in medical as in all other departmental arrangements. When an officer of the light division, writing from the camp at the close of the year, said: 'There is nothing to eat, nothing to drink, no commissariat, no medicine, no clothes, no management, nothing abundant but cholera;' and when another, writing from Balaklava about the same time, concerning cargoes in ships there anchored, said: 'Nobody knows what they are, nobody knows where they are, nobody knows how to get them, nobody knows to whom to give them, nobody knows anything about anything that he ought to know, and no one gets anything'—they depicted the utter desolation resulting from disorder, not the less truly from the ludicrous exaggeration of language sometimes used.

These distressing truths, though discredited by the English government when first announced, became amply confirmed on further inquiry. Dr Smith fully believed that surgeons and medical appliances had been sent out from England in sufficient number; the English government equally believed the declaration made on this head; but neither the one nor the other had taken due account of the disturbing influence of departmental anarchy—popularly personified as 'routine' and 'red tape.' A surgeon of the 63d regiment, examined by the Sebastopol Committee, stated that in the first instance there were no regulations whatever for the removal of the sick from the camp to Balaklava, and that even when such rules were laid down, they became at once cumbrous and unmanageable. Being himself ill, this witness had been recommended by his superior medical officer to go for a time to Balaklava, and had obtained from him a properly signed recommendation to that effect; this recommendation required to be counter-signed by the quarter-master-general, then by the colonel of the regiment, then by the general of the division, and, finally, by the adjutant-general; but while undergoing this complex process it was lost, for the person in whose behalf it was drawn up never saw it again. The paper had been six days travelling about the camp, under the curse of formalism: during which time the sick surgeon was enforced to bear his sickness as best he might.

Considering the vast and costly organisation of the British government, it might appear scarcely credible that such deplorable scenes could have occurred in connection with the Crimean army; but a striking confirmation, not only of the possibility but of the probability, was supplied on the British shores themselves. At the very time when national indignation was aroused by the accounts from the Crimea, and when wonderful efforts were being made to contribute towards the comfort of the army, there were scenes at Portsmouth little less distressing than those in the Crimea. Shortly before the close of the year, the *Himalaya* arrived at that port, bringing a large number of wounded soldiers. After waiting twenty-four hours in the harbour, the steamer was allowed to approach the jetty, and land her cargo. But what a landing! Although in the greatest of England's arsenals, and surrounded by naval and military establishments, there were no ambulances brought down to the beach, no one to superintend the landing, no one willing to bear the responsibility. Omnibuses at length appeared, and the inhabitants and the militia offered aid, by which means the poor invalids—eyeless, armless, footless, shot, sabred, and bayoneted in various ways—were at length conveyed to the hospitals. The comments made on this day's proceedings were bitter and humiliating. 'Everybody knows,' said one influential journal, 'that Portsmouth swarms with officials, naval and military, and that if the Queen had been landing from Osborne, instead of our helpless and crippled soldiers from the Crimea, there would not have been wanted one of the tale to swell the unmeaning pomp and idle ceremony. We should have had the admiral-superintendent, the port-admiral, the lieutenant-governor, and a host of other officials whose titles it is not worth now recording, as none of them could find time to attend to this ordinary duty of hospitality and humanity, or to see that the noble freight of the *Himalaya* was received with all honour, all gratitude, and all tenderness.' The language here used is perhaps unjust as concerns the officers individually: they were no less humane than other men; but official formalism cramped them as it cramped all others, by its inelasticity, its unfitness to bend to any sudden or unusual exigencies. The storm of indignation aroused by this occurrence induced an immediate attention to the matter by the heads of all the government departments; insomuch that, when the *Candia* brought nearly 200 sick soldiers to Portsmouth a week afterwards, abundant arrangements were made for their reception, both by the military and naval authorities.

The analogy thus furnished by Portsmouth will be useful as an illustration, especially if it be borne in mind that there were no such facilities at Balaklava for immediate improvement in the arrangements.

THE SICK AND WOUNDED AT SCUTARI.

Were it merely for the sake of depicting the unmerited sufferings of the noble troops struck down by wounds or disease in the Crimea, any further details on this painful matter might well be spared; but the hospitals at Scutari formed the subject of one of the most remarkable episodes in the history of the war—an episode developing some of the noblest qualities that adorn

humanity. When, in future years, this war shall be looked back upon, apart from the political events that gave it origin, the national and individual attempts to relieve suffering and soften misery, both at Scutari and at the camp, will stand out in brighter colours than any other incidents connected therewith—excepting, perhaps, the soldierly qualities of the men who won Alma, Balaklava, and Inkermann, despite the shortcomings of their commanders and their government. In a secondary aspect, this episode will illustrate forcibly the disordered state into which the administrative machinery of a great country may be brought—by injudicious economy in some departments, coupled with reckless expenditure in others; by favouritism in the distribution of offices; by the rust that gradually accumulates on machinery, whether moral or material, long out of use; and by the slowness in the movements of a constitutional government, where the voices of many, instead of the despotic will of one, constitute the dominant power.

Scutari, the scene of the present section, was sufficiently noticed in a former page,* to afford an idea of its position as a component part of the Turkish capital, separated from the rest by the Bosphorus. When it had been determined, with the assent of the sultan, to establish a British military hospital at Scutari, a portion of the barracks was set aside for this purpose. So immense was this building, that one side of the square and half of another could afford accommodation for 3500 invalids, besides 700 in the Turkish hospital attached to the barracks. If the entire structure had been similarly appropriated, it could have received 6000 sick men; and, being on a height, it was healthily situated.

Constantinople and Scutari became scenes of great excitement immediately after the landing of the Allied army in the Crimea: victories were hoped for, wounds and death were apprehended; and while Constantinople prepared to welcome the former, Scutari prepared for the reception of the hapless men who might be struck down by war or disease. It was known that an advance to the Alma had been made, but an interval of three days followed without news—days of intense anxiety. At length, on the 23d of September, three days after the battle of the Alma, the French steamer *Orênoque* appeared, decked with flags, to announce a victory, the hasty narrative of which was soon noised abroad. Then, on the next day, the mournful consequences of the battle followed—the *Andes* steamer brought 400 British wounded, the *Vulcan* 300, the *Simoom* a similar burden; and other ships speedily augmented the number. It was at this time the troubles at Scutari began. The numbers previously sent from Varna and Old Fort, sick though not wounded, had been large, but still the arrangements were quite adequate to their management: now, however, the time and attention of the surgeons became at once severely taxed. The horrors of the shipment and voyage had hitherto been greater than those of the Scutari Hospital; it was not until afterwards that the worst days of the hospital arrived. In Kalamita Bay, off Old Fort, the sick had been carried on board the *Kangaroo* in such large numbers, that the captain feared for the safety of his ship; and the poor creatures were transferred by hundreds into another vessel, the *Dunbar*, doubling thus their amount of suffering. This was one of the incidents which roused the surprise and indignation of the public at the ill-arranged proceedings of the medical department. One of the miserable results of these disasters was, that charges were brought against medical officers for evils they were powerless to remedy. Thus, a Constantinopolitan correspondent of one of the newspapers, describing the arrival of the *Vulcan* with a cargo of unfortunates, represented the treatment as having been 'worthy only of the savages of Dahomey:' asserting that, on board, the wounded had seized the surgeons by their skirts as they picked their way through the heaps of dying and dead, but that the surgeons shook them off; that numbers arrived at Scutari without having been touched by a surgeon on board; and hence their wounds were stiff and their strength exhausted when they landed. After several weeks, during which this statement had been working its unfavourable results, the chief surgeon of the *Vulcan* wrote to give a positive contradiction thereto: asserting that he and three assistant-surgeons wrought laboriously during the whole time of the voyage; that every wounded man had been attended to before the vessel started; that, notwithstanding the desperate nature of many of the wounds, only two men died on board; and that the surgeons themselves, as well as the officers and crew of the ship, did all that human means could effect, under the circumstances, to alleviate the sufferings of the sick and wounded. If this were true, then might the feelings of a conscientious man be indeed hurt by such accusations: it might all be true, and yet leave to the newspaper correspondent abundant cause for animadversion; for if 500 sick men were thrust by the authorities at Balaklava into a ship ill provided with surgeons, beds, and medicines, no personal exertions on the part of the surgeons could save the invalids from great privation. Herein was frequent injustice rendered to the working-surgeons connected with the army.

'O war, war, how dost thou in thy utter bitterness of trial curse our race! Sowing penalties and pains broadcast over our living soul, heaping up more of poverty on the very poor, deriding the widow in her bereavement, making her childless; casting on them who only in hope are wives pangs as bitter as those of widows; thou begettest orphans; in the very wantonness of thy cruelty seekest victims from every other class; reckless of all social distinction, levelling all to one condition

* Chapter IV. p. 88.

—that of the heart-broken and desolate: men crown thy triumphs with laurel—the cypress of the cemetery, the yew of the village church-yard, these are the real emblems of thy accursed work.'*

Thus wrote the Rev. S. G. Osborne, one among many Englishmen who—doubting whether it were possible that such miseries could have beset the Crimean army as were from time to time communicated to the public journals—resolved to test the verity of the statements by personal observation. He went out to visit, not the troops at the camp, but the sick and wounded at the Scutari hospitals, near which he took up his residence from the 8th of November until the approach of Christmas. Gladly did two of the English ministers, the Earl of Clarendon and Mr Sidney Herbert, afford him facilities for his visit. Gross as was the mismanagement somewhere, no reflecting person could countenance the charges of deliberate cruelty and neglect hastily brought against these and other leading statesmen: none would more willingly have re-ordered and improved the rickety machine of departmental government; but, unfortunately,



Barrack Hospital, Scutari.

such ameliorations can ill be effected in the midst of the calamities that suggest them.

Mr Osborne's picture of the dread terrors of war arose, not merely from the sight of wounds and death, but also from the terrible augmentation of suffering caused by defective arrangements. The hospital noticed in a late paragraph was the first established for the use of the British forces; but towards Christmas, the number had increased to five—the General Hospital, the Barrack Hospital, two Floating Hospitals, and a Naval Hospital. The General Hospital, near the cemetery wherein the poor soldiers were day by day buried, was a large building enclosing a square court; each floor or story had a corridor or passage, bounded on either side by the beds of the patients, with, at intervals, doors opening into large rooms or wards. When the building had been brought into some kind of orderly arrangement, the corridors were occupied by the beds of the sick and wounded private soldiers; while the wards were appropriated to the officers, or fitted up as dispensaries, &c. The corridors and wards, although lofty, were too densely occupied by miserable invalids to render efficient ventilation possible, even had the whole been well organised. The Barrack Hospital, half a mile distant from the former, was similar in form, but much larger in dimensions. Shortly before Christmas, there were nearly *two miles and a half of beds* in this building alone, the average interval between the beds being no more than thirty inches; the corridors were thus vast lanes, densely packed with sick and wounded; and the wards also became much more completely filled than those in the General Hospital. The two Floating Hospitals were at the Golden Horn, on the Stamboul side of the Bosphorus: they were, one an old Turkish hulk, and the other a transport, hastily and imperfectly fitted up as hospitals. The Naval Hospital was at Therapia, twelve miles up the Bosphorus: small, clean, well managed, and adequate to the reception of the

* *Scutari and its Hospitals*, p. 45.

comparatively limited number of seamen requiring its accommodation. This hospital was under the undisputed control of the navy; it was established early in the year, and exhibited none of those humiliating disasters so disgraceful in the military hospitals. Later in the winter, were established an hospital for Russian wounded prisoners at Kululi, on the Bosphorus, and another for convalescents at Abydos, on the Dardanelles; but, as both of these drew their supplies from Scutari, they naturally shared the irregularities observable at that place. Further hospital room being required, and the localities of Rhodes, Marmora, and Sinope having been found for various reasons inconvenient, an hospital was established at Smyrna, under a civilian medical body, but a military commandant. The two hospitals at Scutari, however —Barrack and General—were those to which the greatest importance attached during the winter.

That the prostrate troops suffered intensely on shipboard is beyond all dispute: this fact was mentioned in the last section; but those only who saw the men arrive at Scutari knew the full extent of the horrors, the full measure of the disgrace thereby brought upon the nation. The poor stricken soldiers, with fresh-gaping wounds and amputated stumps, were too often packed side by side on or between the decks, with no bed, and sometimes no blanket under them. Surgeons and medicines being alike deficient, the invalids were attended, perchance, by eight or ten soldiers somewhat less invalided than the rest, but unequal to the deplorable task committed to them. In many cases, the ships containing these hapless burdens were provided with no other rations than the salt-meat usually allotted to healthy seamen; insomuch that, if the invalids could not take this food, they received barely any sustenance: the water, too, was often stored in places so difficult of access as to be, in the existing circumstances, beyond reach. In one ship, the *Mauritius*, the wounded soldiers would have died from neglect on board, had not aid been afforded by an invalided colonel who was present, the sailors of the ship, and some soldiers' wives—the 'authorities,' whoever they may have been, having despatched the ship from Balaklava almost wholly unprovided with stores. The average time of the voyage from port to port, Balaklava to Scutari, was about five days; but the interval between the actual embarkation and the disembarkation often extended to seven, ten, twelve, or even fourteen days; amounting in one instance to more than three weeks, owing to the deplorable confusion in the two harbours. The *Medway* transport had her melancholy freight on board about twenty days; and when at length the time seemed to have arrived for the disembarkation, it was found that all the boats had been appropriated to the shipment of troops for the Crimea: the day was thus lost, and the next three days being stormy, the poor wounded creatures were necessarily detained on shipboard, within a quarter of a mile of the landing-place at Scutari. Even the well-managed Naval Hospital, at Therapia, could not wholly escape the consequences of the woful anarchy among the authorities. A transport-ship on one occasion brought from Balaklava a number of sick soldiers, together with a few marines who had been serving ashore; they were not landed at Therapia, because soldiers could not be admitted into a naval hospital; proceeding to Scutari, the marines were not landed, because, being sea-soldiers, they could not be admitted into a military hospital; and thus, after bearing the rough waves of the Bosphorus during many days, the poor wounded marines were at length received in the Naval Hospital. Even after seven weeks' experience, from the battle of Alma to that of Inkermann, the distracted and distracting authorities had failed to bring the transport system into working-order; the sufferers in the last-named wonderful action were, in too many instances, placed on shipboard with scarcely any surgeons, medicines, fresh food, medical comforts, bedding, or change of clothing; means for preserving cleanliness and order were utterly wanting; and the few passengers who occasionally came by those ships described the horrors of the scene between decks as rivalling those of the slave-ships engaged in the voyage from Africa to America.

Let us suppose a ship-load of unfortunates to have arrived in the Bosphorus, after one of these tedious voyages: what was the next ordeal to which they were subjected? The Barrack Hospital, the nearest to the beach, was about a quarter of a mile distant from the landing-place; the so-called pier was a miserable structure, quite inadequate to the services required; and yet none of the 'authorities' knew who might venture to improve or replace it—so great was the official terrorism that deterred any subordinate from attempting aught that might possibly be deemed a departure from strict routine. A mournful sight did this landing-place often present. The hospital-attendants would carry mattresses down to the beach; they would lift the poor fellows thereon, and slowly bear them up to the hospital; all who had strength enough rendering aid to their weaker companions. Some, wounded slightly, with arm in a sling or leg bandaged, would creep up on foot, supported by a helpmate; others, with traces of death too surely marked on their pallid features, would require the most sedulous care in moving. Occasionally might be seen a Catholic priest, walking among them, and offering his spiritual aid and consolation to those—always a large number in the English army—who belonged to his church. Considering that the wounded had been brought four miles from the field of Alma to the ships, then 400 miles across the sea, and then uphill to the hospitals, and all under great privations, it may easily be credited that many died during this last land-journey. Ambulances were of course out of the question at such a place; but if they had been provided in the Crimea, the

sufferings of the poor fellows would have been much lessened. Dr Andrew Smith, in the memorandum before adverted to, described minutely the ambulances he had provided, and which apparently he fully believed had been placed at the disposal of Lord Raglan.* Frequent experiments were made during the year at Woolwich, to devise improvements in the ambulances and stretchers; but, when the exigencies of war had actually arisen, the vehicles were not where they should have been; and Dr Smith, perplexed by his divided allegiance to the Board of Ordnance, the Commander-in-chief, and the Minister of War, knew little of the fate either of his ambulances or his medicines.

Far more calamitous did the scenes at the Scutari landing-place become at a later date, when the battles and bombardments, the cholera and the dysentery, had so largely increased the numbers sent thither. 'I have seen,' said Mr Osborne, 'the bodies of the dead, stores for the living, munitions of war, sick men staggering from weakness, wounded men helpless on stretchers, invalid orderlies waiting to act as bearers, oxen yoked in arabas, officials stiff in uniforms and authority, all in one dense crowd, on this narrow, inconvenient pier, exposed to drenching rain, and so bewildered by the utter confusion, natural and artificial, of the scene, that the transaction of any one duty was quite out of the question.' Sometimes the wounded, when landed at the pier, were kept exposed to inclement weather until orderlies, themselves invalids in process of recovery, in sufficient number could be obtained to carry them on the stretchers up to the hospital; then, finding the Barrack Hospital to be full, the miserable burdens would be re-shouldered, and jolted half a mile further to the General Hospital; this also being full, the wretched procession would return, and the sick men would be deposited at the doors and along the passages of the Barrack Hospital until accommodation could be provided for them, or would be huddled up for hours in a ward without beds. Perhaps the most terrible fact connected with these scenes was, that many of the invalids were literally starved nearly to death; so disgracefully inadequate had been the arrangements for provisioning them during the voyage from the Crimea. Mr Osborne asserted, that although he had seen much of misery and starvation in Ireland and in the East, he had never seen such gaunt skeletons as some of those who, a few short months earlier, had been the gallant guardsmen of the Household Brigade.

Entering now within the hospitals, the patients encountered new scenes of disorder. Those afflicted with cholera, 'Varna fever,' as many of them termed it, were for a lengthened period laid upon the floors of the hospital, or upon wooden divans surrounding some of the wards, covered only by thin chaff-beds. At this very time, when 3000 sick men were without bedsteads at Scutari, a large number of those very necessary hospital-fittings were at Varna, utterly useless to every one; a steamer was sent to bring them; but this steamer, encountering another ship in a leaky state, brought her back instead of the bedsteads: and thus the invalids were enforced to bear days, or perhaps weeks, of additional discomfort. Thus it was in every department: if the right article were provided, it was in the wrong place; if the right thing were done, it was at the wrong time. Many of the men, when they had reached the hospitals after their distressing voyage across the Black Sea, had no shirts; others were without stockings; while the apparel of all was dirty and ragged to a degree that excited the compassion of bystanders, and added much to the misery of the invalids themselves. The hospitals being ill provided even for those already received, each new ship-load only increased the mass of wretchedness. As the authorities on the plateau before Sebastopol were anxious to send down some of their sick to Balaklava; as the authorities at Balaklava were equally desirous of shipping off the poor invalids to Scutari; so did the authorities at Scutari look anxiously for any opportunity of sending convalescent troops to Malta on their way to England, in order that space might be found for new arrivals of unfortunates. But here another element of anarchy presented itself: unless the admiral-superintendent in the Bosphorus provided transports, this shipment to Malta could not take place; and he claimed and exercised the power of deciding whether, at any particular time, this furnishing of transports comported with his other duties. Thus, it sometimes happened that

* 'The slightly wounded are accommodated towards the front of the carriage, placed back to back, separated from each other by wooden partitions, and prevented from falling outwards by each compartment being provided with a chain covered with leather, to be passed across the chest when the seat is occupied, with a view as well to safety as support. The badly wounded, extended on elastic stretchers, six feet six inches long and two feet wide, are placed behind, and, as already stated, in separate compartments, into or out of which the stretchers glide with facility, from their being provided with rollers. Each of the compartments is fitted with a ventilator from end to end, which can be closed or opened by the person lying on the stretcher.

A waterproof roof, supported on wood hoops, covers the body of the carriage, and under it is a depository for firelocks, knapsacks, caps, accoutrements, &c. There is also under the seats for the slightly wounded men a large capacious locker, in which may be placed water-sacks—for barrels soon become useless, especially if exposed to weather and sun—bedding, and other articles, which the medical officers of the army may consider as likely to be useful; and under the hinder part of the wagon is a convenient box, in which medicines, instruments, &c., can be carried if required.

At the back part of each vehicle there are two iron brackets, which fold down to support a stretcher, and so afford the means of forming a convenient table. This plan I from the first preferred to one which was strongly urged on me—namely, to form a table by placing a stretcher across two panniers.'

There were also wagons for the aid of the medical department. 'Each wagon is capable of carrying from the field, or from field-hospitals to hospitals in the rear, ten persons—namely, four badly and six slightly wounded men, each in a separate compartment. By this arrangement, every person will be insured against inconvenience or injury from his immediate neighbours, which would, did no partitions exist, certainly prove most detrimental, especially to weakly and severely wounded men who might have to be transported along an irregular, broken, or sloping road, or over a country where no roads exist.'

Other vehicles were also described, 'intended for the carriage of bedding, stores, &c., to be used in field-hospitals; and, in the event of their not proving sufficient for the purpose, the wagons intended for the transport of sick and wounded are capable of being quickly dismantled internally, and made available to supply the deficiency. They, like the others, are placed on springs, and, in case of necessity, can also be used for the carriage of sick and wounded.'

convalescents were huddled among the sick and wounded, from the sheer absence of facilities for their removal. In one class of instances, the deadening effect of inelastic routine shewed itself in a remarkable way. When the hospitals were in utter confusion, after the battle of the Alma, some of the wounded officers hired quarters for themselves in the hotels at Pera, on the European side of the Bosphorus; wishing afterwards to return to England, to facilitate their recovery, they were checked by this absurdity—leave of absence could only be obtained by certificate from a board of three medical men; but the officers could not cross from Pera to Scutari, and ascend the hill, without endangering their already shattered health; the surgeons could not cross from Scutari to Pera, because they had overwhelming occupation for their time; and thus nothing could be done, unless some bold hand would venture to break through the routine. It would perhaps be a bitter commentary on such proceedings to liken them to a scene in Sheridan's farce of the *Critic*, wherein all the characters are brought to a dead-lock, because no one knows who should move first; but, in truth, this official formalism, so mournful in its consequences, was little better than farcical in its immediate exhibition.

Mr Macdonald, almoner of the remarkable *Times'* fund, presently to be noticed, has pointed out three distinct sources of the confusion in the hospitals—ill-organisation of the medical department; undefined relations between that and the other departments; and the unfavourable position of the hospitals. Under the first heading, the disorder was considerable. The purveyor of the medical department should have issued the hospital-supplies; but, the assistant-purveyors being too few in number, the stores could not be systematically arranged, they could not be found when wanted, or could not be served out regularly if found. Tea, brandy, wine, sago, arrow-root, when required, were not forthcoming; whether the store were exhausted, or buried beneath other articles, could not be determined; but the sick troops must have remained without those comforts, had not a charitable supply been offered from other quarters. Such was, in like manner, the case regarding hospital-clothing; the supplies might or might not have reached Scutari, but they were not obtainable when needed, insomuch that the poor invalids must have remained in rags or nakedness but for extraneous aid. Even the most trifling but indispensable articles of hospital-furniture were either not at hand or could not be found; the same was true in respect of surgical appliances; and not less so in laundry arrangements. All these shortcomings were internal, within the organisation of the hospitals themselves; but there was a second group, depending on the ill-defined relations between the departments. The hospital authorities controlled no ships: they were dependent in part on the naval authorities at Balaklava, and in part on those in the Bosphorus. It stands on record, that although the distance from Varna to Scutari is only a steam-voyage of two days, there were hospital-stores at the former place more than three months, useless at that spot, and wanted at Scutari; the surgeons could not command the means of bringing them, while the naval and transport departments were in too great confusion to render this service. The surgeons earnestly wished that the ships bringing sick and wounded from Balaklava should be fitted up as hospital-ships, with beds and other comforts; but this duty would have devolved upon the naval authorities, who had, or thought they had, more important claims upon their attention. Then, again, the military commandant at Scutari was responsible to a wholly distinct authority; and thus it happened that, between the military, the naval, the medical, the transport, and the commissariat departments, every one was in doubt how far he might venture to demand the services of the rest. Added to all these evils, there was a third kind, arising from the position of the hospitals on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. Constantinople or Stamboul being the only large city near at hand, all immediate necessaries were there purchased, and conveyed across the Bosphorus; but if, as frequently happened, the wind blew from the south or west, such a surf was raised on the Asiatic shore as rendered almost impossible a landing of stores at the wretched jetty or pier at Scutari. That the apathetic Turks should have made no efficient pier at that spot may be understood, for there is not a good pier throughout the Turkish dominions; but that the English should have been equally negligent, can only be explained on the principle, that no one knew on whom the duty would devolve.

The women, wives of the soldiers, were placed in a more deplorable condition than the soldiers themselves, owing to the disgraceful arrangements of the barrack-system for married soldiers in the English army. Many letters, written from Scutari to England on this subject, gave sad details; but it was an evil beyond the means of cure at the spot, having its foundation in the anomalous position of the English soldier. A French *soldat* is a citizen, a member of society, one of the people; whereas his compeer on the north side of the English Channel is one apart from the rest of the community, and so situated that it is almost wholly impossible for him to support a wife, how kindly and domesticated soever his tastes may be.

If the Scutari narratives had been from one source alone, their verity might perhaps in some instances be doubted; but the evidence was too fully corroborated to warrant any distrust of its correctness. Mr Osborne, Mr Macdonald, Mr Stafford, Mr Woods, Lieutenant-colonel Hamley, and other unbiassed visitors, all agreed in their

pictures of the misery observable, although they might differ in the apportionment of blame among the officials engaged. It is quite true, as Mr Osborne readily admitted, that as ship after ship brought down its dismal cargo, the medical and other officers wrought from morning till night to try and meet the pressure on their scanty resources; but the whole proceeding was a mere matter of excited, almost frenzied energy; for, where so much that was necessary was absent, all that zeal and labour could effect was in devising expedients, temporary and wholly inadequate though they might be. As fresh shiploads arrived more rapidly than the means which were to conduce to their comfort and recovery, the hospital attendants found their anxieties increase rather than diminish as the close of the year approached. Not until after extraordinary aid had been supplied from other quarters, in modes presently to be noticed, could the medical attendants obtain anything like a mastery over the burden of human misery pressing upon them.

Amid these deplorable evidences of mismanagements in the English military hospitals, it was natural that men should inquire into that of the French. Such inquiries, whenever and wherever made, demonstrated that the French system is better, both in theory and in practice, than our own. When a French army is on active service, an administrative department accompanies it, distinct from the military, and comprising numerous well-instructed and well-paid officials; this body directs the establishment of the hospitals, regulates the provisioning of the army, controls the pay and expenses, and enters into contracts in the name of the state. Under the 'military intendants,' thus established, the medical officers act; thus receiving instructions on the spot, instead of referring to the home authorities hundreds or perhaps thousands of miles distant. All the general arrangements concerning health, sanitary police, alimentary prescriptions, the allotment of hospital *matériel*, and the storing and distribution of medicines, devolve upon these intendants; while the medical officers are left to a more uninterrupted pursuit of their personal duties to the sick and wounded.

On the 22d of October, at the time when the British army was beginning to feel the severity of defective medical arrangements, Dr Lévy, inspecting physician and chief of the medical staff of the French army in the East, wrote a Report to the Minister of War at Paris, in which the evidence of careful organisation is very apparent. A few passages from this Report, will shew how very far the arrangements of the French in the Crimea were in advance of those of their allies.* It is, indeed, impossible, on reading this Report, to avoid a comparison between the plans of the two armies: between the anarchy at Balaklava and the sedulous attention at the Chersonese or Kamiesch. It further appears, from this Report, that the French had established hospitals at Varna, Nogara, Gallipoli, Adrianople, and the Piræus of Athens; and that the whole of these hospitals, including that at the camp, contained, in the middle of October, about 4000 sick and wounded, all under careful and skilful superintendence. The French hospital at Constantinople, or rather Pera, on the European side of the Bosphorus, was found to be admirably managed at the time when the British hospitals at Scutari were in a deplorable condition. When, after the battle of the Alma, 4000 sick and wounded British, French, and Russians, were conveyed from the Crimea to the Bosphorus, about 2000 to the east, and 2000 to the west shores, the British, as we have seen, suffered sad treatment; whereas the French found beds ready for them all, with medical and surgical service fully organised; and the Russians who, as wounded prisoners, accompanied the wounded French, found equal comforts placed at their disposal. The Pera Hospital, occupying an airy site, contained lofty, clean, well-warmed, and well-ventilated wards, abundantly furnished with shelves, on which the linen, clothing, and other household and personal requisites were kept ready for use; every patient had his bedstead, mattress, palliass, and clean-sheeted bed; near his head was a shelf containing his medicine-cup, drinking-cup, soup-cup, and food-plate, together with his pipe and a little store of tobacco; and near his hand, affixed to the bedstead, was a small wooden tray serving as a table. 'The French,' says Mr Osborne, 'are certainly a most wonderful people, at home anywhere; I found it difficult to believe that the order, quiet, regularity of service, and perfect machinery of this hospital, could be the growth of but a few months, and that, too, in a foreign land. One element was obvious throughout —system; every one seemed to have his own particular sphere of duty, and quietly to set about it; nothing seemed left to chance, a certain importance being given to even the smallest matter of

* 'The divisionary field-hospitals are well installed, well provided, and well attended. Everybody concurs in praising the good that they do. That of the head-quarters has assumed a useful development; composed of a group of tents and a wooden erection for 115 patients, it offers, like that of the divisions, but upon a large scale, conditions of comfort and regularity which one is almost astonished to find at so short a distance from a besieged town. A field-hospital has been established at Cherson, on the shore, to shelter and give attention to the sick and wounded up to the time of their embarkation. I visited it yesterday, and found only two serious cases—namely, an intermittent fever, and a case of cholera, of mean intensity. The trench-ambulance is formed by turns by two assistant-surgeons of each divisionary field-hospital, and two assistant-surgeons of the head-quarters; they are directed by the different chiefs of the field-hospitals, who have solicited the honour in turns of this more exposed post, which has been granted by the general-in-chief on my application. The camps are spacious, provisions are abundant, bread and fresh meat are distributed at least one day in three, and these provisions are all of good quality. The wine is beyond contradiction the best that can be procured. The moral state of the army is perfect. The earnest solicitude of the general-in-chief for the comfort of the soldiers, the administrative vigilance which has collected so promptly provisions for a period of at least three months, and the intelligent activity of the surgeons, combat with efficacy the injurious influence of an advanced period of the year and a special state of war.'

detail. Passing with the chief officer from bed to bed, I heard his orders as to diet and treatment for the day given most distinctly: they were noted down on the spot by an official in attendance for the purpose. The surgeons in uniform, with their trained orderlies in proper costume, went systematically to their work; the trays with the dressing apparatus were well contrived and admirably furnished; the Sisters of Charity had each her post and its well-defined duties, and went about them coolly and with a skill the evident result of perfect training. . . . . The dispensary, with its adjoining laboratory, its abundant stock of medical *matériel*, and its well-considered arrangement, shewed at once the skilful adaptation of proper means to attain the end desired, so characteristic of the French. The baker's department, the kitchens, the large bathing-room, with its many capacious baths—each, in its own way, was all that could be desired. I saw the meals for the patients in course of preparation; it was far more like the cooking for an hotel than for an hospital. They have established so well considered a system, affecting the supplies each day from every department, of the various things required, as prescribed by the medical authorities, that all work with the order of a well-regulated machine; the dispenser, the cook, the baker, had evidently no time to be idle for a moment; there was ample evidence of the demand made upon their separate resources; but there was no hurry or confusion.' *

It may possibly appear that the word *system*, as here used by Mr Osborne—whose description is fully borne out by Mr Macdonald and Lieutenant-colonel Hamley—is or ought to be equivalent to the word *routine* in the English service. Whatever be the meaning as mere words, however, the practical difference was considerable. The French arrangements indicated a system that might be likened to a machine, whereof all the parts, well constructed, and of good materials, are properly adjusted one to another, insomuch that each produces its due share in the composite result, right in quantity and right in time, and sufficiently elastic to bend to slight disturbing contingencies; whereas the English arrangements indicated a routine more analogous to a machine whereof some of the moving parts have become rusted by long inactivity, while others are so rigid in their adjustments, so deprived of automatic or self-correcting power, that the machine is in constant danger of being thrown out of working-order by slight causes, slight exigencies in the service required.

REMEDIES—THE HOSPITAL-NURSES AT SCUTARI.

If it be painful to read and to think of the miserable shortcomings in the executive of the British army in the East, and the sufferings thereby occasioned to the gallant troops, it is no less gratifying to watch the modes in which individuals, and the nation as a whole, sought to ameliorate those calamities as soon as the knowledge of them reached England. These efforts throw a bright gleam into a dark picture; they afford some compensation for a state of things which must have excited contempt in some foreign countries, and astonishment in all; they lead to a hope that the nation is sound at heart, despite the defects in its administrative organisation.

One of the earliest forms assumed by these remedial measures was that of personal attendance upon the sick and wounded in the hospitals. Before the work of bloodshed had commenced, the defective arrangements of the British service in this particular were known, and had engaged the attention of the war department; but when the newspaper-letters from the Crimea told how the prostrate soldiers were shipped off across the Black Sea, and when similar letters from Constantinople told in what state the sufferers reached Scutari, and how they fared in the hospitals at that place—then did the public journals become vehicles of numberless suggestions and offers of succour. Several medical men put forth plans for the establishment of a supernumerary medical staff—to render aid to the wounded on the field of battle; and to undertake the laborious and disagreeable duties of 'dressers' in the large hospitals where the wounded were kept until healed, such as sponging, bandaging, bleeding, cupping, leeching, and such like. One physician proposed that young men from the large civil hospitals should be sent out from England to fill these duties, as temporary surgeons' assistants, wearing some kind of uniform costume, and acting under the orders of the army medical authorities: it was pointed out that the eminent surgeons Sir Charles Bell and Mr Acton Key had in their younger days rendered service of this special kind at Brussels, after the battle of Waterloo. Another physician, approving some such plan, gave the details of a calculation, shewing that a sum of £2000 would defray the whole expenses for twenty supernumerary surgeons for three months.

Very speedily, however, the suggestions assumed a new form; the truth was recognised that woman is the best nurse for the sick, the best comforter in the hour of suffering. One, a wife whose husband was fighting in the Crimea, and who had watched the exertions of Sisters of Charity in Catholic countries, suggested that there are numbers of tender-hearted but resolute English-women who would joyfully and with alacrity go out to devote themselves to nursing the sick and the wounded, if they could be associated for that purpose and placed under proper protection. A second lady, writing from Constantinople to a friend in England concerning the state of the hospitals soon after the battle of the Alma, made a similar suggestion. Another source of female aid was sketched forth in the following words:—'We

* *Scutari and its Hospitals.*

have the soldiers' wives who are left here dependent on public charity; why should not the most intelligent of them be selected—say six or eight, from the regiments to which their husbands belong, and be immediately sent for a few weeks' practice into our hospitals at home? There these women could be taught the way to wash and dress light wounds, and attend on the sick, under the direction of the doctors; and, as soon as they are competent, let them be sent for hospital-service to the East.'

The plan or proposal which was followed by the most practical result, was contained in a letter to the Bishop of London from the Rev. Mr Shepherd, Master of St John's House in Westminster, a kind of sisterhood of Protestant ladies devoted to acts of kindness and charity; he proposed that ladies from that house should go out as hospital-nurses, with no other fee or reward than the consciousness of doing good to suffering and neglected men. The plan speedily assumed form and working-order; ladies offered their services, not only from St John's House, but from other places in and out of London. The next duty was, to provide a superior, gouvernante, or matron; one who should have a moral and practical control over the nurses or nursing-sisters, and at the same time should be placed in some definite relation towards the medical authorities of the hospitals—the latter claiming of course a controlling voice in all the arrangements. The Duke of Newcastle, as minister of war, had had this subject under his attention throughout the summer; the military authorities at home had discountenanced the plan of hospital-nurses, on various grounds; but when the miseries of the Scutari hospitals became known in England, and when so many ladies had expressed their willingness to go out as nurses, it was resolved to foster the plan if a superintendent could be found. Through the intervention of Mrs Sidney Herbert, the lady of the secretary at war, it was ascertained that one eminently fitted was willing to undertake this most trying and responsible office. Miss Florence Nightingale, belonging to a Hampshire family of station and fortune, and richly endowed with natural gifts, developed by an education of more than usually extensive character, and by travelling in various parts of Europe, had, despite the attractions of wealth, birth, and high social connections, already manifested a yearning to employ her time and services in the succour of the sick and wretched. She had tended the poor in the vicinity of her father's abode; she had visited the hospitals and reformatory establishments of London, Edinburgh, and the continent; she had spent three months ministering in a German hospital; and she had voluntarily assumed the management of the asylum for sick governesses in London. And now she accepted the office of superintendent of the hospital-nurses at Scutari. But what an office! Leaving a happy home, with all its genial associations and comforts—closing a door against those social attractions her varied accomplishments enabled her so well to appreciate—departing from the sphere of those whose cultivated minds could give grace and value to conversation—going out to a country wherein every turn spoke of war and slaughter—taking up her abode in a building containing none of her own sex, save those who might accompany her—walking and tending, from morn till night, among hundreds or even thousands of men, uneducated, rough, ragged, bloody, dirty, wounded, sick, hungry, miserable—undertaking painful and laborious duties at a time and place marked by every kind of deficiency in the necessary supplies—placing herself in a position not clearly defined towards the various 'authorities' at Scutari—responsible for the conduct of all the nurses who joined her in this noble mission: all these things considered, there has indeed rarely been such an example of heroic daring combined with feminine gentleness. It was well observed, at the time when this tremendous duty was assumed, that—although there is a heroism in dashing up the heights of Alma in defiance of death and all mortal opposition, worthy of all praise and honour—the quiet, forecasting heroism and largeness of heart, in this lady's resolute accumulation of the powers of consolation, must rank yet higher among the qualities that adorn human nature.

Offers of personal assistance poured in so numerously from ladies in various parts of the kingdom, that Mr Sidney Herbert deemed it necessary, in an explanatory letter, to shew how trying were the duties required, and how essential the possession of skill and firmness by the nurses. 'Many ladies,' he said, 'whose generous enthusiasm prompts them to offer their services as nurses, are little aware of the hardships they would have to encounter, and the horrors they would have to witness, which would try the firmest nerves. Were all accepted who offer, I fear we should have not only many inefficient nurses, but many hysterical patients, themselves requiring treatment instead of assisting others.' The ladies selected, who departed from London with Miss Nightingale on the 23d of October, were thirty-eight in number; comprising six from St John's House, eight from Miss Sellon's house of Sisters at Devonport, ten Roman Catholic Sisters of Charity, and fourteen experienced hospital-nurses. Six weeks afterwards, another party of nearly fifty departed, made up in a similar way. Of those who went out with Miss Nightingale, all were chosen or approved by herself; and each received a certificate from the government, authorising her to occupy a position in the hospitals at Scutari. With one common consent, men of all creeds and countries rendered honour to those ladies for their noble devotedness; Catholics and Protestants alike bade them God-speed at the hour of their departure by railway from London; the authorities at Boulogne prepared a welcome reception for them; the fishwives at that town busily aided in

carrying their luggage from the steamer to the station; the railway officials throughout the route from Boulogne to Marseille paid them marked attention; and the captain and crew of the *Vectis* steamer strove to shew how proud they were of such passengers to the East.

Arrived at the hospitals at Scutari, all the romance of their position departed from these ladies: the stern realities of life—life in its most desperate forms—at once pressed upon their attention; and they bravely prepared for their self-imposed duties. Accommodation was hastily provided for them within a tower at one of the corners of the Barrack Hospital. Mr and Mrs Bracebridge, who accompanied the ladies, were enabled to afford them countenance and support in various difficult contingencies likely to arise. They all reached Scutari within twenty-four hours of the first arrival of the wounded from Inkermann, and their services were immediately called into requisition in a way that put their firmness and zeal to a severe test.

From that day, the nurses encountered a series of difficulties in all that regarded the organisation of the hospitals. The surgeons, inspectors, dispensers, and purveyors, already in anarchy among themselves, could *not easily, even if* willingly, pursue their duties in harmony with these thirty or forty female assistants; and Miss Nightingale often found her firmness and patience severely taxed. Had it not been for the frequent encouragement received from Lady Stratford de Redcliffe at Constantinople, and the yet more persistent aid of Mr Osborne, Mr Macdonald, and Mr Stafford, her sphere of usefulness would have been much circumscribed. Mr Osborne has given an interesting account of the appearance of that part of the Barrack Hospital occupied by the 'sisters,' the head-quarters whence so much Christian kindness and womanly compassion flowed. 'Entering the door leading into the sisters' tower, you at once found yourself a spectator of a busy and most interesting scene. There is a large room, with two or three doors opening from it on one side; on the other, one door opening into an apartment in which many of the nurses and sisters slept, and had, I believe, their meals. In the centre was a large kitchen-table; bustling about this might be seen the high-priestess of the room, Mrs. C——; often as I have had occasion to pass through this room, I do not recollect ever finding her either absent from it or unoccupied. At this table she received the various matters from the kitchen and stores of the sisterhood, which attendant sisters or nurses were ever ready to take to the sick in any and every part of these gigantic hospitals. It was a curious scene, and a close study of it afforded a practical lesson in the working of true common-sense benevolence. . . . . The floor on one side of the room was loaded with packages of all kinds, stores of things for the internal and external consumption of the patients; bales of shirts, socks, slippers, dressing-gowns, flannel; heaps of every sort of article likely to be of use in affording comfort and securing cleanliness. It gave one some idea of what such a room would be in in a good hospital, if on some sudden alarm it had been made a place of refuge for articles snatched from its every store. In reality, it was one feature of a bold attempt upon the part of extraneous benevolence to supply the deficiencies of the various departments, which as a matter of course should have supplied all these things.' In an adjacent room 'were held those councils over which Miss Nightingale so ably presided, at which were discussed the measures necessary to meet the daily varying exigencies of the hospitals. From hence were given the orders which regulated the female staff, working under this most gifted head. This, too, was the office from which were sent those many letters to the government, to friends and supporters at home, telling such awful tales of the suffering of the sick and wounded, their utter want of so many necessaries. Here might be seen the *Times'* almoner, taking down in his note-book from day to day the list of things he was pressed to obtain, which might all with a little activity have been provided as easily by the authorities of the hospital.' *

The duties that devolved upon the admirable lady who had thus voluntarily expatriated herself for the good of others, were of the most multifarious and onerous nature; for they comprised nothing less than a remedying, so far as might be possible, of the varied evils resulting from the defects and confusion in the government departments; a rendering of services others ought to have rendered, but did not; a supervision over details so numerous, and complications so vexing, that it is a marvel how a delicately nurtured lady could bear the pressure of such a burden. To administer to the wants of 4000 sick and wounded men would have been a formidable task, even if the government organisation of the hospital had been effective; but with a staff deficient in numbers, a commissariat and a purveying department equally under-handed, an absence of any responsible and energetic head, a series of petty quarrels between the respective departments, a disposition to reject all non-military interference, and an unseemly scramble for stores and supplies —the difficulties were augmented manifold. The immediate hospital duties were of a most severe kind, requiring extraordinary nerve and powers of endurance. 'I have been with Miss Nightingale,' said the writer just quoted, who was himself drawn to the spot by an impulse of benevolence, 'at very severe operations: she was more than equal to the trial. She has an utter disregard of contagion; I have known her spend hours over men dying of cholera or fever. The more awful to every sense any particular case, especially if it

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was that of a dying man, her slight form would be seen bending over him, administering to his ease in every way in her power, and seldom quitting his side till death released him.' Many of the nursing-sisters sank under the severity of their duties: it could scarcely be otherwise. In the two hospitals, at about Christmas, there were nearly four miles of beds occupied by sick men, attendance upon whom broke down the health of many whose feminine natures had not been previously nerved by practice. Hastening from one bed to another, as the exigencies of the prostrate sufferers demanded, rendering such aid as each case required, and exposed to such scenes as never meet the eye in an English home-hospital, the wonder is—not that some should have failed under the ordeal—but that any English ladies should have braved it for days, weeks, months, and even a whole year.

The narratives of those memorable winter months exhibit Miss Nightingale engaged in a perpetual struggle in the endeavour to obtain supplies she knew ought to be forthcoming, but could seldom be found when most wanted. Mr

Miss Nightingale.

Macdonald was out there administering a fund presently to be noticed more fully; Mr Osborne was there, the almoner of a smaller fund, and ready to render any of those services which sometimes call a clergyman to the bedside of the dying; Mr Stafford was there, sitting with the sick and wounded soldiers, reading to them, conversing with them, and writing letters for them to friends in their far-distant homes; and all three had ample opportunities of knowing how trying were the difficulties borne by this lady in her daily negotiations with the authorities, who, fully appreciating her motives, could, nevertheless, not readily bend for her a routine they could not bend for themselves. Mr Bracebridge, writing to a friend in England shortly after the arrival of the ladies at Scutari, said: 'The state of things here is melancholy. . . . . We were well received; but the difficulty of dealing with five departments is inconceivable; the division of authority, and the want of clerks in every department, occasion much mischief. . . . . No groans or grumblings are ever heard here; their [the wounded soldiers'] courage seems greater even than that in the field of battle; but it is a sorry sight to see the stumps of legs and arms, and worse to see the poor, emaciated fever and dysentery cases from Varna —many poor boys from eighteen to twenty-one: these cases are the least successful, and very miserable to see. The difficulty of getting anything is inconceivable, from being on the wrong side of the water, with a bad pier. How we are to get through the winter, if more wounded are sent, we cannot see. God help us! I fear we can

expect nothing but evil.' The narrator did not know that he would have to speak of much more trying difficulties as winter advanced.

One of the first embarrassments which weighed upon Miss Nightingale lay in the absence of all due accommodation for cooking the invalids' food—food necessarily different in character from that supplied to hale soldiers; and it was only through the aid of Mr Macdonald's fund that she was enabled to establish a soup-kitchen, supplied with the requisites for preparing nutritious food. It required no long time, however, for these excellent ladies to determine their position in the hospitals in something like harmony with that of the medical attendants; supplies, it is true, were absent when wanted, and difficulties thickened as the numbers of sick and wounded increased; but still the gentle administrators were always to be found where services were most needed, and the surgeons erelong felt the full value of the kindnesses thus rendered. Notwithstanding the enormous consignments from England, unquestionably sent out, let their subsequent fate have been what it might; notwithstanding the large powers

An Hospital Interior.

given by the government to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, to supply any deficiencies pointed out to him; notwithstanding the personal visits of the ambassador's lady, the untiring personal exertions of the nursing-sisters, the daily attentions of the almoners of funds provided in England, and the sedulous working of the surgeons and medical assistants—it remained, throughout the greater part of the winter, a matter of the utmost difficulty to provide those necessaries and comforts without which no hospital can be efficiently managed. At one time, the medical comforts were so utterly wanting, that Miss Nightingale could only obtain them through the eleemosynary fund placed at the disposal of Mr Macdonald; the purveyor, dreading the responsibility of making any purchases without the consent of the commissariat, and the commissariat not being at the time in a condition to act in the matter. During many weeks, notwithstanding the urgent entreaties of the nurses, no under-clothing whatever could be obtained for the poor wounded men who still wore the tattered rags marked by the wounds of Alma and Balaklava and Inkermann; here, again, charity supplied that which the purveyor should have been in a position to furnish. One of the ladies, in a letter to England, thus adverted to this very homely subject: after stating, 'I am every day more and more surprised at the great patience the poor men manifest in all their sickness; neither have I heard an oath or any bad language since I have been here;' she proceeded to say: 'If you would like to send anything, pray let it be flannel-shirts, which are craved for more than anything else; whenever a man opens his mouth with "Please, ma'am, I want to speak to you," my heart sinks within me, for I feel sure that it will end in flannel-shirts.' Another difficulty was that of the laundry, already adverted to. It would be ludicrous, were it not so saddening, to know that, even fourteen weeks after the battle of the Alma, the Turkish laundry attached to the hospitals was occupied as a depôt for chopped straw by the commissariat; while Miss Nightingale was enforced,

in the absence of any other provision, to rent a small building close at hand as a laundry, and to pay the rental out of funds subscribed in England.

Every one, whether officially or non-officially connected with Scutari, hoped that the evils would lessen as winter advanced. This hope was partially realised; for in one corridor of one of the hospitals, better provided than the rest with medical service, and more immediately under the attention of the voluntary nurses, chaplains, and almoners, the prospect brightened by about Christmas. In the other hospitals, however, and in the other corridors of this hospital, the tale was less hopeful; and when the old year had given place to the new, all alike found their prospects darkening. The horrors, although slightly changed in kind, were greater in aggregate amount at the end of January than they had been in November. This arose from the enormous number of invalids sent every week from the Crimea. At the end of January, there were 5000 sick men at the camp alone; and as these accumulated too rapidly for the surgeons to attend to them, they were sent off by ship-loads to Scutari, where they added to a scene of confusion already overwhelming. Not only did the two hospitals at Scutari become filled almost to the doors, but seven other hospitals on different parts of the Turkish shores—that is, cavalry-stables near the Barrack Hospital, fitted up with 150 beds; an hospital for 500 convalescents in the sultan's spring palace, near the General Hospital; an hospital for 400 convalescents at Abydos, on the Dardanelles; another at Kululi, on the Bosphorus, at first appropriated to Russian prisoners, but afterwards made available for British sick by the removal of the Russians to the arsenal at Stamboul; an hospital for convalescents at Smyrna; and two hospital-ships in the Golden Horn; besides the Naval Hospital at Therapia—became almost equally crowded; and the open square of the Barrack Hospital was now fitted up with a structure for 1000 additional patients. The total number was not less than 6000, superadded to the 5000 at the camp. The glory of the victories no longer cheered the enfeebled and sickened soldiers; the wounded men, in November, had some prospect of recovery; but those wounded at a later date were kept down by dysentery and fever, and, the wounds refusing to heal, the grave speedily claimed its own; or they arrived exhausted with chronic disease firmly rooted in their broken constitutions, and almost beyond the chance of successful treatment. An almost insupportable gloom now overspread the hospitals, multiplying the miseries already terrible enough. It may well be imagined that the position of Miss Nightingale and her companions became more trying as the difficulties accumulated in number, kind, and intensity; but a heroic purpose supported them, and was not to be shaken by difficulties. Who, nevertheless, could wonder if sickness struck gentle women exposed for months to the tainted atmosphere of those hospitals? In the early part of March, there were four of the Catholic sisters ill, two more in Miss Nightingale's party, and two in Miss Stanley's, while seven others were too much weakened to render any active services. It was found, in some of the instances, that women who had been cloistered nuns in their own country were unfitted to move in the busy scenes of the hospital: many of these returned; while those ladies whose self-imposed duties had borne more relation to those of Sisters of Charity, visiting houses and families wherever aid and consolation could be given, shewed invaluable qualifications for the duties required of them at Scutari.

It was well that such dispensers of good should, at such a time, receive the sympathy of her who was rendered illustrious by social position. A letter from the Queen, well fitted to be made public, became familiarly known, both in England and in the East, towards the close of the year;* it was addressed to Mr Sidney Herbert, Secretary at War, and was transmitted by Mrs Herbert to Miss Nightingale. A perusal of this letter renders evident the fact, that the official dispatches from the East told little concerning the sufferings and fate of the poor wounded soldiers; the Sovereign 'heard no details of the wounded;' those details, if given at all, were wrapped up in departmental formalism, whereby living men were treated as little other than bales of goods, to be packed aside in heaps and there forgotten. Subsequent events have fully proved, that had it not been for the newspaper press, the English nation would never have known the terrible truths concerning the Crimea and Scutari.

In the silence of night, when all who could sleep were earnestly yearning so to do, might often be seen a slender form gliding noiselessly through the wards and corridors, bounded by long rows of beds, each occupied by a prostrate soldier. It was Miss Nightingale, who, ending a day of untiring activity, would take a last look to ascertain whether any duty had been neglected, any urgent case forgotten, any solace unadministered. When Mr Macdonald, his mission ended, was about to leave Scutari, and when no longer restrained by a fear of hurting the delicacy of one who would brave dangers to serve others while shrinking from hearing her own praises, he stated, in one of his numerous letters to the *Times*, that 'wherever there is disease in its most dangerous form, and the hand of the spoiler distressingly nigh, there is this incomparable woman sure to be seen; her

* 'WINDSOR CASTLE, *December* 6, 1854.'

Would you tell Mrs Herbert that I begged she would let me see frequently the accounts she receives from Miss Nightingale or Mrs Bracebridge, as I hear no details of the wounded, though I see so many from officers, &c., about the battle-field, and, naturally, the former must interest me more than any one?

Let Mrs Herbert also know that I wish Miss Nightingale and the ladies would tell these poor, noble, wounded, and sick men, that no one takes a warmer interest, or feels more for their sufferings, or admires their courage and heroism more than their Queen. Day and night she thinks of her beloved troops. So does the Prince.

Beg Mrs Herbert to communicate these my words to those ladies, as I know that our sympathy is much valued by these noble fellows.' (Signed) 'VICTORIA.'

benignant presence is an influence for good comfort, even amid the struggles of expiring nature. She is a "ministering angel," without any exaggeration, in these hospitals; and as her slender form glides quietly along each corridor, every poor fellow's face softens with gratitude at the sight of her. When all the medical officers have retired for the night, and silence and darkness have settled down upon those miles of prostrate sick, she may be observed alone, with a little lamp in her hand, making her solitary rounds. The popular instinct was not mistaken, which, when she set out from England on her mission of mercy, hailed her as a heroine; I trust that she may not earn her title to a higher, though sadder appellation. No one who has observed her fragile figure and delicate health, can avoid misgivings lest these should fail. With the heart of a true woman, and the manners of a lady, accomplished and refined beyond most of her sex, she combines a surprising calmness of judgment, and promptitude and decision of character.'

And when, all succour being unavailable, the poor stricken soldiers sank into death, then did another spot at Scutari acquire a melancholy interest—the CEMETERY. As they died off, in numbers increasing as the winter advanced, the private soldiers were buried in large graves at a short distance from the hospitals; while the officers had their last resting-place on and near the heights overlooking the sea, with a small wooden tablet at the head of each grave. Each day, Mr Osborne tells us, if the weather would permit, the wasted bodies of the soldiers who had sunk under their trials were collected in certain wards of the General Hospital, and at about two o'clock a funeral-service ensued. A certain number of orderlies, invalids barely equal to the duty, might then be seen following each other from the dead-house, bearing the bodies on stretchers. Coffins were not thought of; each corpse was sewn up in a blanket. 'So accustomed became all to this sight,' says our informant, 'that I have often seen this procession of the dead, which had to pass down a part of a thickly inhabited corridor, go by without even interrupting for one moment the conversation of the sick and wounded, or arresting the attention of any who might be reading aloud or being read to.' When the melancholy procession arrived at the Cemetery, a brief funeral-service was repeated by the chaplains; and a few clods of earth speedily covered all that remained of the brave fellows who had either fought nobly in the Crimea, or had succumbed to disease and death without any such opportunity of earning the soldier's scanty reward—Glory.

REMEDIES—THE SUBSCRIBED FUNDS FROM ENGLAND.

While these events were transpiring—while English, French, and Turks, were contending against Russians in the Crimea; while British troops, outside Sebastopol, were stricken to death by wounds, fever, dysentery, cold, hunger, nakedness, and every kind of neglect; while Balaklava was a concentration of everything abominable and repulsive; while the weekly and almost daily passages of vessels from that port to Scutari were marked by scenes scarcely paralleled in horror, except by the 'middle passage' of the slavers; while Scutari was a theatre of hopeless confusion, in which none knew their duty except those who had no official connection with the place—the British nation was adopting extraordinary means of shewing how nobly it appreciated the devotion of the army. It fell short as a state; it held its high position as a nation. It could not hastily cure the disorders which became every month more and more apparent in the organisation of the government departments, and the causes of which needed long and calm inquiry; but it adopted the ready and generous plan of affording succour, through the instrumentality either of individuals or of societies formed for the especial purpose. No incidents connected with the war were more worthy of record than these; since they illustrated—not merely the just and kind feelings entertained on the subject by all classes, without reference to party, creed, or rank, but also the remarkable and wholly unprecedented way in which the newspaper press bore its share in the good work; shewing how truly in effect, if not formally and legally, the press has become one of the 'institutions' of the country. The succour rendered was partly in funds, partly in commodities, and partly in personal services; and it may be possible to depict its general character in the space of a few pages, without discussing minute details.

It was at a period very early in the war that the public began to subscribe money to aid, in various ways, those who had gone out to fight in the East. Forty years had elapsed since any British army had formally set out to take part in a European war; and those who best knew the composition of the army were most impressed with the desolate position of those belonging to it. Even before the date of the declaration of war, a society was established under the designation of the 'Central Association in aid of the Wives and Families, Widows and Orphans, of Soldiers ordered to the East.' The object was comprehensive enough to command the sympathies of those who were in a position to aid by their subscriptions; and various members of the royal family gave early countenance to the project. The announcements of the committee were, in the first instance, couched in language somewhat too theatrical to satisfy good taste: contributions came in slowly; but when the nation had warmed in sympathy with the war and its object, the Association attained a recognised and definite position, and funds flowed in rapidly; it became customary to contribute sums of £100 each or upwards, and to establish country branches in connection with the

Central Committee. By the end of May, the fund reached £40,000, in great part through the impetus given by the collection made on the 'Day of Humiliation' appointed by the crown; by the end of June, £70,000 had been collected; and before the year had expired, the amount exceeded £100,000. The Association early found itself in a difficulty concerning the recognition of two classes of soldiers' wives. According to the rules of the service, when soldiers marry 'with leave,' their wives, or a certain ratio of their number, are permitted to reside in the government barracks with their husbands; but married 'without leave,' no such permission is accorded. Military officers, when the Association was founded, urged that undue encouragement would be given to marry 'without leave,' as a means of claiming the aid of the Association if the soldiers should die during the war. Certain rules were therefore laid down, determining whether or not a soldier's wife, married 'without leave,' should have a claim on the fund, the date of the marriage being one element in the determination. The anomalies presented by this strange classification of wives involved the Association in much newspaper controversy in the autumn of the year; but as the sentiments of the public, subscribers to the fund, were decidedly in favour of the recognition of any woman honestly married, whether 'with' or 'without' leave, the rules were rendered more elastic in their application. During the year 1854, the Association took upon itself the support of many widows and orphans of soldiers who fell in the East; but from the 1st of January 1855 this duty devolved upon the managers of another fund, presently to be noticed; the Association thereafter limiting its operations to the relief of distress among the wives and children of soldiers still living. When this change was made, there were about 5000 women and 8000 children thus receiving assistance—in money, clothing, food, furniture, medicines, or other partial means of support. Subscriptions continued to flow into this fund, though slowly, throughout the year 1855; and if good faith and good sense were exhibited in the distribution, much privation must obviously have been relieved.

Far more important, because more truly national and larger in magnitude, was the 'Patriotic Fund.' As the year advanced, and the list of deaths in the East augmented, a feeling spread throughout the country that a fund directly sanctioned by the crown, and established with all the weight the crown could give, would be proper and even necessary. The state, paying a miserable pittance to the soldier while living, makes no provision for the widow or children who may be left desolate by his death; no sum for this purpose is voted by parliament, none is demanded by the government; and thus the alternative lies between voluntary funds and no funds whatever. Half a century earlier, during a terrible war, the British nation had subscribed to a 'Patriotic Fund,' with this object in view; and the necessity remained just as urgent, in character if not in extent, in 1854 as in 1803. In the year last named, England had 180,000 regular soldiers, 80,000 embodied militia, 300,000 volunteers, and 100,000 seamen and marines; and the same convulsed state of the political world which led to the arming of these 660,000 men, led also to a wish that some provision, even though small, might be made for the widows and children of those who fell in battle. A sum of £200,000 was subscribed to the Patriotic Fund during a few months of the year 1803—an amount then deemed large, but obviously adequate to the alleviation of temporary distress only. When, in 1854, a new Patriotic Fund was determined on, men speculated on the probability or improbability of the amount reaching so high a sum as in the earlier instance; some supposed that it might, perchance, attain such a height, but few surmised that it would exceed the former seven or eight fold. Some looked forward to instructive contrasts as likely to be presented between the lists of 1803 and those of 1854. 'The beginning of the century,' it was urged, 'was the age of protection and monopoly, and the subscriptions of large favoured associations became conspicuous features accordingly. In the present day, it is the custom to rely for all such support rather on the intelligence, prosperity, and patriotism diffused throughout the whole community; nor is it often found that such reliance is mistaken or misplaced. It is from the contributions of the people, in the real and genuine sense of the term, that the new Patriotic Fund will be maintained, and with perfect confidence may it be anticipated that the resource will prove equal to the occasion.'

A royal proclamation, announcing the opening of the Patriotic Fund, appeared in the *London Gazette* of the 13th of October 1854, appointing at the same time thirty commissioners, mostly persons well known in public life, for its management. The principal paragraphs of the proclamation dwelt upon the desirability of establishing a fund for the relief of the widows and orphans of those who might fall during the war, the probability that the Queen's subjects would wish generally to contribute to such a fund, and the necessity of appointing commissioners to manage it; but there were others which gave to the commissioners power to decide, from time to time, whether to bestow the funds for the immediate relief of such special objects of destitution as might come within the immediate intention of the subscribers, or to apply a portion in aid of any existing charitable or benevolent institutions established with similar purpose. It was also announced that, as a means of facilitating the collection of subscriptions throughout the empire, all lord-lieutenants, sheriffs, custodes rotulorum, provosts, mayors, and bailies within the United Kingdom, and all governors-general, governors, and lieutenant-governors of colonies, should, by

virtue of their respective offices, be commissioners in aid, to collect subscriptions within their several counties, towns, and colonies, and transmit them to the Patriotic Fund Commissioners—organising local committees whenever such a course might appear expedient.

Started under such auspices, the Patriotic Fund advanced with a rapidity never paralleled, perhaps, in any age or country. Royalty headed the list; our great public companies and corporate bodies, our 'merchant-princes,' our ancient feudal nobility, our newly ennobled men of wealth—contributed large sums; while the traders and manufacturers, the professional men, the shopkeepers, the workmen in factories, the children in schools, brought forward contributions to the extent of their means. Some of our large towns furnished through their local committees or commissioners sums truly astonishing for their magnitude. Great as was the London contribution, that of Edinburgh was yet larger in ratio of population; while that of Glasgow was nearly equal to those of Manchester and Liverpool combined. These results excited much attention; for, considering that Scotland is relatively less wealthy than England, they tend to shew either that the northern kingdom felt a warmer sympathy than the southern with the war, or that the local collections were more energetically managed by the committees. In all the three kingdoms, and in the principality, it was a frequent practice to send a second, third, or even fourth instalment, from each town or county—the instalments growing in magnitude as time advanced, rather than diminishing. Perhaps the results which excited most pleasure and surprise were those presented by the colonies, where affection for the old country, despite occasional discontents and collisions, shewed its warmth by the amount of the aid sent over. The English residents in most foreign countries contributed. A body of English excavators being engaged in making a railway in Denmark, about 140 of their number walked twenty miles to Copenhagen on a particular Sunday, to give one dollar each as a contribution to the fund. The Six Nations Indians, in North America, scarcely known even by name in England, sent £100. Among the humble institutions at home, even the Reformatory Asylum in Westminster contributed; for the poor ragged boys, having no money to give, sent the value of one dinner, with which they voluntarily dispensed. To obtain subscriptions to a fund through the medium of a day's or evening's amusement, being a very customary mode of procedure in England, advantage was taken of the custom in this instance by the Crystal Palace Company. A military fête was given at Sydenham on the 28th of October, at which were present the bands of the French 'Guides,' whose visit had been permitted by the emperor, and those of the 1st and 2d Life Guards, the Horse Guards, the Carabiniers, the Grenadier Guards, the Coldstream Guards, the Scots Fusilier Guards, the 18th and 94th regiments, the Royal Artillery, the Royal Marines, and the Royal Sappers and Miners. The state of excitement in the nation at that time, and the unusual combination of musical bands in the transept and grounds of the palace, drew together an immense concourse of visitors; no fewer than 36,000 persons paid half-a-crown each for admission; while those who availed themselves of their season-tickets raised the total number to nearly 40,000. After paying all the expenses incident to the fête, the net proceeds, amounting to £3600, were applied—£2500 to the Patriotic Fund, and the rest to two smaller charities of somewhat analogous character. Before the month had expired, the Patriotic Fund reached £30,000; by the end of November, £100,000; December, £300,000; January, £600,000: until at length, by the time spring had well advanced, the subscriptions had reached a total of £1,000,000. In later months, to which it will not be necessary to advert here, the fund amounted to nearly a million and a half sterling.

In the month of June 1855, the commissioners presented a Report of their proceedings, describing in what manner they had invested a sum of nearly £1,000,000 at interest, and on what principle they had determined to appropriate it. On this last point, they remarked: 'Upon a careful consideration of our powers, we are led to the conclusion that, while they do not exclude the widows and orphans of commissioned officers of the army, navy, and marines, yet, inasmuch as a provision has been made by your Majesty's pension-warrant and compassionate allowances for the relief of claimants of that class, they cannot in general be considered as primary objects of the royal commission. Consequently, we have deferred, for the most part, the claims of this class till the number and urgency of those of the primary classes—namely, those of widows and orphans of non-commissioned and petty officers, private soldiers, seamen, and marines, for whom no such provision exists—should be known and provided for. We are happy, however, to be able to report, that through the instrumentality of the Committee of Amateur Artists, several sums of money have already been placed at our disposal for immediate distribution among the widows and orphans of all classes of officers. We have already offered our warm acknowledgments to the committee, and we have to report to your Majesty that the money has been applied in the relief of several pressing claims, and has elicited very grateful acknowledgments from the recipients.' The commissioners found that the number of applications made to them on the part of widows and orphans was smaller than had been expected; leading to a belief that a large ratio of the soldiers killed must have been unmarried. Arrangements were in progress for educating the orphan children rendered desolate by the war.

There were numerous other funds established, or additions to existing funds sought, during the

summer and autumn of 1854; while in some cases appeals and advertisements appeared indicating a tendency to take unworthy advantage of a peculiarly excited state of public feeling. There was founded an 'Association for the Relief of the Widows and Orphans of Seamen and Marines, in cases arising out of the Present War;' it preceded the formation of the Patriotic Fund; and when the latter was established, including the widows and orphans of seamen and marines among the objects of its bounty, the former abandoned that portion of its plan, and limited its operations to rendering assistance to the wives and families of men yet living: the fund, however, never reached beyond a few thousand pounds. The 'Cambridge Asylum,' established at Kingston some time previously, for the benefit of soldiers' widows, put forth new claims for support, founded on the probable increase in the demands made for assistance. A new 'Soldiers' Orphan Asylum' was projected; but, coming as the proposal did after the formation of the Patriotic Fund, it met with little support. The 'Royal British Female Orphan Asylum' at Devonport, established fifteen years earlier, and claiming to be the only asylum in the kingdom for the female orphans of soldiers and sailors, did not fail to solicit increased subscriptions as soon as the Crimean war commenced. The 'Royal Caledonian Asylum,' established for educating, clothing, and maintaining the children of Scottish soldiers and sailors wounded or slain in the royal service, organised a special fund in 1854 to meet the exigencies of that particular time. Other societies and institutions put forth appeals for public support, in connection with various intended modes of rendering service to the armies and fleets in the East; for instance, the 'Society for promoting Christian Knowledge' established a fund out of which additional army-chaplains might be supported; the 'Society for the Propagation of the Gospel' sought to obtain an analogous result, in the provision of chaplains for the sick and wounded soldiers; the 'Tract Society' adopted similar means to facilitate the distribution of religious tracts in the army; and the committee of St John's House at Westminster, a training institution for nurses, established a separate fund to defray the expenses of sending out trained nurses to the military hospitals at the seat of war—a purpose successfully pursued, as the history of the Scutari hospitals amply shewed.

Not less remarkable, as indicative of the tone of public feeling during the war, were the efforts made to send out to the Crimean army those necessaries and comforts which, through a train of circumstances wholly inexplicable at the time, the authorities had failed to supply. The nation knew that ample means had been provided by parliament, and the home government repeatedly asserted that nothing was deficient at the seat of war; yet did the accounts become overwhelming and undeniable, of brave soldiers wanting in every supply necessary to maintain them in health—of regiments in which food, beverages, fuel, clothing, huts, and medicines were all deficient. Leaving to parliament the duty of ascertaining how such scandal could have arisen, the nation proceeded to adopt the most ready means of cure, by sending new supplies of such articles as appeared to be most needed.

One of the means of effecting this purpose was by the establishment of the 'Crimean Army Fund,' at a time when the narratives from the seat of war were becoming daily more terrible. The avowed object was to forward to Balaklava a supply of such articles of provisions, warm clothing, &c., as might be considered most useful; and to send out with them an agent, who would superintend the disposal. The object being thus clearly defined, the fund met with much favour, insomuch that £20,000 was collected in about two months. Early in December, the *Fairy* yacht was placed by its owner at the disposal of the committee, and was sent out with a cargo of tea, tobacco, and other welcome articles; a larger yacht, of 220 tons burden, was offered by the Earl of Ellesmere; and a small steamer was chartered. The committee did not undertake to land any commodities at Scutari, or to deliver any articles to particular individuals; all were to be placed alike under the care of an agent, and all were to be landed at Balaklava. The Fund was open to the reception of commodities as well as money; and a curious list was drawn up of such articles as would be deemed most acceptable—a list comprising blankets, shirts, flannel, hose, wash-leather waistcoats, leather for shoes, shoemakers' tools, needles, thread, buttons, tape, tobacco, preserved meats, portable soup, arrow-root, tea, chocolate, sugar, essence of coffee, pearl-barley, preserved vegetables and milk, salt, pepper, mustard, Cayenne-pepper, hams, tongues, bacon, cheese, ale, porter, wine, spirits, coffee-roasters, coffee-grinders, and patent fuel. Excisable articles were, by permission of the government, purchased in bond, duty free. The plan of distribution comprised two parts: a gift to the non-commissioned officers and privates of such articles as might be deemed most acceptable; and a sale of the rest, at cost-price, in a store to be established at Balaklava—the agent being empowered to determine the ratio between the gifts and the sales. In this as in many other instances, the railway companies carried free of charge the packages contributed to the Fund. The *Fairy* yacht having sailed with its varied cargo, the other yacht with 100 tons of similar commodities, and the *Isabella* steamer with 270 tons more, the committee chartered by Christmas the steamer *Pioneer*, capable of conveying 700 tons. At the close of January, this last-named vessel sailed; and having thus despatched four cargoes, and made arrangements for their disposal at Balaklava, the committee closed its useful labours, having carried out a definite purpose in a praiseworthy manner. Unfortunately, as the winter had approached before the full intensity of the sufferings of the troops became known in England,

and as the voyage to Balaklava in small vessels unavoidably consumed much time, the necessaries and comforts did not reach the Crimea until the winter was somewhat advanced. An officer at the camp, writing about Christmas, and adverting to a newspaper paragraph which had met his eye, said: 'I have just read the following:—"If the Crimean Army Fund progresses as it has begun, our brave fellows before Sebastopol will spend a jolly Christmas." Ah me! I made my dinner that day off a two-pound loaf purchased in the French camp for 2s. 8d.' Many others, officers and soldiers, wrote with a similar mournful longing for comforts much talked of but not attainable. Nevertheless, the supplies arrived at various times during January and February; and the committee was enabled to furnish to the subscribers a list of the articles distributed by the agents at Balaklava among the troops down to the 5th of March.*

The yearning to send out aid to the suffering troops manifested itself among all grades of society, and in many remarkable ways. The newspapers were inundated with suggestions or inquiries concerning the best kinds of gifts, or the best modes of transmitting them. One contributor spoke of soluble chocolate, packed in pound-parcels, containing thirty-six small cakes, each sufficient for a breakfast, and reasonably enough suggested that such would be more welcome to the troops than unground and unroasted coffee; a ducal park-owner offered 100 deer, which a pastry-cook undertook to convert into potted venison; a manufacturer of preserved food told of his willingness to contribute 1000 pints of preserved soups and broths; a London tobacconist sent out cigars for the use of the officers to the value of £250; while other persons, besides contributing to the Crimean Army Fund, consigned presents of food through other channels—many a Christmas-pudding, however, sent out with bright anticipations of the pleasure it would afford, spent a stormy Christmas somewhere in or near the Black Sea, and never reached its destination. The supply of minor articles of warm clothing was a favourite mode of manifesting kindness, since these could be made by different members of a family circle, or by ladies who formed working-parties among themselves for this purpose. Some, giving effect to their gentle, womanly zeal in this way, busied themselves in preparing warm worsted socks; some in knitting gloves, mitts, jackets, drawers, or shirts; others tried whether crochet-work would suffice as a substitute for knitting; while others, again, searched among their stores of family-linen, to see whether aught could be spared for the poor fellows who were perishing in cold and nakedness. When it was found from the Scutari letters that lint and surgical bandages were deficient, a new field of activity developed itself: such articles were quickly prepared in vast quantity, and were for the most part packed and transmitted by commercial firms that voluntarily undertook this service; while the General Screw Steam Shipping Company conveyed all such packages free of charge. It must have fully repaid the donors of these simple but welcome consignments to read from time to time, in the London newspapers, Miss Nightingale's acknowledgments of the receipt and appropriation of the gifts—gifts of very diversified character, since they comprised lint, old linen, shirts, list-shoes, bandages, stockings, socks, mitts, gloves, flannels, pillows, jerseys, sheets, pocket-handkerchiefs, tapes, thread, pins, books, stationery, camphor, lozenges, arrow-root, preserves, wine, &c. The Queen sent a contribution collected by herself; oranges and lemons were sent by a Palermo firm; a Staffordshire potter offered a large contribution of hospital earthenware; many of the London booksellers sent packages of books and periodicals; and, indeed, all classes seemed desirous of taking part in a good work, rendered necessary by the deplorable shortcomings of the government and the military authorities.

One more example remains to be noticed of the generous warmth with which the nation sought to alleviate the unmerited sufferings of the troops in the East; and this perhaps was the most remarkable in the whole series, as an indication of the silent growth of a great power among the institutions of the country—the Press. The history of newspaper literature affords no parallel to the 'Sick and Wounded Fund' of 1854-5. Nearly twenty thousand pounds were placed, not in the hands of any openly announced board, committee, or commission, but wholly at the disposal of one whose name was never mentioned, one who was unknown to nearly all the donors, and who had no other designation than that of 'Editor of the *Times*;' he might have been one person, or a group of many, or a mere personification; the donors cared nought for this—they sent their money to the *Times*, a recognised embodiment of vast social power, without any solicitude concerning the *personnel* of the establishment, or any doubt that the donations would be honestly applied. The beginning, the progress, and the end of that Fund were among the brightest incidents afforded by the course of the war.

Immediately after the news of the battle of the Alma reached England, the *Times*, as well as several other daily newspapers, animadverted strongly on the disgraceful nature of the arrangements for treating the sick and wounded—animadversions founded on the letters of correspondents which, disputed and denied by the government, received only too much confirmation from subsequent events. Suggestions for relief were made in various quarters; but the *Times*' Fund may perhaps be traced more immediately to a particular letter addressed to the Editor (October 12th) by

* 6½ tons of tobacco; 3000 lbs. of tea; 28 barrels of sugar; 85 cases of cheese; 30 casks of butter; 18 casks of herrings; 30 cases of bacon; 190 cases of Price's patent candles; 6 cwts. of chocolate; 165 dozen of port; 70 dozen of sherry; 160 dozen of brandy; 30 dozen of whisky. Together with large quantities of porter, ale, preserved meats, woollen goods, and sundries.

Sir Robert Peel, son of the eminent statesman—enclosing a check for a sum of money, and proposing the immediate application of a subscribed fund to the aid of the sick and wounded troops. Although the letter contained a suggestion relating to the appointment of a managing committee, yet as money was sent to the invisible 'Editor of the *Times*,' the Fund was at once virtually commenced under that singular responsibility. No sooner did the number containing this letter appear before the public, than its recommendation was responded to in all quarters; checks and draughts, money-orders and bank-notes, poured in rapidly, insomuch that several thousand pounds were contributed in a few days, accompanied by expressions of reliance that the money would be faithfully appropriated. The novel, and indeed wholly unprecedented, nature of the movement rendered necessary a speedier course of practical action than had at first been anticipated. In an article written a few days afterwards, the Editor said: 'It was only on this very day last week that, in the course of our duty, we invited public attention to the necessities of our disabled soldiers at Scutari. We had certainly no idea at the time of becoming the bankers of the charitable public, or of undertaking the distribution of such funds as might be forthcoming; but so rapidly were contributions poured into our hands, and so indispensable did immediate action appear, that we accepted the trust which our own appeals had called into being, and now find ourselves engaged in the duty of applying directly for the benefit of our soldiers the gifts of their countrymen at home. During the seven days which have elapsed since our first appeal on behalf of the sufferers, we have actually received for their use a sum considerably exceeding £5000—the whole of which amount has been subscribed for the single object of comforting the inmates of the British hospital in Turkey.' It was arranged that Sir Robert Peel should act as joint-trustee with the Editor; that three of the largest donors should audit the accounts from time to time, and make known the results to the public; that they should select a competent person as almoner or distributer of the Fund, who would be sent out at the expense of the journal, and would be furnished with such letters of introduction as any of the government departments might be willing to afford—the sole and simple object being, to aid in any practical way the sick and wounded soldiers at Scutari. All this was done. Meanwhile, subscriptions continued to flow in. The close of the month of October exhibited a total of £10,000 thus collected; and the Editor then announced that, the Fund having reached an amount as large as he felt justified in taking under his charge, no further donations would be received: this, however, did not satisfy the public; additional sums were forwarded, until the whole amounted to little less than £20,000. The government was placed in an irksome and anomalous position by those proceedings, shewing, as they did, that if the nation credited the official statements concerning the large stores sent off to the East, it also credited the newspaper statements that those stores were not in the proper places at the time when most wanted; some of the departments exhibited a tendency to resist and resent this extra-official interference; but others displayed a willingness to aid the labours of the almoner of the Fund. The Rev. S. G. Osborne was at first solicited to assume this honourable but onerous function; but he was prevented from acceding to the request, and Mr Macdonald, connected with the staff of the *Times*, was appointed. The Duke of Newcastle as Minister of War, and Dr Andrew Smith as Medical Director, were visited by this gentleman before his departure; both gave him distinct assurances that supplies were abundant at the seat of war and at Scutari, and that the application of the Fund would be found unnecessary—they little knew the real state of the departments for which they were officially responsible.

During a period of three months, marked by the distribution of the Fund collected in so remarkable a way, the letters from the almoner depicted an almost unvarying scene of misery on the part of the patients, confusion among the officials, and noble self-sacrifice among the nurses. One day, he had to record the arrival of a ship from England laden with stores, and the departure of that ship to the Crimea with the supply of medicines still on board—the packing of the cargo having been so ill-managed that the medical stores could not be extricated from the rest at Scutari. On another occasion, he told how, hearing that the wounded from Inkermann were likely to be badly provided with clothing, he had purchased a large supply of flannels, stockings, gloves, and other requisites, which several ship-chaplains and others had kindly consented to distribute at Balaklava. He explained how he directed his attention sometimes to the sick and wounded coming down from the Crimea, sometimes to those in the hospitals, and sometimes to the convalescents shipped off to Malta; arranging frequently with Miss Nightingale how so to make his purchases as to render the greatest amount of good. Within one week, he distributed 2000 shirts, besides a number of other garments very necessary to the comfort of the sick troops, and hospital diet where it was likely to be deficient. Towards the close of November, 200 convalescents were shipped off to England; but so miserable were the arrangements among the authorities in the Bosphorus, that the ship was about to start on her long voyage with nothing but a blanket to soften the trough-like wooden boxes in which the convalescents were to sleep: the almoner, hearing this, hastily obtained a supply of thick Turkish quilts in lieu of mattresses, and sent them on board. It would seem ridiculous, were not all such facts painfully connected with the gradual wasting of a fine army, that the almoner deemed it necessary to apply a portion of

the funds placed at his disposal in the purchase of such articles as scrubbing-brushes, towels, and basins—trifles of hospital furniture, the almost utter absence of which occasioned great delay and difficulty in the hospital duties Miss Nightingale and her companions had taken upon themselves. As was stated in a former page, the almoner purchased the apparatus, and rented the building, which enabled Miss Nightingale to establish a laundry where the proper authorities were in too sad confusion to render this very necessary duty. Considering the rigour of routine observable in the departments of the British army, it is scarcely matter for surprise, perhaps, that the distribution of gifts among the troops in the Crimea was discountenanced by some of the higher authorities, as being inconsistent with military discipline; on this ground, the almoner found more difficulty in carrying out his good work at Balaklava or the camp than at Scutari; yet is it placed upon undoubted evidence that the Sick and Wounded Fund was the means of partially clothing many shivering troops, even at the camp itself, who might have sunk into death without such aid. 'An application has been made to me,' said Mr Macdonald in one of his letters, 'for warm clothing, by the surgeon, on behalf of a regiment arrived direct from a hot climate to the Crimea, and totally unprovided with the means of withstanding so sudden a change of temperature. The application was made on the ground that "prevention is better than cure;" and I knew so much of the mortality that had taken place among the last regiments sent out, that I did not think I should be justified in refusing. I undertook to supply what was wanted conditionally; for if, on arriving at Balaklava, the things were not found to be requisite, they were to be handed over to the Rev. Mr Hayward and the other chaplains there, for the use of the sick and wounded. This arrangement was thankfully acceded to; and yesterday I had put on board the *Golden Fleece* for the 39th foot (660 strong), a stock of flannels, drawers, and socks, which I hope will keep them warm and in good heart until they get into Sebastopol.' This extraordinary case related to a regiment, not shattered and prostrated by wounds and illness, but going out to commence a career of service in the Crimea, so utterly unprovided with proper clothing, that the officers begged for a supply from an eleemosynary fund. The surgeon had heard of the miserable scenes at the camp, and, knowing that the regiment had come from Gibraltar without any winter-clothing, boldly broke through official routine by asking for extraneous aid. Every man in the regiment was supplied in this way with flannel under-clothing—a supply never repaid by the state, for the 'authorities' could take no formal cognizance of so unusual a proceeding.

It is instructive to glance over the lists given by the almoner of the articles provided out of this Fund; lists shewing how deplorable and general must have been the lack of those things most urgently needed by sick men. These commodities were supplied—mostly to the Scutari hospitals, but some also to the camp, the hospital at Balaklava, the ships bringing invalids thence to Scutari, other vessels conveying convalescents to Malta or England, and the floating-hospitals in the Golden Horn. On one occasion, the almoner was enabled to announce 'important discoveries made in the tumuli of the purveyor's department; among them is a case of linen and lint, sixteen feet long by eight feet wide, and eighteen inches deep'—shewing that stores had really been sent out from England, and buried in heaps which the bewildered officials had forgotten or neglected. When, on another occasion, the almoner, at the urgent request of some of the surgeons, who made known their wants under great apprehension of reprimand from their superiors at such a breach of military routine, sent a store of blankets to the camp-hospitals in the Crimea, he expressed a natural astonishment that such a want should have been permitted to exist: he did not know, nor did the nation know until many months afterwards, that there were large bales of warm winter goods at that very moment in the government stores at Balaklava, unissued by reason of technical formalities between the various governmental or military departments. One of the two principal hospitals at Scutari was presided over by a physician who offered every encouragement to the exertions of Miss Nightingale and the almoner; while the other was under supervision so jealous of any non-official interference, that the voluntary workers of good felt their exertions to be paralysed in that quarter; but, willing or not, the authorities repeatedly accepted aid of a kind not easily to be conceived in England. In one instance, a body of convalescents, about to be sent home to their own country, could not start because they were entirely without clothes; the purveyor applied to for a supply had none to give; the Nurses' Fund and the *Times'* Fund gave what could be collected together on a short notice; and those whom this supply failed to meet were deposited in the Floating Hospital, mourning over the strange fact that the want of a few garments should interfere with, and for a time prevent, their return to England.

The almoner has recorded how, among many active men, Dr M'Shane of the *Caradoc*, and the Rev. Mr Hayward, army-chaplain at Balaklava, strove unweariedly, against official coldness and discouragement, to distribute effectively such supplies as he felt enabled to send to the Crimea; how that he forwarded, in one ship, arrow-root, wine, brandy, preserved meats and vegetables, sugar, tea, and other comforts, to the value of £2000; how that these were conveyed up to the camp, and all appropriated within a week among the regiments employed 'in the front:' a mere trifle compared with the requirements of the army, but comprising such items as the regimental surgeons, utterly unable to procure them from the

proper quarters, eagerly welcomed and applied to the wants of the emaciated, toil-worn, sick-worn, hungry, half-naked troops. Some of those regimental surgeons came personally from the camp down to Balaklava; others wrote, describing their position as having the care of hundreds of sick men without medicines or comforts to give them, and begging for a little from the almoner's store; or, if medicines were at hand, there was an almost total absence of those dietetic comforts which might alternate with the salt rations so utterly unfitted for men afflicted with diarrhœa, dysentery, scurvy, frost-bite, and low malignant fever.

The middle of February having arrived, the almoner found that he had fully expended the sum of £10,000 or £12,000 intrusted to his keeping. He was not at that time aware that the urgent activity of the British public had placed in the hands of, or almost forced upon the Editor of the *Times*, a second sum of nearly equal amount, to be applied in a similar way. His health was considerably broken by three months' attendance in those dreadful hospitals, and he returned to England to render a faithful account of his stewardship. The pages of a history of the war may perhaps scarcely be a fitting place wherein to record a list of articles pertaining rather to a provision-merchant's or a slop-seller's stores; yet the circumstances under which this Sick and Wounded Fund was placed in the hands of the anonymous editor of a newspaper, and under which the fund was administered as a palliative for evils caused by governmental neglect and incompetency, were so extraordinary, so wholly unprecedented, that it may be only just to transcribe Mr Macdonald's account of the manner in which he appropriated a sum of about £11,600 during thirteen weeks subsequent to the battle of Inkermann.*

REMEDIES—THE BALAKLAVA RAILWAY.

Chaotic as were the scenes in the Crimea and at Scutari during the memorable winter now under notice, the home authorities were not wanting in earnest desire to inquire into the causes of misrule, and to devise speedy remedies, if such were possible. Laxity and apathy had been exhibited rather in the autumn, before the troubles commenced, than during the winter itself. Even in the War-office, the functionaries of which bore a heavy share of reproach for the mismanagement displayed, there was no lack of exertion; but there was a want of power to bring harmony into the discordant working of the several government departments; and this powerlessness was rendered more marked by the fact, that the reins of government were not held by a master-hand, one possessing energy and determination sufficient to control those under him. The cabinet was, in one sense, too strong; it contained an unusually large number of ministers already distinguished as statesmen—men of such mark and ability, that the prime-minister shrank from the exercise of command over them. The political changes hence arising will be treated in the next Chapter: it will suffice here to advert simply to the fact, that the want of *consensus*, harmonious action, among the ministers themselves greatly checked the power of inducing remedial measures for the evils made manifest.

One remedy, however, strikingly characteristic of the present age, was successfully administered in sufficient time to palliate a particular class of evils pressing heavily on the troops in the Crimea. This was the construction of a railway from Balaklava to the camp, as a substitute for the wretched track-way which had broken the strength of so many men and horses. This track-way has been sufficiently pictured in the letters and extracts already given; and the share it bore in the destruction of the army has been pointed out. Sir Charles Trevelyan, Secretary to the Treasury, expressed before the Sebastopol Committee his conviction that the want of this bit of good road effected more towards the wasting of the army than any other single cause; for, before the existing track-way became soddened and disrupted by the November rains, the means of conveyance were adequate to the requirements of the troops. There was abundance of stone at hand to improve the road, but no labour available. It was about the end of November when the government—and perhaps the public, through the medium of the newspapers, somewhat earlier than the government—received information of these road-miseries; and, as usually happens in such difficulties, many suggestions were volunteered in non-official quarters. One writer, founding his plan on the well-known fact that men

* *Articles of Diet and Nutriment.*—Tea, 20½ chests. Arrow-root, about 33 cwts. Sago, 14 cwts. 2 qrs. 14 lbs. Tapioca, 70 lbs. Sugar, 107½ cwts. 20 lbs. Preserved soups, meats, &c., 4024 canisters or about 80,000 portions. Preserved vegetables, about 80,000 portions. Port wine, 313½ dozen. Marsala, 2½ quarter-casks, and 3 dozen. Brandy, 70 dozen and 200 gallons. Fowls, 18 dozen. Calf-foot jelly, a large quantity. Bottled ale, 33 dozen. Jams, 74 dozen. Macaroni and vermicelli, 1½ cwt. Pearl-barley, 1 cwt. Tamarinds, 2 cwts. Lemons, 366 dozen. Biscuits, 12 canisters. Butter, 2 kegs. Isinglass, 11 lbs. Gum-arabic, 5½ lbs. Figs, 12 drums. Pepper, 15 packets. Mustard, 20 bottles. Vinegar, 20 bottles.

Articles of Clothing and Personal Use.—Cotton-shirts, 713½ dozen. Flannel, worsted, and woollen shirts, 932¾ dozen. Flannel drawers, 3053 pair. Socks and stockings, 10,542 pair. Night-caps, 311 dozen. Comforters, 492¾ dozen. Gloves, 377 dozen. Woollen sashes, 125 dozen. Slippers, 1865 pair. Quilted gowns, 365. Pocket-handkerchiefs, neck-ties, &c., 1100. Tatar stockings, 50. Tatar boots, 50. Flannel in pieces, 927½ yards. Calico, for sheets and shirts, 1310 yards. Soap, 1840 lbs. Paper, 56½ reams. Envelopes, 1200 packets. Ink, 144 bottles. Steel-pens, 30 boxes. Sealing-wax, 10 lbs. Wafers, 20 boxes. Stationery, 1 box. Postage-stamps, £14, 10s. Clay-pipes, 7044. Tobacco, 1547 lbs.

Articles Pertaining to Hospital Use.—Towels, 379½ dozen. Quilts, 200. Mattresses, 75. Basins, 702. Bowls, 99. Blankets, 780. Bed-pans, 290. Close-stools, 20. Kitchen-stove, 1. Tin drinking-cups, 80. Tin pails, 30. Gamelles, 80. Knives and forks, 64½ dozen. Spoons, 62 dozen. Corkscrews, 2. Tea-spoons, 10 dozen. Kettles, 6. Scrubbing-brushes, &c., 27 dozen. Dust-pans, 3. Sponges, 12. Chloride of lime, 27 lbs. Sacking to wash floors, 3 pieces. Shoe-brushes, 22 sets. Sadirons, 6 pair. Starch, 3 cwts. and 33½ lbs. Washing-tubs, 3. Hair combs, 4 dozen. Wall-lamps, 100. Olive-oil, 3 cwts. Oiled-cloth, 130 yards. Carpet-mats, 20 pieces. Mosquito-muslin, 2 pieces. Marking-ink, 4 bottles. Cotton-tape, 3 pieces. Needles, 12 boxes. American-clocks, 12. Castor-oil, 2½ cwts. Charcoal, 1 ton 15½ cwts. Mill-board, 150 sheets. Calico for towelling, 4 pieces.

are able to sustain with ease, for a few seconds, a weight so considerable as to break down their strength if borne many minutes, proposed that Turks, or any other non-combatants, should be employed in a ratio of about 1000 to a mile, to form a zigzag line from Balaklava to the camp, and to hand from one to another, throughout the length of their line, packages, casks, planks, and stores of every kind, in parcels each light enough to be borne for a few seconds by one man. Another, assuming that timber and labour were at hand, calculated the cost of a plank-road, made of common spruce-fir planks, nine inches in width, to form a road eight miles long and nine feet broad: he shewed, in figures at least, that the timber for such a road would cost £6000, and that 500 men could with these materials make the road in a month. Sir Francis Head, familiar with the plank-roads of Canada, recommended the adoption of some such system; and other persons, conversant with the details of the Peninsular war, pointed out an analogous case. It appears that in 1808, when Napoleon was marching an army towards the Spanish frontier, it was found that the moving sands of the Landes—a dreary waste between Bordeaux and Bayonne—not only retarded the progress of the troops, but actually prevented the transport of the artillery and siege-material: he proceeded in person to the spot, observed the nature of the difficulty, ascertained that fir-trees grew at no great distance, quickly constructed a plank-road, or rather what is termed in America a 'corduroy road' of logs, and conveyed his army speedily and safely over the sands. Many projectors thought that Lord Raglan might have adopted some such plan in the Crimea. Other persons suggested contrivances partaking of the nature of portable railways; in which the track-way would be formed in sections about twenty feet long, each section consisting of two planks and two rails, and susceptible of adjustment to other sections at the ends. Suggestions in varied form were numerous; but the government decided on the adoption of a railway, constructed in the usual manner for traction by steam-power.

Among the many novelties introduced into the military art during the Russian war, certainly this was one of the most remarkable—the formation of a railway in an enemy's country, the more effectually to besiege a town belonging to him. The singularity of the exploit is only equalled by the sadness of the fact that any mode should be needed of employing for destructive purposes one of the most precious boons presented by mechanical art to commerce. When the government determined that a railway should be formed from Balaklava up to the camp, there was no want of men able and willing to effect the work. Messrs Peto, Brassey, and Betts, eminent railway-contractors, having signed an agreement with the government, advertised for artisans and labourers who would consent to go out as railway-makers in the Crimea. The war being popular, and public sympathy being aroused in favour of the suffering soldiers, the appeal was warmly responded to; and an ample number of excavators, masons, carpenters, blacksmiths, plate-layers, engine-drivers, and others, offered their services. Many of those chosen had been employed under Mr Beatty in the construction of Canadian railways, whereby they had become acclimatised to great variations of heat and cold; and they were placed under the same managing engineer for the Crimean service—all engaged at high wages and for six months certain. The energy, precision, and promptness with which all the arrangements were made by the contractors, engendered a general if not universal feeling in the public mind that this was likely to be a happy departure from the desolating routine of official working; orders were given to manufacturing firms in various parts of the country, for the numerous articles required in the formation and working of a railway; and shortly before Christmas the first consignment of men and materials left England. If it were a late date to commence operations available during the current winter, this was due to no shortcoming in the contractors, who completed their arrangements in a wonderfully brief space of time. Ten or twelve ships were either purchased or chartered, and fitted up for the special service required. The railway material comprised 1800 tons of rails and fastenings, 6000 sleepers, 600 loads of timber, and about 3000 tons of other material and machinery, consisting of fixed engines, cranes, pile-engines, trucks, wagons, barrows, blocks, chain-falls, wire-rope, picks, bars, capstans, crabs, and a variety of other plant and tools; besides sawing-machines, forges, carpenters' and smiths' tools, &c. This material was distributed over the different vessels in such a manner that, should any one or two vessels be lost or disabled, it would not endanger the efficiency of the whole—thereby avoiding the example of government blunders, such as that of shipping bedsteads in one vessel and bedstead-legs in another. The ships conveyed the men in parties varying from fifty to eighty, each party under the charge of a foreman and assistant; as well as a surgeon to each vessel, and a clerk to attend to the victualling and care of the stores. The allowance of provisions was liberal; and each man was provided with apparel suitable in the first place for the voyage, and then for working in the Crimea during cold or wet wintry weather—indeed the wardrobe-list was such as might well have excited the envy of the poor ragged soldiers. Besides several huts, each capable of housing forty men, there were 100 railway sheets or tarpaulins, generally used to cover goods-wagons, a large quantity of boards and scantlings, and temporary tents and huts impervious to wet, which could in a few hours be erected and again easily removed; the sheets would also afford temporary covering to provisions or fuel likely to be injured or destroyed by water. Coal, coke, and firewood

were furnished in large quantities. To each party of ten a cooking-stove was provided, portable in character, and fitted to boil, bake, and fry food in the open air. The staff consisted of a well-organised body of engineers, clerks, and store-keepers; and while everything was provided to render their work efficient, the sanitary condition of the men was not forgotten. The medical staff consisted of a surgeon, four assistant-surgeons, and four nurses, selected from the hospitals in London; an ample stock of medical stores and comforts was provided; two missionaries or religious teachers accompanied the men, and a selection of books was provided for their use. On arrival at Balaklava, one of the sailing-ships was to be appropriated as a store and hospital-ship, the rest of the squadron being employed as circumstances might render expedient. All these details, technical and mechanical as they may appear, deserve attention, illustrating the striking differences between the organisation of private commercial firms and that of government departments—every one, in the former, knowing the precise nature of his duties, and the amount of force, mental or material, necessary to their fulfilment; and almost every one, in the latter, doubtful how far his responsibility extended, and unable to command the proper amount of force, mental or material, in the right place and at the right time. The same men who failed in the Crimea under the government, might perhaps have succeeded under private merchants or manufacturers; for the faults, in most instances, were rather in the system than in the men.

It was not until the close of January or the beginning of February that the railway flotilla arrived at Balaklava; but, once anchored, the ships were speedily disburdened of their contents; and, the instructions from home being definite and complete, the manager immediately proceeded to lay out his plans. With unbounded astonishment the Turks at that place gazed upon the stalwart excavators or 'navvies,' clad in their warm garments, and handling the pick and shovel as such implements are never handled in the East; they saw wretched hovels demolished, masses of filth and rubbish cleared, huge fires made of such débris as was combustible, pools of slush swept or laded away; they saw surveyors, booted to the thigh, measuring and levelling, and laying out curves and gradients, by the aid of strange-looking implements; they saw strong able horses landed, stables built, forage provided for the horses, provision-stores opened for the men, portable houses set up, work-yards laid down, planks and rails brought on shore in apparently endless quantity, machines and engines brought to light such as had never before met their view; in short, Balaklava speedily became a sort of miniature Wolverton or Swindon, marked by those striking symptoms of energy and system so eminently exhibited in the arrangements of the great railway-contractors of modern times. No one, manager or workman, required to suspend his labours while documents were travelling about from department to department to be signed and countersigned; each knew exactly what he had to do, and did it. The military officers, looking on at these works, sighed to think how far in arrear of private enterprise is the machinery of government; and the soldiers, on their part, sighed —or something worse—when comparing their tattered garments with the comfortable apparel of the railway labourers and artisans. Some of the older officers, wedded to military etiquette and conventional usages, looked doubtfully and somewhat scornfully at these extraordinary adjuncts to siege-works; while others, more ready to appreciate and welcome improvements consistent with the spirit of the age, thought that if Sebastopol were ever to be captured, this railway would contribute in an important way to so desirable a result, by aiding the transport of guns, ammunition, and stores of various kinds to the front. Wherever the railway labourers began to dig and delve, there did a speedy metamorphosis present itself. 'I was favoured,' says Mr Russell, writing early in March, 'by a striking proof of the energy of the proceedings of the navvies the other day. I had left my quarters in Balaklava, as I do each week, to spend some days going from division to division, and regiment to regiment, and left my detestable premises in their usual condition: a court-yard of abominations unutterable, the favourite resort of Tatar camel-drivers, when they had a few minutes to devote to the pursuit of parasites, and of drunken sailors who desired dignified retirement from the provost-marshal's myrmidons, was surrounded by a wall which enclosed a wooden-shed, in which stood some horses and a few old poplar-trees. I left on one post-day and returned on another, and it was with difficulty I recognised the spot. A railway was running right across my court-yard, the walls were demolished, a severance existed between the mansion and its dependencies, and just as my friends and myself entered the salon and bedchamber—a primitive apartment, through the floor of which I could investigate the proceedings of my quadrupeds below—the navvies gave us a startling welcome by pulling down a poplar right on the roof, which had the effect of carrying away a portion of the balcony, roof, and pent-tiles, and breaking in two windows.'

The railway being required to extend from Balaklava beach up to the camp, and thence to branch out in various directions to the respective 'attacks' or siege-works, it necessarily devolved upon the chief-engineer so to take his levels that the ascent might be made with gradients sufficiently easy for ordinary working. It was found that the first mile or two from Balaklava would be nearly level, having a gradient of only one foot in sixty; that the next half mile would have a steep gradient of one in fifteen, followed by another of one in twenty-five during a distance of

one and a half miles; after which, the gradients would be slight. The first portion, one mile and a half nearly on a level, was completed by the middle of February; and within a week from that time, the works were extended to the village of Kadikoï, where a railway depôt was established. Few mechanical works reward the worker more readily than a railway, since every finished mile facilitates the transport of men and materials to the portions yet unfinished; thus it was in the Crimea, where each section became practically useful from the day when the rails were laid down. While the works were in progress, nearly 1000 men were employed; the chaplain with his portable church, and the surgeon with his portable surgery, were instrumental in maintaining the moral and bodily health of the men; the purveyors and clerks attended to the necessary supplies of food, materials, and money; and the men themselves indulged their fancy by giving the designations 'Victoria,' 'Napoleon,' 'London,' 'Blackwall,' and 'Peto' to the rows of huts erected for their accommodation, or perchance yielded to the too British inclination for a pugilistic encounter among

Railway at Kadikoï—Head-quarters of Sir Colin Campbell.

themselves—despite which, their general conduct during their sojourn in the Crimea met with approval on all sides.

Striking was the contrast afforded between the rail and the wretched track-way * it superseded. One horse was enabled to draw an enormous pile of planks for soldiers' huts; and it became sorrowfully evident that many valuable lives might have been saved had this useful work been commenced earlier. The blasting of rocks, the bridging of small streams, the levelling of hillocks, the filling up of hollows, all proceeded simultaneously. When each portion arrived at a certain stage of completion, half the men were employed during the day in laying down the sleepers and rails, and the other half during the night in boxing up with earth and stones the spaces between the sleepers. It is recorded, as an instance of the celerity and good management with which the operations were conducted, that on one particular evening a pile-driving engine was landed at Balaklava, carried piecemeal to a spot at some distance, put together, employed in driving piles for a stout wooden bridge across a small but muddy stream, taken to pieces, and removed; that the bridge was built, and 100 yards of rail laid down beyond; and that all this was effected within twenty-four hours after the landing of the pile-engine. As soon as the line was finished to the heights above Kadikoï, a stationary engine was fixed there, to draw up the incline, by the aid of a revolving drum and ropes, trains of trucks laden with various commodities. And then, engineering and

* There had been two routes from Balaklava to Sebastopol: one coincident in the greater part of its length with the excellent Woronzow Road; and the other a mere farm track-way, steep, irregular, and untouched by the skill of any engineer. Until the 25th of October, the date of the battle of Balaklava, the British had possession of the Woronzow Road, and were enabled to carry supplies up to the camp without much difficulty; but after that date, Liprandi's corps being encamped in the plain or broad valley of the Tchernaya, through which this road ran, the Allies were compelled to withdraw their exterior line of defence further to the south and west, whereby the advantage of the Woronzow Road was lost. All the road disasters of the subsequent winter related to the wretched track-way, the only route then available; and Liprandi thus occasioned a heavier loss to the British than he himself perhaps supposed.

commissariat officers being equally desirous of availing themselves of this invaluable aid, arrangements were made whereby provisions and beverages, fodder and fuel, were conveyed up to the plateau during certain hours of the day; while at other hours the railway was placed at the disposal of the artillery and engineering departments, for the conveyance of those missiles and stores without which the siege could not be maintained. Of barley alone, nearly 1000 sacks were required daily at the camp, after reinforcements of horses had reached it in March; and it is scarcely possible adequately to conceive the relief experienced by the commissariat department when facilities were afforded for conveying these immense stores by rail, in lieu of the few and overworked horses and mules, until that time their sole resource. The supplies required by all the departments, indeed, amounting to hundreds of tons daily, could now be conveyed so easily, that the British had at length the pleasure of returning the good offices rendered by the French during the winter season of trouble and suffering: they made one portion of the railway available for the conveyance of stores from the French camp to certain of the defence-works on the plateau overlooking the Tchernaya Valley. About the beginning of April, the railway was almost incessantly in requisition for the conveyance to the camp of an immense store of ammunition received from England about that time. Ten mortars, for throwing 13-inch shells, were among the ponderous loads taken up; and during many days, about 600 shells for those mortars, each weighing 190 pounds, were similarly conveyed, as were also two 68-pounder guns for the Sailors' Battery. Nearly 2000 barrels of gunpowder were conveyed within twelve days; and as many as 1000 large shot and shell on a single forenoon. The management of the incline, between Lord Raglan's head-quarters and Kadikoï, required much caution: more than one fatal disaster occurred here by the descending trains having acquired too great momentum.

Nothing undertaken during the memorable siege of Sebastopol answered its intended purpose more fully than this railway. From the natural course of events, the works could not be completed until the severity of winter had passed; the gallant troops could not be relieved in time to shield them from labours which brought them in frightful numbers to the grave; but the completion of the railway did nevertheless enable the commander to bring up to the front that formidable mass of artillery and ammunition, and those large reinforcements of troops, which enabled him at a later date to join the French commander in re-opening the bombardment. The whole undertaking was carried out in a worthy spirit by the contractors, one of whom thereby lost his seat in parliament through a technical rule pertaining to the privileges of the House, but received a baronetcy as a recognition of the services rendered to the country in a time of need. That the works were very costly, necessarily resulted from the extraordinary circumstances under which they were carried on; but this was a small matter. Nearly 16,000 invalid soldiers were shipped off from Balaklava to Scutari and elsewhere, struck down by wounds, or in still larger number by sickness, besides those buried in the Crimea, during the six months from October to March inclusive: if the railway had been constructed earlier, how many of these valuable lives might have been saved—how rich an equivalent would have been received for the expenditure!

REMEDIES—OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS.

However forcibly it might be urged that an investigation into the causes of an evil does not necessarily lead to a remedy, and that an investigation by the government into government misrule can scarcely be deemed impartial, yet it is only fair to conclude that such inquiries might be honestly intended, and might lead to beneficial results. The events connected with the wintering of the troops in the Crimea afforded a case in point. Of the deplorable miseries attendant on that wintering, the present and preceding Chapters have sufficiently told, and also of the remarkable efforts made by a pitying and indignant nation—pitying for the sufferers, and indignant against those supposed to have caused the suffering—to alleviate the woes it could not prevent; but the page of history would be unfairly treated if notice were not taken of the efforts made by the government and the legislature, during the existence of the evils, to inquire into their causes, and to suggest remedies either immediate or prospective. The investigations were indeed noteworthy in a threefold point of view—some of them led to immediate improvements; some suggested extensive reforms available for future times; while others conduced, although indirectly and imperfectly, to a readjustment of the national verdict on the characters of the officials engaged—restoring the fair fame of some who had been cruelly misjudged, and reducing to a lower level others who had been overpraised.

One of the official investigations, already adverted to, was into 'the Irregularities which have taken place in the Transport of Stores to the East.' The commissioners, Captain Craigie, Colonel Tulloch, and Mr Stewart, were appointed by the war-department in January, to ascertain the causes of some of the disasters connected with the transport of stores—how it happened, for instance, that the medical and surgical supplies on board the *Prince* could not be landed at Scutari, where they were so much needed; that 100 stoves were sent to Scutari in the *Army and Navy* transport, without the piping for funnels, whereby they were rendered useless; that this piping remained two months in the Thames, carried to five transport-ships in succession, and refused by all; that iron bedsteads, and boards for field-stretcher bedsteads, were sent

out in the *Robert Lowe*, while the legs for the former, and the tressels for the latter, were sent out in the *Manilla*—rendering either cargo useless until the other had arrived. Into such ridiculous anomalies the commissioners inquired; and if the Report and Evidence published by them possesses value, it is in demonstrating the urgent need of reform in the government departments; since the actual amount of misconduct on the part of any one individual was very slight—the cause of the confusion being the indefinite nature of the arrangements by which the Admiralty, Ordnance, and medical department worked together.

The Crimea and Scutari were the scenes of many official investigations during the winter, some intended simply to bring to light the probable causes of admitted disasters, others to give effect to practical remedies. When it was found that Major Sillery, as military commandant at Scutari, was invested with insufficient power to infuse order into the chaos at that spot, Lord William Paulet was appointed, with increased power both to investigate and to execute; his lordship, however, commissioned by Lord Raglan, found his authority too limited for the bewildering task intrusted to him. When Lord Paulet communicated to the home government the state of matters at Scutari, the Duke of Newcastle appointed Dr Cumming, Dr Spence, and Mr Maxwell, as commissioners to inquire into the causes of the ill-treatment of the sick and wounded in the hospitals; Dr Spence was lost in the *Prince;* but the other two commissioners proceeded with their labours, empowered, not to remedy, but to point out faults and to suggest remedies. One unfortunate result of this commission was, that a medical officer at Scutari was thrown into doubt concerning his own authority, from the moment when Dr Cumming, superior in position in the army medical department, arrived: the absurd etiquette and formalism of the service paralysed him, and he was thenceforward bewildered in the vain attempt to determine whether he should or should not act upon any suggestion made by the commissioner. Mr Maxwell, too, found himself embarrassed by the rules of military etiquette, which induced Lord Raglan to interpose many difficulties in the way of an examination, by the commissioners, of the regimental surgeons. At a later date, when the deplorable mortality at the camp and Balaklava, the miry state of the roads, the want of hands to bury the dead men and horses, and the filthy habits of the poor ill-treated Turks, had rendered Balaklava a spot dangerous to health, the government sent out a sanitary commission, consisting of Mr Rawlinson the engineer, Dr Gavin, and Dr Sutherland. These commissioners, arriving in the Crimea when the railway labourers were actively at work, and arranging plans in harmony with those of the railway engineers, speedily rendered an amount of useful service scarcely to be appreciated except by those who know the state to which even a well-kept camp may be reduced during warm weather.

Many other investigations, by commission or otherwise, were made during the winter, and many ameliorations introduced consequent on the revelations thus made. The gross anomaly of the green coffee, for instance, underwent official investigation; some of the home departments flatly denied the rumours that the troops had been supplied with coffee in a state unfit to be used; but when the truth of the reports could no longer be questioned, it was found that absurd confusion and blundering had occasioned the evil. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was, in one sense, invested with the character of a Commission of Inquiry; since he was requested by the government to use his great influence at Constantinople in ameliorating the state of matters at Scutari; but there is no evidence that he wrought much good in this direction. Another inquiry was set on foot to discover, if possible, how it arose that porter and ale, shipped from England in the spring of 1854, were not forthcoming when wanted until six or eight months afterwards—having been wandering about in some inscrutable way during the intervening period. Another movement was, not so much a means of inquiry, as a mode of applying a prompt remedy to an admitted evil; this was the appointment of M. Soyer as a reformer of the hospital-kitchens at Scutari. Lord Palmerston having, in an unfortunate speech in the House of Commons, while defending the aristocracy against certain charges, asserted that the medical, transport, and commissariat departments, *not* officered by the aristocracy, were those which most fully broke down during the war, the members of those three departments indignantly repelled the insinuation thereby supposed to be intended, and pointed out that nothing less than a searching investigation would set them right with the nation. Indeed, among the official inquiries themselves, some were conducted in so imperfect a manner as to press unjustly on particular persons, who were made to suffer for faults duly attributable to a chaotic and anarchical system.

Justice requires that one particular case, that of Captain Christie, should be noticed a little in detail, because it so strikingly illustrates the injury wrought upon individuals by those official defects. It has been noticed in a former page that, during the destructive hurricane on the 14th of November, whereby the *Prince* and so many other valuable ships were lost, Captain Christie was placed in a difficult position as agent or superintendent of transports in Balaklava Harbour. He was responsible for the due mooring and unloading of the transports laden with supplies; but there was another naval officer present who, higher in rank, claimed and exercised a general control over all the ships in the harbour, whether warlike or mercantile. Many of the vessels, as we have seen, were outside instead of inside the harbour at the time of the storm, and were lost. It may have been that the harbour-master could produce justification for his share in the transaction,

according to the exact tenor of the orders he might have received from Lord Raglan at a time when a renewed attack by Liprandi's army was apprehended; but whether this were so or not, Captain Christie, although powerless to act otherwise than he did, was accused by those at a distance of being the cause of the calamity. From events of subsequent date, it appears probable that hasty accusations were made against Captain Christie by amateur observers, and that these accusations were communicated to Lord Raglan by members of the government, with a request that the truth might be ascertained. During a debate in the House of Commons in February, on the mismanagement of affairs in the East, Mr Layard commented on Captain Christie in terms afterwards found to be incorrect; he had based his comments on hasty personal observations while in the Crimea, and had not employed sufficient caution in drawing inferences from what he saw. The family of Captain Christie made earnest endeavours to obtain a rectification of the errors; but this, owing to various painful circumstances, was not given with sufficient frankness and clearness. The proceeding, however, which more immediately led to the mournful death of that ill-used officer, although intended for a far different purpose, was adopted by Sir James Graham, First Lord of the Admiralty. Hearing from various quarters facts, rumours, or opinions concerning the management of Balaklava Harbour, Sir James Graham resolved to subject Captain Christie to a court-martial, as a means of ascertaining whether the duties of his office had been properly fulfilled; he sent out orders to the admiral-in-chief to supersede that officer, not as a measure of disgrace, but as a necessary preliminary to the official inquiries. The inquiries were to be two in number—whether Captain Christie were responsible for the loss of the *Prince* during the November tempest? and whether he had made a mistake in ordering a portion of Turkish troops, who were conveyed from Varna to the Crimea, to land at Balaklava instead of Eupatoria? Before these instructions could reach the Crimea, Captain Christie had been called upon, first by General Airey, and then by Admiral Lyons, to explain all the circumstances relating to the loss of the shipping during the storm, especially that of the *Prince*, with its cargo so indispensable to the wants of the army. The explanations were apparently satisfactory, so far as he was concerned; but what was Captain Christie's astonishment, some time afterwards, to read in the London newspapers that he had been superseded, and was to undergo the ordeal of trial by court-martial! On the 20th of February he received formal notice from the Admiralty of his supercession; and a second notice, a few days afterwards, of the impending court-martial. Astonished as he was at the court-martial, he yet did not fear the result, because it became more and more evident that, had his wishes and representations been attended to, the *Prince* would have been safely within the harbour at the time of the storm; but the supercession deeply wounded him. Throughout the month of March he remained as transport-agent at Balaklava, until his successor arrived; and then, after the cankered wound had been so long festering, he set out for England. These proceedings had excited much sympathy among the transport-captains, who respected Captain Christie, and who entirely discountenanced the belief that he had caused the calamities complained of; the captains of no fewer than sixty-seven transports presented an address to him just before his departure, expressive of their mingled surprise and grief at the treatment he had received. Wounded at heart, but conscious that his integrity ought to set him right with his country, Captain Christie sailed on the 1st of April for England, there to undergo, as he supposed, a court-martial; but while at Constantinople, on the 7th, he received a letter from Sir Edmund Lyons, requesting him to return to be tried in the Crimea, pursuant to orders received from the government. He did so, but was almost immediately attacked by fever, which prostrated him throughout the remainder of the month. Sympathy reached him from all sides, from army and from navy; he was to have been tried on the 24th, but was too ill to attend. Sinking more and more rapidly, he died on the 1st of May. All the transport-captains, without waiting to inquire whether or not it were consistent with etiquette, hung all their flags half-mast high, and there kept them until after the funeral, which many of them attended. The Crimean fever may perhaps be said to have carried off Captain Christie; but it is at least as likely to have been an infliction of a more delicate and incurable kind—a broken heart.

So far as amends could be made to the memory of one thus cruelly destroyed, ample justice was rendered at a later date. On the 18th of May, a few weeks after these events, a debate took place in the House of Commons, in which Sir James Graham expressed deep regret at the whole transaction, laying much of the blame on Mr Layard, but taking much also to himself. In the course of his speech Sir James said: 'A debt of justice is due to the memory of a gallant man. No transaction has for a long time given me such deep pain as the very transaction we are now discussing. I am responsible, and alone responsible, for the original appointment of Captain Christie. He was unknown to me except by reputation; he bore a high and spotless character in his own gallant profession; he had served well and honourably, and was recommended to me as competent to fill the situation to which I appointed him.' After adverting to the comments and alleged charges against the deceased officer, the First Lord of the Admiralty said: 'My fear is that I have yielded too much to clamour with respect to this officer. . . . . I ordered Captain Christie not to return to England, but to remain abroad, that he might be tried by court-martial. And here is the point

which most grieves me. I have reason to believe that the circumstance of having been superseded, in order to be tried, coupled with the fact of accusations having been made in this House so disparaging to his character, really broke the heart of this gallant man; I do believe that his death has been the consequence of the circumstances to which I have adverted.' The acquittal was indeed most complete; if further evidence thereof were required, such would be found in the fact that Captain Christie's name headed the list of those who would have been recommended for promotion to the order of K.C.B. had they survived.

Two series of official investigations, carried on during the spring of 1855, were very important, inasmuch as they brought to light abundant evidence of misrule, pointed out many of its causes, and suggested modes of future improvements. These investigations were carried on, the one in London, by the 'Committee for inquiring into the State of the Army before Sebastopol,' and the other in the Crimea, by commissioners appointed for a similar purpose; the one initiated by the House of Commons, the other by the minister of war; the one to report to parliament, the other to the government. Of the Report of the 'Sebastopol Committee,' as it was for brevity designated, use has occasionally been made in previous pages, while its relation to the politics of the period will need attention in the next Chapter; but the present is the proper place for presenting a brief summary of the results. It was on the 26th of January 1855 that Mr. Roebuck, member for Sheffield, moved the appointment of the Committee here adverted to; on the 29th, after a long debate, the resolution was carried by a large majority. On account of the ministerial commotion raised by this decision, the Committee was not able to commence its labours until the 5th of March; but from that date it applied thirty-five days to the receipt of evidence bearing upon the state and management of the Crimean army. Among the witnesses examined were six or seven cabinet ministers, chiefs and subordinates in many of the government departments, military and naval officers who had returned from the Crimea, and newspaper correspondents and other persons who had narrated the results of their non-official observations near the camp. The examinations were made during the months of March, April, and May; the results were from time to time communicated to the House of Commons; and the final Report was read before the House on the 18th of June.

Every page of the bulky volumes containing the evidence and reports teems with proof of the gross disorganisation among the various departments, whether in England or in the Crimea, by which the British army in the East was governed. For convenience of illustration, the Committee divided the evidence and comments into two parts—the one relating to the condition of the army itself; the other to the condition of the departments controlling the army. Under the first heading are detailed all those miseries and privations of which so many have necessarily been noticed in the pages of this work—misery from overwork and disease until the early part of November, and from the additional inflictions consequent on deficiency of food, clothing, fuel, huts, and medicines during the greater part of the winter. The Report states that the fatigue or overwork, which prostrated so many men early in the winter, 'necessarily resulted from the inadequacy of the force for the task assigned to it. The British army was a portion of an allied force. The whole scheme of the siege, the extent of front to be defended, the positions to be maintained, and the works to be undertaken, depended on military considerations, and were decided upon in conjunction with our allies.' The Committee offered no opinion on the military merits or demerits of these proceedings, but exercised the right of inquiring whether, a certain line of proceeding having been decided upon, the English government adopted the proper means of giving it effect.

The Report could not remain silent concerning the ill-adjustment of the leading government departments at home. Until July 1854, the secretary of state for the colonies was also secretary of state for war; but the combined duties at that time being too great for any one mind to bear, the offices were separated, and the Duke of Newcastle became Secretary for War. The formal routine of a long-established office could not, however, suffer sudden disruption without inducing a transition period of uncertainty and confusion; and the duke speedily found the difficulty of reconciling his duties with those of the Secretary *at* War, the Commander-in-chief, the Treasury, the Admiralty, and the Board of Ordnance. He assumed the general responsibility of managing the war. The cabinet held no councils during two important months of the autumn; the organisation of the new War-office was left in a state of indecision unpardonable to the whole cabinet, and to the prime-minister in particular; and much of the subsequent misery is traceable to the inharmonious working that hence arose. The War-office was not in a condition to form a reserve of troops; and on this account the reinforcements sent out after the battle of Inkermann consisted of troops 'so young and unformed that they fell victims to disease, and were swept away like flies.' The war-minister was, on the one hand, overwhelmed with matters of detail pressed upon his attention; and, on the other hand—owing to the uncertain official relations between himself and other persons—left unacquainted with transactions of which he should have received official cognizance. He took upon himself the task of remedying many obvious defects, without possessing ministerial power sufficient to enforce his own decisions. He, as well as all the other

members of the cabinet, was kept in an extraordinary degree of ignorance concerning the real state of affairs in the East, owing to the mingled formalism and anarchy of the departments; and hence it arose that so many positive contradictions were given in parliament by the ministers, to statements which—promulgated by the press and credited by the nation—proved to be correct. The secretary *at* war had definite duties to fulfil under the old arrangement; but the change in July threw an uncertainty over his office; and many of the orders issued by him for the comfort of the army were given under a painful state of doubt whether it lay with him to originate anything of the kind. In like manner the Ordnance department was in an anomalous position. Lord Raglan still remained Master-general, although commanding an army in the Crimea; a substitute was appointed, with the title of Lieutenant-general of the Ordnance; but this substitute never knew the precise official relations between himself and the other members of the board: whence it arose that disorder and collision marked the proceedings of this department throughout the remainder of the year; and much of the suffering in the Crimea, from the want of huts and warm clothing, is traceable to this cause. The Admiralty was found to be defective, not so much in the arrangements for purely naval matters, as in those connected with the transport department, formerly managed by a distinct board, but during the peace transferred to the Admiralty; the Committee clearly traced many of the Crimean disasters to the fact that the army authorities had no direct control over the transport-ships conveying the troops. The commissariat department, many years placed under the Treasury, and by the Duke of Newcastle transferred to the War-office, was thrown into confusion by this change being made in the midst of a war, necessitating on the part of the subordinates a sudden change in their allegiance, not always clearly appreciated by themselves. Lastly, the medical department was rendered ineffective by the strange fact that even the medical director himself did not know which among four or five boards or departments had the paramount right to issue orders to him.

Directing attention next to the departmental management at the seat of war, the Committee at once found extraordinary proof of bewilderment among nearly all parties. Sir James Graham, First Lord of the Admiralty, had told the Committee that the admiral-in-chief in the Black Sea held a concurrent control with Lord Raglan over the whole of the transports in that region; whereas this officer, Admiral Dundas, alleged that he had nothing whatever to do with the transports—the authority resting wholly on others. It was clearly ascertained by the Committee that the absence of properly fitted ships for the conveyance of sick and wounded from the Crimea to Scutari was due to this opinion entertained by the admiral, an opinion held even against the suggestions and wishes of the war-minister. Of the confusion in Balaklava Harbour, and the November disasters, enough has already been said: the Report shews that there were here three conflicting authorities, naval, transport, and military, wholly unfitted to work harmoniously, on account of the undefined relations existing between them. In the Bosphorus, the transport system was thrown into confusion by a collision between the admiral-superintendent and the commissary, each claiming more than the other would concede, and both harassed by the want of prompt supplies from England. In the Crimea, the commissariat arrangements were considered by the Committee injudicious: there was only one store department for the whole army; this was under the commissary-general, who became thus responsible for almost every imaginable deficiency in the supplies; insomuch that the quartermaster-general, and the heads of many other departments, shook off most of the blame when matters went wrong, and laid it on the shoulders of the commissary, whose office hence became one of arduous difficulty and anxiety. The Committee's Report then treats in succession of the land-transport, imperfect in its organisation in the first instance, and not susceptible of being usefully remodelled until the winter had well-nigh passed over; of the road from Balaklava to the camp, which wrought so much ruin to the army, and of which, when the commissary pointed out its defects to the quartermaster-general, this officer declared he had not hands sufficient to conduct the repair; of divisional depôts of food, which should have been formed by the commissariat at the camp, but which could not be so formed on account of the want of means of transport; of the raw-coffee question, concerning which 'the more immediate comfort of the troops appears to have been overlooked, while ingenious arguments on the volatile aroma of the berry and on the Turkish mode of packing coffee were passing backwards and forwards between Commissary-general Filder and the Treasury;' of the deficiency of fresh meat and vegetables at the camp, due in part to confused management, and in part to the want of means of transport; of the deficiency of forage, attributable in great degree to a series of wrangles between the commissary-general and the quartermaster-general, each of whom deemed the other to be wrong; of the hospitals at the camp and at Scutari, with their dismal story of horrors; and of several other matters—all elucidated by the answers to no less than 21,000 questions.

It is worthy of observation, that, although this Committee was appointed at a time of great public excitement and anger, when condemnation was freely and severely cast in all quarters on government and military officers, the Report deals leniently with individuals. If any of the authorities failed in an effective exercise of their duties, extenuating circumstances are in most cases pointed out, shewing to how large an extent the officials were embarrassed by an

ill-defined classification and adjustment of duties. It became evident that, in a large majority of instances, the same persons who had failed would have succeeded in their work if the system had been better: in other words, the machine was faulty, rather than those who worked it.

While the Sebastopol Committee was thus pursuing investigations in London, the Crimean Commissioners were similarly employed at the seat of war. Appointed by Lord Panmure, who succeeded the Duke of Newcastle as war-minister, the two commissioners, Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, endeavoured to discover, on the spot, the probable causes of the calamities which had befallen the small but noble British army; they arrived in the Crimea early in March (1855), armed with extensive powers to examine witnesses and call for documents. The first Report, sent to the government about midsummer, related chiefly to the commissariat department; whereas the second Report, confined for the most part to the quartermaster-general's department, was from various causes delayed until January in the following year.

The Commissioners' Reports go over nearly the same ground as that of the parliamentary Committee, and lead to nearly the same conclusions; but, being on the spot, the commissioners were enabled to investigate many of the transactions more minutely and fully. One of the first facts ascertained is narrated in terms distinct enough to carry conviction to every mind. 'The information we obtained at Scutari and Constantinople was of great importance to our future proceedings; we ascertained that the sick arriving from the Crimea were nearly all suffering from diseases chiefly attributable to diet, and that the food supplied to the army during the winter, consisting principally of salt meat and biscuit, with a very insufficient proportion of vegetables, was calculated, in the circumstances in which the troops were placed, to produce those diseases; it was therefore evidently desirable to increase the supplies of fresh meat and vegetables, and to substitute fresh bread for biscuit.' When, during the course of their labours, the commissioners traced the ill effects of injurious economy, in relation to the nature of the food supplied to soldiers, they well observe: 'Regarded merely in a pecuniary point of view, irrespective of higher considerations, moral and political, the most wasteful of all expenditure is the expenditure of men. There is hardly any conceivable price that it may be necessary to pay for what is required to preserve the health and efficiency of the soldier that is not advantageously laid out. Every soldier has cost a large sum before he is landed in the Crimea fit for duty, and it costs a like sum to replace him. The value of the other considerations cannot be estimated in money, for they are above all price.'

To detail anew, with these two Reports as a text, the disasters of the Crimean winter will be unnecessary in these pages: they have been sufficiently noticed; but it would not be right to pass over in silence the extraordinary evidence brought to light by the Commissioners, shewing that there were, either at Balaklava or at Scutari, large supplies of many commodities at the very time when the troops were dying for want of them.

Of the ordinary rations of food and drink for the soldiers—salt meat, biscuit, and rum—there was at no time a deficiency in the general store; but unfortunately this store was at Balaklava or in the ships, and could not always be carried to the camp when wanted; hence it arose, especially in the 4th and light divisions, that the men were frequently placed upon three-quarter, two-third, or one-half rations, and on one day had no food at all. The troops were longing and praying for an alternation of fresh meat with salt, at a time when the commissary-general had no less than 8000 bullocks somewhere in Turkey, which he could not bring over in default of transport-ships and baggage-animals; and thus it happened that, throughout December, January, and February, the soldiers on duty received less than one pound of fresh meat per *week*, on an average. The men received two ounces of rice daily, until the middle of November, partly as a medicament, and partly as vegetable food: they valued it highly; but, on account of some unfortunate official difficulty, the supply was withheld during the terrible winter months, although there were stores at Balaklava and Scutari amounting to 370,000 pounds. Equally urgent were the overworked, underfed soldiers in their craving for fresh vegetables; but it appears that, according to the army regulations, vegetables do not constitute an item in the soldier's rations, and it is therefore no part of the ordinary duty of the commissariat to issue or even to provide them; as, however, it would be a mockery to ask the soldiers to buy where there was no market, the commissariat occasionally provided fresh vegetables. Here misrule governed as elsewhere; for the issue of these necessaries did not commence until most of the men had been attacked with scurvy for want of them; and even then, cargoes rotted at Balaklava, and 32,000 pounds of preserved and dried potatoes remained for some weeks in store at Balaklava unissued, owing to official difficulties and deficient transport — besides 65,000 pounds of Scotch barley at Balaklava and Scutari, equally untouched at the very time when most needed. Early in December, when scurvy was working terrible ravages among the ill-treated troops, a supply of 20,000 pounds of lime-juice, the most invaluable of all remedies for that disease, arrived from England; yet did this supply remain in store at Balaklava until the first week in February; the surgeons were urgently entreating, yet it does not appear certain that the higher authorities were aware, during a period of eight weeks, of the arrival of the supply. When the green coffee

was sorely trying the patience of the soldiers, there were 2700 pounds of tea lying in store at Balaklava; a welcome treasure it would have been, yet none was issued. The supply of fuel was, throughout the winter, rendered precarious, not only by the difficulties of the situation, but by this absurdity: 'the commissariat maintained that it was not the practice of the service to issue fuel to troops in the field; that a soldier was not entitled to a ration of fuel unless in a barrack.' Lord Raglan overruled a precedent so obviously unsuited to the condition of troops perishing with cold; yet was it the 29th of December before rations of fuel began to be issued to the troops near Balaklava, while those nearer Sebastopol suffered from the want to a much later date, and in a more intense degree. The men were enforced to drink rum, whether or not they preferred malt-liquor, which the surgeons much wished should alternate with the other beverage; yet no porter could be obtained, although—astonishing to relate—147,000 gallons remained in store at Scutari from the end of November until the middle of April! As a means of providing fodder for the horses belonging to the cavalry, artillery, and commissariat departments, the commissary-general contracted for the purchase of 1,000,000 pounds of hay at Buyuk-tchakmej, on the Sea of Marmora, and ordered hydraulic-presses from England to compress it into cubical masses for shipment; but when, after many difficulties with an insolvent contractor, the greater portion of this hay had been delivered at the town above named, it was found—as if ill-luck were to attend all the arrangements—that the hydraulic-presses had been set up at Constantinople, fifteen miles distant. Since the presses had not been carried to the hay, the hay would require to be brought to the presses; but as there were no means of effecting this, the hay remained in Turkey, and the poor cavalry horses in the Crimea gnawed each other's tails in default of more suitable food. Nevertheless, fodder was at hand in certain quantities: when Balaklava was captured, late in September, several hundred quarters of buckwheat and millet-seed were found there, in a large stone-building near the beach; there this store remained, not only throughout the winter, but until June 1855, although it might certainly have been rendered available for the starving horses. Thus, while the government officers were in possession of fodder, either at Balaklava or in Turkey, the ill-used animals received too little to support their strength; besides those dying from wounds in battle, no fewer than 2011 horses, belonging to the cavalry, artillery, and commissariat, died during the winter from starvation and sickness alone, out of a total of 7377.

Such were a few of the astounding facts ascertained by the Crimean Commissioners in relation to the commissariat department. Those depicted in the Second Report, concerning the quarter-master-general's department, were perhaps less flagrant, but not less instructive as examples of army misrule. It appears that nearly 120 hospital-marquées, and 11,000 officers' and soldiers' tents, were issued; yet, owing to a series of disasters and mistakes, there were but few fitted for their purpose when the necessities of winter arrived. The materials for 1500 wooden huts reached the Crimea, each capable of accommodating about twenty men; but as the rafters and the upright timbers were often brought by different vessels, at intervals of many weeks apart, and as the already overworked troops and horses could not carry up to the plateau a weight of 2500 tons of timber, the army had the benefit of very few huts until the winter was nearly over. Although the supplies of warm clothing sent out from England, and actually landed at Balaklava, despite all the tempests and difficulties, were ascertained by the Commissioners to have been amply sufficient for all the troops, by the end of November or the beginning of December, yet, as the preceding pages have amply shewn, the soldiers were on duty in tattered garments throughout December and the greater part of January. No less than 24,000 thick warm rugs, available as blankets by night and as wrappers by day, arrived during November and the two following months; yet only 800 were issued to the poor shivering troops. Nearly 25,000 blankets arrived in the last week of December, but were not issued until four or five weeks later. More than 11,000 palliasses escaped the perils of the November storm, and were landed safely at Balaklava, yet they remained in store throughout the entire winter; none were issued, although the troops too frequently slept on the bare, cold, wet ground. About 9000 greatcoats and 2000 watch-cloaks remained in store during December and January; besides more than 6000 at Scutari, unissued during many weeks of miserable weather. The officials pointed to an army system, 'that the regulations of the service, as established by the Queen's warrant, did not authorise the issue of regimental greatcoats more frequently than once in three years:' there was no master-mind at the head of the army, sufficiently resolute to break through a rule so absurdly unsuited to the circumstances of the case. A supply of 6000 coatees and 6000 trousers, sent out from England as soon as the wants became known, arrived safely in November; yet three-fourths of the entire number were found unopened and unused so late as six months afterwards, when the perils of winter were long past! Nearly 30,000 pair of boots arrived safely in November and the two following months; yet were many of the Guardsmen walking about with naked feet in the snow on New-year's Day.

The above extraordinary facts, if announced by a newspaper correspondent, would have been received with a storm of indignant denial by the home government, as not only untrue, but absolutely impossible. Coming, however, from impartial commissioners appointed by the government itself,

the revelation made a great and painful impression both upon the ministers and upon the public. Brought to light in this way, the facts require to be noted here, because they shew not only that the nation had provided amply for every want of the army, but also that the supplies had really been sent out to the East, if not so promptly as was needed, at least in sufficient time to avert most of the dreadful calamities of the winter. The delays in the delivery occurred at the seat of war, either through the culpability of individuals, or through the anarchy in the system. Every additional investigation tended to shew that the latter was the more prolific source of mischief, and that nearly the same evils would have arisen, if other men had, without special preparation, occupied the several offices. The commissioners did, nevertheless, although in cautious language, pass condemnation on some of the higher officers, especially the commissary-general, the quarter-master-general, and the cavalry commanders, as having augmented the miseries of the army by a mistaken interpretation of their duties in a time of peril. This condemnation led to a further series of inquiries by commissioners, denials, rejoinders, and counter-charges — rendering it abundantly evident that whatever measure of victory might attend the arms of the Allies, the memory of the Crimean winter of 1854–5 would leave many bitter feelings in the nation, the government, the officers, and the troops.

It is difficult wholly to lose sight of the question, how far the commander was himself responsible for the wretched condition of the army? All the evidence goes to prove that, for two months after the battle of Inkermann, Lord Raglan was rarely seen in the camp. Either he did know the state of his army, or he did not; if not, then did he fail in that watchful attention the French generals so remarkably exhibited; whereas, in the other alternative, he must have received his information mainly through his subordinate officers. He could not be blind to the fact that those subordinates were in collision and in confusion among themselves; and a man of high military genius would, it might be supposed, have interposed with stern decision, and insisted on such a departure from paralysing routine as would have enabled the daily wants of the troops to have been supplied. Such might be the judgment passed; but whether it would be a just verdict, depends on many other considerations. Lord Raglan did not live to return to England, to speak for himself; moreover, there may be a doubt how far he was empowered to depart, on the spot, from a strict and long-established system of military rules; and in the third place, he was acting in conjunction with another general, commander of another army having at least equal authority with himself, which may not unfrequently have given rise to embarrassments he could not, out of delicacy, make public. Until time shall have allowed all those explanatory circumstances to have developed themselves, the portion of blame, if any, attributable to the British commander for the disasters of the Crimean winter, cannot fairly be known. Lieutenant-colonel Hamley, writing several months later, but while hostilities were still going on, used these remarkable words: 'What is most to be regretted is, that the course of the campaign has not been such as to develop what of military genius England may possess. Russia has her Todtleben, the good soldier who, in her hour of need, was equal to the emergency; the creator of the vast works that have so long repelled us. . . . . To us opportunity has been denied for shewing pre-eminence, and the coming general is still unrevealed.' *

Whatever may have been the nature and extent of the investigations made by committees and commissioners, the unanimous verdict of the inquirers and of the nation is highly eulogistic of the admirable soldiers—those troops who, whether their commander and officers conducted the operations skilfully or otherwise, bore so manfully the sufferings that fell to their lot; and, whatever may have been the qualifications of the staff, the regimental officers appear to have been, for the greater part, worthy of the men whom they commanded. The present brief narrative of the calamities of the Crimean winter cannot be better closed than by an extract from the Commissioners' Reports, adverting to this subject:

'The sufferings of the army in the course of the winter, and especially during the months of December and January, must have been intense. We have not noted all the particulars related to us, many of which were unconnected with our inquiry; but we may state that it has been only by slow degrees, and after the frequent repetition of similar details, as one witness after another revealed the facts that had come under his own observation, that we have been able to form any adequate conception of the distress and misery undergone by the troops, or fully to appreciate the unparalleled courage and constancy with which they have endured their sufferings. Great Britain has often had reason to be proud of her army, but it is doubtful whether the whole range of military history furnishes an example of an army exhibiting, throughout a long campaign, qualities as high as have distinguished the forces under Lord Raglan's command. The strength of the men gave way under excessive labour, watching, exposure, and privation; but they never murmured, their spirit never failed, and the enemy, though far outnumbering them, never detected in those whom he encountered any signs of weakness. Their numbers were reduced by disease and by casualties to a handful of men, compared with the great extent of the lines which they constructed and defended; yet the army never abated its confidence in itself, and never descended from its acknowledged military pre-eminence.

Both men and officers, when so reduced that they were hardly fit for the lighter duties of the camp, scorned to be excused the severe and perilous work of the trenches, lest they should throw an undue amount of duty upon their comrades; yet they maintained every foot of ground against all the efforts of the enemy, and with numbers so small that perhaps no other troops would even have made the attempt.

Suffering and privation have frequently led to crime,

* *Campaign of Sebastopol*, p. 338.

in armies as in other communities, but offences of a serious character have been unknown in the British army in the Crimea. Not one capital offence has been committed, or even alleged to have been committed by a soldier, and intemperance has been rare.

Every one who knows anything of the constitution of the army must feel that, when troops so conduct themselves throughout a long campaign, the officers must have done their duty, and set the example. The conduct of the men, therefore, implies the highest encomium that can be passed upon their officers. They have not only shared all the danger and exposure, and most of the privations which the men had to undergo, but we everywhere found indications of their solicitude for the welfare of those who were under their command, and of their constant readiness to employ their private means in promoting the comfort of their men.'

OPERATIONS AT EUPATORIA DURING THE WINTER.

While these complicated miseries at the camp, Balaklava, and Scutari, were engaging general attention—exciting the indignation of some, the heroic charity of others, and the astonishment of all—there was a separate series of incidents occurring in another district of the Crimea, for the most part noiselessly and limited in area and in importance, but not on that account necessarily without influence on the general success of the war waged by England, France, and Turkey against Russia.

It was explained in a former page* that, when the great armament sailed from Varna and Baltschik, a landing in the Crimea was projected at Eupatoria, but that strategic considerations led to the adoption of Old Fort in preference. Nevertheless, the retention of Eupatoria was determined on, as a measure likely to prove advantageous. Considered as an integral part of the Russian dominions, Eupatoria was the chief town in one of the four districts into which the Crimea was divided. It was mostly inhabited by farmers and shepherds, possessing an immense number of oxen and sheep, and a large area of ill-cultivated land. The population, in the autumn of 1854, was about 9000, but towards the close of the year it amounted to 20,000, 30,000, or even more: a great number of the inhabitants of districts wasted by the Russians having sought refuge within its walls, under the protection of the Allied powers. The regular inhabitants were mostly Crim Tatars and Karaïte Jews: the former differing from the main tribes of Tatars, and the latter from the general or orthodox Jews,† by certain characteristics. The Eupatorian Tatars, though Mohammedans like the Turks, and belonging to the same Asiatic stock, differ greatly in aspect; the Osmanli, with his oval face, well-shaped nose, and large eye, presenting a striking contrast to the broad face, short turned-up nose, and long oblique eyes of the Tatar. Still, being Mohammedans, the Tatars of Eupatoria were likely to view in a friendly spirit the arrival of the Turks in that town. The importance of Eupatoria, however, to the Allies, depended rather on its position than on the character of its inhabitants. It was susceptible of being rendered a stronghold, in virtue of the peculiar character of the region around it, provided it were held by a power commanding the sea-approaches. The neighbourhood, for miles around, is so nearly destitute of water, that an enemy, besieging the place, would be subject to great difficulty in procuring that requisite—necessitated either to bring water from a distance, or to dig wells through a formidable thickness of limestone. When Marshal Munich attacked Eupatoria, during the first Russian invasion of the Crimea, his army nearly perished through want of water, on the way from Perekop to that town; during eleven days' march the troops met with but little fresh water, and were frequently tantalised by finding the brooks which met their view to be mere overflowings of salt-lakes. On the other hand, during the fierce heat of June, July, and August, the short herbage of the steppe becomes so dry, scorched, and inflammable, that an army on march would be in imminent peril of setting it on fire, by the hasty operations of camp-life. Thus, owing to the snow and intense cold of winter, the burning steppe in summer, and the want of water all the year round, a land-approach to Eupatoria by a hostile force becomes very precarious. Whoever holds this town, also occupies a formidable position in relation to Perekop, Simferopol, and Baktchéserai, commanding to some extent the interior of the Crimea, and the lines of communication from Perekop to Sebastopol.

Immediately after the landing at Old Fort, Commander Osmont took possession of Eupatoria in the name of the French government, with two companies of the 39th regiment of the line; he installed the Tatar authorities, expelled those of Russia, and then retired with his troops; but on the 19th, the place was formally occupied by the Allies as a military position. The garrison for a considerable time hardly exceeded 600 men, consisting chiefly of seamen, marines, and sappers; but they threw up works sufficiently strong to keep the Cossacks at a distance, formed a corps of Tatar irregulars to protect the flocks outside the town, and acted in conjunction with a small fleet in the harbour to strengthen the position generally. The Allies having taken possession of the town, of course did not scruple to avail themselves of its advantages for their own accommodation. One of the public buildings, a many-pillared, Oriental-looking structure, became the French head-quarters; Captain Brock settled in one of the private residences; the quarantine buildings and grounds were set apart as the head-quarters of the marines; while the custom-house was placed at the disposal of Captain Payne. Most of the public buildings, except the Jews' synagogue and schools,

* Chap. VII. p. 204. † Chap. VII. p. 199.

were situated on the promenade or strand, which had been a favourite public walk for the inhabitants. Several thousand Tatars entered the town early in October, to seek shelter from the Cossacks, who were burning all the villages, and thus necessarily increased the number of mouths to be fed; but as they brought with them 20,000 oxen and 100,000 sheep, their arrival was warmly welcomed. In what manner a small force about that time repelled an attack by the Cossacks, has already been told.* The more certain it became that the Allies determined to occupy Eupatoria, the more incumbent was it on Russia to maintain a force in the immediate vicinity. Hence the establishment of a cavalry camp at Oraz, nine or ten miles inland, consisting of two regiments of dragoons, four of lancers, and a corps of about 1000 Cossacks, with thirty-two field-guns—the whole under General Hizba. It was from this camp that the repeated attacks against Eupatoria were made; if they could not effect anything decisive against the town itself, the Russians, and especially the Cossacks, destroyed the crops, rooted up the trees, burned the villages, and sacked all the houses, to a distance of forty or fifty miles from the place, rendering that part of the Crimea little better than a desert. The garrison was kept constantly on the alert, either to repel attacks on the town, or to afford protection to the flocks and herds in the immediate vicinity. Gradually, infantry was brought by the Russians to aid the cavalry and artillery, and thus a small army was accumulated, threatening the occupants of Eupatoria. It has already been stated that during the hurricane of the 14th of November the ships stationed at this place suffered severely, that the *Henri Quatre* was reduced to a mere hulk, and that the Cossacks made many cowardly attacks on the mariners and others escaping from the wrecks. These calamities surmounted, the Allies felt Eupatoria to be too important a position to be neglected, and they sent reinforcements to the small garrison from time to time, with a few skilful engineers to direct the fortifications.

As the year approached its close, the augmentations of the garrison became more frequent and important. On the 25th and 26th of November, two Turkish battalions arrived from Kamiesch and Balaklava. Early in December, the Russians made an attempt on the town, which was as usual repulsed; and after that the Turkish forces became too powerful to render a repetition of such attacks worth attempting, unless the Russian forces were increased in equal ratio. The Allied commanders having agreed, at a council of war, that Omar Pacha's army should occupy the town, the first division of that army began to arrive on the 9th of December; others disembarked as rapidly as transport facilities could be obtained, until an army-corps was formed under Mehemet Ferik Pacha. It being impossible to accommodate the whole of Omar's army in a town of such limited size, camps were formed on the exterior in good positions, well defended both by continuous lines and isolated redoubts on a range of low hills. Eupatoria became, in fact, one of the strongest places in the Crimea. The shattered and broken *Henri Quatre* still rendered good service, for it was beached in such a position as to enable the guns to command the road leading southward from the town, and thereby clear that road from the clouds of roving Cossacks. Some of the redoubts were armed with long brass 24-pounder guns taken from Turkish ships wrecked during the hurricane, while the *Leander* and the *Bellerophon* supplied other guns of large calibre. The arrival of Turkish reinforcements was expedited by the fact that Liprandi's corps, after breaking up its encampment in the plain of the Tchernaya, thereby greatly relieving the Allies at Balaklava and on the plateau, withdrew in the direction of Eupatoria; the Allies, apprehending a strong attack on that town, augmented the forces and the defences as quickly as possible. Some of Omar's troops were engaged immediately after their landing; for the Cossacks, having, as a spectator termed it, 'an eye to mutton,' approached as closely to the town as safety permitted, seized a flock of sheep, and drove them landward with their lances. The Tatar Irregular Horse, organised within the town, galloped after the Cossacks; a contest ensued, each party endeavouring to snatch the sheep from the other; the Turkish troops marched out, the marines in the redoubts fired briskly, and the final result was the repulse of the Cossacks and the recovery of the 'mutton.' During the daytime, the Eupatorian sheep-owners kept their flocks in the fields between the town and the detached redoubts, relying on the latter to defend them; but, during the night, being suspicious of the alertness of the Cossacks, the shepherds brought the animals within range of the town-defences.

When rumours became rife of 50,000 chosen Turkish troops, under the sultan's best general, being about to go from Varna to Eupatoria, together with an additional detachment of French troops, the besiegers of Sebastopol were elated at the reasonable probability of one of two results—either that Omar Pacha would advance southward and attack Sebastopol on the Russian rear, or that he would intercept any Russian reinforcements coming *vid* Perekop. Possibly both projects entered into the thoughts of the commanders; although later events could alone determine which of them, if either, would be feasible. Colonel Dieu was appointed by the French, and Colonel Simmonds by the English, as Allied commissioners to accompany Omar on this expedition. Omar himself, however, did not go to Eupatoria until many weeks after the council of war at which the manœuvre was determined on. The Osmanlis continued their embarkation throughout the months of December and January, as often as the boisterous winds

* Chap. VII. p. 242.



and waves would permit, selecting as their ports of departure Varna, Baltschik, and Bourgas—the two former for troops of all kinds, but the last for cavalry only. It was sorry work, however; for as the Turks seldom think of making an efficient pier, the shipment of the troops, horses, ordnance, ammunition, and stores, was a difficult and tedious proceeding, interrupted by numerous petty disasters. Large steamers were employed as transports, each accommodating 1200 to 1500 men. The troops took a month's provision with them, consisting of very little else than biscuit, for the Turkish commissariat is of the simplest possible character. Omar Pacha, however, knowing that the Allies had found the west and south-west parts of the Crimea very scantily supplied with available food, made arrangements for accumulating at Varna and Baltschik large stores of wheat, flour, butter, preserved meat, and other articles of food; likewise wood and charcoal for fuel; and he erected a steam-mill and slaughter-houses at Varna. Bulgaria, being a fruitful province, was able to furnish these supplies; but its resources became much reduced thereby. He also drew a lesson from the calamities of the British at Balaklava, and provided an immense number of buffaloes, to be taken over with the troops to Eupatoria, and there employed as beasts of burden and of draught: though it remained to be proved whether those animals would render useful service in a country where few or none of the kind had been before kept. The generalissimo gave out to his soldiers as many fur-lined coats as he could obtain, and useful hoods which, detached from the coats, covered all parts of the head except the face. Regiment after regiment of the Turkish army thus crossed the Black Sea from the Bulgarian shores to Eupatoria, the whole amounting to three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry. One division, the earliest to depart, was that which has been mentioned as having Mehemet Ferik Pacha for its general: the brigadiers were Terfik Pacha and Behram Pacha—the latter an Englishman, General Cannon, who had fought in the Danubian campaign. The generals of the other two infantry divisions were Sali Pacha and one of the many Ismail Pachas; while the cavalry was under Halim Pacha. Nearly all the troops were either picked regiments, or picked soldiers from several regiments, and constituted a martial-looking body of men. The army was weak, however, in that which constitutes the chief weakness of most Turkish armies; its officers comprised too small a number of men who could be relied upon for courage, military skill, and honesty. The system so long pursued by the Ottoman Porte, of giving military command to the sultan's favourites, irrespective of the merits of those so rewarded, was still continued; thus neutralising in great measure the good qualities of the troops. Omar Pacha, the best of the Turkish generals, was himself not

an Osmanli, although a Mohammedan; and his well-arranged plans were frequently thwarted by the jealousy of those who would fain preserve the more truly Oriental system—a system favourable to mediocrity, intrigue, and peculation.

There were many instructive facts connected with this embarkation of the Turkish army from Bulgaria for the Crimea, illustrating the enormous difficulties of such an enterprise in the East. Although it began early in December, it was not nearly finished at the beginning of February, two months afterwards. England, possessing the finest fleet in the world, had found difficulty in transporting 27,000 men across the Black Sea in September; and it was to be expected that Turkey would experience still greater embarrassments in the conveyance of 40,000 men during the stormy winter months. Sailing-ships were employed in large number in September as transports; but this was no longer safe in a turbulent state of the sea—steamers had to be resorted to, as rapidly and frequently as the available supply permitted. England supplied the greater part of these steamers. Now, as steamers were employed throughout the winter in conveying sick from Balaklava to Scutari, and were then obliged to coal before starting for Varna and Baltschik; moreover, as the whole of the English arrangements were involved in trouble and confusion—it followed almost as a necessary consequence that the transport of Omar's army was effected in a dilatory and piecemeal manner. Considering that all the landing-places were rude and inconvenient, it was unavoidable that the circuit of duties—namely, the voyage from Balaklava to Scutari with sick and wounded, the voyage thence to Varna, the voyage from Varna to Eupatoria with 1200 or 1500 Turkish troops, and the return-voyage from Eupatoria to Balaklava—consumed a serious amount of time. Only a few of the steamers were suitable for the transport of horses; hence the embarkation of the cavalry was very tedious, and as a month's provisions and fuel were taken with the troops, the whole bulk to be conveyed was enormous. Then, besides the physical difficulties of the work, there were others resulting from the incapacity of the Turkish officials. 'In Turkey,' said an eye-witness of the proceedings at Varna, treating on the subject just adverted to, 'the idea that any man is fit for everything is carried to the most absurd point. The man who is able to get an office is supposed to get, likewise, with his nomination, the brains necessary for his office. Thus, a man who cannot do a sum in addition awakes one fine morning as a financier, who has to unravel the intricate mysteries of Turkish finance; another, who perhaps never sat on horseback, finds himself suddenly at the head of a squadron or regiment of cavalry; a third, who never crossed the blue ocean, except to go in a caïque to Scutari, has to command a steam-frigate.' The tinge of caricature in this picture does not hide its general correctness; the official proceedings of the Turks at Varna were ludicrous—only equalled by those of the English about the same time at Balaklava and Scutari.

Omar Pacha himself embarked at Varna on the 7th of February, in the *Colombo* steamer; his departure was very sudden, consequent on information from the Crimea concerning the movements of the Russians. He landed at Eupatoria, amid bleak winds which rendered that exposed coast one of the most unfavourable for the disembarkation of an army, and in sight of the hapless *Henri Quatre* and the four stranded transport-vessels, all high and dry on the beach. The English sailors, the Egyptians in the Turkish army, and the Tatars of Eupatoria, aided in landing the vast stores of Omar's army, being more active and more willing at that work than the Osmanlis themselves. At this period the town was in an extraordinary state of excitement, containing at least 30,000 persons beyond the regular population, refugees driven thither for shelter from the Russians; and these, too, in addition to the army. The houses, however, being for the greater part built in the Oriental style, having a square court in the centre of each, covered a considerable area, and afforded facilities for packing a large increase beyond the usual number of inhabitants.

It being certain that the Russians were in considerable force somewhere in the interior, Omar Pacha, shortly after his arrival, sent detachments to make a reconnaissance; troops of Cossacks were seen to be wildly galloping about, watching his movements, but no regular encampment was met with. On the 15th of February, four detachments of Russian cavalry having approached near the town, the Turks quickly marched out to confront them. The country around being a plain, interrupted only by tumuli or small hills, without any trees or shrubs, the antagonists could plainly see each other manœuvring upon and between and behind the hillocks. It became evident, however, that the Russians had no other settled object than that of ascertaining the probable strength of the Turks: they retired, without coming to a general engagement. The movement, indeed, was similar to others the Russians had repeatedly made during four or five months, tending to alarm and harass the defenders of Eupatoria, without hazarding a regular battle—analogous, in that respect, to the repeated surprises experienced by the British on the plateau near Inkermann in October.

The 18th of February, however, was marked by proceedings of some importance, in which the Turks worthily maintained the good fame they had acquired during the Danubian campaign. The sailors on board the stranded *Henri Quatre* had seen long strings of arabas bringing either Russian troops or provisions; and the suspicions hence arising concerning the plans of the enemy were strengthened by two deserters, Polish lancers,

who came over to Eupatoria, and announced the arrival of a large Russian force, destined for an immediate attack upon the town. Early on the morning of the 18th, the sudden withdrawal of the Turkish vedettes, and the whizzing of shells and balls, told that the Russians had reached the vicinity of the town, and that the contest had begun. The Eupatorian Tatars ascended to the flat roofs of their houses, and eagerly watched the commencement of a struggle in which their sympathies were in no sense with the Russians. One of the advanced works of the Turks, on a knoll or hillock, was the scene of conflict. Dark masses of Russian infantry were dimly visible through the gloomy mist of a cold February morning, protected but not hidden by a formidable line of guns. The Turks, remembering Kalafat and Citale, Oltenitza and Silistria, and knowing that their best general was among them, proudly and confidently looked at their foes, and prepared to render a good account of their prowess. The artillery kept up a brisk fire on both sides; while Omar Pacha, between the fitful clouds of smoke, sought to ascertain the numbers and the probable plans of the enemy. Three tumuli, forming a line parallel with the landward margin of the town, had been occupied by the Russians as a base of attack; cavalry in great force occupied one of these tumuli, infantry the two other, while riflemen formed the ends of a crescent by which this line of attack was extended to two small lakes north and south of Eupatoria; eight or ten batteries of artillery were posted in front of the troops, and a few slight earthworks accommodated a corps of riflemen whose duty was to protect these guns from a *coup de main*. The armed line was thus very formidable in appearance and in strength. At first, the Russians directed their fire mostly against the centre of the Turkish position, but afterwards turned their attention rather to the Turkish right, posted near a Greek cemetery outside Eupatoria. The *Valorous* and the *Curaçao* steamers, the *Viper* gunboat, and a Turkish steamer, took up positions opposite the north and south flanks of the Turkish line, and sent their shot and shell right over the Turks, pell-mell into the Russian masses. After two hours of heavy cannonading, the Russian infantry commenced an attack chiefly upon the Turkish right, south of the town; two columns advanced rapidly, cheered on by their officers; the Turks regarded them unflinchingly, allowed them to approach within sixty or seventy yards, and then poured forth a volley which made wide gaps in the Muscovite line. For a moment confused, and forced to retire, the Russians re-formed, and made another advance; but again the Osmanlis steadily confronted them, allowed them to make a near approach, and sent out a torrent of shot against which they were unable to stand. Seeing the enemy thus discomfited, Ismail Bey sallied forth with the 7th regiment of Roumelia, and, aided by Skender Beg with a body of cavalry, completed the route of the enemy, who retired precipitately, leaving 100 dead on the field. The repulse was decisive, for the Russians did not renew the attack at this point, nor indeed did they make any other clearly marked infantry attack; for though they maintained a fierce fire against the Turkish centre, this was the work of artillery. It required the combined aid of English, French, and Turkish guns, naval as well as military, to repel the large force of artillery possessed by the enemy, probably that of General Liprandi, who commanded. The Allies could espy a carriage among the enemy's forces; and after many cavalry officers had held communication with the occupant of this carriage, there appeared to be an order for retreat issued. The infantry marched off, protected by the artillery, while the artillery itself was protected from sudden attack by the cavalry: all retired slowly and safely; and as the sun about that time burst forth through the clouds, the glittering Russian mass appeared rather as if going through a review than a retreat.

The battle was certainly not a great one; but it was important in many ways—among others, in shewing that the Turks, when well commanded, can not only fight well behind earthen ramparts, but can meet steadily a charge from the enemy in the open field, one of the most trying tests of soldierly qualities. The Russian army, estimated at the time at 30,000 in number, was afterwards believed to have amounted nearer to 40,000; it cannot be said to have maintained its attack with much resolution or skill. This army had left Sebastopol three days previously, with six days' provisions for the men; and as the commissariat-wagons were still far distant, it is possible that the commander distrusted his power of effecting much at Eupatoria before his supplies might run short, considering the almost impassable condition of the roads in the winter. Some of the prisoners stated that there were 100 guns with the army. When the brief contest was over, Omar Pacha rode round his camp, and complimented his troops on what they had achieved—a proceeding that gave them extravagant pleasure; for the Turkish soldiers, patient under afflictions, are easily gratified by a little judicious commendation. In the advanced work against which the chief fire of the Russian artillery was directed, Selim Bey, commander of the Egyptians, was killed, and his second in command, Suleiman Bey, severely wounded, as was likewise Ismail Pacha. The Turkish loss in killed and wounded was about 200; the Russian much greater, although, as the wounded were carried off by them, the numbers could not be accurately known. Omar Pacha, in a dispatch to Lord Raglan, estimated the Russian killed at 450. By drawing Liprandi's army away from the vicinity of Balaklava and Inkermann, the Turkish occupation of Eupatoria greatly relieved the Allies encamped outside Sebastopol; and by defeating it, the Turks more than redeemed the credit they had lost at Balaklava, in relation

to which they had received so much ungenerous treatment from the Allies.

The landing of troops and ammunition at Eupatoria continued, until, by the end of February, the force there assembled was very considerable. Early in March, the Turks made a reconnaissance inland. On the 5th, Skender Beg, with 300 irregular horse and 100 Bashi-Bazouks, started off to the interior. He had not proceeded far when he encountered the centre and left of the Russian advanced posts, commanded by Lieutenant-general Korff. The enemy was in too great force to enable the Turks to advance, yet an obstinate struggle ensued before Skender Beg would give way and retreat to the town. The dispatches of the belligerents were as discordant as on other occasions during the war, concerning the losses on either side. The *Journal de Constantinople* announced that the Russians lost about thirty men, while the Turks had only eleven killed and two wounded, one of whom was Skender Beg himself, who received a cut in his right hand, which severed a finger, a lance-thrust near the heart, and a sabre-cut across the forehead; whereas the *Invalide Russe* declared that the Russians had one killed and five wounded, that the Turks had forty killed during the first onslaught, and many more during the fight; and that when the Turks, worsted in their attack, fled, they 'were pursued for nearly three versts by the lancers and Cossacks, while great confusion arose in the town.'

Strengthened both in numbers and by outworks thrown up beyond the town, the Turks made another advance into the interior on the 20th of March. Five regiments of cavalry, two batteries of horse-artillery, and a large force of infantry, departed at daybreak; the infantry remaining near the outposts, and the cavalry advancing into landward. They reached the mounds where the enemy had appeared in force on the 5th, and the Russian vedettes galloped off rapidly to announce the movement. Bodies of Russian cavalry were then seen slowly to retire to the village of Bagai, situated on a slope close to the creek of the salt-lake Sasik; while a long line of Cossack skirmishers extended in the direction of Oraz, guarding the right flank of the Russians. The Turks followed them from hillock to hillock, until at length the creek alone separated the belligerents. The Russians shewed a disposition to draw away the Turks to some distance from the town, and then outflank them on their left; this intent being seen, however, the Turks guarded against it, and maintained a position, with but little firing, until the Russians retired to their camp. It now became evident that the intention of Omar had been, not to make a direct attack upon the Russians, but to mask the construction of new outworks at a greater distance from the town. This attempt succeeded, insomuch that, within a week, detached works of considerable extent were formed. These works, backed by the town on the rear, now enclosed a sort of intrenched camp, rendered necessary by the great augmentation of the army, which could not have remained longer in the overcrowded town without being attacked by sickness. The mounds formerly occupied by the Russian vedettes were now occupied by the Turks, thereby rendering Eupatoria a fortified position of very considerable extent.

On the 29th a body of Bashi-Bazouks—the Cossacks of the Turkish army, fond of galloping excursions and marauding expeditions—set off to make an attack upon the village of Bazar, near Lake Sasik, where many of the Russians were posted. The Bashi-Bazouks dashed in among the Cossacks, engaged them in a hand-to-hand contest, furiously yelling out their 'Yallah, Illah!' and pursued them into the village. Here the Cossacks made a stand; but the Osmanlis routed them, forcing them to leave their baggage, cloaks, cooking-utensils, and a quantity of hay and corn behind them. This was a fine booty for the Turkish irregulars, who, at no time affected by a tender conscience for the property of others, did not scruple now to appropriate the legitimate spoils of war. The approach of a large body of Russian cavalry warned the Bashi-Bazouks no longer to remain on that spot; so, loading themselves with copper-dishes, fur-cloaks, forage, and other treasures, they returned in much elation to the town. After this date the Russian vedettes retreated still further from the town, rendering it evident that any attack on their part would be surrounded with more difficulties than ever.

The month of April thus found the Turks, with a small number of English and French, securely in possession of Eupatoria, while that town had become one of the strongest positions in the Crimea. Here the narrative must at present leave them; the operations at Eupatoria during the winter were now ended; and any further hostilities in that quarter belong to the summer campaign, as part and parcel of a system of strategy to be described in a future Chapter. Although no great achievements presented themselves for record, this occupation of Eupatoria by Omar Pacha was unquestionably beneficial to the Allied cause generally; since the Russian generals could at no time venture to forget or neglect the fact that a powerful enemy occupied a position whence a serious demonstration might be made against them: it affected their tactics, their reinforcements, and their supplies.

THE SIEGE, IN THE EARLY WEEKS OF 1855.

It is not inappropriate that this Chapter, which opened with a narrative of the events connected with the siege of Sebastopol in the closing weeks of 1854, should end with a sketch of those marking the early weeks of 1855. Both were parts of one great undertaking, the siege of one of the most

powerful strongholds in the world; but it would have been impossible duly to understand the circumstances under which the operations of 1855 commenced, without an intermediate notice of the extraordinary calamities of the winter—the dissensions between the British generals; the departure of so many of the officers; the endurance by the troops of so much misery through hunger, cold, nakedness, sickness, and neglect; the anarchy at Balaklava and Scutari; and the remarkable means taken by the British nation to alleviate the miseries and lessen the anarchy. It was not a new campaign commenced with the new year, but a continuation of the siege under circumstances of augmented trial and embarrassment.

The British army, indeed, could scarcely be regarded as the same that landed at Old Fort three or four months earlier. Not only were the soldiers carried off by disease to a greater degree even than by wounds, but Lord Raglan had been deprived of his general officers to so great an extent as seriously to increase his difficulties. Of those named in a former page,* Cathcart, Goldie, Adams, Tylden, and Strangways were dead; Evans, Bentinck, Torrens, De Ros, and Cardigan, had returned to England; while the Duke of Cambridge, Sir George Brown, and General Pennefather were either on the sick-list or returning home. A few other general officers were sent out, while promotions among the regimental officers filled up the remaining vacancies. The cavalry had been brought down, through the various circumstances already narrated, from the rank of a division to very little more than a regiment of fragments. At the end of January, the light brigade—namely, 4th and 13th light-dragoons, 8th and 11th hussars, and 17th lancers—mustered only 782 officers and men fit for duty, averaging about 140 men per regiment; but so far was this from fulfilling the usual conditions of a body of cavalry, that there were only 142 horses among the whole number fit for duty: in other words, each regiment could provide barely 30 mounted troopers! Nay, even this did not adequately represent the depth of the depression; for the poor horses were entered as being 'fit for duty' so long as they could carry a bag of biscuits or a keg of rum: very few of them could have galloped a mile.

The Russians, about the beginning of the year, sent large reinforcements into the Crimea: transferring many regiments of the Bessarabian corps to the neighbourhood of Sebastopol, and filling up the gap by draughts from General Paniutin's corps in Volhynia. The authorities strove to hide disasters as much as possible from the public eye; but there was evidence to render probable, if not certain, the truth of a rumour that large bodies of Russian troops perished in the snow while traversing the inhospitable plains north and south of the Isthmus of Perekop. This, however, did not prevent Menchikoff from receiving new troops more rapidly than he lost his former levies; insomuch that his strength, in and around the beleaguered city, increased rather than diminished.

The earlier weeks of the year were marked, on the one side by repeated sorties of the garrison, and on the other by attempts to bring up guns and ammunition as rapidly as the multiplied difficulties would permit. Amid the daily tales of sadness—of soldiers dying of cold, officers suffocating themselves with the fumes of charcoal in the endeavour to warm their huts, cavalry horses sinking under burdens they were not fitted to bear, and officers and men alike bitterly commenting on the announced comforts which never reached them—the siege-works were still kept up. Three strong divisions of Russians were occasionally, though dimly, visible beyond Inkermann, shewing that no relaxation of caution on the part of the Allies would be safe. On the night between the 12th and 13th of January, much commotion was observable in Sebastopol—watch-fires were kindled on the heights beyond the Tchernaya, lights appeared in the windows of the town, bells were ringing, and a great religious ceremony was in progress; it was the Russian new year, ushered in with great solemnity. But the Allies had more than once found that religious ceremonies at Sebastopol were immediately followed by fierce sorties—especially on Sundays; and they held good watch accordingly. The caution was not unneeded, for, shortly after one o'clock, in the depth of a winter's night, the Russians commenced one of the warmest cannonadings of the winter. The hideous glare from the gun-flashes, penetrating through the night-mist, revealed the Russian defence-works swarming with troops; while the brief intervals between the thunders of the cannon were filled up by the cheers and shouts of the men. The French received the greater part of this iron shower, and could with difficulty reply to it from their batteries; yet the Zouaves and tirailleurs in the trenches kept up a deadly fire of rifles, picking off the Russian artillerymen as they appeared at the embrasures. This tremendous cannonading was intended in part to mask a sortie, or rather two sorties, for the Russians in some force emerged from the town at two points, and rushed upon the English and French advanced posts; they were repulsed, however, as in every other attempt of the kind, and in about an hour the din of war had wholly ceased. Whether these repeated but ill-supported attacks were really intended to injure the position of the Allies, or were intended simply to keep the Russian troops in a state of excitement, is not very clear; but their effect was rather to worry and fatigue the besiegers than to disturb the siege-works. How great was this worry, can only be known by those conversant with the state of the troops at the time; for it must have been no small aggravation to the sufferings of the men to be compelled, whenever these Russian sorties occurred, to stand, even with shoeless feet, in snow two or three feet deep, and

* Chap. VII. p. 209.

maintain a firm front against the enemy; and if, on returning to camp, they found perchance that a supply of boots had arrived, it was quite in accordance with the confused state of affairs at the time that nearly all the boots would be too small for the men. Thus, bootless, supperless, houseless, bedless, it was adding hardship to hardship when the troops were hastily called forth on these duties. Even at this very time, three weeks after Christmas, the soldiers adverted in their letters to the 'plum-puddings' said to be on their way from the ladies of England, and mourned over the non-arrival of those desiderata. Lord Raglan, in his dispatches, dwelt frequently on the state of the weather, and on his endeavours to bring siege-material up to the front; but he did not enlarge on the sufferings of the troops—at least no such dispatches were made public by the government.

General Canrobert, having the advantage of a much better system of organisation in the military departments, was enabled to shield his troops from suffering during the winter far more effectively than Lord Raglan; and the French reserve force

CANROBERT.

at home being large, his reinforcements were frequent and important. The English general, too, received reinforcements; but, as has already been stated, the new troops were mostly young, raw, and inexperienced, and were stricken down by privations almost as rapidly as they arrived. Considering the immense difficulties which beset Raglan, it was an achievement of no small character to bring up to the plateau fifty fine new 32-pounder guns, thirteen large mortars, and several heavy siege-guns, by the middle of January. It was useless to attempt a second bombardment, unless the siege-works were much more powerful than they had been in October; and this increase of power could only be obtained by a large accession of guns, mortars, and ammunition. At the period now under notice, nearly 15,000 large shot and shell had been accumulated in various parts of the British camp; few of these having been expended in repelling the sorties of the Russians. The French, too, had largely increased their siege-material; while the arrival of the eighth and ninth divisions from France raised their army to nearly 70,000 men.

As the end of January approached, the Allies could see that the defences of Sebastopol had advanced quite as rapidly as the works of the besiegers. Beginning from the west, or the shores of Quarantine Harbour, the line of defence between the plateau and the town displayed an amazing series of covered-ways traverses, zigzags, and parallels, bristling with cannon, and well armed by musketeers and riflemen. The houses in the principal parts of the town, in streets sloping

mostly towards the north, had not suffered much during the October bombardment; but those nearer the plateau had been partly destroyed by the Allies, and partly by the Russians themselves, leaving fragments of roof and wall to shelter numerous parties of riflemen. The Flagstaff Battery had been nearly shattered to pieces during the bombardment; but new works of great strength had been constructed immediately behind it, a little further distant from the French lines. The Redan and Garden Batteries, and the crenellated wall connecting them, had been strengthened. The Malakoff, a small round tower, had been nearly rent to pieces during the bombardment, but around it had arisen works of prodigious extent and strength; the slope of the hill whereon the tower stood had been shaped into earthworks, tier above tier, armed with cannon of enormous power, commanding an extensive sweep of open country towards the works of the Allies. While the utmost difficulty was experienced by the Allies in fathoming the movements and plans of the Russians, the Russian spies traversed the Allied camps with inconceivable audacity—now disguised as French Zouaves, now as British riflemen—peering about at everything, and then stealing off into the town, carrying with them a large budget of useful items of knowledge concerning the camps and siege-works of the Allies. Undoubted evidence was indeed obtained, throughout the war, that the system of espionage enabled the Russians to foresee and frustrate many plans formed by the Allies.

Setting apart various collisions of smaller import, involving little either of advantage or of loss, the operations during the month of February may be grouped around four centres, or associated with four dates. Two of those operations bore reference to the plain of the Tchernaya, and two to the plateau outside Sebastopol.

After a long interval of quiet, news, or, if not news, rumours, spread around, on the 7th of February, that the Russians had again made their appearance in the plain, in rear of the Allied camps, and in threatening proximity to Balaklava. Throughout the war, as just observed, spies were generally more successful in the service of the Russians than in that of the Allies; but in this instance a Tatar, arriving at the Highland camp near Kadikoï, announced that the Russians had several small bodies of men in Kamara, Tchorgouna, and other villages eastward or north-eastward of Balaklava; while an army of 35,000 men was making a detour by way of Baidar, further to the south-east, in order, apparently, to approach the heights immediately commanding the harbour. Evening was far advanced when this information was received; but Sir Colin Campbell, who throughout the winter held the chief command in this quarter, lost not a moment in making preparations: he ranged his batteries and troops in order, sent a newly arrived regiment up to the intrenchments on the heights, and brought all the land-defences into an efficient state. Meanwhile, the harbour became a scene of intense activity. Admiral Boxer, who had sometime previously been placed in naval command there, and Captain Christie, who had not at that time been superseded, made such arrangements as seemed likely to be most appropriate among the war-ships and transports; the crew of the *Vesuvius* steam-sloop was landed, as a corps for the defence of the town and stores; the *Wasp* and *Diamond* were cleared for action, and were moored so as to form a floating-battery commanding the land-approach to the harbour; while the crews of all the other ships were ordered under arms, ready to land and render active service if exigencies required it. During the whole night were these preparations, on land and in the harbour, progressing. Mrs Duberly, who was sleeping on shipboard in the harbour at the time, thus summarily dismisses the whole affair, in her *Diary:* 'Roused in the middle of the night by a report that the Russians were coming down in force, and that the crews of the transports must all turn out armed. What an order! what could such a disorganised rabble do in the midst of regular troops? They would most probably fire away at whatever came first, and cause endless worry and confusion.' Whether or not the naval criticisms of this military lady were likely to be justified, great excitement prevailed among all at Balaklava, for it was believed that a tough contest with the Russians was at hand.

Full of expectation, energy, hope—anything but fear—the gallant Sir Colin, having ascertained that all was in proper defence in the harbour, mounted his horse at four in the morning on the 8th, and rode up to the heights, where he and his officers peered through the darkness for any indications of the expected enemy, ready to render a good account of himself and his Highlanders. The expectation turned out to be incorrect; no encounter took place—simply because the British had well prepared themselves for it. The Russians made no attack; yet were the precautions shewn to have been prudent and even necessary; for as the day advanced, the enemy appeared in great force on the left or west of the Tchernaya, and reoccupied the hillocks whence they had driven the Turks in October, on the day of the battle of Balaklava. They prepared to drag up a few guns to Canrobert's Hill, as if to open an attack on the defenders of Balaklava. Here, however, they were so struck with astonishment at the preparations evidently made by the British, that they checked their operations. Not a shot was fired on either side; the Russians remained watching during two or three days, and then were observed to march off towards the north. Events of subsequent date tended to shew that this was a part or the whole of Liprandi's corps, which, frustrated in a designed attack on Balaklava, marched off straight to Eupatoria, and there received a defeat from the Turks under Omar Pacha, as narrated in the last section. The Allies,

of course, did not know, until the departure had actually occurred, what plans might be in agitation; but as they saw numerous bodies of Russians manœuvring among the hills beyond the Tchernaya, on the 8th and two following days, they were kept in a state of watchful attention and some anxiety, doubtful whether any renewed attack were intended. Omar Pacha arrived in a steamer at Kamiesch on the 8th from Eupatoria, to hold a council of war with Raglan and Canrobert; but he returned in a day or two, as soon as it became suspected that Liprandi had designs on Eupatoria. The departure of the Russian general relieved Sir Colin Campbell from immediate anxiety; but the necessity for watchful attention on the movements of the Russians remained sufficiently apparent.

The second of the dates around which the February occurrences are proposed to be grouped was on the 13th. There occurred on this day a sortie of the garrison from Sebastopol, one among many, but somewhat distinguished from the rest in importance. In the dead of the night a body of Russians emerged from the place, under the command of a fine young officer who displayed great intrepidity. The sortie was preceded by a heavy firing from one of the Russian batteries, which blew up one of the French magazines; the Russians, cheering vociferously at this achievement, sallied forth, headed by their young commander, who was speedily wounded in several places, and taken prisoner. The sortie was soon checked, like most of the others; but there was something in the manner of the young officer which much excited the attention of the French, against whose position this attack had been made: he had exhibited daring courage, and had many marks of distinction about him. The Russians, on the following day, sent a flag of truce, requesting to know his fate; the French replied that he had died of his wounds, and that the body would be returned if his name and rank were announced. After some delay and hesitation, the Russians stated that the officer was an aid-de-camp and protégé of the Emperor Nicholas, and that he had arrived at Sebastopol only the night before with dispatches from St Petersburg. His dead body was given up. Many French officers, who attentively watched his features, formed an opinion that he was a natural son of the czar.

The third week in February presented to the Allies one among many proofs, afforded during the winter, of the almost insupportable cold occasionally experienced in those regions. Tatar spies, employed to set a watch on the movements of the Russians in or near the plain, came in and announced that, although the main body of Liprandi's army had gone off towards Eupatoria, about 6000 infantry and a few guns had been left near the Tchernaya. The Allied commanders at once resolved on an attempt to capture this force. The first brigade of the first French division, the whole of the light division under General Bosquet, one regiment of Zouaves, Sir Colin Campbell's Highland brigade, a body of French cavalry under General d'Allonville, a small force of English cavalry, and a few batteries of English and French artillery—forming in the aggregate an army of respectable magnitude—were told off for this service. The plan was that Sir Colin, with his Highlanders, should advance cautiously upon the front of the enemy; while the French, winding round to the south and east, would suddenly appear upon their left flank, and cut off their retreat by the Traktir Bridge over the Tchernaya. The plan might have been good, but 'General February' defeated it—a general on whom the Russians have much relied in all their winter campaigns in their own country. As the night of the 19th arrived, and preparations were completed for the set-out at two o'clock on the following morning, a sudden and most unpropitious change in the weather took place; a heavy gale, accompanied by torrents of rain, set in, and lasted two hours, rending and soaking everything about the camp; then the wind veered round to the north, the rain ceased, and a piercing blast of almost arctic severity began, accompanied by snow so thick that the men were nearly blinded by it. This visitation conquered the resolution of General Canrobert; he hesitated to bear the responsibility of sending out his men in such weather, and at about two in the morning he announced this fact to Lord Raglan. His lordship, seeing the plans thus broken, immediately sent an officer to Sir Colin to countermand the expedition; but unfortunately this officer lost his way during the blinding snow-storm, and did not arrive at the Highlanders' camp until two hours after the time appointed for Sir Colin's departure. This general, true to his orders, started at the pre-arranged hour, despite the snow and cold, trusting that the French force would effect its flank-movement in support.

What a night's march was that! The cold was so intense that the men could scarcely grasp their muskets and rifles; while the snow was falling so thickly, as to render next to impossible any observation of the enemy's movements. Mr Woods asserts, though without mentioning any reasons for such a strange proceeding, that the Highlanders, by special order, wore their open feather-bonnets instead of their warm fur-caps; it necessarily followed that such bonnets, while retaining the snow, were utterly useless in shielding the face from the wind. The 42d, 71st, 79th, and 93d regiments, with a battery of guns, and the remnants of the half-starved cavalry, sallied forth in this inclement night. Blinded by the snow, the leaders of the expedition mistook their way; and a wearisome circuit had to be traversed before the right track was gained. After a brave struggle against the elements, Sir Colin and his hardy men reached the spot where they were to wait until Bosquet had effected his flank-movement. But no Bosquet appeared, and, two hours of marching having been endured, the

troops lay down on the snow for a while, to wait; after half an hour's stoppage, no French appearing, they advanced towards Tchorgouna, having already passed by Kamara. Here they again rested; but matters had now become serious; the troops were frostbitten, benumbed, unable to fix bayonets, and many of them unable to move their hands at all. Sir Colin saw that any contest with the enemy was out of the question under such circumstances, and he ordered a retreat—wondering, nevertheless, why the French did not make their appearance. Just at this moment, the officer sent by Lord Raglan, having been too late at Balaklava and then at Kamara, arrived at Tchorgouna with the message; and about the same time, General Villenois arrived with four French regiments, having determined to afford this succour as soon as he learned of Sir Colin's departure. Day dawned, and then the Russians could be seen, evidently taken by surprise, but soon alert in making an orderly retreat over the heights beyond Tchorgouna. It was physically impossible for Campbell to arrest them; his men had their very heart's warmth almost

Returning to the Camp after a Reconnaissance.

frozen out of them, their limbs were gradually stiffening, and the snow became still more thick and blinding. They returned to camp after an absence of nine hours, and had to place 200 of their number in hospital, afflicted with frostbite. All the circumstances connected with the expedition tended to shew that the plan of attack had been judiciously formed; the secret had been well kept, the Russians were completely off their guard, and the probabilities are many that the whole would have been made prisoners of war. This probability rendered it doubly mortifying to Sir Colin Campbell that he should have been beaten by an enemy proverbially fickle—the weather.

That the snow-storms of that region must be peculiarly intense is forcibly shewn by one of the most striking among Mr Russell's letters. On the morning of the 19th, a few hours before the return of the Highlanders to their camp near Kadikoï, he started off at an early hour to Kamiesch, about nine miles distant in a straight line, in hurry to post a letter to go by a mail about to start—intending to gallop back and witness some of the expected doings in the Tchernaya plain. He joined a convoy of artillerymen, but presently the snow became so blinding that no horseman could see his neighbour. Thinking his companions were going too much to the right, he went further to the left, and separated from them; but wishing to urge upon them a reconsideration of their route, he diverged with an intention again to join them: he lost them completely, however, and then bent his attention seriously to tread a correct path for himself. On he went, dashing against the icy particles that filled the air; but although one hour's good riding would have covered the distance, even on an unfavourable day, he found himself, at the end of two hours, in an unknown spot. He could make out nothing: tents, hillsides, jutting rocks, all seemed to have vanished, leaving nothing but a fleecy white sheet around him. Another hour passed, and yet no living

thing, no camp or tent, to be seen. At last, amid snow yet more terribly dense than ever, the horse suddenly stopped, and resolutely refused to move. What this could mean his rider did not know, but unpleasant surmises began to cross his mind. Presently a dark form, probably of a wolf or a wild-dog, rushed by, and startled the horse into a renewed gallop, plunging above the knees into snow-drifts which were rapidly forming at every alternation of hillock and furrow. The rider became sensitively aware that a deep snow-bed might at such a time prove his grave. 'Minutes became hours,' he says, 'and my eyes were bleared and sore striving to catch a glimpse of tent or man, and to avoid the new dangers in our path. Suddenly I plunged in among a quantity of brushwood—sure and certain sight that I had gone far astray indeed, and that I was at some place removed from the camp and the woodcutters. The notion flashed across me that the wind might have changed, and that in riding against it I might have shaped my course for the Tchernaya and the Russian lines. The idea of becoming the property of a Cossack picket was by no means a pleasant ingredient in one's thoughts at such a moment. Still, what was to be done? My hands and feet were becoming insensible from the cold, and my face and eyes were exceedingly painful. There was no help for it but to push on, and not to let night come on. That would indeed be a serious evil. At this moment there was a break in the snow-drift for one moment, and I saw to my astonishment a church dome and spire on my right, which vanished again in a moment. My impression was, that I must either be close to Kamara or to Sebastopol, and that the church was in either of those widely separated localities. Either way, the only thing to do was to bear away to the left to regain our lines, though I could not help wondering where on earth the French works were, if it was indeed Sebastopol. I had not ridden very far, when, through the ravings of the wind, a hoarse roar rose up from before me, and I could just make out a great black wall as it were rising up through the snow-drift. I was on the very edge of the tremendous precipices which overhang the sea near Cape Fiolente!' The spot was not invested with the Cossack and Russian dangers he had at first suspected; it was neither Kamara nor Sebastopol; it was the elevated cliff close to the monastery of St George, on the southern coast. Having found out his locality thus far, and thawed his frozen hair and garments by a Zouave's fire, he started anew, but still so blinded and utterly bewildered by the snow, that he did not reach Kamiesch until four o'clock in the afternoon. Glancing at the map,* and noticing the five positions of the camp near Inkermann, Kamiesch, the monastery, Sebastopol, and Kamara, it will afford a striking proof of the bewilderment into which a sharp-witted and experienced man must have been thrown by a dense snow-storm, that, in going from the first of these to the second, he arrived unwittingly at the third, while in a painful state of doubt whether he had wildly strayed to the fourth or the fifth. We may thence learn what were the perils and privations to which Sir Colin Campbell and his Highlanders must have been at that very time exposed; and may well understand how imperative became the return of his troops. On that same day, too, Liprandi's army was marching back towards Sebastopol, after having suffered defeat at Eupatoria; and so awful was the snow-storm in parts of the route to be traversed, that 2000 hapless beings were snowed and frozen to death.

Perhaps the most formidable of the movements made in February—although the Allies did not so regard it at the time, or at least did not prepare sufficiently for it—took place on the 22d, two days after the snowy journey into the Tchernaya plain. The scene of activity was south-eastward of the Karabelnaïa suburb of Sebastopol. On looking at the map just referred to, it will be seen that the Malakoff Tower stood on or near the line of defence outside the Karabelnaïa, between the suburb itself and the attack-works of the Allies; and the details of the siege, already given, will have shewn that, by extensively fortifying the hill on which the tower stood, it became a stronghold of the most formidable kind, necessitating greatly increased attack-works on the part of whomsoever might attempt to capture the town. All this the Allies well knew; but they did not know, or did not act as if they knew, that there was another hill fully deserving their attention. Outside the Malakoff, outside the defence-works—indeed, much nearer to the French trenches than to the Russian works—was an elevation subsequently to acquire a world-wide reputation under the name of the MAMELON. This hill, about one-third of a mile in advance of the Malakoff, and somewhat less than a quarter of a mile from the works of the Allies, was about a mile in circumference at the base, gradually narrowing towards an irregularly flat summit; the side next to the Allies, having been quarried for stone, was high and steep, broken and rugged, with large masses of rough stone lying about it; and as the height was very considerably above the level of the most advanced French works, an attack upon such a spot, if defended, would be a serious undertaking, since a noiseless approach would be impossible, over the rough crags and rolling stones.

Now this important position, neglected by the Allies, was cleverly turned to advantage by the Russians. Why the Allies thus permitted the enemy to make so bold and fortunate a stroke, has never been sufficiently explained. Perhaps there was no Todtleben among them, no military engineer of commanding genius, who, seeing a prize neglected by others, skilfully appropriated it to the advantage of the sovereign whom he faithfully served; or perhaps there was discord

* 'Portion of the Crimea forming Chief Scene of Warfare.'

in the Allied councils, some officers recommending one course and some another, and no one possessing such commanding influence as to set the matter right; or perhaps the available hands were deemed too few to undertake this addition to the other siege-works. Whatever may have been the cause, the Mamelon remained untouched, unappropriated by the Allies. The French, being stronger in number than the English, had undertaken during the winter the construction of batteries and siege-works north-east of the English works—that is, nearer to the northern edge of the plateau. A glance at the map will shew that the French not only constructed and maintained all the works south-west of Sebastopol, but also one-half of those south-east of the Karabelnaïa; the English works, about one-fourth of the whole, being situated between two portions of French. Deep valleys, nearly as steep as ravines, separated these siege-works one from another; but the Allies placed detached batteries in such positions as to command the ravines, all of which stretched down towards Sebastopol or its suburb. The French extended their parallels one by one down the spurs of the plateau, towards the Malakoff; and as the distance to the Mamelon became lessened, many officers, colloquially if not in council, recommended that the seizure of that hill should be no longer delayed. Whether or not this advice was listened to, Todtleben was beforehand with the Allies. He had already made the Mamelon useful, by planting riflemen behind temporary barriers on the side next the Allies, to inflict mischief on them; but now he adopted a bolder and more decisive step. On the dark night of the 22d, an immense body of working-soldiers emerged silently from behind the Malakoff, and marched quickly but cautiously over the six hundred yards intervening between that fort and the Mamelon hill, taking with them a store of everything required for the construction of defence-works. The Allied pickets and trench-guards heard subdued sounds during the night, and remained more than usually watchful against a sortie by the garrison; but, suspecting nothing further, made no other preparations. Cold and misty broke the morning of the 23d, leaving the Mamelon almost imperceptible, looming largely but obscurely through the fog. Later in the day, however, the weather cleared, and the Allies, much to their astonishment and mortification, found that the Mamelon had become a fort since the preceding evening. Two complete rows of gabions had been filled, and placed all round the summit of the hill, under cover of which the working-parties were busily engaged in digging trenches, making platforms for heavy guns, and completing all the arrangements necessary for a regular fortification.

This was a severe and discouraging blow to the French. It placed at once a barrier between them and the Malakoff, rendering necessary a conquest of the Mamelon before the remoter fort could be silenced; in other words, it suddenly created a new difficulty in their position, presenting an additional obstacle to those which had hitherto pressed sufficiently heavy upon them. It became evident to all that this new fort, this transformed Mamelon, could not prudently be allowed to remain untouched: an attempt, even though unsuccessful, must be made to capture it ere it assumed formidable proportions. A plan for this purpose was laid; but here again treachery aided the Russians. There was a small Foreign Legion belonging to the French army; and one of the soldiers of this legion, an Italian, after possessing himself of information he conceived would be valued at a good price by the Russians, made his escape in the dusk of the evening, succeeded in reaching Sebastopol, and there told the enemy how the French plans might be frustrated. What became of the traitor afterwards, does not appear; but his treachery fully prepared the Russians to maintain the great advantage they had already gained.

As soon as the French had perceived the new works on the Mamelon, they formed a plan of attack for that very evening, feeling well assured that not a day ought to be lost. According to this plan, two battalions of Zouaves, one of infantry of the line, one of French marines, and about 300 chasseurs—amounting to 2500 in all—were told off for this important duty; General Monet was placed in command, and was ordered to make the attack at midnight. The scheme was talked of with much vivacity in the French camp; and thus traitors as well as true men became familiar with it. As night approached, dark, windy, and boisterous, the chosen troops sallied forth, with orders to approach silently as close to the Mamelon as possible, by the parallels and covered-ways, and then make a sudden dash uphill. Cautiously they advanced, listening for any sounds from the enemy, and emerging from the trenches upon the level ground at the foot of the hill. No Russians appearing, no pickets or guards, they wondered; but still on they went. As cautiously as was practicable among the loose stones, the nimble Zouaves and chasseurs ascended the hill to within twenty yards of the top—still no Russians. This rendered the French troops very uneasy, for the Russians bore and deserved the reputation of being watchful guards at all their outposts. Suspecting an ambuscade, the French looked suspiciously around them; they saw nothing, but presently they heard a movement as of troops rising from the ground, and then the sound of two or three Russian words of command, followed by a terrific volley of musketry from a concealed enemy, which levelled the foremost Zouaves to the dust. The secret was now revealed; the Russians, forewarned of the approaching attack by the traitorous Italian, had allowed the French to ascend to a perilous part of the hill, where a close fire might be poured in upon them. The Zouaves, aroused and exasperated by this sudden surprise, rushed onward with daring fierceness, gained the newly-made parapet

of gabions, leaped over the obstruction, and engaged in a bloody struggle with the Russians, whom they now for the first time caught sight of in the gloom of night. Officers and men, French and Russians, all engaged in a hand-to-hand contest, firing, cutting, bayoneting, stabbing—a second Inkermann on a small scale: tactics being at such a moment out of the question. After a terrible struggle the Zouaves poured up in sufficient numbers to capture about half the works, the Russians retaining the other half; and now came the question, which half should yield to the other? If the numbers had remained without reinforcements on either side, this question would probably have been answered in favour of the French; but a new manœuvre prevented this. Two bodies of Russian infantry, each about 2000 strong, marched out from the Malakoff, or from the Karabelnaïa, and came round to the flanks of the French marines, who, lower down the slope of the Mamelon, were preparing to support the Zouaves and the chasseurs higher up. The marines, thus surprised, bore a discharge of musketry without shrinking, but a bayonet-charge greatly disordered them; attempting to re-form, and present a new front against their assailants, the broken ground bewildered them: they wandered and wavered; the Russians charged again, and with fatal effect. The marines, quite separated from the Zouaves above, and probably ignorant that those daring fellows had effected a lodgment, lost heart, broke rank, began a retreat downhill, and ended by a precipitate flight, pursued by the fire of the Russians. Meanwhile the Zouaves and chasseurs, having full employment on their hands, stuck closely to their conquered position, endeavouring to extend their advantages. General Monet, in the thickest of the fight, received a shot through the shoulder, and had his right hand shattered by a hand-grenade, one of many hurled by the Russians at their opponents. After a desperate charge, in which the colonel of the Zouaves was dangerously wounded, the French succeeded in dislodging the Russians. But in so doing a danger of startling character opened upon their view; being now on the inner edge or slope of the Mamelon, they came within range of the Malakoff and the Redan, which immediately opened a murderous fire of shot, shell, and rockets; the torrent was indeed so terrific that the Zouaves could neither brave it by standing up nor by lying down: the shot and shell ploughed up the ground, and left not a square yard where safe shelter could be obtained. There were no cannon on the Mamelon to reply to those of the Malakoff and the Redan; and muskets were powerless at such a time. What was to be done? The hardy fellows braved the burning tempest for full half an hour, and would even have rushed on in an endeavour to capture the Malakoff itself; but this would have been little less than madness, and therefore Monet ordered a retreat. As soon as this commenced, the Russian artillery ceased to fire, and the Russian battalions charged with the bayonet; the Zouaves stoutly resisted this charge, but still found it necessary to continue their retreat, during which Monet received a bayonet-wound in the stomach. Whenever the line of retreat brought the French within scope of the Malakoff or the Redan, the cannon of these forts poured out a destructive fire. At length, when the French reached their own works, they were galled at hearing the Russians give a loud cheer at resuming their occupation of the Mamelon; while the whole Allied camp could not fail to hear the bell-ringing and jubilation within Sebastopol itself, as a recognition of a victory obtained. In this struggle, General Monet was brought away dangerously though not fatally wounded; while nearly 600 officers and men, among the French, were either killed or wounded.

So entirely was this a French enterprise, that the English, separated from them by a ravine, knew little concerning it until roused from their slumbers by the deafening thunder of the Russian artillery in the Malakoff, at about three in the morning. Then did officers and newspaper correspondents, leaving their tents and blankets, speedily hurry forward to see what had transpired; but nothing was visible except a blaze of fire belching forth, and nothing audible but the boom of artillery, the whizzing of balls, and the bursting of shells. Not being able to approach more closely, the spectators remained for some hours ignorant of the real nature of the contest, but impressed with the conviction that it must have been a serious affair, involving, probably, much loss of life, and a successful sortie upon the French works. Daylight revealed the truth, exemplified in the strengthening of the new fort constructed on the Mamelon hill. Whether any immediate attempt was made to renew the attack on this position, does not clearly appear; but certainly none attended with success: the Russians made good use of their days and nights, and a mere *coup de main* on the part of the French became no longer practicable.

With this brief but sharp contest—this battle of the Mamelon, if so it may be called—the present Chapter may appropriately be closed. The date, February 24, marked a sort of dividing-line between the terrible winter and the advancing spring. The crocus and the primrose had already begun to put forth their beauties, the intense frost yielded to a milder temperature, and the murky sky was more frequently relieved by patches of cheerful blue. The French had brought enormous reinforcements to bear upon the beleaguered city, and had increased the number and length of their siege-works. The English had seen the worst of their miseries, and—such of them as were left—began to look forward with a little hopefulness; new regiments were arriving from England; stores of shot and shell, guns and mortars were being landed at Balaklava

as rapidly as the limited capacity of the little harbour would permit; the railway was beginning to make its appearance; and the plateau was becoming more than ever strengthened against any rear attack from the Russians by way of Inkermann or the Valley of the Tchernaya. On the other hand, the Russians had not only, with indomitable perseverance, given formidable strength to the Malakoff, the two Redans, the Flagstaff Battery, and the other defence-works, but had also interposed a most formidable obstacle between the besiegers and the besieged, in the newly fortified Mamelon: thereby rendering a conquest of that place necessary before the Malakoff could be reached by the Allies. It was on the 26th of September that Lord Raglan and his army had arrived in this region, after the flank-march from the Alma, and on the 27th that the dying St Arnaud joined him with the French force. Just one hundred and fifty days had elapsed. If an impartial inquiry be made, how far success had attended the efforts of the besiegers during this long period, it seems difficult to resist the conclusion that credit was due to the Russians rather than to the Allies. True, the Russians had the advantage of being in their own country, whereas

A French Approaches. B Mamelon. C Russian Works. D Malakoff.

a long sea-voyage separated the besiegers from France and England; but, on the other hand, the Allies completely commanded the Black Sea; and, moreover, the south side of Sebastopol, next the plateau, was almost entirely undefended at the time of the arrival of the besiegers: the defence-works grew under the very eyes of the French and English. Apart from any invidious comparison between the opponents—not fairly to be made until a multiplicity of circumstances has been duly considered—the besiegers themselves could not but admit that the Russians behaved most gallantly during the winter. Firing upon flags of truce and burying-parties, and stabbing the wounded, were black deeds attributable to a rude soldiery in moments of passionate excitement, and were rather extenuated than defended by the Russian commanders; but, these excepted, the actions of the czar's troops were those of faithful and brave men; while the genius of Todtleben enabled him to soar above the tremendous difficulties of his position. As in many parallel instances, it may be that the commander, Prince Menchikoff, obtained a share of glory from the reflex action of his subordinate: it may be true, as has in many quarters been asserted, that Todtleben was the man who suggested the sinking of the ships in the harbour, as well as the construction of the defence-works on the southern margin of the town: it was a daring deed—very unseamanlike, certainly—but as fully effective towards its intended result as any manœuvre perhaps in modern warfare. After the hundred and fifty days, after the perils of winter, the besiegers saw that a formidable work was yet before them, that they had yet to test the full power of a vast series of forts and batteries, and of large reinforcements received by the garrison.

CHAPTER IX.

DIPLOMACY, FROM THE DECLARATION OF WAR TO THE VIENNA CONFERENCES.

The Sultan ABDUL-MEDJID.

EUROPEAN statesmen and ambassadors were actively engaged, throughout the warlike transactions narrated in Chapters IV. to VIII., in attempts either to stem the torrent of war, or to establish new and extended alliances among the respective powers. The courtesies of diplomacy were concurrent with the thunders of cannon, the wiles of intrigue with the strategy of battle-fields; and at no period was there an extinguishment of hope that peace might possibly supervene, as a reward to the statesmen for their labours.

THE QUESTION OF THE NATIONALITIES.

When England and France declared war against Russia, towards the close of March 1854, the terms of the declaration, and those of the treaty or convention between the two Allies, distinctly recognised the principle that no ambitious project, no acquisition of territory, no disturbance of the balance of power in Europe, was aimed at; it was simply a determination to check a tendency, long observable in the Russian court, to tamper with the independence of the Turkish Empire.* It was

* See Chapter III., pp. 67-74.

seen that any longer abstinence of the Western Powers from interference would be attended by a paralysis of the Ottoman power; that the 'sick man' would become more and more powerless; and that the dream of the Muscovite court would be realised, by the planting of the Russian eagle, if not at Constantinople, at least in some locality which would have rendered the czar virtually master of the destiny of Turkey.

So far all was simple; but when the other powers of Europe were called upon to enter the alliance, complicated difficulties were at once foreseen. Even if it were supposed that all the states, from Sweden in the north to Austria in the south, were interested in maintaining such a balance among the powers as might prevent Russia from becoming dangerously influential, and were anxious that the Osmanli should not be trampled down by the Russ—still there were other reasons why those powers might not be disposed to enter into a hearty coalition, fearful lest other questions, more immediately affecting their domestic policy, should be inconveniently raised.

Taking England as a first exemplar, it is obvious that she had no immediate danger to fear from the machinations of Russia. A wide region separates the two empires, and no boundary difficulties or border contests were at that time imminent. Still, superadded to the agreements which bound England in honour to assist Turkey in time of peril, there were certain contingencies that could not safely be kept out of view. England, possessing vast territories and colonies in the East, is closely interested in the possession of a power of transit over the neck of land separating the Mediterranean from the Red Sea. While Egypt is governed by pachas subordinate, in ever so slight a degree, to the sultan, there is no probability that this power or privilege will be tampered with, especially as English engineers have been so largely engaged in railway enterprise in that country. But, supposing Russia to possess power over any provinces in that region, who could answer for the safety of the privilege? The same power which allowed the Sulina mouth of the Danube to choke up with sand, in order that the Turkish Galatz might not compete with the Russian Odessa, would not be scrupulous in interposing obstacles to a free passage over the Isthmus of Suez, if a claim of possession and a feeling of self-interest converged in that direction. Again, the English possessions in the East Indies come nearly in contact with those of Persia, Tibet, and other Asiatic nations; they are separated from Asiatic Russia by vast sandy plains and inhospitable districts; but if Russia were to obtain a hold over Asia Minor, and supersede Turkish power in that region, she would be so powerful a neighbour to Persia, that the latter would possibly be compelled to acquiesce in Russian designs against British India.

Considering now the neighbouring country, France, and giving to the sovereign and people of that country credit for an equally impartial wish to shield Turkey from the claws of the northern eagle, there is nevertheless evident a wide difference in the nature of the sympathies and the instincts of self-advancement. France has no possessions in the East, or, rather, has possessions of such small area and slight value, that it is of less account to her than to England to be in command of a short commercial route from Europe to Asia and Australasia. Nor had France at any time much to fear from any encroachment by Russia on the regions of Southern Asia. If the czar had poured his armies over the sands of Khiva and Bokhara to the Hindoo Koosh, on the way to the plains of India, the movement might cause disquietude to England, but could not materially affect France. On the other hand, France has an unbroken land-frontier from Dunkirk to Nice, separating her territory from those of Belgium, Prussia, two or three of the minor German states, Switzerland, and the Sardinian states, and involving all the stern international arrangements concerning customs and passports. Any influence obtained by the gigantic power of Russia over these intermediate states might be of serious moment to France, endangering her relations with her immediate neighbours, and rendering it doubtful whether an offensive or a defensive attitude would be more conducive to her own welfare. She might hear of a Russian invasion of India without alarm; but any advance of Russian troops from the Vistula to the Oder or the Elbe, or any increase of Russian influence in the countries through which those rivers flow, would make the pulse of the nation beat higher.

Turning next to Austria, we find a government which, in earlier years, had shewn no disinclination to acquire power in the northern and western provinces of Turkey, making use of a somewhat crooked diplomacy to increase her influence in those regions. On the other hand, the Russian and Austrian Empires being conterminous throughout a distance of many hundred miles, from Cracow on the Vistula to Czernovitz on the Pruth, Austria was naturally averse to any quarrel with her powerful neighbour, who might have poured down immense armies on the frontier, or might by degrees have lessened the influence of the court of Vienna in the Germanic confederation. Moreover, Russia, at a time when Austria was sorely pressed by the gallant achievements of the Hungarians in the years 1848–9, held out a saving-hand, crushed the Magyars, and liberated Austria from the attacks of an indignant ill-used nation. This was a service not soon to be forgotten. Considering that Austria was sufficiently ready in former years to share with Russia in the spoliation of Poland, and that the policy of her court had undergone very little change, there is much reason to believe that, in 1853, she would have deemed a partition of

Turkey no very glaring act of wickedness, if thereby she could have obtained some of the frontier provinces as her portion. The Servians had ample means of knowing the yearnings of Austria in this particular. As to any aggressive movements of Russia in the north or east, Austria cared little concerning them—they would affect her not. Apart from, or beyond, any readiness to fulfil engagements previously entered upon, therefore, Austria had little cause or wish to quarrel with Russia. Dredge the Sulina mouth of the Danube, and keep Russian hands off the 'Illyrian triangle' forming the north-west corner of Turkey, and the kaiser was ready enough to remain at amity with the czar.

Glancing further northward, and viewing the position of Prussia as affected towards the Turkish question, it becomes evident that the southern interests were less and less in the ascendant. If Prussia had signed any treaties or conventions, binding her in a guarantee to assist in the preservation of Turkish independence, such engagements she must of course respect; but her own selfish interests were little affected by the mere mode in which provinces on the shores of the Black Sea were appropriated. Not so in the region of the Vistula, however; Russia there met her face to face, and any advance of Russian influence westward would have been perilous. Narrowly considered, therefore, Prussia might be willing to disregard Russian encroachments on the south, provided none such were made in a direction dangerously proximate to Berlin. Moreover, there were family reasons for the maintenance of amicable relations between the two countries: the king's sister was the czar's wife; and that royal lady, respected in both countries, was instrumental in smoothing down any causes of international irritation that might occasionally arise.

Still further north, the singular group of islands and peninsulas constituting the kingdom of Denmark was less than any of the nations hitherto named interested in the affairs of the Turkish Empire. What had Denmark to hope or to fear, to wish or to deprecate, concerning the ownership of provinces washed by the Black Sea, or concerning the 'Holy Places' at Jerusalem or elsewhere? So long as she held the keys of the Baltic, by ruling over the only channels through which ships could enter or leave that sea, she obtained an acceptable revenue under the name of the Sound Dues; and so long as Russia shared the willingness of other maritime states to pay those dues, Denmark was quite willing to remain on terms of amity with her, especially as, being a trading people, the Danes pursued a profitable trade with the Russian ports on the Baltic and White Seas. Moreover, the struggle between Denmark and the duchies of Schlesvig and Holstein, a few years earlier, had ended in an arrangement which gave Russia a certain choice or power in regulating the future succession to the Danish throne; and the king, at the time when the Turkish war broke out, had little inducement to offend the powerful czar by taking up arms against him in a quarrel concerning the far-distant Ottoman territories.

Another northern state, Sweden, had its own cause for disquietude, but not on account of Turkish sympathies. She looked back to the day when her north-eastern frontier extended nearly to the White Sea, and when Finland was hers, with all its fringe-work of ports and islands; and she had her own reasons for suspecting that the same power which had enriched itself at her expense had an eye upon further acquisitions, not only along the northern coast of Norway, but in the vicinity even of Stockholm itself. Sweden had ample reasons to yearn for a termination of the aggressive tendencies of Russia; but still, viewing the ostensible causes of the Turkish war—seeing that the northern encroachments of Russia were not mentioned in the several declarations of war—and seeing, moreover, that Sweden had not been a subscribing party to the various treaties between Turkey and the other powers—there was no obvious reason why she should exasperate a haughty neighbour by taking an active part in a coalition against him.

Of the other nations of Europe, little need be said in relation to the matter now under discussion. Holland and Belgium were too small to take a prominent place in warlike manœuvres against Russia; the czar had not offended them, and was not likely, from geographical position, to make encroachments on their small dominions; they cared little for Turkey; they had nothing to win or to lose by any probable contest either in the Black Sea or the Baltic; and were only too glad to be allowed to remain neutral, carrying on lucrative commerce and manufactures while others were fighting. Of Germany, it was difficult to see how any other determination could be arrived at, other than Austria and Prussia, the two most powerful members of the confederation, might approve. The Germans sing and dream of Fatherland and of freedom; but this Fatherland is severed into so many petty fragments, that the states find it a matter of the utmost difficulty to combine for any great or useful purpose; while, as to freedom, the petty sovereigns of these states have shewn a tendency to imitate on a humble scale the grand despotism of the czar, rather than the constitutional usages of those countries which have parliaments, and ministers responsible to the people as well as to the rulers. United Germany would be equal to great achievements; but Germany, split up into nearly forty separate states, each with its little sovereign prince and courtly flatterers, can develop little of its power; and hence it arose, in the various diplomatic controversies connected with the Russo-Turkish war, that German opinion was little studied, except in so far as expressed through Prussia and Austria. Of Switzerland, that small home of republican

mountaineers, it is needless to speak, in relation to any immediate or actively expressed interest in Turkish affairs. Of Italy, alas! it is almost equally unnecessary to treat; for, fallen from its former greatness, and trodden down by misgovernment, it has in recent years scarcely been mentioned as a participator in the international politics of Europe; it has been treated as a 'geographical expression,' not as a nation. The one splendid exception, to be noticed in connection with a later period in the history of the war, does but offer, by a striking contrast, the more evident proof of the rule—that the Italian nation slumbers. Of Spain and Portugal it may be said that such states were not likely to embroil themselves with quarrels in the east of Europe; Russians were nearly as unlikely as Turks to adopt measures injurious to the Iberian peninsula; and having—Spain especially—a sufficient amount of domestic discord within themselves, they were not likely to be called upon to display a knight-errantry in defending the Osmanli from the Muscovite.

Considered, then, in relation to this complexity of interests, it will not appear strange that the Russo-Turkish war presented itself in different aspects to the several European states. The English ministers felt all the difficulty of their position, arising from this cause. In inviting the co-operation of other governments, they were enforced to take into account numerous divergent tendencies, and to seek for some common ground applicable alike to all. But in doing so, it was inevitable that the ministers would raise expectations not likely to be fulfilled. Certain set-phrases had become familiar in parliament and throughout the country; men talked and wrote of aggression, tyranny, despotism, serfdom, spoliation; of liberty, freedom, constitutional government, rights of conscience; they began to identify Russia with the former and England with the latter; and the Russian war speedily became regarded, not merely as a defence of Turkey, but as a manifestation of England's readiness to support freedom against tyranny, liberty against despotism. Even the cabinet ministers themselves, warming under the influence of parliamentary excitement, frequently threw their eloquence into this form, and employed high-sounding phrases which at a later day they would willingly have withdrawn.

As a consequence of this state of feeling, the commiserators of 'depressed nationalities' steadily urged upon the government the necessity, the sword having been drawn, of not sheathing it until those nationalities had been relieved from the burdens pressing upon them. The two modes of viewing the subject were sufficiently well stated, while the war was in progress, in the following words:—'The struggle in which we are engaged may be, and is, regarded in two lights—as a war of statesmen or as a war of patriots—as a war against the local aggressions of one despot, or as a war in defence of freedom and civilisation in the aggregate—as a war for the maintenance, or as a war for the amendment, of the *status quo*. Viewed in the one light, it is full of immoralities: viewed in the other, it is full of difficulties and dangers: considered from any point of view, it is replete with anomalies and perplexities innumerable; considered in a confusion of lights, and from ever-shifting points of view, its conduct cannot be otherwise than chaotic, and its resulting consequences, if not its ultimate success, must be greatly jeopardised. Our ideas upon the subject need much clearing and collating. So long as the people and the government have different notions on the matter, and different objects in their eye, so long will the vigour which results from perfect harmony of purpose be unattainable; golden opportunities will be lost; valuable alliances will be forfeited or foregone; and imperfect understanding or discreditable aims will first imperil victory, and then impair and mutilate its fruits.'*

These words, written after the war had considerably advanced, do not the less correctly represent the complexity inevitable from the outset: a complexity embodied in the question—whether England engaged in war *only* to defend Turkey from Russia? The reviewer obviously takes the popular side, the side of the nationalities as against despots in general; and there can be no doubt that this feeling or tendency, extensively entertained in England, conduced very largely towards the warmth and earnestness with which the war was encouraged in 1854. It may not be difficult to shew in a few words the nature and scope of this sympathy for the 'nationalities'—by which was usually meant the Polish, Hungarian, and Italian nations, but with an extension generally to all 'peoples' or nations oppressed by despotic rulers.

Russia, considered as a unity, or system, had for many years been the very incarnation of encroaching and conquering absolutism, the mainstay of tyranny and arbitrary power throughout the continent; dissuading the petty German princes from any concessions to their subjects; aiding to place the partially emancipated Hungarian nation again under the yoke of the House of Hapsburg; conquering and partitioning Poland; seizing Bessarabia, Transcaucasia, and the Crimea from Turkey, and Finland from Sweden; binding Prussia in the shackles of family selfishness; and obtaining a hold, the beginning of a grasp, over the future destinies of Denmark. Such being the case, then, was it right that England should shed her blood and expend her treasure in the maintenance of such a *status quo?* Was it respondent to the wishes of the nation that all our strength should be brought into action simply to prevent Russia from seizing another slice of Turkey, and that no attempt should be made to readjust the map of Europe by releasing freedom from the iron heel of despotism? Such were the inquiries made soon after the war broke

* *North British Review*, No. XLVII.

out; and to these inquiries the popular party replied by an indignant negative. The sympathisers with national liberty 'did not care much for Turkey itself. They gave little heed to protocols and proclamations. In their eyes, a war against Russia was, *ipso facto*, and whatever were its pretext or its form, a war against the mightiest and most persistent foe of progress, of justice, of liberty, and of peace—a war, therefore, in behalf of those great interests of humanity. They listened to no nice distinctions; they turned a deaf ear to the formal and decorous language of official disclaimers; their native instincts told them that the struggle would become, if it was not at the outset, one for grand and worthy aims—they resolved that it should become so—they were satisfied that timid and lukewarm ministers could not prevent its becoming so. They regarded it, therefore, in the light of a sacred cause, and threw their whole heart into its strife.'

Nevertheless, a steady consideration of the existing politics of Europe shewed, to the minds of others, how overwhelmingly difficult—nay, how practically impossible—would have been any recognition by England of the principle of the nationalities, any waging of a war for European freedom, arising simply out of the quarrel between Turkey and Russia.

In the first place, how could France at that time ally herself with England for such objects? The strong-willed man, whose self-elevation from Prince Louis Napoleon to Emperor Napoleon III. had been so recent, might have had a heart to wish, and wisdom to foresee, the arrangements most conducive to the honour and prosperity of the French nation: he might or might not: opinions would of course differ on this point; but there could be no difference of opinion that he had become virtually a despot—sending into exile those who had resisted his assumption of power, depriving the legislative chambers of the greater part of their legislative freedom, placing the whole press of the country under rigid censorship, imposing such shackles on scientific and literary men as to drive them almost into silence, and bringing about such a peculiar state of public affairs that the names of really distinguished living Frenchmen were seldom heard. How could such a monarch be reasonably expected to join England in a generous crusade for the liberty of nations—a war of peoples against despots? He might be a faithful ally in an endeavour to liberate Turkey from the schemes of her powerful neighbour; but he could not consistently talk, and write, and fight for liberty and freedom generally.

In the second place, Austria was still less likely than France to aid in the realisation of the hopes of those who yearned for liberal institutions and popular elevation. The allies of Turkey sought assiduously to obtain the services of Austria in repelling the aggressive movements of Russia; yet, if the arguments had extended beyond the strictest limits of the subject, Austria would sus-piciously have held aloof. For how was it possible for that power to recognise the nationalities, and negotiate or fight for enlightened freedom, without previously undoing all her own handiwork? Her mode of governing Austrian Poland, Austrian Italy, and Hungary, was a perpetual protest against liberty of speech and of action. It may be doubted whether the English nation has not entertained a more intense dislike to the internal government of the Austrian dominions than to that even of Russia itself; the reveries of Polish, Hungarian, and Italian republicans may, perhaps, have gone beyond the sympathies of Englishmen accustomed to a constitutional monarchy; but those sympathies have certainly not, in recent years, been shewn towards a court in which generosity of sentiment seems to be almost wholly wanting. There is a certain grandeur in the despotism of Russia: nothing grand can be encountered in that of the neighbouring state. Setting aside the general tenor of English feeling, however, it would have been obviously impossible for the court of Vienna to listen to any invitations from England, if those invitations involved any reopening of the question of the nationalities, any large use of the words freedom, liberty, and independence. Moreover, there was a suspicion abroad that, if Austria threw herself too readily into the arms of the Western Powers, Russia would not have scrupled to raise Hungary and Italy against her, by some of those intrigues and machinations so familiar to the court of St Petersburg; and then it might perchance have happened that England would be fighting *with* Austria against the 'nationalities,' a contingency utterly opposed to the general tone of feeling in the country. Any hope of obtaining the alliance of Austria with England and France, therefore, in defending Turkey against Russia, rested on a careful abstinence from all arguments calculated to arouse the suspicions of that power on the dreaded subject of popular freedom.

In the third place, Turkey herself was not placed in so enviable a position that Englishmen would like to devote lives and fortunes in a war merely to support her as she was before, to maintain the *status quo* without change. Liberal as Abdul-Medjid may have been in comparison with earlier sultans, he could not suddenly bring order and justice into an empire distinguished by the grossest anomalies and inequalities. Five-sixths of the inhabitants were Christians; and the *status quo* was a state in which these Christians were debarred from numerous privileges held by Mohammedans. It would have seemed strange if Christian England had aided Mohammedan Turkey against Christian Russia, without making some effort to lighten the bands which bound the 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 of Christians under the sultan's rule; and yet such a reform could scarcely be regarded as among the objects of the war; for, although there were Christians of the Greek Church of Russia, and Christians of the Romish Church of Austria, there were few or none of the

Protestant Church of England; and therefore the Allies of Turkey could not regard this subject from the same point of view. There was also this difficulty—whether, and to what extent, the Allies had an international right of interference in the internal government of the Ottoman states; no treaties gave this right, except in an indirect way and to a slight degree. If such a right were conceded, there was abundant room for the admission of argument concerning nationalities: the Moldavians, the Wallachians, the Bulgarians, the Servians, the Bosnians, the Croatians, the Montenegrins, the Albanians—all are, to a certain extent, distinct nations, having their recollections or traditions of a former state of independence, and viewing with dislike many of the laws in the internal government of the Ottoman Empire. But any consideration of these national rights or aspirations was a subject quite large enough in itself, without being entangled in the European struggle against Russia.

Those who wished, at the time when England formally announced her participation in the war, to make that movement ancillary to the progress and liberty of nations, condemned the intention, announced by the ministers, of maintaining the existing state of things in Turkey and in Russia. The *status quo* was believed to be a very bad status in both instances, and not worth fighting for. 'If the *status quo* in Turkey,' said the reviewer lately quoted, who well represents one particular side of this question, 'embodied much that no philanthropist would wish, and no statesman would deem it possible permanently to uphold, much that neither could nor ought to endure; if the spirit of progress forbade the indefinite prolongation of a despotism which, however occasionally mild and invariably lax, has got the inherent character of stagnation and rigidity which belongs to a theocracy; if, in the advance of civilisation, the subject races of Turkey must inevitably become too powerful and too restless to submit to the dominion of a small, a foreign, and an inergetic tribe; if, in a word, the time was certain to arrive, and was fast approaching, when the supremacy of the Porte over the heterogeneous elements subject to its sway, and the consequent unity and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, could no longer be maintained without trampling upon indefeasible rights, and lending our aid to crush or to depress natural and noble aspirations—the *status quo* in the Muscovite dominions, on the other hand, comprised many arrangements alike iniquitous and impolitic, which it was immoral to sanction, and would be criminal actively to uphold, and which, being the result of recent spoliation, could not plead even the poor excuse of lapse of time or long acquiescence in support of the claim of conquest. The *status quo* in Turkey stood upon the ground of four centuries of duration; and the impossibility of its continuance was a question more of to-morrow than of to-day. The *status quo* in Russia was only from twenty-five to seventy-five years old; was founded rather upon robbery than upon conquest; was much of it an open defiance of European treaties and of public law; and had been the subject of a series of armed and diplomatic protests which entirely barred any plea of title arising out of long and peaceable possession. Therefore we hold that the original proclamation of the Allies, "that they had not the slightest intention of altering the territorial boundaries of Russia," was an error in policy and in principle, and a fruitful source of mischief and embarrassment.'

But what, it may be asked on the other side, would have been the chances of England's success, if she had looked ahead to these restitutions of territory and this restoration of nationalities? If such objects had been attempted, would it have been possible to obtain the aid of Austria or Prussia? Nay, if liberty and freedom had been on the lips of British statesmen, would the Emperor of the French have gone with England into the alliance? The subject was so delicate, so surrounded with difficulties, that it would have been morally impossible in the spring of 1854 to organise a formidable alliance against Russia, if, in addition to the Russo-Turkish question, the Allies had taken up the subject of the nationalities, with a view to the promotion, not of the *status quo*, but of something better. There was not one single power in Europe that would have joined England at such a time for such an object; the Russo-Turkish question would have sunk into insignificance as soon as those further questions became involved; the continental sovereigns would have uneasily regarded the revival of questions which in 1848–9 had so convulsed their territories. England could not have effected the work alone, and her allies would have ceased to maintain their alliance, had the purpose held in view been thus complicated. Four or five of the great powers were bound, by treaties formally signed, to interpose between Turkey and any hostile attacks perilous to her existence as an independent state; but those powers were not parties to any agreement concerning the rights of subject nations, the freedom of the press, liberty of speech, constitutional government, public control over the public purse, responsibility of rulers, or any of those maxims of government to which the English nation had for ages been attached.

Attention to these considerations becomes necessary, in order to the due understanding of the diplomacy of Europe from the date of the declaration of war to that of the Vienna conferences, a period of about fourteen months. It might possibly have been, that, had another minister than the Earl of Aberdeen been in power when the war broke out, the political tactics would have differed in degree; but they could scarcely have differed in principle. The responsible ministers were bound, in appealing to the nation for support in the conduct of a just war, to place that war upon intelligible grounds; they

were bound to state what had been done by Russia to give offence to Europe, what check they deemed it necessary to give to that power, and how that check was to be managed—to give, in short, an account of the work to be done, and of their intended mode of doing it. If they had held out hopes that something more than this would be effected—that some of the national wrongs inflicted by the congress of Vienna in 1815 would be remedied, that an equitable rectification of the doom of oppressed races would be attempted—the announcement would have met with a warm response in the hearts of a large portion of the British nation, but it would have involved a war of a different kind; and the alliances would not only have required remodelling, but would have been well-nigh extinguished altogether, for England could not have obtained the aid of France, of Austria, or of Prussia for such objects. In justice to those who felt the burden of ministerial responsibility at a difficult time, it is necessary to bear these facts in mind; the English cabinet saw a way to shield Turkey from imminent peril, but did not and could not see a way, at such a time, of combining with this object a liberation of nationalities. Some such extension might offer itself during the progress of the war, but could not be announced as one of the preliminary grounds of warfare.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA.

The negotiations carried on during many months by England and France with Austria and Prussia will be rendered intelligible by a consideration of the facts brought forward in the last section. The two last-named powers would unquestionably have rejoiced if Russia had abstained from disturbing the peace of Europe; but, that peace ruptured, they felt—selfishly or reasonably, according to the side from which their conduct was regarded—that the war might possibly involve consequences much more serious to them than any disturbance of Turkish independence or violation of Turkish rights.

Francis Joseph, the youthful emperor of Austria, had ascended the throne with more advantages than many of his predecessors. He had little to unlearn, and his name was not associated with any line of policy it would have been humiliating for him to abandon. Called to the crown in 1848, when scarcely past his eighteenth year, he possessed many qualities which rendered him a favourite with his subjects. His uncle, Ferdinand I., after a reign of thirteen years, abdicated the Austrian throne in December of that year, being mentally unfitted for the great struggle carried on at that time by the House of Hapsburg against its Hungarian subjects. Ferdinand having no children living, the crown reverted by succession to his brother, the Archduke Francis Charles; but he, likewise, having no taste for royalty in a troubled period, renounced it in favour of his son Francis Joseph, nephew of the Emperor Ferdinand. The marriage of the youthful emperor with a still more youthful bride in 1854 gave pleasure to the Viennese; and Francis Joseph, being fond of athletic exercises, became a great favourite in the Tyrol and Styria, where—dressed in the jäger costume of the country, and joining in the hunting and shooting expeditions there customary—he ingratiated himself with the peasantry. He was not old enough to have become entangled in the meshes of Russian intrigue; and, if well advised by his ministers, there was a fair opportunity before him of adopting such a line of policy as might be useful and honourable to his country. The Western Powers, to this extent, had better materials to work upon than if the emperor had been a prejudiced old man, too much involved in obligations to the czar to venture on a bold and independent course; and it remained to be seen how far the diplomatists of England and France could win over Austria to their cause.

Frederick William, of Prussia, was placed in different circumstances, both by his years and his family ties. Ascending the throne in 1840, at the age of forty-five, he had made a near approach to middle life ere the emperor of Austria was born, and had been long mixed up with the general current of European politics. At the time when the war broke out, his sister had for thirty-seven years been the wife of Nicholas, and for twenty-nine years empress of All the Russias; and it was morally impossible that this tie of connection with the powerful House of Romanoff could be without its influence on the policy and actions of Frederick William. There was a general opinion, both in Prussia and in other countries of Europe, that the king was kind in heart, but vacillating in purpose—honourably true to his engagements, but timid as to the adoption of any decided line of policy—willing to join the Western Powers in a good cause, but shrinking from giving offence to the imperial husband of his sister—desirous that Prussia should occupy her proper place among the first-class powers of Europe, but unwilling to involve himself and his country in a war of indefinite duration. On these accounts, especially as Prussia was very little interested in Turkish affairs, it became probable that, although more closely assimilated than Austria to the constitutional government of England, she would with quite as much difficulty be brought into any formal alliance against Russia. This was one of the tasks presented to the diplomatists of England and France.

It will be remembered* that, about three weeks after the declaration of war by England and France, a cautiously worded convention was signed by Austria and Prussia—guaranteeing to each other the undisturbed possession of the German and non-German dominions of the two

* See Chap. III. p. 73.

sovereigns, against any hostile attack from any quarter; engaging to defend in a similar spirit the German confederacy in general; undertaking to keep a part of their respective armies on the war-footing, in furtherance of these views; proposing to invite all the German states to become parties to this convention; and pledging themselves that neither of the two states, Austria or Prussia, would, during the maintenance of the convention, enter into any separate alliance with other powers inconsistent therewith. Nothing was said concerning Russia: nothing to indicate either approval or disapproval of the course pursued by the czar—in the body of this convention; but an 'additional article,' an appendix to one of the clauses, was introduced, in which the two sovereigns declare that 'Their Majesties have not been able to divest themselves of the consideration that the indefinite continuance of the occupation of the territories on the Lower Danube, under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Porte, by imperial Russian troops, would endanger the political, moral, and material interests of the whole German confederation, as also of their own states, and the more so in proportion as Russia extends her warlike operations on Turkish territory.' The two sovereigns then express a hope and belief that their imperial brother of St Petersburg does not intend to do aught inconsistent with the rights of nations; but at the same time declare, that if that hope and belief should not be borne out by facts, they would take up arms against Russia—provided, and provided only, the czar should incorporate the Principalities in his dominions, or advance with his army across the Balkan towards Adrianople or Constantinople.

This convention formed the key to the whole of the diplomacy of Austria and Prussia, relative to Russo-Turkish affairs, for twelve months afterwards. It was so carefully worded that it allowed either contracting party abundant room for escape from active participation in the war, unless Nicholas proceeded to such extremities as that wily monarch was not likely to indulge in against the openly expressed opposition of the Western Powers. It clogged both parties in regard to any independent action, for it bound each to defend the other; but, at the same time, it shewed the czar how much his neighbours would permit him to do before arming against him.

The diplomacy of Europe, throughout the remainder of the year, was mainly directed to an attempt, by England and France, to give vitality to the 'additional article' of this convention, the only one possessing value for the object they had in view. Austria and Prussia, while regretting that the Western Powers had declared war, signed a protocol admitting that the war was nevertheless just, and agreeing 'that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire is and remains the *sine qua non* condition of every transaction having for its object the re-establishment of peace between the belligerent powers;' at the same time, in the peculiar wordiness and obscurity of such documents, they undertook 'to endeavour in common to discover the guarantees most likely to attach the existence of that empire to the general equilibrium of Europe; as they also declare themselves ready to deliberate and to come to an understanding as to the employment of the means calculated to accomplish the object of their agreement.' Nearly coincident in date with this convention between Austria and Prussia, was a protocol between all the four powers—pledging England, France, Austria, and Prussia to hold steadily in view the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; to provide, by every means compatible with the sultan's independence and sovereignty, for the civil and religious liberties of the Christian subjects of the Porte; and to refuse any arrangement with Russia inconsistent with these objects.

Austria and Prussia formally communicated to Russia the results of these agreements, and repeated a demand or request that the czar would, by withdrawing his troops from the Principalities, put an end to the embarrassments. These applications were met by a haughty reserve on the part of the court of St Petersburg; and for a considerable time Russia neither replied to the demands nor withdrew her troops. This course of action gave uneasiness to Austria, who—if the Principalities were to be taken away from Turkey—would infinitely rather possess them herself than see them transferred to the czar's keeping. Under these circumstances, the Austrian diplomatists, entirely without the knowledge of England and France, succeeded in drawing Turkey into a separate treaty, called the Treaty of Boyadji-Keuy, from the name of the place at which it was signed, on the 14th of June 1854; Count Bruck and Reschid Pacha being the negotiators. This treaty has been before given, so far as regards its principal clauses or articles.* How it affected the strategy of the Russian generals, was shewn in the narrative of the Danubian campaign. That the czar felt mortified and angry at the signature of such a treaty soon became manifest. On the 29th of July, Count Nesselrode replied to Austria and Prussia—especially the former, who had energetically urged the evacuation of the Principalities. In the course of his argument, the count said: 'If, in the opinion of the Austrian government, the prolonged occupation of the Principalities was the motive of the war, it ought to be a consequence that when the occupation ceased the war would cease from that fact itself, seeing that hostilities would be suspended. Is the cabinet of Vienna in a position to give us the assurance of it?' After asserting that the Danubian regions were, for Russia, a very important military position so long as the war might last, he added: 'It is therefore quite evident that before voluntarily giving up, in deference to Austria, the only point where, by

* See Chap. II. p. 51.

assuming the offensive, we should have any chance of restoring in our favour the balance against us, we ought, at least, to be made acquainted with the securities which Austria has to offer us.' He ended by demanding an exposition of such 'guarantees of safety' as Austria could offer. To Prussia, who had made a much more timid appeal, Count Nesselrode replied more briefly, evidently under a conviction that there was not much to fear in that quarter. Count Buol replied to this dispatch, regretting that Russia should demand 'guarantees of safety' for undoing that which never ought to have been done, but promising to use the influence of Austria with the Western Powers to obtain as easy and honourable conditions for Russia as possible, in the event of the czar's troops evacuating the Principalities.

During the remainder of the year, the exertions of the Western diplomatists were directed, not so much to obtaining the aid of Austria, as to support Austria's endeavour to obtain the aid of Prussia. Whatever the czar announced as his positive intention, Frederick William, or his minister Manteuffel, either meekly assented to, or opposed timidly and with misgiving: as a consequence, it was found impossible to engage Prussia in any definite and bold course of policy; and, as a further consequence, England and France commented frequently and severely on the conduct of that state. On the 19th of June, during a debate in the House of Peers, Lord Lyndhurst, although in the eighty-third year of his age, made a speech full of fire and brilliancy, astonishing the House by the force of his reasoning, the richness of his language, and the earnest warmth of his indignation against Russia. During his speech, he adverted to a series of remarkable documents in which, twenty-seven years earlier, Count Pozzo di Borgo and other Russian diplomatists had replied to a query from the czar, their master—What course would the European courts pursue if Russia were to enter the Principalities with a view to coerce Turkey? Lord Lyndhurst pointed out the striking evidences of crafty intrigue in the suggestions of the ambassadors, and the analogy between the two series of events twenty-seven years apart. After urging strongly the duty of Austria to take part with the Western Powers in the war, he said: 'Before I go further, I must refer to Prussia. I quite forgot Prussia. I do not wish to read all the remarks of Count Pozzo di Borgo with respect to Prussia: they might weaken some very tender friendships at the present moment. It has been said, I know not with what truth, that a change has taken place in the policy of Prussia. I can assure your lordships, however, that the cohesion between Russia and Prussia is of long standing. Count Pozzo di Borgo said: "Being less jealous, and consequently more impartial, Prussia has constantly shewn by her opinions that she has a just idea of the nature and importance of the affairs of the East; and if the court of Vienna had shared her views and her good intentions, there can be no doubt that the plans of the imperial cabinet would have been accomplished!" I may say this very moment, that if the cabinet of Vienna had shared "the views and good intentions of Prussia," the objects of Russia might have been accomplished.'

The European question assumed this form: Austria demanded that Russia should evacuate the Principalities; Russia demanded that, previous to such an evacuation, a conference or meeting should be held, to determine what 'guarantee' she should receive in acknowledgment for such an abandonment of her plans; Prussia sided with Russia in this view; Austria insisted that the evacuation should precede any convention; while the Western Powers not only demanded as much as Austria, but pointed out that the evacuation of the Principalities would not in itself suffice to bring the war to an end without further concession by the czar. On the 8th of August, the representatives of England, France, and Austria, at Vienna, signed a note declaratory of the opinions of those three powers concerning the *minimum* of conditions that would render peace possible: a declaration far too anti-Russian to meet with ready support from Prussia. The note declared that the three powers agreed in opinion:

'That the relations of the Sublime Porte with the Imperial Court of Russia cannot be re-established on solid and durable bases:

1. If the Protectorate hitherto exercised by the Imperial Court of Russia over the Principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, be not discontinued for the future; and if the privileges accorded by the Sultans to those provinces, dependent on their Empire, be not placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers, in virtue of an arrangement to be concluded with the Sublime Porte, and the stipulations of which should at the same time regulate all questions of detail.

2. If the navigation of the Danube at its mouths be not freed from all obstacle, and made subject to the application of the principles established by the Acts of the Congress of Vienna.

3. If the Treaty of the 13th July 1841 be not revised in concert by all the High Contracting Parties in the interest of the balance of power in Europe.

4. If Russia do not cease to claim the right of exercising an official Protectorate over the subjects of the Sublime Porte, to whatever rite they may belong, and if France, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia do not mutually assist each other in obtaining from the original action of the Ottoman Government the confirmation and the observance of the religious privileges of the different Christian communities, and in turning to account, for the common interest of their co-religionists, the generous intentions manifested by His Majesty the Sultan, without any prejudice resulting therefrom to his dignity and the independence of his Crown.'

These four conditions are worthy of note here, for, although different in language, they correspond in principle with the 'Four Points' or 'Four Bases' so much discussed at a later date. The third condition related to the overwhelming maritime power of Russia in the Black Sea, so threatening to Turkey.

Prussia made an endeavour to draw Austria into a recognition of two distinct principles—that Austria ought to close the Principalities, during her occupation of them, against any offensive operations of the Turks and the Western Powers in hostility to Russia; and that Austria and Prussia ought not to attack Russia, unless Russia previously attacked them. To this requisition Count Buol replied in a dispatch, dated the 30th of September, pointing out that such demands were evidently incompatible with the engagements already entered into by the court of Vienna. In relation to the second of the two proposals, he said: 'It is evident that we cannot wait in order to obtain peace, which is a necessity for us, from the efforts and combats of others; nor can we bind ourselves to support for an unlimited lapse of time the difficult sacrifices which such a passive attitude must entail on us.' In relation to the first proposal, his arguments were more detailed. 'We cannot consider ourselves as authorised in the co-occupation of the Principalities, except under the twofold supposition that we should defend them against any attack by the armed forces of Russia, and that we should not oppose the warlike operations of the Allied powers. This results from our convention with the Porte, and is, moreover, completely in accord with what we have always expressed and maintained both to Russia and to the other powers. When we demanded the evacuation of the Principalities, we expressly stipulated that no condition should be attached to it which it would not be in our power to grant. Russia then declared herself ready to effect that evacuation, demanding, however, from us guarantees that she should not be exposed to the pursuit of the enemy and to ulterior attacks. This we refused. Then, and only then, did Russia declare that she would retire from motives purely strategic, and she thus foresaw a conflict which but for that would have been the consequence of our irrevocable resolution. It is therefore not to us that Russia has delivered up the Principalities; she abandoned them to their fate.'

Austria, it must be admitted, was placed in a position of some difficulty: constantly in danger of giving deep offence to the czar, constantly implored by Prussia to deal as gently with the czar as possible, and constantly urged by the Western Powers to adopt a bold and decided course in favour of Turkey against Russia. No one could reasonably expect that the Vienna court would wholly forget selfish motives at such a time; and England and France, while employing very strong representations, did yet, in parliament and elsewhere, express greater confidence in Austria than in Prussia. The Austrian army, necessarily large at all times, becomes enormously expensive when placed on anything like a war-footing. In the autumn of 1854, it was estimated that about 70,000 Austrian troops were posted in the German provinces; nearly 120,000, under Radetzky, in Austrian Italy; 30,000 in the Danubian provinces then under occupation; 60,000 in Hungary and Transylvania; 80,000 in Galicia and Bukovina; 60,000 in the district around Cracow; nearly 100,000 under Jellachich in the military frontier districts; and 12,000 in the federal fortresses of Germany—making a total of considerably more than 500,000 men under arms. Any hostilities with Russia would have necessitated a still greater augmentation of the army; and therefore Austria had abundant reason to wish for a peaceful settlement of the Turkish difficulty, without involving any serious disagreement with her powerful neighbour the czar.

As the close of the year approached, when the Allied armies advanced from Gallipoli to Constantinople, from thence to Varna, and then to the strongholds of the Crimea, the czar shewed less and less inclination to yield to his open opponents, or to listen to the strong advice of Austria or the timid suggestions of Prussia; his pride was piqued; he saw that he would lose prestige in the eyes of his subjects if he lessened his pretensions; he thought he might reckon on the Aberdeen government being disinclined to press him too closely; and he trusted that the terror of his great name would paralyse many of those who might otherwise oppose him. The note agreed to by Austria and the Western Powers on the 8th of August contained four conditions which, as has just been remarked, became known in diplomatic language as the Four Points; but all attempts by Austria during the remainder of the year to induce the czar to concede these Four Points were fruitless. On the contrary, he exhibited every tendency to encourage a warlike and even revengeful feeling among his subjects; the following letter, addressed to Count Perowski, Minister of the Appanage, but evidently intended, by publication in the St Petersburg newspapers, to meet other eyes, was only one among many cases in point:—

'GRÄF LEO ALEXEÏVITCH.—In full view of the dangers that threaten our beloved fatherland from the intentions of the enemy, our heart is refreshed by the zealous striving of all ranks to contribute to the defence of the Russian soil. In compliance with the wish of our Imperial family, we have permitted it to raise a regiment of sharpshooters from among the peasants of the appanage domains. The orthodox Russian people has from time immemorial gained a glorious celebrity by its attachment to the faith, its devotion to the emperor, and its love to fatherland. In thus, through your agency, summoning our appanage peasants to the defence of Holy Russia, we offer them the opportunity, like our valiant troops, to vindicate the ancient Russian courage. We intrust it to you to organise the regiment of sharpshooters, and are convinced that the task will be executed with the desired success.—We remain, your well inclined,

NIKOLAUS.

GATSCHINA, Oct. 25th / Nov. 6th.

The old Muscovite party, whose head-quarters were at Moscow, left no means untried to urge the czar into a determined persistence in his plans on

Turkey, and an equally resolute refusal of any terms dictated by other powers. All was not harmony, however, in the bosom of the imperial family; the empress retained the German yearnings of her birth and early youth, and joined Nesselrode in the advocacy of a moderate policy; while the most energetic of the princes, although not the eldest, sided with the Menchikoffs, Bibikoffs, and other adherents of the old Muscovite party. Large numbers of offices in the state, the army, and the navy were held by Germans, against whom the native nobility entertained a prejudice; and, so far as Moscow could prevail over St Petersburg, the Emperor Nicholas was impelled by a force ill fitting him to listen to the councils of Francis Joseph, or even those of the weak and vacillating Frederick William. The party in question dissuaded him, by every argument that could be used, against any withdrawal, submission, or relaxation of his projects—asserting that not only national danger, but even personal danger to himself, would be involved. They advocated Pan-Slavism, the unity of all the Slavonic races under one great sovereign, and that sovereign the czar; they advocated the autocracy of the czar over all the branches of the Greek Church, or Russo-Oriental Church, as they preferred to designate it, in whatever countries that faith might be professed; but, beyond this, they sought to overcome and subdue any and every non-Russian nationality within the czar's dominions, rendering the whole scheme of government fully Muscovite, and depressing the German and all other extraneous elements. That the religious feeling strengthened in the heart of the czar as his later years approached, is evinced by many circumstances, involving a Greco-Russo or Russo-Oriental intolerance alike of Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, and Jews; and there were not wanting symptoms that he dreamed of a canonisation, whereby he might be reverenced by Muscovites in after-ages as St Nicholas. To whatever extent these aspirations influenced him at the time, a manifesto, issued on December 14th (26th), appealed strongly both to the religion and the nationality of his subjects for support in the war. He said:

'The causes of the war, which still lasts, are well understood by our beloved Russia. The country knows that neither ambitious views, nor the desire of obtaining new advantages to which we had no right, were the motives for those acts and circumstances that have unexpectedly resulted in the existing struggle. We had solely in view the safeguard of the solemnly recognised immunities of the Orthodox Church and of our co-religionists in the East. But certain governments, attributing to us interested and secret intentions that were far from our thoughts, have complicated the solution of the question, and have finished by forming a hostile alliance against Russia.

'After having proclaimed as their object the safety of the Ottoman Empire, they have waged open war against us, not in Turkey, but within the limits of our own realm, directing their blows on such points as were more or less accessible to them—in the Baltic, the White Sea, the Black Sea, in the Crimea, and even on the far-distant coasts of the Pacific Ocean. Thanks to the Most High, both in our troops and in all classes of our subjects, they everywhere meet with intrepid opponents, animated by their love for us and for their country; and, to our consolation in these troublous circumstances, amid the calamities inseparable from war, we are constantly witnessing brilliant examples and proofs of this feeling, as well as of the courage that it inspires.'

After making the most of such limited successes as had attended the arms of his troops, he added:

'Penetrated with our duty as a Christian, we cannot desire a prolonged effusion of blood, and certainly we shall not repulse any offers and conditions of peace that are compatible with the dignity of our empire and the interests of our well-beloved subjects. But another, and not less sacred duty commands us, in this obstinate struggle, to keep ourselves prepared for efforts and sacrifices proportioned to the means of action directed against us.

'Russians! my faithful children! you are accustomed to spare nothing when called by Providence to a great and holy work—neither your wealth, the fruit of long years of toil, nor your lives—not your own blood, nor the blood of your children. The noble ardour that has inflamed your hearts from the first hour of the war will not be extinguished, happen what may; and your feelings are those also of your sovereign.

'We all, Monarch and subjects, if it be necessary—echoing the words of the Emperor Alexander in a year of like trial, "the sword in our hands and the Cross in our hearts"—know how to face the ranks of our enemies for the defence of the most precious gifts of this world—the security and the honour of our country.'

Towards the close of the year, attention was frequently directed towards Denmark, with a view to ascertain whether any decided line of policy was likely to be taken by her; but that small state was distracted by internal discord, irrespective of any question connected with the general politics of Europe. The king was sovereign over four states or nationalities—Denmark Proper, Schlesvig, Holstein, and Lauenburg; Schlesvig had been united to Denmark since the middle of the eleventh century; but Holstein only since 1773, and Lauenburg since 1817. Even in the first of these instances the union has never been very cordial; for while the sovereigns have always insisted that Schlesvig was incorporated with Denmark, the Schlesvigers have always obstinately maintained that they are German, united with Denmark under the same king, but having a distinct nationality and distinct rights. In the other instances the separation is yet more marked; for Holstein and Lauenburg not only claim to be German in origin and sympathies, but are actual members of the Germanic confederation. The civil war of 1848 arose out of these dissensions between the four nationalities under the Danish crown; the success of the Danes in that war prevented the lapse of Schlesvig; nevertheless, in the treaty of peace, the Schlesvigers were allowed to retain their ancient German laws, to have a special diet or parliament, and to be administered by authorities distinct from those of Denmark. The king, like many other

kings at that troubled period, granted a constitution to his subjects; and this constitution worked well for a time; but in 1850 the four nationalities began to wrangle concerning it, because—although each had its own internal government for particular purposes—the army, navy, diplomacy, customs, police, post-office, &c., were general for the whole kingdom, and under the central government. The general diet, volksthing, or parliament, voted supplies for these general objects; and while discussing these votes, Schlesvig, Holstein, and Lauenburg shewed plainly a great jealousy of Denmark, as being in the sunshine of royal favour, and absorbing an undue share of the supplies. As the diet, by its usual votes, sided with the king and the government, it became thrown by degrees into antagonism with the three duchies. Discords hence arose, and continued three or four years. In July 1854, the king, whether entertaining a lurking love of despotism, or distrustful of the anarchy among his subjects, suddenly put an end to the constitution and to the separate liberties of the three duchies. The diet and the duchies hereupon joined, and opposed a firm resistance to the change, threatening to impeach the ministers if the proposed scheme were adopted. The king, finding that the diet would not attend to bills sent down by him, would not grant supplies, and would not recognise his ministers, dissolved it in October, and summoned the people to elect a new volksthing. A curiously framed proclamation immediately followed, in which the king appealed to the nation in favour of himself and his ministers against the parliament then just dissolved. These proceedings so completely occupied the attention of the Danes, that the Western Powers saw little probability that the king would openly side either with or against them; nevertheless, knowing that the czar was prone to fish in troubled waters, to send his emissaries into any country distracted by internal struggles, they kept a careful watch on the proceedings of Denmark—remembering that that power, by possessing the Sound, held the keys to the Baltic.

More immediately interesting to the neutral Baltic powers, as affecting their peace and commerce, and especially so to Prussia, were the arrangements concerning blockade. England, being the most powerful of maritime nations, undertook the blockade of Russian ports as soon as the war commenced, and was only prevented by equitable commercial motives from rendering that blockade very stringent in character, hurtful to Russia's neighbours as well as to Russia herself. The definition of the terms of a blockade is always a delicate matter, to avoid giving offence to neutral nations. On the one hand, the trade of Russia was large, and ought to be stopped according to the usages of war; on the other, the stoppage should not injure other countries if it could be avoided. On an average of several years preceding 1854, Russia sold to England 800,000 cwts. of tallow, 800,000 cwts. of hemp, 1,200,000 cwts. of flax, 700,000 quarters of linseed, 9,000,000 lbs. of wool, besides large quantities of corn and other commodities; and it was necessary to see, while checking this trade—one of the unavoidable evils of war—that the rights of other nations were not interfered with. In one of the wars of the last century, many of the continental nations engaged in what was termed an 'armed neutrality,' recognising the doctrine that 'free ships make free goods, except in the case of articles contraband of war;' that is, that any produce imported into or exported from the enemy's country, is safe if conveyed in a ship belonging to a neutral power, exception being made of commodities directly used in warfare. During the great war with France, England refused to acknowledge this rule, which consequently fell to the ground; but in 1854, England and France frankly admitted the principle that 'free ships make free goods' —not as a permanent system, but as a temporary arrangement during the war then about to commence. The United States government, interested in European commerce, but not much in European politics, endeavoured later in the year to obtain the consent of all maritime nations to this international law. Russia at once agreed, probably to ingratiate herself with the powerful republic across the Atlantic; but the other nations required, as a counterpoise, a concession by America of the privilege of privateering during war: to which, however, that power would not assent. Hence, throughout the Russian war, a lenient interpretation of the laws of blockade was adopted by England and France, calculated to avoid offending America as a commercial nation, but expressly limited to that particular war, and leaving untouched the general principle at issue. It was found, however, that the doctrine 'free ships make free goods' was unfairly interpreted by neutral nations; and the English ministers received much condemnation in parliament for not rendering the blockade more stringent. Indeed, the precaution was in some particulars strangely neglected. For instance, nothing in the nature of blockade was attempted, except in a very slight degree, in the Sea of Azof throughout 1854; as a consequence, English merchants and shipowners suffered under the erroneous impression that a blockade of the ports in that sea had been or would be effected; while Russian goods were being exported through the medium of the Greek firms at Constantinople, who realised enormous profits by this strange laxity. In the White Sea, as has been shewn,* the blockade was not conducted with vigour; and in the Baltic it began too late, although tolerably effective when once established.

The negotiations between the Western Powers and Prussia, during the latter half of 1854, were much mixed up with this question of blockade. Our merchants full well knew that a large indirect trade was carried on by Russia through the

* Chapter VI., pp. 184-188.

medium of the neighbouring state; and it was frequently and strongly urged upon the English government that such a course should not be permitted to a country which, like Prussia, maintained so suspicious a neutrality between the belligerent powers. Large caravans of goods crossed the frontier between the two states, conveying raw produce in one direction and manufactured goods in another; and as the Prussian ports were free from blockade, they were doubtless the ports of arrival and departure. Although British subjects were prohibited from trading with Russia, yet it was found, at the end of the year, that the United Kingdom had received supplies of Russian timber, hemp, flax, tallow, and other commodities, in large quantities, although not equal in amount to those of peaceful years. It is evident that, the Russian ports being closed, other channels had been found. Strong representations being occasionally made by England, the Prussian government was thrown into uneasiness. An opinion had grown up, however, among those statesmen and economists who had watched the effects of free-trade, that commerce, though it may bend, cannot in these days be broken by blockade laws. England, it is well known, smiled proudly at the attempts of the elder Napoleon, by the Milan and Berlin decrees, to crush her commerce during the time of war; and it remains an open question whether, to a country circumstanced as was Russia in 1854, the effects of a blockade are so disastrous as the theory intends: whether, in short, the chief effect is not that of transferring to neutral merchants and shipowners those profits which previously flowed to those of the blockading power. Whether 'free ships make free goods,' or 'free goods make free ships?' whether the narrow views of publicists and international writers in times of limited commerce, or those of later and more commercial days, should be preferred? whether Grotius, Vattel, and Bynkershoek, or Hübner, Martens, and Hautefeuille, should be taken as the best group of authorities?—were questions largely discussed in parliament and elsewhere; but the events of the year tended, for the most part, to shew that the old theory of blockade could scarcely be maintained in modern days.

In relation to this question of neutrals and blockades, little difficulty could arise in connection with those European states which, from the beginning of the war, declared a distinct neutrality, and undertook no duties as mediators between the belligerent states. Thus, whatever may have been the internal complications of Denmark, that kingdom sided with Sweden in a definite line of policy even before the rupture between Russia and the Western Powers occurred. On the 2d of January 1854, a few weeks after the declaration of war by Turkey, and when it became evident that England and France would speedily declare war likewise, Denmark and Sweden entered into a convention respecting the line of policy to be pursued by them, and communicated the result to the Western Powers. The principal portion of this convention, as applying to Sweden, declared that the king would remain strictly neutral during the war; that war-ships and trading-ships belonging to the belligerent powers might enter any Swedish ports except a small number expressly named; that such ships must observe the sanitary and maritime police regulations of the ports; that no privateering vessels would be admitted; that the ships of the belligerents might purchase supplies, in Swedish ports, of any provisions and stores not contraband of war; and that all prizes taken by either belligerent power would be excluded from Swedish ports. The king of Denmark's declaration was identical with this in all particulars, except in relation to the names of the ports placed within the bar of exclusion. These conventions were made, as just remarked, before the Western Powers became involved in the war, and were scrupulously adhered to throughout the remainder of the year.

In the case of Prussia, however, matters presented a different aspect. This state was under certain obligations by treaty, as one of the great powers, to aid in the defence of Turkey under certain contingencies; and England and France never ceased to urge upon her the adoption of a course befitting her position. All was in vain, however; the year came to its end, marked by the same evidences of Prussian irresolution as its beginning. Austria was much embarrassed by this line of proceeding: bound to Prussia by the convention of April, she could not easily break from that power; desirous of remaining if possible on good terms with Russia, she avoided immediate participation in the war; strongly urged by England and France, she could not remain quite inactive. A definite advance was, however, made on the 2d of December, when the Earl of Westmoreland, Baron de Bourqueney, and Count Buol-Schauenstein, signed a treaty at Vienna as representatives of England, France, and Austria. It is desirable to give the chief clauses of this treaty in full, as they played an important part in the subsequent negotiations:

'Art. I.—The High Contracting Parties refer to the declarations contained in the Protocols of the 9th of April and 23d of May of the present year, and in the Notes exchanged on the 8th of August last; and as they reserved to themselves the right of proposing, according to circumstances, such conditions as they might judge necessary for the general interests of Europe, they engage mutually and reciprocally not to enter into any arrangement with the Imperial Court of Russia without having first deliberated thereupon in common.

Art. II.—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria having, in virtue of the Treaty concluded on the 14th of June last with the Sublime Porte, caused the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia to be occupied by his troops, he engages to defend the frontier of the said Principalities against any return of the Russian forces; the Austrian troops shall for this purpose

occupy the positions necessary for guaranteeing those Principalities against any attack. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, having likewise concluded with the Sublime Porte on the 12th of March a Treaty which authorises them to direct their forces upon every part of the Ottoman Empire, the above-mentioned occupation shall not interfere with the free movement of the Anglo-French or Ottoman troops upon these same territories against the military forces or the territory of Russia. There shall be formed at Vienna between the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, and Great Britain, a Commission to which Turkey shall be invited to send a Plenipotentiary, and which shall be charged with examining and regulating every question relating either to the exceptional and provisional state in which the said Principalities are now placed, or to the free passage of the different armies across their territory.

ART. III.—In case hostilities should break out between Austria and Russia, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, mutually promise to each other their offensive and defensive alliance in the present war, and will for that purpose employ, according to the requirements of the war, military and naval forces, the number, description, and destination whereof shall, if occasion should arise, be determined by subsequent arrangements.

ART. IV.—In the case contemplated by the preceding Article, the High Contracting Parties reciprocally engage not to entertain any overture or proposition on the part of the Imperial Court of Russia, having for its object the cessation of hostilities, without having come to an understanding thereupon between themselves.

ART. V.—In case the re-establishment of general peace, upon the bases indicated in Article I., should not be assured in the course of the present year, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, will deliberate without delay upon effectual means for obtaining the object of their alliance.

ART. VI.—Great Britain, Austria, and France will jointly communicate the present Treaty to the Court of Prussia, and will with satisfaction receive its accession thereto, in case it should promise its co-operation for the accomplishment of the common object.'

How far the Western Powers succeeded in the object of the 5th Article, that of obtaining the warlike aid of Austria if the czar did not come to terms before the 31st of December 1854; or in that of the 6th, relating to the active co-operation of Prussia—will appear in a future section.

THE SARDINIAN ALLIANCE.

At the period now under notice, there was one small state—small relatively to its neighbours—which honourably distinguished itself by a decided anti-Russian policy, at a time when the whole of the German states were painfully vibrating between conflicting tendencies. This was Sardinia.

No European kingdom can be less perfectly judged by its name than this. Sardinia is a rude, little-known island in the Mediterranean, the possession of which would by no means qualify a monarch to enter into European alliances with the great powers on equal terms. If this monarch were designated king of Piedmont, or of Genoa, or of Savoy, his position would more readily identify itself in the public mind. Be this as it may, however, the Sardinian states have become deeply interesting to Europe, as possessing the only elements of constitutional freedom throughout the whole of Italy, and as drawing upon them, in virtue of this fact, the suspicions of the despotic rulers of Lombardy, Tuscany, Rome, Naples, and the minor states. The House of Savoy, one of the most ancient regal houses in Europe, reigned during many centuries over the dukedom of Savoy; the dukes gradually acquired possession of the rich Italian plains of Piedmont, by conquest or by treaty; they obtained Sardinia about the year 1720, and exchanged the title of Duke for that of King, or rather appropriated the three titles of King of Sardinia, Prince of Piedmont, and Duke of Savoy. After the disruptions and expulsions consequent on the French Revolution, the kings of Sardinia were reinstated in all their possessions by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and received in addition the territories of the extinct republic of Genoa. The 'Stati Sardi,' or Sardinian States, thus gradually became, although not very extensive in area, one of the most fertile, flourishing, and well-founded kingdoms in Europe: occupying an important position between France, the Austrian dominions, Switzerland, and Tuscany.

There were circumstances of a personal character, too, which rendered Sardinia a deeply interesting state to England. Charles Albert, who reigned from 1831 to 1849, entered so ardently into the revolutionary turmoils of 1848, that—not content with establishing a constitution, a legislature of two chambers, and a free press, in his own dominions—he joined the Milanese and Venetians in a war of freedom against Austria: a war which would have met with much approval in England, had it not presented so many aspects of a wild adventure, ill fitted to arrive at a satisfactory result. Defeated by the Austrians in a battle at Novara, Charles Albert resigned in favour of his son in March 1849, and died four months afterwards. Victor Emmanuel, thus placed upon the throne in a time of difficulty, had a perilous task before him. He found it necessary at once to agree to a treaty of peace with Austria, resigning all the objects which his father had so impetuously pursued, and accepting the best terms obtainable. At the same time, he steadily maintained the constitutional freedom of his country, despite the suggestions thrown out by the arbitrary princes around him. Moreover, he was called upon to defend the principles of religious liberty on the soil of Piedmont: attacked as those principles were by an audacious and aggressive movement on the part of the higher priesthood and the papal court. Nobly supported by his parliament, Victor

Emmanuel successfully resisted the machinations of despots, both political and ecclesiastical, and brought his country into a state of peace and prosperity. He won the admiration of England by his conduct, and her sympathy by his bereavements; for he was a man of sorrows—having lost father, mother, wife, and brother within a limited period, and being left with a young family of motherless children as his only solace amid the cares of royalty.

This was the sovereign who frankly entered into alliance with England and France against Russia at a time when Austria hesitated to draw the sword, and Prussia shrank even from the bare possibility of having so to do. It exhibited, in a favourable light, the establishment and maintenance of constitutional usages in Sardinia, that the war policy was openly discussed in the parliament at Turin, and the speeches reported in the Turin newspapers. On the 27th of January 1855, the chambers met to receive and consider the government proposals concerning the alliance. Count Cavour, minister for foreign affairs, opened the proceedings by remarking that 'the Eastern war, having called forth new interests to combat on the field of politics, has rendered new alliances necessary. The course of old diplomatic traditions was all at once interrupted; and both from a careful consideration of the present serious moment and of a future, from which the greatest prudence alone can avert the dangers, it was clear to every government that, in the face of complications so unexpected on the world's stage, it was necessary to seek a new system that should procure strength, supports, and remedial acts, to provide against the altered circumstances.' After commenting on the unselfish spirit in which the English and French governments had entered upon the war, the count proceeded to consider the two alternatives—neutrality, or alliance with the Western Powers—open to Sardinia: 'Neutrality, sometimes possible to powers of the first rank, is seldom so to those of the second, unless placed in special political and geographical circumstances. History, however, rarely shews happy instances of neutrality, the least sad results of which terminate in making those who adopt it either objects of suspicion or disdain to both contending parties. To Piedmont, moreover, the high heart of whose kings inspired at all times a resolute policy, alliances have always been more pleasing. Piedmont has succeeded in making herself accounted more by Europe than her limited territory would appear to warrant, because in the day of common peril she has always known how to face the common fate; as also because in times of tranquillity it was part of the rare wisdom of the princes of Savoy to reform by slow degrees, adapting the political and civil laws to the new wants, the natural consequences of the incessant conquests of civilisation.' He adverted to 'the proposition of an alliance to the government of His Majesty on the part of those of Her Majesty the Queen of England, and of His Majesty the Emperor of the French;' and finally said: 'The examples of history, the anticipations of the future, the noble traditions of the House of Savoy, all unite to drive the ministry from a timid, idle policy, and to lead it instead by the old road followed by our fathers, who knew true prudence to exist in sharing the sacrifices and perils encountered for justice, whence arose increased reputation or benefits after victory.'

The legislative chambers cordially responded to the views of the king and his ministers, and gave formal sanction to a military convention between Sardinia, England, and France; a treaty between Sardinia and Turkey; a separate convention with England; and a loan to carry out the objects of the alliance. The military convention, signed at Turin by the representatives of the three powers on the 26th of January, bound the king of Sardinia to provide, in prosecution of the war against Russia, an army of 15,000 men, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery in due proportions; to be organised into two divisions and six brigades; and to be paid and rationed by the king. The Western Powers, on the other hand, agreed to facilitate the transport of this army to the East; and, moreover, agreed to defend the Sardinian dominions from any Russian attack during the war. By virtue of this convention, arrangements were made with England, as possessing a numerous fleet of transports, to convey the Sardinian troops to the Crimea. When the king had thus established his relations with the Western Powers on a satisfactory footing, he entered into a treaty with Turkey, on the 15th of March; in which he declared his adhesion to the treaty of the 12th of March 1854, whereby England and France undertook to defend Turkey against Russia; and announced the approaching departure of a Sardinian army to aid in this good work. The Sultan, on his part, undertook that the Sardinian troops on Turkish soil should be treated in all respects like those of England and France.

This heroic determination on the part of one of the secondary states of Europe was remarkable, and at once raised that state, both in the estimation of Englishmen and in the diplomatic formalities of negotiations and conferences, to a level with the first-class powers. When Count Cavour, in his speech to the chambers, said: 'As the fruit of a prudence which tends to courage and generosity, we confidently believe that this treaty will obtain your consent more readily than it would have done had it been suggested by a timid prudence and short-sighted calculation'—he paid a well-founded compliment to the good sense and high feeling of the Piedmontese nation; and afforded England and France a justification for pointing out how unfavourably the conduct of the king of Prussia contrasted with that of this new ally. What part the Sardinian army took in the Crimean war, a future Chapter will shew.

FALL OF THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY.

It now becomes necessary to interrupt the thread of narrative concerning the general politics of Europe connected with the war, in order to trace the progress of a remarkable disruption of the English ministry, occasioned principally by the war itself. Although this disruption led to departure neither from the alliance with France nor from the war against Russia, it nevertheless, during a period of several weeks, threw a painful doubt over the characters and capabilities of public men in England, and occasioned some distrust among foreign powers.

The Aberdeen ministry, as has already been stated, contained an unusually large number of ministers possessing a reputation for ability and experience.* It combined, indeed, the chief members of the Peel party (as it was popularly termed) with the Whig party; and was regarded by a fair majority in both Houses of Parliament as the resultant of a laudable attempt to break through the trammels of party conflict, in order that the best men of two parties might work together for the common good. What duration the ministry would have had if peace had continued unbroken, it is useless now to inquire; but when war began, the ministry was placed at a disadvantage by a popular belief that the Earl of Aberdeen was friendly to Russia, and would put up with a large amount of Muscovite aggression before making resistance. This impression, whether well or ill founded, unquestionably encouraged the friends of the czar, and to that extent placed at a disadvantage those who wished to present a bold front to Russian machinations. Even at a later date, when the earl's concurrence in the war could no longer be doubted, there yet lingered in the public mind a belief that he was supine in its management, and too ready to accept the first possible proposals of peace.

During the greater part of the year 1854, from the declaration of war until Christmas, there were many censures passed on the government, in some instances arising from mere party tactics, but in others unquestionably due to a suspicion that the war was not being pursued with due energy and good faith. Still, these censures were passed upon the government as a whole: the public had no authentic means of knowing whether harmony existed or not within the cabinet; and therefore all the ministers were made responsible for a laxity believed to be chiefly due to the premier himself.

Discord first arose concerning the management of the War-office: the first dissentient being Lord John Russell; and the period of the beginning of this dissension being after the rising of parliament. It has already been stated that the secretaryship of State for War and the Colonies was, in the summer of 1854, found too onerous for any one statesman; and that the Duke of Newcastle, who held that office, assumed the new office of Secretary of State for War: Sir George Grey being appointed to the other half of the divided secretariat—the Colonial Office. Mr Sidney Herbert remained Secretary *at* War. During the autumn, Lord John Russell, having no laborious duties connected with his office of President of the Council, studied attentively the reconstructed state of the War-office, and opened a correspondence with the Earl of Aberdeen in relation thereto. He adduced reasons why, in his judgment, the war-minister should sit in the House of Commons rather than in the Upper House; he discussed the delicate question whether the Duke of Newcastle were equal to the duties of his office, suggested that Lord Palmerston was a fitter man, and endeavoured to smooth away the difficulty of abolishing the office filled by Mr Sidney Herbert. It is evident, from the tenor of the published correspondence on this subject, that the premier was taken by surprise by Lord John, who had not urged at the cabinet councils any of the objections thus put forward by letter in the middle of November. The earl placed the letter, at the writer's own request, in the hands of the Duke of Newcastle and Mr Sidney Herbert, that nothing secret or unhandsome might be expected. The duke, however, in his place in the House of Lords at a later date, shewed plainly that he felt little flattered by the letter of Lord John; he denied that he had ever expressed a 'strong wish,' as had been asserted, to be war-minister; he was ignorant of the writer's preference for Lord Palmerston; he gave no thanks for the compliments with which he said the writer attempted to lessen the asperity of a proposal for his removal; he was as little pleased with the character for 'commendable ambition' attributed to him; and he expressed his willingness to retire, if such retirement would lead to a strengthening of the ministry. In the course of several letters exchanged between Lord John Russell and the Earl of Aberdeen, the latter discussed calmly the suggestions of the former, and stated his grounds of dissent from them—expressing a belief that there would be something ungenerous in making such changes in the midst of the war, unless it could be proved that the Duke of Newcastle was personally amenable to charges of incapacity from which the other members of the cabinet were free. After many letters had thus passed, the

* The chief offices of the government were thus filled:

First Lord of the Treasury	Earl of Aberdeen.
Lord Chancellor	Lord Cranworth.
Chancellor of the Exchequer	Mr Gladstone.
Lord President	Lord John Russell.
Lord Privy Seal	Duke of Argyll.
Home Secretary	Lord Palmerston.
Foreign Secretary	Earl of Clarendon.
Colonial Secretary	Sir George Grey.
War Secretary	Duke of Newcastle.
Secretary *at* War	Mr Sidney Herbert.
First Lord of the Admiralty	Sir J. Graham.
President of India Board	Sir C. Wood.
Chief Commissioner of Works	Sir W. Molesworth.
President of Board of Trade	Earl Granville.
Post-master General	Viscount Canning.

premier wished to know whether and when Lord John Russell would bring the question before the cabinet, there to be discussed in the usual way; but it appeared that the proposer of these changes, having ascertained that the opinions of some of his personal friends were unfavourable to the movement, had been thrown into a state of doubt and hesitation; he declined to make it a cabinet question, he dropped the subject, and the Earl of Aberdeen was left in possession of an opinion that his colleague acquiesced cheerfully in the views and plans of the government generally.

Meanwhile the public mind had become greatly agitated by the mournful accounts from the Crimea. Every newspaper throughout the kingdom, in every impression published in November and December, had told the tale of suffering; how that noble soldiers had been ignobly treated, and that supplies paid for by the nation had never reached those for whom they were intended. The readers of those narratives had not at that time the means of determining whether the fault lay with the home authorities or with those in the Crimea; but they knew that the government

EARL OF ABERDEEN.

departments must somewhere be in the wrong; and they felt angered at the frequent denials by the ministers of the existence of miseries so vividly depicted by the newspaper correspondents. Parliament assembled on the 12th of December, many weeks earlier than usual—the chief purport of such an early meeting being to pass two or three measures necessary for the due prosecution of the war. But the two Houses did not silently vote these measures; they commented severely on the manner in which the war had been conducted. When the former session was closed on the 12th of August, the Allied armies had not yet left Varna; but in the interval between the two sessions had occurred the landing at Old Fort, the skirmish at Bulganak, the battle of the Alma, the flank-march, the first bombardment of Sebastopol, the battle of Balaklava, and the two battles of Inkermann—concerning which the Peers and the Commons passed warm and merited eulogiums on the conduct of the soldiery, coupled with animadversions on the short-comings of the government officials. The Earls of Derby, Malmesbury, and Ellenborough censured the government for being too peaceful; Earl Grey took just the opposite view; but, in the midst of much censure, the House of Lords passed two bills—one for the enrolment of the militia, and one for the enlistment of foreigners—urged by the government as being necessary for the maintenance of the army up to the proper standard. In the Commons the discussions were more fierce; but even here the ministers had the advantage of pitting their antagonists one

against another; for if Mr Layard and Mr Disraeli argued that the war was not conducted with sufficient vigour, Mr Cobden and Mr Bright were equally distinct in asserting that the warlike tendency was too prominent. Lord John Russell assisted his colleagues in defending the general course of government policy; and nothing appeared, outwardly at least, to indicate any discord in the cabinet.

Another period passed over; parliament rose for the holidays on the 22d of December, and during about a month the government pursued its measures without the control of the legislature. During this month, however, the accounts from the Crimea had been more terrible than ever; the families of officers as well as of common soldiers had heard through private letters how great were the sufferings of the army; and thus all ranks were impatient to know how such things could be, and who was to blame; while even those who had no relations in the army, reading day by day the tragic details given by newspaper correspondents, deemed it imperative that the House of Commons, as the more immediate representative of the nation, should institute an inquiry into the whole case. When the Houses reassembled on the 23d of January, various matters touching the war were discussed; but the proceeding attended with the most important result was a notice, given by Mr Roebuck, that on a certain day he would move for the appointment of a select committee to inquire into the 'Condition of the Army and the Conduct of the War.' This notice was the proximate cause of the downfall of the Aberdeen ministry.

From letters and explanations afterwards published, it appears that when Lord John Russell heard this notice given, an end was put to a period of doubt and indecision; he had expected some such notice from one member or other; but when he found that it came from a supporter of the government in its liberal measures, its decisive importance rendered necessary an immediate determination of his own course of action. He wrote at once to the Earl of Aberdeen a letter, in which he said: 'Mr Roebuck has given notice of a motion to inquire into the conduct of the war. I do not see how this motion is to be resisted; but, as it involves a censure upon the War-departments, with which some of my colleagues are connected, my only course is to tender my resignation.' In a speech delivered three days afterwards, he justified the step thus taken: 'A motion for inquiry may be resisted on two grounds—the one, that there are no evils existing of sufficient magnitude to call for inquiry; the other, that sufficient means have been taken to remedy those evils, and that they will be best cured by other means than by a resort to the inquisitorial powers of this House. Now, with respect to the first of these grounds which I have stated, it is obvious that it is impossible to be resorted to. No one can deny the melancholy condition of our army before Sebastopol. The accounts which arrive from that quarter every week, are not only painful, but horrible and heart-rending; and I am sure no one would oppose for a moment any measure that would be likely not only to cure, but to do anything to mitigate those evils. I must say that there is something, with all the official knowledge to which I have had access, that to me is inexplicable in the state of our army.'* The second ground for resisting the inquiry, by asserting that sufficient means had been taken to remedy the evils, Lord John declared his inability to adopt: he could not point to remedial measures as having been adopted by his colleagues. Thus embarrassed, not knowing either how to support or to oppose Mr Roebuck's motion, and not seeing how the ministers could escape from their difficulties, his lordship cut the knot by escaping from the ministry himself.

This proceeding, as was soon made evident, greatly surprised the other members of the cabinet. The Earl of Aberdeen did not make any attempt to shake the determination expressed, but proceeded to Windsor, and communicated with the Queen, who at once accepted Lord John Russell's resignation. On the 26th of January, in the House of Lords, the earl, in announcing this event, expressed both surprise and regret; and on the same evening, in the House of Commons, after Lord John Russell had announced his resignation and the reasons for it, Lord Palmerston, in the midst of kind expressions, temperately censured him for the time and the mode of taking this step. He said: 'Though my noble friend might properly and naturally have continued to entertain an opinion that a change was necessary with regard to the person who held the office of Secretary of State for War, yet I must venture humbly to submit to him that that opinion ought to have been repeated to the noble lord at the head of the government before the reassembling of parliament after the late recess. He ought to have given the government the opportunity of stating to him whether or not that proposal would be accepted on his renewal of it. . . . . The course taken by my noble friend, I must venture humbly to submit to him, was not in correspondence with the usual practice of public men. It was one calculated inevitably to place the government to which he belonged in a position of embarrassment in which, at the hands of a colleague at least, they ought not to have been placed.'

The important motion which thus occasioned the retirement of one of the most influential members of the government, was brought before the House of Commons on the same evening marked by the explanations just adverted to—namely, the 26th of January. It was couched in these words: 'That a select committee be

* Speech in the House of Commons, January 26, 1855.

appointed to inquire into the condition of our army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those departments of the government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that army.' The motion was warmly debated on the 26th and the 29th: several members of the government opposing it on the threefold ground —that the misconduct and miseries were not so great as was publicly supposed; that the government itself was instituting inquiries; and that a parliamentary inquiry on military matters would imperil the cordiality of the alliance between England and France. After a protracted debate on the night of the 29th, the Commons came to a decision at an early hour on the 30th; when, to the amazement of all parties, Mr Roebuck's motion was carried by a majority of 305 to 148—no one having deemed so large a majority probable.

This vote decided the fate of the Aberdeen ministry, and set aside numerous other motions. Lord Lyndhurst, on the 25th, had given notice, in the House of Lords, of a resolution for the 2d of February, to the effect, 'That in the opinion of this House the expedition to the Crimea was undertaken by Her Majesty's government with very inadequate means, and without due caution or sufficient inquiry into the nature and extent of the resistance to be expected from the enemy; and that the neglect and mismanagement of the government in the conduct of the enterprise have led to the most disastrous results;' but this intention underwent modification, consequent on the vote in the Commons. On the 30th, the ministers proposed an adjournment for two days, in the peculiar exigency of public affairs; and on the 1st of February, the Earl of Aberdeen announced in the Lords, and Lord Palmerston in the Commons, that the ministry had resigned, retaining the seals of office only until their successors were appointed. In the Commons, little more than the simple announcement was made; but in the Lords, the Duke of Newcastle dwelt with some severity on the manner in which his name had been used by Lord John Russell. During several days, parliament and the country were kept in uncertainty relating to the ministry, and minor subjects only were discussed. One of these, however, was interesting; inasmuch as General Sir de Lacy Evans appeared in full military uniform in the House of Commons, to receive the thanks of the House for his zealous and intrepid services at the seat of war. The general, while thanking the Speaker for the honour, frankly stated that he believed he had been quite as good a general thirty years earlier, when frowned upon by the Horse Guards and the aristocratic officers in the army. It was not until several days had elapsed, that, by the issuing of new writs for elections in certain boroughs and counties, the House of Commons learned that the seals of office had been transferred to new hands.

The trying difficulties of the position were fully shewn by the negotiations between statesmen at this juncture. It remained during many days so doubtful whether any ministry could be formed, that deep anxiety was felt throughout the country. The Queen commissioned the Earl of Derby to form a government; and his lordship made many overtures with this view. He first thought of establishing a Conservative ministry, including the Earl of Ellenborough and Sir E. B. Lytton, who had advocated a bold policy in the prosecution of the war; but when he came to measure his strength in the House of Commons as shewn by votes, and in the country as indicated by the press, he felt that he had insufficient support to enable him to carry on the government. Thus baffled, the earl essayed a singular course—the formation of a coalition ministry. The Aberdeen government, comprising Peelites, Whigs, and Liberals, had been mercilessly criticised by the Earl of Derby and his supporters, as an embodiment of that which England abhorred—a coalition of men professing opposite views, a compromise of honest principle: when, therefore, the earl proposed an adoption of this very system, he placed himself on the horns of a dilemma from which escape seemed difficult. He made overtures to Lord Palmerston, and through him to Mr Gladstone and Mr Sidney Herbert, three of the most active members of the late government: postponing the consideration of other names until this application had been responded to. The three statesmen, after conferring with each other and with their supporters, declined to join the Earl of Derby in the formation of a ministry: feeling, in all probability, that there was little chance of such a combination working harmoniously for any long continuance, in the peculiar state of public affairs. The earl, making no further attempt, resigned into the Queen's hands the commission he was unable to fulfil. Lord John Russell was then sent for; but the peculiar manner in which he had recently isolated himself from all parties rendered it impossible for his lordship to bring together a working ministry; and thus this attempt also failed. The Queen next consulted the Marquis of Lansdowne, not as a minister but as an adviser, on account of his great experience, knowledge of parties, and high standing; the result of this consultation was, that Lord Palmerston undertook the formation of a ministry: a fact announced in both Houses of parliament on the 5th of February.

The task undertaken by Lord Palmerston was one of enormous difficulty. Turn to what quarter he might, embarrassments would beset him. As he had boldly stood by the Aberdeen ministry in all its troubles, he could not dissociate himself from sympathy with his late colleagues; and yet, if he identified himself with their policy, he would neither please the Conservatives nor the Liberals, who had for once joined in defeating the Aberdeen government on Mr Roebuck's motion. Many days elapsed before he could surmount the difficulties of his position; but

at length a ministry was announced,* containing so many names compromised by the late vote, and so small an infusion of new blood, that distrust of its permanence became general. The Liberals were disappointed, for they expected a ministry willing to pledge itself to bold reforms in the administration of the state and the army. Whether Lord Palmerston made this selection because it suited his own views and opinions, or because he deemed it best fitted to possess working efficiency in parliament, or because he had no other resource, he boldly undertook the task of government with these as his coadjutors.

On the 16th of February, the new ministry fairly began its labours. The premier made an announcement, shewing that the elements of the old ministry were incorporated in the new to an extent even greater than had been supposed; for Lord John Russell, although not made a cabinet minister, was appointed to the delicate and responsible office of negotiator at a conference about to be held at Vienna concerning the war. Lord Panmure in the House of Peers, and Lord Palmerston in the Lower House, on that same evening, sketched an outline of the army reforms proposed, as shewn to be necessary by the deplorable calamities in the Crimea. Under the influence of these reforms, if carried, the enlistment for soldiers would include recruits of a more varied range in age than under the old system; the recruit would have the privilege of determining the duration of his service, between the limits of one year and ten years; the office of Secretary *at* War would be abolished, and the duties transferred to the Secretary *for* War, aided by a sufficient number of competent officials; the Board of Ordnance would be abolished, by transferring the military duties to the Commander-in-chief, and the civil duties to the Secretary for War (conveniently called the War-minister); a transport-board would be appointed by the Admiralty, to prevent the recurrence of such gross blunders as had disgraced the proceedings of the winter; a commission would be sent out, not simply to inquire into the state of matters at the camp and Scutari, but to remedy defects in the sanitary condition of camp, ships, and hospitals; another commission would be sent out—that of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch—to inquire into the causes of the wants and sufferings of the army; there would be a 'chief of the staff' appointed, to lessen the enormous duties pressing on the commander of the army in the daily and hourly communications with his staff; there would be an entire remodelling of the medical department of the army, as soon as it could be effected without interference with the active operations of the war; and, finally, as a means of relieving the commissariat-officers from a part of their too onerous duties, a land-transport corps would be established, analogous in some degree to the wagon-train of an earlier period, and responsible for the due ordering of all necessary means for carrying provisions and other stores to the army.

Thus Lord Palmerston inaugurated his accession to the premiership by a catalogue of improvements, some completed, some in progress, and some about to begin. The time was critical; and the nation, ready to support any minister who would honestly endeavour to remedy admitted abuses, received this catalogue cheerfully, and resolved to overlook the defects in the ministry for the sake of its good elements. But there were rocks ahead. Mr Roebuck's motion still retained its threatening influence: that motion had resulted in a determination by the House of Commons that a committee of the House, uncontrolled by the government, should inquire into the nature and causes of government misdeeds; and as Lord Palmerston was one of those who had abandoned office rather than assent to such a measure, men of all parties looked eagerly for any indications of his forthcoming line of policy. On the 16th, the premier had stated that he retained his objection to the measure on constitutional grounds; and he expressed a hope that the House would at least suspend the appointment of the committee: pledging himself, if this were done, that the government itself would institute a searching inquiry. On the 19th, Mr Layard called attention, in a long speech, to the condition of the country, animadverting on the conduct of the war by the late government, and expressing distrust in the new ministry on account of its containing so many of the old elements; while Lord Palmerston, in reply, urging the country to look forward with hope, frankly engaged to do his best to remedy abuses. Other subjects came on for discussion, and the ministerial progress seemed to be favourable, when suddenly, on the 22d, the House of Commons was startled by an announcement from Lord Palmerston, that Sir James Graham, Mr Gladstone, and Mr Sidney Herbert had resigned their places in his government: thus throwing public affairs once more into confusion. On the 23d, the three ex-ministers assigned their reasons for this step. They stated that a hope had been entertained by the ministry, that the advances already made in administrative reform would be accepted by the House as an earnest of the future; and that the appointment of the committee, under these circumstances, would not be persisted in. It further appeared that no definite understanding had been arrived at between the premier and these three ministers at the time when the ministry was formed; they had believed that the appointment

* First Lord of the Treasury.....Lord Palmerston.
Lord Chancellor.....Lord Cranworth.
Lord President.....Earl Granville.
Lord Privy Seal.....Duke of Argyll.
Foreign Secretary.....Earl of Clarendon.
Colonial Secretary.....Mr Sidney Herbert.
Home Secretary.....Sir George Grey.
Minister of War.....Lord Panmure.
Chancellor of the Exchequer.....Mr Gladstone.
First Lord of the Admiralty.....Sir James Graham.
First Commissioner of Works.....Sir W. Molesworth.
President of the India Board.....Sir Charles Wood.
Post-master General.....Lord Canning.
In the Cabinet, but without office.....Marquis of Lansdowne.

of the committee would still be resisted by the government, while Lord Palmerston had foreseen the necessity for yielding to it. The subject necessarily came on for discussion in the cabinet; and when the three ministers learned the decision of Lord Palmerston, they resigned. These resignations led to others among the Peel party, and great embarrassment was again felt in the formation of a government. The committee, the motion for which had produced all these dislocations, was appointed on the same evening the explanations were given: it comprised the names of Mr Roebuck, Mr Drummond, Sir J. Pakington, Mr Layard, Colonel Lindsay, Mr Ellice, Lord Seymour, Sir G. C. Lewis, Mr Ball, and Mr Bramston.

The substitutes obtained by Lord Palmerston for the retiring ministers were inferior in parliamentary reputation and administrative experience. Lord John Russell, it is true, became Colonial Secretary; but as he was at the same time diplomatist at Vienna, an incongruity presented itself in his position and functions. Sir G. C. Lewis became Chancellor of the Exchequer; Sir Charles Wood, First Lord of the Admiralty; Mr Vernon Smith, President of the India Board; while numerous changes were made in the subordinate offices. On the 5th of March the committee of the Commons began its inquiry into the 'State of the Army before Sebastopol'—with what result has been stated in the last Chapter. Lord Palmerston made a direct appeal to the members of the committee, leaving to their honour and patriotism the avoidance of any inquiries which might imperil the amicable relations between England and France—an appeal generously responded to by the committee, who checked the questionings when the answers appeared likely to involve any allusions to the French army fighting side by side with the English in the Crimea.

The Palmerston administration, weakened as it was, nevertheless struggled against the difficulties of its position: gradually working out such reforms as the cabinet could agree upon, and as parliament would be likely to sanction; and steering a middle course between the ultra war-party and the peace-party. Three circumstances led to a more ready public acquiescence in the proceedings of the government than would otherwise have been exhibited. In the first place, public affairs had arrived at such a dead-lock, that if the ministry had been defeated, no other seemed possible: it was not apparent to whom else the Queen could apply, to accept and hold the reins of government. In the second place, Lord Palmerston himself held a high place in public estimation, as one well conversant with European politics, and possessing great administrative ability: it was hoped that his talents would atone for some of the deficiencies of the ministry in other particulars. And, lastly, the seals of the Foreign Office continued to be held by the Earl of Clarendon, who had conducted the diplomacy relating to the war from the commencement, and who bore a reputation for skill, temper, and honesty, in the management of the duties of that very onerous position.

DEATH OF THE CZAR NICHOLAS.

A startling event occurred while these ministerial changes were yet in progress. The powerful if not great Czar Nicholas died. The autocrat who had inherited an aggressive policy from his predecessors; who had concealed that policy with wonderful sagacity from all but a few far-seeing statesmen; who had gradually and silently constructed fortresses and arsenals of unprecedented magnitude; who had entangled Turkey in a net-work of embarrassments, tending to render that state more and more powerless before him; who had watched closely for the hour when the Ottoman Porte, the 'sick man,' might be brought under his perilous 'protection;' who had determined rather to wage war with England and France than abandon pretensions which, if conceded, would have made him virtually master over twelve million Christian subjects of the sultan; who had striven, by stern menace and crafty intrigue, to retain Austria and Prussia in his favour; who had placed in jeopardy the commercial prosperity of his kingdom, by enormous levies of men for his army and navy, and vast demands in the shape of taxes and contributions; who had roused up all the intolerance of religious zeal, by converting the war into a holy war of God's favoured people, the Russians, against heretics of all creeds—this man was taken from the scene of strife when that strife was at its hottest: leaving to his successor a bitter inheritance.

During the early weeks of 1855, it was rumoured that the czar was in ill health; and those who knew how little prone he was to listen to advice, whether from physicians or from others, augured a possibly unfavourable result, at a time when severity of weather and intensity of mental anxiety combined to affect him. Although suffering from influenza, the czar refused to keep his room, but transacted business in his usual way. On the 22d of February, however, his resolution no longer availed him: he consented to remain within his private apartments, which he never again left alive. On the 23d, he transferred all authority in imperial matters to his eldest son Alexander. Day by day he became worse; until, on the 1st of March, his physician ventured to announce to him that the end was approaching. The dying czar heard this announcement with a firmness befitting his character; he took the sacrament, bade a last farewell to the wife who had shared his throne during so many years, kissed all his children and grandchildren, personally thanked the principal servants of the household for their faithful services, and then lost the faculty of speech for a few hours. On the morning of the 2d, he regained the power of expressing a few sounds; and among the last

words he was heard to utter were: 'Tell Fritz to remain constant to Russia, and not to forget the words of his father.' The 'Fritz' here mentioned was Frederick William of Prussia; but the exact meaning of the latter part of the message was left in obscurity to all but those immediately concerned. At about noon, the Emperor Nicholas ceased to live.

As if to add to the noteworthy event of this day, a proof was afforded of the power possessed by one of the most brilliant mechanical inventions of any age—the electric-telegraph. The death of Nicholas was known in half the capitals of Europe on the very day on which it occurred! When the House of Lords met at five o'clock on that evening, for the despatch of public business in the usual way, the Earl of Clarendon said: 'My lords, I feel it my duty to communicate to your lordships the contents of a telegraphic dispatch I received half an hour ago from Her Majesty's minister at the Hague; it is as follows: "The Emperor Nicholas died this day, at one o'clock, of pulmonic apoplexy, after an attack of influenza." I have also received a dispatch from Her Majesty's minister at Berlin, stating that the Emperor of Russia died at twelve o'clock, about an hour before these dispatches arrived.' The same announcement was made by Lord Palmerston in the Commons; and the news spread the same evening over the country, from Aberdeen in the north-east to Plymouth in the south-west—not merely figuratively, but actually with the speed of lightning; for the electric current was the messenger. Another remarkable circumstance connected with the death of the czar was, that Lord John Russell was at that moment in Berlin, on his way to Vienna to attend a conference of diplomatists: having made a short sojourn at the first-named city, to endeavour, by an interview with the Prussian king and ministers, to facilitate the discussion of peace proposals at the conference. Lord Lyndhurst, a short time previously, had given notice of a motion for this very 2d of March, concerning the negotiations for peace; and consequently the Earl of Clarendon, after announcing the czar's death, added: 'As this unexpected event must exercise so important and immediate an influence on the war, on the negotiations for peace that are now going on, and possibly on the policy of Russia, I think my noble friend will agree with me that it might be attended with much inconvenience if he brought forward his motion this evening. I therefore trust that he will not, on public grounds, object to the request I take the liberty of making.' Lord Lyndhurst consented, not to withdraw, but to postpone his motion.

The great czar being dead, the busy tongues of nations quickly asked—did he die a natural death? The past history of Russia has presented so many examples of emperors and princes arriving at an untimely end, that a suspicion arose of something analogous in this case: these suspicions, however, received no support from any facts made public; and the death is fairly attributable to a bodily illness attacking one whose mind had suffered much irritation and anxiety. On the day after the death, Dr A. R. Granville communicated to the *Times* a remarkable document relating to the mental habitudes of Nicholas, and of the czars generally. This physician resided at St Petersburg during many weeks in 1849, in medical attendance on a high personage at the imperial court; and while so employed, he made observations leading him to certain opinions on the characteristics of the czars and their relations. These opinions were embodied in a letter addressed to Lord Palmerston four years afterwards, at a time when the Russo-Turkish troubles were becoming serious. One paragraph of the letter ran thus: 'The Western cabinets find the conduct of the Emperor Nicholas strange, preposterous, inconsistent, unexpected. They wonder at his demands; they are startled at his state-papers; they cannot comprehend their context; they recognise not in them the clear and close reasoning of the Nestor of Russian diplomacy, but rather the dictates of an iron will to which he has been made to affix his name; they view the emperor's new international principles as extravagant; they doubt if he be under the guidance of wise counsels. Yet they proceed to treat, negotiate, and speak as if none of these perplexing novelties in diplomacy existed on the part of a power hitherto considered as the model of political loyalty.' Dr Granville proceeded to argue that the czar should be treated rather as a man suffering under monomania, not fully master of himself; that Nicholas, in the later years of his life, had become irritable, passionate, superstitious, capricious, precipitate, obstinate; that ill health, unskilfully treated, had brought on a cerebral excitement, impelling him to extravagant measures — such as had been exhibited by the Emperor Paul in 1800, the Emperor Alexander in 1820, the Grand-duke Constantine in 1830, and the Grand-duke Michael in 1848–9; that the father and the four brothers had all exhibited traits of connate insanity; that Paul, Alexander, Constantine, and Michael had all died with apoplectic symptoms; that ten weeks' observation of Nicholas, in 1849, had brought into view many strange freaks in his mental deportment; and, finally, that Dr Granville had made all this known to the English government, at some hazard of professional delicacy, as a means of shewing the necessity for treating the czar in a different manner in all political discussions. It further appeared that, at an interview with Lord Palmerston in February 1854, Dr Granville, in reply to a question concerning an opinion before expressed, ventured to predict that the czar would barely reach his 59th birthday; 'let but a few reverses overtake the emperor, and his death, like that of all his brothers, will be sudden.' In making this remarkable communication to the *Times*, Dr Granville added: 'It has proved so. Alma, Inkermann, Balaklava, shook the mighty

brain; Eupatoria completed the stroke, which has anticipated my prognosis only by a few weeks.'

Whether or not the Czar Nicholas inherited insanity, he unquestionably inherited a policy—that of systematic aggression on the territories of his neighbours. This policy has been traced by many writers up to a document called the 'Will of Peter the Great.' That such a will was ever made, however, has not been satisfactorily proved. It purports to have been transmitted by the Chevalier d'Eon, French ambassador at the court of St Petersburg, to the king of France, in the year 1757; it was printed soon afterwards, and has since been either printed or adverted to in many histories and biographies relating to Russia. Failing more detailed evidence, it cannot be received as of unquestioned authenticity; yet it corresponds so nearly with the known tendencies of Peter's character, as to carry a recommendation with it. The preamble of the will sets out that, according to his view, and according to the apparent design of Providence, the Russian nation is destined to exercise supreme dominion over Europe; that Russia, which he found a brook and should leave a river, would, under his successors, grow to a mighty sea, destined to fertilise worn-out Europe, and to render the Muscovite genius everywhere paramount. Assuming that such would be the ultimate result, he lays down certain 'Rules' for its more efficient attainment; and if these rules were really fashioned so many generations ago, they shew how steadily Peter's successors have followed the course marked out by him. The rules are fourteen in number; they prescribe in a dogmatic manner what is to be done, and Peter recommends his subjects to study them as the Israelites studied the tables of the law consigned to them by Moses. He pronounces that Russia should always preserve herself on a war-footing, to keep the soldiers in good condition, and to prepare to insure by force any aggrandisement of the empire; that skilled men should be invited from all countries to Russia, to impart their wisdom and their tact; that Russia should take part in all continental quarrels, especially those of Germany, to avail herself of any advantageous openings that might occur; that Poland should be thrown into discord, by keeping up constant jealousies and confusion there, through the medium of bribes, intrigues, and 'occupation' by Russian troops; that Sweden should be kept as much as possible in hostility with Denmark, in order that Russia might obtain portions of the former country, either as a reward for friendly intervention or as a fine for any easily imagined offence; that the Russian princes should always intermarry with German princesses, in order that a Russian party might exist in the heart of every state in the Teutonic Empire; that Russia should endeavour to maintain good relations with England, as possessing a powerful navy and a commerce likely to be advantageous; that the boundary of the empire should gradually be extended along the shores of the Baltic and the Black Sea; that attention should unceasingly be directed to Constantinople and India, establishing ports and docks in the Black Sea, and fomenting constant quarrels with Turkey and Persia, insomuch that each of these states might be instrumental in weakening the other; that Austria should be kept, as much as possible, in a state of discord with the minor German powers, Russia weakening all by alternately aiding each against the rest; that, if Turkey could be taken by Russia, Austria should be appeased by a small strip, which could afterwards be recovered by Russian diplomacy; that all the adherents of the Greek Church, in whatever empire residing, should be encouraged to regard the czar as their natural protector. One maxim is so exceedingly remarkable, that it deserves to be quoted in full: 'When Sweden is ours, Persia vanquished, Poland subjugated, Turkey conquered—when our armies are united, and the Euxine and the Baltic are in the possession of our ships, then we must make separate and secret overtures first to the court of Versailles, and then to that of Vienna, to share with them the dominion of the world. If either of them accepts our propositions, which is certain to happen if their ambition and self-interest are properly worked upon, we must make use of this one to annihilate the other: this done, we have only to destroy the remaining one by finding a pretext for a quarrel, the issue of which cannot be doubtful, as Russia will then be already in the absolute possession of the East, and of the best part of Europe. Should the improbable case happen of both rejecting the propositions of Russia, then our policy will be to set one against the other, and make them tear each other to pieces. Russia must then watch for and seize the favourable moment, and pour her already assembled hosts into Germany, while two immense fleets, laden with Asiatic hordes, and convoyed by the armed squadrons of the Euxine and the Baltic, set sail simultaneously from the Sea of Azof and the harbour of Archangel. Sweeping along the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, they will overrun France on the one side, while Germany is overpowered on the other. When these countries are fully conquered, the rest of Europe must fall easily and without a struggle under our yoke. Thus Europe can and must be subjugated.'

Now, let the decision be what it may concerning the authenticity of the will of Peter the Great, these 'maxims' were unquestionably in print generations ago, long before the modern conflicts of Europe had commenced; yet, if the maxim or rule of conduct just quoted be compared with the 'Secret Correspondence' of 1844 and 1853, and with other Russian documents, it will be impossible to lose sight of the remarkable analogy in the tactics of the different periods—everything tending to shew that there has been a steady uniform policy pursued by the Russian court during a long series of years.

Nicholas certainly inherited this policy, as he

did also the consequences of a certain amount of dissatisfaction among the Russians themselves. His brother Alexander, a cheerful and kind-hearted man during the greater portion of his life, became melancholy and morose towards the close of his days, exhibiting, as Dr Granville states, indications of insanity. The eldest of four brothers, and without legitimate issue, Alexander would be succeeded by the eldest of the remaining three: this prince, however, the Grand-duke Constantine, had so violent and ill-regulated a temper, that Alexander, dreading the consequences, exercised his imperial will so far as to set aside Constantine and nominate Nicholas—who, though brother to Alexander, was nineteen years younger; the one having been born in 1777, and the other in 1796. Alexander had been in frequent collision with the old Muscovite party, headed by his brother Constantine; and the nomination of Nicholas was regarded as a triumph of the German element over the Russ. The youngest brother Michael was more of a nullity, distinguished neither by the passions nor the abilities of the rest.

No sooner had Nicholas mounted the throne in 1825, than the machinations of numerous secret societies, long in process of formation, were directed against him: harassing enough collectively, but weakened by differences in the objects aimed at by the several societies. The firmness of the young czar on a day of peril saved him and the empire; but when the time came for displaying magnanimity towards the vanquished, he failed in that quality: the retribution and bloodshed were terrible. His occupation of the throne being now firmly secured, Nicholas proceeded in those measures, external and internal, which rendered him the most remarkable of the contemporary sovereigns of Europe. Misunderstandings—if events can be so called which were probably foreseen and fully intended by one of the parties—soon arose with Turkey; misunderstandings so clumsily treated by the Western Powers, that they led, by the weakening of the Turkish navy at the battle of Navarino, to the furtherance of the very policy intended by the czar. The Treaty of Adrianople, which shortly followed, drove another rivet into the chain binding Turkey to Russia. A war with Persia then enabled Nicholas to obtain valuable positions south of the Caucasus, secured to him by the Treaty of Turkmanchai. Then, Egypt having, under a turbulent pacha, rebelled against its suzerain the sultan, an opportunity was afforded to Nicholas of strengthening his own power over Turkey, by defending Turkey against Egypt. For it must be remarked, as a singular characteristic in Russian aggression, that the czars, in interfering between disputants, have generally contrived to reap an advantage, let their advocacy have been employed on the one side or the other. Shortly after these events occurred that rising of the Polish nation which ended, in 1831, by the blotting out of the last remnants of that ill-used nationality, and incorporating the kingdom of Poland—itself a mere fraction of the older kingdom, and placed under one of the grand-dukes—with Russia, as a mere province. During the remaining twenty-four years of his life, Nicholas was not involved extensively in actual warfare; but, as the previous pages have shewn, he was frequently engaged in intrigues, aided occasionally by brief campaigns, tending to increase his power in Turkey, Persia, Central Asia, and other countries. In 1853, unfortunately for his life and his reputation, he suffered the Muscovite element to drive him into collision, not merely with weakened Turkey, but with nearly the whole of Europe. On the 2d of March 1853, Prince Menchikoff held that interview with the grand vizier at Constantinople, and passed that studied insult upon Fuad Effendi, which shewed to the startled ambassadors in the Turkish metropolis that a more than usually audacious tone was about to be adopted by Russia towards Turkey: on the 2d of March 1855, precisely two years afterwards, the autocrat whom Menchikoff had served—perhaps too well—succumbed to a greater, Death.

It would be unjust to lose sight of the fact, that the Czar Nicholas earnestly desired the good of his country, and laboured hard to bring about reforms in some of the many abuses which beset it. The dishonesty of the Russian officials he could not and did not deny; and to contend against it was one of his greatest difficulties. It would not be just, either, to forget that there was an enormous power in the centre of his empire, perpetually urging him to the adoption of strong aggressive measures in connection with the Muscovite and Pan-Slavonic movements, and discouraging all attempts on his part to assimilate his empire to those of other states. If he dreamed of Constantinople and of India, it was a dream instilled into him by the memory of Peter and Catherine; but if, as is abundantly evident, he left Russia richer and more powerful than he found it, the fact should be remembered even by those who have smarted by his unjust pretensions to increased dominion.

Of all the sovereigns of Europe in the nineteenth century, there was none who 'looked the king' so well as Nicholas. Some admirers ran off into extravagant praise of his manly beauty; but even those who could read bad qualities of heart or temper in his countenance, yet admitted the physical grandeur of the autocrat. Tournier's description has often been quoted, as delineating a man who could more easily be feared than loved: 'It has been said and repeated everywhere, that the emperor of Russia is one of the handsomest men in his empire. But what ought to have been especially remarked is, that the beauty of the czar is cold, inanimate, without grace, and without brilliancy. He is taller than was his brother Alexander; but he has neither his smile nor that engaging exterior, nor those amiable manners

which exercised such invincible attraction for all who approached him. Nicholas may be one of the tallest men in his empire; we will not contest his claim to that privilege; but Alexander was the more amiable, and the best beloved. Nicholas is stiff, starched, and absolutely freezing in his deportment. His features, stern and severe, shew no impression. He has no freedom in his manner, but seems to imagine that his constrained demeanour displays dignity—you would say that he was enclosed from head to foot in armour of whalebone. His countenance exhibits the immovable regularity of a lifeless statue; it is correctly handsome, but there is nothing transparent; it is like marble, and it is easy to see that the kindly warmth of humanity has rarely illumined that polished brow; his aspect betrays a constant struggle between a desire to appear benevolent, and the necessity of shewing himself imperial; he is haughty, and yet does not inspire awe. What is peculiar in the expression of his countenance is the want of agreement between the mouth, which sometimes will smile, and the eye, which remains cold and unlighted. It is more

Nicholas I., as he appeared immediately after death.

difficult for Nicholas to feign to be a man, than to appear as the emperor.'

The three brothers of Nicholas preceded him to the grave; two sisters, and the wife and daughter of his brother Michael, survived him. He left six children, Alexander, Maria, Olga, Constantine, Nicholas, and Michael; the two princesses were married to German princes, and two of the princes to German princesses. Of the four sons, at that time aged respectively 37, 28, 24, and 22 years, the eldest, the Czarévitch Alexander Nicolaïvitch, ascended the throne by virtue of his seniority, under the title of Alexander II. Then did Europe ask, as with one voice, 'Will Alexander follow in the footsteps of his father?' The czarévitch had not mixed prominently in public affairs; he bore the character of being somewhat indolent, fond of personal indulgences, kind-hearted, easy-tempered, disinclined to trouble himself with public affairs; whereas his brother Constantine was regarded as a fierce, haughty, active, clever, energetic, stern, unforgiving young man; Alexander was believed to be favourably disposed towards the German party, Constantine being the favourite of the old Muscovites; Alexander was compared in many respects to his uncle Alexander, Constantine to his uncle Constantine; the opponents of Russian aggression, judging from such indications as had been made public, rejoiced that Alexander rather than Constantine had succeeded to the Russian throne. Alexander had been married about fourteen years to a princess of the House of Hesse, who, in accordance with the usage of the Russian court,

gave up her own Christian names, and became Maria Alexandrovna; there were five children of this marriage, of whom the eldest, Nicholas Alexandrovitch, became in 1855, at the age of eleven years, heir to the Russian throne.

The personal character and the German sympathies of Alexander II. appeared to furnish some ground for the favourable anticipations of those who wished for a cessation of that aggressive policy which had caused the war. These wishes were, however, not responded to. Alexander, even supposing the yearnings of his own heart to have been peaceful, was closely watched and eagerly pressed by Constantine and the Muscovite party; and, difficult as it was to carry on the war successfully, it might have been still more difficult to adopt a peaceful policy against the wishes of his brother, the old nobility, and the priesthood—all of whom thirsted for an extension of the political and theocratic influence of 'Holy Russia.' On the day of Nicholas's death, Alexander issued a manifesto, in which these words were used: 'May Providence, who has called us to this high mission, so aid us that, guided and protected by Him, we may be able to strengthen Russia in the highest degree of power and glory; that by us may be accomplished the views and the desires of our illustrious predecessors, Peter, Catherine, Alexander the much-beloved, and our august father of imperishable memory;' and a few days afterwards he addressed the diplomatic body—from which the representatives of several nations were necessarily absent—in these remarkable words: 'I solemnly declare here before you, gentlemen, that I remain faithful to all the sentiments of my father, and that I will persevere in the line of political principles which served as a rule to my uncle, the Emperor Alexander, and to my father. These principles are those of the Holy Alliance. If that Alliance no longer exists, it was certainly not the fault of my father. His intentions were always upright and loyal: and if recently they were misunderstood by some persons, I do not doubt that God and history will do him justice.' There was nothing in these sentiments to indicate a departure from the principles of his father; and the Western Powers were enforced to conclude, that, whatever might be the secret personal wishes of the new monarch, they must treat with the Czar Alexander as they had treated with the Czar Nicholas.

THE VIENNA CONFERENCES.

Negotiations, as has before been implied, were in progress between the European powers at the time when Nicholas died; and his death did not materially alter the course pursued in relation thereto. The circumstances leading to those negotiations, occurring in the months of December, January, and February, now call for notice, as a means of rendering intelligible the negotiations themselves.

On the 2d of December, England, France, and Austria came to an agreement respecting the minimum of concessions by Russia likely to form the basis for a satisfactory peace.* The attention of Russia was brought to this agreement, through the medium of Austria; and on the 28th of December the three powers drew up a 'Memorandum,' explaining more fully the meaning attached to the Four Points by the preceding document; namely, 1*st*, The abandonment by Russia of all exclusive control over Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, in order that, under the suzerainty of the sultan, those principalities, in regard to their privileges, should have the collective guarantee of England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia; 2*d*, The abandonment of Russian control over the mouths of the Danube, and the establishment of a joint-syndicate empowered to maintain the free navigation of that river; 3*d*, The suppression of Russian preponderance in the Black Sea, and of all treaties between Russia and Turkey calculated to prevent the latter state from taking her place among the European powers; and 4*th*, A renunciation by Russia of all special right of interference with the Christian subjects of the Porte, in order that a general protection might be exerted by all the five Christian powers, who would work together in urging upon the sultan the observance of tolerant rules in his dealings with the rayahs or Christians of Turkey.

The three powers experienced nearly as much difficulty in inducing Prussia to look favourably on these Four Points, as Russia herself; and lengthened diplomatic correspondence thence arose. The king hesitated to accept frankly any bases of negotiation offered, and yet felt alarm at any proposals for conducting such negotiations without his concurrence—as if anxious that Prussia should remain a leading power, without incurring any of the perils or liabilities incident to that position. Austria had bound herself in this pledge:—that if, by the 31st of December 1854, Russia should not have consented to the Four Points, she would join the Western Powers in arms against the czar; but to this agreement Prussia would not be a consenting party. The czar, seeing indications that Austria might possibly be in earnest, consented—not to the actual adoption of the Four Points—but to the holding of a conference at Vienna relating thereto; and the year 1855 opened with the preparations of statesmen to wage a diplomatic battle in that city, to decide who could struggle best with the pen and the voice. The Czar Nicholas, in a manifesto, dated $\frac{\text{Jan. 29th}}{\text{Feb. 10th}}$, called the attention of his subjects to the efforts he had made for the maintenance of the orthodox Russo-Greek Church, to his sincere desire for the wellbeing of all, to the absence of any undue ambition on his part, and to the sanction given to his views by the conduct

* See Chapter IX., p. 357.

of all ranks in his dominions; he declared that he loved peace sincerely, and had agreed to the holding of a conference at Vienna in earnest of that love; but he also announced, that as the Western Powers were continuing their warlike preparations, despite the proposed conference, he could not do less than adopt a similar course. He thereupon ordered the formation of a general militia of the whole Russian Empire; and ended in that religious strain which characterised so many of his manifestoes in the later years of his life: 'More than once Russia has been menaced, and has undergone sad and cruel trials; but she has always found her salvation in her humble faith in Providence, and in the close and indissoluble bands which unite the monarch with his subjects, his devoted children. Let it be so again to-day! May the Almighty, who reads every heart, who blesses pure intentions, grant us his assistance!' This was written only three weeks before the czar's death.

Lord John Russell, about a fortnight after the formation of the Palmerston ministry, received from the Earl of Clarendon a letter of instructions for his guidance in his newly assumed character of British negotiator at the Vienna conferences. The selection may have been made to strengthen a ministry weak in many of its departments; or to heal the wounds arising out of the recent disruption of the Aberdeen ministry; or as an acknowledgment of great public services rendered in past years; or on account of the fact that Lord John had been Foreign Secretary during a few weeks when the Russo-Turkish troubles were beginning: but be the ground what it may, his lordship prepared for this new duty, making a short sojourn on the way at Berlin, with a view to win over the king of Prussia to the plans of the Western Powers. It was during this sojourn, as before remarked, that the Czar Nicholas died; but, although giving rise to a large additional correspondence, the death did not prevent the assemblage of the diplomatists at Vienna. These statesmen, selected by the respective sovereigns, bent their steps from London, Paris, St Petersburg, and Constantinople, towards Vienna, there to meet those named by Austria. It was certainly strange, at such a time, to see Prussia holding aloof from a conference so established; a non-appearance arising from the fact that, while England, France, Austria, and Turkey would not admit her as an avowed advocate for Russia, she, on the other hand, withheld such support as would have justified those powers in recognising her as a negotiator friendly to the Allies.

The Earl of Clarendon's instructions to Lord John Russell, dated the 22d of February, conveyed very clearly an outline of the views entertained by the English government concerning the objects sought to be attained; and it is probable that those intended for the guidance of the Baron de Bourqueney, as representative of France, were of similar character. These objects were stated to be, either the establishment of peace on such a basis as to afford sufficient guarantee for the future security of Turkey; or, failing this, a combined effort of the great powers of Europe 'against the spirit of encroachment and wrong by which the councils of Russia have been animated.' The Earl of Clarendon suggested that the Third Point, as the most important, ought to be discussed first; since the others would possess little value 'unless effectual precautions are taken to render the Turkish Empire an integral part of the European system, and sufficient restraint be imposed upon the military and naval power heretofore exercised by Russia in the Black Sea, and the overbearing influence which, by reason of that power, she has acquired over the councils of the Porte;' nevertheless, the plenipotentiary was empowered to take the Four Points for discussion in any order the diplomatists generally might deem best. The Third Point was, however, dwelt upon as being all-important: the primary purpose of the conference being to determine how Russian supremacy in the Black Sea could best be abrogated, in order that Turkey might occupy a place as an independent self-existing state, a member of the great European family, an essential element in the balance of power in Europe. Three modes of bringing about this end were pointed out. *First*, By maintenance, on the part of the Western Powers, of a fleet in the Black Sea, adequate to counterbalance the naval forces Russia had heretofore maintained, and, if uncontrolled, might again maintain in that sea; to this plan the Earl of Clarendon pointed out numerous objections. *Secondly*, By reducing the maritime force of Russia in the Black Sea within reasonable compass, and allowing the Western Powers to send an equally reasonable fleet as a counterbalance; but this also was characterised as objectionable—on the ground that it would be impolitic for the Porte 'so to be impressed with a sense of its own comparative weakness as to be prepared to abdicate its power to defend the Turkish Empire against even a limited display of hostile force: it would be better for the nations of Europe that the Porte should be encouraged to rely on its own resources, though left at liberty to call in the aid of friendly powers to counteract the menaces of its powerful neighbour.' *Thirdly*, By the reduction of the Russian naval force in the Black Sea within such bounds as might, in co-operation with an equal Turkish force, suffice to provide adequate protection for peaceful commerce, and to frustrate the probability of any future march of Russian armies on Constantinople. This was the plan which appeared to the Earl of Clarendon best fitted to meet the object held in view; as likely to relieve Turkey from the terror the Russian power had so long inspired, and to afford opportunity for peaceful reforms in the internal organisation of the Ottoman Empire. The First and Second Points, involving a renunciation by Russia of special protective powers over the

Danubian provinces, and a liberation of the mouths of the Danube from all hurtful obstructions and disputed ownership, were regarded by the Earl of Clarendon as simple and easily managed. The Fourth Point, concerning the rectification of the Turkish rule over Christian subjects, was treated by him as being more delicate and difficult, calling for much abnegation and self-control on the part of the Christian powers in their dealings with the Porte. 'It would tend greatly to the peace of Turkey,' said his lordship, in relation to this matter, 'if the powers of Europe would mutually renounce all sectarian prejudices as applied to the subjects of the sultan, and look upon all Christians, whatever ritual they may belong to, as entitled to an equal share in the religious privileges and immunities which the sultan may, at the instance of the great powers of Europe, consent to accord them.' Summing up these explanatory elucidations, therefore, the Earl of Clarendon regarded the First and Second Points as comparatively easy, the Fourth as the most delicate and difficult, but the Third as the most important in relation to the subsequent peace of Europe.

Armed with these instructions, Lord John Russell met the other plenipotentiaries at Vienna. As assembled for business about the middle of March, the diplomatists were nine in number—namely, for England, Lord John Russell and the Earl of Westmoreland; France, the Baron de Bourqueney; Austria, Count de Buol-Schauenstein and Baron de Prokesch-Osten; Turkey, Aali Pacha and Aariff Effendi; Russia, Prince Gortchakoff and M. de Titoff. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as a second plenipotentiary for France, did not reach Vienna until a later period. At the commencement of the proceedings, on the 15th of March, Count Buol was elected chairman of the conference, and opened it with a speech relating to the important matters at issue; he stated, among other things, that 'the Emperor of Austria had made up his mind on the indispensable conditions of peace, and that nothing—not even the most serious consequences—would prevent his majesty from scrupulously adhering to the engagement he had contracted with his Allies.' The Russian plenipotentiaries, in accordance with a promise made by the czar, expressed their willingness to accept the oft-quoted Four Points as bases of negotiation; and it was agreed by all that these Points should be taken for discussion in their regular order. The Russians made an attempt to introduce Prussia to the conferences; but the other powers refused.

After much amicable negotiation affecting the First and Second Points, on several days of meeting, a difficulty suddenly arose on the 26th. When the Third Point came on, the Russian plenipotentiaries were invited to take the initiative, to propose some method by which they thought the principle already provisionally assented to by Russia could be attained. Gortchakoff and Titoff, much to the surprise of the other diplomatists, announced that they were without powers to adopt any such step, and that it would be necessary to send to St Petersburg to obtain these powers. Herein was at once a cause for great delay, which appears to have been part of the Russian diplomatic tactics at the time. While messages were being transmitted to and fro between Vienna and St Petersburg, the Russian and Austrian plenipotentiaries were willing to enter upon the consideration of the Fourth Point; but as England and France attached most importance to the Third, and were determined that unless that were settled the others should be regarded as non-effective, the Fourth was postponed until the czar had expressed his views. And when, at last, these views were made known to his representatives, it was found that the whole transaction had involved so much lost time; as the Russian plenipotentiaries had no proposals to make—that is, the czar, willing to take advantage of any concessions made by his opponents, would not commit himself by making any proposals of his own.

The conferences were at once thrown into disorder. The plenipotentiaries had already agreed upon the First and Second Points, at the especial and earnest desire of Austria. For it must be remembered that, as this power had bound herself to go to war with Russia in a certain contingency, she was anxious to discover whether that contingency might by any means be obviated: in other words, Austria said: 'It must first be ascertained that Russia is not willing to make peace on terms that we may think sufficient, before we carry out the treaty into which we have entered.' It was Austria that urged most strenuously the holding of the conferences, and that most earnestly strove to frame propositions acceptable to all. One omen was unfavourable. Lord John Russell, as he stated in the House of Commons several weeks afterwards, went to the conferences with a strong doubt in the probability of success, and expressed this doubt to Count Buol; he thought the Allies had so far been successful in the war as to justify them in making important claims upon Russia; but he did not see that Russia had yet become so weakened as to render probable any great amount of concession on her part. England and France would probably have preferred to postpone negotiation until further success had attended their arms; but, in acquiescence to Austria, they consented to hear what Russia had to say; and so the conferences were held. The spirit in which Russia yielded the First and Second Points enabled the plenipotentiaries to make some progress, although the difficulties were speedily found to be considerable. As concerns the principalities, Russia consented to the complete and permanent abrogation of the former treaties on that subject; she agreed that the sultan should provide, by a solemn act, for the maintenance of

all the privileges and liberties of those provinces; and that Russia should take no part in the matter other than as one of the great powers. Doubts were, however, felt how so to frame the new laws or constitution as to keep the provinces at peace with their three imperial neighbours; Moldo-Wallachia might become a focus of intrigue, in which partisans of Turkey, Russia, and Austria would alternately have the advantage; and the country might become distracted by contentions thence arising. No immediate mode of solving the difficulty being apparent, it was agreed that a commission should subsequently be formed at Constantinople, to frame the details of this Moldo-Wallachian constitution. So much for the First Point. As to the second, the embarrassments were fewer; Austria easily shewed that, in accordance with existing treaties, Russia had no right whatever to obstruct the free commercial navigation of the Danube: Russia yielded all that was necessary; and it was agreed that a commission or syndicate from all the great powers should superintend the carrying out of this decision. Thus, although the First and Second Points were agreed to, they would have involved the subsequent establishment of two bodies of commissioners, one to manage the details of the Moldo-Wallachian question, and the other those

Sulina Mouth of the Danube.

of the Sulina-Danube question. Next came on the Third Point; and here at once was presented a check to the progress of the plenipotentiaries. The check involved a delay of no less than three weeks; for the diplomatists, wanting further instructions for their guidance, were enforced to maintain a busy correspondence with their respective governments at London, Paris, Constantinople, and St Petersburg.

The courts of France and England were much annoyed at this interruption, as it left in total uncertainty the great question of peace or war, and strengthened an opinion already entertained, that Russia must meet with more defeat and humiliation before she would be likely to assent to satisfactory terms. Nevertheless, being desirous of neglecting no reasonable measures, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, drew up a new schedule of means for fulfilling the implied conditions of the Third Point; and, as a mode of strengthening the French plenipotentiary at Vienna, went himself to that city. In order to concert measures with the English government, however, he first visited London, and had a long interview on the 30th of March with the Earl of Clarendon, Lord Palmerston, the Marquis of Lansdowne, and M. Walewski—the last named being at the time French ambassador to the court of St James's. Two projects were agreed upon, with a provision that Austria should have the privilege of deciding which to support, as a *sine quâ non* to the continuance of peace between that state and Russia.

When, after an active transmission of couriers and dispatches, the plenipotentiaries had supplied themselves with instructions from their respective governments affecting the Third Point, the representatives of the Allied powers discussed among themselves the terms of the proposal fashioned

by M. Drouyn de Lhuys—who had by that time reached Vienna—and agreed as to the reception they would give to any probable scheme proposed by the Russian diplomatists. It was, however, the 17th of April before the latter had received their full instructions from St Petersburg; when, to the unmingled astonishment of the others present at the conference, these credentials were found to be valueless, so far as concerned an immediate advancement of peaceful negotiations. Prince Gortchakoff announced, as the result of his instructions just received, that Russia declined to initiate any proposals respecting the Third Point, while at the same time she would be willing to assent to reasonable terms proposed by the other powers. The prince took advantage of an expression used, perhaps inadvertently, by Lord John Russell at a former meeting, 'that the best and only admissible conditions of peace would be those which, *whilst consistent with the honour of Russia*, should at the same time suffice for the security of Europe, and for preventing the recurrence of the existing complications.' The expression was exactly suitable to Russian objects —indefinite, elastic, susceptible of interpretation in any way most pleasing to the interpreters. The representatives of the other powers were startled by this announcement; they had fully prepared themselves to discuss a Russian proposition; they felt that Russia was playing a double game; and they saw their chances of success vanish before them. M. Drouyn de Lhuys spoke strongly, and demanded in what sense the 'honour' of Russia would interpret the limitation of ships-of-war in the Black Sea; to which Gortchakoff replied that Russia would not consent to the strength of her navy being restricted to any fixed number, either by treaty or in any other manner. The English, French, Austrian, and Turkish representatives, with little difference of intensity, expressed their astonishment and regret at the refusal of Russia to take the initiative—a course suggested by Austria, out of courtesy to the czar; and announced their intention to deliberate separately, before conferring again with the Russian plenipotentiaries. Thus unsatisfactorily ended the conference of the 17th. They met again on the 19th; when Aali Pacha, representing Turkey, presented a formal proposition concerning the Third Point, founded on the agreement made in London three weeks before: this proposition was warmly supported by the eight representatives of the four powers. Gortchakoff and Titoff argued the subject in various ways; viewed distrustfully any proposal for limiting the number of Russian ships in the Black Sea; threw out a hint, repelled at once by the Allies, that Russia and Turkey might perhaps be able to settle the matter by themselves; and asked a little time for further consideration. The next meeting was on the 21st, when Gortchakoff and Titoff undertook to give a specific reply to the plan proposed for the settlement of the Third Point. This plan comprised the following items: that Russia and Turkey should each limit her Black Sea fleet to four ships-of-the-line, four frigates, and a proportionate number of smaller vessels, to act simply as a maritime police for the protection of commerce; that each of the other contracting powers should be allowed at any time to send half this number of ships into the Black Sea, also as a mere commercial protection; that the sultan should be empowered to ask the aid of any amount of naval service from his Western Allies, if at any time threatened by the czar; that Russia and Turkey should admit consuls from all the other contracting powers to all the commercial ports in the Black Sea; that Sardinia should be admitted as one of the contracting powers to the treaty; and that Russia should grant a general amnesty to any or all of her subjects who might have been compromised by the war. Prince Gortchakoff placed before the conference a lengthened document, explanatory of the reasons for rejecting the plan of the Allies; and he also detailed a plan which Russia proposed in substitution. In this document the czar's representative made a singular attempt to depreciate the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea, as if to shew that Turkey had no cause for alarm: the Allies, however, were not easily to be deceived on that point—they remembered Sinope. Prince Gortchakoff then brought forward his proposition—that the Black Sea should be open to the navies of all nations without distinction; leaving to Russia and Turkey the building and maintenance of any amount of war-ships they might individually choose.

This meeting of the 21st of April was, in one sense, the closing of the conferences; for, although other meetings were afterwards held, Lord John Russell did not attend them. In truth, Gortchakoff's propositions were entirely alien to the views of the Allies; he would have made the Black Sea open to all war-ships, probably on the supposition that Russia could always under such circumstances, having her own ports and arsenals at hand, maintain a preponderance; whereas the Allies wished that the war-ships should be so few in number as to leave the Black Sea virtually a commercial sea, freed from the threats and dangers of war. The plenipotentiaries of England, France, Austria, and Turkey, expressed themselves so decidedly against the plan proposed by Russia, that little more could be done or said; yet another meeting was convened by Count Buol on the 26th, to hear a new proposition the Russians stated they had to make. All attended except Lord John Russell, who announced that his instructions from England did not permit him to discuss in any sense the new Russian proposal. This proposal was little more than a maintenance of the *status quo:* a declaration that the Black Sea should be closed against all war-ships except those of Turkey and Russia, unless the sultan, in a time of apprehended danger,

should invite other powers to send fleets inwards through the Dardanelles, or that of Russia outwards through the same straits. It would, indeed, have rendered matters worse than before; for it would have enabled Russia, by a well-managed system of intrigue, to obtain from the Porte, at some critical moment, permission to send her Black Sea fleet out into the Mediterranean, thereby enlarging the field for ambitious extensions of influence. Count Buol wished the plenipotentiaries to declare that this proposition, though inadmissible, nevertheless contained a slight clue to a practicable arrangement; but the representatives of England, France, and Turkey refused to discuss it further, or even to ask for further instructions from their respective governments concerning it: they rejected it *in toto*, as utterly irreconcilable with their instructions.

Thus did the 26th of April witness the failure of this attempt to bring about peace between the belligerent powers. Russia, it will be seen, rejected every proposal for limiting her naval power in the Black Sea, although she brought forward no satisfactory proof or evidence that a powerful fleet in that region was necessary to her safety. There was another suspicious circumstance. The eight representatives of the Allies proposed, as part of the Third Point, that all the great powers should mutually respect and guarantee the independence and territorial inviolability of the Ottoman Empire—that is, that any one of them would join Turkey in a war against any of the others who might tamper with this inviolability. No arguments could induce Gortchakoff and Titoff to consent to this; they would not consent to place Russia on a level with the other powers in this particular; they used the word 'respect' and the word 'independence,' but they eluded anything that would, in its ultimate effect, shut the door against further aggression by Russia on Turkey. This fact made a deep impression on the other diplomatists, shewing how ingrained was the Muscovite tendency to regard as a possible future prey some of the many provinces constituting the territories of the sultan. The Fourth Point did not come under discussion at all; Russia and Austria wished that it might, as it affected them more than the Western Powers, relating, as it did, to the various Christian nations, Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic, under the suzerainty of the sultan; but England and France resolutely refused to touch this matter until the Third Point had been settled, seeing that this was the more important for the general peace of Europe. One of the two propositions by Russia concerning the Black Sea, for allowing her fleets ingress and egress by way of the Dardanelles, as part of the plan for rendering the sea open to the war-ships of all nations, was thus commented on in the House of Commons a few weeks afterwards by Lord John Russell: 'It is obvious that, if we had agreed to these terms, we should thus have increased to a large amount the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, and have allowed that fleet to come out from time to time, passing close to the sultan's palace, and parading the waters of Greece to raise discontent and disaffection among his subjects; and thus the facility of menace would have been increased whenever the czar of Russia might think proper to send a fleet to enforce unjust demands;' while the second proposition, emanating from the same quarter, to the effect that, if menaced by Russia, Turkey might call up the fleets of her allies to her aid, was characterised by Count Buol at the conferences as likely to lead to perpetual misunderstandings, whereby the sultan would be bewildered in the attempt to determine who were his friends or who his enemies. Count Nesselrode issued an elaborate document from St Petersburg early in May, giving a Russian version of the conferences, and claiming for the czar the credit of having made all possible concessions for the peace of Europe consistent with the 'honour' of Russia—again referring, as to a great point obtained, to Lord John Russell's declaration concerning that same 'honour' on the 26th of March. This document was addressed to the Russian ministers at foreign courts generally.

The present Chapter suitably closes here. Meetings continued to be held at Vienna by the diplomatists there assembled, and the statesmen of London, Paris, Turin, Berlin, St Petersburg, Vienna, and Constantinople continued to pour forth 'notes' and dispatches affecting the probable or possible modes of solving the great European problem; but the 26th of April marked a decisive moment in the progress of the diplomacy. Now, more than ever, did England and France become convinced that Russia must suffer more by the sword before she would yield to the pen; and they resolutely proceeded with their warlike plans in the Crimea and elsewhere. The strange revelations afterwards made concerning the details of the conferences, leading to the retirement of Lord John Russell and M. Drouyn de Lhuys from their respective governments, belong to a later period in the diplomatic history. The immediate result was simply this, that England, France, and Sardinia proceeded with the war against Russia as allies of Turkey; while Austria and Prussia still held aloof.

CHAPTER X.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1855.

THE war with Russia was carried on under remarkable circumstances, so far as concerned one at least of the belligerent powers. England, after forty years of European peace, found nearly all departments of her army in a defective state: the organisation confused; the expenditure too great in some particulars and too small in others; some departments overworked or underhanded, others a mere booty for favouritism; the encouragement of merit checked by the mode of disposing of commissions; and skill in the art of warfare being deficient simply because there had been none with whom to fight. One of the staff-officers of Lord Raglan's army, during the discussions springing out of the Crimean Commissioners' Report, made the following significant assertion:—'The War-office regulations are not adapted to a state of war'—an evidence of unfitness scarcely less glaring than would be that of a locomotive not adapted for running upon railways, or of a steam-ship not adapted for progression through the water. Mr Sidney Herbert, after many months' experience as Secretary at War, pictured the British army itself as being fully as disorganised as the War-office. He discussed the various circumstances that had led to this result, and added: 'I am not now speaking merely of reductions effected in men or in votes of money, but of the destruction of the very sources of our military power during the forty years' peace following 1815; and I think I can satisfy you in a very few words that we have had virtually no army during that time—that we have kept our troops for the purposes of police at home and in our colonies rather than for the purposes of defence abroad. What, I ask, is your English army? It is only a collection of regiments. The internal discipline of those regiments is certainly complete—you have in every company and in every regiment a most perfect regimental system; and, if you observe, you will find that in the actions that have lately taken place, and in the whole of the campaign during which they have occurred, there has not been the slightest sign of regimental disorganisation. . . . . There has been wanting that control over the whole army which you can get only by practice—and you have had no such practice. I venture to say that there have been field-officers in command of regiments in the Crimea who, until they went there—unless they had been in India or been quartered in Dublin—never in their lives saw a brigade. What, then, I ask, can you expect from such an army? Can you expect men who have never seen an army in the field, and are utterly unacquainted with the movements of such a force, and with the regulations required for its supplies and its security—can you expect such persons to be Heaven-born administrators, who can do not only what they have never practised, but what they never even saw done? This is a very important element in the consideration of the causes of the misfortunes which have occurred to our army.'*

To reform an army during a war in which that army is to be engaged must obviously be a difficult task; nor can it be said that such a great work was effected during the war with Russia. Nevertheless, so many important improvements were wrought, that the spring and summer of 1855 witnessed, in the British army engaged in the Crimea, a state of completeness far in advance of that in 1854. There were also many arrangements planned, and partially enforced, for obtaining aid through sources extraneous to the British army itself; and there were many remarkable applications to the art of war, of recent scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions. A few sections devoted to these instalments of improvement—improvement in the *personnel* and the *matériel* of the army (to use two convenient French words, to which there are no equally convenient English synonymes)—will render more intelligible the progress of the great siege of Sebastopol during the year 1855.

MILITIA, CAMPS, AND FOREIGN LEGIONS.

The British army has no existence unless parliament annually votes the necessary supplies.

* Speech in the House of Commons, January 26, 1855.

It has no self-sustaining power; no vested rights or property; no charter, freehold, estate, or corporate bond of continuity; nor does the royal sanction avail it, unless supported by the popular will expressed through the medium of the Commons. When once the War-minister, however, or any other officer of the government, has obtained the necessary votes from the House, all else devolves upon the crown, subject only to an occasional survey or scrutiny from parliament. Monarchs, in all ages, have been willing enough to find an armed force ever at their disposal; but a singular distrust has marked the English nation in this particular: a jealousy lest the monarch should apply this force against the liberty of the people; we are prone, as has been remarked, 'to look upon the soldier by profession as an unconstitutional being, and firmly believe that when he accepts the shilling he sells his birthright as an Englishman.' While this feeling exists, the army is not likely to be dangerous to national liberty; but, on the other hand, an army constituted under such circumstances is likely, despite the bravery of the men, to be defective in the completeness observable in continental armies. The sovereign having obtained supplies from the Commons, proceeds to organise an army; and it was in this organisation that the shortcomings were rendered so manifest by the memorable Crimean winter of 1854–5. The troops were paid by the Secretary at War at home, but by the commissariat abroad; the clothing was managed by regimental colonels at home, but by the Ordnance in the colonies, and in the home army so far as concerned great-coats; the provisioning of the army rested with the Ordnance at home, with the commissariat abroad, and with the Admiralty while on board ship; forage, fuel, and light were provided by the Ordnance at home, but by the commissariat abroad; while the Secretary at War paid money to officers serving abroad, that they might provide those necessaries for themselves; barracks, hospitals, and lodgings devolved upon the Ordnance, but the Secretary at War managed those cases in which allowances were made in lieu of barrack accommodation; the medical care of the army was controlled by no fewer than five government offices; the movement of troops was under the recommendation of the quarter-master-general, but under the higher orders of the Secretary at War; the army expenditure was audited by the Secretary at War for effective service, but by the Audit Office for non-effective service.

'Never,' it has been well observed, 'were bankrupt's accounts in greater disorder!' There were thus different officers performing nearly the same duties; while many of the offices combined duties utterly unconnected—especially the commissariat—which, besides supplying provisions, forage, and fuel for the troops, had in peace-time to see to the payment of the military, convict, and other establishments in the colonies; to make the necessary advances to the regimental paymasters; to pay in detail the staff-pay, forage, and other money-allowances, as well as Chelsea and naval pensions; and to pay the salaries of stipendiary magistrates and other officers connected with the convict and other government establishments abroad. All these, and more, were the duties of the commissariat in 1850, somewhat lessened in later years. How this system, too much work for the men to accomplish, contributed to the Crimean miseries, the preceding Chapters have sufficiently shewn; how the opposite evil, too many men to accomplish the work, led to difficulties, the medical director could have told, who—worried by the conflicting orders of the Commander-in-chief, the Admiralty, the Treasury, the Ordnance, and the War-office—'spent five shillings in correspondence about a penny bottle.' There were evils in the military constitution of the army itself, which prevented it from rendering all the services required in time of need. The promotion into distinguished regiments by favour rather than merit; the system of purchasing commissions, rendering a poor but good officer almost ineligible; the inferior position of the artillery, as compared with the cavalry and infantry, in honours and emoluments; the wretched pay of the common soldier, who had his poor shilling a day lessened by so many petty items; the favouritism which relieved an officer from onerous regimental duty in order to place him upon the staff, whence alone commanders for the army were selected; the deficiencies in field-days and reviews, ill calculated to illustrate the duties of an army in actual battle—all contributed to render the British army less effective than the excellence of the men and the magnitude of the expenditure would seem to indicate.

Reforms in the army, in many of the particulars above noted, commenced before the war, advanced during the war, and seemed likely to spread over many successive years after the war. These reforms need not be treated in detail; but it is necessary to notice the efforts made to strengthen the army by means of militia, camps, and a foreign legion.

The British militia is, in principle, a body of men chosen by ballot to serve for a certain number of years as soldiers within the limits of the kingdom. The conscription or levy on the continent is widely different; for, under that system, the man chosen by ballot becomes a member of the regular army, and can be called upon to fight beyond the limits of his country. The military force of England, in the time of the Saxons, was a kind of militia, towards which every five hides of land were to contribute one man; during the feudal ages, the landowners provided a militia, by supplying men and arms in due proportion to the area of their estates; but since the reign of Mary, the lords-lieutenant of counties have been charged with the raising of a militia, at such times as the sovereign may command. A great part of the

troubles in the reign of Charles I. was due to a transference of power over the army from the king to the parliament; but this power was restored during the next reign. In pursuance of a system of economy, the militia was practically abandoned during the first half of the eighteenth century. George III., at an early period of his reign, reinstated this arm of the service, and introduced new regulations affecting it—placing it under general officers, subjecting it to the articles of war, defining the exceptions to the general rule that all were subject to the ballot, and stating the number of days during which each militiaman was required to exercise in the course of his three years' service. During the great European war from 1793 till 1815, England had three bodies of home-troops subsidiary to but nearly resembling the regular militia — supplementary militia, local militia, and volunteers. Taken altogether, the number was about 200,000; but at one particular period, when an invasion was feared, the available militiamen and volunteers were little less than 400,000 in number.

This militia system, long in abeyance, was brought again into notice shortly before the war with Russia. In February 1852, Lord John Russell, at that time head of the ministry, stated reasons why an augmentation of our military forces was necessary: not because any immediate danger threatened the country, but because England would be found weak if danger should arise. He proposed a small increase in the regular army, an improvement in the weapons intrusted to the soldiers, and a re-establishment of the militia. There had been a difference in the organisation of the regular and the local militia in earlier years, of such a kind as to lead to a recommendation that the latter would be preferable in 1852. The premier sketched the plan of the government for this purpose, defining the number of years' service, the mode of officering, the maximum and minimum of ages, the mode of balloting, the system of substitutes, the favour conceded to any one who would volunteer without waiting to be balloted, and the amount of duty required in each year. He proposed to begin with a militia of 70,000 men, to be gradually increased to 150,000. There happened to be much political excitement at the time, arising from Lord Palmerston's secession from the ministry on account of events in France; and party opposition soon shewed itself in an amendment, proposed by his lordship on the reading of the militia-bill, that the new force should be organised on the basis of the general rather than that of the local militia—that is, instead of being a force existing only two or three years, during a period of excitement—it should have a character of permanency: supplying, in the time of peace, a considerable defensive army, organised, drilled, armed, and equipped, which could be raised at the shortest possible notice. This amendment, carried by 136 votes against 125, led to the fall of the Russell administration, and to the temporary abandonment of the project.

When the Earl of Derby's ministry was formed, the first government measure brought before the House of Commons was a militia-bill, introduced by Mr Spencer Walpole on the 29th of March. He proposed a middle course between an augmentation of the regular army and the establishment of a local militia: offering a bounty to volunteers, rather than balloting among unwilling men, but retaining the power of the ballot if necessary; and paying the cost out of the public purse rather than by local rates. The number proposed was about 80,000, the period of service was to be five years, and the expense was estimated at about £160,000 per annum after the first year, which would necessarily be more costly than the rest. Although opposed by Lord John Russell and his late colleagues, the government bill was carried on a second reading by a majority of 355 to 165; and, with a few modifications, became law. One of the last speeches made in parliament by the Duke of Wellington was strongly recommendatory of this measure to the House of Lords: the veteran commander having long held the opinion that, by regular soldiers or by militia, the military force of England urgently needed augmentation. By the terms of the act, every encouragement was to be given to volunteers; no balloting being resorted to, unless the volunteers fell short of the full number of 80,000: moreover, the Queen was empowered to raise the militia to 120,000, in the event of any invasion or serious danger. No Militia Act was passed in 1853; but the formation of a corps of Naval Coast Volunteers was sanctioned by parliament. This corps was a kind of naval militia, to consist of 10,000 seamen, voluntarily enrolled at a prescribed rate of bounty and of pay, and for a prescribed period; they were to be taught all the duties of men-of-war sailors, but were intended especially for the defence of the coasts — with a proviso that no such naval volunteer should be required to serve at a greater distance than 50 leagues from the British or Irish coasts during peace, or 100 leagues during any great emergency. In the spring of 1854, when the war was in its earlier stages, the Militia Act of 1852 received amendments calculated to render it more effective, with an additional proviso that the militia might be embodied whenever a state of war should exist; and in December of the same year, a few weeks before the disruption of the Aberdeen ministry, an act was passed, enabling the government to send militia regiments—not to the Crimea—but to render garrison-duty at Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu, in order that the regular troops stationed at those places might be placed at the disposal of the commander at the seat of war: every militiaman exercising a choice whether he would volunteer into this special service. There were also, about the same time, many improvements introduced in the mode and conditions of enlistment into the regular

army, calculated to increase the number of recruits.

These improvements in the details of the military service, together with the bonus offered, and the halo of glory thrown over the soldier's life by the deeds at Alma and Inkermann, enabled the government to obtain considerable reinforcements, both in the militia and the regular army. Peers and members of parliament connected with Scotland and Ireland even complained that those two countries were not called upon so early as England to embody their militia. The militia was not merely a renewal; it was a creation, so far as the existing generation was concerned, of a nursery for the army, whence battalions could be strengthened with men already conversant with the chief duty of soldiers. About the period when the Allied armies landed on the Crimea, to commence their eventful campaign, there were seventeen regiments of militia embodied in England, varying from 500 to 1000 men each; and others were in process of formation. The infantry militia was clothed by the Ordnance; whereas the yeomanry cavalry, of higher social standing, was to a greater extent self-supported. A circular, sent from the War-office to the colonels of all the militia regiments, in November 1854, called upon them to send as many volunteers as possible to the Guards, the line, and the marines: to render the militia, in short, practically available as a store whence the regular army could from time to time be augmented. The demand was for one-fourth of every regiment, selected by volunteering through the medium of recruiting-parties sent from the depôts of the regular regiments; the honour, such as it is, of serving in the regular army, and the bonus offered in money, being deemed sufficient to attract volunteers from among the militia; while officers in the militia regiments were encouraged to increased exertions by gifts of 'ensigncies in the line without purchase,' to be awarded on the nomination of the colonel, according to the number of men volunteering from each regiment. About the middle of the year 1855, when the system had experienced several months of practical working, the militia within the United Kingdom numbered about 40,000, while 5000 were on service in the colonies. It was proposed in many quarters that the army might be further strengthened by remodelling the arrangements of the Indian army, in which the rank of officers was only maintained during service in India: it was urged that valuable and experienced officers might be obtained for the Queen's army by an assimilation of privileges; but this change, involving a reorganisation of many departments in the Company's service, was not effected during the war.

Strengthened as it was by recruits to the regular regiments, and furnished with a reserve of trained soldiers by the embodiment of the militia, gradually augmenting in amount during the progress of the war—the British army was nevertheless placed in a position for receiving still further numerical power, by the formation of a FOREIGN LEGION.

A prevalent feeling has been manifested in modern times in England, that the country ought to supply men sufficient in number and efficiency to defend the honour, liberties, and property of our national home, apart from the system of employing mercenaries—foreigners who lend their swords to the highest bidder. Nevertheless such mercenaries, under the designation of a Foreign Legion, have frequently been so employed. During the great war 1793–1815, the English government had frequently in its pay German, Belgian, Hanoverian, and Italian regiments, some of which behaved well, while others occasioned great embarrassments to their commanders. The Duke of Wellington, writing in 1813 from his camp in Spain, said in one of his dispatches: 'The foreign troops are so much addicted to desertion, that they are very unfit for our armies, of which they necessarily form too large a proportion to the native troops. The evil is aggravated by the practice which prevails of enlisting prisoners as well as deserters, and Frenchmen as well as other foreigners. The consequence is, therefore, that a foreign regiment cannot be placed in a situation in which the soldiers can desert from it that they do not go off in numbers; and in the Peninsula they carry to the enemy the only intelligence which he can acquire.' This, however, was a picture of a foreign legion under the most unfavourable circumstances, where no care was displayed in the selection: it left untouched the question of the trustworthiness of well-selected foreign contingents. France, although so thoroughly a military nation, had a foreign legion during the Russo-Turkish war, composed principally of Swiss and Italian soldiers, and commanded by a Swiss general.

When the Aberdeen government brought forward a measure for sanctioning the raising of a foreign legion, in 1854, the bill was received with little favour. In parliament and by the public press it was regarded by many as dishonouring to the British nation: as a virtual confession that we could not honestly fight our own honest battles by our own resources. The Earls of Derby, Ellenborough, and Malmesbury opposed it in the Lords; while the opponents in the Commons comprised many of the most distinguished members of the Conservative and Liberal parties, who joined their votes on this occasion. Nevertheless, the bill passed, probably because the ministers threatened to resign if defeated.

Three circumstances became gradually manifest, arising out of the formation of the foreign legion, and the discussions to which it had given rise—an absence of sympathy with the measure on the part of the nation generally; a difficulty in raising the force at all, on account of the sarcastic and insulting expressions concerning foreign mercenaries, used by influential men in the British

parliament; and a risk of collision with foreign governments, who generally disliked this kind of recruiting among their subjects. As concerns the first of these circumstances, the absence of national sympathy or popular approval, the act had been framed to offend home-prejudices as little as possible; the men of the foreign legion were not to be regarded as substitutes for militiamen, or as soldiers to be quartered permanently in England, but were to be introduced for a limited time, to undergo drilling, and then sent out to the seat of war. The act empowered the Queen to raise a foreign legion expressly for foreign service; it limited the number in England at any one time to 10,000; it declared that the legion was to be commanded and officered by foreigners, with certain stipulations concerning pay and rank; and it limited the application of the act to a period not later than one year after the ratification of a definitive treaty of peace with Russia. Yet, notwithstanding these guarded limitations, the measure never met with a warm response in the heart of the nation. The second difficulty became evident soon after the act passed; for the agents of the British government, seeking for recruits in foreign countries, met with much indignant comment on the opprobrious epithets applied in parliament to mercenaries; insomuch that these epithets, as the ministers expressly declared at a later date, had gone far to frustrate the whole object of the measure. The third difficulty was more serious than either of the others: many foreign states formally denied the right of the British government to send recruiting-parties into their dominions; and in America especially, the United States government resented even an approach to such a proceeding in so bitter a spirit, as to jeopardise the friendly relations between the two countries. Considered in all its bearings, therefore, the Foreign Enlistment Act was attended with more vexation than advantage.

The increase of the army by regular recruiting, by the militia, and by a foreign legion, was connected with another measure somewhat new to the English nation—the establishment of military CAMPS.

Camps, military towns or communities established on plains and commons, are well known to continental countries, where large armies are maintained; but the British army, having so many colonies to defend, leaves only a limited number of soldiers in the United Kingdom at one time; and these can be accommodated in barracks. Such soldiers, however, are not an army; they are isolated regiments, or even fragments of regiments, deprived of the power of learning those combined movements and manœuvres so essential to an army in the field. When a military force has somewhat lost its consolidation and due organisation by a long peace, an assemblage of many regiments in one large open spot for a considerable time affords opportunity for learning the art of war; and a camp, constituted by such an assemblage, then becomes serviceable.

A camp formed at Chobham in 1853 was the first example of the kind in England since the great war with France. It did not arise out of the excitement connected with the Russian war, for it was begun and ended before the Danubian campaign had commenced; but a feeling of uneasiness connected with the state of affairs in France, a knowledge that the army was in a defective state, and possibly a secret impression that Russo-Turkish difficulties might ultimately involve England, led the British government to the formation of a camp as a prudential military proceeding. A common situated a few miles west of Chertsey, in Surrey, was selected for this purpose; and a force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery was selected, to form a small army intended to practise military manœuvres under the command of Lord Seaton. The tents forming the camp were ranged in a curved line about three miles in length; and in these tents were accommodated certain regiments of the light and heavy cavalry, Horse Guards, Foot Guards, the line, the rifles, the sappers and miners, the engineers, the artillery, &c., amounting in the whole to about 10,000 men. The irregularity of the ground offered difficulties in the way of comfortable encampment, but at the same time afforded an excellent field for military evolutions and tactics. The regiments and battalions were changed from time to time, as a means of affording opportunities of practice for many. As every article for the consumption of the men and horses had to be brought from a distance, the commissariat was called upon to exercise its powers in maintaining the daily supply; while the soldiers, living under canvas for several weeks, experienced a few of the privations so numerous in actual warfare. The camp-kitchens, and the details relating to the domestic or indoor life of a soldier, afforded abundant scope for the exercise of that kind of ingenuity in which the English soldier is considered to be inferior to the French. The troops marched to the ground on the 14th of June; and from that date till the 18th of August, when the camp was broken up, they were exercised in many of the duties calculated to render them good soldiers—now a grand field-day, in presence of the Queen; now a skirmishing of the rifles against an imaginary enemy, or an attempt by a party of troops to capture an intrenched hill held by another party; now a pursuit of one body of cavalry by another, over ground broken by alternations of ditch, sand, furze, pits, and other obstacles; now a galloping and marching to so great a distance, and during so many hours, that men and horses returned exhausted by fatigue; and now an explosion of a fort, followed by an expulsion of the garrison by a storming-party. All this, the mere mimicry of war in itself, was something more in its results; since it afforded to the troops a foretaste of the duties naturally demanded, and the services naturally

rendered, during actual warfare. Many of the men who struggled so nobly at Alma and Inkermann, had engaged in their first field-manœuvres at Chobham little more than a year previously.

When the war with Russia supervened in all its stern reality, the military authorities, appreciating the advantages of the Chobham encampment, planned another on a more durable scale, that might admit of housing the troops in huts instead of under canvas, and might afford a military-school for the tuition of militiamen as well as regular soldiers. Hence originated the camp at Aldershott Heath, a dreary waste on the confines of Surrey and Hampshire, south-west of Chobham. Many experienced officers considered that the arrangements at the last-named place exhibited the effects of forty years of peace in their clumsiness and inefficiency; that the helplessness of the soldiers in the Crimea revealed the same fact; that the camp had thus aided in affording a useful lesson; and that a second camp ought to school the troops to something better—not in bravery or powers of endurance, but in aptness in many of the minor though still important duties of a soldier's life. The camp at Aldershott was not formed until after the British army in the East had struggled through the terrible Crimean winter; but it may be regarded as one of the measures suggested by the experience of that winter. The camp was formed with an intention somewhat different from that at Chobham; the soldiers' quarters being well-constructed wooden huts, each accommodating twenty or thirty men, and calculated to endure several years. Each regiment or battalion had its own group of huts distinct from the rest, and under its own regimental officers; while the militia were wholly separated from the regulars, in order that each might perform the evolutions and obtain the practice best suited to its wants.

A third camp, at Shorncliffe, bore relation exclusively to the foreign legion. The foreigners enlisted in the British service were, by the expressed or implied terms of the act of parliament, retained in England during such time only as might suffice for their effective drill and preparation; and this probationary period was passed, for judicious reasons, apart from the regular British army. Barracks on the heights near Dover, whence soldiers had departed for the Crimea, were placed at the service of Swiss regiments belonging to the foreign legion; but when the space had thus become appropriated, a camp was formed at Shorncliffe, a healthy elevated spot overlooking the sea, about two miles west of Folkestone in Kent. Here, all the necessary arrangements were made for the accommodation of several regiments of jägers (riflemen) and other German troops; the wooden huts being sufficiently substantial to endure a few years. The men were mostly obtained from North Germany, Belgium, and Holstein, in the face of great opposition from the several governments: many had previously been soldiers, and all quickly displayed a military appearance equal to that of the British line. The camp itself was far superior in convenience, appearance, and salubrity to those at Chobham and Aldershott.

The formation of these three camps, one preceding and two following the Crimean winter, tended to improve the organisation of the English army, making it not merely a collection of regiments, but a united body; while the augmentation by means of recruits, militia, and a foreign legion, supplied the vacancies occasioned by the drafts for the war in the East, and considerably increased the total strength of the army. The regulars and the militia, as has been stated, were encouraged by increased bounty, pay, and chance of promotion, while the foreign legion was engaged on terms expressly defined. These terms were in substance as follows: The men were to serve until one year after the termination of the war; they were to take an oath of fidelity to the Queen, and to serve wherever called upon; the officers were to receive pay equal to that of English officers of analogous rank, to be continued for a short time after the breaking up of the legion; while, besides the pay received during service, the whole force, officers and privates, were to receive a year's pay, and to be conveyed either to their native country or to Canada, where land would be ceded to them. At a later period in the war, when the foreign legion had become well organised, the troops presented a martial appearance, and were willing enough to contend against the common enemy. The German legion, under Baron Stutterheim and Brigadier Woolridge, went out to the East, ready to render service when needed, and ingratiating itself with the other parties to the alliance. One body of foreign troops in English pay, the Italian legion, did not come to England; the men were raised in the Sardinian states, and were barracked and exercised near a town between Turin and Novara. This Italian legion was wholly distinct from the Sardinian contingent, presently to be noticed.

Irrespective of the militia, the artillery, the engineers, and the troops in India, the army voted by parliament for 1855 exceeded by 36,000 that for the preceding year. This was effected, not by the creation of new regiments, but by augmenting the number of men in troops and battalions, the number of troops in many of the regiments of cavalry, and the number of battalions in several infantry regiments.

THE ARMY-WORKS AND LAND TRANSPORT CORPS.

The improvements sketched in the preceding section bore relation to the efforts made in England to strengthen the army in its general organisation. There were others, however,

planned with more special reference to the wants of the army in the Crimea, as made manifest during the winter of 1854–5. Among the novelties of this latter class was the formation of two new corps—one for army-works, and the other for land-transport. The ill-requited troops who sank during that fearful winter were stricken down, not so much by fighting, as by working and carrying: they laboured as workmen, and carried burdens as porters, at a time when human strength could scarcely bear the ordinary duties of regimental service; they were required to mend roads and build hovels because the quartermaster-general had insufficient resources, and to carry provisions and stores because equal insufficiency marked the resources at the command of the commissary-general.

Apart from this, however, the English soldier, even under less unfavourable circumstances, is not clever as a workman or labourer; and, notwithstanding the services rendered in one special department by the admirable corps of sappers and miners, it has often been felt that the English army needed the aid of some additional corps distinct from fighting-men. Mr Sidney Herbert, when Secretary at War, pointed out the causes of the awkwardness of English soldiers in everything except their warrior-duties. 'In England,' said he, 'you have the highest degree of civilisation to be found in the world. As a matter of course, you have the minutest subdivision of labour; and, from the smallness of the country and the close proximity of different places, you have the most rapid communication between your cities and towns. What is the result? Why, that the English peasant never does anything for himself, as is the case in less advanced states of society. His house is provided for him, and so is his dress and everything else he requires, except in the case of the most remote districts of the empire, where a few of the peasantry may be found who build their own cabins and make their own clothes, shoes, and other articles in a primitive manner. The great subdivision of labour consequent on high civilisation offers such facilities for every man getting everything done for him, that he does not know how to turn if he is thrown upon his own resources and left to shift for himself. I recollect an honourable friend of mine opposite handing me last autumn a letter, with suggestions relating to the clothing of the army to be sent to the Crimea, which I adopted without loss of time; and that letter concluded with a remarkable sentence of warning, to the effect that when I had done all the things that he recommended they would be almost valueless, for the men must suffer through not knowing how to help themselves.'*

Early in the Crimean campaign, when the sufferings of the troops had only just commenced, an eminent civil engineer urgently suggested the employment of ordinary labourers and workmen as aids to the soldiers; seeing that the immense amount of 'fatigue-duty,' as it is termed, would inevitably prostrate the troops. 'If,' he argued, 'in the first investment of Sebastopol, we had sent out a strong and efficient band composed of railway navigators and Cornish and Lancashire miners, with a complete establishment of barrows, planks, and tools, as well as an experienced gang of well-sinkers and borers, our brave soldiers would have been relieved of a great portion of their harassing duties, and would have been spared the sufferings of thirst.' He proceeded to express an opinion, that 'such a band, to be effective, must be entirely independent of military-discipline, excepting so far as may regard perfect co-operation, but should be conducted by a civil engineer-in-chief, who would receive his instructions from the chief in command of the military—the engineer-in-chief being provided, of course, with proper assistants, as well as a sufficient number of subordinates. The men should be under the immediate control of their own chiefs and heads of gangs, and their own contractor's engineers, as they are called. They should be accompanied by travelling workshops and artisans for making and repairing tools, boring and blasting apparatus, and one or more compact portable high-pressure engines for general purposes, but more particularly for raising water. In proportioning the numbers of such a band to attend upon the regular army, especial regard may be had to the fact, that each of those men would do with ease the usual work of three soldiers on fatigue-duty.'

Whether or not the plans were adopted in consequence of such suggestions as the above, the government obtained the aid of civil engineers in the construction of a Crimean railway; and when the usefulness of that measure became apparent, an Army-works Corps was established as an extension of the same principle, calculated to assist the Crimean army in its labours, and to be at the same time a constituent part of the army, which the railway corps was not. The sappers and miners were too few in number to dig the trenches for the siege, and perform the other handicraft services required by the army; and thus the army-works corps was organised, to work under the engineers. As railway labourers can command good pay in England, their services could not be obtained for anything like military pay; they would require far higher remuneration than is customarily given to soldiers. This was a difficulty which had to be contended against; for while on the one hand civilians would not serve unless for high pay, the military, on the other hand, found that those who fought received less emolument than those who worked. The men selected were not merely labourers; they included artisans of various kinds, skilled in executing the various works in brick, stone, earth, wood, and iron. The number sent out to Sebastopol, in successive

* Speech in House of Commons, January 26, 1855.

consignments, amounted in the autumn of 1855 to no less than 3000, afterwards still further increased, all amply officered and provided for the service.

This new corps, however, excited some jealousy in the army. The salaries paid were so high that military officers looked with dissatisfaction at the comparison inevitably suggested; the workmen received such high wages that it became doubtful how far the common soldiers would remain content with their own wretched pay; while the Sappers and Miners, one of the most efficient corps in the whole British army, complained—and not without some show of justice—that that corps had been especially intended to render the very services now to be rendered by the new army-works corps. It was contended that, had those working-troops been better supported and maintained by the government, the *esprit de corps* would have been cherished, the chances of promotion increased, and the expenditure of public money lessened. Considered, however, as a temporary arrangement, the plan was not affected by these arguments. When the war began, the English army contained only 3000 sappers and miners, of whom no more than 1000 could be spared for Crimean service; and it was to strengthen, not to supersede this small body, that the army-works corps was sent out. The first contingent of 1000 was so highly prized by Lord Raglan, that an increase of numbers was applied for; and the corps became gradually augmented to 3500 men. The raising and organisation of this force had been intrusted by the government to Sir Joseph Paxton, whose observations concerning it, made at a later date, may advantageously be adverted to. 'When the corps was first contemplated,' he said, 'the question was, not whether the government could induce the particular men who now composed it to proceed to the Crimea, but whether they could get any men at all to go. There not being sufficient sappers and miners to build hospitals, construct roads and bridges, and do the general mechanical work of the camp, what he, acting for the government, had to set about in the first instance, was to raise a body of men competent for such duties, to officer it, and to despatch it expeditiously to the seat of war. The first thousand men sent out were not as scrupulously selected, nor as well trained as could have been wished, and a little confusion occurred when they landed; but the second, third, and fourth contingents, were carefully chosen and excellently disciplined; and the whole corps was now conducting itself with exemplary propriety.' After shewing that the salaries paid were not so high as those received by civil engineers in their ordinary duties, he added: 'I had no little difficulty in inducing a gentleman of first-class acquirements to go out for merely as much money as he would have been sure to earn if he had remained at home.' Comparing the two corps, he said: 'Sappers and miners might have been in some respects preferable; but it would have taken a year to organise such a force, and the new corps was required in four weeks. The officers and men were the best of the kind that could be procured, and the "navvies" were the most powerful of their athletic class. With regard to expense, taking all circumstances fairly into consideration, this was the cheapest corps ever raised. The men were one and all in condition at the time they were embodied; they did not require to be drilled and instructed for years; they were all thoroughly conversant with their respective trades, and within three months of their return to this country they might be disbanded and completely got rid of.' The best test of efficiency was perhaps the following:—'The commissary-general, seeing how admirably the army-works corps did its business, applied to the war-minister for a body of men to be organised on similar principles for the service of the commissariat department.' *

The second of the above-named auxiliary forces, the Land-transport Corps, was a revival, with improvements, of the wagon-train belonging to the British army in earlier wars. The sufferings of the troops in the Crimea through the deficiency in transport-power were such, that a remodelling of this arm of the service became imperative. In the continental armies, wagon-trains form recognised portions of the military establishments; whereas the British army in the Crimea had no such aid—the commissaries being forced to rely on the resources procurable in the East, and to apply to the service of the different departments such horses, mules, and vehicles as they could procure. The railway from Balaklava to the camp, already described, rendered immense service: shortly after its completion it carried up to 'the front' daily as much as 300 bags of biscuit, 100 large casks of salt-meat, 500 bags of corn, 120 bales of hay, 30,000 pounds of groceries, and 50,000 pounds of fuel, besides stores and ammunition of other kinds. Nevertheless, such service was limited to the actual places lying along the line of railway, and was inapplicable to any spots right or left of it without the aid of ordinary means of transport; and, moreover, service in any other part of the Crimea would obviously receive no aid from this railway. Colonel M'Murdo was commissioned by the government to organise a land-transport corps, and to provide such porters, animals of burden or draught, and vehicles, as would render that service the overworked commissariat was ill able to supply. Under this new arrangement, each department of the army, requiring transport-power for a particular purpose, applied to the officers of the land-transport corps, whose duty it was to furnish such power. The transport of water to the camps and hospitals was one of the most beneficial services rendered by this corps.

* Speech in the House of Commons, March 3, 1856.

THE TURKISH AND SARDINIAN CONTINGENTS.

The preparations for the campaign of 1855 were marked, besides the several augmentations of the British army already noticed, by the raising of two contingents, two forces auxiliary to the Allied army in the Crimea—the one Turkish, supported by the English government; the other Sardinian, supported by its own government, in virtue of special treaties.

The raising of a Turkish force in British pay was mooted very early in the war, as one among many schemes for employing Asiatic troops. That a body of cavalry irregulars affords valuable service in the Anglo-Indian armies has been often proved. When Lord Lake, for example, pursued Holkar in a flight after a celebrated battle in Hindostan, a body of troopers called 'Skinner's Horse' joined in the pursuit for seven days at the rate of fifty miles a day, without commissariat or tents of any kind: foraging for each day's supplies, and never unsaddling the horses during the whole time. The horses and mules, over nearly the whole of Asia, are inured to hard service, whereby they are rendered of great value in many of the exigencies to which cavalry are liable. The English cavalry horses are prized for speed and beauty; but the events of the Crimean campaign led many authorities to the opinion that a portion of these excellences might advantageously have been exchanged for greater hardihood and powers of endurance. A Turcoman leader, in some of the less known regions of Central Asia, will sometimes gallop off with fifty or a hundred followers, and ride eighty or a hundred miles a day for more than a week together, on a marauding expedition—the men taking nothing with them but a few hard cakes, and a small bag of barley each for his horse. The horses for such work are low, stout, compact animals: the fine 'Arabians' being kept rather for show and special occasions. A Turcoman courier, at the time when Sir John Malcolm was in Persia, carried an express dispatch from Shiraz to Teheran, a distance of 500 miles, in six days, using only one horse: this wonderful achievement was rendered possible, not by the adoption of a high speed, but by a power both in man and horse of maintaining a moderate speed during a great length of time.

At an early period of the war many projects were considered relative to the organising of a body of Turkish irregular cavalry, either as a distinct force, or as part of the regular army. Lord Raglan and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe were both consulted on the subject by the government; and at length a convention was agreed to with the Ottoman Porte for the formation of a Turkish legion or contingent, to be officered and paid by the British. A body of light cavalry was the first to which attention was specially directed, but Lord Raglan reported on the numerous difficulties presented by the collection of such a body. Indeed, the whole enterprise was fettered by embarrassments, principally due to the very irregular habits of the 'irregulars' sought to be enlisted, and the difficulty experienced by the English officers in dealing with the Turkish officials. General Beatson, of the Indian army, succeeded, however, after an immense amount of trouble, in collecting a brigade of irregular horse, from almost every part of European and Asiatic Turkey—the troopers being wild, reckless, unscrupulous fellows of the Bashi-Bazouk class, willing to serve any one for pay, and not over-conscientious concerning the laws of property. To drill these men into order was an onerous task, calling for much both of energy and of patience. Indian officers and Queen's officers were appointed to commands in the Turkish contingent; and the favouritism displayed by the home authorities towards the latter gave rise to much unpleasant discussion, and to the suggestion that all inequalities between the two services ought to be removed. Notwithstanding the utmost exertions, the formation of the contingent proceeded slowly during the early months of 1855; and it seemed long doubtful whether the prescribed number, 20,000, could be collected. There appears to have been a disinclination on the part of the Ottoman Porte to further the scheme; as a consequence, officers were sent out to Turkey long before the men whom they were to command could be collected. From time to time, reports reached England, bearing on the turbulent proceedings of the Bashi-Bazouks; and it remained long doubtful whether General Beatson would be able to construct a body of efficient irregular horse out of such rough materials. The regular contingent, under General Vivian, made greater progress against difficulty; insomuch that about 2000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry were collected by the month of July. The progress, however, was little satisfactory to the Indian officers, most of whom had seen hard fighting in the Company's service, and, reading of the glories of Alma, and Inkermann, and Balaklava, had longed to share in the busy work: they saw with regret the months of spring, summer, and autumn pass away, without any defined or intelligible path to honour marked out for them. They learned that Queen's officers, Company's officers, and Sultan's officers, viewed the same subject from different points of sight; and, moreover, they experienced some of the perplexity springing out of the ministerial, ambassadorial, and military confusion of authority at Constantinople and in the Crimea. In spite of all these difficulties, however, the Turkish contingent became efficient as a body of troops.

Far more favourably circumstanced was the other contingent named at the head of this section—the Sardinian. A small but brave nation supplied a small but efficient force with great expedition.

The organisation of the Sardinian army had

been remodelled shortly before the war, as the basis of rendering a small permanent force susceptible of great expansion in time of emergency. A simple captain of artillery, about the year 1848, displayed such energy and skill in working out reforms, that he gradually rose to be Minister of War; he studied the military systems of all the great powers of Europe, and, proceeding on an eclectic method, culled from each whatever appeared most likely to be practically available for his own country. In the wild over-zealous contest maintained by Charles Albert against Austria in 1848–9, his army was inferior in organisation and in officers to that of his foe; commissions had been regarded as a mere appanage of the nobility, a means of provision for the sons of the aristocracy, rather than as rewards for skill and bravery in the field. As a consequence, the army had become over-officered in regard of numbers, but the reverse of this in relation to the ability and experience of those who held the commissions. The Sardinian government, up to that time, had been little less absolute than those of other Italian countries; the claims of the

Victor Emmanuel II., King of Sardinia.

people to a share either in army promotion or in political power had not been acknowledged; and the aristocratic trappings of the army were consistent with the general state of things at the time. When war with Austria supervened, however, Charles Albert discovered too late the hollowness of his military system; his troops fought well, but were neither well commanded nor well organised. When defeat, abdication, and death occasioned the transfer of regal power from that monarch to Victor Emmanuel, army reforms commenced, and were steadily continued until the period, six years later, when Sardinia engaged in the Russo-Turkish war. General Alfonso Della Marmora, who filled the post of Minister of War at the period when Sardinia took part with the Western Powers, was the officer who had wrought the reforms in the army. The peace-establishment numbered about 45,000 men, comprising line-infantry, rifles, cavalry, artillery, sappers and miners, wagon-train corps, chasseurs francs, and gendarmes or carabiniers—the last named being a kind of police during peace, but a royal body-guard in war. The war-establishment was 85,000, capable of being raised to 100,000 by extraordinary levy. The infantry, two regiments of four battalions each in each brigade, consisted of short but stout and healthy men; the rifles (Bersaglieri), organised by General Alessandro Della Marmora, brother to the Minister of War, maintained a high reputation for quickness, precision, and powers of endurance; but the artillery was regarded as the most efficient arm of the service, it having received especial attention from the Minister of

War and from the Duke of Genoa, Victor Emmanuel's brother.

Such was the army out of which a contingent of 15,000 men, by convention with England, France, and Turkey, was provided early in 1855. In order to render it a complete little army in itself, the different elements of force were combined in due proportions—four brigades of infantry of the line, two battalions of rifles, two regiments of cavalry, four batteries of artillery, and a company of carabiniers. The infantry brigades were those of the Guards, Aosta, Pignerol, and Piedmont.

Many of the officers embarked at Genoa for Constantinople before the end of March, to make preparations for the reception of the troops; but the main body did not move until a later date. By a special convention, England agreed to provide means of transport, the Sardinian government not possessing the requisite resources. Nine large steamers, the *Cleopatra*, *Emu*, *Batriana*, *Thames*, *Europa*, *Charity*, *Imperatrix*, *Tamar*, and *Niagara*, besides sailing-vessels, arrived at Genoa from England early in April, and prepared to receive the Sardinian troops; the space afforded was adequate to the accommodation of about half the contingent at one time; but, as the king wished the whole force to be collected before any embarked, the flotilla was gradually increased by the arrival of the *Imperador*, *Andes*, *Jason*, *Crœsus*, and *Queen of the South* steamers—a naval force now so large that the harbour of Genoa could not afford requisite accommodation, and Spezzia had to be resorted to.

It was an impressive sight when, on the 14th of April, Victor Emmanuel met the whole contingent, assembled on the celebrated plains of Marengo, on the road between Turin and Genoa. Regiment after regiment arrived, and took up its place in a crescent-formed line; altars were decked with tapers and crucifixes, and attended by sumptuously arrayed priests, who were to bless the enterprise, and the banners as its symbols; an amphitheatre of seats and stands for spectators, adorned with flags and military trophies, became speedily filled; and all was prepared for the reception of him who was about to give a parting greeting to the army, ere it proceeded south to Genoa for embarkation. On came the king, surrounded by a brilliant cortège of military officers and dignitaries of state—inspecting each regiment as he passed, and being received by the band of each regiment with the Sardinian national air. Near him were the two brothers Della Marmora—Alfonso, who had left his post as Minister of War to take the command of the contingent in the Crimea; and Alessandro, a stern-looking warrior whose jaw had been shattered during the war of 1849. It was the first time the king had been seen in public since a series of bereavements wellnigh sufficient to crush one of warm and generous sentiments; and his soldiers and subjects looked anxiously to see how he bore his sorrows. They knew that, three months before, he had lost his mother, the widowed queen of Charles Albert; that he was next bereaved of his young and lovely wife, who had endeared herself to his subjects; and that death had then robbed him of his only brother, the Duke of Genoa, who, a favourite with the army, had assisted him in all his reforms and ameliorations—they knew these things; and they saw, in the stern and saddened expression of a once open and frankly cheerful countenance, that grief had done its usual work in its usual way. Nevertheless, the ceremonies of the day proceeded, with that imposing splendour which the church throws around military matters in Roman Catholic countries. The Archbishop of Tortona, attended by numerous priests, performed mass—the troops presenting arms, the spectators baring their heads, and all maintaining silence; then, mass being ended, military clangour and excitement supervened: bands played, cannons roared, king and officers galloped up to the sacred precincts, choirs sang, and the archbishop blessed the standards, unfurled one by one before him. Victor Emmanuel, with his own hand, presented each flag to the regiment to which it was to belong; a brief address was then read to the assembled officers, containing an assurance that nothing less than motives of state-policy prevented the king from heading the army himself; and a ringing acclamation from all, soldiers and spectators, ended the proceedings of a day honourable alike to the Sardinian nation and to the sovereign who governed it.

The 23d of April was the day fixed for the commencement of the embarkation of the first division, comprising about 7000 men, and a due proportion of officers, horses, guns, vehicles, and stores. The Sardinian government was to provision the army; but, as a matter of convenience, it was agreed that the arrangements should be thus planned: the army would take over one month's rations; and, afterwards, as a means of avoiding unprofitable competition for food in the market at Balaklava or Constantinople, the British commissariat would furnish supplies, to be paid for by the Sardinian government. The commissary, however, felt the weight of his responsibilities to be more than he could well bear; and, as a precautionary measure, much larger stores of provisions were taken out from Genoa than had been originally intended: this delayed the embarkation. A sad mischance threw a gloom over the enterprise. The splendid screw-steamer *Crœsus*, chartered from the General Screw Steam-shipping Company, started from Genoa on the 24th of April, laden with about 400 men, and three months' provisions for the whole force; besides having in tow a sailing-vessel laden with cannon and ammunition. A fire broke out two hours after the vessel started; and it was with the utmost difficulty the steamer could be run gently ashore. All on board were

steady and collected until the moment came for descending to the boats as a mode of escape; but the raging of the fire had by this time created a panic, and much loss of life ensued. The ship and the provisions being destroyed, the departure of the expedition was necessarily much delayed: still, no material change of plan occurring, the troops sailed during the latter part of April and the early weeks of May. General Alfonso Della Marmora, before embarking, addressed an order of the day to his soldiers, in which he said: 'We shall have before us a strong and powerful enemy, but by our side will stand brave armies, which have already consigned to history the celebrated names of Silistria, Alma, Balaklava, and Inkermann. We shall arrive in a few days at the seat of war, and, vieing with our allies in courage, firmness, and discipline, we will endeavour to imitate the constancy of which they have given such heroic proofs.' He reminded them that Genoa, now part of the Sardinian kingdom, had once possessed power and wealth in that same Crimea which was again about to be the scene of achievements. He added: 'A cruel and premature death has deprived us of a prince who was to guide us in that glorious enterprise. You followed him with alacrity in the fields of Lombardy, and admired him at the fatal battle of Novara. He expired, regretting his inability to lead you to victory. May the name of the Duke of Genoa remain engraved on our hearts.... Soldiers! let us swear not to disappoint those expectations, and pledge ourselves to demonstrate that an Italian army is worthy to co-operate in this gigantic struggle.'

It was a striking fact, illustrative of the Russian sympathies of Naples, and the dislike of the despotic king of that state for the more liberal sovereign of Northern Italy, that the most marked incivility was displayed towards any Sardinian officers who touched at Neapolitan ports on the way to the East. There was an ample compensation for this, however, in the hearty greetings which met them at Constantinople, Balaklava, and Kamiesch, where Turks, English, and French accorded them a welcome, observed their soldierly bearing, and admired their neat and convenient uniforms—especially that of the Bersaglieri or riflemen, whose feathered Italian hats gave a dash of the picturesque to a dark-coloured and closely-fitting dress. As they landed at the little harbour, the Sardinians passed up the Balaklava Valley, wound round by Kadikoï, and proceeded to their camping-ground near the left or western-most camp of the French. Here this section may leave them: future pages will shew to what extent and in what way these new allies of the sultan aided in the active operations of the war.

BLACK-SEA SUBMARINE TELEGRAPH.

The preparations for the campaign of 1855, relating to army-recruits, militia, camp-exercises, foreign legions, Anglo-Turkish contingent and Sardinian contingent, were accompanied by remarkable applications of mechanical skill in the secondary or subsidiary operations of the war. A large distilling apparatus, for instance, was sent out, for supplying the troops with fresh water distilled from the salt-water in Balaklava Harbour, of which 40,000 gallons could be prepared per day. As another example, the *Chasseur* was fitted up as a military floating-factory, containing an engineer's fitting-shop, a smithy, a foundry, a saw-mill, a carpenter's shop, portable engines, and a store of working-materials—to form a depôt in Balaklava Harbour for the Army-works Corps. Other ingenious applications of scientific discovery and mechanical invention were made, requiring no special mention: there was one, however, so extraordinary, and so unquestionably beneficial during the later months of the war, that it must not be passed unnoticed in this place—the SUBMARINE ELECTRIC-TELEGRAPH, from the shores of Bulgaria to those of the Crimea—an application to warlike purposes of the finest mechanico-scientific invention, perhaps, of the nineteenth century.

A glance at the various maps by which this work is illustrated will render evident the fact that the French government, and still more strongly that of England, must have experienced great difficulty in the early stages of the war in maintaining communication with the Crimea, either for the receipt of intelligence or the issue of instructions. The electric-telegraph, it is true, had spread over most of the districts in Central Europe, and had been connected by submarine cables with the wires of the English system; but this great boon to society had not made a near approach to the Crimea. The Russian wires, extend as far as they might, would obviously not be available to the Allies; the Austrian wires did not cross the Carpathians from Transylvania towards Bucharest or Jassy, neither did they extend from Cracow to Czernovitz and the Pruth; while as to Turkey, one of the last of European nations to adopt European improvements, not a mile of electric-telegraph existed. The Crimea being a peninsula, joined only at one point to a continent, and that continent in the possession of Russia, the Allies had no other mode of approach than across the Black Sea, and consequently no other mode of transmitting messages. The practical questions to be solved were, for Russia on the one hand—How could the czar most quickly receive news at St Petersburg from the Crimea? and on the other, How could the Allies best receive news at Vienna, Paris, and London? The four capitals here named were connected by telegraphic wires; and therefore each might learn from the others, so far as the respective governments might permit; but the difficulty consisted in the filling up of the gap beyond the south-easternmost limit of the system.

At about the period when the Allies landed in

the Crimea, St Petersburg received information from that region more quickly than the other three capitals; the Russian generals despatched Tatars or Cossack couriers from the Crimea to Moscow, across the Ukraine; and as the electric-telegraph was laid down between the two Russian capitals, the Tatar journey virtually measured the duration of time for the transit of the message. As a means of improving the Vienna route for the Allies, a plan was organised some weeks after the commencement of the siege of Sebastopol, for a steamer to leave the Crimea for Varna at stated intervals, and mounted couriers to gallop from Varna to Kronstadt, in Transylvania, *viâ* Bucharest, crossing the Danube at the most convenient point. But even when this was done, the advantage lay with Russia; for the old semaphore, a system of telegraphic stations on the mechanical principle of early days, had been established throughout the whole distance from Sebastopol to Moscow; insomuch that, while mounted couriers carried the full dispatches, the semaphore signaled short messages in about two days.

During the earlier weeks of the Crimean operations, great disappointment was felt in England at the tardiness in the arrival of intelligence, owing to the irregularity of the postal service by sea. When the Tatar route through Bulgaria was planned, ardent expectants calculated that messages might reach London from Balaklava in about ninety hours; but this, too, proved to be an oversanguine view. When, on a particular occasion, a Tatar courier, or some who bribed him, cheated all Western Europe by an announcement that Sebastopol was taken, men began to think that the courier-system had more faults even than its slowness. The London newspapers, learning that the first shot of the momentous siege would be fired on the 17th of October, calculated, in a spirit almost fretful, on the probable amount of time that would elapse before accounts of the result could reach England; men had persuaded themselves that Sebastopol must fall by the first bombardment, and they reckoned eagerly the days and hours that might perchance suffice for the transmission of the news. There was an absurd charge made against the active London newspapers, early in the war, that they were the means of conveying intelligence to the Russian generals in the Crimea concerning the intended movements of the Allies. At the time when these accusations were made, the London editors rarely obtained the letters of their correspondents at Constantinople, Varna, or Bucharest, &c., in less than twelve days; and it frequently happened that this interval extended to nearly three weeks. The news thus obtained, printed in London, posted to St Petersburg, and telegraphed to the Crimea or the banks of the Danube, might, it was feared, teach the Menchikoffs and Gortchakoffs something they knew not before. It was not, however, difficult to shew that the czar must have received information much earlier, by channels carefully kept up for that purpose. In truth, military authorities and government officials were ill satisfied with the current newspaper activity, and would have frowned it into discredit.

The electric-telegraph being acknowledged in all the principal countries of Europe as the most effective as well as the most rapid means of transmitting messages, the Allies were earnestly desirous that this wonderful agent should be made ancillary to the operations of the war. Austria had no right, and the Ottoman Porte had insufficient commercial means, to extend the electric wires from the Hungarian frontier into the heart of the Danubian provinces; and therefore England and France took up this matter, knowing that every hundred miles thus completed would shorten the time necessary for the transmission of news and brief dispatches—leaving the full dispatches, as before, to find a line of transit through other channels. Consequently, on the 1st of February 1855, a convention was signed between the two governments with this object. By the terms of the first clause or article, a line of electric-telegraph, in continuation of the Austrian lines, was to be laid down by the French government between Bucharest and Varna, passing through Shumla, Silistria, and Rustchuk—half the expense of its construction to be defrayed by the English government. By the terms of other clauses, it was agreed that the French government should insure by its agents the superintendence and working of the line, in consideration of an annual reimbursement of one-half of the expenses; that official dispatches coming either from the two governments, or from the head-quarters of the Allied armies, should have precedence of transmission over all others, and on a footing of perfect equality for the two countries; that with regard to dispatches arriving at the same moment, the order of precedence in their transmission should be alternate; that dispatches, whether official or private, should be paid for according to a scale to be determined upon by common agreement, the receipts to be divided equally between the two governments; that if at any time after the construction of the line, one of the two governments should desire that more wires might be established, they were to be laid down and worked by the French government, under similar conditions; that the English government was entitled to have an agent attached to the administration of the line, to superintend the execution of the agreement, in regard to all that concerned British interests; and, finally, that the accounts between the two governments, arising on the one hand from the expense of superintending and working the line, and on the other from the receipts for dispatches and messages, should be made up and balanced at the end of each year.

This remarkable plan, for driving words with lightning speed through the territories of an ally, as an aid to that ally in repelling an aggressor,

was carried out in the same good faith as all the other conventions between England and France during the war. The new electric line, connecting five important Turkish towns, rendered a double service—it shortened the time for transmitting messages to and from Constantinople; and it supplied one more link in the chain of communication between Western Europe and the Crimea. Already had the British army in the Crimea derived benefit from the telegraphic system, even within the narrow limits of its own camp. The government was supplied by the Electric-telegraph Company with a remarkable apparatus, fitted for laying down and working a few miles of wire at any place over which the British army might hold temporary command. Two wagons, built for the purpose, were furnished with galvanic-batteries, telegraphic instruments, and ten or twelve miles of insulated wire, suitable either for land or sea. Sappers and miners were instructed in the use of the instruments, and arrangements were made for managing and guarding the whole apparatus, which included a kind of subsoil-plough for laying down the wire a few inches below the surface of the ground. Such apparatus, it was considered by the home government, might be useful in keeping up communication between head-quarters and distant outposts or intrenchments, between the army and the sea-shore, or between the fleet and the sea-shore.

The great event, however, in relation to the completion of telegraphic communication between the camp and Western Europe, was the submersion of an electric cable in the waters of the Black Sea, from the coast of Bulgaria to that of the Crimea. This wonderful application of a wonderful principle was completed in the month of April 1855. Already, by the cables from a point near Dover to France, and from a point near Orfordness to Holland, the English telegraphic system had been connected with that of the continent, extended by degrees to the shores of the Black Sea near Varna; but the extent of sea then to be traversed far exceeded the limit ever before attained by submarine telegraphs; and it fully taxed the powers of the engineers and manufacturers to surmount the numerous difficulties incident to such an enterprise. These difficulties conquered, however, the cable was conveyed safely to the Bulgarian shores of the Black Sea.

The starting-point being near Varna, where the land-telegraph ended, the engineers sought for a convenient spot at which a junction between the land-wires and the submarine cable might be effected. They selected a rugged ruin called Kaliakra Castle, on the shores of Kavarna Bay, fourteen miles north-east of Varna; a small addition of land-line, sometimes on the sands, sometimes underground, establishing a communication between the two points. This castle had belonged to the Genoese so far back as the thirteenth century, before the Turks owned a rood of land in Bulgaria. Remains of an arch, a chapel, a well, and ponderous walls, alone remained to tell of this once strong position, which was built on an elevated rock surrounded by the sea except at one narrow isthmus. A telegraph-house was built among the ruins; and near it was established the connection between the two systems, the wire-rope and the submarine cable. A Turkish guard was hutted among the ruins, to protect the telegraph. The arrangements were managed by Captain Robinson on the part of the government, and Mr Liddell on that of the contractors. The *Argus*, *Terrible*, and *Spitfire* steamers left Varna on the 31st of March, with the whole of the apparatus and persons to work it; they proceeded to Kaliakra Castle to complete the necessary junctions; and by the middle of April the marvellous talking-machine, as an Oriental might well designate it, lay along the bottom of the Black Sea from Bulgaria to the Crimea. One steamer led the way, to pilot the shortest and most convenient course; another contained the enormous cable; while the third acted as tender, assisting to lower the cable into the sea. The ships carefully approached the southern coast, at that part called St George's Bay, just beneath the monastery of the same name, between the English naval depôt at Balaklava and the French at Kamiesch; and the cable was landed at a point indicated in one of the maps.* Here it was connected with the land-wires extending to the respective head-quarters, and to various other parts of the camps.

Thus were the means afforded for almost instantaneous communication between England and the Crimea: an achievement truly marvellous, although familiarity speedily brings down all such marvels to the level of everyday commonplace. It was curiously observed at the time that, 'It would not now be difficult, by some little further novelty of invention, to cause the reverberation of the very cannon themselves, as it were, to be transmitted, in the shape of electric vibrations, through the 3000 miles of intervening wire, and heard, in still continuous vibrations, finally communicated to some acoustic apparatus in the British Houses of Parliament!' The nation, apart from such refinements, was well content with the immediate result obtained; since it enabled the newspapers of each day to give a few words of a dispatch from Lord Raglan telegraphed on the preceding day from 'the camp before Sebastopol'—that is, so far as the Minister of War was willing to communicate those messages to the public. The Black-Sea Submarine Electric-telegraph was, perhaps, the most wonderful gift ever made by the arts of peace to the purposes of war.

The novelty of this quick transmission of news led to some misconception of the right of usage. It was not at first clearly seen whether, the Bulgarian and the Black Sea lines having been

* 'Portion of the Crimea forming Chief Scene of Warfare.'

established for war-purposes, they would be available for private and newspaper interests. Immediately after the completion of the line, a question on this subject was asked in the House of Commons; to which the First Lord of the Admiralty replied: 'I hope the House will clearly understand that the government, in reference to communications made to them by the admiral and generals in the Crimea, must obviously, for the good of the public service, exercise the most complete discretion as to what intelligence they will communicate to the public. They may obviously receive intelligence which it would be most improper to communicate; and I wish it to be distinctly understood, in consequence of the numerous questions which have been put upon this subject, that the government feel it to be their duty to reserve such intelligence as they think ought to be reserved.' As the telegraph was primarily intended for war-purposes, any application of it for private or commercial usage was at the discretion of the two governments, parties to its formation.

The submarine portion of the line was finished somewhat earlier than the land portion; for although the Bulgarian wires from Varna to Rustchuk, and the Wallachian from Giurgevo to Bucharest and Kronstadt, were in use, the passage of the Danube itself, from Rustchuk to Giurgevo, was somewhat delayed. This delay, however, was not considerable: the line was soon in working-order from end to end. The advantage of these lines of instantaneous communication became so evident to the Turkish government, that arrangements were shortly afterwards made for extending the system to other parts of the Ottoman dominions. The Austrian wires carried south through Hungary to Belgrade, there touched the Turkish frontier on the banks of the Danube; and a French company contracted for a continuation of this line through the towns of Semlin, Sophia, and Adrianople, to Constantinople. Commercially speaking, no such line of rapid dispatch was consistent with the then existing state of Turkey. The towns on the route, it was well observed at the period, have so little intercourse with each other, that they could not pay one per cent. on the cheapest line of telegraph ever made. 'The country is a desert, the inhabitants simple or savage; the roads, if they may be called so, are infested by robbers; the poles, if unguarded, would be cut down for firewood, and the more valuable copper would be a still greater prize. One part of the population would look upon the telegraph as useless, another part as impious.' In a national or state point of view, however, such a work was likely to become extremely valuable—as one among the civilising agents destined, perhaps, to render Turkey a worthy member of the European family of nations. A portion of this line, from Constantinople to Adrianople, joining another line from the last-named town to Shumla, was completed by the autumn of the same year, 1855—guard-houses being built at intervals, for the men employed to protect the wires in the wild districts of the Balkan. Besides this line, an English firm sought the means of extending the advantage southward from Constantinople to Alexandria, thereby connecting the European with the African dominions of the sultan. The plan laid before the Ottoman government comprised a series of submarine cables, dipping into the Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, and the Ægean, to the island of Rhodes, with a few resting-points on land, and then boldly crossing the Mediterranean by a submerged cable from Rhodes to Alexandria.

Two remarkable consequences attended the establishment of electro-telegraphic communication between Western Europe and the seat of war—the one affecting the journalists, and the other the military and naval commanders. In the days of Alma, Balaklava, and Inkermann, when steam-ships or mounted couriers were necessary components in any available dispatch-route, the newspaper correspondents in the Crimea were all-powerful in the eyes of the nation. It was to them that the home-circle looked for information concerning the deeds of fathers and sons, of brothers, and husbands, and lovers engaged in the war; and it was not a vain search. Never has there been more brilliant writing, more vivid descriptions of battle-fields and martial achievements, than the newspapers of London contained in the closing months of 1854; and when misery followed in the train of glory, when a deplorable winter closed a warlike autumn, still did the journalists furnish the only full and truthful tale: presenting the verity in all its sternness, despite official coldness and contradiction. There never before was a period in the history of the newspaper press in England, in which the public so generally trusted the journalists in preference to the holders of office, in all that concerned news from the seat of war. But when the spring of 1855 arrived, a change supervened. The letters of the newspaper correspondents came as rapidly as before, and were as well written as before; but they came to hand at a date when the chief items of information had long been diffused over the empire. The electric-telegraph, though it could not well transmit long dispatches at one time, could be used day by day, or hour by hour, and thus successive instalments of news reached England, finding their way to the public through various channels. The keen thirst for immediate information was allayed by the telegraph; and the letters of 'Our own Correspondent,' though still necessary for a due comprehension of the details, were received much more calmly, or neglected with much less scruple, after this remarkable change of system had been effected.

The second consequence, adverted to above, bore relation to the position and proceedings of the military and naval commanders. So long as dispatches were transmitted by the old method, the commanders were left to the guidance of their

own judgment in all that concerned immediate tactics. No order issued from London or Paris was available for the next day, or even the next four or six days; the commanders could be forewarned of the wish of the government regarding large schemes of strategy only by messages transmitted long previously: any minor events occurring in the intervening period were necessarily controlled by the commanders themselves rather than by the governments. The result might be good or bad, according to circumstances: the general might be shielded from the vexatious operation of fluctuating councils at home, or on the other hand he might be deprived of ready advice at a critical period; but the truth was the same in either case—he was left to his own resources. When, however, thoughts and words, orders and counter-orders, began to flash across Europe with lightning-speed, the relative positions of the two parties were changed. The Western governments acquired a power of learning each day's proceedings on the succeeding day, nay, on the very day itself. A minister in London was enabled to announce in the House of Commons occurrences in the Crimea of that same morning, after, perhaps, having transmitted a brief reply to the message received. As a consequence, the armies were commanded nearly as much in London and Paris as at the seat of war itself. Every important movement of troops, every opening of a new battery, every suspected approach of an enemy's force, every loss to be regretted or success to be vaunted, was known to the Western Powers within a few hours of its occurrence; and orders, consequent on the news thus received, were quickly transmitted in return. The commanders marked out their policy for the morrow, not immediately from the events of yesterday, but probably from the opinions of the two governments respecting those events. At times this intervention was valuable; on other occasions it disconcerted the plans: to some men it was a source of strength in the midst of their feebleness; to others it was a palsying check to an energetic course.

There can scarcely be a doubt, on a fair balance of good and bad results, due allowance being made for the usual effects of novelty and change, that the completion of submarine telegraphic communication, between the Turkish shores and the Crimea, was among the most striking of the proceedings to which the present Chapter has been devoted—the preparations for the campaign of 1855.

Interior of an Officer's Hut before Sebastopol.

CHAPTER XI.

SEBASTOPOL: THE SIEGE, TO THE FALL OF THE MALAKOFF.

VARIED and important as may have been the subsidiary labours in other quarters, ingenious the collateral aid brought to bear upon the art of war, the siege of Sebastopol never stopped. It was a continuous event, affected of course by concurrent circumstances, but still distinct from them. The winter-terrors formed a history of their own: still the siege continued—the European statesmen discussed the possible conditions of peace, and the English government busily concerned itself with recruits, militia, camps, foreign legions, and allied contingents: still the siege continued—the engineers and men of science invented new guns, formed monster shells, laid down camp-railways, and constructed war-telegraphs: still the siege continued—the fleets blockaded, or steamed from port to port, or quietly lay at anchor: still the siege continued. Not that it was a siege presenting day by day the smoke and noise of actual warfare, the booming of guns and the shattering of forts and walls; for there were long intervening periods of repose. Nor was it a complete blockade or investment; for the allies commanded the southern side of Sebastopol only, having no power to reach the northern, no force to check the fire of the tremendous batteries on the northern heights, no means of preventing the reception of reinforcements and supplies by the garrison. Still it was a siege, marked by unceasing vigilance on the part of the besiegers, a gradual increase in the siege-material, and a closer and closer approach to the margin of the town, together with frequent sorties by the garrison, attempts at surprise in the rear of the camp, and skirmishes between the hostile troops.

The slow and laborious operations of the siege during the winter were traced in Chapter VIII., which closed with an account of the occupation and fortifying by the Russians of certain elevated positions exterior to the Malakoff about the end of February and the beginning of March. This date may be used to mark the ending of the winter operations and the commencement of those of spring—since those achievements by the defenders of Sebastopol greatly increased the strength of the place; while, on the other hand, the besiegers were beginning largely to augment their forces in men and in guns, and had nearly surmounted the miseries of the winter. The summer siege operations of 1855, then, treated in the present Chapter, continued until September, when, by the capture of the Malakoff, and the retirement of the Russians from the south to the north side of Sebastopol Harbour, the siege assumed a wholly new character.

ADDITIONAL WORKS OF ATTACK AND DEFENCE.

The siege of Sebastopol presented a marked contrast to those generally recorded in military history. So far from being a place strongly fortified in a regular manner, the town was at first almost undefended on the very side where the siege commenced. The engineers had long before fortified the northern heights, against any foe approaching from the Katcha, Belbek, or Alma; they had also protected the harbour against the fleets of any hostile maritime power, first by forts and batteries of tremendous strength, and then by a line of bulky ships sunk across the entrance: but, not recognising the probability, scarcely believing even the possibility, of an attack from the plateau on the south, they had left that side of the town undefended, the streets ascending to the plateau itself without the intervention of any wall, ditch, or other obstruction. A military guard-house, or a barrack mounting a few guns, was all that assumed a defensive aspect. In effect, the Allies began to besiege a place unfortified on the side besieged, and then saw the fortifications grow up before them. The Sebastopol of the 14th of September, when the Allies landed in the Crimea, was not the Sebastopol of the 26th of September, when they arrived at Balaklava after the flank-march; nor was this the same as the Sebastopol bombarded by the Allies on the 17th of October; the place at the opening of the new year was not the same as at the ending of the old; and all in common were different from the Sebastopol presented in March. True, the inhabited part of the town was the same, having the same streets and buildings; but it was changed to the eye of a military engineer. It has been found necessary, as a consequence of this singular metamorphosis, to describe briefly the defences as they existed at different dates, as a means of defining the nature and extent of the work attempted by the besiegers, and the difficulties



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W. & R. CHAMBERS, EDINBURGH & LONDON.

wherewith that work was beset. Another description, and this the last and most detailed, will now be desirable; since the siege operations, in the six months beginning with the fortifying of the Mamelon and ending with the capture of the Malakoff, were especially dependent on a state of Sebastopol not existing in the autumn or winter. The maps in the present volume serve to illustrate this very point; for while the wood-cut plan * shews how scanty were the attack and defence works on the 17th of October 1854, when the first bombardment began; the coloured maps exhibit a striking advance in this particular, applicable to the spring and summer of 1855—proving that English, French, and Russians had enormously increased their lines, redoubts, forts, bastions, batteries, rifle-pits, trenches, ramparts, &c.

It may be well here to remark, that there is much difficulty in identifying by name many of the fortifications and eminences around Sebastopol, on account of discrepancies in the nomenclature by those who were present at the operations. The French gave the name 'Bastion du Mât' to the same work called by the English the 'Flagstaff

Bastion du Mât, or Flagstaff Battery.

Battery,' and without any reference to the Russian name. The rounded hill called by them the 'Mamelon,' received the name of Gordon's Hill from the English, who also borrowed the designation invented by their neighbours; but it is not always clear whether the 'Mamelon' and the 'Mamelon Vert,' as mentioned by the French, were two hills or two names for the same hill. Again, the Malakoff was designated by the Russians sometimes by a name, sometimes by a number; while the Allies gave it two distinct appellations, both different from either of the Russian names. The French applied the names 'Ouvrages Blancs' and 'Ouvrages Verts'—translated by the English into 'White Works' and 'Green Works'—to Russian redoubts, without any knowledge of the Russian names, and according to the prevailing colour which those batteries happened to present at the time. As a last instance, Lord Raglan sometimes applied the name 'Dock-yard Creek' to the Inner Harbour, whereas most of the officers and writers gave that name to a small inlet on the east side of the harbour. From these discrepancies it arises that there is an occasional liability to error in identification.

When a spectator wishes to obtain a clear idea of the various objects spread over a wide expanse of ground, he either takes up a station on an elevated spot whence the whole appears spread out in bird's-eye perspective before him, or he studies a ground-plan whereon the whole is depicted as if seen by an eye vertically above. The first-named mode was adopted by Lieutenant-colonel Hamley,* as a means of rendering his readers familiar with the appearance, fortifications, and siege-works of Sebastopol, as seen from a particular spot at the period now under notice. The result, in a condensed form, will be useful here.

The spot selected for this look-out was a small

* See p. 243.

* *Campaign of Sebastopol*, p. 194.

building which had been a Russian picket-house, near the Woronzow Road, in advance of the light-division camp. Down the slope immediately in front was a mortar-battery, with a small breast-work of earth and stone; and beyond this, far distant, spread out the city of Sebastopol. In a deep recess were visible the barrack and dockyard buildings, white stone structures, dotted with numerous windows; then another bulky stone mass, ending at Fort Nicholas; and beyond this again, the great or main harbour, whose waters were clearly visible. Behind the great barrack were seen turreted and lead-roofed and spired buildings of various kinds. A little to the left was the main portion of the town, built on an inclined site, with a line of intrenchment half-way up the ascent. Handsome houses, well-built streets, and pleasant gardens, were observable, interspersed among or between the government buildings. Still further to the left, beyond a suburb of meaner streets, were earthen batteries to defend the town; and parallel with these appeared the French batteries and trenches, furrowing the plateau further to the south. In the middle distance, as painters would term it, were the batteries of the British left attack, extending towards the French, but separated from them by the great ravine; and these batteries, at their other or northern extremity, intervened between the spectator and the more formidable defence-works of the town. Turning further towards the right or north, the spectator saw in the middle distance the parallels of the British right attack, boldly traversing the crest of a green knoll, and losing themselves in ravines at either end. The Karabelnaïa suburb of Sebastopol formed the background to this part of the picture. Wheeling yet further to the right, the observer espied the formidable line of embrasures in the earthen Redan, separated from the British works by a deep hollow about a third of a mile in width. Bounding this on the north-east appeared another depression or shallow ravine; and next came prominently in view the tremendous Malakoff, with its tiers of parapets pierced with embrasures, and its numerous *abattis* or obstacles of felled trees and pointed stakes; then a gap through which ships could be seen in the harbour; then the fortified Mamelon; then another valley; and then various undulatory heights, some occupied by Russian works, and some by French. Beyond all these works, beyond the harbour itself, were the formidable northern fortifications, which appeared to be daily increasing in extent and magnitude.—Such was the scene presented to the officers who, telescope in hand, were wont to take up their station at the picket-house, or on Cathcart's Hill. It was an addition to the picture not pleasant to contemplate, when large trains of wagons were perceptible, convoyed into the town, and filled with those stores without which the Russians could not have maintained the defence of their important stronghold.

The details of the defence and attack works must next be considered in relation to their ground-plan.

Beginning, then, with the eastern half of Sebastopol, forming the Karabelnaïa or sailors' suburb, there was, about the period now under notice, a line of defence, consisting of ditch and rampart, extending in a series of zigzags around that suburb, from Careening Bay at one end to the Inner Harbour at the other; it enclosed a triangular space, containing the dock-yard, sailors' barracks and hospital, and the houses of the suburb—structures which this line would have aided to defend had the besiegers penetrated so far. Exterior to this inner or second line of defence, at an average distance of probably one-third of a mile, was the much more formidable outer or first line, consisting of redoubts and bastions of immense strength, and bearing distinctive names which facilitate their identification. First, at the extreme north-east of the whole line, touching the Outer Harbour, and bounded on the west by Careening Bay, was an elevation called Mount Sapoune; this the Russians fortified with two defences, designated by them the Volhynian and Selinghinsk Redoubts, but by the French the Ouvrages Blancs or White Works; these redoubts were supported by rifle-pits in front, and in the rear by a battery of twelve guns, 'Bastion No. 1,' on the opposite side of the little bay. Next, about half a mile to the south-west, was constructed the work called by the French the Little Redan, the Russian 'Bastion No. 2.' Six or seven hundred yards further south-westward stood those enormous works, of which one part was called by the Russians the Korniloff Bastion, while another was the Malakoff, corresponding to the White Tower or Round Tower of the Allies; and in advance of these, out towards the besiegers, was the eminence of the Mamelon or Gordon's Hill, crowned by the Kamtchatka Redoubt, with rifle-pits in front. A valley or depression separated these works from the formidable Redan, the Russian 'Bastion No. 3,' in front of which, south-eastward, were the Quarries and some of the rifle-pits, scenes of frequent and sanguinary struggle between the belligerent forces. The line next curved round to the west, until it abutted against the southern or upper end of the Inner Harbour, and comprised the Barrack Batteries and other strong defensive works.

Such being the Russian defences of the Karabelnaïa, the attack-works in that quarter were as follow:—The outer line of defence extended in about a quadrant of a circle, upwards of two miles and a half from end to end; and exterior to the whole of them were the French and British siege-works. Opposite the White Works or Sapoune redoubts were the zigzags and parallels of the French extreme right attack, gradually approaching closer and closer to the Russian works, and backed by the French and English batteries on the heights opposite Inkermann. Next, east and south-east of the Malakoff and

Mamelon, and separated from the extreme right attack by a hollow, the Careening Bay Ravine, were other French parallels and rifle-pits, supported far in the rear by a work called the Victoria Redoubt, and by batteries which had a range of shot over the heads of the besiegers towards the place besieged; and behind this, further to the south-east, was a portion of the light-division camp. Next, after passing the Otchakoff or Middle or Karabelnaïa Ravine, the English works began: a series of parallels and batteries which, at different angles, commanded the Mamelon, Malakoff, and Redan, but especially the last named; there were rifle-pits nearest to the Redan, then the trenches of the British right attack, next the guns of Gordon's Battery on Frenchman's Hill, then a marine battery, beyond this the look-out or picket-house on the Woronzow Road, and, lastly, the remainder of the light-division camp—all in receding order further and further away from the Karabelnaïa towards the south-east. Another dip in the ground, the Woronzow Ravine, separated this British right attack from the left, facing the Barrack Battery of the Russians, and consisting chiefly of Chapman's Battery on Green Hill, with Cathcart's Hill and the fourth-division camp far in the rear. The 'Valley of the Shadow of Death,' or 'Slaughter Valley,' bounding these works on the south-west, formed a junction with the great ravine, which, running nearly north and south, placed a limit to the attack-works directed against the Karabelnaïa, and formed the western limit of the British works.

Turning attention next from the Karabelnaïa to the city itself, it was observable that there was an inner as well as an outer line of defence, gradually constructed by the Russians as the siege advanced. The inner line, rampart and ditch, enclosed about two-thirds of the city, including the more important streets and buildings near the harbour; indeed, towards the southern part of the city, the lines were three deep, presenting a threefold obstacle to any besiegers. Near the head of the Inner Harbour, and on its western side, was a stronghold called by the English the Garden Battery; and exterior to this, in a very commanding position, was the Flagstaff Battery, Bastion du Mât, or 'Bastion No. 4,' which had grown up before the eyes of the French, despite all their attempts to check its progress. A zigzag line of formidable ditches and ramparts connected this work with the Central Bastion, 'Bastion No. 5,' jutting out south-westward. The external line of defence then changed its direction, extending nearly northward to the sea at Quarantine Fort, and having the Quarantine Battery, 'Bastion No. 6,' nearly in its centre.—Thus, including the Karabelnaïa suburb, the Russians, besides the double and in some parts triple line of continuous defence, and besides the tremendous Malakoff, Mamelon, and White Works, had six strongly fortified works, called by them Bastions Nos. 1 to 6 respectively, but by the Allies the Careening Redan, Little Redan, Great Redan, Flagstaff Battery, Central Bastion, and Quarantine Battery.

Nor were the French works in front of the south and south-west of Sebastopol less extensive than those of the English and French in front of the Karabelnaïa, although less distinctly separated into portions by ravines between the elevations or hillocks. The zigzags and parallels were, indeed, amazing in their complexity, extending throughout a length of three miles and a half in a curved line, from the great ravine to Quarantine Harbour, and more than a mile in depth, as measured south-westward from the Flagstaff Battery. These trenches, formed by an immense expenditure of labour on a hard soil, were provided at intervals with batteries of siege-guns and mortars; and the approaches, carried by sap to within a short distance of the Russian works, enabled the French musketeers, riflemen, and storming-parties to render active service. The principal camps of the French army lay south-westward of these siege-works, at an average distance of about two miles and a half from the exterior defence of Sebastopol. The French landing-place and depôt at Kamiesch, also, had been completely enclosed on the land-side by a line of defences, as a precaution against any unforeseen manœuvre on the part of the Russians. All these defences, too, were quite irrespective of the formidable lines thrown up by the Allies on the northern margin of the plateau from Mount Sapoune to the heights opposite Inkermann, and on the eastern margin thence to Balaklava—a length scarcely less than fourteen miles.

In what consisted these various works of attack and defence, it is unnecessary again to particularise. They were ramparts, parapets, mounds, or breast-works, built up chiefly of the earth taken from pits, trenches, ditches, or parallels, but in part of fascines, gabions, and sand-bags; all alike serving either as a support for heavy guns, or as a screen for infantry and riflemen.

As to the fortifications north of the harbour, truly formidable in 1855, the besiegers knew little concerning them. Unable to advance beyond the plateau occupied by their camps and siege-works, they could only infer from indirect data what was transpiring on the distant heights. It became afterwards known, however, that the Russian defences in that quarter were of vast circuit and power, extending as far north as the valley of the Belbek, and comprising lines of intrenchment, batteries, bastions, forts, and redoubts, in astonishing number—the chief being the Sievernaya or Star Fort.

SORTIES: STRUGGLES FOR THE RIFLE-PITS.

During the last week in February, and the first three weeks in March, while the Allies were busily bringing up siege-material to 'the front,' the

Russians were not less busily endeavouring to harass the besiegers, by occupying and fortifying certain elevated spots beyond the former limits of the fortifications—by cannonading, so far as they could, any new batteries constructed by the besiegers—by frequent sorties or sallies at night in great force—and by forming and occupying rifle-pits, in annoying proximity to the Allied lines. By the middle of March, Lord Raglan became impressed with the activity of the Russians in extending their defence-works on every side; and, acting in conjunction with Canrobert, he commenced the construction of a parallel or trench from the British right attack to the French parallels, rendered necessary by the formidable works of the enemy on the Malakoff and Mamelon: this was an operation of extreme difficulty, owing to the rocky nature of the ground, and the impossibility of effectually covering the working-parties from a fierce hostile fire. Not only so; but the Russians constructed rifle-pits during the night so close to the trenches under formation, that when the British and French working-parties appeared in or near those trenches, a destructive fire of rifles was poured out upon them. On the 17th of March, a serious contest thus took place, so threatening, that the whole British force was placed under arms, although the French bore the brunt of the attack. Canrobert, finding that the Russian riflemen were greatly disturbing his trench-parties, ordered 700 men to advance and capture the pits. Sallying forth swiftly but cautiously, and creeping when in danger of being discovered, the French reached the nearest pits, and drove out the Russians at the point of the bayonet; reinforced by other battalions, they then dashed on to capture a second line of pits nearer to the Russian works; but the enemy, emerging from the town and the forts in great force, advanced and met the French, when a fierce encounter took place in the space between the French and Russian lines, the fire of the Russian musketry being occasionally aided by the guns of the forts. Notwithstanding the bravery of the French, they were compelled to yield to the superior force of the enemy, and were left to deplore the fact that the Russians instead of themselves had occupied the Mamelon.

A change occurred in the Russian command at Sebastopol about the middle of March, by the substitution of Prince Gortchakoff for Prince Menchikoff—whether as an expression of the czar's dissatisfaction, or in consequence of a failure in Menchikoff's health, or for some other reason, was not publicly stated. Gortchakoff, in an address to the garrison, adverted to the admiration felt for the soldiers by the late Czar Nicholas, and delivered the following message from Alexander, then newly risen to the throne:—'Tell the brave defenders of Sebastopol, in the name of our immortal benefactor, that the Emperor Nicholas was proud of them, and that he thought of them on his death-bed in sending them, through me, the expression of his last and cordial gratitude. Tell our brave soldiers that I thank them in his name by these letters, and that I am perfectly convinced that they were always worthy of his paternal solicitude.' Gortchakoff proceeded to say, in his own name: 'Soldiers! the most difficult time is over. The roads are better, transports of every description arrive easily, and considerable reinforcements sent to your support are on the way. In taking the command of this army, I am sincerely convinced that, with God's blessing, success will finally crown our efforts, and that we shall justify the hopes of our august sovereign.'

The sorties of the garrison were frequent, and kept the camps of the besiegers constantly on the alert. Made at night, especially if dark and misty, these sudden inroads of armed bodies were terribly harassing to the trench-guards, who, few in number, were surprised by formidable battalions, and had to fight in the dark for very life: sometimes forced to retreat to the camp, but more usually maintaining a resolute stand until aid arrived.

As if incited by some unusual anticipation of success, or probably by the presence of one of the grand-dukes, the Russians made a sortie on a formidable scale on the night of the 22d of March. They had discovered a weak point in the Allied lines; they were able to penetrate to that point, and, when there, to ascertain that the British trenches were, through paucity of means, very insufficiently guarded. In the middle of a dark and windy night, a formidable body of nearly 15,000 men emerged from Sebastopol in two columns, and advanced upon the Allies, one column in the direction of the French trenches to the north-east of the Mamelon, and the other against the English left attack. The assault was so sudden, that the Zouaves, guarding the French trenches, were driven back after a fierce struggle, and obliged to abandon the trenches for a while to the Russians, until they could bring up sufficient force for the recapture. The troops in the British left attack, the 20th, 21st, and 57th regiments, were assailed almost at the same time by a force many times larger than their own; but various covering-parties having come up in support, a fierce but short struggle ensued, ending in the complete repulse of the Russians. The contest was very fatal to the officers, however; for the numbers being small and the attack sudden, every sword and pistol had to render its service. A display of cool gallantry has been recorded on the part of Major Gordon of the Royal Engineers: he was seen with a little switch in his hand, standing on the parapet of the ditch, encouraging his men to defend the trenches, and, for want probably of other ammunition, hurling stones upon the Russians; all exposed as he was, he received one ball in his shoulder and another in the lower part of his arm—from both of which wounds, however, he recovered.

The effect produced at the camps by night-

attacks of this character was very remarkable, sometimes impressive. The tents of many of the regiments were far distant from the trenches, while the head-quarters of the commanders were yet further removed; and it might happen, under a peculiar state of the wind, that but little of the din of firearms could be heard. Such appears to have been in a great measure the case in this instance; for Lord Raglan, in his dispatch, said: 'The night was very dark, and the wind so high, that the firing which took place, and which was very heavy, could scarcely be heard in the British camp.' This must have referred more especially to head-quarters; for some of the journalists, stationed at other spots, noticed the roar of the cannon, the hissing of the shells, the intermittent growl of the musketry, the wild scream of the rockets, and the whizzing of the round shot, as audible accompaniments to the flames, star-like flashes, whirling fuses, and trains of dropping sparks. At such a time a camp becomes greatly excited; men eagerly strain their eyes and ears, to detect how matters are going on, and speculate whether this or that shot comes from the enemy

Night in the Trenches.

or from friends. So it was on that night; the troops not engaged saw that a soldierly struggle was involved; but it was not until the following morning that the details of the sortie became generally known. So wide, indeed, was the area over which the Allied camps spread, that the English generals were often for many hours ignorant of the nature of an attack borne by the French. The details afterwards collected shewed that there were in effect three attacks; for the northern column, after temporarily repulsing the French, turned into the advanced-works of the British right attack, where the Russians were speedily met by the 77th and 97th, who repulsed them by a bayonet-charge, fatal to Captain Vicars of the 97th. Besides these onslaughts, the Russians, at another part of the scene of conflict, approached with 'Bono Franciz' as a deceptive watchword, and bayoneted many of the trench-guards before the true nature of the attack became apparent; they succeeded in getting into the second parallel of the left works, and into a mortar-battery on the right. This battery, entered about midnight, was held during a quarter of an hour; but an English detachment, coming up to the rescue after a hard day's service in another part of the works, opened so severe a fire of musketry as to check the Russians; and a mere handful of men, dashing into the battery, expelled the enemy. The 7th, 33d, and 34th were among the regiments engaged in this exciting series of conflicts. The recapture of the mortar-battery was an especially gallant affair; for the few hardy fellows who leaped in, after exhausting their ammunition, groped among the dead Russians in the dark, and obtained a supply of cartridges from their pouches. An artillery officer, engaged in the thick of the fight, characterised it as 'an Inkermann on a small scale—an attack in very great force and on all points.' The attack was indeed a serious one: many fresh battalions had evidently been engaged in it; and there is a probability that the Russians hoped to have destroyed the approaches directed against the Malakoff. In this

they completely failed, as the attack was in all points defeated.

General Canrobert, in his dispatch relating to this engagement, commented on the nature of the Russian tactics. 'This operation of the besieged has differed completely from all those which they have hitherto attempted against our works. In order to insure its success, in addition to the former strength of the garrison, the Russians brought up eight battalions of fresh troops, the regiments of Dnieper and Ouglitch. It was a species of general assault against our lines of communication; and the combination appeared uncommonly well devised for obtaining a decisive result. The importance of the failure on the part of the besieged ought to be estimated by the greatness of the object they had in view. The prisoners we have made state the Russian loss as being enormous; and, taking into account the masses employed, I consider that this combat, irregular as all nocturnal combats are, and with a firing which lasted several hours, must have cost them at least 1000 to 1200 men. The ground in front of our parallels is strewn with the dead; and General Osten-Sacken has just demanded of us an armistice, which has been granted and fixed for to-morrow, in order that the last duties may be paid to the fallen.' Lord Raglan corroborated this account of the great loss by saying, in reference to the appearance of the battle-field, 'The whole of the ground between the posts of the two armies was covered with their dead, besides those which they had undoubtedly carried off.'

From a Russian account of this great sortie, it appears that religious enthusiasm was employed to work upon the Russians on this occasion, as on many others during the war. A priest named Savinoff, at a moment when some of the troops were irresolute under the French fire, appeared among them in his robes, crucifix in hand, and cried out with a loud voice: 'Lord, save thy people! Give our orthodox monarch the victory over his enemies!' Under the influence of this impassioned prayer, the troops renewed the attack. The priest was active also in conveying orders to the troops, during which duty the lower part of the crucifix was shot away. The czar presented him with the military order of St George, for his intrepidity. As a contrast to this employment of a man of peace in warlike duties, there was, on the 24th, an employment of fighting-men in peaceful duties. The troops who fell, in the various parts of the scene of conflict, were not much less than 2000 in all, dead, wounded, and contused; and as the greater part of these could be removed only while hostile firing was stayed, a truce was agreed to. At the instant when white flags were hoisted on either side, hostilities ceased, and English, French, and Russians hastened forward, regarding each other with curiosity, and the officers exchanging courtesies: it was a strange sight, one among the small number of amenities in grim war; officers of the three nations spoke together a little in French, smoked together, and directed the operations of the soldiers, who—amid a wreck of accoutrements and arms of all kinds, and over ground stained with blood—bore their dead and wounded comrades. It was observed, by the officers who attended, that the Russian soldiers looked dirty and shabby, but healthy and well-fed; larger in frame than the French, but smaller than the English; very Kalmuck-like and uncultivated in appearance. When the sad duties of the day were over; when the 'Rooskees' had grinned and smoked with their enemies for a brief space—the troops retired to their respective camps and batteries, the flags were taken down, and hostilities instantly recommenced between those who had just before met in peaceful converse.

Struggles in the rifle-pits, supported by cannonadings on either side, were of almost nightly occurrence during the spring months. Wherever placed, and however constructed, these pits were simply sheltered spots, behind or within which unerring marksmen might take their stand, and pick off any enemy appearing in sight within half a mile. The pits, very numerous around the base of the Malakoff, were in most instances simple excavations in the ground, faced round with sand-bags loopholed for rifles, and banked with the earth taken from the pits; although large enough only to contain eight or ten men each, and little raised above the ground, they were redoubts in effect, manned by riflemen instead of artillerymen. The destructive power of these armed positions was so formidable, and so serious an obstacle to the formation of batteries and earthworks, that each party eagerly endeavoured to obtain a mastery over the rifle-pits. The contests were frequently thus managed: A corps of riflemen, occupying a few pits in front of the Allied camps, would work much mischief on the sentries and others passing within sight; a battalion or two would be sent out to dislodge them, and close hand-to-hand fighting would follow; the Russian batteries would pour forth a torrent of shot to deter the Allies, which would be replied to by a similar torrent from the batteries of the besiegers; and, under cover of this confusion, a large body of Russians would sally forth from the town, and endeavour to surprise the French or British in the trenches. The rifle-pits themselves frequently changed possessors, being one night in the hands of the Allies, and the next in that of the Russians; indeed these repeated struggles for the pits cost more lives than the siege itself. It not unfrequently happened that a few round shot from the French or English batteries would scatter the sand-bags and earthen ridge round the pits, expose the riflemen, and compel them to retreat; that each side was deterred during the day by a hot hostile fire from attempting to occupy the pits; but that the Russians stole into them again during the dead of night, to renew their fire on the next

morning against any head that might appear above the trenches of the besiegers. The Russian rifles were more dreaded than the larger kinds of weapon. A captain in the Royal Engineers, describing in a letter the severity of the trench-duty at this period, exposed night and day to incessant firing from the enemy, and called upon to support this fire amid fatigue and every kind of alternation in weather, said: 'The Russians treat us to a pleasing variety in the way of projectiles. First comes the round shot of all size, which rushes past you with a shriek something like a railway whistle badly blown. Next comes the grape, which flies slower and round, like a large covey of strong birds flying very swiftly. Then comes a gun-shell, which approaches like a round shot, but has the pleasing trick of bursting when it reaches you; so that you have to run a double risk—first of the shot itself, and then of the pieces. Next comes the mortar-shell, which, though really the worst of the large projectiles, I somehow dread the least: it remains in the air for nearly half a minute, and in the night you can see it quite plainly, owing to its bearing the fuse; it glances along very gracefully, rising to a great height, and making a gentle whistle every now and then like a peewit or plover, which becomes louder and louder till it drops; although you can see it all the way, it is a most difficult thing to tell where it will fall—none but the oldest hands can really make a good guess. But my greatest horror of all, and the deadliest foe we have, is the Russian rifle-bullet. It is not so perfect as ours, but, as Mercutio says: "It will do well enough." This little gentleman gives you no warning, but flies about all day long, and ranges 1200 yards. At a quarter of that distance it will go through two men.' One of the most severe contests in which these rifles took part occurred on the 17th of March, when no fewer than 5000 French troops were sent to attack a range of rifle-pits, near the Malakoff, containing only sixty men in all; but as the Russians also poured forth in immense force, a murderous fire was maintained for four hours, ending in a repulse of the French attack. Four days later, however, the pits were captured.

Life in a rifle-pit, during these exciting days and nights, was more remarkable, perhaps, than that in any other part of the scene of struggle; owing to the extraordinary nerve and coolness demanded from the men. The English constructed pits of their own, in front of the Russian works; and an officer of the Rifle Brigade has described his duties while engaged in this service. He spoke of the new Enfield rifle, smaller in bore than the Minié, as 'carrying beautifully.' He saw two of his men firing at a Russian earthwork which he estimated at 400 yards distant; they had fixed the 'sights' or range-points of their rifles at double as far, and fired too high; but he, taking a 400 yards' range, 'put two shots in succession through the loophole the Russians were firing from.' Seeing three men leave the earthwork for the town, he put up his sight for 900 yards; and when they had reached one of the streets of Sebastopol, where they deemed themselves safe, he fired a little higher (for 1000 yards), and one of the three dropped, the other two rushing into a house. Soon afterwards, seeing two carts laden with powder-boxes going from the town to the batteries, he took aim at 1100 yards' range, brought down one of the drivers, and frightened the rest with very astonishment at such a rifle-shot. He kept up a 'regular duel' with a Russian in the nearest opposition rifle-pit, about 250 yards distant, each firing at the loophole manned by the other: he left his place for a time to a substitute; but 'very soon the Russian, who was a splendid shot, put a ball right through private ———'s cap, because he did not bob his head when he saw the smoke.' On one particular day, this officer found his rifle-pit selected as a target for a 68-pounder gun in the Redan, 700 yards distant: he employed two men loading for him, and while taking aim, a corporal at his elbow watched the embrasure by means of a telescope; and when a gunner was seen by the corporal at this spot, the officer fired instantly, and either shot him down or disturbed his proceedings: when, however, the telescopic observer found that the great gun appeared to be loaded ready for firing, the officer ordered his men to lie down behind the sand-bags until the shot had done its worst. For a man to 'bob his head when he sees the smoke,' and to look steadily through a telescope at a terrible missile, which in the next instant may shatter him to fragments, it may easily be imagined that great intrepidity is needed; and yet the riflemen of all the three nations exhibited this quality in the performance of their daily duties.

SECOND OR APRIL BOMBARDMENT.

The day at length came when the bombardment of the formidable city was to recommence. If, in October 1854, any one had asserted that a period of nearly six months would elapse before the renewal of the bombardment then abandoned as unsuccessful, the assertion would have been received with a shout of derision. That the place would be captured much earlier, was confidently anticipated by some; that the Allies would leave their position on the plateau, and boldly strike inland to cut off the Russian sources of supply, was believed by others; that they would voluntarily raise the siege, and retire to their ships at Balaklava and Kamiesch, was deemed probable by a third party; while there were not wanting those, in the Russian camp at least, who believed, or feigned to believe, that the Allies would be driven as a herd of swine into the sea, unable to face the armed masses brought by the czar against them. All these results were considered more or less probable; but no one anticipated anything so astonishing as the cessation, for half

a year, of the cannonade by the besiegers, commanding, as those besiegers did, the whole seaboard of the Crimea, and the unchecked use of two harbours at which siege-material might be landed. Why this cessation occurred, has already been sufficiently explained—in the miserable wasting of the British forces during the winter, the incessant strengthening of the Russian works, the increasing extent of the works required to be constructed by the besiegers, and the enormous difficulties encountered in the conveyance of heavy stores up to the camps and batteries. How far a general of high military genius, armed with unlimited powers by his government, and having unity of command over all the Allied forces, would have surmounted these difficulties at an earlier date, it is impossible to determine. Many causes combined to produce the delay—a delay mortifying and even irritating to the English and French nations, although not attributable to the misconduct of any one person or department in particular. Here it must be borne in mind that the operation adverted to is not a mere firing of cannon occasionally and at particular spots; it is a bombardment, in which all the guns from all the batteries pour forth a red-hot torrent all day during many days in succession, with a hope of so battering down the walls, forts, bastions, or other defences, as to enable the besiegers to enter the beleaguered place and capture it. Such a bombardment had been commenced on the 17th of October, and maintained during a few days, but without the desired success; and now, nearly half a year afterwards, a second bombardment commenced, under still more tremendous circumstances.

Writing on the 10th of April, Lord Raglan announced to his government the opening of the cannonade, in a dispatch marked by those references to the state of the weather, so singularly combined with nearly all his lordship's announcements. At the time when the formidable batteries of the Allies commenced fire at daybreak on the 9th, 'the weather was extremely unpropitious. Much rain had fallen in the course of the night, and it continued during the day, accompanied by a tempestuous wind and a heavy mist, which obscured everything, and rendered it impossible to ascertain with any degree of accuracy the effect of the fire, which has been continued with little or no interruption from the commencement, and has been superior to that of the enemy, who were evidently taken by surprise, and, except upon the extreme left, did not respond to the attack for nearly half an hour. This morning has been hazy, and for some time there was a drizzling rain; but it is clearing this afternoon, and there is again a prospect of fine weather. The country yesterday was covered with water, and the ground was again very deep. The trenches were likewise extremely muddy, and their condition added greatly to the labours of the men employed in the batteries, who consisted chiefly of sailors, artillerymen, and sappers. They conducted their duties admirably, and I am sorry to say that the two former, particularly the navy, sustained considerable loss.'

From other quarters, ample testimony was afforded to the inclemency of the weather. It was a windy, boisterous Easter-Monday, during which rain fell in torrents, nearly blinding the men as they stood at their guns; while the accompanying mist was almost as dense as that on the terrible morning of Inkermann. Batteries fired against batteries, besiegers against besieged, each guessing rather than aiming at the other, and each unable to see the whizzing balls and shells except in close proximity. The deafening roar seemed to receive new terrors from the obscurity of the scene. The men at the guns encountered the utmost difficulty in braving the storm and wind; while those in camp were either in danger of seeing their tents whirled away from them, or had to wade through a slough of liquid mud that covered almost every part of the ground. Hour after hour did the thunder of artillery boom forth, each gunner hoping that he rendered good service, but unable to measure the effect produced through the simple impossibility of seeing anything. The secret of the intended renewal of the bombardment having been well kept, the Russians were completely taken by surprise; but being summoned with alacrity to the posts severally attacked, they speedily manned the Flagstaff, Garden, Careening Bay, and Inkermann batteries, as well as the Redan, Malakoff, and Mamelon. There had been so many postponements of the 'grand day,' as the troops called it, when the bombardment would commence, that its actual arrival appeared sudden; and immense exertions were made on the Sunday to complete the arming of the heavy batteries. It is probable that the Allied commanders received at that juncture information that the conferences at Vienna were not proceeding satisfactorily, and that any signal success at Sebastopol would greatly promote the cause advocated by the representatives of the Western Powers. When it became certain that the batteries would open on the morrow, generals, aids-de-camp, journalists, all hastened to Cathcart's Hill, and other elevated spots whence the scene of destruction might be viewed; there they remained, struggling against tempest, fog, and mud, until the opening of the fire. One gleam of light, towards the close of the afternoon, is presented to view by Mr Russell in words as vivid as a picture. 'The sun slowly descended into a rift in the dark gray pall which covered the sky, and cast a pale yellow slice of light, barred here and there by columns of rain and masses of curling vapour, across the line of batteries. The outlines of the town, faintly rendered through the mists of smoke and rain, seemed quivering inside the circling lines of fire around and from them, but they were the same familiar outlines so well known to us for the last seven months—the same green cupola and roofs, and long streets and ruined suburbs, the same dock-

yard buildings, and dark trenches and batteries. The eye of painter never rested on a more extraordinary effect, and his art alone could have rendered justice to the scene which shone out on us for a moment, as the sickly sun, flattened out, as it were, between bars of cloud and rain, seemed to have forced its way through the leaden sky to cast one straightened look on the conflict which raged below. The plateau beneath our standing-place was lighted up by incessant flashes of light, and long trails of white smoke streamed across it, spirting up in thick masses, tinged with fire for a moment, till they were whirled away in broader volumes by the wind. In the deep glow of the parting gleam of sunset, the only image suggested to me calculated to convey the actual effect of the fire of the batteries to our friends at home, was a vision of the Potteries' district as it is seen at night, all fervid with fire and pillars of smoke.'

As in October, so in April—the bombardment continued many days in succession; the besiegers watched eagerly, when the sky was free from mist, for any indications of ruined forts, overturned guns, abandoned redoubts, dispersed batteries, breached ramparts; while the defenders, with that indomitable perseverance displayed in so marked a manner throughout the siege, took advantage of every cessation in the firing to repair the injuries—nay, conducted those reparations while the firing yet continued. In a diary of operations, transmitted from Sebastopol to St Petersburg, and published occasionally in the *Invalide Russe*, the bombardment of the 9th of April is described as being 'tremendous,' and maintained by 250 guns, which threw 20,000 projectiles into the town on that one day. The cannonading was continued at a slower rate during the night, but with redoubled vigour on the morning of the 10th; on which day, however, the Russians claimed to have dismounted no fewer than fifty guns belonging to the besiegers, and to have inflicted great injury; while the damage to the fortifications is described as being no more than could easily be restored during the night. On the 11th, the Russians speak of a sharp hand-to-hand contest with a body of French in some of the rifle-pits, ending, after many alternations of success, in the retention of the position by the defenders: the bombardment on that day being less fierce than on the two preceding. Continuing the story of the siege, the Russian writers give an epitome of each day's proceedings, generally contrasting the fierceness of the enemy's fire with the slightness of the result, but occasionally acknowledging a serious loss. Sometimes the contests in the trenches and rifle-pits outside the forts were stubborn and sanguinary, and the Russians announce their frequent success in smoking out—*donnê le camouflet*—the enemy from those positions. An achievement is described in connection with the closing week of April, credible because the Russians more than once succeeded in a similar bold and skilful exploit. Seeing an unoccupied eminence in front of one of the bastions, they resolved to occupy and fortify it as they had done the Mamelon, by forming two strong intrenchments connected by a covered-way. On the night of the 24th, special detachments were told off to construct these works; and during five days and nights repeated collisions took place between the musketeers of the French and Russians at this spot: the French endeavouring to prevent the fortifying, or to seize the position if fortified; and the Russians striving to maintain their advantage—the diary implying that this latter object was attained. During these contests, Gortchakoff acknowledged a loss varying from 100 to 175 per day, in killed, wounded, and contused; although, from another source, it appears that 2380 dead and wounded were carried from Sebastopol to the military hospitals at Baktchéserai between the 9th and the 20th, indicating a greater loss than here admitted. Taken altogether, this Russian document is hopeful if not boastful; and Gortchakoff brings it to a close by narrating how, on the 29th of April, the new czar's birthday was celebrated by a grand *Te Deum* in the principal church of Sebastopol, by prayers offered up by all the officers of the garrison for the preservation of the czar and the imperial family, and by 'a salvo of 101 cannon-balls fired against the enemy in honour of the occasion.'

Lord Raglan's dispatches, brief and containing few details, did not throw a halo of success around these operations of April: he was too truthful to colour brightly events not very bright in their result; and his account confirmed rather than refuted that contained in Gortchakoff's diary. Writing on the 14th, the British commander said: 'The fire of the British artillery, chiefly directed against the Garden Batteries, the Barrack Battery, the Redan, the Malakoff Tower, and the Mamelon, has been most effective, and the enemy's works have suffered very considerably; although they have, as usual, made a good use of the night to repair damages, notwithstanding that the vertical fire has been continued throughout the twenty-four hours.' On the 17th he stated that although the fire of the besiegers was stronger than that of the besieged, it had not produced the results he had anticipated. 'The guns of the Russians have been turned upon some of our advanced-works in vast numbers; and in one particular instance the injury sustained by a battery was so great, that the unremitting exertions of Captains Henry and Walcot, and the gallantry and determination of the artillerymen under their orders, alone enabled them to keep up the fire and to maintain themselves in the battery.' In another battery a shell exploded the magazine, and wrought much mischief. 'The French blew up several small mines in front of the Bastion du Mât after sunset on Sunday evening, with a view to establish a parallel on the spot: this operation greatly

alarmed the enemy, who at once commenced a heavy fire of cannon and musketry in every direction from that part of the town, which they kept up for a considerable time.' Less and less was said in the subsequent dispatches affecting the bombardment, until at length, on the last day of the month, his lordship made no mention whatever of cannonading—the chief part of his dispatch relating to the following announcement:—'The Russians continue actively engaged in covering their advanced-works, and they have constructed a new battery on their left of the Mamelon; troops are constantly in motion on the north side, and there is every appearance of the establishment of a very large camp on the plateau above the Belbek, extending towards Mackenzie's Farm.'

These anxious days were, however, not unmarked by gallant achievements on the part of the besiegers. On the 17th, the English engineers began to advance their trenches to the right and left of Gordon's Battery; and so boldly was this done, that by the night of the 18th they had made two zigzag approaches very near the Malakoff and the Redan. It then became necessary to construct a trench to connect these zigzags; but the Russians, knowing the full importance of the work, brought artillery as well as musketry to bear on the working-parties, and sank a line of rifle-pits to enfilade the new trench. The contest became very hot; the English rifles silenced a 12-pounder gun by picking off the artillerymen; but they could not prevent the formation of the new Russian rifle-pits, nor could the working-parties proceed with the trench while these pits remained in the hands of the enemy. It became necessary, therefore, to capture them; and this was effected in a most brilliant manner on the 19th of April by Colonel Egerton, commanding a detachment of the 77th regiment, forming part of an additional force sent to strengthen the trench-guard in the evening. 'The resistance of the enemy,' said Lord Raglan, 'although obstinate, was speedily overcome by the impetuosity of our troops; and the pit, which it was desirable to retain, was, without the loss of a moment, connected with our approach, and thereby furnished protection to the working-party to continue its labours without interruption for a considerable time. After the lapse, however, of about three hours the enemy brought a heavy fire of artillery and musketry upon the party in advance of the pit, into which they retired, and which they effectually defended and maintained; but this brilliant achievement was not accomplished without considerable sacrifice of life, and it is most painful to me to have to announce to your lordship the death of Colonel Egerton, of the 77th, who was unfortunately killed.' This gallant officer had only 250 men to support him in resisting an attack not only from the troops in the rifle-pits, but from a column of 1000 Russians marched down upon him from the Malakoff. He saw Lieutenant Lempriere fall by his side; he carried him off to shelter, and then returned to his little band, ordered them to pour in a close volley upon the advancing Russians, charged with the bayonet, drove back the enemy, and secured the pit—but did not live to hear the thanks of his commander or the plaudits of his countrymen. It was one of those chivalrous incidents which, occurring from time to time during the siege, inspirited the officers and troops, somewhat cast down by the dashing of their hopes that Sebastopol would soon surrender. There being yet another rifle-pit at this place of struggle in front of the Malakoff, it was boldly attacked on the morning of the 21st by a volunteer-party of the 30th regiment, under Lieutenant Walker; it was captured, but being found empty, was filled in with earth, and rendered useless; for, affording as these pits did shelter for a small number of unerring marksmen, both parties were anxious that, if not captured, they should be destroyed.

The Allied fleets, whose services had been so seldom in demand during the winter, rendered a little aid during this second bombardment; but so little, as scarcely to need notice. In addition to the forts at the mouth of the harbour, the obstacles to the approach of a hostile fleet were increased by the number and extent of the shoals off the coast. Nevertheless, on the 13th of April, the *Valorous* steamed forth to try her guns against the forts; she took up a position, and speedily sent a volley of shells towards the town. The Russians being taken somewhat unawares, several minutes elapsed before they could reply; but Forts Constantine, Alexander, and Quarantine, shortly got into play; and the *Valorous* retired, apparently without much damage on either side. This was an evening attack, after dark; and about midnight the *Caffarelli*, French steamer, set forth on a similar adventure, and exchanged shots in a similar way with the forts. There was a sharp contest of musketry on that night between the Russians and the British 23d; and it is possible that the sea-attack was intended to take off the attention of the enemy in part from the land-side. The naval officers and sailors fretted at enforced uselessness; they saw their noble vessels reduced practically to mere freight-ships and transports, and themselves employed merely as carriers; and they burned for any favourable opportunity of achieving something which might give them name and fame at home. The *Valorous* and *Caffarelli* were followed in their attacks by the *Gladiator*, *Wrangler*, *Furious*, *Tribune*, *Dauntless*, and one or two other vessels, on different days, or rather nights; the apparent object being, to endeavour to effect some mischief to the town and port by shells, rockets, and 68-pounder shot, without bringing down upon themselves the fire of the vast stone forts. On one particular night the gun-boat *Wrangler* steamed in slowly, preceded by a boat with muffled oars to take soundings; the night was dark and foggy;

and when so close to one of the forts that its guns could not be directed down upon her, she maintained for two hours a hot fire right into the heart of the town. These active labours were welcome enough to the small crews of the gun-boats engaged; but there was little for the main body of the fleet to do. Steaming to and fro between Kamiesch and Balaklava, or Kamiesch and Eupatoria, or between the Crimea generally and Constantinople or Scutari, afforded no opportunity for gaining renown; and the seamen, finding naval achievements to be nearly beyond their reach, gladly threw their hearts into the working of the sailors' batteries ashore.

CONTESTS IN MAY: CANROBERT'S RESIGNATION.

Great was the disappointment felt in England and France when the failure of this second bombardment became manifest. Day by day the telegraph had been appealed to with an eagerness almost fretful, for any indications of success in the East; newspapers announced that the besiegers had poured into the beleaguered city shells and cannon-balls in thousands, far exceeding those of the first bombardment in October; they recorded the number of the guns and positions of the batteries belonging to the Allies; but April advanced to its close, giving no note of a capture, even of the smallest fort; and the public became erelong painfully aware of the fact that the Allies had expended their vast store of siege-material, without attaining the hoped-for result. The formidable nature of the Russian defences, it is true, was suspected, if not accurately known; for the dispatches and letters had told of the Flagstaff Battery as being rather a series of batteries than simply one; of the Garden Battery mounting three tiers of large ordnance, some of them 13-inch mortars; of the Barrack Battery, so strongly armed that almost the whole force of the English left attack had to be concentrated upon it; of the Redan presenting two faces, each strong enough to resist a siege by a formidable force; of the Malakoff, exceeding all the rest in strength, and forming the key to the whole position; of the Mamelon, being strengthened each day since its occupation by the Russians; of the Little Redan and the Careening Battery—all in addition to the powerful batteries and bastions protecting the city on the south-west side. Still, it was known that the Allies, on their part, had enormously increased the attack-works; and a sanguine hope had been entertained that the vast preparations of the besieged would have been overmatched by those of the besiegers.

This failure of capture was accompanied by an increase of danger and loss in other particulars. The sappers and miners of the hostile forces were each week approaching nearer; the English and French trenches advanced concentrically towards Sebastopol, while the mines, galleries, and rifle-pits of the Russians advanced outwards; and the working-parties thus frequently came into deadly conflict, even in subterranean excavations. Destructive explosive contrivances, called fougasses, were often used in such places by the Russians: so arranged that if the foot of any enemy trod on one of these, an explosive compound became fired, and death and wounds resulted. The 'parallels' of the besiegers became increased in number, until the first, second, and third were headed by a fourth, so close to the Russian batteries as to render the utmost precaution necessary. Close examination with the aid of telescopes, from any spot commanding a sufficient view, revealed this additional fact to the notice of the besiegers: that the Russians had not only extended their defence-works out towards the plateau, but that in the heart of the town they had constructed earth-works pierced for guns, in such a way as to maintain a struggle in street after street and house after house, should the besiegers succeed in capturing the outer forts and bastions. Hence discussions and speculations arose among the officers, whether it would be an act of true heroism or an act of madness to attempt an assault or storming. The troops themselves had no doubt whatever on this point: they had been so long before the beleaguered place, and were exposed to so much nightly danger in the trenches, without a fair chance of earning fame for good deeds performed in the dark, that they would much have preferred a dash at the enemy, trusting to their courage to achieve some noteworthy result. The commanders, however, feeling the heavy responsibility placed upon them, and measuring the probable future by the experience gained in the past, decided that the hour had not yet come for a personal encounter between the belligerents within the fortified lines of Sebastopol. Unless the defences could be battered in many places, and several breaches effected, for the admission of several storming-parties or assaulting columns, the success attained was not likely to be conclusive; because the distinct forts and batteries on the line of defence were so numerous that a destructive fire could be concentrated on any one assaulting column, unless diverted by similar assaults elsewhere. To effect these breaches, to bring down the earthen defences in a crumbling mass, seemed indeed a work within the power of the besiegers, viewing the strength of the attack-batteries; for in the English left attack alone there were, at this period, no fewer than eight batteries varying from two to twelve guns each, mostly 32-pounders, with a few 8-inch and 10-inch guns, 10-inch mortars, and several 13-inch mortars for special attack against the buildings in the city; while the right attack contained twelve batteries still more heavily armed than the other, comprising several 68-pounders among the armament; and yet, as the April bombardment too surely shewed, these batteries, mounting about 140 guns and mortars,

and the French batteries of far greater power, failed to bring down the defences of Sebastopol, or to open a gap through which the besiegers might enter.

During the bombardment, as well as at preceding dates, the riflemen rendered signal service, shewing in a remarkable way the power of their weapon against great guns. This power had to some extent been appreciated in the Peninsular War; but the intervening period of forty or fifty years had brought the rifle to such perfection, that both besiegers and besieged had reason to be well satisfied with its service at Sebastopol. It was found that a rifle-pit was in effect a battery, which, at 600 or 700 yards' distance from a battery of large ordnance, had power to drive away the artillerymen from the embrasures at which the mouths of the guns appeared; if the cannon-battery aimed at demolishing altogether the rifle-battery, the other aimed at the gunners in the former, and with a success never before attained during warfare. In what mode the riflemen joined in the terrible contest, details have already shewn; and there is no call for surprise that the besiegers should, at all hazards, have attempted the capture of the dreaded rifle-pits constructed by the Russians, as they did in the brilliant affair which cost the life of Colonel Egerton. In truth, it may be said that the operations of the siege were at this time carried on nearly as fully by the riflemen as by the artillerymen, so continuous were the attacks and counter-attacks between the sharpshooters. During the last week in April, for instance, the French extended their trenches almost close to the Flagstaff Battery by means of the 'sap,' a very perilous kind of digging or excavating, in which the sappers must work on their knees, with a screen of some kind hastily fixed up between them and the enemy; to check the progress of this sap, the Russians began to construct rifle-pits in near proximity; and, on the other hand, to check the construction of these pits, the French resolved to attack them; hence, on one particular night, there was a battle of seven hours' duration near this spot, each side bringing up reinforcements, and each side losing several hundred men in killed and wounded. The siege received, from such incidents as these, characteristics rarely if ever exhibited by earlier sieges; for, if in no former siege such great guns had been used, it is equally true that none had presented such rifle-practice.

May opened bright and cheerful; a genial warmth and a blue sky did what weather could do to inspirit the besiegers; but the results of their labours in the preceding month were not so flattering as to foreshadow a successful future. If the Allies sought to know how the Russian defences had borne the fire, they obtained for answer a confirmation of a doctrine much insisted on by modern engineers—that earthworks are stronger than works of stone; for although 68-pounder shot penetrated ten or twelve feet into the earthen ramparts of the Redan and the Malakoff; yet, as those ramparts were twenty to thirty feet thick, the shot buried themselves in the centre of the mass without necessarily effecting a breach in the continuity. If they inquired whether the strengthened fire of the besiegers had interfered with the communication by the Russians between the northern and southern sides of Sebastopol, they found that although, on one particular day, a bridge of boats across the great harbour had been shot away by heavy cannon, the next day displayed to view a new bridge of boats constructed in a different spot. If they asked themselves whether the Russians exhibited less personal devotion to their czar than before, the answer was no less decisive; for those troops won the admiration of the besiegers arrayed against them. A French officer, describing one of the terrible conflicts in the trenches and rifle-pits, said: 'We cannot help admiring those fine fellows. I commanded during that night a working-party, and saw upwards of twenty killed on the spot, whilst creeping on all-fours to ascertain what we were doing in our works. They were killed the moment they were discovered; and scarcely had they breathed their last, when others undertook the same perilous mission. Their devotedness is beyond all praise.'

The month of May, we have said, opened with this state of affairs, this balance of account between the besiegers and the besieged. Although the furious bombardment could not be continued, through the failure of ammunition and the wearing of the cannon, yet the hostile encounters did not cease for a single day; if there was infrequent firing of great ordnance, there were sharp contests of musketry and rifles. On the 1st of the month the French achieved a gallant manœuvre. As announced by telegraph to London, it was described simply thus: 'A sharp engagement took place on the night of the 1st of May; the whole of the Russian rifle-pits were taken, eight light mortars, and 200 prisoners;' while General Canrobert's telegraphic message to Paris told that, 'The enemy had strongly connected his works, and with lodgments in front of the Central Bastion was a work of counter-approach, with a double enceinte, and very strong; we stormed it, and maintained ourselves there under a very heavy fire, and have definitely established ourselves: we took from the enemy eight small portable mortars which were inside.' The Central Bastion, it will be remembered, was on the south-west side of Sebastopol, attacked only by the French, and far distant from the English works. It appears that, shortly before this date, the Russians had constructed a work of counter-approach between this bastion and the French siege-works, enclosing a large *place d'armes*, and greatly increasing the defensive strength of that part of the city. Canrobert, perceiving that this position would be very important to whoever might hold it, resolved

on a capture. At ten o'clock at night on the 1st, the French commenced an attack, organised by General Pelissier, and conducted by General de Salles. Several battalions were formed in two columns, the right headed by General de la Motterouge, the left by General Bazaine. The attacking-party did not seek for darkness, but advanced by the full light of a brilliant moon. Motterouge rushed on the enemy's work with the bayonet, scarcely firing a shot, and drove the Russians out of it by a direct attack; while Bazaine, getting round to the flank of the work, repulsed a body of the enemy there stationed for its defence; the Russians escaped precipitately into the town, leaving behind them many dead and wounded, and eight small mortars. This advantage gained, the French proceeded expeditiously to make the most of it. The work was, in effect, a series of rifle-pits, so connected as to form an intrenchment of considerable length; and the French engineers, by much labour among the earthworks, converted these pits into a portion of their own lines of attack—but under great difficulties; for the cannon of the garrison, as soon as the Russian infantry had got clear of the spot, poured out a tremendous fire upon the French working-parties; requiring to be met by the utmost coolness and steadiness, and by a fire in return from such of the French batteries as were in positions to command the spot. The French, however, were equal to the exploit they had undertaken; and by daylight had secured themselves in their new position.

Not without another brave struggle, however, did the defenders abandon a post which had much importance in relation to the general defences on this side of the town. On the afternoon of the 2d, a body of Russians, estimated at from 2000 to 3000 strong, was seen by the English to assemble in an open place behind the Flagstaff Battery, whence they made a bold and desperate sortie against the French near the Central Bastion, with a hope of regaining the works lost during the night. The place was defended at the moment by two battalions and three companies only, who were completely overwhelmed by the musketry and sudden approach of the Russians, many of whom leaped the parapets and engaged in a hand-to-hand contest. Other French battalions quickly arrived; and then was presented a renewal of the scene of the preceding night—infantry engaged in fierce conflict in and near the work, while the great guns of the batteries on either side joined in the mêlée. After a display of great soldierly qualities on both sides, the Russians finally retreated into the town, leaving the French in a stronger position than they had occupied in the month of April. The contests, lost among so many others during the siege, were little less than battles in their character; for Canrobert acknowledged a loss of nearly 800 in killed and wounded, including twenty-two officers; while it was supposed that the Russian loss, including prisoners, must have nearly reached 2000. The space both within and without the contested work was strewn with the dead and wounded, mingled up with a disordered assemblage of garments, arms, accoutrements, cannon-balls, and disrupted batteries and gabions; but the human portion of the wreck, living and dead, was so great, that Canrobert and Osten-Sacken found it necessary to agree to a few hours' truce, to bury their dead and remove the wounded. Canrobert issued a glowing 'order of the day,' thanking his army for what they had achieved; and, judging from the result as well as from the details of the struggle, the capture of the place was sufficiently important to justify congratulation; for the Russians eagerly endeavoured afterwards to effect a recapture, but without success. Gortchakoff, in his dispatch, acknowledged the loss of the outworks, but dwelt on the effect of his cannon in preventing a further advance of the enemy, and on the annoyance inflicted by his 'smoke-balls' on the enemy in the pits and trenches; he estimated the strength of the French attacking-party on the night of the 1st at 10,000 men; but according to Canrobert's dispatch the number must have been much smaller.

If the Russians suffered a loss on the first two days of the month, they manifested no diminution in activity; for they made so many sorties, and opened so many cannonadings, during the following weeks, that the besiegers became virtually the besieged. The second bombardment by the English and French was completely ended: the batteries rendered occasional service only during the isolated contests; and thus the Russians had time and opportunity to plan their partial attacks and sallies. On the night of the 5th, they boldly assaulted the advanced parallel of the British right attack, some of them leaping into the very trenches; but a few detachments of the 30th and 49th regiments speedily expelled them. On the night of the 9th, again, the Russians kept the besiegers on the alert for many hours. They made two serious assaults on the British trenches nearly in the same spot as on the 5th: these were, however, met and repulsed without much difficulty; but on the following night the enemy opened a powerful fire on the trenches, without approaching very near; and then ensued the musket-firing of hostile columns, the cheers of the British, the yell (the 'Inkermann screech') of the Russians, the flashing light from small-arms along a line a mile in length, the retreat of the Russians, the opening of the Russian batteries to cover that retreat, and the counter-fire of the British and French batteries. Thus for two or three hours in the dead of night did glaring flashes and deafening sounds tell of the horrors of war. Nothing daunted by their repeated failures, the Russians made another sortie on the next night, the 11th, in the midst of darkness, storm, and wind—a favourite combination with them on such occasions. They selected the British left on this occasion, instead of the right, upon which they moved forward in two columns along

the Woronzow Road; the advanced sentries retired to give the alarm; and the trench-guard, under Captain Edwards of the 68th, presenting a determined front, speedily repelled the attack, with the loss, however, of the gallant Edwards. Like many others during the same month, it was a short but sharp struggle; for the Russians leaped the parapets, and engaged at close quarters with those defending them. Nothing is more certain than that, throughout these sudden assaults, the Russians were more numerous than the British at the points attacked, and that had there been any failure in the steadiness and self-reliance of the latter, the trenches might speedily have changed possessors: the French, in like manner, did not stop to measure numbers on such occasions; but it was the fate of the British, owing to the smallness of their force, to be always in the minority; and the men thus became accustomed to confront five or ten times their own number, with an unhesitating confidence in the power to render a good account of their work. In Gortchakoff's dispatch or diary dated May 11th, there appeared a few words noticing an attack of the Russians on the British works in front of the Mamelon, ending thus: 'The enemy withdrew in great haste, abandoning their guns, many of which we spiked.' No such achievement finds record in any English account.

It was the lot of the French chiefly to bear the brunt of these nightly assaults during the second half of the month of May. At one time the Flagstaff Battery, at another the Central Bastion, at another the Quarantine Battery, or a new work called the Schwartz Redoubt, would be the point at which the Russians would sally forth and attempt, if not to capture, at least to injure the works of the besiegers; or, instead of making a sortie, they would concentrate a fire of grape-shot on the French working-parties in the trenches. If the night were darker or more tempestuous than usual, the besiegers displayed additional vigilance, knowing from experience that it was likely to be demanded; and not unfrequently it happened that at three distant points—the Quarantine, the Flagstaff, and the Redan Batteries, these harassing skirmishes were occurring at the same instant.

Standing out in marked prominence among the events of the month, were the fierce and sanguinary contests between the French and Russians on the nights of the 22d and 23d—struggles which, under any other circumstances, would have been denominated battles. The Russians, smarting under the defeat of the 1st and 2d of May, and well appreciating the importance of the position then gained by the besiegers, had since been watching for any opportunity of recapture: they thought such an opportunity offered about three weeks afterwards, and took their measures accordingly. The plan apparently comprised the construction of new lines of counter-approach near the Quarantine Battery, and the connecting of these lines with the Central Bastion by a gabionade or parapet of gabions in such a way as to enclose a large *place d'armes* exterior to the former defences of the town, commanding the flank of the French works. Silently did they begin this vast work on the night between the 21st and 22d, bringing large bodies of men to labour at various spots. When daylight revealed this design, the French commander saw at once that such a work must not be permitted to advance; and he arranged with General de Salles a plan whereby this new position might not only be conquered, but turned against the Russians themselves. General Paté was intrusted with the adventure; which comprised one attack, headed by General Beuret, on the new ambuscades near the Quarantine; and another, headed by General de la Motterouge, on similar ambuscades at the Cemetery, somewhat nearer the Central Bastion. By making these two attacks simultaneously, it was hoped that the ambuscades or advanced-works might be taken, as well as the gabionades connecting them. At nine o'clock in the evening of the 22d, two strong bodies of French set forth on the service; and as the Russians—whether to finish their works, or expecting an attack—were also in large force, it soon became evident that a determined struggle was at hand; indeed, the French estimated the Russians at twenty-six battalions. The battle was terrible. During the whole night did the contending forces dispute inch by inch of the ground; the ambuscades and gabionades, now mastered by the French, now regained by the Russians, became a scene of smoke and blood: sheets of fire were vomited forth by the ranks of infantry, each flash giving aim to the volley next succeeding. No less than five times did the ambuscades near the Quarantine change owners during this fierce night, the bayonet being here the chief weapon employed. When morning dawned, the left attack was found to have been successful; the Russians had retreated; and the French engineers, installing themselves within the gabionade, soon added that to the number of important positions occupied by them. On the right, however, the success was less decisive; the contest had been so deadly, that the French engineers could not advance to strengthen that which the fighting-parties had gained; and the finish of the work had yet to be looked forward to. During this night, the musket, rifle, and bayonet were the weapons by which the conquests and reconquests of the ambuscades and rifle-pits were effected; but the distant spectators, the English officers and journalists—for the journalists were always fully awake at such moments—assembled on Cathcart's Hill, were most impressed with the artillery. The French, knowing that large reserves of Russians were collected to aid in the defence of their new works, began with a tremendous cannonading from many of their batteries, to scatter these bodies and to distract the attention of the Russian generals. The enemy, never backward on such occasions, speedily got

all the southern and western batteries into play, and took part in the horrid concert, which was strengthened at intervals by the explosion of two or three small magazines. Even the bombardment of the previous month had scarcely produced a more deafening roar. Prince Gortchakoff, describing this night's work, said: 'When our men were about to resume the continuation of these works (trenches of counter-approach from the Central Bastion to the Cemetery), the enemy attacked this point vigorously with seventeen battalions, besides reserves. A most determined combat was kept up during the whole night; charges with the bayonet were repeatedly made; our troops, twelve battalions strong, fought heroically, and the affair terminated by the enemy being driven back with very considerable loss. Unhappily, the loss on our side was also very great; we had 2500 men put *hors de combat*. The success with which this attack was repulsed has heightened the spirits of the garrison, and shewn the enemy how dangerous it would be to try to assault the fortifications of Sebastopol.' This dispatch was singularly silent concerning the French success on the western of the two attacks; and so far from the forces being much in favour of the French, Lord Raglan, in a brief dispatch relating to the day's proceedings, stated that 'the French were assailed by vastly superior numbers.' This much is certain, that the right attack of the French was a failure—they having been overpowered by the tremendous fire, of ordnance as well as of small-arms, brought by the enemy to bear on that point.

Daylight on the 23d arrived, and with it a determination on the part of the French to complete the work only partially performed on the preceding night. General Le Vaillant, as evening approached, was directed to organise two bodies; one under General Couston, to secure the position already gained; and the other, under General Daval, to conquer the other position. At the same hour as before, nine o'clock, they set forth, attacked the enemy with great fierceness, bore a terrible fire of grape-shot unmoved, and succeeded in setting their engineers to work in securing the new conquest: making the gabionade protect the French instead of the Russians, and directing the fire of the rifle-pits or ambuscades against the Russians instead of the French. This was not all; for the routed enemy, bewildered by the fierceness of the attack, fled in great disorder, and some of them failed to regain the spot from which they had sallied; throwing away their arms, they fled towards another bastion, with the French closely pursuing and firing at them. By the time these fugitives, or such of their number as had surmounted the danger, had regained the town, the French had penetrated further into the Russian lines than the Allies had ever before ventured, and a withdrawal was deemed desirable. Before doing so, however, they discovered a new battery behind a breast-work previously unknown to them; they speedily set to work, spiked the guns, overturned them, knocked off the trunnions, chipped the spokes of the carriage-wheels, pulled down the breast-work, emptied the gabions, severed and emptied the sand-bags, and then returned safely to their trenches, carrying off some small cohorn mortars with them. The achievement was very brilliant, and completely successful.

Lieutenant-colonel Hamley, who estimates the Russian loss on these two terrible nights at not less than 6000 in killed and wounded, was permitted by the French authorities to visit the scene of conflict during the hours of daylight intervening between the two struggles; and his description shews to what a state the once peaceful Cemetery must have been reduced. This enclosure, in a green hollow at the head of Quarantine Bay, was filled with small stone-crosses and grave-stones, behind which the musketeers and riflemen had crouched on the preceding night; there had been desperate hand-to-hand contests, too, among the graves. The north-eastern wall was not more than 100 yards distant from the town; and between the two were the Russian ambuscades or rifle-pits, strongly formed of earth and gabions, and capable of accommodating about a dozen riflemen each. The Russians had been driven from the Cemetery, and from some of the pits; but they remained in others, ready for a renewed struggle on the following night.

The French dispatch recording these struggles of the 22d and 23d of May, and the burial-truce that took place on the 24th, was signed by the name of 'Pelissier,' marking an important change which occurred about that period in the command of the French army. Whether the emperor was dissatisfied with the management of the siege by Canrobert, and caused his opinion to be quietly made known to that general; or whether Canrobert felt that he did not possess the experience necessary for the command of a great army; or whether the state of his health were such as to render it necessary for him to be relieved from a portion of the responsibility weighing on him—were questions much discussed at the camp and in France; but there could be but one opinion of the excellent spirit that marked Canrobert's conduct on the occasion. On the 16th of May he wrote thus to the government: 'My shattered health no longer allowing me to continue in the chief command, my duty towards my Sovereign and my country compels me to ask you to transfer the command to General Pelissier, a skilful and experienced leader. The army which I leave him is intact, hardened to war, full of ardour and confidence. I beseech the Emperor to leave me a soldier's place as commander of a simple division.' The Minister of War replied on the same day: 'The Emperor accepts your resignation. He regrets that your health has suffered; he congratulates you upon the sentiment which makes you ask to remain with the army, where you

shall have the command, not of a division, but of the corps of General Pelissier. Transfer the chief command to that General.' The curt style of these communications arose from their being merely brief telegraphic messages. On the 19th, Canrobert made over the command to his successor, and in the course of an address to his army he said: 'General Pelissier, Commander of the First Corps, assumes from this day's date the chief command of the army in the East. The Emperor, by placing at your head a General accustomed to great commands, grown old in war and in the camp, has wished to give you an additional proof of his solicitude, and to prepare still more the successes which, believe me, shortly await your energetic perseverance. In leaving the exalted position where circumstances and the will of the Sovereign had placed me, and where you maintained me in the midst of severe trials by your warlike virtues and that confiding devotion with which you never ceased to honour me, I do not separate myself from you; the happiness of taking a closer share in your glorious fatigues and your noble labours has been granted to me, and it is

The Cemetery opposite the Central Bastion.

together, under the skilful and firm guidance of the new Commander-in-chief, that we will continue to fight for France and for the Emperor.'

The feeling of a gallant and true soldier marked the mode in which Canrobert made this transfer of power from himself to another; for he went back immediately to the command of the same corps d'armée, the 1st, which he had headed under Marshal St Arnaud in the earlier months of the war, and which Pelissier had since held. The whole weight of the siege on the French side, from the day of the flank-march to nearly the end of May, had devolved upon him; during which time he had had to support his troops under much suffering and disappointment, although not defeat. It was a graceful act to appoint one of his own generals to succeed him; shewing that, if he felt the weight of his duty too heavy, he had no narrow jealousies where the interests of the French army were concerned. Canrobert raised rather than lowered himself in public estimation by an act which would sorely have tried the vanity of many men placed in positions of authority.

The general thus placed in command of the French forces before Sebastopol, Aimable Jean Jacques Pelissier, had seen more active service than Canrobert, and had in his composition something more of the rough and stern soldier. He sprang from an Irish family long settled in France, and was born, the son of a soldier, near Rouen in 1796. Accustomed to a military life from childhood, he rose through all the gradations of rank up to that of chef d'état major, which appointment was conferred upon him in 1842. From that year his services were always in active request, and his promotion rapid. He served under Bugeaud in Algeria as lieutenant-general; engaged in repeated contests with Abd-el-Kader and his wandering tribes; rose to the rank of colonel in 1843; defeated the Kabyles in the interior; and took part with Bugeaud and Cavaignac in an encounter which ended in the defeat of a Moorish army under

Muley-Abderrahman, the emperor of Morocco. Pelissier was concerned in 1846 in a deed which excited great horror in Europe, the suffocating of 1100 unhappy Arabs in a cave during a contest with the French; Soult, Montalembert, and Ney, in the Chamber of Peers, all condemned his conduct; but Bugeaud defended him, characterising the proceeding as one of the unintended tragedies of war; and Pelissier was promoted. He was made general by Louis Napoleon in 1851, and left Algeria on the last day of that year. After St Arnaud's death, Pelissier accepted a divisional command in the army of the Crimea, after having spent forty-one years in service during a life of fifty-nine. Canrobert had been respected by Lord Raglan for his conciliating and generous disposition: it remained for the sterner soldier to try his fortune in a similar position of divided command with an ally.

THIRD BOMBARDMENT: CAPTURE OF THE MAMELON, ETC.

If Pelissier assumed the office of French general-in-chief under circumstances of heavy responsibility, there were, on the other hand, many advantages placed within his reach; for the French army received important augmentations about this period. A large reserve of French troops, at Maslak near Constantinople, had been reviewed by the sultan on the 12th of May, and had embarked for the Crimea a few days afterwards: 30,000 picked troops, under Generals Aurell, Herbillon, and Regnault de St Jean d'Angely, including 1000 cuirassiers and 7000 of the Imperial Guard. This splendid reinforcement, an army in itself, raised the number of French troops in the Crimea to nearly 120,000. At this same time, too, the British, repairing the ravages of the winter, had restored their army to its old number of 30,000; the Turks had 50,000 at Eupatoria and other places in the Crimea; while the Sardinian contingent of 15,000 had just arrived. Thus the Allies had more than 200,000 troops in the Crimea at the end of May; and as these could not all be advantageously employed in the siege, the generals held many councils of war for the planning of expeditions to other quarters, the Baidar Valley, Kertch, &c. What were the results of these expeditions, the next Chapter will shew. So far as concerned Pelissier, much was expected from him; he had not the courtesies and frank qualities of Canrobert; nor was he, on the other hand, credited with the qualities of a great military commander; but he bore a reputation for daring, fertility of invention, and indomitable courage: it was he who had planned the attacks of May 1st and 2d, when Canrobert was in command; it was he who planned those of May 22d and 23d, when in command himself; and it was from him that the French expected a repetition of bold tactics and manœuvres. Under the new arrangement, Canrobert and Pelissier changed places, while Bosquet retained his old command of the army of observation overlooking the Tchernaya.

The Russians, at that period, maintained their position with an immovable firmness it is impossible not to admire. A steam-boat, the *Elborus*, plied between the southern and northern shores of the harbour, carrying over each day, or perhaps many times each day, the dead and the wounded to the cemeteries and hospitals protected by the northern forts; and other steamers were incessantly crossing, bringing countless stores of guns, mortars, shot, shell, powder, and other munitions of war, to the south side from the north, whither they had been brought in immense convoys from Perekop, Simferopol, Kertch, and other parts of the Crimea. A letter appeared in the Austrian *Militar Zeitung*, written from Sebastopol about this period, which bears upon it a stamp of authenticity. The writer said: 'The southern side of our town has suffered most severely, and is scarcely to be recognised. Five hundred houses have been totally destroyed, and grass is growing on their ruins. The beautiful theatre no longer exists. Though the other districts of the town are not so much damaged, yet there is not a single house to be seen which does not bear manifest traces of the bombardment. The streets are everywhere ploughed up by shot, and the pavement is totally destroyed; while at every corner stand whole pyramids of the enemy's cannon-balls and exploded shells, which were regularly collected before the opening of each day's fire. In many streets five or six such pyramids are to be seen, each of them from eight to ten feet high. The streets are filled with people, and crowds of children run to and fro, assisting at the construction of barricades. The greatest activity prevails in the harbour of Ekaterin (Artillery Bay), where cannon-balls, powder, fascines, sacks, and provisions are landed in astounding quantities, as they are forwarded from the northern forts.'

Such was the state of affairs in and near Sebastopol when the month of June opened: the besiegers and the besieged each marvelling at the enormous preparations made by the other, and each looking forward with a mingled feeling of hope and fear to the result. A few events of minor importance occurred on the first five days of the month; but it was on the 6th that a real step in advance was made by the besiegers. Before that day, preparations only were being made—on one occasion a mine would be exploded in the Russian works; on another, a row of cases filled with explosive compounds would be discovered, just beneath the ground where the besiegers would be likely to tread—but all knew, or suspected, that something of greater magnitude was at hand.

None of the various attacks on the defence-works of the Russians, during the siege, were better conceived or more fully carried out than

those of the 6th, 7th, and 8th of June: there was a completeness about them, shewing that they had been well considered by Pelissier, Raglan, and Omar Pacha, in the council of war which preceded them. The stages of the proposed plan were these —that the renewed bombardment, the third, should be commenced on the afternoon of the 6th; that it should be maintained by all the siege-batteries until the whole margin of Sebastopol, from Careening Bay in the north-east to Quarantine Bay in the south-west, was enveloped in sheets of fire from the guns; that when the firing should have become so hot as to attract all the attention of the Russians, three attacking-parties should set forth at a given signal, and capture three distinct defence-works of the enemy; that the northernmost of these three assaults, on the right, managed by the French, should be directed against the 'Ouvrages Blancs,' White Works, or Sapoune redoubts; that the second or middle assault, also conducted by the French, and separated from the former by the hollow of the Careening Ravine, should be against the Mamelon; while the southern or left, undertaken by the English, should have for its object the Quarries in front of the Redan, separated from the Mamelon by the Karabelnaïa Ravine. These three positions, if conquered, would greatly aid the progress of the besiegers; for the White Works would enable them to command Careening Bay and the north-east part of the Karabelnaïa suburb; the Mamelon would enable them to confront the Malakoff; while the Quarries would furnish them with a base of operations available against the Redan. The two ravines separating these three assaulting bodies would, it was foreseen, inconveniently isolate the attacks; but, on the other hand, they would afford cover for reserved troops, ready to aid the attacking columns at any moment of exigency.

On a formidable scale, truly, did the third bombardment commence. More than 450 large guns and mortars opened their murderous mouths at once, nearly 300 belonging to the French, and the rest British. Spectators may employ the words roar, thunder, deafening, to convey a notion of the horrid din maintained by such instruments of mischief; but all verbal description must fail here. Nor is it more easy to realise the condition of a beleaguered city at such a time, when missiles are rushing by thousands into every part of the town as well as the fortifications, and when no one can tell whether the roof which covers him or the barrier behind which he is working, may be shattered in an instant. The firing began by daylight, that the aim might the more correctly be taken; but the sight increased in awful grandeur as night supervened. The Russians appear to have been taken by surprise; for, as though appalled by the fierceness of the fire, they did not reply with any vigour until after the lapse of a considerable time. When, however, their guns and gunners were in readiness, the booming of shot and bursting of shells on both sides became terrific. The naval brigade in front of the Redan, commanding batteries of the largest guns, was especially conspicuous for the intensity of its fire. Hour after hour passed in this way: the officers collecting in groups on all the commanding spots, and watching the destructive conflict as long as any daylight remained. Night came on, and with it a slackening though not cessation of the cannonade. Daylight on the morning of the 7th exhibited the Redan spotted with many gaping wounds, the embrasures shapeless, and the parapet disordered and disrupted by fifteen hours of heavy firing. The Russians had become used to such visitations, however; knowing that a few hours' labour would restore those simple but formidable earthworks, they did not shrink from their positions. The cannonade was maintained around the whole extent of the attack-works, according to previous arrangement; but the firing on the south and west of Sebastopol was much less fierce and continuous than that on the east and south-east; nor was the Russian fire equal in intensity and vigour to that of the besiegers. As afternoon approached, the cannonade became more furious than ever, and so continued until the moment arrived when the commanders determined on making the threefold assault by infantry. Measures had in the meantime been taken to bring the troops into the requisite positions; various divisions of Bosquet's corps d'armée arrived from distant parts of the plateau; and twelve battalions of Turks advanced from their camp, about midway between Balaklava and 'the front.' The duty intrusted to the Turks consisted partly in aiding the French in the intended attacks, but principally in defending the posts on the heights opposite Inkermann, during the absence of the French and English from that quarter, or in forming a reserve in case the fortune of the day should place the French in need of reinforcement. Every one, according to his duties, prepared for a momentous crisis in the history of the siege.

Intense was the anxiety in the camps as the hour for the assault approached. Although the plan had been divulged only to a few, the secret gradually leaked out; and all the officers not especially engaged hastened to their favourite look-out, Cathcart's Hill, commanding a view of the Russian works attacked by the British, and some of those attacked by the French. Lord Raglan took up his position on the edge of the hill nearest the enemy; while General Pelissier stationed himself at the Victoria Redoubt, directly in a line with the Mamelon and Malakoff, and commanding a view of the White Works on Sapoune Hill. The two commanders agreed that a rocket, sent up by Pelissier at the proper moment, should be the signal for the advance of all the three attacking bodies. At about half-past six, up went the signal, cheers rent the air, and three bodies of chosen troops rushed forth from their trenches, to pass over the exposed ground between the

besiegers and the besieged, and then assault the works marked out for capture. In order to give clearness to the otherwise complex operations of this exciting day, it will be necessary to keep the three assaults quite distinct. Indeed they were rendered distinct by the conformation of the ground; for the Karabelnaïa Ravine intervened between the southern attack on the Quarries and the central attack on the Mamelon; while the Careening Ravine intervened between the latter and the northern attack on the White Works of Mount Sapoune.

Beginning, then, with the southern or left assault. Lord Raglan employed for this service detachments from the light and 2d divisions, supported at night by the 62d regiment. The command of this storming-party was intrusted to Colonel Shirley of the 88th, who was at that time acting as general officer of the trenches. He was assisted in the arrangements, and guided as to the points of attack and the distribution of the troops, by Lieutenant-colonel Tylden, directing engineer of the British right attack. The Quarries, intervening between the English trenches and the Redan, had been rendered by the Russians a lodgment very annoying to the besiegers: their capture was a necessary preliminary to that of the Redan itself. The distance being short from the trenches to the Quarries, the troops quickly ran over the ground, and engaged at once with the Russians defending the position. The Quarries were on the left slope of the hill crowned by the Redan, about midway between that fort and the most advanced British trench. Until April, the ground at that spot had been occupied merely by heaps of loose stones and rubbish; but after the second bombardment, seeing the importance of the position, the Russians had converted it into an advanced intrenchment, protecting the Redan at a distance of about 400 yards, and filled it with riflemen; it became, therefore, in character, something intermediate between a redoubt and a rifle-pit, although retaining the old name of the Quarries. When the troops had hastened over the intervening ground, two officers, one of the 7th and one of the 88th, were among the first to set foot within the parapets, closely followed by the detachments of the 7th, 31st, 34th, 38th, and other regiments. The Quarries were found empty; and thus the British were enabled to commence the plan originally agreed upon, which was, that some of the troops, musket in hand, should keep a watch upon the Mamelon, while the rest converted the Quarries from a Russian to a British outwork, by reversing the parapets.

But this first capture of the Quarries was a slight affair: to retain possession was the difficulty, as the whole night and the morning of the 8th clearly shewed. No less than six separate and distinct attempts at recapture were made by the enemy, repulsed in every instance with undaunted valour, but at the cost of much brave blood. The English artillerymen, keeping a good look-out, watched for the moment when the fire of some of the batteries might safely be resumed, so as to pour a torrent of shot over the heads of their comrades towards the enemy, as a means of checking these repeated attacks. The Quarries became little less than a sheet of flickering flame, so sharp and incessant was the fire of musketry from within and without. Every embrasure in the Redan was more or less damaged by the British fire; while the guns of that formidable work could not be depressed so low as to command the Quarries, situated down in the hollow in front. There were not more than 400 British sent out to assault the Quarries, and about 600 as a support to them during their night-struggles; and this small force of 1000 men had to maintain a series of attacks throughout the night—now repelling a body of Russians emerging from the Redan on the one flank, or on the other, and now engaged in a hand-to-hand contest in the middle of the Quarries themselves. At three o'clock in the morning, the British batteries so distracted the enemy by a murderous fire, that the officers and men in the Quarries believed, and freely asserted afterwards, that they might have entered and captured the Redan itself, had they been led on to it: one officer crept up so close as to ascertain that that fort was but slightly defended at the moment; and nothing more than a signal was wanted to induce the men to hazard their lives on this venture. Were this opinion correct, the amount of subsequent loss during the siege would have been incalculably diminished; but it is possible that Lord Raglan was not at the time fully aware of the exact state of the case; or, on the other hand, he might have been aware of sources of danger not fully to be appreciated by those engaged in the struggle: it is at any rate certain that, if the Redan were not strongly manned with artillerymen during this night, the fatigue-parties were numerous and busy, repairing the injuries borne by the earthworks. It is moreover certain, from the relative positions of the several works, that the Redan could scarcely have been held by the British so long as the Malakoff remained in the power of the Russians. It was formidable only on the outer side, towards the besiegers; on the flanks and rear it was weak, for it there faced other Russian works, which would have become fatally hostile from the moment when the Redan passed into other hands. The Malakoff completely commanded the northern flank of this work, both from its greater elevation, and in the greater circuit of its embrasures for guns.

Thus, then, the southern or left assault by the British against the Quarries fully succeeded; and attention may next be directed to the French operations on the elevation beyond the adjoining ravine. The attack and capture of the Mamelon, the great event of the day, was one of the fiercest struggles maintained during the siege, calling forth indomitable resolution and fearless bravery, rather

than tactical or strategical science. It was not a night-slaughter with an unseen enemy at an unexpected time and place: the troops knew what they had to effect, and effected it in a gallant spirit.

From the details given in Pelissier's dispatch, illustrated by particulars from other quarters, it appears that Bosquet, intrusted with the French operations, employed the 2d division under General Camou, and the 5th under General Brunet, in the attack on the Mamelon. The troops, consisting of Zouaves, Algerine Rifles, Imperial Guard, regiments of the line, and a few Turks of Osman Pacha's division, were divided into two parties, one for the attack and the other in reserve. When the rocket-signal was given, away rushed the troops to attack the formidable redoubt, from their camp and trenches in front of that position. Three columns, under General de Wimpffen, advanced to the base of the hill, ascended, and carried by storm two advanced trenches and some intermediate rifle-pits. Then did the Mamelon, Malakoff, and Redan open a tremendous fire of shot and shell upon the besiegers, threatening to blow them to atoms; but the nimble Zouaves continued the ascent, followed by the other troops of the three columns. The Algerine Rifles speedily captured a small battery of four guns; and when this was done, the 50th and the Zouaves rushed up to the foot of the Mamelon. Scaling-ladders they had none; but they scrambled up the earthen parapet, through the embrasures, into the redoubt itself, employing the bayonet where the musket was not available; and being now within the fortifications of the Mamelon, they cut down the Russian artillerymen as they stood at their guns. Colonel de Brancion, of the 50th, the first to plant the French eagle within the redoubt, fell in the hour of triumph, covered with wounds. The English officers, looking on from Cathcart's Hill, could but admire the Zouaves, as they were running, climbing, scrambling up the slope of the Mamelon; nor was the activity less displayed, when the redoubt had been gained, in so turning the gabions as to render them protective against the Russian fire from the Malakoff and Redan. There were other encounters, however, which the English spectators could not see; the Russians had assembled a strong body of troops behind the Mamelon, which the French only recognised when they had entered the redoubt; and these reserves advancing up the opposite brow of the hill, materially enhanced the difficulties encountered by the besiegers. The swaying masses, now within the redoubt, now on the outer slope, now on the town slope, contended inch by inch in a bloody struggle; but the redoubt and the victory remained with the besiegers.

The Zouaves nearly rushed upon their own destruction after gaining the Mamelon. Seeing a saddle-shaped hollow between them and the Malakoff, and burning with an intense desire to make this a day indeed to be remembered, they ran down the nether slope, gun in hand, and then up the further slope, nearly to the Malakoff itself. This temerity cost them dearly; they had received strict orders not to go beyond the protecting parapets of the Mamelon; and when they had rushed to a distance of 400 or 500 yards, their officers, having a misgiving as to the result, sent urgent orders for their withdrawal. The daring fellows then smarted for their boldness; for, returning to the Mamelon in full view of the Malakoff, they had the fiery mouths of a multitude of cannon directed towards them: as a consequence, the saddle-hollow became strewn with the dead and wounded struck down by this fierce fire. The Russians, trembling for their Malakoff, sent forth a powerful body of troops to endeavour to recapture the Mamelon; and the cannonading and musketry became so murderous that, aided by an explosion among the works of the redoubt, they compelled the French to retire for a while below the brow of the hill. Now was the time for Brunet's reserve to advance and support the brave troops thus placed in peril; forming in three columns, they rushed up the hill, joined Wimpffen's brigade, made an ardent and sudden onslaught on the enemy, and drove them completely and finally from the Mamelon, which from that moment remained in the possession of the French—after a struggle which, notwithstanding its severity, had endured only one hour. Then did the sappers and engineers set to work during the night, to repair the damage received by the Mamelon redoubt during the attack, and to turn the batteries and guns in such a direction that, instead of commanding the outer plateau, they might direct their fire against the yet more formidable Malakoff—the works being afterwards designated by them the Brancion Redoubt, in honour of the officer who had fallen while planting the eagle-standard on the conquered mound. The English gunners were witnesses from a distance to the fearless dash of the Zouaves against that fort, and strove, by maintaining an incessant fire of large ordnance, to draw off the attention of the Russian gunners from this little band of orientalised Frenchmen. The large force of French at the Mamelon had not to bear the same kind of severities as the small force of British at the Quarries; they were not disturbed throughout the night by repeated counter-assaults from the enemy.

Another and last achievement of the day has now to be told. The right or northern assault on the Russian works was directed towards the redoubts constructed on Mount Sapoune: redoubts which did not exist until the close of February, and which would not have been constructed but for the untiring activity of the defenders of the city, ever alive to the importance of fortifying all the available heights on the border-land between the besiegers and the besieged. At half-past four on the afternoon of the 7th, Generals Mayran and Dulac were ordered to take up a

position on the rising-ground north of Careening Ravine, and in front of the Sapoune or White Works, the Volhynian and Selinghinsk Redoubts. They had at their service the 3d and 4th divisions of the 2d army-corps, Bosquet's; one brigade of Mayran's division was to attack one redoubt, the other brigade the other redoubt; while Dulac's division, the 4th, was held in reserve to advance at the proper moment in support of the attacking brigades. An additional force was posted in the ravine; to cut off the retreat of the enemy after the capture of the redoubt. At half-past six, when Pelissier threw up the rocket as a signal to Raglan on the one side and Bosquet on the other, the two attacking brigades of Mayran's division, one under General de Lavarande and the other under General de Failly, rushed forth from the French trenches to assault the two redoubts. They hastened over the exposed portion of intermediate ground, 200 yards to the Volhynian Redoubt, and 400 to the Selinghinsk; and herein they suffered severely; for both the redoubts, and guns in other positions, opened a destructive fire of grape-shot, sweeping them down in considerable numbers: this, however, had been foreseen as inevitable, and was not permitted for an instant to check the advance of the troops. Arrived at the earthworks of the redoubts, the French leaped in at the breaches and embrasures, and immediately came in close encounter with the defenders, musket to musket, bayonet to bayonet, sword to sword. The contest was brief; the attack was sudden and bold; and the Russians, unable to maintain a position cut off by the ravine from all their other defences, were obliged to yield the two redoubts, and flee towards the mouth of the Careening Harbour, whither the pursuers could not in safety follow them. The Russians attempted to throw a reinforcement into the redoubts from the town; but a bayonet-charge by Mayran's troops frustrated this endeavour, and the redoubts remained permanently in the hands of the French, giving them an important command over the mouth of the Careening Harbour, and a power of establishing a flank-fire against the Mamelon and Malakoff. Meanwhile, a clever manœuvre was effected by the reserve force: descending the ravine nearly to the bay, and then climbing up the right slope, they intercepted the flight of the Russians from the redoubts towards the town, and thus took 400 prisoners, including twelve officers. The command thus obtained by the French over the east or right shore of Careening Harbour was attended by another important circumstance: the Russians, during the winter, had maintained a communication between Sebastopol and Inkermann by a road winding round the northern base of Mount Sapoune, close to the Great Harbour, and invisible to the Allied camp; but this road remained no longer tenable when the heights fell into the hands of the French.

When day fully broke forth on the 8th, with the Quarries, Mamelon, and White Works safely in the hands of the Allies, men had time to breathe, and to look round on the busy havoc among them. It was found that the small British force had suffered severely, relatively to its numbers. The 88th regiment had four officers killed and four wounded; while the casualties in the other detachments brought up the numbers to more than thirty officers and 350 rank and file. The French loss was nearly thrice as large, owing to the magnitude of the enterprise undertaken by them. While the French and Russians were bringing in their dead, from the space around and beyond the Mamelon, the Russian ships in the harbour, commanding a range up Careening Bay to one side of the now lost Mamelon, poured out their broadsides upon the French captors, who also received the fire of a battery, the existence of which was before wholly unknown to the besiegers, and also the fire of the Malakoff. Ammunition-carts were passing to and fro; ambulance-vans were conveying away the wounded; reserves of French were dotting the ravines, ready to advance if their services were required; burying-parties of Russians were employed at the head of the harbour; sappers and engineers were strengthening the works taken by the Allies on the previous evening; the bombardment was maintained in other quarters—all these strange scenes were observable at once. Narrators told of an English major being blown literally into the air by a shell, and falling a mere blackened mass; of another officer having his hair singed off by an English shell in his own trenches, ignited by another shell fired by the enemy; of a sailor who would pop his head above the naval battery, in spite of repeated cautions, 'to see where his shot went;' and of a Russian officer having been captured by Corporal Quin. This last achievement, specially mentioned by Lord Raglan in his dispatch, was a bold one: during the night, when the Russians made the attempts to recapture the Quarries, a Russian officer very bravely advanced at the head of four men; Quin rushed forward, levelled one of the men with the but-end of his musket, bayoneted a second, made the remaining two scamper off, and then captured the officer—doing the whole of this extraordinary work unassisted.

On the morning of the 9th a flag of truce was hoisted from the Malakoff, proposing a cessation of firing while the dead and wounded were being collected from the bloody field. This was assented to; and yet the Russians, with their too frequent departure from the rules of honourable warfare, employed the time not merely in the ostensible purpose of the truce, but also in strengthening the earthworks of their batteries, and in replacing dismounted guns: thereby rendering the truce an advantage to them and an injury to the besiegers. This rendered the Allied commanders very indignant; and yet a burial-truce was absolutely necessary, for at least 5000 men had been killed or wounded during the three days.

MALAKOFF AND REDAN IN JUNE—THE REPULSE.

After these exciting and sanguinary contests on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of June, a temporary lull took place in the proceedings; not arising from any despondency on the part of the besiegers, but necessary to the preparations for a yet more formidable series of assaults on the dreaded Malakoff and Redan—those fortifications of which the Mamelon and Quarries were mere outposts.

On the 9th, after the truce so unfairly observed by the enemy, firing recommenced, flashes of guns and muskets being observed along various parts of the line; and the same thing occurred on the 10th. Nevertheless, the English troops could not conceal from themselves that the third bombardment was nearly over, without a conquest of the Malakoff, the Redan, or any of the forts on the south-west side of the town. Disappointment hence ensued; for the men, succeeding in the actual work cut out for them at the Quarries, were burning to effect yet more, by storming the works that would have given them entrance into the town. The wish was overruled, on grounds, doubtless, sufficient to the minds of the commanders, but not appreciable by the men. All the incidents conspired to shew that the Russians had been taken by surprise; and it is within the bounds of probability, that although the commanders may have been justified in the limitation of their attack, a reserve support might have enabled the daring troops to maintain the positions some of them reached in the Redan and Malakoff. Be this as it may, eight or nine days were employed in incessant preparations—by the French in rendering the White Works formidable against the ships and strand-batteries near Careening Bay, and the Mamelon formidable as a new base of operations against the Malakoff; by the English in rendering the Quarries the first step of a scaling-ladder to lead up to the Redan; and by the Russians in endeavouring to strengthen the various works within those captured by the besiegers. The English, starting from the Quarries, cut zigzags to a new trench sixty yards in advance, established a battery for guns and mortars, and obtained the power of sending shells right into the Redan. As to the Russians, they lost between 3000 and 4000 men during the contests in the first half of the month; but there was a constant stream of reinforcements flowing into the Crimea *vid* Perekop, and thence to Sebastopol across the harbour from the northern shore. All parties, besieged as well as besiegers, foresaw that a renewal of active operations would soon occur; and the 18th of June was the day selected by the Allied commanders for a great assault.

The plan was well conceived, whatever success or failure may have attended it. Pelissier had made the Mamelon and the White Works the base for a new attack, by arming them with powerful artillery, while Raglan had made the most of his conquest at the Quarries; and it was considered that, if a new bombardment were opened along the whole line, the enemy might be so distracted as to render an assault practicable. On the 17th of June, therefore, the batteries recommenced their fearful roar, crashing and scattering the earthworks and buildings of the town with their ponderous cannon-balls and shells, nearly 12,000 in number. When this had continued all day, it was decided that the firing should be renewed for two or three hours early on the 18th, and the assault then made. This assault was to consist of no less than seven distinct manœuvres or movements, three by the French and four by the British. The French, it was agreed, should assemble three masses of troops in convenient positions; and at a given signal, these were to rush forward from their places of concealment, provided with scaling-ladders and all other appliances for an assault, and endeavour to capture the Malakoff and all the defence-works extending thence northward towards the harbour—the three masses attacking three distinct points simultaneously. It was further agreed that the English should have four assaulting columns, to attack the Redan and all the works extending thence westward to the Inner Harbour. The Malakoff being the key to the whole of these works bounding the Karabelnaïa suburb, the English were to be guided in their movements by the success of the French.

The extreme right assault by the French was unfortunate at the outset, and was the principal cause of the whole day's disasters. It failed by being commenced too soon, and by the depression among the troops caused by the death of their leader. General Mayran's assigned duty was to attack the works between the Malakoff and Careening Bay—works not remarkable in themselves for strength, but important as flanking the Malakoff on the north-east. The unfortunate general, at a given signal, was to set out in that direction; one of his brigades, under Colonel Saurin, placed in front, and to the right of the Mamelon, was to advance from the Careening Ravine as far as the aqueduct, and carry the extreme northern intrenchments of the Russian line; while the other, under General de Failly, in the rear and to the right of the Mamelon, was to endeavour to carry the Little Redan. Placing himself on an elevated spot, Pelissier could regulate the movements of all the French attacking columns; and he says in his dispatch: 'Notwithstanding the obstacles accumulated by the enemy, and although the Russians, evidently informed of our plans, were on their guard, and ready to repel any attack, I am inclined to think that if the attack could have been made general and instantaneous on the whole extent of the line—if there had been a simultaneous action and *ensemble* in the efforts of our brave troops—the object would have been

achieved. Unhappily, it was not so, and an inconceivable fatality caused us to fail.' The first 'fatality' was an error made by Mayran; he mistook the fuse of a shell sent up from the Mamelon for the signal to be given by Pelissier, and ordered his brigades to advance, at a moment when the other attacks were not yet prepared. Saurin and De Failly rushed forward at the head of their respective columns; but no sooner did the men become visible, in the early dawn of a bright June morning, than a most destructive fire of shot, shell, and grape poured out upon them, not only from the intrenchments intended to have been attacked, but also from the north-eastern face of the Malakoff, not at that time attacked by any other force, and from the steamers in the harbour, which at that point were enabled to fire up Careening Bay upon the French position. One of the missiles struck down Mayran; and the troops, bewildered by the tremendous fire and the loss of their leader, shrank from the advance. De Failly, then, on Pelissier throwing up the signal that ought to have guided Mayran's movements, advanced with his brigade to support the attack; and General D'Angely, when Mayran's mistake became known, was sent with four battalions of voltigeurs in aid —but all in vain; the crushing fire of the enemy completely overwhelmed the besiegers before they could commence the operations necessary for an assault. The men fell in heaps in front of the Russian works, struck down by grape-shot and musketry. It was not a fair hand-to-hand struggle with the bayonet, for the French could not reach the parapets where a personal encounter with the enemy would have occurred.

Mayran's failure was fatal to the success of General Brunet's attack; for the enemy, so suddenly and unexpectedly freed from the one general, were able to turn numerous additional batteries on the other. Brunet, with one division of the 2d corps, prepared all in readiness to attack the north flank of the Malakoff, supposing that the other Russian intrenchments on his right were being effectually handled by his brother-general. Bitterly he learned his mistake; he found his columns beset with shell and grape on a side he did not expect, and with a severity his brave troops were utterly unable to contend against. The general himself fell mortally wounded by a ball in the chest, and the command devolved upon General Lafont de Villiers. Again and again the French returned to the assault, but each time the murderous volleys from the enemy checked them, paralysed their movements, thinned their ranks, carried off their officers, and dispirited those who still remained. There is a particular moment, in the career of these terrible storming-parties, when the personal qualities of good soldiers appear in great vigour, and work up the men to a high pitch of excitement—it is when they reach the parapet of the assailed work, and come within arm's length of their opponents; but in Brunet's assault, as in that of Mayran, the men were staggered and checked by the furious fire before this moment could arrive.

Whether the several divisions were really unprepared for the work intended for them, or whether Mayran's first blunder threw all the other generals into confusion, certain it is that ultimate failure marked the whole line of French operations. General D'Autemarre, with one division, had been commissioned to operate on the left flank of the Malakoff, while Brunet was engaged with the right; he placed one brigade, under General Niol, in advance, and to the left of the Mamelon, while another, under General Breton, was in the rear and to the left of the same work —the second brigade being intended to support the first. When the given signal was thrown up, he advanced his chasseurs and line regiments, and sent them along the slope of the Karabelnaïa Ravine towards the Malakoff, or rather towards an intrenchment which connected that fort with the Redan. The troops, supplied with scaling-ladders, were ready to surmount the outworks bounding the Malakoff on that side. But here the same combination of disadvantages affected them as their colleagues: the Russians, finding that the attacks had a piecemeal character, brought several batteries to bear on each division or brigade in turn; and D'Autemarre, to his astonishment and regret, observed that the Redan, instead of being wholly engaged in repelling the British, was in a condition to pour out one face of its murderous fire against himself; not only so, but a powerful reserve issued from the Karabelnaïa suburb, and fell upon the French, who, although reinforced by the supporting brigade under General Niol, were forced ultimately to retreat, although for a time they had held possession of some of the outworks of the Malakoff.

The English assaults on the Redan were, according to the plan laid down by the commanders, to be threefold; each conducted by portions of one particular division of the army; the remaining portions of those divisions, as well as the Guards and the Highlanders, being held in reserve. Sir George Brown was intrusted with the management of the three attacks; each of which was conducted by about 1800 men, comprising a storming-party, a working-party, a party of artillerymen to spike or turn any guns that might be captured, riflemen, men to carry ladders and sand-bags, and a supporting-party. The light division was sent to the right flank of the Redan, the 4th to the left flank, and the 2d to the apex or salient angle; while the 3d division was intrusted with a duty entirely to the west of the Redan. The three attacks on this fort were not to be simultaneous, operations on the two flanks being deemed necessary before a successful assault could be made on the centre or apex; indeed, it was hoped that the right and left columns might enter and unite in the rear of

the Redan, drive the garrison towards the Inner Harbour, and thus enable the central column to seize the salient angle. The Redan having somewhat the form of one tooth of a saw, this relation between the two sides and the apex may be easily understood. Colonel Yea led the storming-party of the light division, consisting of portions of the 7th, 23d, 33d, and 34th regiments; Colonel Windham that of the 4th division; while Lieutenant-colonel Eman would have led the storming-party of the 2d division, had the assault on the apex been made.

When Lord Raglan gave the signal for the assault, it was rather with a view to support a gallant ally in a moment of trouble, than with a serious expectation of taking the Redan; it had evidently been arranged that the capture of the Malakoff ought to precede the assault of the Redan, which was commanded by the first-named fort; and it is equally evident that the British general was driven by circumstances to a modification of the plan proposed; for he said in his dispatch, in relation to the repulse of the French, 'observing this, I was induced at once to order our columns

Attack by General Mayran's Division on Works near the Malakoff.

to move out of the trenches upon the Redan.' The signal given, the gallant fellows forming the right and left storming-parties leaped or scrambled out of the trenches, and rushed forward to the vast earthwork which had so many months confronted the besiegers. No sooner, however, did the troops shew themselves on level ground, than the gunners in the Redan commenced a fearful cannonade against them; the first ranks were swept off in such numbers that those behind them found it almost impossible to advance. 'I never,' said Lord Raglan, 'witnessed such a continued and heavy fire of grape combined with musketry from the enemy's works.' On the right attack, Colonel Yea, feeling that anything was better than standing still in the midst of such a hail of balls and bullets, led his storming-party gallantly forward; but a grape-shot levelled him with the dust; and the other officers of the light division—which had fought so nobly and suffered so severely at Alma—fell with fearful rapidity. Officers and men, indeed, were swept away to such an extent that the attack was not persisted in, and the division returned. No more successful was the 4th division, intrusted with the assault of the left flank of the Redan; Sir John Campbell fell in leading on the troops; the cannonading by the Russians was as tremendous, and the loss of the besiegers as serious, as on the right flank; and in the one case as in the other, the whole murderous conflict was begun and ended in about a quarter of an hour. The desired results not having been attained on the right and left flanks, the central assault was not made: perhaps wisely, or the 2d division might have suffered as severely and as fruitlessly as the light and the 4th.

Such, then, were the three intended assaults on the Redan by the British, two attempted with failure, and the other left unattempted; and all distinct from the three unsuccessful French assaults on the works further to the north-east. There yet remains another to be noticed—the assault made by Major-general Eyre, on the extreme left of the whole series. This assault

was very remarkable in its character, distinguished by incidents peculiar to itself, and leaving a deeper impression on the minds of the men engaged in it. Eyre's troops were actually masters of a portion of Sebastopol, which they held during many hours, while the other brigades were endeavouring in vain to make an effective impression on the formidable bastions. Southward of the Inner Harbour, in the low ground where the Woronzow ravine joined the great ravine, was a small Russian cemetery, so fully commanded by the batteries of both the hostile forces as to be tenable by neither; it was towards this spot that Eyre directed his attention, not for the value of the position itself, as for ulterior purposes; since it had been planned that, if the two flank-assaults on the Redan had succeeded, Eyre might possibly join his column to the other two in the rear of the Redan, and capture the Barrack Battery. The first brigade of Sir Richard England's division, under Major-general Barnard, being intrusted with the occupation of the right slope of the Woronzow Ravine, Eyre's brigade was free to manœuvre further to the left, to attack some rifle-pits in that quarter, and to make a demonstration at the head of the Inner Harbour. He moved down from the 3d division camp shortly after one o'clock in the morning of the 18th, with about 2000 men of the 9th, 18th, 28th, 38th, and 44th regiments. He speedily mastered the rifle-pits, and then prepared for a sort of battle in the dark with a Russian force outside Sebastopol, on this bit of low ground commanded by tremendous English, French, and Russian batteries on almost every side. The enemy, in unascertained strength, occupied a position with a knoll on their right and the small cemetery on the left; and Eyre divided his troops into four bodies—an advance-party, a right flanking-party, a left flanking-party, and a reserve—the ground between the two forces being barricaded with rude stone-walls, which the British, though under fire, were obliged to pull down before they could advance. Immediately behind the knoll and cemetery were a few houses belonging to a suburb of the town, evidently defended by Russian troops, whose numbers could not in the dark be even guessed at. Eyre having completed his plans, sent forth an advance-party of experienced marksmen; and the 18th Royal Irish, as the storming-party, then rushed forward to the houses of the suburb, exposed on the right to a fire of grape-shot from one side of the Redan and from the Barrack Battery. They captured several houses immediately under the Garden Battery, and in perilous proximity to the Flagstaff Battery; other parties followed up the advantage, seizing more houses, and setting their riflemen to pick off the gunners of such of the Russian batteries as caused most annoyance. The British became, in effect, masters of the whole position, and awaited with anxiety any indications of success in the attack on the Redan—well knowing, on the one hand, that their position in this suburb would be very valuable if the Redan were taken, but that, on the other, a failure in that attack would necessitate a retirement of Eyre's brigade. The brigade gallantly held every part of the position gained; darkness gave way to daylight, noon and evening came, without witnessing any departure of the British from the suburb they occupied, notwithstanding that the enemy were firing shells and heavy shot upon them during the entire day. The situation was, however, a terrible one; for the Redan, Barrack Battery, Garden Battery, and Flagstaff Battery, all commanded either the cemetery or this suburb with some of their guns. Eyre had more than one-fourth of his whole force struck down, either killed or wounded; he himself received a wound in the head, which forced him to give over the command to Lieutenant-colonel Adams; and thirty of his officers were either killed or wounded. Finding that his brethren in arms had failed at the Redan, and that his continued holding of the suburb was thereby rendered impracticable, Eyre withdrew his brigade as evening advanced.

The success at the suburb was so unexpected, and the access to the Inner Harbour so nearly effected, that important results might have attended the reinforcement of Eyre's brigade by the Guards and Highlanders, who were not engaged on this day. There might, indeed, have possibly been obtained a passage between the harbour and the rear of the Redan, and a position held very important in its consequences. These were hypothetical considerations suggested after the labours of the day were over; their correctness could only be tested by a knowledge of the whole plan agreed upon by Raglan and Pelissier. The facts, nevertheless, are certain, that four companies of the 18th regiment took, and occupied for seventeen hours, several furnished houses in one of the suburbs of Sebastopol; that the heavy guns of the Russians could not get at them in this position, although the men themselves could neither advance nor retreat so long as daylight continued; and that the enemy were driven from a small battery and a few rifle-pits. Although the regiments in the cemetery were exposed to much fire from the batteries, the Barrack Battery could not depress its guns sufficiently to touch the houses in the suburb, nor did the other batteries effectually command them; hence the storming-party had little else to do than to keep close within the houses they had seized, firing musketry at any Russians within sight. Some of the men, struck by the novelty of their position, roamed about the houses, and found a piano here, sofas there, pictures and books, and wine in the cellars. When darkness enabled them, about nine o'clock in the evening, to withdraw, they brought away numerous knick-knacks with them, as material proofs of their occupation of Sebastopol. So completely had this little knot of men been isolated all day, that it

was difficult to convey any message either to or from them. Captain Esmonde, commanding the storming-party, wrote to General Eyre in the middle of the day, asking for reinforcements and ammunition; a sergeant crept cautiously with this letter; and then, as there was no possibility of sending reinforcements by daylight without immense loss, Colonel Edwardes crept back with the sergeant, to ascertain the exact state of affairs; he ordered the storming-party to defend themselves in the houses as well as they could until nightfall, and then withdraw.

A circumstance impressed on the minds of all those who studied the tactics of the day with the light gained by subsequent experience, was the absence of any operations on the south-west side of Sebastopol. The French were encamped there in great force, but made no assault, and refrained even from bombarding at the critical time when the assaulting columns were engaged elsewhere. The Allies were little less than 200,000 in number, including English, French, Turks, and Sardinians; and yet the formidable Redan was assaulted by only 5000 to 6000 English; while the smaller forts on the south-west, with a large French besieging army before them, were exempted from assault of any kind. If the whole of the forts had been simultaneously assaulted after being fiercely bombarded for several hours, the garrison would in all probability have been bewildered by the number of points requiring their attention, and would have been unable to bear in force upon all the assaulting columns at once. Whatever were the reasons, the Flagstaff, Central, and Quarantine Batteries were left unmolested by the French throughout the day.

The naval brigade, under Captain Sir Stephen Lushington, bore a hard part in the services of this discouraging day. After the bombardment on the 17th, this officer offered to Lord Raglan the services of his sailors to carry the scaling-ladders and other materials for the assault. His offer being accepted, Sir Stephen told off four parties of sixty men each, to accompany the four assaulting columns; and Captain Peel, of the *Leander*, volunteered to head the men on this perilous duty. As an obvious accompaniment to the failure of the soldiers, the sailors failed also—not in planting the siege-ladders in the trenches, but in mastering any of the enemy's works. Captain Peel's small band, necessarily among the foremost men in the assaulting columns, met the full force of the enemy's fire; only two parties out of the four actually advanced to the trenches, under Captain Peel and Lieutenant Cave, both of whom were wounded, as well as a very large ratio of the non-commissioned officers and men. When the assaulting columns returned, the sailors of course returned with them. A little was effected, about the same period, by the fleet off the harbour; for Raglan and Pelissier had informed Admirals Lyons and Bruat that the bombardment and the assaults would probably be assisted by some demonstration from the sea, distracting the attention of the enemy in that quarter. Accordingly, on the night of the 16th, the steam-frigates and sloops *Tribune*, *Highflyer*, *Terrible*, *Miranda*, *Niger*, *Arrow*, *Viper*, *Snake*, with several French steamers, poured in a shower of shells and rockets upon the town; and on the night of the 17th, the fire was repeated—not, so far as appears, with any considerable damage to the Russians.

Prince Gortchakoff recorded with justifiable elation the events of a day so disastrous and humiliating to the besiegers. Let the causes of failure have been what they may, the defenders unquestionably maintained a soldierly bearing throughout, manning all the batteries that could be brought to bear upon the assaulting columns, and keeping masses of infantry to dispute the entrance of the besiegers. His diary and dispatches, made public through the medium of the official Russian newspapers, state that the third bombardment, commenced on the 7th of June, continued with much violence until the 12th; that he then began to repair the shattered defence-works, which were soon brought again into an effective state, in spite of the fire, weak and intermittent, kept up by the besiegers between the 12th and 16th. The renewed bombardment on the 17th he characterises as being of unwonted severity, and maintained against the whole line of fortifications; followed, during the evening and night, by a shower of shells and rockets sent into every part of the town, into the harbour, and even across to the northern forts. Despite this hot fire, the besieged, he asserts, repaired their ramparts and remounted their guns, in readiness for the events of the morrow, whatever they might be. At daybreak, the besiegers advanced in a line four versts in extent, apparently under the impression that the bombardment of the previous day and night had effected numerous breaches in the defence-works; but Gortchakoff implies that the Russians had sufficient insight into the plans of the Allies to know that a strong attack on the Karabelnaia suburb was impending; and he therefore not only repaired the earthworks, but also brought up compact masses of infantry in support. He estimates, with customary exaggeration, the attacking columns of French at 30,000 men, and those of the English at 15,000 to 20,000. Describing briefly all the distinct attacks made by the besiegers, the Russian general comments on the immense service rendered by the steamers *Vladimir*, *Gromonosetz*, *Khersonesus*, *Krim*, *Bessarabia*, and *Odessa*, in firing their broadsides up the Careening Bay at the columns of Mayran's division: in this, indeed, he was fully corroborated by Pelissier himself. One struggle, at a point between the Little Redan and the Malakoff, Gortchakoff describes thus: 'At a given signal, the French left the trenches of the Mamelon; volunteers taking the lead, provided with scaling-ladders. Despite the violent fire of grape and musketry,

they advanced boldly; the head of their column entered the ditch, and the volunteers jumped into it to place their ladders; but the brave defenders, leaping upon the crest of the parapet, fired down point-blank upon them, running them through with their bayonets, knocking them over with the but-ends of their muskets, and pelting them with stones in the ditch. The enemy, repulsed, threw away their ladders, and retreated.' It is worthy of note, that Gortchakoff records one instance of success on the part of the French more clearly than Pelissier. He states that they captured a small battery near the Malakoff, pursued a body of Russians some distance, and occupied a group of houses near the foot of the Malakoff Hill; a reserve of Russians under Pauloff advanced to drive them from this position; and then 'a sanguinary *mêlée* took place among the houses and ruins. The French in ambuscade there made a determined resistance; it was necessary to take each house by storm. Our men scrambled upon them, unroofed them, and threw stones upon the men inside, or else burst in the doors, and killed or made the enemy prisoners.' The French were driven back to their trenches. Gortchakoff acknowledged a loss of nearly 6000 men in killed, wounded, and contused, during the bombardment of the 17th and the various assaults of the 18th; but he raised the loss of the besiegers to the extravagant height of 10,000 French and 3500 English.

The causes of the disastrous failure on the 18th of June were probably numerous, each contributing a share in the production of the joint result. Many persons present at the siege, weighing the various circumstances afterwards brought to light, urged that the supporting reserves were too far in arrear of the attacking-parties; that the English lost themselves in the labyrinth of works in front of the Redan; that the arrangements for the departure of the men from the trenches being imperfect, the advance of the storming-parties was little better than a scramble; that these parties were too weak for the enormous extent and strength of the place to be attacked; and that the artillery was not called upon to aid at the critical moment, by firing at the batteries whence the murderous storm of grape-shot proceeded. These, so far as they were really defects, applied to the British side; but it has been strongly maintained that the most fruitful cause of disaster was the change of plan insisted on by Pelissier. The agreement had been, that two hours' cannonade should be maintained early on the 18th, 'for the purpose of destroying any works the enemy might have thrown up in the night, and of opening passages through the abattis (sharpened stakes and branches) that covered the Redan;' but on the preceding evening Pelissier announced his determination to make the assault at daybreak on the following morning. He appears to have been influenced by an apprehension that the Russians intended to make a sortie from the Malakoff upon the Mamelon, and to have considered that the best way to prevent this was to anticipate it by an attack from the Mamelon upon the Malakoff. Raglan yielded, evidently against his own judgment; the assault on the Mamelon, ten days earlier, had been successful because following immediately upon a fierce bombardment; and he may reasonably have supposed that an analogous result would attend a similar attack on the more formidable fort. Whatever may have been the impression in the French camp, the English certainly attributed the failure in great part to the absence of a cannonading on the morning of the 18th; Pelissier dwells more on the 'want of simultaneity' in the attacks as the cause of failure, especially the mistake of Mayran in this particular. Drawing a line of distinction between the Allies, Lieutenant-colonel Hamley thinks that, 'On our part the disaster was rather a blunder than a repulse; for an attack so feeble against such a work as the Redan could not be called an assault. Probably its garrison of thousands never beheld from their ramparts more than 300 enemies marching upon them, and they must have been puzzled to account for such a futile attempt, taking it, perhaps, for an ill-concealed feint.' The troops sent forth by Raglan were unquestionably very few, relatively to the services required.

This was the only occasion on which the Allies asked for an armistice to enable them to bury their dead and carry off the wounded—all former applications to this effect had been made by the Russians; but the besiegers being here the defeated party, and their losses very severe, they were enforced to be the first in making the demand. The Russians had made such unfair use of truces or armistices, as to draw upon them frequent expostulations; and now it was their turn to determine whether the application of the besiegers should be complied with. After much delay, the truce was assented to at four o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th, at which hour the English and French hastened out from their trenches, to search among the mangled bodies around the Redan, the Malakoff, and the other works that had been assaulted: many of the wounded troops had been lying there six-and-thirty hours, without attendance, without water; a few others had crawled away during the night; and hundreds had died of their wounds as they lay. While the burying-parties were engaged in their sad duties, a few officers and journalists, permitted to obtain a near approach to the Russian works, were equally struck by their vastness and strength, and by the prodigious number of shot and shell which had ploughed the whole space between the besiegers and the besieged.

DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN: TARDINESS OF THE SIEGE.

Bitter may have been the closing days of the British commander; yet no trace of this bitterness

appears in his dispatches. He had just been called upon to bear the loss of 1600 brave companions-in-arms, in an attack from which much was expected; he knew that his countrymen at home were impatiently waiting for news of the capture of that fortress which had so long baffled the besiegers; he knew that his own troops were dissatisfied with the operations of the day; and he also felt that the two armies, French and English, each wished to lay the blame of failure chiefly on the other. On the 18th of June the unsuccessful series of assaults had been made; on the 28th of the same month Lord Raglan expired. True, the assigned cause of death was a malady very prevalent in the camp at that time; but mental anxiety unquestionably bore a heavy share in producing the result. The last dispatch from Raglan made public was dated June 25th, announcing the death from cholera of Major-general Estcourt, adjutant-general of his army; and the same mail brought a dispatch from General Simpson, communicating the sad news that the British commander himself had sunk on the evening of the 28th. Lord Raglan, unwell for some time previously, was pronounced by his medical attendants much better on the morning of that day; nevertheless, as evening approached, he gradually weakened and died.

That Lord Raglan was a great military commander did not appear by any evidence furnished during the war; but he possessed eminent qualities which won for him the esteem of those who knew him best. As a son of the fifth Duke of Beaufort, he had entered the army under favourable auspices; and throughout the Peninsular war frequent mention was made of him as Lord Fitzroy Somerset. He was on the staff of Sir Arthur Wellesley when only a simple captain of infantry, and rarely afterwards attended to any regimental duty. Throughout forty-five years in the career of the great British commander, as Sir Arthur Wellesley, Lord, Earl, Marquis, and Duke of Wellington, Lord Fitzroy Somerset was closely associated with him: a continuity of service that tells much concerning the sterling qualities of the person so employed; for the Duke was not a man to rely on inefficient subordinates. Fitzroy Somerset was to Wellington what Berthier was to the first Napoleon, not only a secretary, but a trusted companion-in-arms. When the Duke became commander-in-chief, Fitzroy Somerset acted as military secretary at the Horse Guards, and so continued till Wellington's death in 1852. As an active officer in the field, he had received wounds and won honours at Badajoz, Busaco, and Waterloo; but his services had been mostly rendered in more peaceful scenes as military secretary. He knew more concerning the qualities and organisation of the British army, perhaps, whether good or bad, than any man of his time, except the commander-in-chief. When the Duke's death occurred, Lord Fitzroy Somerset was raised to the peerage as Lord Raglan; and when the war with Russia broke out, it seemed fitting that so experienced a man should be invested with the command of the British army in the East. He had not, it is true, seen a battle-field for nearly forty years; and some of the hardy officers who had become bronzed in the Indian wars might possibly have been better fitted than he to contend with the stern severities of the Crimean campaign; but there are many indications that the British government, at the commencement of the war, did not anticipate much hard fighting: they expected that a military 'demonstration' in the East would suffice to prevent war by checking the aggression of the Czar Nicholas. Lord Raglan would have been eminently fitted by his great experience, courteous bearing, and kindness of disposition, for such a supposed state of things. Practically, however, he found himself involved in difficulties of almost unexampled severity during the Crimean winter, when the rough, active, stern soldier was fully as much needed as the courteous commander, and when in addition he was called upon to bear the embarrassments almost inseparable from divided command: no great manœuvres being possible unless the French commander assented. The forbearance exhibited by Raglan in all differences of opinion between the Allied generals was fully appreciated by the French.

All was done that could be done to honour the remains of the deceased commander, by the Allied armies on the plateau outside Sebastopol. A military procession was formed, to escort the body to Kazatch Bay. At four in the afternoon on the 3d of July, a selected body from every British infantry regiment formed an avenue from the British to the French head-quarters, a distance of about a mile; and from thence to Kazatch Bay, where the *Caradoc* was ready to receive her melancholy freight, the French troops formed a similar avenue. Squadrons of cavalry and batteries of artillery were drawn up behind the lines of infantry, and military bands were placed at intervals. The funeral-procession, taking the route thus marked out by the avenue of infantry, consisted of English, French, and Sardinian cavalry, and English and French horse-artillery, acting as an escort to the mourners. The coffin was carried on a platform fixed to a 9-pounder gun; near the four corners of the platform rode Simpson, Pelissier, Della Marmora, and Omar Pacha, the commanders of the four Allied armies; then followed all the generals and officers who could be spared from the siege-works. Thus the procession advanced, amid the solemn booming of guns, and the playing of the 'Dead March' by the bands. At Kazatch Bay, marines and sailors were drawn up on the wharf, Admirals Bruat and Stewart were in attendance, and in a few minutes the body of Lord Raglan was removed from that peninsula which for nine months had been the scene of such anxious labours. The *Caradoc*, after a very lingering voyage, arrived at Bristol on

the 26th of July; a water-procession escorted the body up the Avon; a land-procession was formed through Bristol; and the departed general found a last resting-place in the churchyard at Badminton in the neighbourhood of that city, near a mansion belonging to the Beaufort family. Within a few days after the death of Lord Raglan became known in England, the House of Commons voted a pension of £1000 per annum for life to Lady Raglan, and a further pension of £2000 per annum to the next two holders of the title, son and grandson of the deceased.

The death of the British commander occasioned many changes in the army in the Crimea. Sir George Brown would have taken the command by virtue of seniority, but had been compelled to leave the Crimea about that time through shattered health. Cathcart, Estcourt, Adams, Evans, Pennefather, these and many others had been lost to the Crimean army by death or illness; and the command hence devolved upon General Simpson, who had been sent out as chief of the staff to Lord Raglan, and who was the senior officer present at Raglan's death. The home government

General Simpson.

confirmed Simpson in the command, despite his broken state of health. Changes were at the same time made whereby brigadiers became divisional-generals, and colonels became brigadiers. Comparing the list given below,* with that at p. 209, it will be seen that Sir Richard England was the only general officer whose position had not been changed between September 1854 and June 1855.

* *First Division.*
General Sir Colin Campbell.
Brigadier Lord Rokeby. Brigadier-colonel Cameron.

Second Division.
General Barnard.
Brigadier-colonel Lockyer. Brigadier-colonel Trollope.

Third Division.
General Sir Richard England.
Brigadier-general Eyre. Brigadier-colonel Barlow.

Fourth Division.
General Bentinck.
Brigadier-colonel Spencer. Brigadier-colonel Garrett.

Light Division.
General Codrington.
Brigadier-colonel Von Straubenzee. Brigadier-colonel Shirley.

Whether the death of Lord Raglan necessitated a laxity in the renewing of the bombardment of Sebastopol, can only be surmised by inference; but a laxity certainly appeared; insomuch that the entire months of July and August passed without any of those fierce cannonadings which might have effected a practicable breach in the defences. Simpson and Pelissier, week after week, were enabled to announce to their respective governments little more than the fact that the trenches and batteries of the besiegers were every day approaching nearer to the beleaguered city, entailing constantly increasing loss both to

besiegers and besieged through the proximity of the fire. The French had established a *place d'armes* in front of the Malakoff capable of containing 5000 men, in readiness for an assault; but this required a vast system of trenches and earthworks as a protection from the cannon and rifles of the fort; and it is incontestable that the Russians increased their defences with equal activity. Most unexpectedly to the besiegers, the Russian ships in the harbour had wrought nearly as much mischief to the assaulting columns on the 18th of June as the attacked forts themselves, by firing their broadsides up Careening Bay: to prevent a repetition of this, new batteries were constructed by the Allies to act against the ships; and to prevent this construction of new batteries, the Malakoff and Redan frequently poured out torrents of shot against the working-parties: thus a considerable part of the month of July was spent in attempts on each side to weaken or frustrate the works of the other. As auxiliaries to these attempts, the English were day by day bringing up enormous stores of shot, shells, guns, powder, and all the other implements of offensive war; the French were similarly covering the road from Kamiesch to the lines with convoys of military stores; while the Russians kept the harbour alive with boats, barges, and steamers, bringing over from the north to the south sides countless numbers of gabions, fascines, sand-bags, trunks of trees for abattis, as well as every kind of ammunition for large and small ordnance. The trees for forming the terrible abattis or rows of pointed stakes on the external slopes of the Malakoff and Redan, were cut down and brought from a distance of ten or twelve miles. All the boats and all the crews of the sunken ships were free for this transport-service across the harbour; and thus the Allied admirals had the vexation of knowing that, while the sunken ships barred up the harbour and rendered the mighty fleets of the invaders almost useless, the boats and crews of those ships were made by the Russians available to assist the forts and soldiers in defending the town.

Every day the booming of cannon was heard; sometimes from the besiegers to check the defence-works, sometimes from the defenders to check the besiege-works; while in many instances the two together joined to produce a roar almost as deafening as that resulting from a regular bombardment. Now would the French endeavour to plant a battery at the very foot of the abattis of the Malakoff; now would the Russians begin to construct a covered-way or trench of approach from the town to the Great and Little Redans, and from those redoubts to the Malakoff; now would their riflemen creep out of the Malakoff, throw themselves down on their faces, hastily dig up a little earth as shelter, and finally so extend these diggings as to form rifle-pits, whence they might maintain a fire against the French; and in all these instances the hostile force, be it of the besieged or the besiegers, strove by force of cannon-shot to stop the operations thus commenced.

As the month of July ended, so did that of August begin, amid incessant preparations by besiegers and besieged, and daily exchanges of cannonadings and musketry, but with no renewal of the bombardment, properly so called. The officers and men in the Allied armies became disappointed and irritable. They suffered under trying alternations of weather—solar heat so great as nearly to strike them to the earth, and rain so violent as to convert the plateau into a patchwork of lake and quagmire; while myriads of flies, fleas, bugs, and mosquitoes tormented them in the hours when they would fain have slept or rested. Complainings and suggestions of all kinds met the public ear, each adviser announcing what *he* would do if invested with command. One pointed to the fine army of French, Sardinians, and Turks encamped at this time in the Tchernaya and Baidar Valleys, and shewed how, in his opinion, it might usefully be employed in cutting off the communications of the Russians with their depôts north and north-east of Sebastopol. Another suggested that, as the French had found a balloon serviceable during the battle of Jemappes, sixty years earlier, so might General Simpson now derive advantage, by sending up an engineer officer to make a plan of the interior of Sebastopol as seen from the car of a balloon—the car being connected with a windlass on the ground by a wire-rope, and a calm day being selected. A third, knowing that the *Simoom* was an iron steamship of unusual strength, proposed that she should be employed to cut a way through the barrier of sunken ships at the mouth of the harbour, by running full speed against the hulls, 'her bows being so sharp and so strong, that her keel would go through the submerged hull like a knife, while her superincumbent weight in settling down upon it would crush it like an egg-shell.' A fourth, remarking that divided councils most probably existed at head-quarters, and that such division must necessarily weaken all the exertions of the besiegers, proposed that the French, ample in numbers as they were, should conduct the entire operations of the siege; while the English, Sardinians, and Turks, about 70,000 in number, should sally forth from the plateau and the Tchernaya Valley, and meet the Russians somewhere in the open field. Even officers of distinction in England, who had served in the Crimea, wrote to the public journals to suggest plans or to pass censure. The best frame of mind, perhaps, was that which led officers and men to bear cheerfully, and to look forward hopefully; as did one officer who wrote: 'We manage to fit up our tents very comfortably, considering our limited baggage; I have had mine sunk in the earth two feet and heaped outside, which makes it more snug. I begged an old beer-barrel, and had it cut in two; the best half makes an excellent bath-tub; and in the daytime it is inverted,

and with an old coat thrown over it, does well for a seat. I have also managed to rig up a tolerable table, and avail myself of every chance to render life here as comfortable as possible.'

The first of General Simpson's dispatches in August announced the departure from the Crimea of Sir Richard England, broken in health by fifteen months' service in the East as general of division; and subsequent dispatches treated of little else than brief notices of the approach of the French sap towards the Malakoff, the capture of which was looked forward to as the great event of the season, since that fort was admitted to be the key to the whole of the fortifications, giving to the holder the mastery over Sebastopol. Generals and engineers made daily examinations of the trenches and batteries; the camp-hospitals were cleared out for new occupants, by the despatch of all invalids to Scutari who could bear the voyage; councils of war were held, to lay down plans of attack; additional siege-material was brought up to the front, to give greater certainty to the operations; medical stores were brought up to the camp by dozens of tons, shadowing forth the terrible havoc of blood and limb expected to ensue; and all the regiments were kept on the watch. About the middle of the month vast reinforcements were received by the Russians. General Simpson, writing at this period, said: 'During the last few days considerable activity has been exhibited in the movements of the enemy, both in the town and on the north side; and from the information we have received from the country, as well as the examination of deserters, I have reason to believe that the Russians may attempt to force us to raise the siege by a vigorous attack from without. Every precaution is taken on the part of the Allies; and the ground occupied by the Sardinians above the village of Tchorgouna and in its front has been made very strong through the energy and skill of General Della Marmora, who is unceasing in his precautions.' Several days in succession the British troops were ordered out at an early hour, either to repel attacks really expected, or to habituate the soldiers to alertness when the moment of trial should arrive. The officers in the Allied fleets, out beyond the harbour, could, by the aid of their telescopes, look over the houses of Sebastopol to the rear of the Malakoff and Redan, and there see vast bodies of Russian troops assembling: this information, communicated to the generals, confirmed their previous belief that serious manœuvres were intended by the defenders of the place.

On the 17th the Allies opened a fire of some severity against the various forts, intended probably to mask the approach of the French by sap towards the Malakoff. It commenced at four in the morning; and was shortly afterwards replied to by the Russians; but although a contest full of noise and fury, it effected little in weakening the defence-works on the one side or the attack-works on the other—although the British naval brigade suffered a severe loss in officers and men, by the fire of shot and shell from the Russian batteries; while the enemy likewise suffered heavily through the explosion of a magazine fired by mortars from Gordon's Battery. Just at this time the brilliant BATTLE OF THE TCHERNAYA, described in the next Chapter, took place in the plain immediately eastward of the plateau whereon the siege-works were planted; the great success of the French and Sardinians in this battle elated the whole Allied camps, and roused the troops to dare all that their commanders might bid them dare, nay more, in relation to the siege itself. Day by day the French works approached nearer the abattis of the Malakoff; day by day the Russians accumulated in increasing masses behind that fort; and everything indicated that the crisis for the assault was not far distant. On the 20th, the British right attack sent a shower of rockets into the Karabelnaïa, which fired several houses in that suburb, and caused great commotion among the garrison. The French left attack on the same day opened a severe fire on the south-western defences, after a long-continued silence; but there is no evidence that this firing was preliminary to any immediate intended assault. Prince Gortchakoff, in his diary and dispatches for August, corroborated in general terms the dispatches of the Allied commanders—acknowledging the occasional fierceness of the shell and rocket practice of the besiegers, the increase in the number of their batteries, and the steady approach of their sap towards the Malakoff; but claiming credit, which the besiegers were willing enough to give, for the undaunted resolution with which the Russians maintained all their works and planted new batteries of guns in every available position.

On the 23d, Pelissier's troops succeeded in capturing a Russian rifle-pit on the glacis or slope in front of the Malakoff, repulsing 500 of the enemy who sallied forth to recapture it, and striking down more than half their number. A few days afterwards a 13-inch shell, from the Malakoff, fell into the intrenchments of the Mamelon, and fired a French magazine containing 15,000 pounds of powder; the explosion was terrific, followed by a scattering of mangled bodies in all directions; but the disaster scarcely delayed in any degree the advance of the sap-work and the planting of new siege-batteries.

Another month arrived, and with it a still more deep conviction that a fierce and perhaps decisive struggle was at hand. Rumours reached the Allied camps that the Russians were becoming discontented and disorderly inside Sebastopol; that the vertical storm of shells from the besiegers' mortars left them not a roof where they might obtain shelter; that bread and spirits and other provisions were failing; that large convoys of stores and property were daily passing —not from the north to the south of the harbour, but from the south to the north—and that Gortchakoff had received permission from the czar to

abandon the south side altogether, whenever the necessity or propriety of such a course might become apparent. These rumours, varying as they probably did in correctness, tended as a whole to shew that the Russians had little hope of being able to maintain Sebastopol much longer: to that extent the besiegers derived encouragement. The Allies, amid their wearisome and dangerous duties, contrived to maintain a joyousness of spirit by performances at the 'Theatre-royal, Naval Brigade,' or the 'Théâtre Français, Kamiesch,' where laughable farces were played, despite the occasional plunging of shot within a few yards of the tent appropriated as a temple of the drama. The officers appreciated the value of such entertainments, incongruous as they may appear to those unaffected by the trying scenes of a soldier's life; the medical efficacy of cheerfulness cannot be lost sight of in camp; and an hour's extravagance, accompanied by an hour's laughter, was permitted, if not directly encouraged, by the commanders.

During the anxious months of July and August, the loss of the Allies in the trenches was terrible in amount, although the achievements were not such as brought fame and honours to the hard-working troops. The works approached so near the Malakoff and Redan, that the gabion-parapets of the trenches afforded very insufficient shelter from the balls, shells, and rifle-bullets of the enemy, which swept off the working-parties and trench-guards with fearful rapidity—swelling the list of dead and wounded by many thousands during a few weeks.

THE FINAL BOMBARDMENT, AND CAPTURE.

Everything was now ready for one last and desperate assault on the beleaguered city. Great as the siege-works had been in spring, as described in the early part of this Chapter, they were far greater in September; for six months' labour had since been bestowed upon them. The 'front' extended six or seven miles, from the Sapoune heights to Quarantine Bay; while the various 'lines,' consisting of trenches and of parapets formed of the earth taken therefrom, extended not less than seventy miles. The French, having the entire attack of the south-western part of the city, confronted the Quarantine Fort, Quarantine Bastion, crenellated wall, Bastion Rouge, Bastion Noir, Central Bastion, and Bastion du Mât, of the Russians—many of which did not exist in the spring; but the Allies found, after many months of labour, that the south-east side, commanded by the Malakoff, was the real key to the whole place; and that, whatever force they might bring to bear against the Garden and Barrack Batteries, the Lunette, Great Redan, Gervois Battery, Little Redan, and Careening Bay forts, their main efforts must be directed against this gigantic redoubt. The labour bestowed by the Russians was almost inconceivable. A formidable palisade or abattis of sharpened stakes in front; then an earthen parapet of enormous height and thickness; then a deep and wide ditch; then three tiers of batteries rising one above another, armed with more than sixty guns of large calibre; then sheltered spots at which riflemen might be posted; and, lastly, a *place d'armes* large enough to contain a powerful defensive or offensive body of infantry—such was the Malakoff in September.

A strong opinion prevailed in the Allied camps at the opening of this month, that the enemy contemplated an attack on a formidable scale. It was believed that Gortchakoff, Osten-Sacken, Liprandi, and Paniutine, had planned together that 90,000 Russians should assault the whole exterior of the besiegers' rear, from Baidar to Inkermann, and that sorties at the same time should take place from various parts of Sebastopol. The whole country from the Belbek to Baktchéserai, and thence south to Baidar, was known to be occupied by troops; it was known, too, that forage for the horses, food for the men, and means of transport were becoming exhausted in the centre of the Crimea; and thus it was rendered probable that the enemy would attempt one last and desperate manœuvre against the besiegers. The British troops almost hoped that such might be the case; they were becoming wearied of the siege, and would gladly have met the Russians in the open field. Certain movements, too, in the harbour attracted the attention of the Allied commanders. It was seen that the rudiments of a bridge were appearing on the north shore, formed of rafts moored side by side, and that this bridge lengthened day by day, until towards the period now under notice it had reached the south shore, to the point of rock whereon Fort Nicholas was built. Trains of vehicles were put into requisition, conveying commodities of various kinds from the south to the north shore. The purport of these manœuvres was much discussed in the camp; it had long been rumoured that Gortchakoff had received the czar's permission to abandon the south side of Sebastopol whenever he might deem that course necessary or prudent; and some supposed that the construction and employment of the raft-bridge was thus to be interpreted; while an opinion was held in other quarters that the bridge was to be made ancillary to a bold attack on the besiegers. The Allied commanders, it is certain, were watchful of the Tchernaya Valley, and were at same time desirous of making an immediate and vigorous bombardment and assault of the town.

The 5th of September 1854 was the day on which the Allied armament began to sail and steam from Varna to the Crimea; the 5th of September 1855, after the lapse of an eventful period of twelve months, was to witness the beginning of the final bombardment of Sebastopol

by the same Allies, aided by the Sardinians. General Simpson, in his dispatches relating to the events of this memorable week, stated that the engineer and artillery officers of the two armies had announced to the commanders the completion of all arrangements for the assault; and that the plan recommended comprised—a vigorous and continuous bombardment on September 5th, 6th, and 7th, followed on the 8th by a storming of the Malakoff by the French and of the Redan by the English. Pelissier and Simpson arranged that, at a certain hour on the 8th, the French storming-columns were to leave their trenches, with the intention of taking possession of the Malakoff and adjacent works; and that, after this should have been achieved, the British would storm the Redan. To distract the attention of the Russians during these operations, it was further agreed that the French on the left should make a formidable attack on the Flagstaff and Central Batteries. The tricolor flag, planted on the summit of the Malakoff, was to be a signal that the French had triumphed, and that the British were then to storm the Redan. This last-named arrangement

General Pelissier.

was in recognition of the principle maintained throughout, that as the Redan could not be held by the Allies while the Russians commanded the Malakoff, the latter fort should be attacked first, and with a magnitude of force consistent with its importance.

Appalling in its severity was the final bombardment of Sebastopol. It began at dawn on the 5th, as prearranged by the Allied commanders. Telescopic observers on Cathcart's Hill could already see that churches, mansions, terraces of houses, rows of meaner dwellings, and public buildings, had been pierced, loopholed, shattered by previous cannonadings; and it became now evident that the work of destruction would be carried much further, although the immediate objects of attack were the Redan and the Malakoff. The French opened *four miles of cannonading* at one instant! Balls and shells issued simultaneously from the fiery throats of cannon and mortars along a line of this great length, shaking the very ground with the tremendous reverberation, raising clouds of earth and disrupting batteries along the Russian lines, filling the air with vivid gleams and sparks and trains of fire, burying the horizon in dense clouds of smoke and vapour, and carrying death and destruction into the heart of the devoted city. The general cannonading thus maintained was along the French line on the south-west of Sebastopol; the British fire, on the south-east, was severe but less continuous and concentrated. After three or four hours of this tremendous bombardment, the French ceased for a while, to cool their guns and rest their gunners; then

resumed, with such effect that the Russian earthworks became distorted in an extraordinary way, without, however, exhibiting any of those actual gaps or breaches which would infallibly have befallen stone structures under such a pelting storm of iron hail. Darkness did not stay this visitation; shells and balls continued to whiz through the air, marking out a line of light to shew their flight, and crashing one by one against the defences and buildings. The English, too, brought their mortars to bear against the ships in the harbour; and the garrison exhibited evident symptoms of agitation, dark masses of infantry crossing from the north side of the harbour by the raft-bridge, as if to increase the defences of the forts when the hour for assault should arrive. The Malakoff and Redan, when no longer visible by ordinary light, were brought out into vivid relief by the bursting of the shells around and upon them. One of the ships in the harbour caught fire, perhaps from an exploding shell, and was burnt to the water's edge.

All through this night did the firing continue, in sufficient force to prevent the Russians from repairing their shattered parapets and embrasures; and with daybreak on the 6th recommenced the regular bombardment with as great fury as before, interrupted by a few intervals only to cool the guns. The Russians, seeing that the hour of peril had arrived, used almost superhuman exertions to keep their batteries at work; and thus there were 1500 large pieces of ordnance maintaining a murderous fire simultaneously, 700 belonging to the besiegers, and 800 to the besieged. Increased agitation was visible among the enemy on the 6th; and several movements seemed to indicate the commencement of a removal from the south to the north sides of the harbour, of all such persons and valuables as could not be rendered available in the defence. Again did a night of intermittent firing ensue; and again did the bombardment along the whole line, from the Sapoune heights to Quarantine Bay, recommence on the 7th. On this day, too, another ship was burnt in the harbour; flames broke out in the town behind the Redan; and a loud explosion, as if of a magazine, took place after nightfall. A fourth time did the destructive and pitiless storm of shot and shell reopen on the morning of the 8th, and continue until the eventful hour, noon, when the grand assault was to be made, and when the troops, taking forty-eight hours' provisions with them into the trenches, prepared for that duty which would lay so many thousands of their number lifeless.

All necessary arrangements had been made by the Allied commanders for the crisis of the siege—this great assault. Pelissier collected 25,000 men in and near the Mamelon works, to form the attacking columns for the Malakoff and Little Redan, and as reserves in support of those columns; together with other troops for the assault on the south-west side of the town. With the French were associated about 5000 Sardinians, thus for the first time taking part in the active operations of the siege. The general with his staff took up his station on an elevated spot near the Mamelon, about eleven o'clock on the forenoon of the 8th; and the French trenches became about that time packed with men as closely as they could stand, ready to issue forth to the assault when the pre-arranged signal should be given. The Russians were accustomed to a slight mid-day rest, during which the ramparts were not fully manned; and as the besiegers intended to take advantage of that hour, the arrangements were kept as secret as possible. General Simpson, on his side, similarly brought forward his available forces. The morning had dawned, gray and cold, and a biting wind blew dust into the eyes of the besiegers; nevertheless, the British proceeded to the positions they were to occupy for the assault. Troops of cavalry were called up to the front, to form a chain of sentries as a means of keeping off mere idle spectators; the Highland brigade marched up from Kamara, and took position in the rear of the right attack, with the brigade of Guards near them; the 4th division went to the left attack, one brigade in the trenches and one in reserve; the 3d division remained as a reserve, available to support the left attack; while the light and 2d divisions, intrusted with the assault of the Redan, went down quietly to the front parallels. The chief officers advanced sufficiently near the front to inspect the operations, and, as health-worn elderly men on a cold windy morning, presented an appearance the reverse of martial; ludicrous pictures of their position have been given, ungenerous to dwell upon if treated as condemnatory of the persons concerned; but in truth the war, from first to last, was distinguished, on the part of the British, by a scarcity of officers in the prime of life: men in full possession of vigour added to experience in the field. The 'Peninsular officers' had become old men; while the 'Indian officers' were, from the rules of the Queen's service, intrusted with few opportunities for employment in the Crimea.

The assault on the Malakoff being obviously the most important of the proceedings of the day, General Pelissier and his chief engineer, General Niel, directed their especial attention to it. M'Mahon's division was to act against the Malakoff, Dulac's against the Little Redan, and La Motterouge's against the 'Curtain' or continuous line of defence joining those two forts; while Bosquet was to hold powerful supports in reserve. Pelissier took up his position in the Mamelon, to observe all, and to signal the British at the critical moment. The most advanced French parallel was only twenty yards from the outworks of the Malakoff, while the 'sap' had been extended with such extraordinary perseverance that the sappers could reach over and touch the lower edge of the abattis itself, practically almost close to the sixty or seventy enormous guns with which the fort was armed.

This wonderful fort, about 400 yards long by 180 in width, was fronted by a ditch 20 feet deep by 24 in width, behind which was a parapet nearly 20 feet high; but the shells and balls from the siege-batteries had so disrupted the earthworks that the descent into the ditch and the ascent of the parapet were rendered less difficult than they would otherwise have been. Precisely at noon the bombardment ceased, and the storming columns issued forth, preceded by riflemen, sappers, and miners; and as the French had constructed ingenious portable bridges as substitutes for ladders, the ditch was crossed and the parapet scaled with surprising celerity. Then commenced the struggle up the slope to the old stone-tower of the Malakoff—a struggle maintained with guns, rifles, pistols, swords, bayonets, gun-rammers, pickaxes, stones, any weapons that could be obtained; but within a quarter of an hour the tricolor flag floated on the tower, announcing both to besiegers and besieged that the formidable position was taken. The engineers set to work, filling up trenches, opening passages, laying bridges, turning batteries, and executing other works necessary to the securing of the position then gained. What followed will be seen presently.

Meanwhile the Little Redan and the Curtain had been scenes of separate encounters. The French parallels were nearly as close to these two strongholds as to the Malakoff. The Little Redan had become a bastion of formidable strength; while the Curtain was armed with sixteen large guns, and had a parallel parapet within it, also armed. The two divisions, Dulac's and La Motterouge's, were to master both these parallels, aid each other, and also aid M'Mahon's attack on the Malakoff if necessary. As the hour approached, the various divisions, all belonging to the 2d or Bosquet's corps, assembled in the *places d'armes* among their parallels, and in the Karabelnaïa and Careening Ravines, taking every possible precaution to conceal their movements from the enemy. At the moment when the one division set forth to the Malakoff, the other two rushed upon the Little Redan and the Curtain, and with similar result; for after a brief but fierce contest, the French overcame the Russians defending those positions, crossed the ditch, scaled the parapet, and pressed on towards the inner defence. It was now found, however, that the Little Redan was exposed to a cross-fire from several batteries and from the steamers in the harbour; this fire the French were unable to check, and, as a consequence, they abandoned the position, after having held it some time. La Motterouge's division, moreover, was for a similar reason enforced to abandon all but a small part of the Curtain; nevertheless the two divisions did not retire until further resistance had become desperate, and the loss enormous: the French, mortified by defeat at such a time, struggled heroically, and saw their officers fall thickly around them; but not even their soldierly qualities could bear the unchecked fire from numerous flanking batteries and broadsides.

The most obstinate and sanguinary struggle of the day, however, took place at the Malakoff; for, although the French had captured it, the Russians so well knew its value that they made furious attempts at recapture; but Bosquet judiciously sent powerful reserves of Zouaves, voltigeurs, and regiments of the line to the support of M'Mahon; and these reserves maintained a series of desperate battles against the Russians within the Malakoff. For battles they truly were; the enemy sent dense masses of infantry from the town through the gorge into the fort; bayonet against bayonet, musket against musket, the contest continued for several hours—never placing the French occupancy imminently in peril, but nevertheless exposing the troops to fearful slaughter. General Ragon, who headed the engineers in the assault, has given a brief description of the day's operations, in which he says: 'I entered the Malakoff at the head of the sappers, conjointly with the Zouaves of the 1st division of the 2d *corps d'armée*. We climbed the ditch like cats, dislodged the enemy, forced the lines, and carried the redoubt with an enthusiasm and rapidity perfectly French. Our standards planted on the parapet were assailed and vigorously defended for more than six hours. After this heroic struggle, our column had alone the honour of remaining master of its conquests; the four others, two on our right and two on our left, were compelled to give way, leaving the ground covered with their killed and wounded. But our triumph sufficed to deprive the Russians of the power of retaining the redoubt.' Anything more wildly disordered than the interior of the Malakoff during these dreadful encounters can hardly be imagined; the space within had been excavated in an extraordinary way by the Russians to form traverses, breastworks, bomb-proof chambers, and subterranean cells in which the soldiers might sleep at night; the earth had become torn up by the violent bombardment; and every foot of the space became a rugged, frightful scene of bloody struggles, thousands of dead and wounded men being heaped up within this one fort alone. It would have been harrowing to the sight of an unwarlike spectator; but troops associated glory with those horrors, and heeded them not.

Such were the French achievements. Those of the British now come under notice.

When General Simpson came to make the arrangements for attacking the Redan, he determined that Sir William Codrington should command the attack, aided by Lieutenant-general Markham in organising the details. The 2d and light divisions were to have the dangerous honour of the assault; because, in the construction and maintenance during many months of the trenches in front of the Redan, they had become familiarly acquainted with the intricacies of the British lines and the appearance of the

Russian defences; and, moreover, perhaps an opportunity of earning glory was deemed due to them on that account. When the fire of the artillery had wrought as much damage as possible in the Redan, Simpson decided that the assault should be made on the salient angle or apex, as being less exposed than the inner angles or the sloping sides to the heavy flanking fire of other Russian batteries. Codrington and Markham agreed that an assaulting column of 1000 men should be formed, 500 of the light division to lead, and 500 of the 2d division to follow; that they should leave the trenches at a given signal, and move quickly across the ground to the Redan, preceded by a covering-party of 200 men, and a ladder-party of 320; and that, on arriving at the base of the vast work, the ladders should be placed, the ditch crossed, the parapet scaled, and the assault of the interior commenced, in the strong hope that the formidable bastion would be captured.

As soon as the tricolor was seen floating on the Malakoff, a flight of rockets gave the signal for the British columns to storm the Redan. Out rushed the men devoted to this duty—first, the covering-party, then the ladder-party, next the storming-party, then the working-party, and, lastly, the supporting-party, all composed of the 2d and light divisions, but a mere handful altogether: indeed it appears astonishing that so few should have been told off for so great a work. Every soldier had a perilous duty assigned to him. The covering-party of riflemen was to issue forth in extended line to shield the ladder-party, and to shoot down the gunners at the embrasures of the Redan; the ladder-party was to advance, reach the ditch, place the ladders, descend into the ditch, leave half the ladders for the descent of the storming-party, place the other half against the further slope of the ditch, and ascend to the parapet of the Redan itself; the storming-party, about thrice as numerous as the ladder-party, was to be the efficient force in obtaining entrance through the embrasures into the Redan; the working-party was to make such changes in the position of the guns and parapets as might secure the fort, if taken; and the supporting-party was to move into the advanced trenches as soon as the others had left them. Among the officers named in immediate command of the columns engaged in these dangerous duties were Captain Fyers, Major Welsford, Lieutenant-colonel Handcock, Captain Grove, Captain Lewes, Captain Hammond, Captain Crealock, Captain Maude, &c. —colonels, brigadiers, and generals holding, of course, higher command over their respective regiments, brigades, and divisions. Some of the superior officers being ill and absent, their subordinates 'tossed up' for the honour of being the first to lead into the Redan.

No sooner did the British emerge from their trenches, than the guns of the Redan opened a fierce fire on them, sweeping them down as they hastened over the intervening ground. Colonel Unett of the 19th was one of the first officers to fall; he had 'won the toss' for the post of honour with Colonel Windham a few minutes before, and ended by a soldier's death. Brigadiers Shirley and Von Straubenzee were speedily hurt, though not seriously; Major Welsford and Lieutenant-colonel Handcock received mortal wounds; and scarcely an officer connected with the first assaulting-party escaped unhurt. The distance from the most advanced parallel to the outworks of the Redan was too great—amply sufficient to bring upon the assailants a murderous fire of cannon, musketry, and rifles. The riflemen of the advanced-party effected what they could to pick off the gunners at the fort; but it was little they could do in these few minutes, and against the masses congregated at that spot. The survivors rushed on, gained a position where the guns could not be depressed to aim at them, and reached the abattis, the pointed stakes of which, jutting outwards, presented a formidable obstacle to further progress; as, however, it had been rent and distorted by the shot from the British batteries, the gallant troops found gaps through which they crept or clambered. Then came another rush to the salient angle of the ditch, and the ladder-party prepared to render their service: it has been said that they found the ladders too short for the depth of the ditch—fifteen feet—and this again has been denied. However it was, great difficulty was experienced in crossing the ditch; it was a scramble down and a scramble up, many falling all the time under the shot of the enemy. Officers and men were emulous for the honour of being among the first to enter the formidable works, but miserably deficient in the numbers necessary for such an enterprise. Mahoney, Killeany, and Cornellis, are named among the privates who bravely struggled to be the 'heroes of the Redan,' yielding up life or blood at the moment of triumph. Mounting to the parapet, the besiegers saw the interior of the Redan before them. Some officers afterwards declared that it was occupied, behind numerous breast-works and traverses, with compact masses of infantry and powerful ranges of guns; while others saw so few, that they thought the whole work might have been captured had the attacking columns been stronger: it is probable that the numbers, few at first, were reinforced by battalions entering from the town, or driven by the French from the Malakoff; for the defenders of the Redan were unquestionably largely reinforced while the struggle was going on.

Wild and sanguinary was the scene within the assailed fort. The light and 2d divisions had entered at different points—the latter having effected an entry a little way north of the salient; but, once within the parapet, they were equally exposed to the murderous ordeal. Colonel Windham was among the first officers to enter, and, when fairly within the parapet, he and his

brother-officers did all that men could do to lead on the handful of troops to dislodge the Russians from behind the traverses and breastworks. Some military critics have asserted that the storming-party stopped to fire when they ought to have charged; but be this as it may, the Russians not only maintained their position behind the inner line of defence in the Redan, but rapidly brought up reinforcements, and soon completely overpowered the few British, who saw they must either retire or remain to be shot down. Colonel Windham displayed almost incredible boldness and activity, rushing from spot to spot, now to the light and now to the second division, endeavouring to collect the scattered fragments of the different regiments, and to charge with them against the inner breastworks in a body; for such was the confusion in the excitement of the moment, that men and officers of various regiments became mixed up confusedly, to the destruction of all discipline; while the superior officers who fell, dead or wounded, were so numerous, that the subalterns were for a time bewildered by the new duties suddenly imposed upon them. Windham sent message after message to Codrington, begging him for reinforcements; but the messengers were shot down one by one as they endeavoured to traverse the space between the Redan and the trenches. Supporting-parties did, however, reach the devoted band; but they arrived in such driblets and in such confusion as to render impossible any well-directed charge against the breastwork. How Colonel Windham escaped death from the missiles hurled at him, appears inexplicable; for he rushed from the salient to the left flank, then to the right, to and from the various spots where the British had entered, encouraging and endeavouring to reorganise the men—all within the Redan itself, and distant only a few yards from the inner works, whence the Russians kept up a fierce fire. The Redan, be it remembered, had a formidable abattis outside, then a deep ditch with sharp palisades, then a broad and lofty parapet pierced for the embrasures of large guns, then a deep inner ditch, and then a lofty inner parapet or retrenchment; the English were hemmed in between the two parapets; around and in front of them were earthworks of formidable size; and the enemy, powerful in numbers, confronted them with cannon as well as muskets and rifles. If for a time a few British were collected in a body, volleys of musketry levelled them to the dust; if officers came to aid, they in like manner were stricken. Seeing the Russians increase their strength every moment, Windham made one last desperate effort to obtain reinforcements—he resolved to go himself. He said to Captain Crealock: 'Let it be known, in case I am killed, why I went away;' and then scrambled out over parapet, ditch, and abattis, reached the trenches, and urgently demanded aid. While in conference with Codrington on this subject, Windham saw his men wildly leaping and rushing out of the gaps in the Redan, escaping to their trenches as best they could, and pursued by large bodies of Russians pouring out a murderous fire on them. The departure of the colonel, the killing and wounding of the officers, and the augmentation in the number of the Russians, appear to have paralysed the men, who, seeing no supports from their own army, lost heart and retreated. It was not an Inkermann: the men did not stand their ground, nor did they charge with the bayonet; but, on the other hand, they had not the support which was so eagerly given at Inkermann—they were hemmed into one angle of a triangular space, and were crushed with the overwhelming superiority of numbers on the part of the enemy. The *place d'armes*, the parapet, the ditch, the abattis, became a harrowing scene of death and wounds, the English troops falling at every step under the fire of the Russians, and lying in heaps at particular spots.

The assault failed, notwithstanding that so many men of the assaulting columns remained within the Redan during a considerable time. The question immediately arose—What was next to be done? Pelissier sent to ask whether Simpson intended a second assault. On this point the English general said, in his dispatch concerning the day's proceedings: 'The trenches were, subsequently to this attack, so crowded with troops that I was unable to organise a second assault.' These proceedings were severely criticised afterwards; for the first assault failed through insufficiency of men, whereas the second assault, according to the general's language, was left unattempted because men were too many in one place. General Simpson himself, sitting in a trench, could see little of the manœuvres; and the 30,000 men of the British army with deep mortification saw themselves brought to sudden idleness with the unconquered Redan before them, while their allies were heroically engaged in maintaining their hold of the Malakoff. At twelve at noon, the attack began; at two o'clock it was over; and in these two hours the British loss was very severe, relatively to the small number sent to the attack. The British officers and troops could but ill brook the result of this day's labours; the same Redan which had resisted all their former assaults had again baffled them. During many months, humbled and irritated feelings were made manifest through the medium of letters and articles in the public journals. Some writers commented on the fact that the British trenches were 200 yards from the Redan, while the French were only twenty from the Malakoff—the space of 200 yards being, moreover, commanded by the cross-fire of many batteries; others complained that the assaulting columns had not been supported as they should have been by reinforcements; others asserted that the commander had taken up his post at a spot where he could know little that transpired; others thought that picked experienced troops—such as the Guards and Highlanders who had survived

Alma and Inkermann—should have been chosen as the 'forlorn hope' to head the assault; while others, again, demanded justice for gallant regiments not mentioned in the dispatches. The 57th, which had acquired the sobriquet of the 'Die-hards' at Albuera during the Peninsular war, and which led the storming column on the left face of the Redan, was among the regiments of which the officers and men thought they deserved a little more notice from their commander.—In short, the failure at the Redan damped the pleasure of the British at the fall of Sebastopol generally.

Another part of the busy theatre of operations now demands notice. The assault on the south-west or town-side of Sebastopol was intrusted to some of the divisions of the 1st or Canrobert's *corps d'armée*. The French trenches on this side had arrived within forty-five yards of the Central Bastion, and thirty-five of the Flagstaff Battery. The assault in this direction does not appear to have been planned in reference to the immediate importance of those positions, but rather to distract the attention of the Russians from the storming of the Malakoff. General de Salles was intrusted with this duty; Le Vaillant's division was to attack the Central Bastion, and D'Autemarre's division the Flagstaff Battery, while Bouat's and Paté's divisions were to act as reserves; moreover, a Sardinian brigade, under General Cialdini, was to assist D'Autemarre in the attack on the Flagstaff Battery. Pelissier having given the signal from the Mamelon, these several attacks commenced. Le Vaillant's columns rushed out of their trenches, and attacked the left flank of the Central Bastion, which they entered; but a sanguinary struggle ensued: the Russians collected in great force, planted themselves behind breastworks and traverses in various directions, brought field-pieces to bear upon the besiegers, and kept up such a fire of cannon, musketry, and rifles as shook the resolution of the French; Generals Rivet and Breton were killed, Generals Couston and Trochu wounded; and the destruction at length became so terrible as to force the French to abandon the works they had entered and return to their trenches. De Salles prepared a second assault; but Pelissier, feeling certain that he had by this time a firm hold of the Malakoff, countermanded any further attack on the south-western forts, where the Russians were more powerful than had been anticipated. The assault on the Flagstaff Battery did not take place. The English, smarting under their defeat at the Redan, had some consolation—or, more generously, perhaps, some justification—in thinking that the French had been similarly foiled at the Little Redan, the Curtain, and the Central Bastion.

It had been intended by the Allied admirals to bring the broadsides of their bulky ships-of-war to bear upon the various Russian batteries near Quarantine Bay, during the bombardment and assault; but the weather was too boisterous to permit the carrying out of this plan. Nevertheless, ten or twelve mortar-vessels were set to work, and poured a storm of shells into the town, as well as against Forts Alexander, Quarantine, and other defence-works near the harbour. At a later hour, the Allied ships formed a cordon round the mouth of the harbour, to prevent any Russian steamers from escaping during the night, if such should happen to be their design. That portion of the British fleet which manned the naval batteries in the bombardment bore, as it always bore, a prominent share in the danger and the good service; it was commanded at that time by Captains Keppel and Moorsom. The Allies had not the glory of meeting the Russian fleet in fair battle, and vanquishing it; for the Russians effected a self-conquest. Although some of the large ships-of-war had been sunk just twelve months previously, to form a barrier across the harbour, there yet remained a larger number which had wrought much mischief to the besiegers: these were now finally doomed; one by one, during the terrific final bombardment, and the fierce struggle immediately following it, the ships were sunk, either burnt or scuttled, until at length fifty vessels, of which eighteen were ships-of-the-line, lay beneath the waters! Thus was Sinope avenged—all the ships destroyed, most of the officers and crews killed or wounded, that had been engaged in the ruthless attack at that place.

A mournful tale had the adjutant-generals of the two armies to tell, when the mutilated and bleeding bodies were collected, to determine who were killed and who wounded on this sanguinary 8th of September. No other day throughout the war recorded such dread havoc. Of the 2447 officers and men in the British army killed, wounded, and missing on this day, no fewer than 1435 belonged to the light division, comprising the 7th, 19th, 23d,* 33d, 34th, 77th, 88th, 90th, 97th, and Rifles. The Rifles, the 23d, and the 97th each had more than 200 placed *hors de combat;* and the 19th, 88th, and 90th made a near approach to an equal amount of loss. Four regiments of the 2d division, the 3d, 30th, 41st, and 55th, bore an almost equally severe ratio of loss. The Highlanders, Guards, 4th division, and cavalry, suffered very slightly on this day. The French loss was threefold more severe; it comprised no less than 7551 killed, wounded, and missing, making with the English a total of 9998; their officers were struck down in astonishing numbers; no fewer than fifteen generals and 398 commissioned officers of various ranks were killed, wounded, or contused. The 15th French regiment went into action with 900 men, and came out with only 310. The British lost a greater number in unsuccessfully storming

* The losses sustained by the 23d regiment, or Royal Welsh Fusiliers, were severe beyond all parallel in the British army during the war—in officers, if not in men. Nine officers were killed at Alma, five at the Redan, one in the trenches, five died of wounds and cholera, and sixteen were wounded at Alma, Inkermann, and in the engagements at the Redan and trenches—making a total of thirty-six commissioned officers in one regiment in a period of about a year.

the Redan than Wellington lost in the famous storming of Badajoz during the Peninsular war. As to the Russian loss, no authentic account of it was obtainable; it must have been frightful in amount, as the hospitals, the interior of the various forts, the whole area of the town, and the long trains of ambulances, too surely told. The men laid prostrate on this day, killed or wounded, besiegers and besieged, far exceeded 20,000.

Now arrived the climax, almost amounting to sublimity, of the siege: one of the most impressive sights ever witnessed in war—the departure of the whole of the Russians from the south to the north side of the harbour, during the night. Pelissier remarked, in his dispatch: 'Towards evening I had a suspicion this would be effected; I saw long files of troops and baggage cross the bridge to the north side; conflagrations soon burst out on all sides, and every doubt on the subject vanished. I should have liked to push forward, gain the bridge of boats over the harbour, and cut off the enemy's retreat; but the besieged commenced blowing up their fortifications, magazines, and buildings.' General Simpson, who had intended that Sir Colin Campbell and General Eyre should make a second assault on the Redan on the morrow, sent up a party cautiously about eleven at night to see how that bastion was occupied; it was found to be evacuated, telling significantly of the intended abandonment of the whole southern side. From the manifestations during the night, and from facts afterwards made public, it appears that Gortchakoff, when the impossibility of maintaining his position became evident, commenced arrangements for blowing up all or nearly all the public buildings of the devoted city, storing up combustibles within and beneath them. The gunners at the several forts kept up, during the early hours of the night, a cannonade sufficiently continuous to mask their proceedings, although the Allied commanders had strong suspicions of the impending event.

In the dead of the night, when the Allied camps were filled with men either sleeping or thinking anxiously of the scenes which daylight might bring forth, lurid flames began to arise in Sebastopol, explosions of great violence shook the air, and intense commotion was visible to some silent spectators on the heights around. The fires began in various parts of the town, thereby indicating a pre-arranged devastation—a second Moscow. One tremendous explosion, immediately behind the Redan, tore up the ground for a great distance around; and other explosions succeeded so rapidly that a black murky mass of smoke flitted amongst and across the flames from the burning buildings, imparting an awful grandeur to the scene. Now came a resistless outburst which blew up the Flagstaff Battery; now another that reduced to a shapeless heap the Garden Battery; now others that dispersed many of the smaller batteries and redoubts; while numerous unspent shells, left purposely or perhaps unavoidably near these spots, ignited, flew up wildly, burst in the air, and scattered their fragments around. The French were in a better position than the English to observe this terrific scene, having possession of the elevated Malakoff. General Ragon said: 'At midnight, from the top of our conquered work, and mounted on heaps of dead Russians, we were witnesses of one of the grandest spectacles that can possibly be conceived—the town in flames, lighted up all the harbour, where the Russian vessels were disappearing, one after the other, beneath the waves, lurid by the glare of the fire on shore. To this terrible picture was added the successive explosions of forts, batteries, and powder-magazines, which the enemy blew up in their retreat.' As daylight approached, Fort Paul was seen surrounded by flames and exposed to devastation, then Fort Nicholas, and then the Central and Quarantine Bastions. Meanwhile the bridge of boats was incessantly laden with living freight. Masses of infantry crossed over the Great Harbour, from the south side to the north, braving the deep waters beneath them and the fires and explosions around, and lighted in their perilous passage by nothing but the glare of the burning city they were leaving. It was a time of deep and impressive meaning. All the regular inhabitants still left, all the soldiers and engineers, all the seamen engaged on shore, the dead bodies of the killed and the maimed bodies of the wounded—passed in a continuous stream over this frail bridge. It may have been that the besiegers could not reach that bridge readily with their guns; it may have been that, glad to see the enemy evacuate the south side of Sebastopol, they had no wish to check the departure; but be the explanation as it may, the bridge of boats remained intact all night. At seven in the morning, when the last battalion of infantry had passed over, the Russians broke the bridge, and thus placed the harbour definitely between them and their assailants—at a time when the town, in flames in every part, sent up 'a pillar of black and velvety fat smoke which seemed to support the very heavens.' The achievement was grand and terrible; the besiegers could not withhold their admiration of the manner in which Gortchakoff carried out his desperate plan, the last available means of saving the rest of the garrison.

It was on Sunday morning, the 9th of September, when the 200,000 Allied troops, British, French, Turks, and Sardinians, posted or encamped in various directions outside Sebastopol, listened to the announcement that the mighty city had fallen—the city which during forty-nine weeks had day by day been looked at and studied by their generals and engineers, and in front of which nearly 10,000 of their number had been killed or wounded on the preceding day. With difficulty was the announcement credited, so accustomed had all been to the dashing of their hopes and the non-fulfilment of their predictions. All who could

or were permitted hastened to the spot; many for curiosity, many also for plunder—always a dark incident in the storming of cities. The rational visitors to the interior were astonished at the enormous extent of the defence-works; at the manner in which the shells and balls of the besiegers had searched out every nook and corner in the town, at the bomb-proof excavations and chambers where so many of the Russian soldiers had been lodged, at the masses of stone and beams of timber which had been hurled hither and thither by the explosions, at the countless balls and burst shells strewed over every part of the city, and at the fearful scene of bloodshed within the Malakoff. Other visitors, not of the rational class, rushed into the town, peered about the burning houses, loaded themselves with pictures, chairs, looking-glasses, dresses, and countless articles quite useless in a camp, and staggered back to their comrades—each hoping he had obtained something which might either be sold for money or taken home as a memento. The generals, appreciating the disorganisation to which such irregular doings lead, established a cordon of cavalry round the town, to keep back stragglers; but there were many fitted to observe keenly and describe vividly, who obtained access to the interior, and sketched scenes never to be forgotten, although too hideous to be dwelt upon. Considering that 20,000 besiegers and besieged fell at the margin of this one town on one day, the frightful state of the parapets and trenches may be only too well conceived; while the great hospital was filled to choking with miserable creatures whom Gortchakoff could not, or at least did not remove. No fewer than 1000 dead bodies lay in this hospital alone, just where they had been placed after being removed wounded from the fortifications: they had died from the impossibility of receiving medical aid at such a time; and the living were mixed up with the dead, all mutilated and mangled, in this horrible place.

Thus ended the great siege of Sebastopol, which had been in progress nearly a year; which had involved the construction of 70 miles of trenches, and the employment of 60,000 fascines, 80,000 gabions, and 1,000,000 sand-bags; and during which more than 1,500,000 shells and shot had been fired at or into the town from the mortars and cannon of the besiegers!—ended, at least, so far as concerns the south side; how far the besiegers really obtained command over the town and harbour, a future Chapter will shew.

The Malakoff.

CHAPTER XII.

CAMPAIGNS SUBORDINATE TO THE SIEGE, IN 1855.

THE siege of Sebastopol, although absorbing a preponderant share of attention on the part of the Allied powers, was not alone sufficient to afford a check to the aggressive movements of Russia. Whether the best was effected that could be effected with the vast military and naval resources at command, may well be doubted; but still there were several distinct enterprises, demanding, in different ratios, the services of the armies and fleets, contemporaneous with the siege in 1855, and conducted at or near the margin of the Black Sea. The occupation of Eupatoria—the expedition to Kinburn and the Dnieper—the battle of the Tchernaya—the operations in the Sea of Azof—the heroic defence, ending with the surrender, of Kars in Asia Minor—and Omar Pacha's campaign in Mingrelia—were of this character.

OPERATIONS AT EUPATORIA.

Eupatoria, it will be remembered,* had been strongly garrisoned during the winter 1854–5 by a large Turkish army under Omar Pacha, which army was engaged in a few serious conflicts during the early weeks of spring. The course of events at that spot, during the remainder of the year, related rather to an occupation than to a campaign; rather to a formidable warning on the west flank of the Russians, than to battles or sieges; rather to a passive than an active assistance rendered to the besieging army.

When the April bombardment of Sebastopol was about to commence, many of the Turkish troops departed from Eupatoria with a view to aiding the besiegers, leaving sufficient only of their number to guard the last-named place; but the failure of the bombardment having liberated them, they returned. On the 22d and following days, Omar Pacha, who had come from Eupatoria to Kamiesch to assist at the bombardment, re-embarked with portions of his army in the *Megère*, *Terrible*, *Jean Bart*, *Sidon*, *Valorous*, and other steamers. The assigned reason for this departure, rather suddenly made, was, that two divisions of Russian infantry were suspected to have left the beleaguered city for Eupatoria, with an intention of attacking that place. The rumour proved to be unfounded; and the Turks returned to a position of inactivity. They had made the fortifications of Eupatoria very strong, insomuch that an attack by the Russians would have been futile; but, on the other hand, as the Turks did not extend their infantry encampments, or their cavalry excursions, far beyond the limits of the town, they opposed very little resistance to the passage of the enemy's columns and convoys from Perekop towards Sebastopol. Omar Pacha's troubles, at that time, consisted not in fighting the Russians, but in feeding a large army and 20,000 impoverished Crim-Tatars at a place where almost every mouthful of food had to be imported in ships from other lands: England had experienced difficulty enough in a duty of analogous character at Balaklava; but the obstacles were still more trying at Eupatoria under Ottoman arrangements. The Turkish commissariat, an imitation in modern times of European organisation, had, unfortunately, imitated little but the defective portions: it worked moderately well on Turkish soil; but when seas divided the army from head-quarters at Constantinople, abuses of every kind crept in, and the troops were in frequent peril of *starvation*. General Cannon, one of the English officers in the Turkish service, was sent by Omar Pacha from Eupatoria to Constantinople, to urge promptness in the pay and rations of the Ottoman army. Irrespective of deficiencies in supply, however, the Turkish troops were placed in circumstances of great disadvantage at this period. The political authorities in Paris and London controlled not only the movements of the French and English armies, but those of the Turks also; and the plans, marked at every stage by indecision and absence of comprehensiveness, frittered away the services the Osmanli might have rendered. There were Turkish forces at Eupatoria, before Sebastopol, on the banks of the Danube, and in Asia Minor; yet, through vacillation or mismanagement, none of these armies had a fair chance for

* See Chapter viii., pp. 330-335.

rendering useful service. The submarine electric-telegraph was extended from Balaklava and Kamiesch to Eupatoria, and thus Omar Pacha was enabled, by the middle of May, to hold ready communication with the British and French commanders; but still this advantage did not lead to any profitable or heroic employment of the Turkish army in the Crimea. The numerous evils of uncertainty were increased, during the spring months, by changes of plan concerning an expedition to Kertch, and by the supersession of Canrobert by Pelissier in the command of the French army: both of which, affecting the French directly, exerted also a disturbing influence on the movements of the Turks at Eupatoria.

During the summer months, active operations were almost entirely suspended at this town. The English and French found their attention wholly absorbed by the various attacks on the Quarries, Redan, Mamelon, Malakoff, White Works, &c.; while the Russians were incessantly occupied in providing for the necessities of the garrison at Sebastopol. The Allies did not cut out any work for the Turks to effect at Eupatoria; nor did the enemy attempt any attacks in that quarter, other than slight alarms by reconnoitring parties of cavalry. When, however, the abandonment by the Russians of the southern part of Sebastopol, in September, gave a new aspect to the siege, the position of Eupatoria attracted the attention of Pelissier and Simpson; and it was thought that that town might be made one extremity of a great base of operations against the enemy. The topographical position of Eupatoria, relatively to Perekop, Simferopol, and Sebastopol, is easily appreciable by the aid of a map; but it becomes necessary here to notice the roads of approach to the Crimea, since the operations at Eupatoria, Kinburn, and Kertch were greatly influenced by considerations touching the convoy of Russian supplies to Sebastopol.

The Isthmus of Perekop* being the only land-connection between the peninsula of the Crimea and the mainland of Russia, the chief road of communication will naturally be at that point; but it does not necessarily follow that this would be the only route. The Sivash, or Sivach Moré, or Putrid Sea, bounding this isthmus on the east, and itself nearly separated from the Sea of Azof by the remarkable tongue of land called the Spit of Arabat, attracted the attention of the Russians early in the war in connection with schemes for sending reinforcements and supplies to the besieged city. A commercial route to the *eastern* parts of the Crimea, by way of this spit, has long existed, necessitating a boat-passage across the Strait of Genitchi, separating the spit from the mainland. The road traversed the whole extent of the spit, from Genitchi to Arabat, a distance of sixty or seventy miles; and from Arabat it bent directly west to the central and southern parts of the Crimea. At a later period, the plan was adopted of traversing only the northern half of the spit, and then crossing a narrow part of the Putrid Sea into the Crimea by means of a bridge of boats, near the spot where the river Salghir ends. This plan involved two crossings of the water, at Genitchi and Salghir; and, therefore, as an improvement, about the year 1845, a road across the Putrid Sea itself was commenced, by means of bridges and viaducts. This road, completed some time before the breaking out of the war, was constructed at such places as supplied shoals whereon piers and other foundations might be constructed. The Putrid Sea presents considerable analogy to the lagoons which encircle Venice, and which, too shallow for easy navigation, offer facilities for hydraulic engineering and bridge-building. At one point, twenty miles south-west of Genitchi, this shallow sea is so narrow, that a timber-bridge, less than a quarter of a mile in length, might cross it; and at this point, the Chongar or Tchongar Peninsula, the road was constructed. The part of Russia, however, immediately at the northern end of this route, is very sterile and destitute of fresh water; insomuch that no general would select that route for the conveyance of supplies to Sebastopol, unless driven by urgent circumstances. The corn-growing provinces lie north-east and north-west of this point: if the former, the produce is brought down by the Volga and the Don, with the aid of a little transhipment, to the Sea of Azof, whence a route may be found to Sebastopol through Kertch, Kaffa, Kara-su-bazar, and Simferopol; if the latter, then the Bug and the Dnieper would form a channel or transit to the estuary whereby the waters of those rivers enter the Black Sea, protected by Russian forts at Kinburn and Oczakoff. Moreover, several government establishments connected with the building and armament of ships were situated on the above-named rivers. Many of these facts were not sufficiently known to the Allied commanders at the commencement of the war; but in the summer and autumn of 1855, several probabilities became apparent, as follow:—If the Allies could command Perekop, they might cut off supplies to Sebastopol from that quarter; if, without commanding Perekop, they could send out strong attacking-parties from Eupatoria, they might intercept convoys going southward; if they could obtain Kinburn or Oczakoff, or both, they would virtually close the estuaries of the Dnieper and Bug, and might perhaps ascend to the great arsenal at Nicolaieff; if they held the Cimmerian Bosphorus or Strait of Yenikalé, they might close up the whole Sea of Azof, and prevent supplies from being forwarded to Kaffa or other ports; if, in addition to Yenikalé, they controlled the mouths of the Don near Taganrog, they might prevent any supplies from being sent through that important route into the Sea of Azof; if they held possession of Genitchi, they would cut off the old commercial route *viâ*

* The topographical details of this section are illustrated in the two coloured maps—'The Crimea,' and the 'Sea of Azof.'

the Spit of Arabat; and, lastly, if they could occupy the Putrid Sea with gun-boats of light draught, they might destroy or command the new road into the Crimea by the Chongar Bridge. There were thus seven modes which, if practicable with the means then at hand, would have enabled the Allies to weaken the Russians, by intercepting supplies and reinforcements intended for Sebastopol. The occupation of Perekop, if ever contemplated, was definitely abandoned; but, as we shall see in this and future sections, the other remaining channels of communication, or most of them, became objects of hostile demonstration.

The intercepting position of Eupatoria, mentioned above, induced the Allies in September to attempt something in that quarter. Notwithstanding a large body of Turks having long been kept there in idleness, they sent a powerful reinforcement from Kamiesch and Balaklava. The object appears to have been, to disperse the Russian troops in the vicinity of Eupatoria, and then to act upon the line of road between Perekop and Simferopol. For this purpose a body of about 2000 French cavalry under General d'Allonville was sent, consisting of hussars and dragoons, aided by horse-artillery; these, with numerous regiments of infantry, landed at Eupatoria in the last week of September, and occupied various villages in the neighbourhood. A fleet of French ships conveyed the troops; and the expedition gave rise to hopes in the camp that something important was pending. The French contingent found 30,000 Turkish troops at Eupatoria, idle, but willing to be usefully employed; it was also ascertained, or at least rendered extremely probable, that the Russians either did not make use of the Perekop route at that time for the conveyance of supplies to Sebastopol, or else made a wide detour eastward to keep as far as possible from Eupatoria. The Turks at this period were commanded by Achmet Pacha, who had arrived in the British ship *Gladiator* on the 7th of September, and had been received with all military honours. He had not been many hours in his new command when the rumour of the fall of Sebastopol—if that can be a fall which left the northern forts untouched—arrived, coloured with all sorts of exaggerations; at first, the Eupatorians, native and foreign, were told that the Russians were about to attack them in force, and then that a powerful French army was about to arrive. The French contingent proved to be smaller than report had indicated; but though small, it soon shewed signs of activity. Generals d'Allonville and Schramer, Admiral Bruat, and the Turkish generals, Achmet Pacha, Ismail Pacha, and Sefer Pacha, exchanged hospitalities and attended reviews; and Achmet Pacha also fulfilled the honours of an entertainer to the Duke of Newcastle, Sir Edmund Lyons, and Sir Houston Stewart.

On the 24th, the French and the Turks first fought side by side in this region. A body of Russians was known to be hovering near the south shore of Lake Sasik, the shallow sheet of water lying south-east of Eupatoria; and the Allies thereupon resolved to send a force to attack them. French, Turks, and Egyptians, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, set forth, to the number of 8000, and came up to a position where 2000 Russians were posted, near the village of Saki. The inferiority of strength was such that the Russians could make but little resistance; they fled, and left the Allies in possession of the strip of land between the lake and the sea.

On the 29th took place the second encounter, with French and Turks as allies, in this quarter; it was a cavalry engagement, at Koughil, about fifteen miles north-east of the town. D'Allonville, having received information that a body of Russians was in the neighbourhood, under General Korff, laid a plan of attack with Achmet Pacha, by which it was agreed that three columns should start from the town early in the morning; that one of these should proceed south-east to Saki, at the further extremity of Lake Sasik; that a second, commanded by Achmet Pacha, should proceed nearly north, and advance upon the Perekop road at Doltchak or Toltchak; while a third, commanded by D'Allonville in person, and consisting of twelve squadrons of horse, a battery of horse-artillery, 200 irregular cavalry, and six Egyptian battalions, should cross one of the arms of Lake Sasik, and join the second body at Doltchak by a detour. These forces were considerable in strength, amounting in the whole to 20,000 regulars, besides the Bashi-Bazouks, whose numbers were as irregular as their habits; there were in addition twenty-two field-pieces. D'Allonville's corps encountered the enemy in considerable force near the northern margin of the lake; the Russians had eighteen squadrons of cavalry, with Cossacks and horse-artillery, and the French general deemed it possible that this force might be hemmed in by a judicious attack. A brisk charge of cavalry was made on two or three different points; when Korff, feeling himself unable to make a successful resistance, resolved to retreat while retreat was yet open to him, leaving behind him Colonel Andreaski and about fifty troops killed, besides 170 prisoners; the Allies also captured three cannons, three mortars, twelve caissons, a field-forge, and 250 horses, at a loss of about thirty-five killed and wounded. The other two corps or divisions, under Achmet Pacha and Ismail Pacha, encountered very few Russians, brought away little with them but a cargo of trifling trophies, and left behind them a string of miserable burning villages. As is usual in the lamentable manœuvres of warfare, the Russians destroyed some of the villages to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Allies; the Allies devastated the rest; and thus the few remaining Tatar inhabitants of the villages were effectually driven from every part of the district except Eupatoria itself.

General Pelissier appears to have been so far satisfied with this cavalry movement at Eupatoria, that he applied to General Simpson for a reinforcement of English horse, to be sent to the same place. No objection was made to this, as the cavalry under British command was almost entirely useless on the plateau outside Sebastopol, or in the Tchernaya plain. Simpson thereupon agreed to send Brigadier-general Lord George Paget, with the Carabiniers, 4th and 13th Light Dragoons, 12th Lancers, and one troop of the Royal Horse-artillery; and preparations were made at Balaklava for the transport of this contingent. Not a single opportunity had been offered to the English cavalry to distinguish itself since the battle of Balaklava, more than eleven months earlier; and the men had become dispirited by duties irksome without being fame-worthy. Before this force could arrive at Eupatoria, D'Allonville made a reconnaissance into the interior, over and beyond the ground traversed on the 29th of September; this took place on the 7th of October. A mixed force of Turks and French, infantry and cavalry, set forth at daybreak, and penetrated to a distance of about twenty miles, meeting with a few bodies of Russian cavalry and Cossacks, but failing to entice them into action; they returned with a few hundred head of sheep and cattle, principally seized by the roaming Bashi-Bazouks, but without effecting anything of importance.

When the British cavalry, under Lord Paget, arrived about the middle of October, various consultations were held concerning the best mode of rendering its services available. On the 22d an expedition set out, under D'Allonville, towards Saki; the English, French, and Turkish cavalry taking the inland or eastern side of Lake Sasik; while a body of infantry proceeded along the isthmus separating the lake from the sea. Pelissier had about that time sent General de Failly's division of infantry to Eupatoria; and the forces under D'Allonville being thus rendered considerable, he was instructed to advance in the direction of the great road from Perekop to Simferopol, to ascertain the nature of the Russian communications in that quarter. The region being almost waterless, he was provided with portable pumps for working wells, skins for water, &c. On the morning in question the cavalry advanced inland by way of Kumen, Karagurt, Tchobtar, Temesch, Tuzla, and other villages, and encountered various small bodies of Russians; the Cossacks and Bashi-Bazouks, alike in many of their qualities as skirmishing irregulars, had a few encounters; and the English artillery fired a few shots at distant bodies of Russian horse; but the enemy retreated too quickly to admit of close contest, although they had as many as twenty squadrons of cavalry in one body. Near Temesch, on the 23d, the Russians were in yet greater force, comprising infantry and artillery as well as cavalry; but as they persisted in their tactics of non-fighting, and as D'Allonville had not provisioned his force for a long detention, he returned to Eupatoria on the 24th, with no other glory than that of destroying two or three villages. An opinion was formed, resulting from this reconnaissance, that the enemy had established his points of concentration further northward than the parallel of Eupatoria; and to ascertain this fact more fully, D'Allonville made another excursion on the 27th, on a somewhat formidable scale; taking with him twenty-four battalions of French and Turkish infantry, thirty-eight squadrons of French, English, and Turkish cavalry, and fifty-six pieces of artillery—a large army, in fact. He advanced south-east to Saki, and thence towards Tchobtar, which was found to have been fortified with a few earthworks by the Russians, and to be further defended by a piece of marshy ground in front. The Russians were here in considerable force; and unmasking a battery of thirty heavy guns, they sent forth a torrent of shot and shell upon the Allies, doing considerable mischief. There were a few indications of other low earthworks, probably masking batteries; but as the Russians steadily refused any open encounter during the 27th and 28th, D'Allonville returned to Eupatoria on the 29th—having ascertained that the enemy, if near that town at all in great force, was posted south-east, near the road leading from Perekop to Baktchéserai. Prince Gortchakoff, in his dispatch relating to these movements, states that the Russian troops were under Prince Radzivil and General Schabelsky. In reference to the events of the 23d, he makes a statement differing marvellously from anything contained in the English and French dispatches: 'The Allies fell back on Saki in such haste that our troops, who advanced at a trot, could not come up with them.' The same style of language marks the prince's dispatch concerning the manœuvres five days later—the Allies being made to shrink as soon as the Russians attacked them.

November came, and with it a repetition of these reconnaissances. D'Allonville, having received information that large flocks and herds, intended for the Russians, were collected at a village about twenty miles north-east of Eupatoria, resolved to capture them. He sent forward a few squadrons of English, French, and Turkish cavalry, giving the command—a very rare thing among the Allies—to a Turk, Ali Pacha: who so far justified the selection as to return in the evening with 270 oxen, 3450 sheep, 50 horses, 10 camels, and 20 wagons, captured from the Russians, after having 'set fire to the villages and destroyed thirty large ricks of hay.'

These, unquestionably small achievements for so large an army, suffice to characterise all that was done at Eupatoria. Nothing great occurred; nothing that the troops, by any stretch of imagination, could glory over when they returned to their respective countries. Eupatoria, it will thus

be seen, rendered slight aid to the Allied cause, so far as concerned actually military contests: yet there can be no doubt that the Russian movements were sensibly affected by the knowledge, on the part of the commanders, that the Allies held that position in formidable strength—rendering doubly necessary an attention to the routes whereby reinforcements and supplies might reach Sebastopol.

EXPEDITION TO KINBURN AND THE DNIEPER.

A wholly distinct series of operations bore relation to Kinburn and the estuary of the Dnieper.

A glance at a map will shew in how remarkable a manner the coast-line between Odessa and the Crimea is cut up by bays and estuaries. The river Dnieper, after a tortuous course through Russia, enters the Black Sea nearly in a westerly direction, expanding into a *liman*, estuary, bay, or firth, sometimes called Kherson Bay. Into the middle of this estuary, most correctly so called, nearly at right angles, descends the river Bug or Boug; and if the united waters of these two rivers were to proceed in a straight line after leaving the estuary, they would impinge full upon the port of Odessa, forty miles distant. A long sandy peninsula separates the estuary from the Bay of Kinburn (Kilborun, Kilboroun); another peninsula separates this bay from Tendra Bay; which, in its turn, is separated by the Tendra Peninsula, a curious elongated sandy spit, from the Gulf of Perekop—all the waters near these spits and peninsulas being very shallow. The mouth of the estuary is guarded by two forts, Kinburn and Oczakoff (Otchakow, Otschakov), the former on the south and the latter on the north. Kinburn, the more important, is built on a spit of sand at the extremity of the Djarilgatch Peninsula, itself little other than a sandy spit; and the space between the two forts, about a mile and a quarter in width, is the outlet for the waters of the large rivers Dnieper and Bug, with their numerous confluents. The estuary, about forty miles from east to west, is everywhere shallow, and in many places interrupted by shoals; and there are also dangerous sandbanks near its mouth—rendering the roadstead hazardous for large ships. The Dnieper enters the estuary by a multitude of mouths, separated by sandy or marshy islets; at the apex or eastern end of the delta thus formed, sixty miles from Kinburn, is the town of Kherson or Cherson, known to English readers as the burial-place of Howard the philanthropist. On the eastern shore of the Bug, twenty-five miles above the confluence of that river with the estuary, stands Nicolaïeff (Nikoliev, Nicholief), a place which, at the time of the war, was important to Russia as the arsenal for building and fitting war-ships. The small town of Kinburn, as one of the two defences of the mouth of the estuary, was, in October 1855, found to be furnished with a fort, regularly casemated and stone-built, and mounting between thirty and forty guns, assisted also by two strand-batteries. Oczakoff, on the northern margin, was less strongly fortified. The sandy spit facing the southern side of the estuary is provided with a road extending from Kinburn to Kherson. The last-named town was of much importance to Russia as a military centre; being fifty miles by road distant from Kinburn, forty from Nicolaïeff, and seventy from Perekop, it connected all as the centre of a triangle, and facilitated the transport of troops from one to another; it contained large military magazines, and its docks admitted ships of considerable burden.

Such being the relative positions of Kinburn, Oczakoff, Odessa, Nicolaïeff, Kherson, and Perekop, the Allies saw the importance of obtaining one or both of the two first-named towns, as a means of shutting up the Russian arsenal at Nicolaïeff, and of establishing a new base of operations for Crimean warfare. French and English prepared for an expedition, military and naval. The *Royal Albert, Algiers, Hannibal, Leopard, Sidon, Princess Royal, St Jean d'Acre, Arabia*, and other vessels, were selected on the part of the British to convey the 17th, 20th, 21st, 57th, and 63d regiments, together with marines, artillery, engineers, and a few cavalry: Brigadier-general Spencer being placed in command of these troops. The known scarcity of water in that region led to a limitation in the number of horse. On the 7th of October the French and English troops, having been on board ship several days in Kazatch and Kamiesch Bays, set sail, accompanied by several line-of-battle ships, small steamers, gun-boats, mortar-vessels, and three new French floating-batteries of formidable strength—constituting altogether an armament of considerable magnitude. The English squadron alone comprised six steam line-of-battle ships, seventeen steam frigates and sloops, ten gun-boats, six mortar-vessels, three steam-tenders, and ten transports, making fifty-two vessels, carrying in all about 1500 guns, and 5000 troops of all kinds. The Russians north of Sebastopol were for a time in wild excitement, when this large armament appeared; but the ships struck off to the north-west, and disappeared from the Crimea. The admirals signaled to the several captains to rendezvous four miles from Odessa; and it was then the turn for the Odessa people to be alarmed by this display of force, as the ships severally came within four or five miles of the pillar, the telegraph, the guard-house, the domes and steeples, the broad steps, the cheerful terraces, the tree-lined boulevards, the forts, palaces, batteries, barracks, of this remarkable city—a city which has been characterised as 'a temple erected by Despotism to Civilisation, in hope of making peace with her.' It was

on the 8th that the fleets anchored within sight of Odessa, there to remain until a few surveying vessels had taken careful soundings of the channel thence to Kinburn, concerning which the admirals entertained much doubt. The Russians, on the heights around the city, became incessantly active in making telescopic observations, sending off telegraphic messages and clouds of reconnoitring Cossacks, and drawing up infantry and artillery to the cliff-line, ready to defend Odessa if attacked. So completely had the telegraphic wire by this time assumed its mastery, that the anchoring of the Allied fleet at this spot on the 8th was known nearly all over Europe a day or two afterwards, exciting hopes in some hearts and fears in others. All day on the 9th the fleet remained stationary, seventy or eighty French and English vessels in a line five miles in length, eagerly watched on the cliffs by large masses of infantry and cavalry; the rocket-boats, gun-boats, mortar-vessels, and floating-batteries, might have gone nearer, and crumbled the beautiful city to ruins; but such were not the orders received from Paris and London: not a shot was fired; and thus was Odessa spared, for the third or fourth time during the war. It is supposed that the object of the admirals in making this singular sojourn opposite Odessa was to entice Russian troops away from Kinburn, Nicolaïeff, or Kherson, leaving those towns more easily to be controlled by the besiegers. The 10th and 11th found the fleets in the same position, frequent dense fogs giving the seamen a foretaste of the dangers of that coast; and as the 12th and 13th were very stormy days, the admirals would not incur the risk of setting sail until the weather moderated—thus it happened that the Odessans had the apparently threatening fleet before them full six days, from the morning of the 8th to that of the 14th.

It was an immense armament for so small a work—the capture of Kinburn; but doubtless the admirals and generals intended something more than this simple capture. The fort at that place had been so little attended to by the Russians, that an English lieutenant had some time previously offered to seize and blow it up if he had 300 men to aid him; but when the Russians saw English steamers cruising about, they began to strengthen the fort and augment the garrison; and it now became probable that if the Allies, once attempting the capture, were to fail, the fort might soon become a miniature Bomarsund: hence the dispatch of an assailing force disproportionably large. Admirals Lyons, Stewart, and Bruat, with Generals Spencer and Bazaine, arranged their plan of attack. According to this plan, nine line-of-battle ships were to open their broadsides on Fort Kinburn and the strand-batteries, at distances from 1000 to 1400 yards; the mortar-vessels and floating-batteries were to take up positions varying from 600 to 2800 yards distant, according to the kind of projectile thrown; the frigates and small steamers were to be held in readiness for any active service; the gun-boats were to protect the landing of the soldiers on the spit; while some of the steamers were to anchor in line as night-beacons to guide the fleet on its way from Odessa to Kinburn. Then, supposing the troops to be landed on the south margin of the spit, a little eastward of Kinburn, the French were to form the left wing and the English the right.

The plan underwent change; but in truth the capture was so easily effected, that there was insufficient work for the ships to do. On the evening of the 14th, some of the vessels—the *Fancy*, *Boxer*, *Cracker*, and *Clinker*, English gun-boats, with four French gun-boats—entered the estuary, by passing the mouth at Kinburn and Oczakoff against a heavy fire from the enemy; and on the morning of the 15th the troops landed unmolested, at a part of the spit about three miles east or south-east of the town. By this double manœuvre, the Russians were prevented from receiving reinforcements by sea, while the garrison were cut off from escape along the spit. In the evening, the mortar-vessels began to try their range on the forts, but without commencing a regular bombardment. The weather on the 16th was very unfavourable to vessels on a dangerous sandy coast, and little was attempted. The troops set to work, intrenching themselves on the sandy spit; and during the day a few French sentries had a skirmish with a handful of Cossacks; but the chief labour of the day was the landing of stores, tedious and dangerous work over the rough surf, occasioning the swamping or stranding of some of the boats. A sort of encamped position was formed on the sandy spit; the French having a line of intrenchment on the west or Kinburn side, and the English another on the east or Kherson side; while the other two sides, washed by the sea, were controlled by the larger vessels which had entered the estuary, and by the mortar-boats and floating-batteries.

The 17th of October—the anniversary of the first bombardment of Sebastopol—having dawned with more favourable weather, it was determined that the assault should be made on that day. The direction of the wind enabled the French and English mortar-vessels and gun-boats, and the French floating-batteries, to take up positions off Fort Kinburn, and to open fire at once. In order to trace the operations of the day clearly, it will be necessary to speak separately of the manœuvres of the larger ships, of the smaller vessels, and of the military force.

The labours of the larger ships are soon told. The frigates and other vessels of moderate size inside the estuary, under the more immediate command of Rear-admiral Sir Houston Stewart and Rear-admiral Odet Pellion, steamed in a line between Kinburn and Oczakoff, the *Valorous* being followed in order by the *Furious*, *Asmodée*, *Cacique*, *Sidon*, *Leopard*, *Sané*, *Gladiator*, *Firebrand*, *Stromboli*, and *Spiteful*. Each ship poured out

its broadside upon the fort and the strand-batteries as it passed, and received the enemy's fire in return. Had the fort resisted for any length of time, it was Stewart's intention to maintain the *Sidon*, *Leopard*, *Sanê*, and *Gladiator* directly in front of it, and to silence the guns on that side by repeated broadsides; but the Russians did not render this continued assault necessary. The difficulty of this enterprise consisted mainly in penetrating into the estuary; for the shallows rendered it necessary to keep much closer to Kinburn than to Oczakoff, and therefore to bring the steamers under the influence of the guns of the forts. The two earthwork batteries, nearer to the extremity of the spit, mounted twelve and twenty guns respectively; and it was necessary to silence these as well as the larger fort. The line-of-battle ships, together with the small vessels, were at this time outside the spit; the *Royal Albert*, *Algiers*, *Agamemnon*, and *Princess Royal*, and four French ships-of-the-line, approached abreast the principal fort; the *Curaçao*, *St Jean d'Acre*, *Tribune*, and *Sphinx* attacked the nearest earthwork battery; the *Hannibal*, *Dauntless*, and *Terrible* took position opposite the battery near the end of the spit; while the cloud of smaller vessels directed their attack mainly on the east and centre of the fort. Thus the Russians, from the peculiar shape and position of the spit, were attacked from all sides at once. It was perilous work, however, to the large vessels; for, anchored as they were in front of the fort, they had only two feet of water under their keels, although 1200 yards distant from the fort: a fact added to many others shewing the superior value of gun-boats and mortar-vessels over line-of-battle ships on shoal coasts. The ships, however, brought their broadsides to bear upon the devoted fort, and dismounted many of the guns on the southern front.

The smaller vessels were those which effectually reduced Kinburn—affording a lesson that might have been very valuable to the Allies, in their Black Sea and Baltic operations, if occurring earlier. They were stationed nearly south of the fort, the floating-batteries nearest, then the gun-boats, and the mortar-vessels most distant: each endeavouring either to batter down the defences of the fort or to fire the interior. Sir Edmund Lyons summed up the result in a very few words: 'Their fire was so effective that before noon the buildings in the interior of the fort were in flames, and the eastern front had suffered very considerably;' but from more detailed accounts it appears that the three French mortar-batteries—appropriately named the *Dévastation*, *Lave*, and *Tonnante*—exhibited qualities well deserving the attention of all concerned. Being only 600 to 700 yards from the fort, these vessels were exposed to a tremendous hurricane of shot and shells; but the missiles glanced off without doing serious mischief: the enormous iron enveloping sheath of the batteries being quite bomb-proof. Each was a target to be fired at, but, like a target, it received the fire without destructive injury; the shot and shell could be heard by the sailors in the distant ships slapping and smacking against the sides of the batteries, and then rebounding off into the water. One battery alone received sixty indentations or shot-marks, all of which would have been perilous to a wooden vessel, but were of little account to this case-hardened burly piece of engineering. Nor were the crew in more danger than their vessel, for they all worked below, except a look-out man in a shot-proof box on deck. From half-past nine o'clock until noon these three powerful vessels maintained their terrible fire against the chief fort, crashing the parapets and disabling the guns; while the mortar-vessels set fire to the buildings within the fort. The *Arrow* and *Lynx* gun-boats, with others of the same class, were exposed to much more danger than the ponderous floating-batteries; having taken up a position at 800 to 900 yards, to discharge their Lancaster shell upon the fort, they received in return an iron torrent which tried the resolution of the crews.

The military evolutions of the day were slight. Bazaine and Spencer made a cavalry reconnaissance early in the morning, to a ruined and deserted village, but without encountering any of the enemy's troops; they returned by the hour of commencing the cannonade. Bazaine placed two companies of chasseurs under cover, at a distance of 400 yards from the east side of the fort, and kept up a fusilade on the Russian artillerymen; while at the same time the field-pieces opened a fire on the fort; but the results tended to shew that the fleet had wrought most damage to the besieged, on account of the great power of the guns and mortars employed.

The surrender of Kinburn was a touching ceremony. When Lyons and Bruat saw that, notwithstanding the inevitable destruction impending, no sign of failing courage was exhibited by the garrison, they felt, as gallant men, admiration for the loyal devotedness of the defenders to the cause they were called upon to support; and Lyons stated, in his dispatch to the Admiralty, that he determined to offer terms, rather than see the forlorn garrison utterly annihilated by a resistless fire. The two admirals and two generals, acting by concert, sent in a flag of truce summoning the governor and garrison to surrender. There appears to have been a council of war held *forthwith in the fort*, during which—notwithstanding the crash and ruin and conflagration going on around them—the officers had the utmost difficulty in bringing themselves to consent to an act humiliating though imperative; the guns were rapidly becoming dismounted and useless, and though there was good store of ammunition, the destruction of the place and all within it could not much longer be averted except by submission. Bazaine and Stewart met the governor, Major-general Koïnovitch, at the entrance to the fort; the governor tendered his surrender, in

military form, but not without bitter tears, and a passionate exclamation expressive of wounded national and professional honour. The officers in general bore the scene with dignity, but with deep mortification; and many of them were said to have been on the verge of mutiny against the governor, so strongly did they resist any proposals for surrender. The garrison marched out—some say fierce with soldierly irritation, some say brutally drunk with ardent spirits, but probably a combination of both—and laid down their arms; they amounted to 1420 men, with Koïnovitch and 40 officers; these, with 200 now killed and 300 or 400 wounded, had garrisoned the fort and manned the two earth-work batteries. The terms of surrender were—that the garrison were to retire with everything except arms and ammunition; the officers being allowed to wear their swords, and the men to carry off their knapsacks, clothing, and other trifles of personal property. It was a surrender made as little painful as could be to the defenders. By the terms of capitulation, the victors were to receive the place with all its military stores

Fort of Kinburn.

as at the moment of surrender; and Koïnovitch undertook, as a point of honour, that there should be no explosion of magazines or destruction of guns or batteries, on the part of the Russians. Several ship-surgeons were sent ashore to attend the Russian wounded in the place. Bazaine transferred 17 officers and 740 men to Spencer, as prisoners to the English; these were sent to Constantinople in the *Vulcan*, while the remainder, as French prisoners, were sent in one of Bruat's ships. General Spencer, it may here be remarked, acted in subordination to General Bazaine in this expedition; as a set-off to the precedence willingly yielded by the French to the English in the fleet. The captors found nearly eighty guns mounted in the fort and batteries, mostly long and heavy 18 and 24 pounders; but there were many others ready for mounting, platforms to support them, and newly constructed casemates, raising the total of guns to 174; there was also a very large store of ammunition in the place, including 25,000 shot and shell, and 120,000 cartridges—rendering evident the intention of the Russians to have strengthened the place if the attack had been longer delayed.

The prisoners having been sent off to Constantinople, the captors proceeded to garrison Kinburn, repair and increase the defences, and form plans for ulterior proceedings. Oczakoff had already engaged their attention. This place, on the north shore of the strait, is built on a cliff of moderate height, projecting southward like a promontory or headland, and fronted by a fort, an old defence-work of no great strength, called the Nicholas Battery; there was also an earthen battery near the fort. Kinburn, on the other hand, was a regular fortress, well built of stone and earth, having ditches on the two sides not washed by the sea, ranges of casemated guns on every side, and barracks and magazines in the interior. Kinburn village, outside the fort, had been occupied by a few military colonists. When the small garrison at Oczakoff found that their guns could effect little against the invaders, and that Kinburn was

forced to yield, they blew up the Nicholas Battery on the morning of the 18th, and retired; at the same time, or a few hours afterwards, a deserter came over to the Allies, stating that the Russians had 15,000 men near Oczakoff, and an equal number near Nicolaïeff. It afterwards became known that Lüders had been at Oczakoff and Kinburn shortly before the arrival of the besiegers, and had made preparations and given orders tending, as he hoped, to lead to the retention of those places.

Impatiently waited the English and French soldiers and sailors, the latter especially, for some indications of further conquests; but the admirals felt the weight of the responsibility incurred by any advance, on account chiefly of the doubtful soundings of the estuary and rivers. On the 20th the two admirals second in command, English and French, steamed up the estuary with their light-draught flotilla, steam-sloops and gun-boats, to reconnoitre and examine. The seizure of Oczakoff was not attempted by the Allies—because the Russians could have approached by land in some force from Nicolaïeff; and because the shot and shell from the gun-boats could not have reached those troops, on account of the great breadth of sand and shoal; the Allies contented themselves, therefore, with knowing that the batteries of the place were destroyed. The rear-admirals cautiously felt their way along, between the shoals, and reached the mouth of the river Bug, little less than five miles in width. Houston Stewart, with the *Stromboli*, *Spitfire*, *Grinder*, and *Cracker*, turned northward, determined to see a little of the river itself; the banks were found to be rather high, but behind them was nothing but bare steppe, with a few large farms and small villages at intervals. The gun-boats ascended the river about one-third of the way towards Nicolaïeff, and there encountered a Russian earth-battery on the right bank; a sharp interchange of firing took place; and the steamers, having made a careful series of soundings, returned—an attack on the Russian positions not having been the object of that excursion. On the next day, the 21st, a few French gun-boats ascended the river, and exchanged shots with the same battery. It was ascertained on this day that the Cossacks were busily engaged burning all the small villages between Kinburn and Kherson, to check any anticipated progress of the invaders in that direction by land. The Russians displayed the same activity in preparing defences as had been so remarkably exhibited at Sebastopol; for a headland on the northern side of the estuary, east of the mouth of the Bug, was quite unprotected on this day, the 21st, whereas, within twenty-four hours, the village of Stanislaff, close at hand, exhibited a sand-bag battery of five guns; while numerous bodies of infantry and Cossacks were narrowly watching on the heights above.

In England and France, anxious readers began to ask for further announcements of success, solid military or naval advantage, in this Dnieper expedition; they felt that the mere capture of Kinburn was an insufficient result of arrangements planned on so large a scale. The authorities at Nicolaïeff telegraphed to St Petersburg on the 23d, that the enemy's vessels were cruising in various places within and outside the estuary, taking soundings, but not engaging in hostile demonstrations. It was found, by the examination made this day, that the spit of Kinburn could not be well commanded by gun-boats, on account of the great breadth of sedgy shallows preventing the boats from making a near approach: hence any military advance of the Allies eastward along the spit could receive little aid from the fleet. In truth, therefore, the light war-steamers roamed about in search of adventures, rather than engaged in any definite work. The Russians had been accustomed to maintain communication between Kinburn and Nicolaïeff *viâ* Oczakoff, men and stores being rowed across the estuary in large barges; and when this channel was closed against them, they naturally kept strict watch on the invaders, and telegraphed day by day, to St Petersburg in one direction and to Sebastopol in another; mentioning the numbers of vessels visible, and the movements or apparent movements of the enemy. On the 24th nothing particular was recorded. On the 25th the *Stromboli*, *Triton*, *Wrangler*, and *Snake* steamed eastward to the mouths of the Dnieper, where they found two enormous rafts of ship-building timber, which had descended that river from the forests of Russia, and were to have been towed up the Don to the dock-yard at Nicolaïeff; the value of the two was estimated at not less than £20,000. These rafts were afterwards dragged out by the *Spiteful* and *Spitfire*, and brought down to Kinburn. Though of small value to the Allies, at that time and place, the capture was deemed important; inasmuch as the great Russian arsenal at Nicolaïeff was supplied with ship-timber mostly from the governments of Minsk, Mohileff, and Vitebsk, where forests of vast extent supplied the oak logs and beams, drifted thence down the Dnieper to Kherson. In the last century Kherson was a great ship-building depôt; but as the mouth of the Bug has deeper water than that of the Dnieper, the Russian government removed the chief dock-yard to Nicolaïeff, at the point of confluence of the Bug with the Ingul; and small steamers were employed to tow the enormous timber-rafts from Kherson to this town.

The Allied military forces had been doing little. After the capitulation of Kinburn on the 17th, Spencer employed two days in removing his troops nearer to that fort, and rendering their encampment as convenient as was practicable. On the 20th, Bazaine set out with several regiments of both forces, about 4500 strong, and advanced eastward along the spit to Paksoffka, Skakoffka, and one or two other villages; it was

a three days' reconnaissance, during which little was seen but a dismal waste of sand, spotted with a few wretched villages, which, if not destroyed by the Cossacks, were at once destroyed by the assailants. About 250 Russian cavalry were sufficiently near to watch Bazaine's return on the 23d, but no engagement took place.

The end of October arrived, amid these unimportant proceedings; and questions became seriously pressed in various quarters, whether nothing further was to result from an expedition of such magnitude. Why, it was asked, did the fleet make so portentous a stay at Odessa, as if to draw off troops from Oczakoff, Nicolaïeff, and Kherson, unless it had been intended to attack and occupy one or more of those three towns? Why seize Kinburn and nothing further? If simply to close the estuary of the Dnieper and Bug, the frost would effectually do this in a few weeks. Why awaken the vigilance of the Russians in this quarter, by a small enterprise which would infallibly lead them to add formidable defences to Nicolaïeff and Kherson during the winter? These queries did not receive satisfactory answers; it was resolved to leave a sufficient number of troops and vessels to guard Kinburn during the winter, but to bring away all the other forces, both military and naval. On the 27th of October, Bazaine and Spencer began their arrangements for this departure, selecting for a garrison as many troops as the fort would conveniently accommodate; while Lyons and Bruat selected the vessels which might most usefully be left to protect Kinburn from any Russian attack across the estuary. The Allies destroyed the earthen batteries at the end of the spit, but brought the fort itself into an excellent state of defence—clearing away the ruins, repairing the walls and embrasures, replacing the damaged guns by large ships' ordnance, deepening the ditch, re-forming the palisades, strengthening the crest of the parapets, making a ravelin in front of the east face, restoring the casemates, completing efficient barracks and magazines in the interior of the fort, and depositing a large amount of military stores of all kinds.

When the main body of the armament had departed, early in November, the garrison made preparations for the winter, with a somewhat gloomy prospect before them. There was not a tree, not a bush, to shelter the men from keen winds blowing from the dreary steppe country; and the ships anchored at hand prepared to resist the floating ice, which, brought down by the Bug and Dnieper, accumulated near Kinburn. Gun-boats remained for a time to blockade the mouths of the two rivers, and then returned to the roadstead near the fort. The crews became convinced that the two rivers could be ascended safely only by vessels with shot-proof screens and proof decks; as a few riflemen on the high shores, right and left, could have picked off the men one by one, unless the invaders had at the same time a strong force on land. Throughout November the preparations for wintering advanced; and by the end of the month ice appeared. Shooting wild-fowl, of which the concourse was immense, was almost the only amusement for the garrison. The Russians were at the same time proceeding vigorously with their defences; throwing up such works at Oczakoff, and on all the shores near the mouths of the two rivers, as foreshadowed a formidable resistance in the event of any renewed attack by the Allies in the spring of 1856.

Thus the close of the year shewed that, whatever may have been the motives leading to the despatch of a powerful Allied armament from Kamiesch to the estuary of the Dnieper, the enterprise resulted only in the capture of one fort, and in teaching the Russians to be on the alert in that region. Pelissier, in his dispatch to the emperor, had stated that 'Kinburn, in our hands, will become a formidable menace against Nicolaïeff and Kherson;' but a 'menace' which induces the attacked party to strengthen his defences is shorn of much of its value to the besiegers.

BATTLE OF THE TCHERNAYA.

Among the various operations in and near the Crimea, subordinate to the siege of Sebastopol in 1855, one of the most important was the BATTLE OF THE TCHERNAYA, or the battle of TRAKTIR BRIDGE, as it is sometimes called. This, in effect, was only part of a long series of operations; for the Allies held possession of the Tchernaya Valley, in considerable force, throughout almost the whole of the year, and also of the Baidar Valley during many months. It was not deemed expedient to interrupt the narrative of the siege by any notice of the manœuvres in this quarter; but a brief though connected account of the operations of the Allies in these valleys now becomes necessary. One of the coloured maps* may usefully be referred to, in illustration of this section.

It has already been seen† that when, in February 1855, the Allies were making great exertions to recommence vigorously the siege of Sebastopol, strong bodies of Russians were manœuvring in the Tchernaya Valley, or on the hills beyond. The hope had never been abandoned by the czar's generals, that the besiegers might successfully be attacked in the rear; such an attempt, in the previous month of October had, it is true, been a failure, since it led to the battle of Balaklava; but the frequent assemblage of dense columns of Russian infantry and squadrons of cavalry during the winter and early spring, convinced Raglan and Canrobert that the Tchernaya plain would need to be narrowly watched; and arrangements were consequently made for forming a strong camp in that

* 'Portion of the Crimea forming Chief Scene of Warfare.'
† Chapter viii., pp. 338-340.

quarter. The Allies had hitherto known little of the plain excepting from the village of Tchorgouna or Chorguna down to Sebastopol Harbour; but a long and lofty range of heights to the north-east occupied by the Russians, rendered it evident that the upper valley would need to be explored. At Tchorgouna, the Tchernaya receives the stream of the Tchouliou or Chuliu, coming from the neighbourhood of Aïtodor on the north-east; also another stream flowing from the south-east through the beautiful Valley of Baidar; and it became essentially necessary that the Allies should keep watch on the hills behind these rivers and valleys.

One among many reconnaissances, made to ascertain the position and strength of the Russians on these heights, was conducted on the 19th of April by Omar Pacha, who was about that time in conference with Raglan and Canrobert concerning the siege. The Turks and the Highlanders were, as they had been during the whole winter, guarding the heights and plain near Balaklava. Provided with twelve battalions of Turkish infantry, and a small force of English and French cavalry and artillery, Omar Pacha advanced eastward from Kadikoï to Kamara, thence to the Tchernaya, and a little way southward into the Baidar Valley. The Scots Greys and Enniskilleners, on the way, passed the spot where they had made the brilliant heavy-cavalry charge at the battle of Balaklava, half a year earlier, within an hour of the equally brilliant but less justifiable light-cavalry charge; and they found some of the whitening bones of their poor companions. A close examination was made of the district around Kamara, and a few skirmishes took place with Cossacks; but Omar Pacha ascertained that, if the Russians were anywhere assembled in force, it must be behind the distant hills. On the 24th, another reconnaissance was made in the same direction. When the month of May approached, strong suspicions arose that the enemy was collecting a large army secretly behind the hills, although few visible evidences of the fact appeared. General Della Marmora, with a portion of the Sardinian contingent, arrived about this time; and it was then felt by the Allied generals that the plain eastward of the plateau might be held in considerable force, as a check to any advance of the enemy. A decided step in this direction was made on the 25th; the left wing of the French occupying a position nearly under the Inkermann heights, the right of the French near Traktir Bridge over the Tchernaya, the Sardinians and some English cavalry and horse-artillery near Tchorgouna, the marines on the heights between Balaklava and the Baidar Valley, and the Turks near at hand. The immediate purpose was to dislodge a few of the enemy, but a more important aim was to establish a command over the whole left bank of the Tchernaya.

The month of June found the Allies stronger than ever; the French, Turks, and Sardinians occupied the position just indicated in a manner not to be assailed; but still the Russians remained masters of the heights on the other side of the valley, and established two new batteries to fire down upon the plain. On the 3d, a body of French and Sardinians set forth on a reconnaissance up the Baidar Valley, encountered a few hundred Cossacks, and dispersed them, but saw nothing like a collected Russian army. About this time the French made another step in advance, by crossing the Traktir* Bridge, and throwing up an earthwork defence on the further side of the Tchernaya. Later in the month, the Turks received orders to advance eastward to Kutchka, a village near the confluence of the Upa with the Tchernaya, one stage further towards the heights whereon the Russians were supposed to be encamped. Ozenbash, Aïtodor, and other villages, were reconnoitred; and it was rendered pretty certain that the main body of the Russians was on the heights between Aïtodor and the upper waters of the Belbek. One important advantage gained by the Allies during these expeditions was access to fertile valleys rich in forage, invaluable to the cavalry; and in an indirect way they obtained useful information from a few Tatar families who, resident in the valleys, had bitter reasons to lament the marauding visits of the Cossacks.

When July arrived, the Allies were engaged in a series of movements very similar in character to those which had characterised the previous month; the Turks and Sardinians encamped near the upper waters of the Tchernaya, and making frequent excursions towards Baidar in one direction and Ozenbash and Aïtodor in another. The valleys in that vicinity are so beautiful, rich herbage diversified with pleasant woods and graceful hillsides, that the troops were for a time delighted with their position, after the hard life of the trenches, the dirt and squalor of Balaklava, and the dreary plains of Eupatoria; they were quite willing to luxuriate in the intervals between the reconnoitring excursions. One result, however, of these repeated examinations, was to lead the Allies to the opinion that they had no chance of being able to ascend the heights which stretch across nearly east and west, separating the Tchernaya Valley from that of the Belbek; the Russians would not descend from those heights to meet the invaders in the plain: they remained on their uplands in unknown strength. General Lüders arrived early in the month, with a large army; and the Allied commanders began to deem it prudent to withdraw somewhat from the Baidar and Tchouliou Valleys towards Sebastopol and Balaklava, lest he should cut off this expeditionary force from the siege-army. Omar Pacha's Turks

* *Traktir* and *Khutor* or *Kutor* are frequently given in maps of the Crimea as if names of villages or towns; but the former means simply an inn or ferry-house, while the latter is a farm.

had for eight months been shifting about, in obedience, apparently, to ever-vacillating councils —first from Turkey to Eupatoria, then to Kamiesch, then back to Eupatoria, then to Balaklava and Kamara, then to the valleys east of the Tchernaya, and now back again to Kamara: never being allowed to carry out any enterprise themselves, and never admitted to equal fellowship with the English and French. Many English officers thought at the time, and later events justified the opinion, that the Turks would have been more usefully employed at Kars or in Mingrelia than in the Crimea. Omar Pacha had no opportunities for displaying his military genius. What arrangements were made between him and the other commanders, and to what extent those arrangements were dictated by orders from Paris or London, were matters little known; but the fact is undeniable, that the Turkish troops, much neglected by their own government, were not rendered usefully available by the council of generals in the Crimea. Throughout the whole of the summer, the Osmanlis were kept in perplexing uncertainty whether their next move would be



Tchernaya Bridge.

to Eupatoria, to Balaklava, to Kamara, to Baidar, to Kertch, or to Asia; and their patriotism was effectually damped by the strange treatment they received. The Sardinians, more favourably viewed by the English and French, suffered, nevertheless, severely from sickness in the hot weather of this month (July), encamped as they were in the Tchernaya plain, in inactive awaiting for some symptoms of movement on the part of the Russians, who still remained in strong positions on the heights of Mackenzie, Albat, Aïtodor, Akyar, &c.

It was left for the month of August to afford, by the sanguinary battle of the Tchernaya, employment and excitement to the numerous troops of four nations encamped in this wide-spreading plain; to give to the Allies enthusiasm resulting from military glory, and to the Russians another example of the defeats which always awaited them in this quarter. The three camps, French, Sardinian, and Turkish, with a cavalry camp of English, commanded the whole triangular space marked by Balaklava, Baidar, and Inkermann; but the Russians, at the beginning of the month, shewed evident signs of activity on the heights beyond the Tchernaya: in short, they resolved to descend into the plain, and try their fortune in another battle; and as a preliminary to this step, they formed new earthwork batteries on the slopes of the hills. General Lüders was reinforced by another corps under Paniutine, which came from Bessarabia or some neighbouring province, despite any arrangements made by the Allies to watch the Perekop and Chongar routes. Several deserters about this time came in, giving particulars of these reinforcements, but at the same time asserting that the Russians, both within and without Sebastopol, were becoming straitened for supplies: the dreadful havoc among the draught-animals having sorely checked the transport-service. Still, however deficient food or other supplies might be inside the beleaguered town, reinforcements of troops unquestionably arrived; and the Allies gradually changed their position in

the Tchernaya plain from an offensive to a defensive character, intrenchments being thrown up on all the exposed positions. The Sardinians were especially active in this work; for their position, on a series of hills between two points where the Russians might possibly cross the river, was one of some danger. So certain did the augmentation of the Russians become, that the Allies kept many of their troops under arms night after night, about the middle of the month, to guard against a sudden assault. A party of French had been some time in the Baidar Valley, and among the beautiful coast-scenery thence to Yalta, visiting the deserted summer-residences of the Russian nobility, and coming away laden with furniture, pictures, books, musical instruments, ornaments, wines, and countless articles which—against the English general's wish certainly, if not that of the French—they chose to regard as fair booty; but these troops were gradually called in, to strengthen the force in the Tchernaya Valley.

When the day of battle was about to approach, the French forces in the plain extended from the vicinity of Inkermann to the stone-bridge over the Tchernaya, the Traktir Bridge; and the Sardinians from thence to the wooden bridge at Tchorgouna. The Traktir Bridge, opposite the French centre, led to the main road up to the Mackenzie heights; while opposite the French right and the Sardinian forces were the Tchouliou heights, between or among which the river Tchouliou descended to its junction with the Tchernaya at Tchorgouna. Still further to the right, General d'Allonville occupied the lower part of the Baidar Valley. Thus, with the Turks on the heights near Balaklava, and a few English cavalry in rear of the Sardinians, the whole left bank of the river was watched; and Pelissier, who held the chief control in this district by virtue of the largeness of the force under his command, conceived himself prepared to meet any sudden assault. General Herbillon, in immediate command, took up his position with the centre division, opposite the bridge; Faucheux commanded the right wing, and Camou the left; Le Vaillant's and Dulac's divisions, with the Imperial Guard, formed a reserve; General Morris with the Chasseurs d'Afrique, and General Scarlett with the English cavalry, occupied a position between Kamara and Tchorgouna; lastly, the French horse-artillery, under Colonel Forgeot, were held in readiness for active service.

Very early in the morn of the 16th, before daylight, the French heard a brisk firing on the Sardinian flank, and then found themselves suddenly exposed to a battery of heavy cannon from the opposite heights. Enveloped in mist from the river and smoke from the guns, the heights were almost obscured from view; but it speedily appeared that the Russians had descended from the Mackenzie and Aïtodor Hills during the night, and were advancing in force towards the river. With great vigour the enemy crossed the river and the aqueduct opposite the French left, and attacked Camou's division, advancing with a resolution which attracted the admiration even of their opponents; but, met by the bayonet in front, by a flank-movement on the left, and by artillery on various sides, they were repulsed after a short but severe struggle, and recrossed to the right bank of the Tchernaya. The central attack, on the bridge and Herbillon's division, was much more severe: the Russians, working themselves up to a frenzy after each repulse, and returning again and again to the charge. Two divisions dashed over the river—by the bridge, by pontoons, and by fording—crossed the aqueduct, then the outer French line of defence, and came upon Herbillon in a way that seems to have been little expected by him or his troops. Two field-guns were at the same time drawn over the bridge, and a third dragged over at a ford. Then, under cover of these guns, the Russians, with excessive ardour, rushed halfway up the Fedukhine heights, and seemed on the point of gaining the day. Herbillon, however, quickly made the necessary arrangements; Generals Faucheux and De Failly met them, bore their charge, and then charged in return, driving them back over the bridge. Then, amid a roar of artillery on both sides, the Russians re-formed their columns of attack, reinforced by another dense mass of infantry, and prepared for a second onslaught; to resist this, Herbillon strengthened Faucheux and De Failly by several additional regiments; while Forgeot brought up his horse-artillery into such a position as to pour out a fire of grape upon the enemy as they advanced; the result of these movements was, that at the second passage of the bridge by the Russians they encountered a most determined resistance, followed by a sanguinary conflict and a disastrous retreat. A third time, driven on by their generals like sheep to the slaughter, did the devoted Russians cross the river, and attempt to reach the positions whereon the French defence-works had been constructed; but again were they repulsed with terrible loss. At every point where the French were attacked, failure attended the Russian operations—failure accompanied by fearful carnage; for the Russians were so densely packed as to render retreat difficult; and the retrograde movement to the bridge, with the victors closely pursuing, was attended with more sanguinary consequences than even the attacks themselves. A French officer, describing the scene at this moment, said: 'It was in vain that the Russian generals made the most desperate attempts to stay and rally the thousands who were wildly flying; the Russian soldiers, panic-stricken under the influence of terror, opened for themselves a passage through their own reserve battalions, decimated and falling by hundreds under the fire of the Allied batteries. The bridge, far too narrow for the heavy compact masses which rushed to it, became a scene of the most frightful

confusion.' At last the defeated columns, lessened in number by many thousand men, finally crossed the bridge and retired.

The Sardinians, from the nature of the contest, bore a much lighter burden than the French, inasmuch as the latter were posted at and near the contested bridge. When General Della Marmora, on the evening of the 15th, received information that Pelissier apprehended an attack from the Russians, he ordered his forces to be under arms at a very early hour on the following morning. The Sardinians had slightly fortified a small range of hills at the left bank of the Tchouliou, near the point of junction with the Tchernaya, as well as two advanced points on the opposite or right bank: the chief of these was called by Della Marmora the Tchorgouna Mamelon—apparently the same as Gortchakoff designated the Telegraph Hill. Before daylight on the 16th these outposts were suddenly attacked by Liprandi; three Russian batteries opened fire; and ere Della Marmora could rightly estimate the nature and scope of the assault, three strong columns of Russian infantry made a bayonet-charge against a series of earthen breast-works thrown up by the Sardinians, the men bringing scaling-ladders to surmount the ditches and parapets. Della Marmora, seeing the importance of maintaining these works, which were at the time defended by only three companies, sent over a battalion of Bersaglieri—Piedmontese riflemen—under Major Govone, together with a column of Turkish troops. The enemy's attack was, however, too strong to be resisted, although the three companies gallantly held their position for some time; and the Sardinian outposts retired under the protection of the supporting-party; at the same time that the English and Turkish artillery, conveniently posted, kept up a warm fire on the enemy's batteries on the heights beyond the river. From the appearance of the battle-field in other quarters, Della Marmora formed an opinion that the attack on his position was only a feint; and he therefore sought how best he might render aid to the French. He sent a portion of his fifth brigade to the French right wing; he placed two batteries in a position where they might maintain an oblique fire against the enemy; and he arranged a small body of English and Sardinian cavalry in a state of readiness to make a charge, if need should require. The French had been enabled to repulse the enemy completely before the Sardinians arrived, and therefore Della Marmora was in a position to direct all his attention to the retreat of the Russians, crossing the river, and reoccupying the heights he had held in the morning. Only a portion of the Sardinians were engaged, and of these no more than 200 were put *hors de combat:* among whom was General Count Montevecchio. It was not much that the Sardinians had to achieve; but they did it gallantly, and were proud to have met the czar's forces in the open field.

The Russians effecting a final retreat across the bridge, Pelissier felt for a moment inclined to pursue them, and was about to order the French, English, and Sardinian cavalry to dash across the river; but the retreat was effected so quickly, and the Russian columns were so strongly protected by artillery and cavalry, that he deemed it expedient to abandon this plan; the cavalry captured several hundred prisoners, but did not check the retreat of the main body. From nine o'clock until three in the afternoon, this retrograde movement was being effected, until, at the last-named hour, the Russians finally disappeared over the Mackenzie heights, carrying with them wounded comrades, disappointed hopes, and lost honour. From the wild, frenzied manner in which the dense columns had made the attacks, it was believed by the French that the Russians had been plied liberally with brandy before the battle, as at Inkermann; and this proved to be the case; for innumerable spirit-bottles were found on the battle-ground, near the slain and wounded men; and some of the prisoners stated that the distribution of spirits had followed the reading of a letter by Gortchakoff from the czar to the troops.

When Pelissier sent his account of the battle to the French government, he enclosed a copy of an official document found on the body of a Russian general killed in the action: the officer was supposed to be General Read, who commanded the Russian right wing; and the document was a plan for the conduct of the battle on the 16th. There is reason to believe that the attack was in pursuance of stringent orders received from St Petersburg, against the judgment of the generals engaged; but whether this were so or not, Read's instructions and Gortchakoff's dispatches are deserving of notice here, as they throw some light on the tactics of the battle. The document set forth that the right wing, under General aid-de-camp Read, consisted of twenty-five battalions of infantry, eight squadrons of regular cavalry, one regiment or eight sotnias of Cossacks, and sixty-two field-pieces. On the night of the 15th, Read and Liprandi were to descend from the Mackenzie heights, leaving all their baggage behind, except four days' provisions and the camp-equipage necessary for distributing it: the cavalry and artillery taking with them as much horse-fodder as possible. At four o'clock in the morning of the 16th those generals were to descend towards the banks of the Tchernaya, in command of the right and left wings respectively, having their infantry in advance and cavalry in the rear, and provided with flying-bridges for crossing the river at various points. At a given signal, Read was to effect a crossing, and immediately attack the Fedukhine Hills or heights, a series of low elevations in the middle of the plain occupied by the French. Having gained possession of those hills, he was to fortify his position, and await further orders from the commander-in-

chief. The document was signed by Major-general Grotenfeld, quartermaster-general.

That much importance was attached by the Russians to this manœuvre is unquestionable. Gortchakoff is known to have represented to his government, some weeks earlier, his apprehension that his supplies, of food if not of ammunition, would fail at Sebastopol if some distinct enterprise were not undertaken—especially as the Allies controlled at that time the Sea of Azof. Consequent on these representations, Gortchakoff appears to have received stringent orders from the czar or his government to make an attack in the Tchernaya plain, in the hope that success there obtained would compel the Allies to raise the siege. Military critics have since agreed that the attack was ill planned, not likely to succeed even against less brave and skilful soldiers than the French; although the latter were to a certain extent taken by surprise. A corps d'armée, after an exhausting march from Bessarabia, was driven to battle without any interval for rest. Some of the Russian prisoners taken during the battle stated that a council of war had been held on the Mackenzie heights on the 13th, to consider the nature of the attack to be made; and that a majority of generals agreed in opposition to the opinion and advice of Osten-Sacken. The prisoners also stated that one of the grand-dukes had arrived, to kindle the enthusiasm of the czar's troops.

Prince Gortchakoff, in his account of the action, stated that he divided his forces into two wings or columns, one under Read to attack the Fedukhine Hills, and the other under Liprandi to attack Tchorgouna. The French, he said, occupied the Fedukhine heights opposite Traktir Bridge; the Sardinians and Turks held the Hasfort heights opposite Tchorgouna; while the Baidar Valley, a part of the right bank of the Tchernaya, and the region between Kamara and Kadikoï, were occupied by various portions of the Allied troops. Liprandi was to attack the Sardinians near Tchorgouna, drive them across the river, and then seize the Hasfort heights; while Read was to attack the French at Traktir Bridge, where they had established a strong *tête du pont* or bridge-defence, and then, crossing the bridge, to assail the Fedukhine heights. Although these elevations are sometimes called 'heights,' sometimes 'hills,' sometimes 'mamelons,' they are not so lofty as the plateau and mountains surrounding the plain generally. Gortchakoff ordered Read not to attack the bridge until Liprandi had succeeded in his assault on the Sardinians at Tchorgouna; but Read, according to the prince's account, spoiled all by commencing too soon. 'It is impossible,' says Gortchakoff, 'for me to explain the motive which determined that general to make the attack contrary to the pre-arranged plan without having received my orders so to do; for very soon afterwards he himself and the chief of his staff were killed.' The dispatch goes on to state that Read's forces, anticipating the proper moment for the attack, descended to the river, captured the tête du pont, crossed at two or three different points, then crossed the aqueduct leading down to Inkermann and Sebastopol, and began to ascend the Fedukhine heights. Read, who met his death very early in the struggle, had been fourteen years inspector-general of cavalry at Warsaw; then second in command under Prince Woronzow in the Caucasus; and then successor to Osten-Sacken as commander of a corps d'armée in the Crimea; much had been expected of him, and his death produced a painful sensation in many Russian circles. Gortchakoff's dispatch proceeds to narrate that, seeing the error which had been made, and seeing the advance of strong French reinforcements, the prince hastily countermanded the attack on the Hasfort heights, and concentrated all his attention on Traktir Bridge and its vicinity; that his divisions made many heroic attempts to gain the Fedukhine heights; that seeing the French increased now to 50,000 men, he deemed it prudent to abstain from further attacks, recrossed the river, and drew up his whole army in order of battle eastward of the Tchernaya. The manner in which the dispatch converts a defeat into an apparent victory is curious:—'I remained here four hours, hoping that the enemy, who had called in his troops, would cross the Tchernaya and attack us in this position, where I would have opened a heavy fire of artillery upon him, and then charged with infantry and cavalry; but he dared not attempt it; and as deficiency of water did not allow me to remain longer on the spot, I ordered back the troops to Mackenzie heights. During this retrograde movement, the enemy remained inactive.' Gortchakoff acknowledged his loss to be very severe, though its amount was not publicly announced: it included Generals Read, Wreffsky, and Weimarn killed, and Generals Wracken, Prouskouriakoff, Touloubieff, and Gribbe severely wounded; while several other general officers received slight wounds. The prince sought to lessen the mortification of his army by issuing an 'order of the day' on the 17th, praising their gallantry.*

The plain between the Fedukhine heights and Traktir Bridge presented a terrible sight when the battle was over, especially near the banks of the aqueduct. Russians strewed the ground in every direction, heaped one upon another, and shattered by cannon rather than by muskets or the bayonet; for, according to their usual practice, they had charged in dense columns, as if

* 'Soldiers!—However calamitous yesterday, by God's will, may have been for us, the army gave a new proof of its traditional courage and power of endurance. Your impetuous courage broke through all impediments as if they had been mere reeds, and you proved to your enemies that no fortifications on earth can protect them against your bayonets. Soldiers! you yesterday worthily maintained the reputation of our arms; and it is a sacred duty on my part to inform the Emperor, our Sovereign, that such was the case. The power placed in my hands already enables me to give many of you those rewards which you deserve for your unshaken valour. Act as you did yesterday, and, even if Providence should not crown your efforts with the success they deserve, you may be assured that you will receive the thanks of your Emperor.'

to act by the momentum of a ponderous mass, and had thus been shot down in whole ranks at a time, while in a state almost maddened with drink. It was necessary to agree to a truce for collecting the wounded and burying the dead—sad duties which occupied two entire days. Pelissier, in his dispatch, gave the Russian loss at no less than 3000 killed and 5000 wounded. So many poor shattered but living men were lying about steeped in gore, that Pelissier took 1626 of them as wounded prisoners, and placed them, together with 38 officers, under the care of his own surgeons. About 400 unwounded prisoners remained with the French, and 100 with the Sardinians. The French loss, though considerable, was small compared with that of the enemy: shewing that there must have been something strikingly different in the tactics pursued by the two generals. Pelissier acknowledged a loss of 9 officers killed and 61 wounded, together with 172 non-commissioned officers and privates killed, 146 missing, and 1163 wounded. The total, French and Sardinians, put *hors de combat*, were about 1800. For the sake of common humanity, the French agreed to bury all the dead, without distinction of nation, on the left side of the river, and the Russians those on the right. The river and aqueduct became so choked with dead and dyed with blood, that orders were issued for no cavalry horses to be watered in those now polluted streams.

The importance of this victory was not fully known to the Allies until all was over. Gortchakoff, who commanded in person, had intended, if the attack had succeeded, to compel them to raise the siege; one portion of his army was to have attacked Balaklava, another to have stormed the rear of the siege-works on the plateau, while two vigorous sorties were to have been made from the town—the whole of these operations tending, if successful, to drive the besiegers out seaward in the direction of Kamiesch. It is difficult to estimate the strength of the garrison within Sebastopol at that time; but Gortchakoff's army engaged in this battle was estimated by Pelissier and Simpson at 50,000 to 60,000 infantry, with 6000 cavalry and 160 pieces of artillery; and this he appears to have considered — or perhaps the authorities at St Petersburg considered—a force sufficiently powerful to justify an attack on the besiegers. General Simpson, in a dispatch detailing the achievements of his Allies, stated that the French and Sardinians together, actually engaged, did not exceed 16,500 men; although large reinforcements would unquestionably have come up had the battle continued. The English and Turks, except a few batteries of artillery, were not engaged in the struggle, although at hand if needed.

The Tchernaya plain resumed nearly its former condition after the battle, the Allied troops having little to do but to look out for Russians, and the Russians seldom allowing any of their forces to be visible on the hills except a few reconnoitring Cossacks. Nevertheless, glimmering lights were frequently seen at night among the hills; and as it was not well known what these might portend, the French and Sardinians were frequently harassed and fatigued by night and early morn duties, in readiness for some supposed possible attack. The Tatars, who came in frequently as informants, succeeded rather in exciting vague uneasiness than in giving positive information. To guard the Traktir Bridge more effectually, the French now constructed three redoubts near it, which they named respectively after Raglan, Bizot, and La Bussonière; while the Sardinians rendered their position, south-eastward of the French, almost as strong as an intrenched camp. Whole regiments were at the same time employed, as they could be spared, in making gabions for the siege-trenches outside Sebastopol, which were conveyed daily to the trenches by artillery-wagons. General Simpson received information that two divisions of grenadiers had arrived in the Crimea from Russia, and were being conveyed in carts from Simferopol and Baktchéserai to the Mackenzie heights; but it formed no part of the Allied policy to make any attempt to check the arrival of those reinforcements.

When September arrived, the expectations of another attack from the Russians gradually died away; and the rumours then became rife of a demoralised state of the soldiery within Sebastopol, and of Baktchéserai being one vast hospital of wounded Russians, crowded with far more miserable creatures than the surgeons could attend to. Symptoms became visible of an intention on the part of the Russians to hut themselves, or rather burrow themselves, among the Mackenzie heights, in readiness for the approaching winter, as if to form a permanent barrier against any advance of the Allies northward. Nevertheless there was sufficient doubt concerning the intentions and movements of the enemy to keep the Allies on the alert in the Tchernaya plain, strengthening all the numerous hillocks on the left bank of the river. During the momentous proceedings at Sebastopol —the bombardment on the 5th, 6th, and 7th, the capture of the Malakoff on the 8th, and the retreat of the Russians to the north side of the harbour on the 9th—this motley army in the rear, consisting of Allies of four nations, remained on the watch for any operations that might call for their services; but none such occurred. Highlanders, Bersaglieri, Zouaves, and Osmanlis fraternised during their hours of leisure: using the 'bono' as a sort of universal language of good-fellowship amongst themselves, and the 'Moskov non bono' as an equally general declaration of opinion concerning the enemy.

After the evacuation of Sebastopol by the Russians, large bodies of French left the siege-camp and went to the Baidar Valley, either preparatory to some intended manœuvre, or to recruit their health in this verdant part of the Crimea, which was traversed and re-traversed by the

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Allied troops all the way from Tchorgouna and Baidar to Yalta. New military roads were constructed in various directions, between Balaklava, Kamara, Tchorgouna, the Fedukhine heights, and the plateau, to facilitate the movements of the great number of troops encamped on the plain. The positions of the belligerent forces were truly comprehensive and formidable at this period; for while the Allied lines and camps extended from Kamiesch in the west to Baidar in the east, the Russian lines and camps occupied the whole range of heights from the northern side of Sebastopol Harbour to the Aïtodor Hills near Mangoup Kalé, with Simferopol and Baktchéserai as a base of operations. In the month of October the Allied position became still more extensive; for the Sardinians pushed across the Tchernaya at Tchorgouna, and made frequent excursions up the Tchouliou Valley to Ozenbash and Aïtodor; while the French extended their encampments from the Baidar Valley north-east towards the upper waters of the Belbek, and occupied a position not more than nine or ten miles distant from Baktchéserai. Great as were these advancements, however, they assumed no other than a defensive character; for no comprehensive field-operations were undertaken by the Allies in this quarter—the main purport having apparently been to keep a watch on the Russian lines. And thus did winter begin in the Tchernaya Valley.

OPERATIONS IN THE SEA OF AZOF.

While one portion of the Allied forces—four armies under four leaders—was engaged in the prosecution of the siege of Sebastopol, another in the occupation of Eupatoria, and a third in operations in the Tchernaya Valley, important events were occurring at another part of the Crimea, washed by the Sea of Azof.

The military value of the western shores of this Sea has already been touched upon, relative to the routes of supply for Sebastopol; but the sea has a vast importance of its own, as an outlet for the produce of Central Russia, and it early became a question with the Allies, whether an expedition to this quarter would not be an effectual mode of carrying on war against the czar. Even while the winter-frosts yet bound the coasts with an icy fringe, a strict blockade was established by Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral Bruat, dated the 1st of February 1855, against all the ports in the north-west part of the Black Sea, including Odessa, Akermann, and Ovidiopol—all those near the mouths of the Bug and the Dnieper, including Kinburn, Oczakoff, Kherson, and Nicolaïeff all those, minor in importance, in the Gulf of Perekop—all those on the south coast, including Yalta, Alushta, Soudak, and Kaffa—and all the ports in and near the Sea of Azof, including Kertch, Yenikalé, Berdiansk, Taganrog, Arabat, Genitchi, and Anapa. But a mere blockade did not comprise all aimed at by the Allies; and to understand further operations, it will be necessary to trace the relation between the several ports on this last-named sea.

The Sea of Azof* extends about ninety miles from the Strait of Kertch nearly northward to the Biéloserai Spit, at the entrance to the Gulf of Azof or Don, which extends a further distance of seventy miles. Stretching across east and west, from Biéslitskoï Liman to Genitchi, the length is 140 miles. The northern shore is generally of moderate height, broken up into bays by projecting spits of sand, which, it will be observed, are singularly hooked towards the west at the points, as if influenced by currents coming from the Don. The eastern coast, inhabited by Cossacks of the Black Sea, is low, sandy, and much interrupted by limans or lagoons. The Kertch peninsula and the Taman peninsula form the south coast, broken by the only opening into the Sea of Azof, the Strait of Kertch or Yenikalé; while the western coast is formed by the remarkable Spit or Tongue of Arabat, described in a former section. The greatest depth of the sea is under fifty feet, and most of the coast-line is bounded by shoals which, seriously impeding navigation, are yearly rendering the whole sea shallower. The stagnant waters —frozen in winter and pestilential in summer— of the Sivash or Putrid Sea, itself nearly cut in two by the Chongar peninsula, enter the Sea of Azof at Genitchi Strait. The towns of Taganrog, Nakhitchévan, Rostoff, and Azof are within the limits of the estuary of the Don; those of Mariopol, Berdiansk, and Genitchi are on the north coast; in the south-west corner is Arabat; while near the straits are Yenikalé, Kertch, and Taman, with Anapa and Kaffa on the outer or Black Sea coast.

Even before the operations of 1855 began, the Allied admirals had sent reconnoitring squadrons towards this region,† examining the Circassian coast, but distrustful of the shallows at the entrance to the Sea of Azof. Early in March, Captain Gifford, cruising in this quarter, sent the *Viper* steamer to examine Kuban Liman or Bay, between Anapa and the Strait of Kertch; Lieutenant Armytage, commanding the steamer, dispersed a few Cossacks on the shore, and destroyed a fort, battery, barrack, and granaries. A few days afterwards, hearing that the Russian fort of Soudjuk Kalé, on the Circassian coast, was in an ill-defended state, Gifford determined on an attack. He acted in conjunction with a few Circassians on shore, who undertook to attack the fort by land if he would do so by sea. He anchored at 1000 yards from the place, and sent in such a hot fire of shot and shell as to drive the garrison out of the fort; but the Circassians, for some reason which Gifford could not divine, neglected to make the land-attack; and as he did not think it prudent to land a force under such circumstances,

* See coloured map, 'Sea of Azof.'
† Chapter iv., pp. 109, 110.

the Russians probably returned to the fort after he had left.

A direct attack on the ports in the Sea of Azof, however, was not made until the month of May, when the good sense of the English and French nations insisted on something more being done in the Crimea than merely besieging Sebastopol. Towards the end of April it began to be whispered in the camp that a naval expedition was about to be sent towards the Sea of Azof; and early in May preparations were made for despatching a fleet of heavily-armed steamers, with several gun-boats, under Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral Bruat, to test the strength of the Russian fortifications at Kertch and Yenikalé: there was also to be a contingent of British troops under Sir George Brown, and two batteries of artillery; while one or two skilled interpreters were to be included, as if to open communications with the Circassians. All were in pleasurable expectation at the prospect of active service in a new region, when suddenly the hopes were dashed by the abandonment, or at least postponement, of the expedition. What were the motives, was not publicly announced; but the decision was made at Paris, not at Sebastopol. On the 3d of May, a well-appointed fleet of forty sail steamed forth from Kamiesch and Balaklava, conveying 12,000 or 14,000 troops eager for glory; when, after a rendezvous on the 5th, just as they were nearing the Strait of Kertch, a French express-steamer was espied hastening towards them: the steamer brought a message, countermanding the expedition, in virtue of instructions received from Paris. Whatever may have been the nature of those instructions, Canrobert felt bound to obey them, and he sent orders to Bruat at once to return. This broke up the expedition; for whether or not Lyons was authorised by Raglan to proceed alone, thus shorn of his ally's support, he did not do so, but returned with his fleet to Balaklava, of course bringing back with him the soldiers, who had landed nowhere. It was with bitter mortification and disappointment that the order was received; soldiers and sailors saw no strategical reasons, and did not want to know any political reasons, for such a strange retrograde movement at such a time; they knew they had set out for some warlike attack on Kertch or its vicinity, and could ill brook such a change of plan. It was surmised, from many concurrent circumstances, that the emperor of the French, determining on a bold prosecution of the siege, wanted Bruat's fleet to carry large reinforcements from Constantinople to Kamiesch, and telegraphed orders to this effect; that he did not know the expedition to Kertch had actually sailed, and was vexed at Canrobert's timid obedience to orders which were possibly not quite applicable to the state of matters when they were received; and that Canrobert's yielding to Pelissier shortly afterwards was a consequence of this want of moral courage. Whatever truth there may have been in these surmises, the English officers at least regretted at that moment the existence of an electric-telegraph. Their reasons were embodied in the following remarks, among many of similar kind, made in the public journals:—'It would be an inconvenience and an evil of a very serious order if this extreme facility of communicating the will of the government to its instruments abroad impaired the independent judgment, and consequently the moral courage, of those who are really intrusted with the command of the army; for whatever be the perfection to which this instrument has already been brought in the conveyance of intelligence and other short messages, we have every day occasion to remark that it gives us a very inadequate impression of the real state of affairs. It would therefore be the height of folly and presumption on the part of a government deliberating at a great distance on the events of the campaign, to attempt to overrule the measures taken by commanders who are really in possession of the whole state of the case. Their plans are formed and their opinions are influenced by a thousand circumstances which it is impossible for any telegraphic communication to repeat; the latest movements of the enemy, the condition of the troops, and even the variations of the weather, all enter into their calculations; and we cannot conceive that any officer of high character and real military ability would consent to retain the nominal command of an army, and the responsibility of its operations, if he were liable to be interrupted in the course of an important movement by some irrelevant order, wholly at variance with the plan on which he was acting.' Thus numerous fine ships returned from a bootless errand; while the Russians, warned by their spies, immediately strengthened their defence-works in all the ports bordering on the Sea of Azof—hence deriving a positive advantage from the strange tactics of the Allies.

No sooner was Pelissier placed in command of the French army, than a new expedition was planned; and not only planned, but carried out with great success. On the 20th of May, the Allied generals and admirals agreed on a scheme of operations. The French provided a military force of 7500 men, consisting chiefly of the 19th, 26th, 39th, and 74th regiments of the line, and the 5th and 14th battalions of chasseurs-à-pied; the Turks, 5000; while the English fitted out 4000, comprising the 42d, 71st, 79th, and 93d regiments, and contingents of cavalry, marines, engineers, artillery, and land-transport corps, supplied with all necessary apparatus for throwing up earthworks on any conquered positions. The French prepared their armament at Kamiesch; while the English, collecting a fleet of war-steamers and transports at Balaklava, began to embark the troops on the 22d, and to steam towards the Strait of Kertch on the 23d—appointing a place of rendezvous where all might assemble before commencing operations. The 'flying squadron,' consisting of gun-boats and

war-steamers less ponderous than line-of-battle ships, comprised the *Miranda, Vesuvius, Stromboli, Medina, Ardent, Arrow, Beagle, Lynx, Snake, Swallow, Viper, Wrangler,* and *Curlew,* under the command of Captain Lyons, son of the admiral, who hoisted his flag on the *Miranda:* these, with five small French steamers, were to operate in shallow waters, within the Sea of Azof; but Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral Stewart, who with Admiral Bruat conducted the naval enterprise as a whole, had also under their command the *Royal Albert, Hannibal, Algiers, Agamemnon, St Jean d'Acre, Princess Royal, Sidon, Valorous, Leopard, Tribune, Simoom, Furious, Highflyer, Terrible, Caradoc, Sphinx, Spitfire, Gladiator,* and *Banshee.* On the part of the French, the fleet under Admiral Bruat comprised the *Montebello, Napoléon,* and *Charlemagne,* men-of-war; the *Pomone, Caffarelli, Mogador, Cacique, Descartes, Asmodée,* and *Ulloa,* steam-frigates; the *Véloce, Primauguet, Phlégethon, Berthollet, Roland,* and *Caton,* steam-corvettes; the *Lucifer, Megère, Milan, Brandon, Fulton,* and *Dauphin,* steam-sloops; the *Vautour* steam mortar-boat; and a few other vessels—the troops being distributed among the various ships.

These well-appointed fleets, amounting to about sixty war-ships, leaving Kamiesch and Balaklava on the 23d, reached on the 24th the entrance to the Strait of Kertch, rounded Cape Takli, and came to anchor opposite Ambelaki, a small village near Fort Paul, at the point where Kertch Strait ends and Yenikalé Strait begins —having, during their progress, given the officers and men a view of much hurrying and agitation along the shore. It was the anniversary of the Queen's birthday; and the British were willing to take this as a favourable augury. The troops prepared for immediate landing, the English under the command of Sir George Brown, and the French under that of General D'Autemarre; they had been purposely distributed among the steamers of light draught, in order to be able to approach as near the shore as possible. The men were lowered into boats, and towed to the beach by steamers, while gun-boats and small war-steamers prepared to cover their landing by a fire on the enemy if necessary. The opposition being, however, very slight, all the troops were landed in safety, and the village taken possession of. Very early in the disembarkation, a loud explosion was heard; this proved to be the result of a destruction by the Russians of their batteries at Fort Paul—a strong earthwork, with stone magazine and houses for a garrison —preliminary to a retreat of the garrison; later in the day, other explosions denoted a similar destruction of various batteries in the direction of Kertch: the enemy foreseeing that these places must speedily fall into the hands of the invaders. With the usual destructive tendency exhibited by the Russians on such occasions, they at the same time set fire to several large granaries in Kertch, as well as to two steamers in the harbour; while the Cossacks burnt all the forage and farmhouses around. During the whole night, the horses, guns, and *matériel* were being landed; and at six o'clock on the morning of the 25th, the two generals set forth—the French leading, the British following, and the Turks bringing up the rear. They advanced northward towards Kertch. By this time, the naval demonstration had so completely quelled any slight symptoms of opposition on the part of the Russians, and the latter had so much apprehension of being hemmed in and captured, that they evacuated the place; they were seen from the mastheads of some of the ships, retreating westward, and might have been intercepted had a cavalry force been at hand. The Allied troops marched quietly through Kertch from end to end, left a contingent to garrison it, and advanced north-east to Yenikalé, which town they reached early in the afternoon—having suffered greatly on the march through want of water. There was no fighting, for no enemy appeared with whom to fight; the only hostile operation consisted in destroying an iron-foundry at Kertch, where shell, shot, and Minié-bullets had been cast for the Russian government. Kertch was evacuated by troops only; but Yenikalé was nearly abandoned by the inhabitants also, as if in dread of the invaders. A sort of ransacking or spoliation appears to have occurred here, judging from a letter written by a sailor who assisted in landing the troops:—'Our ship is like a fair. Some of our men you will see dressed in the best of women's clothes, dancing jigs; more with officers' uniforms, parading the lower-deck; others trying to play musical instruments;' the letter itself was written on what the writer designated a 'trophy,' the back of a Russian document. The czar's troops retreated westward, in the direction of Arabat and Kaffa. About eighty guns, in good condition and of excellent make, were found in the two towns, and taken possession of by the Allies. General D'Autemarre established his head-quarters at Kertch, appointed a commandant, took possession of the government establishments, and made an inventory of all the stores and materials left by the enemy. It was found, from an intercepted letter, that General Wrangel had commanded 6000 Russians in this vicinity; that he had applied to Gortchakoff for reinforcements, but without success; and it was further ascertained that, on leaving Kertch, he had burnt or destroyed 4,166,000 pounds of corn and 508,000 pounds of flour, to prevent them from becoming available to the Allies.

Meanwhile the steamers, large and small, but especially the latter, had been busily employed in search of adventures against the enemy. The first vessel actually engaged was one of that class which, if employed earlier in the year, might have insured important advantages—gun-boats. No sooner did the Russians desert Fort Paul, and leave a passage moderately free from fire, than

Lieutenant M'Killop, commander of the *Snake*, obtained permission to push his little craft northward, and endeavour to capture a Russian war-steamer which was seen on the point of escaping from Kertch Bay. He exchanged shot with a land-battery as he passed along, and succeeded in preventing the steamer from escaping into the Sea of Azof, but not before she had placed herself under the protection of the guns at Yenikalé—not yet abandoned by the enemy. He shelled the steamer, set it on fire, and saw the crew escape and the vessel burn to the water's edge. Numerous sailing-vessels were then intercepted and captured; for the French admiral sent the *Fulton* and *Megère*, and the English admiral two or three gun-boats, to support M'Killop in a threatened attack from several Russian vessels; and thus a smart firing ensued, during which three or four Russian government vessels were sunk or burnt by the crews.

This adventure of the little *Snake*, which brought promotion to M'Killop, was one among many encounters within and near the strait, where Captain Lyons' 'light squadron' was employed.

Entrance to the Sea of Azof.

This officer had anchored with his active flotilla, on the night of the 24th, just beyond gunshot of the batteries at Yenikalé, and was within sight of the explosion by which the enemy blew up their magazine, containing 70,000 pounds of powder. Early in the morning of the 25th he made demonstrations which induced the Russians to destroy other batteries on the eastern side of the strait; and as his sailing-masters were at the same time employed in searching for a safe channel through the strait, he found himself enabled to make an unmolested passage into the Sea of Azof on the afternoon of the same day. It will be seen, by reference to a map,* that a singular narrow strip of land, a mere sandy spit, stretches south-westward from Cape Kamenoï—analogous to the sandy spits on the north shore of the Sea of Azof—and narrows the Strait of Yenikalé to less than two miles; the channel is still further narrowed by shoals, rendering cautious sailing and steering essentially necessary. There were other dangers, also, for the invaders to guard against, in the shape of explosive machines sunk in the strait; an electric wire connected these machines with a galvanic-battery on shore, which, if the Russians had not abandoned the spot, might have wrought serious mischief.

Now commenced a series of operations, proving in a striking way the value of quick small steamers in that sea. Captain Lyons, with thirteen English steamers, and Captain Sedaiges with five French, left the main fleet at three o'clock in the morning of the 26th. Lyons' own vessel, the *Miranda* (15), was the only one in the English flotilla having more than eight guns; while six of them were screw gun-boats of only two guns each. The Russians had so relied on the impossibility of ships-of-war passing through the strait, that the attack of the 24th had come upon them unexpectedly: this was unquestionably due to the light-draught vessels. Captain Lyons steamed directly across the Sea of Azof to Berdiansk, on the northern coast, and

* See coloured map, 'Sea of Azof.'

sent off the boats from the larger steamers to destroy all the government vessels near the shore; while the steamers themselves wreaked a similar destruction upon vessels sailing in and beyond the harbour. At daylight on the 27th he carried his squadron closer in towards the town, and there saw four Russian war-ships which, to escape capture, had been burned to the water's edge. He sent in a flag of truce, demanding the surrender of all government property; the governor complied; and Lyons landed a party of marines and seamen, under Commander Lambert. These very quickly destroyed several vessels, together with corn-stores to the value of £50,000; bringing away with them an 8-inch gun from one of the wrecks. The orders, here and elsewhere, were strictly to respect private property, and the personal liberty of civilians; to destroy or capture nothing but that which belonged to, or was in the service of, the czar. The inhabitants, mostly Greek and Genoese colonists, were left unmolested; although very apprehensive at first, they became reassured by the firm and scrupulous demeanour of Commander Lambert, to whom they gave much useful information concerning Russian troops. Although 800 Cossacks were at this time at Petroskoï, five miles off, they did not molest the invaders. This work of ruin effected, Lyons steamed off south-westward to Arabat, a town at the southern end of the spit named therefrom: detaching the *Swallow* and *Wrangler* to command the entrance to the Putrid Sea at Genitchi, and the *Curlew* to cruise about in the estuary of the Don. On the morning of the 28th he arrived off Arabat, and immediately began an exchange of hot firing with the guns mounted on the fort. A shell exploded a magazine in the fort, and a cannonading for an hour and a half wrought much mischief in the place; but several circumstances induced Captain Lyons to desist from further attack—there were no vessels to capture at that spot; the fort itself could not have been captured without the aid of a land-force; and a large store of grain, on the Spit of Arabat near the town, could not have been touched without exposing the ships' boats to a dangerous fire from the fort. At this time the French steamers separated from the squadron and returned to Kertch; but Lyons was enabled to announce that, in the short space of three days, he had destroyed more than a hundred vessels belonging to the Russian government, or else freighted with provisions for supplying the Russian armies. If taken as prizes, these vessels would have brought much emolument to the Allied crews; and on this point it is just to give Captain Lyons' own words, as contained in his dispatch: 'Had we sent these vessels in as prizes, we should have lost much valuable time, and not been able to effect so many captures; the active and zealous way in which the officers and ships' companies perform their duties, and the cheerful manner in which they suffer this pecuniary loss for the benefit of the service, will, I trust, meet with your approbation.'

The *Swallow* and *Wrangler*, detached by Captain Lyons to operate upon Genitchi, destroyed a large number of vessels laden with government stores, and took three more as prizes; but many others escaped and passed into the Putrid Sea through the strait, which is only fifty yards wide, and is commanded by low cliffs whereon the town is built. When Lyons found that nothing more could be speedily effected at Arabat, he hastened across the Sea of Azof to see what had been achieved at Genitchi. Having ascertained the state of affairs, he sent Commander Crauford, early in the morning of the 29th, with a flag of truce to demand the immediate surrender of all the sheltered vessels, all the vast stores of corn intended for the Russian army, and all government stores within the town: promising that the town, the inhabitants, and private property should be respected if these terms were complied with. A Russian officer met the flag of truce, and refused the surrender, possibly encouraged by the presence of six field-pieces, and a small but efficient body of infantry and Cossacks, visible from the ships. Lyons immediately prepared for action, bringing his steamers as near the land as the shallow water would admit. The town, built on a hill sloping down to the sea, just at the entrance to the strait, contained few good buildings except the church and the government house; but within the strait were seventy or eighty vessels, and near the beach were large stores of grain and coal. About ten o'clock, the surrender having been refused, Lyons prepared for action: he sent a volley of shells over the town from the steamers, to prevent the arrival of land-forces, while his boats fired the shipping and stores by shot and rockets; the result was an immense destruction of corn-magazines and corn-laden ships.

Sir Edmund Lyons, in a dispatch to the Admiralty concerning this very busy week's work, said: 'Had the expedition been longer delayed, there would have been many and great difficulties to overcome; for the enemy was actively employed in strengthening the sea-defences, and in replacing the sunken vessels which had been carried away by the current during the winter months.' The vessels here adverted to had been sunk by the Russians in the previous autumn, to obstruct the passage of the strait: no less than forty having experienced this peculiar characteristic of the czar's strategy. The gallant admiral further stated —that the Russians had no time to destroy 17,000 tons of coal stored at Kertch, which thereupon became available for the Allies' steamers; that the total number of vessels destroyed was nearly 250, including four war-steamers; that the quantity of corn and flour destroyed at Berdiansk and Genitchi was nearly half as large as that destroyed by the Russians themselves at Kertch; that the whole collectively amounted to 6,000,000 rations; and that more than 100 fine guns were captured. The importance of Kertch as a granary for Sebastopol was proved by this circumstance,

brought to light soon after the capture—that the enemy had for several days been in the habit of sending off 1500 wagons daily, each laden with half a ton-weight of grain or flour.

Prince Gortchakoff gave a curious colour to these proceedings, in his dispatch to the czar. He stated that the entrance of the Allies into the Sea of Azof, so much vaunted by them, 'had only been signalised by the inglorious devastation of the coasts, and by the destruction of some grain-stores, but has by no means exercised the influence they expected upon the general progress of affairs in the Crimea.' He further averred, that he had expected the attack; that he had given orders to the governors of Kertch and Yenikalé to retire if strongly assailed; that he had for some time brought the chief part of his supplies to Sebastopol by another route; that the rations destroyed by the enemy were really very small in amount compared with those he received from other quarters; and that 'it is the property of private individuals which has had principally to suffer from the cruelty of the enemy'—a statement certainly the reverse of true.

Thus closed the month of May, marked by various successes at Kertch, Yenikalé, Arabat, Genitchi, and Berdiansk: successes which excited a most extravagant amount of anticipation in England and France, as if the speedy fall of Sebastopol was thereby rendered inevitable; and these warm hopes were made yet warmer by news received from Taganrog, early in June, shewing how much work could be effected by gun-boats in shallow waters.

The *Curlew*, it will be remembered, was sent by Captain Lyons from Berdiansk to the estuary of the Don, to watch the Russians in that quarter. This gallant officer, after the operations at Genitchi, steamed eastward on the 30th of May, and anchored on the following day about ten miles distant from Taganrog—a port very difficult of access. The soundings for many miles off the coast are very shallow, and when land-winds prevail, are reduced almost to nothing, vessels of all kinds being then imbedded in the mud. The town itself, founded by Peter the Great, was better fitted in his days than in our own for a commercial port; as the entire estuary has since become considerably filled up with sand and mud. Since the year 1833, Kertch has grown at the expense of Taganrog, being more favoured by the government as a commercial port, and being at once, virtually, on the Black Sea as well as on the Sea of Azof. Taganrog still remains important as a port at which the produce of Southern Russia is shipped in small vessels, to be transhipped to larger vessels at Kertch; but in a generation or two the port will probably be inaccessible to anything beyond row-boats; and before that day has arrived, the commercial value of the town will have departed.

Soon after the anchoring of the flotilla off Taganrog, a ship was seen on fire in the harbour, followed by an explosion. On the next day, June 1, Captain Lyons moved up cautiously to within three miles of the town, a nearer approach of the steamers being impracticable. Then arose the question, how to bring heavy guns to bear upon the town at an available distance, as the steamers' boats carried nothing heavier than 24-pounder howitzers? but by the application of seamen's ingenuity, 32-pounders were rafted and boated into shallow water. Meanwhile other arrangements had been making for operating in this difficult estuary. Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral Bruat sent twenty launches belonging to the line-of-battle ships, armed with howitzers and rocket-mortars, to form an important addition to the light squadron under Captain Lyons. Thus strengthened, Lyons and Sedaiges advanced towards the town early on the 3d, and sent a flag of truce on shore, demanding just such a surrender as at Berdiansk—that is, a yielding, for the purpose of destruction, of all corn, flour, provisions, vessels, and stores, belonging to the Russian government. The governor stated that, having troops enough to defend the place, he was justified in refusing the surrender. Thereupon commenced preparations for an attack: launches, cutters, paddle-box boats, gun-rafts, and rocket-boats, to the number of about forty, being fitted out to open fire on the town—the whole placed under the superintendence of Commander Coles, of the *Stromboli*. The storm of shot, shell, and rockets was very destructive, firing the ships and granaries in various directions; and as if this visitation were not sufficiently severe, bodies of men landed in the ships' boats, and carried the work of destruction yet further. It was one of the sad sights of war. The town presents a picturesque appearance as seen from the harbour, with its large white stone buildings, domed churches, and pleasant gardens filled with trees; and many lady-spectators had been seen on the heights, shortly before, in their droshkies: but now all was smoke and desolation; the custom-house, various government buildings, granaries, and large storehouses, became a prey to the flames; and unfortunately, in spite of all attempts to prevent it, private property became involved in the ruin. The government storehouses occupied an immense length of beach, and 3000 Russian soldiers endeavoured to dispute the landing of the invaders at that spot. An officer in the launch of the *Royal Albert*, describing the day's proceedings, awarded praise to the Russian troops:—'One or two instances of great coolness were shewn by the enemy. One was that of a sentry walking his post some quarter of an hour after the opening of the fire; round and grape, spherical and case and Minié, were fired at him, without effect: he looked at us occasionally, as if to ask what we meant by it; and I presume, by his standing fire so long, he did not leave until ordered. It was the admiration of every one.' The Russian troops, owing to the fierceness of the fire from the boats, did not appear openly on the beach;

they kept up a musket and rifle fire from behind gardens, trees, walls, and buildings. About four o'clock in the afternoon the hostile attack ceased, the government property being almost wholly destroyed, including a war-schooner and a large timber-raft. Such was the work of the 3d of June, causing little loss of life to the Russians and none to the Allies.

The defensive arrangements at Taganrog had been under Count Tolskoï, military governor of the town, and Lieutenant-general Krasnoff, commandant of the detachment of troops sent thither. Krasnoff, in a dispatch to Gortchakoff, narrated that, as a reply to the summons to surrender, he said: 'My military honour forbade me giving up without a struggle the town, the defence of which had been intrusted to me; that our troops were ready to die for the czar; and that, if the enemy really wished to spare the peaceful inhabitants, I invited him to land on the coast and accept the combat I offered him—to decide by arms the possession of Taganrog by the result of the day's battle.' The first part of this statement was probably true; the conclusion mere bravado. After describing the day's proceedings, tinted with a Muscovite colouring, Krasnoff added: 'Thus ended this new act of powerless animosity directed against a peaceful commercial city, which during so many years had provided the West with its magnificent grain; against a town which ought to be sacred to England, to France, and especially to Sardinia, in memory of the last days of the Emperor Alexander, who had conferred so many benefits upon them.' These 'benefits' were certain trading privileges held by Genoese merchants.

Captains Lyons and Sedaiges, after these operations at Taganrog, next directed their attention to Mariopol or Marioupol, a town between Taganrog and Berdiansk—a place of much commercial activity: being a depôt at which corn from Southern Russia is collected, and thence exported. There is fifteen feet depth of water at a mile in front of the town, sufficient for maritime purposes with the aid of boats and small vessels. The light squadron anchored before Mariopol on the 4th; and, a surrender having been refused, prepared to open fire on the morning of the 5th. No opposition was offered; a landing was effected; and everything was fired and destroyed which appeared to belong to the government—a proceeding almost certain to involve the destruction of some private property, unless every step of the invaders' progress was guided by persons well acquainted with the town. Another place was next to be subjected to this fiery ordeal, Gheisk or Jejsk, situated at the bottom of a liman or bay on the southern shore of the Gulf of Azof, opposite a sand-spit between Taganrog and Mariopol. The governor, feeling the impossibility of resisting the invaders successfully, at once agreed to the surrender demanded: requesting only that the vessels and boats should approach as closely as possible in imposing array, to justify him in the eyes of the townsmen and the government. He conducted the landing-party to the government stores, where they burnt an enormous quantity of hay and straw, together with a considerable store of rye and other kinds of corn.

The operations outside the Strait of Kertch during these summer months were not numerous. On the 28th of May the Russians evacuated Soudjuk Kalé on the Circassian coast, after destroying all the principal buildings, sixty guns, and six mortars. They next destroyed a fort on the road between Soudjuk and Anapa. More important still, they evacuated Anapa itself on the 5th of June. The Allies, not being certain at that time concerning the plans or powers of the Circassians, wished at anyrate that so commanding a place as Anapa* should not remain in the hands of the Russians; and thereupon Rear-admirals Stewart and Charnier directed their attention to the town and its fortifications, with a view to a military attack by Generals Brown and D'Autemarre, if such should be deemed necessary; but the Russians obviated the attack by leaving the place, after having exploded the powder, rendered useless most of the guns, and burnt the barracks, granaries, and coal-stores. The defences had been remarkably strong, comprising fifteen mortars, twenty-one howitzers, and eighty long guns, which could have maintained a formidable fire against any attacking force. The garrison, 8000 strong, crossed the river Kuban when they had quitted the town. This abandonment was determined on through the uncertainty of being able to obtain supplies should the Allies continue their operations in the Sea of Azof: there was an utter absence, too, of fresh water.

The naval operations having been briefly traced, it becomes now necessary to notice the proceedings of the military force at Kertch and Yenikalé.

Kertch, taken possession of by the Allies on the 25th of May, is a good-looking town as seen from the sea—a Naples on a small scale; with a semicircular bay, a noble quay faced with hewn stone, lofty spires, pillared porticos, houses almost as large as palaces, some of white stone, and some of gaily painted wood-work, and public buildings of much pretension. One ancient Greek ruin is supposed to mark the resting-place of Mithridates; and there are many others interesting to the classical antiquary. Considered as a Russian government town, Kertch at the time of its capture contained extensive magazines, stores, factories, saw-mills, shell and ball foundries, bakeries, a dock-yard, batteries, and numerous military and naval buildings. Very few of these were destroyed either by the Russians or the Allies, so hasty was the change of masters. The town contained many well-dressed inhabitants, and presented an aspect of much prosperity. The soldiery scandalously departed from the usages of honourable warfare

* See wood-cut, p. 109.

during the first few days of their occupation of this town; the Turks principally, but French and English to a smaller degree, and seamen also. The principal inhabitants left their houses and furniture unprotected, while the Tatars, Jews, and poorer Russians remained behind; yet all the property found in the town, and some of the persons, were rendered objects of plunder and violence. A large museum, full of antiquities connected with early Greek times, was ruthlessly despoiled, and its contents scattered and broken; the governor's house, furnished in a costly way, was similarly wrecked; and drunken men, laden with spoil, were staggering about the streets in wild disorder. Whether the two generals had not decided who should hold control, or whatever may have been the cause, the occupation of Kertch was marked by much to condemn the Allies, and to give just cause of reproach from the Russians. It appears that the lowest grade of Tatar inhabitants, hating the Russians, assisted the Turks in the chief part of the devastation; while the French and English bore a larger share in the misconduct than was at all creditable to them.

Kertch.

Meanwhile arrangements were made for securing the defences of the town, in case a Russian force should return to take possession; but no enemy appeared, and the military had to leave to the steam-squadron the achievement of further glory.

The other of these two twin-towns, Yenikalé, was similarly occupied by the Allied troops. Yenikalé is important from its position in relation to the Sea of Azof, and had many good houses and respectable inhabitants. Sir George Brown, who took up his quarters here, had at first much difficulty in keeping the soldiery from depredation; houses were broken open, and 'trophies' taken away in a very unscrupulous manner; the sailors, going to and fro between the town and the ships, being only too ready to join in this plunder. The general, however, by a stern example in a few instances, brought the rest to reason.

The Allies proceeded in a regular way to destroy all the government property, very large in amount, in the two towns. Among it was a mass of official documents, which Raglan and Pelissier might have highly valued, but this was lost during the reckless riot of the first two days. The Turks were rejoiced at having given up to them some of the guns which the Russians had seized at Sinope eighteen months earlier. Thus day by day passed, scenes of wreck being exhibited in these two towns, at the time when the steamers were doing their worst against the granaries and stores in the Sea of Azof—altogether a scene of devastation, not of fighting. By the 13th of June, the generals and admirals determined on returning to Balaklava and Kamiesch. The Russians had evacuated Kertch, Yenikalé, Fort Paul, Anapa, and Soudjuk Kalé; and the light squadron had destroyed granaries and stores at Arabat, Genitchi, Berdiansk, Mariopol, and Taganrog; whether anything further of importance could have been achieved, remains a matter of opinion; but the commanders decided on leaving garrisons of Turks at Kertch, Fort Paul, and Yenikalé, and on allowing the light squadron again to scour the Sea of Azof. The middle of the month witnessed the

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arrival of the greater part of the armament at the vicinity of Sebastopol, to renew its services subordinate to the siege.

Early in July, the light steam-squadron was again placed in requisition in the Sea of Azof, to destroy the government stores of corn and hay resulting from the harvest of that spring and summer. Commander Osborn succeeded Captain Lyons, and hoisted his flag on board the *Vesuvius*. The first operations were against Genitchi. Osborn sent Lieutenant Hewett in the *Beagle* to examine the mode of connection between the town and the northern end of the Spit of Arabat, which he found to be by means of a ferry of two large flats or raft-boats and hawsers. On the forenoon of the 3d, Hewett resolved to destroy this floating-bridge; he sent out two parties in boats, who succeeded in cutting the hawsers and setting the rafts adrift, although exposed to the musketry of numerous troops lining the beach and riflemen posted in the houses. Various vessels under Osborn remained in this region of the Sea of Azof several days, seeking every opportunity to destroy government property without injuring the inhabitants. Heavy gales forced him to anchor his larger vessels for some time; but during this detention, his boats destroyed numerous guard-houses, barracks, and stores, on various parts of the Spit of Arabat, as well as the floating-bridge from the middle of the spit to the mouth of the Salghir. Osborn, leaving part of his flotilla near Arabat Spit, next steamed to Berdiansk, and fired vast stacks of corn and forage without hurting the town itself. He then went to Fort Petrovskoï, a newly constructed work between Berdiansk and Mariopol, cannonaded it, destroyed the batteries, and fired the stores and buildings. Steaming further east, he continued the work of destruction, attacking fisheries and fish-stores as well as granaries; for it had been fully ascertained that the fisheries of the Sea of Azof had during some time been rendered available to the feeding of the army at Sebastopol; and in that sense the fish was government property. Large bodies of Cossacks on the shore resisted, but not successfully, these proceedings. In short, the whole coast from Genitchi to Taganrog was kept by Osborn in a constant state of agitation during July; his orders were to destroy all food and forage which in his judgment appeared to be more than sufficient for the wants of the actual inhabitants—Sebastopol being in the thoughts of the invaders the whole time, and Berdiansk and other towns having been rendered by the Russians vast granaries for the army. For such services, Commander Osborn was raised to the rank of captain.

These operations were succeeded by a long period of comparative inaction. Most of the steamers returned to Balaklava or Kamiesch, and no more corn burning took place. The garrisons at Kertch, Yenikalé, and Fort Paul were chiefly Turkish, but under the control of English and French officers. The towns were fortified with great care on the land-side, to render them secure against any attack by the returning Russians; and frequent intercourse was maintained with the Turks garrisoned at Anapa; but no further expeditions, worthy of note, took place during the remainder of the summer in this region. Of the autumnal and winter proceedings, a little will be said in a later page.

In estimating the operations in the Sea of Azof, it will be seen, therefore, that the strategy involved little more than the destruction of food intended for the Russian army. Although Kertch, Yenikalé, and Anapa were taken, none of the towns within the Sea itself were occupied; nor was there any battle, besieging, or manœuvring of hostile armies. The soldiers won little or no glory; the sailors, in the gun-boats and small steamers, much, although not of that kind which results from a well-fought naval battle. Yet, taken as a whole, the expedition was unquestionably beneficial to the Allied cause.

SIEGE AND SURRENDER OF KARS.

The present section of this Chapter will relate to the most interesting of the campaigns and military operations subordinate to the siege of Sebastopol; interesting, not for its success, but for the glory which surrounded its failure.

The campaign in Asiatic Turkey in 1854 ended, it will be remembered,* with the disastrous battle of Kurekdere, disgraceful to Zarif Mustapha and most of the other Osmanli pachas and generals, and mortifying to Guyon and Kmeti, Hungarian officers in the Turkish service. The English government, with a view to strengthening the Turkish cause in Asia, had determined some time before to send a British military commissioner to advise and uphold the Turkish commanders at Erzeroum and Kars. They selected for this mission Colonel Williams, who, as an officer of engineers, had been many years engaged in marking out the boundary between the Turkish and Persian Empires, and who, in that difficult and laborious service, had acquired an intimate knowledge of the Asiatic provinces and tribes. Unfortunately, owing to tardy official proceedings, he did not, although appointed on the 2d of August, reach Kars till the 24th of September, several weeks after the ruinous battle. Colonel Williams thus found himself suddenly plunged into the midst of a defeated and utterly demoralised army, governed by pachas equally incompetent and corrupt, who from the first systematically opposed every reforming measure suggested. The manner in which this gifted man, during the succeeding period of fourteen months, struggled with the difficulties besetting him—rendered more embarrassing by the strange conduct of the British ambassador at

* Chapter V., pp. 127-140.

Constantinople—raised him to a higher pitch of fame than any other officer, military or naval, engaged throughout the war.

The Turkish troops suffered shamefully from their pachas in Europe; but in Asia it was still worse. Abdi Pacha, *mushir*, or marshal or generalissimo in Asia Minor in 1853, was incompetent; Ahmed Pacha, who succeeded him in January 1854, was corrupt as well as incompetent; Zarif Mustapha Pacha, who succeeded Ahmed within a few months, was the commander who lost the battle of Kurekdere; and all had aided in bringing the army into a deplorable condition, by starving the troops, and secretly appropriating to their own use the money sent from Constantinople to pay for food, forage, clothing, medicine, tents, and other camp necessaries. An able, energetic, honest English officer, in such a region at such a time, was likely to be regarded as the worst of all foes by a fraudulent pacha. Hence may be inferred the trying difficulties of Colonel Williams's position. It was afterwards acknowledged by the British ministers in parliament, that if Williams had been an ordinary man, he might have avoided this anxiety, and remained a quiet looker-on; but he was not an ordinary man—seeing gigantic evils that required a cure, he sacrificed ease and health in the heroic determination to work this cure, trusting to the purity of his motive as his chief reward.

The difficulties of the Turkish army were increased by many additional circumstances: there were occasional jealousies between the Polish and Hungarian officers; there were Armenian spies always ready to reveal to the Russians the state of matters in the Turkish towns; the Kurds on the frontier, though Mohammedans, were as ready to sell their swords to the Russians as to the Osmanlis; while the atrocities of the Bashi-Bazouks, during several marauding expeditions, had exasperated Transcaucasian tribes that might otherwise have assisted the Turks in liberating them from the czar's power.

It was late in September 1854 when Colonel Williams entered Kars, accompanied by Captain Teesdale and Dr Sandwith; the latter had been a physician at Constantinople, and now formed a member of the commissioner's staff in a medical capacity. They had adopted the route from Trebizond through Erzeroum, thereby acquiring the means of ascertaining the difficulties of bringing up supplies to Kars.* Williams at once set to work, beginning his researches at Trebizond, and continuing them at Erzeroum and at Kars. He brought to light numberless military abuses at all three places; wrote full details thereof, politely but firmly, to the pachas; and told them plainly that all their misconduct would speedily be known to Lords Stratford de Redcliffe, Raglan, and Clarendon, in their several official capacities. At Kars especially, he sifted the villainies that had been practised; exposed the delinquents; and threatened to report them at Constantinople. Some of the pachas were struck with dismay, and sought to tempt him to silence by bribes; while others, finding that he had no special credentials from the Porte, refused to acknowledge him. Nothing daunted, he persisted in his investigations—comparing the muster-roll of every regiment with the actual number of men; inquiring what had become of the pay and rations for the deficient number; personally inspecting the camp-kitchens and examining the food; visiting the hospitals and testing the medical drugs; comparing the soldiers' clothing with the supplies sent from Constantinople; and labouring to procure comfortable winter-quarters for the troops. As a consequence, he soon became idolised by the army, and hated by the corrupt officials.

The importance was soon apparent of connecting Williams with some recognised Turkish dignity; that he might give full effect to his plans, and punish the guilty whom he had exposed—for his commissionership was a British appointment, not Turkish. The British government had made arrangements that he should acquaint Lords Raglan and Stratford de Redcliffe with all his proceedings, and receive support and countenance from both; and it was especially the duty of Stratford, as British ambassador at Constantinople, to secure for Williams a Turkish recognition; but the aid was delayed until long after the proper time. If the colonel had been appointed *Ferik* or general of division, and authorised to call himself Williams Pacha, a step would have been made in the required direction. The voluminous parliamentary papers relating to Kars published early in 1856, consisted of nearly 400 dispatches, chiefly correspondence touching this matter, followed by urgent entreaties from Williams for reinforcements to the Kars army. The want of direct power on the part of the colonel was shewn in the extraordinary diplomatic machinery required to effect even the smallest reform. Colonel Williams, at Kars, would write to Lord Clarendon, pointing out the wretched state of the army; Lord Clarendon, in London, then wrote to Lord Stratford, communicating this intelligence: Lord Stratford, at Constantinople, told M. Pisani the interpreter, who told Reshid Pacha the seraskier, who promised reform; and there probably the matter would end—until Williams, many weeks afterwards, finding nothing done, renewed his applications either to Clarendon or to Stratford, and then the circuitous game of diplomacy began to be played over again. The clumsy machinery of the English government departments added to the complexity; for one of the letters issued from the War-office was virtually as follows—Mr Peel wrote to Lord Wodehouse that Lord Panmure would suggest to Lord Clarendon that Lord Wodehouse should be instructed to tell Lord Stratford to request M. Pisani to translate to Reshid Pacha

* Views of the three towns, and a description of the route, will be found in Chapter V., pp. 128-134.

a hope that he would order the Mushir to attend to Williams's recommendations!

Were it not for the interest attached to the heroic courage and masterly skill of Williams, this mass of correspondence would be wearisome and repulsive; but it is, in truth, worthy of study, to see how this indomitable man conquered the pachas by his untiring persistence in a course which he knew to be right—and, it may fairly be said, at last conquered the British ambassador himself. He wrote voluminously, to Clarendon, Raglan, and Stratford, giving ample particulars of everything relating to the state of the Turkish army and the frauds of the pachas. Again and again Clarendon wrote to Stratford, urging the importance of Williams being boldly upheld in his useful labours. As early as the 22d of September, his lordship wrote that the colonel 'ought to have a high Turkish rank given to him, in order to insure respect for his authority.' The tone of these letters frequently implies that the ambassador had been lax in his duty towards Williams; but this was rendered still more apparent when, on the 8th of December, the colonel wrote a feeling letter to Clarendon, complaining that no less than *fifty-four* dispatches, addressed by him to Stratford, had been left unanswered; each was official, similar to those sent to Clarendon and Raglan, and each was accompanied by a private letter; yet dispatches and letters were alike left unanswered, even unacknowledged. Lord Clarendon hereupon administered to Lord Stratford a rebuke as severe as courtliness would permit. Williams at length received a firman conferring upon him the title and dignity of Ferik, about the close of January, ten weeks after Stratford had applied for it, and four months after Clarendon had urged its importance—a delay very detrimental to the colonel's influence. His endeavours to bring Zarif Mustapha to justice had so far succeeded as to lead to the supersession of that individual by Shukri Pacha, as mushir of the army of Asia; but as Shukri proved to be still more opposed to healthy reforms than Zarif, Williams's difficulties were redoubled, for he found that bribes and family influence at Constantinople were sufficient to give the scales of justice a bias in favour of the offender. December and January were marked by numerous letters; Williams complaining of the remissness of Stratford, Clarendon admitting the justice of those complaints, and Stratford assigning various reasons in excuse for his delays. In February, somewhat stung by Clarendon's reproofs, Stratford hinted a sort of jealousy of Williams's tone and influence; but it had become by this time so evident that the British government wished to support 'Ferik Williams Pacha' in his laudable exertions, that the ambassador gave up his strange system of cold neglect: and the correspondence after the end of February contains few allusions to neglected dispatches or unanswered letters.

Early in 1855 General Williams—for he ceased to be called colonel when the Turkish government had conferred upon him the dignity of ferik or general—by a bold policy, and by a use of the English name among tribes by whom England is customarily respected, repressed a Kurdish insurrection in a remarkably short space of time, and gained that sort of power which speedily attaches to a man in whom ability is conjoined to firmness. In February, the Porte appointed Vassif Pacha successor to Shukri Pacha as mushir or commander of the army. Vassif was considered, and proved himself to be, an honest man; but his capabilities were thus sketched by Dr Sandwith, one who had the best possible means of judging: 'He had about as much military knowledge or experience as might be expected from any Fleet Street shopkeeper taken at hazard from his counter. His antecedents were those of nearly all the mushirs; he had been, as a boy, the slave of old Hosref Pacha, and so had begun life with gold and preferment within his reach. I believe he had never heard a gun fired in earnest; he scarcely knew how to read or write; his accomplishments were limited to smoking a narquileh, and gracefully receiving visitors.'* Yet this Osmanli was one of the best pachas Dr Sandwith ever knew! The undaunted boldness with which Williams received Vassif Pacha, and irresistibly compelled him to send Shukri Pacha—as well as two other dignified delinquents, Hussein Pacha and Ahmed Pacha—to Constantinople on trial for peculation, remarkably illustrates the moral power of an energetic mind: it would have been audacity, but for its strict justice and honesty.

As spring advanced, the attention of Williams became seriously directed to the state of the Turkish army as confronted with the Russians, who were now commanded by General Mouravieff as successor to the less skilful Prince Bebutoff. Six months of untiring exertion had enabled the ferik to introduce numerous reforms; but the army still remained twenty-four months in arrear of pay; the cavalry horses, the soldiers' clothing and accoutrements, were of the most wretched description; and stores and ammunition of all kinds were still deficient. Williams and Sandwith had remained during the winter chiefly at Erzeroum, as a convenient centre for head-quarters; but young Captain (afterwards Major) Teesdale was at Kars, reforming and remodelling the army with indefatigable perseverance, and gaining the goodwill of the more reasonable among the pachas. Three other Englishmen, Colonel Lake, Major Olpherts, and Captain Thompson, having arrived in March, a new arrangement was made—those officers taking up their quarters with the Kars army; while Teesdale went to assist Williams in fortifying Erzeroum against any Russian attack. The ferik's great knowledge of the tribes of Asia Minor, combined with his ability, firmness, and honesty of purpose, enabled him to win over both

* *Narrative of the Siege of Kars.*

Christians and Mohammedans; and when he took commissariat matters into his own hands, to prevent the army from actual starvation, he found abundant supplies sent in by the country people, who depended more on his single guarantee than on the commercial honesty of the pachas. Dr Sandwith and Mr Churchill were two English civilians who worthily aided him in all his labours. The former was placed at the head of the military hospital, and, backed by the iron will of the ferik, succeeded in making it such as no Turkish hospital ever was before: he found that the drug-depôt contained cosmetics, aromatic vinegar, *eau de luce*, perfumes, obstetric instruments, and other strange commodities; and he had no easy task to sweep away the corrupting abuses which had led to the inclusion of such things among army medical-stores. By almost incredible exertions, Williams succeeded in rooting out the nest of fraudulent officials connected with the army; he secured the good services of three out of the numerous pachas, Vassif, Tahir, and Kerim, in his work of reform; and, moreover, he had caused himself to be listened to by Lord

General Williams.

Stratford de Redcliffe; but he had still numerous opponents at Constantinople, where rival seraskiers and viziers succeeded in frustrating each other's proceedings, and in shewing only too plainly that bribes were welcome at head-quarters. Indeed, General Williams, in writing to Lord Clarendon, frequently expressed his conviction that the seraskier, or minister of war, Riza Pacha, experienced a secret delight in the prospect of ruining the army of Asia.

The spring passed away; and when June arrived, Mouravieff began to move the Russian army from Gumri towards Kars. Williams had now to shew himself a general as well as a reformer of abuses. He went with Sandwith to Kars, and proceeded at once to measure his resources and prepare for defence. The task was onerous; for his army amounted only to 17,000 men of all arms, with 42 guns; whereas Mouravieff had 28,000 infantry, 7500 cavalry, and 64 pieces of artillery. Williams, by immense exertions, had accumulated four months' provisions in the town; the mushir, at his urgent entreaty, sent to the pachas of Mosul and Diabekr for reinforcements; while Williams himself never ceased to impress upon Lords Clarendon, Stratford, and Raglan—and Sir James Simpson after the death of Raglan—the importance of supplying the army of Asia with men, money, and stores. Lord Stratford at this time seriously exerted himself in aid of Williams, acknowledging the critical nature of affairs, and importuning the Turkish government. What were the discussions carried on, and the plans adopted, concerning the despatch

of an Ottoman army to Mingrelia, to relieve Kars by acting on the rear of Mouravieff, the next section will shew: suffice it here to say, that no reinforcements reached Williams. The honest but feeble mushir, Vassif Pacha, frightened at the approach of the Russians, who were only four hours' march distant, proposed to abandon Kars, and fall back upon Erzeroum; and thus Williams, in addition to his other difficulties, had to quell the craven fears of the Turkish generalissimo.

Scanty, indeed, was the time for preparations; as the 16th of June witnessed the arrival of the Russians before Kars. The Turkish advanced-posts were driven in soon after daybreak; and Mouravieff's army, 25,000 strong, made its appearance about half-past six o'clock. First came the advanced-guard—three regiments of Cossacks, supported by artillery and a rocket-troop; then the main army—three columns of infantry, flanked by three regiments of dragoons, and supported by forty-eight pieces of artillery; and, lastly, the rear-guard—a strong column of reserve infantry, and an immense train of wagons, containing three days' provisions for the whole army. This formidable force advanced upon the eastern or Gumri side of Kars; and, the outposts being driven in after a stubborn resistance by the Bashi-Bazouks, the cavalry made an attempt to gallop into the town with the retreating pickets; but the Turkish artillery opened such a tremendous fire, that the cavalry, notwithstanding the aid of the Russian guns, retreated upon the main army; and the whole retired to the position previously occupied, a camping-ground between Zaiur and Akche-Kalé. It was an attack not very glorious to the Russians—one charge of cavalry, and then a retreat of the whole army; probably Mouravieff found the defences to be stronger than he had expected. The Turks felt greatly inspirited by the result; for their cavalry and artillery had both wrought well, and the infantry were prepared to make an indomitable resistance had the Russians once entered the gates. The short contest occasioned scarcely any loss to the Turks, and only a small loss to the enemy.

Williams soon became the life and soul of the defensive army. The common soldiers declared again and again that *Veelliams Pacha chock adam dur* ('Williams Pacha is no end of a man'); and at a later date he was pointed out as the wonderful Ingleez who had 'made our pachas eat dirt, and who fed the Karsli with fine flour.' The Kars citizens offered to fight in defence of their town without pay, if he would lead and regulate them. 'The Turkish soldiers,' said Dr Sandwith, writing at the time and on the spot, 'see him everywhere; he is with the sentries at the menaced point ere the morning has dawned; anon he is tasting the soldiers' soup, or examining the bread; and if anything is wrong here, his wrath is terrible. His eyes are everywhere, and he himself ubiquitous. Each soldier feels that he is something more than a neglected part of a rusty machine; he knows he is cared for and encouraged, and he is confident of being well led.' Such a man makes heroes of the soldiers under him. Even the timid generalissimo, Vassif, became almost a soldier under the magnetic influence of the ferik; while Kmeti, the Hungarian, and Hussein, a Circassian, fulfilled all the duties of gallant officers. As for the English—Lake, Teesdale, Thompson, Sandwith, and the rest—it may well be believed that they did not remain idle spectators.

On the 18th, the Russian army, strengthened to more than 30,000 men, with an immense park of artillery and convoy of provisions, left the Gumri road, and by a flank-march reached a position four miles south of Kars, as if to commence a siege on a new plan.* It becomes now necessary, therefore, to understand the nature of the defences at this period. A slight description of the town and its environs was given in a former page;† but the Kara-dagh defences, there noticed, had by this time been greatly strengthened by other works, chiefly through the labours of Colonel Lake during the winter 1854–5. The town lies under a hilly ridge, of which the Kara-dagh, or Black Mountain, forms the eastern end, and a sort of mamelon, or rounded hill called the Tahmasp, the western. This ridge is cut by a deep gorge, through which the river Kars-chai flows, crossed by four or five bridges in and near the town. A fine open plain bounds the town on the south. On all the elevated spots near the city, earthworks were constructed—some closed like redoubts, others open like bastions and redans. These earthworks, generally called by the Turks *tabias*, each had a distinctive name, among which were *Arab tabia, Teli tabia, Chatlak tabia, Koltak tabia;* or named after Turkish officers, *Hafiz Pacha tabia, Yussuf Pacha tabia, Fizi Bey tabia;* or after the Englishmen, *Williams Pacha tabia, Sandwith tabia,* &c., although they were generally called redoubts which bore the names of Teesdale, Thompson, Lake, Churchill, and the other English officers serving in the Turkish army. There was also a line of defence, enclosing an intrenched-camp about a mile and a half square, on the southern side of the town; and as the summer and autumn advanced, batteries and redoubts sprang up on every side, until at length Kars became the centre of a series of works scattered over ten square miles of area.

Williams now felt terribly the want of an efficient body of cavalry, to command the Erzeroum road, by which alone provisions could arrive; for a Turkish pacha, obstinate, or incompetent, or corrupt, or all three, had, instead of sending in a large convoy of supplies from Erzeroum to Kars, deposited it at Yenikoï, fifty miles distant; and Williams too well knew that, if Mouravieff, by a flank-movement, should seize this store, Kars

* Mouravieff and Osten-Sacken, as generals subordinate to Prince Paskévitch, had assisted at the siege of Kars twenty-six years before.

† Chapter V., p. 134.

would be starved in the course of a few months. Cavalry would be necessary to avert this calamity; cavalry he had scarcely any, worthy of the name; and all his letters—to Stratford at Constantinople, to Raglan in the Crimea, and to Clarendon in London—failed to procure for him any strengthening in this important arm: so minutely divided, and so ineffectively distributed, were the powers and responsibilities of these several officials. Before the month of June was over, Mouravieff had begun to seize the provisions in villages between Kars and Erzeroum, and more than once got possession of the mail-bags, revealing to him important information; but he politely sent on the private letters containing no important public news. The crowning misfortune occurred on the 30th, when the Russians reached Yenikoï, and effectually deprived Williams of two months' store of wheat and barley—the ferik being powerless beyond the reach of his own guns.

From this time General Williams saw that he would have to 'fight with the spade;' to throw up strong earthworks, and struggle till every mouthful of food was gone. His chance of obtaining any aid from Erzeroum, Batoum, Bayazid, or other towns, became daily less and less, as the Russians gradually augmented their investing army. The month of July passed without any battle. Mouravieff knew that he need not expose his army to any severe loss: he had a terrible ally, impending starvation, too surely working in his favour; for he gradually drew such a cordon of Cossacks around the beleaguered town, that neither reinforcements nor supplies could enter it, even if such had been obtainable.

The stern history of the siege now approaches. All the food in the town was collected, and its quantity ascertained; and short rations commenced. The oxen and sheep, the wheat and barley, the grass and hay, were placed under careful commissariat management, and a plan was laid down to effect the best that could be done for inhabitants, soldiers, and horses. The Bashi-Bazouks on the one side, and the Cossacks on the other, had frequent skirmishes, principally to determine who should have the privilege of cutting grass in the neighbouring fields; but beyond this, troops were nearly stationary, and guns nearly silent.

August arrived. Mouravieff sent a portion of his army—now raised to nearly 50,000 men—to watch Erzeroum, and the remainder continued the investment of Kars. While the Russian commander was away, his second in command made an ill-judged attack on the town, which the Turks easily repulsed, and which greatly vexed Mouravieff, who had found Erzeroum too strongly defended to warrant any immediate attack.

The brave heart of the ferik was now the moral support of the whole population and garrison. Supplies failing, and the hopes of relief becoming daily fainter, the poor Turks looked anxiously up to Williams, and endeavoured to read their future fate in his eyes. Thin and spare he was, for he worked incessantly, and slept little; but no indication of despair was there: if he had forebodings, he confided them to a few of his English companions, or committed them to paper. To others, he was still the commander, really though not officially, who wrought up those around him to a heroic determination. Whether at the Tahmasp, watching every movement in the Russian camp; whether at the Kara-dagh, or in the hospitals, or in the commissariat-stores, or at head-quarters with Vassif Pacha—he was ever the same, thinking for all and encouraging all. His English officers, too, worked just as young Captain Butler had worked at Silistria.* Thompson was guarding and watching at the Kara-dagh from morning till night; Teesdale was labouring with the veteran Kmeti at the Tahmasp; Lake was at all hours tramping from redoubt to redoubt, to see that the defences were good and well manned; while Dr Sandwith, who modestly says little concerning himself in the volume which narrates the events of this siege,† is known to have been rendering surgical aid to Russians as well as Turks, and throwing a halo of humanity about rough warfare. Espionage, desertion, and insubordination occasionally appeared; but Williams quickly applied a stern measure of punishment, which made him to be feared by the ill-doers as fully as loved by all the rest.

When, in September, General Williams found that the few horses must inevitably be starved to death if they remained longer in the town, he resolved to give the cavalry a chance of escaping. He collected his scattered irregular horsemen, about 1000 in number, gave a good feed to the horses, and sent them forth in the middle of a dark night. The Bashi-Bazouks were well fitted to try their luck in this venture; many fell under Russian balls and bullets, but the majority cut through the enemy's lines, and escaped to villages which were as homes to them. The healthy horses having thus been got rid of, and the dying horses shot, human beings alone remained to be provided for; and a trying task it was, for no supplies came for the replenishing of the granaries. A bright gleam, however, shone in upon all, on one particular day: a large store of corn was discovered in a hiding-place in Kars, deposited there by one of the despicable pachas who had cheated the government many months before: the knave had been checked by Williams ere he could make money of his booty, and now he lost all. The garrison heard, too, of the fall of Sebastopol, and of an intended expedition by Omar Pacha to their aid, and they were raised in hope.

The 29th of September was marked by a vigorous Russian assault, repelled with more than equal vigour by the garrison. During many days, movements had been observed in the enemy's camp, leading to an opinion in some minds that the siege

* Chapter II., pp. 48-50. † *Narrative of the Siege of Kars.*

was about to be abandoned by Mouravieff, under apprehension of attack from Omar Pacha in his rear. Williams and Kmeti, however, thought differently, and took care that no post should remain unguarded. At four in the morning of the day in question, the attention of Kmeti and Teesdale was called by the sentries on the Tahmasp to a low rumbling sound, audible through the thick darkness; Kmeti, applying his ear to the ground, recognised the sound of the wheels of guns; and instantly the garrison were roused to arms. Listening again, the measured tread of infantry was heard; and orders were given for riflemen to prepare, and for artillerymen to load their guns with grapeshot. A dark mass was seen moving; a gun was fired into it; cries of agony arose from it; and in a few minutes, vast bodies of Russians assaulted the earthworks. The enemy, nearly 35,000 strong, were on the north and west of the defence-works; Teesdale held the tabia nearest to them; Kmeti and Lake were between him and the city; while the mushir and Williams had their head-quarters south-west of the city; but very speedily all were at the posts most imminently in peril. The Russians had placed artillery on some adjacent hills; and under cover of a heavy fire, dense masses of infantry advanced to the assault. Deadly became the contest. The Russian officers, sword in hand, charged at the head of the column, and every redoubt and breastwork became a scene of bloody strife. When day dawned, vast masses of Russians were seen advancing to give support; while a large force of cavalry and artillery menaced, or feigned to menace, the plain on the south. Williams took up a central position, where he could see all, and manœuvre his slender forces; Kmeti, Lake, Teesdale, and others—not excluding several Turkish officers, who fought gallantly when thus well commanded—met the Russians bayonet to bayonet and gun to gun; while Thompson, on the Kara-dagh, wrought destructive havoc among the enemy by one single gun of large calibre. During seven hours did the mortal struggle continue, the Tahmasp being the chief point of attack; again and again did the Russians, as at Inkermann and Tchernaya Bridge, rush on in dense columns; again and again did the motley garrison repel them—for it was indeed a motley garrison; although Williams had infused into them so much of his own dauntless spirit, that all fought well on this day. About noon, the enemy, utterly repulsed at all points, retired: if Williams had possessed either cavalry or horse-artillery, he might have nearly destroyed them during the retreat; but having neither, he could not venture beyond his defences, and so Mouravieff got clear.

This battle of Kars, worthily so called, greatly elated the Turks; it was in every sense honourable to them; and if they had not been so cruelly abandoned by the authorities at Constantinople and in the Crimea, it ought to have led to permanent success. It was a sad duty that now devolved upon Dr Sandwith and his coadjutors. Thousands of Russians lay dead or wounded among the earthworks which had been attacked; and while the troops buried the one, the surgeons sought to heal the wounds of the other. Williams estimated the Russian loss at more than 2500 killed and 5000 wounded; while his own loss was less than 1000; others, however, including Dr Sandwith, place the Russian casualties at a much higher number—even so great as 10,000. As at this time, owing to the absence of animal food, and other causes, cholera appeared with much severity in the town, the labours of the surgeons became unspeakably onerous and distressing; still, Sandwith braved heroically the duties of his position.

October began and ended in wearing anxiety. When the cholera abated, then did the emaciated frames of the troops and the inhabitants tell only too truly how the spare diet was bringing down their strength. A little bread and a little gruel made of flour and crushed biscuit constituted all their food; and the hospitals became filled with men whose only malady was want of sustenance. Dr Sandwith tells of the untiring exertions of Mr Churchill, a secretary and commissary, in duly protecting and portioning the scanty store; and he speaks with generous warmth of the services rendered by the Turkish surgeons attached to the army, in furtherance of the plans which his experience had laid down; but no services could avert the gradual exhaustion of the supplies. Day by day the officers looked out from the heights, to see whether Mouravieff would really abandon the siege, and afford the garrison an opportunity to forage in the neighbouring districts; but they found that the Russian general, though not attacking them, still hovered around the beleaguered town. They awaited, too, any news of Omar Pacha's success, or of succour from Trebizond and Erzeroum; but none such arrived—or, if such came to hand, it was found to be futile rumour, and therefore worse than useless. The wild-dogs and the vultures were the only beings fully fed; there was, alas! plenty for them. Within the city, women and children were searching and craving for food; grass and roots were torn up and eaten raw; a small store of onions, brought in by a venturous dealer at the hazard of capture by the Russians, was sold at the rate of 5s. per pound; the few wretched horses yet left were killed, and their flesh cooked for food; and several soldiers were poisoned by eating indiscriminately of the herbs dug up from the ground. It was a terrible truth told in few words when, in a dispatch written towards the close of the month, Williams said: 'I have on my shoulders the management of the starving population as well as of the army.'

Mouravieff, an active and intelligent general, knew that Omar Pacha was not likely to reach Kars from Batoum, a distance by circuitous and difficult roads of nearly 200 miles, before winter arrived; and he therefore resolved to remain quiet and watchful before Kars, until the garrison

surrendered through sheer starvation. Such was the state of matters when November arrived. There were Turkish troops at Erzeroum, which Williams earnestly requested might be sent to relieve him, and to bring convoys of food; but here as elsewhere his hopes were frustrated: it seemed to be his destiny to struggle on, seeing his own garrison gradually diminish, and left wholly to his own resources. On the 18th he wrote to Mr Consul Brant at Erzeroum, speaking almost with bitterness of this (to him) unaccountable neglect from all sides, and adding: 'We divide our bread with the starving towns-people. No animal food for seven weeks. I kill horses in my stable secretly, and send the meat to the hospital, which is now very crowded. We can hold out, and try to retreat over the mountains *viâ* Olti. Have provisions sent in that direction ere the eighteenth day after this date. We shall carry three days' biscuit with us.'

The die was cast. This hopeful man, with a moral grandeur of character worthy of all admiration, clung to every probability, every chance that others would do as they should have done. He

had measured his poor supply of biscuit; he counted up eighteen days; he found that if he could cut through the enemy at the end of that time, and reach Olti, he might yet save his starving troops, provided Selim Pacha would advance from Erzeroum to Olti with supplies. But Selim was one of the many incapables among the pachas: Williams received news, on the 23d, that he refused to advance; and then indeed was all over; for the troops could not have carried food for the whole journey from Kars to Erzeroum, even if the food were at hand, and even if unmolested by Mouravieff. The soldiers had been gradually becoming weaker, from want of sustenance; insomuch that Sandwith could observe a difference in the appearance of those who had been fortunate enough to secure a dead horse to flavour their gruel or soup; even with this poor addition, they were less emaciated than their companions. Men died of starvation in the hospitals in such number, that the surgeons deemed it quite a treasure if they could provide horse-broth as an hospital luxury; and the women and children, inhabitants of the town, were attacked with typhus through deficiency of sustenance. If a man were more eager for money than bread (and there were such even at that time), he could procure a sum equal to two or three shillings for a loaf no larger than his fist; and when, on one occasion, a peasant contrived to steal into the town with a lame buffalo laden with a bag of flour, he reaped almost a fortune by the sale of his treasure. The poor fellows were taken to the hospital at the rate of a hundred per day, many dying before they had been a single hour within the building; and those who still braved their troubles and remained at their posts, shewed only too plainly, by their hollow cheeks, tottering gait, and feebleness of voice, the physical exhaustion under which they were sinking. Every morning dead bodies were seen in the streets: the hand of

* Copied by permission from Dr Sandwith's *Narrative of the Siege of Kars.*

the destroyer had been busy during the night. Women and children gathered the dust before the flour-depôts, and regarded it as food in virtue of the few grains of flour it contained. Aged persons were moaning and crying in the streets, for very hunger; and mothers would bring their children to the military council and lay them down, saying: 'Take and keep these children, for we have no bread to give them.' Yet, amid all these sufferings, the devoted soldiers remained gallantly at their posts; a party of them stood sentry over a store of three days' provisions at the batteries, and although starving, not a biscuit was stolen from first to last. Night after night Williams sent forth messengers to Selim Pacha, each carrying a note in cipher rolled up and put into a quill, which they might drop if stopped by the Cossacks, and each note urgently pressing for aid; and day after day brought with it the sickening sense of disappointed hopes.

The chivalrous man to whom all looked up, and whose heart bled within him at the haggard looks and moaning cries of so many thousand human beings, knew where to draw the line between heroism and cruelty. So long as he felt that Selim might and could and ought to have sent supplies—if not to Kars, at least to an intermediate station—he resolved to hope on and bear all; but when this last chance was taken from him, he decided to maintain no longer the terrible struggle. He saw the mosques and khans and large houses full of dying men whom the hospitals could not contain; he saw the river frozen over, and snow indicating the approach of pinching winter; he saw that water could scarcely be brought to the hospitals, for the water-bearing horses and asses were all dead; he saw some of the citizens exhume for food the carcasses of horses buried before the time of suffering had arrived; he saw that many men became idiotic through hunger, and that others were deserting in spite of his stern denunciations; he saw that, although the mouths to be fed were daily diminishing with fearful rapidity, he had only seven days' provisions left, at half a pound of bread per day per head—he saw all this; and when he received from Consul Brant a note in cipher saying, 'Selim Pacha won't advance,' he felt that the hour of surrender had arrived. He called together all the pachas, and asked whether they thought the troops could cut a way for themselves through the investing army; but they all declared with one voice that such an effort was impossible for men so emaciated and debilitated. In a dispatch, written about this time to Lord Clarendon, he said: 'We had, up to that date, suffered from cold, want of sufficient clothing, and starvation, without a murmur escaping from the troops. They fell dead at their posts, in their tents, and throughout the camp, as brave men should who cling to their duty through the slightest glimmering of hope of saving a place intrusted to their custody. From the day of their glorious victory, the 29th of September, they had not tasted animal food, and their nourishment consisted of two-fifths of a ration of bread and the roots of grass, which they had scarcely strength to dig for; yet night and day they stood to their arms, their wasted frames shewing the fearful effects of starvation, but their sparkling eye telling me what they would do were the enemy again to attack them. We had now lost nearly 2000 men by starvation, and the towns-people also suffered, and would have died by hundreds if I had not divided the bread of the soldiers among those who had bravely fought by their side.'

On the 24th of November Williams sent Teesdale, under a flag of truce, to request a conference with Mouravieff. The antagonists met on the 25th. The Russian general was a gentleman as well as a soldier; he had the generosity of a gallant man, and knew how to respect those who had so nobly defended Kars amid such great trials. Williams offered to surrender if honourable terms were granted; but an unconditional surrender he would not submit to until he had destroyed every gun, every standard, every trophy within the town. Mouravieff said: 'I have no wish to wreak an unworthy vengeance on a gallant and long-suffering army, which has covered itself with glory, and only yields to famine. They must be splendid troops,' he added, pointing to a lump of bread and a handful of roots, 'who can stand to their arms in this severe climate on food such as this. General Williams, you have made yourself a name in history, and posterity will stand amazed at the endurance, the courage, and the discipline which this siege has called forth in the remains of an army. Let us arrange a capitulation that will satisfy the demands of war without outraging humanity.' By the terms agreed on, the forts, redoubts, batteries, guns, small-arms, magazines, ammunition, powder, military clothing, stores, and government documents of every description, were to be given up to the conquerors. On the other hand, the regular troops were to march out with colours flying and bands playing, and surrender themselves prisoners of war; the officers were to retain their swords; the troops, men as well as officers, were to be permitted either to preserve or to sell their few trifling articles of personal property; the militia and irregulars were, unarmed, to be allowed to return to their homes; the medical staff, and all non-combatants with the army, were to be set unconditionally free; some of the foreign officers serving in the Turkish army were to be released, under certain conditions; the castle, mosques, public buildings, and private property in Kars were to be respected; and the inhabitants, when the Turkish army had left, were to be shielded from pillage and insult. These terms, estimated by military precedents, were highly honourable, and shew that the conqueror was worthy of the great opponent who had yielded to him. It is not quite certain whether Mouravieff, from a generous motive, connived at the escape of

Generals *Kmeti* and Colman; but those Hungarians—known to the Turks as Ismail Pacha and Fezzi Pacha—at the first whisper of surrender, asked Williams to allow them to cut their way out and escape to Erzeroum, preferring the chance of dying in the attempt to that of being made prisoners; since Russia would perhaps have felt bound to deliver them up to the vengeance of Austria, had they been captured. On the 27th, Williams and his whole staff, with two Turkish officers, went over to dine with Mouravieff, who—speaking the Russian, Turkish, English, French, and German languages—acted the host as gracefully as he had acted the general gallantly. Dr Sandwith writes as if tears overflowed his pen, with joy at the delicate attention paid to the vanquished by all the Russian officers. Among the incidents of the conversation, he says, 'one of the officers recognised Teesdale as having, under a deadly fire of grape and rifle balls, leaped over our breastworks, and rescued from some marauding soldiers a wounded Russian officer. This little episode was not hitherto known to us; and I almost fear to shock the modesty of that gallant officer in thus recording it.' During these hospitalities, Mouravieff did not forget to send in food to the starving garrison and inhabitants.

Kmeti and Colman, with a band of daring Kurdish horsemen, made their escape to Erzeroum, after undergoing great peril. Sandwith went through the wild Lazistan country to Batoum; hearing everywhere that, in the estimation of the people, 'Williams Pacha was a Rustem, an Ilderim, a lion in the fight, a very Solomon in council.' Williams, Lake, Teesdale, and Thompson went as prisoners to Gumri; and Churchill, a civilian, voluntarily accompanied them. A Russian force took possession of Kars early in December, and quartered in the barracks lately inhabited by the Turks.

OMAR PACHA IN MINGRELIA.

It now becomes necessary to attend to the proceedings of Omar Pacha.

'There is one preliminary to relieving a besieged town which is indispensable—it is that you must first find your army.' This, in the language of Mr Oliphant,* is a truism that must be constantly borne in mind, in any attempt to explain why Omar Pacha rendered no assistance to General Williams.

It was not until the month of June that the Ottoman authorities at Constantinople took any steps towards sending reinforcements to Kars; by proposing that an army should be made up of General Vivian's Turkish contingent, General Beatson's Bashi-Bazouks, the Batoum garrison, and sundry Albanians, Bulgarians, Egyptians, and Tunisians, making 43,000 in all; that General Vivian should command; and that the destination should be Mingrelia, on the way to Tiflis, so as to get on the rear of the enemy. Lord Clarendon, to whom this plan was forwarded by Lord Stratford, distrusted the idea of such an army, 'hurriedly collected from various quarters, imperfectly disciplined, doubtfully armed and equipped, and as yet unorganised;' while General Vivian stated that he would want at least 15,000 horses to carry provisions and stores on such an expedition.

The plan for this motley army being abandoned, the Turkish government conferred with Lord Stratford as to the best course to pursue, provided a better army could be raised. They agreed that an expedition from Batoum or Redout Kalé towards Kutaïs would be better than one from Trebizond and Erzeroum towards Kars, as menacing the Russians at a sensitive point; but Lord Clarendon, when appealed to, gave an opinion in favour of the Trebizond route. The whole of the authorities, British and Turkish, at Constantinople, appear to have been of one mind in this matter; and many valuable weeks were wasted in futile correspondence, the consent of the British ministry being necessary to any important movements in this direction. Meanwhile Omar Pacha, hearing of the proposed expedition, offered to go to Asia with his Crimean army; and he held a meeting with the Allied commanders on the 14th of July; but the admirals and generals, appreciating the weighty affairs at Sebastopol, and ignorant or indifferent concerning Kars, resolutely refused to part with the Turkish troops then in the Crimea. A tedious and most improvident waste of time followed, dispatches being written to and from Sebastopol, Constantinople, London, and Paris; and suggestions being made whether the Turkish regulars or the Turkish contingent could most prudently be sent. It is difficult to unravel the knotty complication of this period, so many voices being concerned in determining what might best be done; but the months of July and August were allowed to pass away before Pelissier and Simpson (the chief opponents) would assent to Omar's plans. The Turks were idly encamped at Kamara and elsewhere, willing to be employed, and their favourite general was willing to employ them; yet it was not until after the fall of Sebastopol in September that they were allowed to depart. Whatever may have been the faults on the part of the British and the Turks, the official correspondence has rendered evident the fact that the French were chiefly instrumental in preventing Omar Pacha from rendering useful service in Asia.

After surmounting these difficulties, a small Turkish force was conveyed, in British steamers, from the Crimea to Redout Kalé in September. This town is at the eastern end of the Black Sea, and is connected, by a tolerably good road 150 miles in length, with Tiflis in Russian Georgia; but as its harbour is inconvenient, and as Batoum, a port further southward, is backed by a very

* *Transcaucasian Campaign of the Turkish Army under Omar Pacha.*

rugged country, Omar Pacha determined on establishing the base of his operations further to the north, at Suchum Kaleh or Soucoum-Kalé,* where he arrived on the 3d of October. He made immense exertions to bring in troops from all quarters, and to discipline them: this accomplished, he began his march towards the interior, having many English officers under him, including Colonels Simmons, Ballard, and Caddell, and accompanied by several English amateurs and newspaper correspondents; but it was not until the close of October that this advance could be made. They marched south-east from Suchum to the river Ingour, near Sugdidi; and as the Russians were posted in some strength in that part of Mingrelia, Omar had to force a passage across the river. Mr Oliphant, one of the civilians with the army, sought to render himself useful; and although, to use his own words, his 'experience in military matters was exactly that of most other Lincoln's Inn barristers,' he managed to superintend the filling of gabions and the construction of a small earthwork battery during the night. This battery was to cover or protect the Turkish army during the crossing of the Ingour. Omar had been enabled to muster around him about 20,000 men, besides leaving 10,000 to guard Suchum and other places.

On the 6th of November, the passage of the Ingour was effected. A spot was selected where a long narrow island separates the river into two channels, which it was hoped might be forded in safety. Russian batteries now became visible, and a deadly fire was maintained on both sides: the Turkish artillery and rifles keeping up a volley while the bulk of the army was crossing. The Russians near that spot, regulars and Georgian militia together, were about 15,000 in number; but the Turks were superior in energy and determination, and succeeded in effecting a passage, and routing the enemy, who fled in great disorder, leaving guns and knapsacks behind them. The Turks, as always occurred when commanded by Omar Pacha, fought well; and the 'Giaour' officers, English, Polish, and Magyar, threw themselves heartily into the contest; but Mr Oliphant only echoes the accounts of most other writers when he states that the Turkish officers, the true Osmanli pachas and beys, were for the most part either cowardly or inefficient, or both. Captain Dymock, aid-de-camp to Colonel Simmons, was killed. The Russian loss in killed and wounded was 1250; that of the Turks, about 400. The Ingour having been crossed, Omar Pacha found himself in the province of Mingrelia, under the nominal rule of Princess Dadian: the province just left, Abasia or Abkhasia, being under Prince Michael; although the czar was in effect master over both. The princess fled from her palace, a building in Sugdidi, sumptuously furnished, for safety in the mountains, and Omar took up his quarters in that town; but as the province was very hostile to him, he had to send back his scantily provided commissariat-staff for supplies; and this occasioned a delay very detrimental to his plans. On the 15th, after this sojourn in a beautiful region, with the magnificent Mount Elbruz (nearly 15,000 feet high) full in view, the Turks resumed their march towards Kutaïs—still in the midst of the Mingrelians, a people of whom Mr Oliphant gives a very interesting description, and who, whatever were their feelings towards their co-religionists the Russians, had unquestionably little sympathy with the Turks. The march, however, was of very limited extent; for heavy rains, after a propitious autumn, began in the third week of November, and kept the army near the almost impassable torrents of the hilly country until the 2d of December, near the town of Sinakia, still in Mingrelia.

The remainder of this singular campaign, or rather expedition, was very trying to the Turkish troops. The district on the confines of Mingrelia and Imeritia is hilly, and the rivers become torrents in the rainy season, while the roads through the valleys are sloughs of mud. The fording, and the bringing up of supplies, entailed severe labours on the troops; while the nights were passed in misery. 'The condition of the unfortunate soldiers under these circumstances,' says Mr Oliphant, 'may be easily conceived. Crowded into their small tents, they lay literally packed in mud. My own bed was upon the ground, or rather in the water; and for the last two nights I had been suffering from fever and ague. To add to our miseries, we were running short of provisions.' At last, on the 8th of December, Omar Pacha decided that he would struggle no more; the rivers between him and Kutaïs were almost impassable, for the Russians had destroyed the bridges; while the swelling torrents behind him threatened to cut off his communication with his supplies. Moreover, he just then received the news of the surrender of Kars, which gave a wholly new complexion to his strategical position. The banks of the small river Skeniscal, near the town of Mehranie, was his furthest advance inland; and his army listened with bitter disappointment to the order to retreat, without having come within sight of Kutaïs: indeed, notwithstanding their numerous marchings and encampments, they were never more than forty miles distant from the nearest point of the Black Sea. The retreat was marked by misery at every step, so great were the difficulties of the situation; and, moreover, the Turks had the mortification of being attacked by Cossacks, who, avoiding them during the advance, harassed them in the retreat.

Omar Pacha decided that his army should go into winter-quarters at a spot where commissariat supplies might reach them by boats from Redout Kalé, up one of the Mingrelian rivers. He himself returned to Constantinople; while the Englishmen, Colonels Ballard, Simmons, Caddell, Hinde, Captain M'Intyre, Mr Oliphant, and Mr Longworth, nearly all bade adieu, about Christmas, to

* See coloured map—'Map of the Caucasus and Portion of Turkey in Asia.'

a land not likely to afford them any pleasant adventures during the winter.

Thus ended Omar Pacha's Mingrelian expedition, rendered utterly abortive by obstacles beyond his own control. Mr Oliphant asserts strongly that an advance to Mingrelia and Georgia early in the summer would not only have saved Kars, but thrown the whole Transcaucasian possessions of Russia into peril. Even one week gained in the commencement of the campaign would have enabled Omar Pacha to reach Kutaïs before the rains commenced, take up his winter-quarters there, obtain the submission of the chiefs of Mingrelia, Imeritia, Gouriel, and Abasia, and enter upon a spring campaign in 1856 under great advantages. On the other hand, Dr Sandwith remained of the same opinion at the end as at the beginning of the campaign—that Kars could better have been relieved by way of Erzeroum than Batoum or Mingrelia; but his heart was centered in the Kars army itself: he did not profess to take a wide strategical view of the whole war. Some opponents of Russia have urged that a campaign on a great scale in the Transcaucasian provinces would probably have been attended with more vital consequences than the campaign in the Crimea itself. This at least is certain—that the Western governments effected nothing towards weakening the czar in that important region; and that, while doing nothing themselves, they paralysed the exertions of the two commanders who, above all others, possessed the confidence of the Turkish troops—General Williams and Omar Pacha.

England, when all was over, did not forget the man who had won such glory by a defeat. In the midst of much that was mortifying during the progress of the war, the country felt justly proud of General Williams; leaving to a future time to determine whether, in reference to the neglect he had experienced, blame could most justly be awarded to the authorities at London, Paris, Constantinople, Kamiesch, Balaklava, or Erzeroum; but agreeing with one voice that he at least had nobly borne the difficulties of his position. On the surrender of Kars, Williams and his English companions, with the Mushir and about 8000 Turks, went as prisoners of war to Gumri, and afterwards to Tiflis, awaiting orders from the czar touching their further destination. Here the heroic man broke down; fourteen months of incessant toil and mental anxiety, and deficient sustenance during the last two of those months, told severely on his frame, and threw him into a long and severe illness, which detained him many months at Tiflis. With the chivalry of a true soldier, General Mouravieff sought by the most delicate attentions to alleviate the sufferings and cheer the mind of his noble prisoner. When the spring of 1856 arrived, and 'Ferik Williams' was well enough to be moved towards Riazan and Moscow—which did not take place until the end of May—he wrote a letter to the Earl of Clarendon, shewing that Mouravieff had displayed his magnanimity alike to all the prisoners. 'I have already told your lordship of General Mouravieff's kindness towards myself and my party; but his humanity and benevolent treatment of the poor famished garrison of Kars will gain for him the respect of the civilised world, and must tend to lessen, if not eradicate, the animosity which for more than a century has existed between Russia and Turkey, especially on the part of the latter. I shall therefore quit General Mouravieff with great regret, although I have every hope that on my arrival at Riazan we shall hear of the re-establishment of peace, and continue our journey towards England.'

England acknowledged her sense of the merits of General Williams in two modes. The two Houses of Parliament resolved, almost with acclamation, to vote him an annuity of £1000 for life; while the Queen conferred upon him the dignity of a baronetcy, by the title of 'Sir William Fenwick Williams of Kars,' thus gracefully associating his name with the town he had so gallantly defended. Nor did the country hesitate to respond heartily to the encomiums passed upon the companions of Williams by Earl Granville, the president of the council. Speaking of the engineering services of Colonel Lake at Kars, his lordship said: 'I understand that the fort named after this talented officer was perfectly impregnable, while the others were so ingeniously constructed by him that none could be attacked without exposing the assailants to the most destructive fire. So great, indeed, was the engineering skill of Colonel Lake, that he has received the designation of "the Todtleben of Kars."' The Earl proceeded to notice the other Englishmen: 'Another officer deserving of great commendation is Major Thompson, who was seriously wounded in the first campaign, and who returned to his native country in ill health, after an absence of ten years. He remained here only ten days, or hardly long enough to do more than embrace his mother, when he immediately started for Kars, which he reached in a crippled state, and conducted himself in defence of that fortress with a gallantry beyond all praise. Another name that will live in the annals of English military discipline is that of Major Teesdale. This gallant gentleman being only twenty-three years old, and of very boyish appearance, there would have been something almost ridiculous, were it not for the high testimony borne to his merits, in seeing him acting in the absence of General Williams, and daily consulted on matters alike of the greatest importance and the minutest detail, by all the gray-headed generals of the Turkish army. My lords, I know nothing tending more to illustrate the usual characteristics of English officers—courage, modesty, and humanity—than the incident mentioned in Dr Sandwith's interesting book—namely, that the writer and his companions learned for the first time from the Russians that they had

seen Major Teesdale jump from the walls of the fort in which he was stationed amid a shower of bullets to rescue a wounded officer of the enemy. Next in succession comes Dr Sandwith, and I am glad to include a civilian among the other heroes of this scene. This gentleman found the hospitals destitute of every requisite for an army in the field, and, in spite of enormous difficulties, placed them in a state of order which would do credit to hospitals nearer home; while, by the peculiar talent which appears to have belonged to him in common with all his English companions, he also obtained an influence over the Turkish assistants which stood him in good stead. I am not surprised to hear that Dr Sandwith exposed himself in the field under a most severe fire, in order to discharge the duties of his profession; because we have been accustomed to the same devotion on the part of all the distinguished medical men attached to the army in the Crimea; but I think it reflects infinite credit on him that—notwithstanding the ample excuse afforded him by his multifarious civil occupations for declining to undertake any other duty—during the whole of those dreary months spent by our brave countrymen in Kars, he never shrank from the fearful night-work amid which no exposed part of the fortifications was ever allowed to be left for an instant without a European eye to watch it; and this, too, at a period when the cold was so intense that even the running-streams passing through that town were converted into solid ice.'*

The defence of Kars was one among several indications afforded during the war, that the English operations were distinguished—not so much by military successes—as by an indomitable perseverance in struggling against difficulties, followed by a heroic patience under suffering when the difficulties became too great to be surmounted. It was so at Inkermann; it was so at the camp and in the trenches during the dreadful winter; it was so in the Scutari and Smyrna hospitals; it was so at Kars; and it was alike observable in officers and in men, and—last though not least—in FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE and her companions.

* Speech in the House of Lords, 9th May 1856.

Hospital at Smyrna.

CHAPTER XIII.

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH IN 1855.

A SINGULAR parallelism is observable between the two years 1854 and 1855, in relation to the naval operations of the Allies in the north. In both years, vast and well-appointed fleets were sent out by England and France; in both, ardent anticipations of success were entertained; in both, the Russian admirals took shelter behind stone-batteries, and declined naval battles; in both, the Baltic was the chief scene of manœuvre, with the White Sea and the North Pacific as subordinate localities; in both, the results obtained or effected were utterly disproportionate to the magnitude of the means employed; and in both, bitter disappointment was felt by the respective nations, especially the English. The paucity of incidents in 1855, and the topographical and historical details already given,* will justify a brief mode of treatment in the present Chapter.

DISCUSSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS.

Numerous professional controversies, leading in some instances to improvements, having marked the naval affairs of 1854 and 1855, it may be well to notice them here, as elucidating many points in the history of the period.

The controversy between Sir Charles Napier as Admiral-in-chief in the Baltic, and Sir James Graham as First Lord of the Admiralty (adverted to at p. 183), would be simply painful if regarded as a personal contest between two distinguished men; its value results from the light thrown upon the naval arrangements necessary for the conduct of the war in 1855. The correspondence and debates bearing upon the controversy ran over a period of more than two years, from the early spring of 1854 to the late spring of 1856; and during its continuance, state documents and private letters were quoted with a freedom from scruple rather unusual among public men. Even in February 1854, before war was declared, the admiral and the minister differed in opinion as to the efficiency of the fleet about to be despatched; but after that date, matters went on smoothly until the attacks of the strong forts in the Baltic came under discussion. On the 1st of May Graham wrote: 'I by no means contemplate an attack on Sveaborg or Cronstadt. I have a great respect for stone-walls, and have no fancy for running even screw line-of-battle ships against them. Because the public here may be impatient, you must not be rash; because they, at a distance from danger, are foolhardy, you must not risk the loss of a fleet in an impossible enterprise. I believe both Sveaborg and Cronstadt to be all but impregnable from the sea, Sveaborg more especially; and none but a very large army could co-operate by land efficiently, in the presence of such a force as Russia could readily concentrate for the immediate defence of the approaches to her capital.' This important letter was the text of much that followed, since it unquestionably advocated a cautious rather than a daring policy. When Napier found that the Russian admirals would not emerge from their hiding-places and give him battle, he evidently felt perplexed how best to employ the great fleet placed at his command; and much correspondence resulted on this matter. The despatch of a French military force was announced to him in July; and the minister then said: 'Bomarsund will be clearly within your reach. Sveaborg, if it were possible, would be a noble prize; but on no account be led into any desperate attempts; and above all things avoid the least risk of the Russian fleet slipping out of the Gulf of Finland when your back was turned.' The army arrived; Bomarsund was cannonaded and destroyed; and the English government thanked Sir Charles as well as all else for what had been effected. But from that time, discord began. It has since come to light that the various admirals and generals in the Baltic differed greatly among themselves, in estimating the probabilities for and against success in any attack on Sveaborg or Cronstadt; Sir Charles Napier, in the complicated discussions and correspondence thence arising, lost the even balance of his temper; and a few unguarded expressions, written at that time, were dwelt on by the First Lord as being derogatory to official etiquette.

It is worthy of note, that the admiral's opinion in autumn coincided nearly with the minister's

* Chapter VI., pp. 152-194.

opinion in spring. Writing on the 29th of August—after expressing his conviction that a large military force would be necessary to reduce Sveaborg, and that, however large this force might be, the czar would probably bring forward one still larger—Sir Charles proceeded: 'If you attack the islands with an overwhelming force of gun and mortar boats, backed by the fleet and steamers, I believe you would destroy it; but it would be a work of time. I do not think our present force would do it, and the season is much too far advanced to attempt it.' There is further evidence, afforded by the correspondence, that confusion arose from duplicate instructions—the First Lord writing familiarly to the admiral; the Admiralty as a united board writing officially; and the two sets of documents not always being consistent one with the other. General Jones, an engineer officer attached to the military portion of the expedition, had, at a council of war, expressed an opinion that great effects might be wrought by the fleet and army on Sveaborg; Sir Charles Napier wrote home somewhat impetuously, even intemperately, combating that opinion; but as the English public was impatient for some bold sequel to the taking of Bomarsund, the Admiralty became more bellicose than before, and treated Jones's report with attention—especially as it was supported by the opinions of General Baraguay d'Hilliers and General Niel. Nay, the last-named officer, chief-engineer to the French army, averred that the fleet itself, even unassisted by troops, might lay Sveaborg in ruins in a few hours. From that moment disagreement marked all the correspondence. The Allied generals had thought the fleets might work mischief against Sveaborg; the Allied admirals declared this to be impracticable; the French troops, 'too many for Bomarsund, too few for Sveaborg,' as Sir Charles thought, had taken their departure in discontent; the public in France and England were also discontented; and then Sir James Graham joined in the discontent. Although not actually charging the admiral with timidity, the First Lord used an expression sufficiently galling to a veteran naval officer, when he said—writing on the 17th of October: 'War is not conducted without risks and dangers; prudence consists in weighing them, and firmness in encountering them; and nothing great by sea or land can be achieved without considerable peril.' The admiral, who in the spring had been warned against 'knocking his head against stone-walls,' appeared now to be under condemnation for having respected that advice; and the whole of the painful quarrel—shewn in parliamentary debates and newspaper correspondence of great length—was marked by attempts on either side to shew that the other was wrong.

Practically, the great fact brought to light was this—that gun-boats, mortar-vessels, and floating-batteries would have been more valuable than large ships-of-war for destroying Sveaborg and Cronstadt; if the Admiralty had provided those, more might have been achieved. Whether Sir Charles Napier had pointed out this fact with sufficient clearness, is just one of the controverted points. A further truth was made manifest in the Baltic as well as on the plateau outside Sebastopol—that several commanders with co-extensive powers, and serving different sovereigns, are ever in peril of disagreement.

Another subject, much discussed before and during the Baltic operations of 1855, was the relative value of earthworks and stoneworks for fortification, and the best modes of employing projectiles in the destruction of such works. The wonderful defence of Silistria by the Turks against the Russians; the obstinate retention of Sebastopol by the Russians against the Allies; the battering down of Bomarsund; and the high estimate evidently taken by Sir Charles Napier of the vast masonry-defences of Cronstadt and Sveaborg—all contributed to render this subject one of high interest. Mr James Fergusson, an architect and architectural writer, had previously written a volume in advocacy of a new system of earthwork fortification, which had been much discussed among military engineers. Silistria, it was contended, had been saved by the Arabtabia, an earthwork hastily thrown up on a hill; the garrison, led by Butler and Nasmyth, defended this redoubt against all attacks, and thereby saved Silistria—although the besieging force amounted to 30,000 or 40,000 men, the garrison to only 12,000, and although the enemy, during thirty-nine days, threw 50,000 projectiles into the place, and lost 12,000 men. It was also pointed out that the stoneworks of Bomarsund had not resisted so stoutly as the earthworks of Sebastopol; and that, if battered by continuous cannonading, an earthen parapet could be repaired during a single night, whereas a stone-fort would require many days, if not weeks, for its restoration. Later in the year, when the capture of Kinburn occurred, the advocates of earthen fortifications pointed still more confidently to the relative weakness of stone against large ordnance. On the other hand, many engineers contended that the long defence of Sebastopol was due mainly to the almost unlimited supply of men and guns on the part of the Russians.

These discussions, however, bore relation to the best mode of constructing fortifications, not to the best mode of attacking those already existing. The latter inquiry engaged many eager pens, and elicited arguments of remarkable character—among the most prominent of which were those relating to the Earl of Dundonald's plans. Mr Warner, some years earlier, had brought forward a project for a 'long range,' a projectile which was to destroy any ship at a prodigious distance. Notwithstanding warm advocacy and numerous trials, the government declined to adopt the invention; and as the inventor would not divulge it unless well paid, the nature of the plan remained unknown to the general public. The same may be said of the invention of the veteran Earl of Dundonald; but as his plan was directly advocated in relation

to the operations of 1855, it may be well to touch briefly on the arguments used.

In the autumn of 1854, when a popular idea prevailed that less had been effected in the Baltic by Napier than was practicable, the earl wrote to the newspapers, declaring his conviction that 'success could not have attended the operations of combustible ships against stone-batteries firing red-hot shot, however coolly unresisting walls may be leisurely demolished.' About the same time he brought his secret plan under the notice of the government—entertaining an inventor's usual conviction that it was the best of all plans. In March 1855, his lordship presented a petition to the House of Commons, shewing—that so far back as the year 1811 he had invented 'a simple yet irresistible means whereby ordinary implements in war might be dispensed with, and speedy and successful results insured;' that he disclosed it to the Prince Regent in 1812; that a commission, consisting of the Duke of York, Lords Exmouth and Keith, and Colonel Congreve, examined and reported favourably of it; that the prince swore them to secrecy, on account of the importance of the plan; that many years afterwards, on returning from foreign service, the earl had explained the plan to William IV., and received praise from the king for his patriotism in not selling the secret to any foreign power; that on two occasions during 1854 he had brought the subject under the notice of the cabinet, offering to reveal his secret, under pledge, to a board of officers appointed to examine the plan; that the subject was investigated by the board thus appointed; but that an unfavourable report, prepared by the board, was based upon erroneous suppositions. The petitioner finally solicited another inquiry, asserting, in most unhesitating terms, that his plan would enable the British speedily to subdue Cronstadt, Sveaborg, Sebastopol, or any fortress whatever. No notice being taken of this petition, and the Emperor of the French having about that time announced an intention of going out to command the Allied armies in the Crimea, the earl thought of communicating his secret to England's ally: both intentions, however, fell to the ground. The inventor then wrote numerous letters to the public journals, asseverating that gun-boats, mortar-boats, floating-batteries, large ships, small ships—all would be unavailable to destroy the czar's great forts, which could be effected by his missile alone; he estimated that a million sterling would suffice to defray all the expenses of utterly destroying Cronstadt, Sveaborg, Helsingfors, and Sebastopol by his plan. From time to time questions were asked in parliament concerning the views of the government in this matter; and the answers, always cautious, implied that the scientific and military men consulted saw insurmountable obstacles to the success of the scheme, although the power employed, if really applicable, would be fearfully irresistible. In vain did the earl urge his plans; the secret became known to several scientific persons, who honourably kept it; like that of Captain Warner, it remained a secret to the public generally; but the government, with whatever sincerity the investigation was made, declined to avail themselves of it. Commenting on the probability that, after all, the scheme would be practically inapplicable, a leading journalist said: 'On the other hand, if there is a man in the whole world who ought to be listened to with more attention than another when he promises extraordinary things, it is certainly Lord Dundonald; for his whole life exhibits a series of achievements coming under this very category. If his present plans are pronounced impracticable, he can very truly say that half the things he has done would have been regarded in a similar light, but that he did them nevertheless.' This is an allusion to the daring naval exploits of the earl, when Lord Cochrane, in foreign service.

But while this veteran, in his ardent estimate of an invention on which he had secretly pondered for forty years, disparaged other modes of naval attack, he had few supporters in his condemnation of gun-boats and floating-batteries. The Baltic campaign in 1854 had shewn so strikingly the necessity for vessels of shallow draught, that the government were urged to prepare a large number of these for service in 1855. It was simply one among many changes introduced or advocated in the mechanism of the fleet. Already the line-of-battle ships had undergone many reforms, both in their bulk and in their means of propulsion. The *Victory*, a famous ship in Nelson's days, carrying 104 guns, was not equal in burden to some of the 50-gun steam-frigates now built; and even the *Caledonia*, 120-gun ship, built in 1808, was forty feet shorter, and 1000 tons less burden, than the *Duke of Wellington*, on which Napier hoisted his flag in 1854. The old '74's,' with which so many battles were won by Nelson, Collingwood, Howe, St Vincent, and the heroes of those days, were not larger than some of the single-decked ships-of-war now in use. This vast increase of bulk and tonnage has been mainly due to the substitution of steam for sails, especially since the adoption of the screw-propeller instead of the paddle.

But it is singular, nevertheless, that while the liners and frigates have increased in bulk, experience has shewn that the real fighting vessels, especially for closed seas, should be small. Russia, Sweden, and Denmark have for many years employed in the Baltic open gun-boats about fifty feet long, each carrying one 32 and one 18 pounder gun; they are worked either by sails or by very long oars, and can act in water so shallow, that none but ships' open boats can get at them. These furnished an idea of the usefulness of gun-boats. It became known also, shortly after the commencement of the war, that Prussia had provided steam gun-boats far superior to any in the English navy —vessels which, fully armed and coaled for 2000 miles of voyage, drew only seven feet of water,

ran fourteen knots an hour, and carried two long 68 and two long 32 pounder guns, so working on traverses as to be fired in any direction. These, and other facts, taught the Admiralty that small vessels would be of great value in such seas as the Baltic and the Euxine, having the properties of light draught, great speed, and carrying a small number of very powerful guns. Such began to be constructed in the autumn of 1854, under the designations of steam gun-boats and dispatch-boats, all moved alike by screw-propellers. Hence arose the numerous small-craft to which names were given supposed to indicate their aggressive qualities—*Wrangler*, *Viper*, *Snapper*, *Pelter*, *Pincher*, *Biter*, *Boxer*, *Cracker*, *Swinger*, *Grinder*, *Banterer*, *Bouncer*, *Confounder*, *Griper*, *Growler*, *Spanker*, *Tickler*, *Clinker*, *Teazer*; or some *Ariel* or *Arrow*-like designation indicative of swiftness. Each

Gun-boat.

carried either two, three, or four heavy guns. Some of those first constructed were too heavy in draught and too slow in movement; but improvements became quickly introduced. The mortar-vessels, mortar-rafts, or mortar-boats—such as the *Blazer*, *Flamer*, *Havock*, *Mastiff*, &c., used in 1854, or advocated in 1855—differed little from those employed in former wars: each consisting of a boat formed expressly for carrying a mortar, whence shells of large size might be fired at a considerable angle of elevation. In addition to all these, attention became directed to the construction of iron vessels of enormous strength, which, under the name of floating-batteries, might cannonade forts without being injured by a cannonade in return. France and England commenced the construction of such ponderous machines about the same time; the French batteries rendered good service at Kinburn; but the first constructed by the English failed, and were superseded by others of different construction. In truth, the Admiralty was beset by inventors with plans of floating-batteries; and as the efficacy of none could be determined without trial, vast sums of money were expended before success was attained.

Considered in its totality, the British navy, as indicated by the *Admiralty List* at the beginning of 1855, had been increased during the year 1854 by the building of two 90-gun screw ships-of-the-line, two of 60 guns, seven screw-corvettes of 20 guns, six screw-sloops of smaller size, five screw dispatch-boats of 4 guns, twenty-two gun-boats of smaller size, nine mortar-vessels, three floating-batteries, six iron paddle-wheel steamers, and three steam-transports of great capacity, power, and tonnage.

Not only were the sizes and qualities of the vessels subjected to much change, but the guns, shot, and shell became greatly increased in dimensions and force. The experience at Sebastopol in 1854 shewed the necessity of preparing larger ordnance for 1855, both for the army and the navy. In the last century, guns for field-service were made very light, carrying 4, 6, or 9 pounder shot; then followed 12 and 18 pounders; but the Russians shewed how to bring 24 and 32 pounders into the field at Alma, though it is not known by how many draught-animals those ponderous masses were dragged from Sebastopol. In the language of artillerymen, 'field-pieces' are guns light enough—weighing from 6 to 18 hundred-weight, and carrying balls from 6 to 12 pounds—to be moved from point to point of a battle-field, or to join in a pursuit; 'siege-guns' are fixed on batteries and earthworks, to fire enormous shot, even amounting to 84 pounds each; while 'guns of position' are intermediate both in purpose and in size; and the tendency in each of these classes has been to increase the weight and diameter of the shot and shell thrown. It is in naval matters, however, that the change has been most considerable. At the beginning of the present century, the *Victory* (104) carried 32, 18, 12, and 8 pounder guns in various proportions, averaging about 20-pound shot per gun; whereas the *Agamemnon* of 1855 (91) carried 68 and 32 pounder guns, averaging 45-pound shot per gun. The broadside of the *Victory* poured forth 1000 pounds of iron missiles; that of the *Agamemnon*, with guns fewer in number, more than 2000 pounds! Thus, in addition to the power of locomotion afforded by the steam-engine and the screw-propeller, the war-ships of 1855 greatly excelled those of 1805 in weight of metal thrown by the guns.

Besides the improvements and novelties actually introduced, new missiles were under experiment during the whole course of the war. Wrought-iron guns, steel guns, mortars and shells of enormous size, Lancaster guns with rifled bore, shot of parabolic and other remarkable forms, gun-cotton and other explosive substances—all were made subjects of earnest inquiry and costly expenditure. If the war had continued many years, missiles of frightful power and violence would gradually have been introduced; but the cessation of hostilities occurred while these experimental researches were still in progress, and it therefore becomes

unnecessary to treat in this place of the results obtained.

THE ALLIED FLEETS IN THE BALTIC.

Consequent on the disagreement between Sir Charles Napier and the Admiralty, the Baltic command in 1855 was intrusted to another officer, Rear-admiral Richard Saunders Dundas. Nevertheless, the British fleet in 1855 presented great similarity to that of 1854, except in being still more completely a steam-fleet, and in being provided with a small number of swift vessels of light draught for service in shallow estuaries.

A blockade of the Baltic ports at the opening of spring being a necessary component of the warlike operations, Captain Watson, commanding an advanced squadron, reached the Russian coasts of that sea about the middle of April, and declared the whole of those ports to be blockaded from and after the 17th of that month. This blockade was notified in the *London Gazette* of the 27th of April, and was rendered still more formal when the main fleet entered the Baltic. A certain amount of confusion, leading to complaints on the part of the Russian government, presented itself at first, due to a mistake in the two words 'produce' and 'property,' as applied to Russian interests in ships and cargoes; but the blockade speedily became established in regular form.

The advanced squadron above adverted to was one intended to occupy the sea before the main fleets could come up. It consisted of the *Impérieuse, Euryalus, Arrogant, Esk, Tartar, Archer,* and *Conflict,* reinforced afterwards by a few other vessels; it was ultimately to be commanded by Admiral Baynes, in the *Retribution,* but was in the first instance intrusted to Captain Watson of the *Impérieuse.* The Queen and the royal family witnessed the departure of this 'flying' squadron from Spithead on the 20th of March. The squadron reached the Kattegat about the end of the month, and then separated into two—Captain Watson going through the Great Belt to Kiel with some of the ships, and Captain Yelverton proceeding through the Sound with the remainder. The ice was still in great quantity, and Yelverton's squadron remained many days anchored at Landskrona before it could advance. So desolate and inaccessible are many of the Baltic islands during the winter, that the news of the death of the Czar Nicholas did not reach the island of Gothland, in the middle of the Baltic, until six weeks after it occurred: this inaccessibility arose from icy barriers, which at the same time much affected the English advanced squadron, and rendered cautious steaming and steering necessary.

Meanwhile the great fleet prepared for Baltic waters. The *Duke of Wellington, Exmouth,* and *Retribution* respectively carried the flags of the three admirals in command—Dundas, Seymour, and Baynes; while the Hon. F. T. Pelham was 'Captain of the Fleet.' All the ships were steamers; one of 131 guns, one of 102, five of 91, three of 81, one of 70, eight of 60, one of 58, two of 51, two between 30 and 50, more than twenty under 30 guns, and about thirty gun-boats and mortar-vessels. The fleet departed from Spithead on the 4th of April; but at that time scarcely any of the gun-boats were ready, nor was the failure of the monster floating-batteries at that time known. Omitting gun-boats, mortar-vessels, and other steamers of minor character, the list given in below* includes those marked out for the Baltic campaign of 1855; it may have been departed from in a few instances, but not in many. There were about forty vessels above 10 guns each; but the number below that rank is not easily determined. No royal presence, no rejoicing, distinguished the departure of this fleet; the ships got their steam up, quietly weighed, bore away eastward on the 4th, and left their anchorage at the Downs on the 9th.

Many of the larger ships, after passing through the Kattegat, reached Kiel on the 17th of April; and Admiral Dundas remained in Danish waters during the remainder of the month, making one visit to the king at Copenhagen, and receiving marked attention from the inhabitants. May

		Guns.	Horse-power.
**Duke of Wellington,*	Captain Caldwell, flag of Rear-admiral the Hon. R. S. Dundas, C.B.; Captain of the Fleet, the Hon. F. T. Pelham,	131	700
Exmouth,	Captain W. K. Hall, flag of Rear-admiral Michael Seymour,	91	400
Retribution,	Captain Fisher, flag of Rear-admiral R. L. Baynes,	28	400
Royal George,	Captain Codrington, C.B.,	102	400
James Watt,	" George Elliot,	91	600
Orion,	" Erskine,	91	600
Cæsar,	" Robb,	91	400
Nile,	" Mundy,	91	500
Majestic,	" Hope,	81	400
Cressy,	" Warren,	81	400
Colossus,	" Robinson,	81	400
Sanspareil,	" Williams,	70	350
Blenheim,	" W. H. Hall,	60	450
Hogue,	" W. Ramsay,	60	450
Ajax,	" Warden,	60	450
Hastings,	" Caffin,	60	200
Pembroke,	" Seymour,	60	200
Cornwallis,	" Wellesley,	60	200
Hawke,	" Ommanney,	60	200
Russell,	" F. Scott,	60	200
Edinburgh,	" Hewlett,	58	450
Impérieuse,	" Watson, C.B.,	51	360
Euryalus,	" Ramsey,	51	400
Arrogant,	" Yelverton,	46	360
Amphion,	" A. C. Key,	34	200
Horatio,	" the Hon. A. Cochrane,	24	250
Malacca,	" Farquhar,	17	200
Cossack,	" Fanshawe,	20	250
Tartar,	" Dunlop,	20	250
Pylades,	" D'Eyncourt,	20	250
Esk,	" Birch,	20	250
Archer,	" Heathcote,	15	200
Magicienne,	" Vansittart,	16	400
Odin,	" Willcox,	16	560
Vulture,	" Glasse,	6	470
Centaur,	" Clifford,	6	540
Dragon,	" H. Stewart,	6	560
Bulldog,	Commander A. Gordon,	6	500
Desperate,	" White,	8	400
Conflict,	" Brown,	8	400
Cruiser,	" Hon. G. Douglas,	15	60
Harrier,	" Story,	15	160
Falcon,	" Pullen,	15	100
Ariel,	" Luce,	9	60
Basilisk,	" Jenner,	6	400
Rosamond,	" Crofton,	6	286
Driver,	" A. H. Gardner,	6	280
Geyser,	" Dew,	6	280
Gorgon,	" Crawford,	6	320
Lightning,	Lieutenant Campbell,	3	100

arrived, and with it the news that the ice was gradually giving way, and that the advanced squadron had captured a few prizes. On the 3d, Dundas departed from Kiel Harbour, with thirteen ships-of-the-line, five frigates, and two gun-boats: all on board impatiently hoping that achievements were in store for them somewhat more glorious than those of 1854; and many of them knowing that the inhabitants of Finland, retaining an angry feeling on account of the burnings of the preceding year, would now be less willing to assist the English. A rendezvous having been appointed near the island of Gothland, the main fleet met the advanced squadron there on the 7th, and various expeditions immediately commenced; some detached squadrons steamed towards the Aland Islands, some to Hangö Head, some to the island of Nargen, opposite Revel. Dundas with the main fleet went to Nargen, and found that Revel had been strongly fortified during the winter; that the batteries and forts were fully manned; and that furnaces were lighted for making shot red hot at any moment. Nargen is a sort of pleasure island, a Bute or an Arran, for the Revel inhabitants; but it was abandoned to the English on this occasion: the Russians confining their defensive arrangements to Revel itself. One of the batteries, visible from the ships, was of immense power, mounting 200 guns in four tiers. From its position just within the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, Nargen was adopted as a convenient head-quarters for the fleet throughout the summer; while detached squadrons were cruising in various directions.

The French Baltic fleet of 1855 was small—so small, indeed, that it appears as if England undertook all the operations in that sea, with merely a French accompaniment by way of etiquette. It was not until the 1st of June that Dundas was joined by Admiral Penaud, who had under his command the *Tourville*, 90 guns, *Austerlitz* (100), *Duquesne* (90), and *D'Assis* (16), all screw-steamers. This meeting took place near Cronstadt, a place regarded with intense interest by both the Allies. During the two or three weeks preceding this junction, the English ships had been actively engaged, though not to much definite purpose. Dundas himself went to reconnoitre Sveaborg and Cronstadt: several of his officers ascertained that squadrons of Russian light cavalry were hovering round the coast, prepared to gallop to any place that might be attacked; the sailors at Nargen, when not otherwise engaged, practised firing at targets on the island; the *Archer*, *Basilisk*, *Conflict*, and *Desperate* went to reconnoitre Riga, and found the enemy quite as ready there as at Revel to resist by red-hot shot any attack upon the town—these, and the capture of numerous small vessels laden with enemy's stores, were the proceedings which occupied the English ships during the second half of the month of May.

The Allied admirals having joined their forces, Dundas and Penaud immediately commenced the

consideration of a question that pressed upon their notice as one of first-rate importance—the propriety or not of attacking Cronstadt. On the 1st of June, the admirals had full before them the island of that name, and could see in the distance the gilded spires of St Petersburg;* they could also descry ten three-decker line-of-battle ships, nine two-deckers, two frigates, and seven steamers, in Cronstadt Harbour—a sight which infused into the British seamen a longing for a regular naval engagement; but as forts of unexampled strength intervened, the problem was rather that of a siege than of a battle at sea. The admirals landed at Tolbuken light-house, at the west end of the island, and there obtained a panoramic view of the formidable scene; they also steamed along the southern coast of the island, noticing the strength of the several forts as they passed; and then they made a similar survey on the northern side. Sometimes they would remain for an hour or two before one fort, just beyond range of the guns, and they would then see the enemy's batteries bristling with men, ready to open fire at an instant's warning. It was ascertained that three line-of-battle ships and two frigates were moored across the entrance to the harbour, which had been further secured by a line of submarine piles. Along the whole line of coast, new earthworks had been thrown up, and the island with its appurtenances was in every respect stronger than in 1854—especially in the important aid of gun-boats, which so thickly studded the harbour that their number was estimated as little less than two hundred, although few of them were propelled by steam. The two British rear-admirals, during one of the reconnaissances, embarked in ships' boats with a view of approaching nearer to the shore; the Russians, watching them eagerly, refrained from firing, but attempted a capture, which might have been successful had not the *Merlin* thrown out hasty signals for return, prudently obeyed by the admirals. It was impossible for the Allied commanders to be otherwise than forcibly struck with the almost unexampled strength of the Russian defences at Cronstadt; nor could they avoid feeling that their large ships, unable to approach nearer to the northern shore than two miles and a half, were ill fitted for breaching the forts of such a place; two hundred gun-boats, rather than twenty, were wanted for such a work—or else some of the floating-batteries, on which so much money had uselessly been expended. It was ascertained by indirect means that, after every successive resistance to an assault at Sebastopol, the military council at St Petersburg had been informed of the details, and had put in force at Cronstadt every defensive means the value of which had been tested at the great southern stronghold; hence the large number of forts, redoubts, and batteries which had sprung up since the autumn of 1854. The Risbank, Cronschlott, Peter, Alexander, Menchikoff, and Mole Forts, all strengthened during the winter by earthworks on shore, formed a sort of vast intrenched-camp, protected by detached forts, and armed with ordnance of the heaviest calibre. A naval officer, writing under the influence of a survey of these works, declared his conviction that the saving of Silistria had in this instance been detrimental to the Allies, since it had taught Russia the importance of forming earthworks at Cronstadt. The new works ran right across the island, in such positions as to defend, and be defended by, the detached forts; but more especially were they adapted to prevent any landing. Around the beach, submarine piling and infernal machines had been employed to a vast extent. At Lisi Ness, on the Finland side of the north channel, a strong fort had been built; and the channel was further defended by sunk caissons, gun-boats stationed between the caissons, and floating-batteries. The infernal machines were not 'myths,' merely creations of rumour: two of the ships were injured by them, and others would doubtless have been so had an assault of the place been attempted at close quarters. So certain were the admirals that numbers of these destructive contrivances had been laid down, that they sent out boats expressly to fish for them; and nearly fifty were discovered and picked up off Cronstadt within ten days—not without a few disasters to the officers and men so employed. The angling for this dangerous kind of prey was thus managed: two boats took between them a long rope, which was sunk by heavy weights to a depth of ten or twelve feet, and held suspended at that depth by empty casks as floats; the boats then separated as far as the rope would allow, and rowed onward at right angles to the length of the rope; it was a species of trawl-fishing, in which the agitation of the floats shewed that a prey had been caught, which prey was then hauled up carefully. Each machine was a complex chemical apparatus, in which a slight concussion caused a chemical mixture to ignite a large charge of gunpowder; a mooring-anchor at the bottom, with a definite length of cable or rope, kept each machine floating at a definite depth beneath the surface of the water.

Long and anxious were the observations made by the Allied admirals on this extraordinary fortress; careful the calculations as to the number, distance, and power of the floating ordnance on the one side and the fixed ordnance on the other; and the result arrived at—mortifying and disappointing to the crews of both fleets—was that the small chance of success was not such as to warrant the enormous sacrifice involved in any attempt to capture the place. What the fruit of the deliberations might have been, had the admirals been furnished with a large fleet of steam gun-boats, mortar-vessels, and floating-batteries, it is useless now to inquire: such a fleet had not been provided in time for the summer operations of 1855, and an

* See plan of Cronstadt, in the coloured map of the Baltic; also the coloured bird's-eye view of Cronstadt and vicinity; and the wood-cut view in Chapter VI., p. 168.

abandonment of the perilous enterprise was the consequence. So disheartening was this conclusion, that it appeared to cloud the whole prospect of the year's labours; men had wrought up their expectations to the point of determining that the exploits of 1855 should make amends for the paucity of events in 1854; and they began to doubt whether, after all, Sir Charles Napier might not have been hardly treated, since his successor had equally shrunk from attacking Cronstadt. It was unquestionably mortifying to the admirals to arrive at such a negative result; for in the middle of June they had no less than sixteen line-of-battle ships, six frigates, and ten gun-boats, all efficient steamers, anchored nearly close to the place. The naval officers and men were wont to write home, saying that their daily duties were monotonous, and that they sighed for some more active exploits. Still, the commanders could not blind themselves to the fact, ascertained by many days' close examination of the place, that Cronstadt contained fourteen powerfully mounted batteries, in addition to all those existing in 1854; the case was regarded as settled—Cronstadt was not bombarded.

The month of June was passed in various expeditions: Cronstadt being carefully watched by a portion of the fleet, while the other ships were cruising about in various directions. The *Blenheim* and *Exmouth*, with the *Pincher* and *Snap* gun-boats, went, under the command of Admiral Seymour, to explore the coast near Narva, on the south side of the Gulf of Finland: they found this town strongly fortified, and they exchanged shots with two earthen batteries at the mouth of the river on which the town is situated; but beyond this nothing was effected. Here, and at every place along the coast, as well as at Cronstadt, the enemy displayed the utmost vigilance as soon as the Allies appeared; manning the batteries, bringing columns of infantry near the beach, and holding squadrons of light cavalry in readiness to gallop off in any direction where their services might be required.

The only occurrence in June exhibiting any departure from the wearying, monotonous, desultory proceedings of the fleets was the 'Hangö Massacre,' so called by the Allies as involving a departure from the ordinary rules of honourable warfare. Amid the lengthened correspondence that ensued, marked by very contradictory statements on different sides, the narrative of the officer chiefly concerned was in brief as follows:—On the 5th of June, the *Cossack* lying off Hangö Head, at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, Captain Fanshawe gave orders to Lieutenant Geneste to proceed on shore in the cutter of that ship, under a flag of truce; to land five Finnish seamen who had been taken, but whom Dundas did not regard as prisoners; and to send an official declaration, that all small Russian vessels along the coast would be pursued and captured, as a necessary consequence of the blockade. There was, however, a further duty, which appears to have led to the mischief. 'Captain Fanshawe,' says the lieutenant, 'also informed me that he had given permission to the stewards to go in the boat, and that if the Russian officer whom I should meet on shore had no objection, and the inhabitants were willing to sell any eggs or poultry to them, I was to permit them to purchase these articles; but I was on no account to permit their being with me to interfere in any way with the performance of the duty on which I was sent; nor, if the things which they wished to purchase were not immediately at hand, were we to wait for them, nor on any account to permit them to detain the boat.' The Fins had been captured in small trading-vessels a few days before; and one of them had stated that he thought the peasants near Hangö would be able and willing, if permitted, to sell a few trifling articles to the English. The cutter started, with the lieutenant, Dr Easton, Midshipman Sullivan, the three stewards, the five Fins, and a crew of young hands. Muskets and musket-ammunition were stowed in the bottom of the boat; but the muskets were left unloaded, and the men unprovided with cartridges, because the mission was regarded as a peaceful one. At a distance of a mile and a half from the shore, Geneste hoisted the flag of truce, and kept it flying during the remainder of the passage; it was not answered, and therefore he concluded there was no military force on shore. He landed near a telegraph station, gave strict orders to the crew not to leave the boat, and then sought an interview with a Russian officer at the telegraph station—taking with him Dr Easton, the Fins, and the stewards; he expressly states that the stewards would have been empowered to make no purchases unless with the full consent of the Russian authorities. The land-party went on, waving their flag of truce before them; but, to their unbounded astonishment, they suddenly found themselves attacked by a murderous volley, poured forth by Russian soldiers who had been in concealment. One of the Fins called out loudly to them to stay their fire, but he was shot dead on the spot; three of the other Fins were wounded; two of the stewards were killed, and one wounded; Dr Easton and the remaining Fin leaped into the water; and thus Geneste was the only one on shore who remained uninjured—he was just on the point of falling under twenty bayonets, when a Russian officer hastened forward, saved his life, but took him prisoner, regardless of his flag of truce. The boat received so many shot that most of the crew were either killed or wounded. The Russians went down to the boat, took prisoners all who were not killed, and brought the muskets and ammunition on shore. Thus, of the twenty-two persons, three Fins were wounded, one killed, one escaped unhurt, five English were killed, and four severely wounded; of the sixteen not killed, fifteen were made prisoners. Only one, a seaman named John Brown, succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the Russians; wounded and bleeding himself, and

the boat perilously injured, he nevertheless contrived to row back to the *Cossack* steamer during the night; and it was only by this means that the admiral became acquainted with the outrage. Geneste estimates the number of Russians who attacked him at nearly 200, all of whom loaded and fired several times, insomuch that the boat and the dead bodies became completely riddled with balls. Geneste and Sullivan were brutally treated—struck by the Cossacks, had their hands tied behind them, thrown on their backs in small carts, and carried to the village of Ekness; the crew, still more severely handled, were driven on foot like cattle, wounded and unwounded alike, until at length carts were provided for the wounded to prevent them from dying on the road. Geneste asserts, that two officers, military and naval, appeared to sanction fully the treatment which he and his unfortunate companions received. At Ekness, the officers of another regiment appeared to feel ashamed of the severity of the treatment which Geneste and Sullivan had received; and General Mollar ordered a more lenient course to be pursued. He offered to transmit a letter from Geneste to General de Berg, commander-in-chief in Finland, who would send it from Helsingfors to Admiral Dundas. Geneste, Sullivan, and Easton were conveyed to Helsingfors, where they were confined strictly for five weeks, but afterwards treated more leniently; being separated, they knew little of each other's fate, and nothing concerning the hapless boat's crew; for, whether by accident or design, Geneste's letter did not reach the fleet until five weeks after his capture. In all probability the letter had been opened; and the Russian authorities, not choosing to admit the correctness of his statement, delayed it until they could find some kind of support for their own version.

Such a transaction being a glaring violation of the law of nations touching a flag of truce, the question arose, whether the facts of the case had been correctly ascertained? and hence sprang a long correspondence. When, on the afternoon of the 5th of June, the cutter did not return to the *Cossack*, Captain Fanshawe sent Lieutenant Field in another of the ship's boats to search for it; Field saw the cutter on the beach, with several dead bodies in it; but appearances on the shore leading him to suspect an ambush, he would not land. Early in the morning of the 6th, the *Cossack* steamed in closer; and then poor Brown the seaman was seen painfully rowing out in the cutter, although it was perforated almost like a colander above the water-line. Brown having narrated the sad adventure, Captain Fanshawe steamed off to Cronstadt roads, to report the event to Admiral Dundas, after having poured forth a few angry cannon-shots at the place where the treachery had occurred. Brown's narrative being unavoidably confused and imperfect, Dundas at first doubted whether Fanshawe himself had obeyed the laws of truce; but further explanations removed all difficulty on this point; and then the admiral deemed it right to communicate with the Russian authorities. He despatched a letter, under a flag of truce, to General de Berg at Helsingfors. The general, putting together the items of information furnished to him by the officers at Hangö, replied—that the English had repeatedly approached the shore unfairly, with a flag of truce covering a plan of attack and spoliation; that they were therefore not entitled to claim so imperiously the right of such flags; that the Hangö officers did not see any flag of truce in Geneste's boat; that they were justified in apprehending a hostile landing; that the muskets found in the cutter appeared as if they had been loaded; and that a supply of 360 cartridges was incompatible with a peaceful mission. In short, he said that 'Geneste had been caught in his own trap,' and maintained that the Russians had done no more than they were justified in doing. This letter, when known to the English government, led to an application to the Russian government, through the intervention of that of Denmark; but Prince Dolgorouki, minister of war, persisted in supporting General de Berg, who had supported the Hangö authorities. Thus the correspondence ended—the British remaining of opinion that the attack was a massacre, grossly inconsistent with a flag of truce; and the Russians asserting that it was a justifiable defence, no proper flag of truce having been descried. Geneste and the remaining crew were liberated by exchange after many months' imprisonment.

July arrived, but brought with it few changes in the character of the duties intrusted to the ships of this vast fleet. The blockading of all the ports, and the capture of all small trading-vessels belonging to the Russians, comprised nearly the whole of the exploits; varied occasionally by an exchange of shots with some new fort or battery detected on shore, or a reconnaissance of a column of Russian infantry or a squadron of cavalry vigilantly on the watch. On one occasion 2000 troops and four pieces of artillery were seen proceeding along the coast of Finland from St Petersburg to Viborg; the *James Watt* and *Snap* shelled them for a time, but without delaying their march. Captain Yelverton, in the *Arrogant*, blew up Fort Svartholm, and destroyed the government stores in the pretty town of Loviso just at hand; during the night the town itself was burned—by accident, as Yelverton stated, but purposely according to the version of the Russians. This officer, while in the Gulf of Finland, dislodged by shot and shell a Cossack encampment on the heights near Kounda Bay, and destroyed a Cossack barrack and stable at the mouth of the river Portsoiki; but he was disappointed, by the obstacle of a sunken barrier, in an attempt to capture a Russian war-steamer in Viborg Harbour. Captain Story, in the *Harrier*, destroyed in two days forty-seven Russian trading-vessels near Nystad, varying from 200 to 700 tons burden—an important work in relation to the



FORTIFICATIONS OF SVEABORG AND CITY OF HELSINGFORS.

stern exigencies of war, however much below the aspirations of gallant seamen. The *Magicienne*, *Arrogant*, *Cossack*, and *Ruby* attacked and destroyed a new earthen battery at Fredrikshamn, a town between Viborg and Helsingfors; and shortly afterwards the same squadron, Captain Yelverton's, aided by gun-boats and mortar-boats, destroyed a fort on the island of Kotka, a short distance westward of that town. It was an almost unavoidable accompaniment of these cannonadings and burnings that some of the villages should be destroyed; the English officers neither wished nor intended it; but the Russian government took advantage of every such incident to excite the people against the invaders as brutal incendiaries. These and similar operations employed single detached ships, while the rest remained idly anchored off Cronstadt. Admirals Dundas, Seymour, and Penaud made a reconnoitring trip to Nargen and Revel, but without disturbing the quietude of their larger ships; and then they similarly examined Sveaborg and its approaches, as if to determine whether any large operation were to be regarded as otherwise than utterly hopeless. These two facts at least became certain—that the defences were every week increasing in magnitude and strength, and that infernal machines had been laid down in great number at the entrances to all the ports. Some of these machines were exploded by concussion, some by electric communication from the shore; but the Allies acquired a kind of prescience in detecting their locality, and suffered little from them. The officers in one of the steamers saw the Russians sink two of their line-of-battle ships at Sveaborg, as if to pursue the tactics which had proved so successful in blocking up the harbour of Sebastopol. The sight of this operation, and of nearly twenty new batteries and earthworks constructed since the autumn of 1854, was not likely to remove the misgivings of the admirals concerning the possibility of capturing the great stronghold of Finland.

The month of August promised to be one marked by more active operations; and the promise was fulfilled, for the Allies bombarded the stronghold just adverted to. Leaving Admiral Baynes with a squadron to watch and blockade Cronstadt, Admirals Dundas and Penaud collected at Nargen a fleet of about thirty war-steamers, twenty gun-boats, and twenty mortar-vessels: a fleet carrying a vast armament of the largest ordnance used in naval warfare. These being assembled, and a large store of ammunition received from England, the two admirals laid their plans, and then steamed across from Nargen to Sveaborg, where they brought their vessels into battle-array on the 8th. What these war-ships and boats effected on the 9th, 10th, and 11th, may now be narrated. Admiral Dundas, in his dispatches to the Admiralty, stated that the Russians, by erecting batteries on every advantageous position, had so commanded all practicable approaches to the harbour, that he relinquished any intention of making a general attack, limiting his operations to the destruction of such fortresses and arsenals as could be reached by mortar-shells. Sveaborg is, indeed, a place most inaccessibly situated; it consists in effect of six islands, Langörn, West Svartö (West Fort, or West Fort Island), East Svartö, Lilla East Svartö, Vargon, and Gustafsvard, besides numerous islets of less importance. Vargon is the central, principal, and strongest island. The forts on all the islands were granite constructions on granite bases; five of the number were connected by bridges; and as the channels between them were rendered impassable, the islands and islets formed collectively one huge fortress.

To gain a suitable position for the mortar-vessels, amid the rocks and reefs of the intricate channels between the islands, was a difficult

task; but ultimately these vessels were ranged in a curved line on either side of the islet of Oterhall, the ends of the line being opposite to Bakholmen and Stora Rautan; while four lighter mortars were placed on an islet in advance of Oterhall. The mortar-boats, clumsy sluggish craft, were towed to their places by steamers. Early in the morning of the 9th the cannonading commenced, by the moored mortar-boats, by a sand-bag battery formed on the rocks, and by such of the gun-boats as could be manœuvred through the intricate channels so as to come within range. The gun-boats and sand-bag battery fired nearly horizontally against the various forts; while the mortars threw up shells at a great elevation, which, falling into the interior of the fortress, or between it and Helsingfors, might destroy magazines, ships, stores, and buildings. Many of the ships cruised about east and west, to distract the attention of troops visible on shore. The bombardment became hot and severe, and was during many hours returned with great

resolution by the enemy. Now an explosion would be heard, and a conflagration seen in the island of Vargon, now in that of Gustafsvard, now in another island, until the whole place seemed to be in peril from the thickly falling shells and balls, fragments of roofs, and ignited timbers. Night having arrived, the gun-boats were withdrawn; and the rocket-boats then commenced sending their terrible missiles into the fortress, keeping the interior of Sveaborg in one vast flame during the night, and filling the air with masses of lurid smoke. Early on the 10th, slight adjustments having been made in the line of mortar-boats, the cannonading recommenced; columns of smoke rose higher and higher, vivid gushes of flame became more and more frequent and numerous; and at length it was evident that the stores in East Svartö had fallen a prey to the flames. Again on the second night did the rockets continue the dread work which the shells and balls had maintained during the day. Early on the 11th Dundas and Penaud considered that they had destroyed most of the arsenal stores within reach; and as they could not penetrate further into the

Admiral Dundas.

intricate channels between the islands and islets, they brought their operations to a close. The seaward defences of the various forts and batteries exhibited few indications of injury; and the admirals therefore could only advert to the destruction of enemy's property within the interior, as proof of the success of their operations. Considering that the mortars and guns fired at an average distance of more than two miles from the places aimed at, it can scarcely be matter for surprise that the forts were little damaged. Admiral Penaud, in his dispatch to the French government, stated that for two days and nights Sveaborg appeared like 'a vast fiery furnace,' so numerous were the fires and explosions of magazines, storehouses, barracks, and other government establishments.

One among many instructive features presented by this bombardment, was that the ships were virtually the tenders to the boats, instead of the boats being tenders to the larger vessels. The sailors in the ships-of-the-line and frigates, boiling with excitement at the view of the blazing scene within the fortress, envied those engaged in the mortar-boats and gun-boats; they could do nothing but run madly up the rigging to obtain a good look-out, and shout and cheer whenever a good shot from the gun-boats banged against the forts, or a shell from the mortar-boats burst within the stronghold. It was a necessary condition of the work which had to be done: work for heavily armed small-craft, and not for bulky men-of-war. Some of the ships—the *Cornwallis*, *Hastings*, *Amphion*, *Arrogant*, *Cossack*, and *Cruiser*—main-

tained, it is true, a fire for a time against the forts; but the boats rendered the greater part of the service. It is recorded that *more than one thousand tons* of iron missiles were hurled into or against Sveaborg in about forty-eight hours, involving the use of 100 tons of powder for their propulsion! The 'Mosquito squadron,' as the steam gun-boats became familiarly called, shewed its value here for the first time on a large scale; in so important a light did the admirals and the government regard it, that immediate arrangements were made for building a vast number of these boats, ready for any operations that might be necessary in 1856; and it was further resolved, that thenceforth each of these valuable craft, instead of being ranked as one of the boats belonging to a particular ship, should constitute an independent command, having its own officers and crew. The gun-boats attacking Sveaborg had escaped injury in a surprising way; each had steamed round and round slowly in a circle, firing the bow-gun, then the midship-gun, and then reloading while finishing the rest of her circuit; the Russian gunners could not take accurate aim at objects thus continually on the move. Not one man was killed throughout the Allied fleet during these two days of hot firing; and this astonishing exemption from loss must mainly be attributed to the mobile power of the boats. The mortar-boats, too, had a play of position given to them, by means of a hawser 400 yards long attached to each; but the mortars shewed significantly the nature of the hot work in which they had been engaged; three burst, five became useless, and the rest could not have held out much longer—for there is a limit to the number of shells that can be fired from a mortar before it becomes fractured or dangerously weakened. The mortars in the boats *Pickle*, *Mastiff*, and *Growler* were those which burst; the last of the three fired off no less than 355 shells, and then split from end to end. When the great efficiency of the gun and mortar boats became known in England, Sir Charles Napier wrote to the public journals, demanding as an act of justice that the operations of 1854 should be judged in the light furnished by those of 1855: this was no more than fair, seeing that Napier had been provided neither with gun-boats nor mortar-boats, and could not have done that which Dundas was enabled to do. A letter written by him to the Admiralty, on the 12th of June 1854, is worthy of notice in relation to the following passage:—'The only successful manner of attacking Sveaborg that I can see, after the most mature consideration, assisted by Admiral Chads, who is a practical man, and knows more about gunnery than any man in the service, is by fitting out a great number of gun-boats carrying one gun with a long range, and placing them west of Sveaborg and south of Helsingfors; every shell from them would tell somewhere, and perhaps not five per cent. from the enemy would take effect; back them by the fleet to relieve the men, and in the course of the summer Sveaborg would be reduced to ashes, and Helsingfors also, if it was thought proper.' This prediction, partly fulfilled fourteen months afterwards, ought not to be forgotten. Napier, in his commentary on Dundas's proceedings, stated that if that admiral had had 200 gun and mortar boats instead of 40, which he might if the Admiralty had made due exertions, 'the bombardment might have been continued by means of reliefs, as men are relieved in the trenches; the mortars would have had time to cool, and the bombardment continued till not one stone was left on another, and an opening made for the ships to go in and finish the work.' Whether the final catastrophe would have been 'the whole of the fortifications, islands and all, blown to the devil,' as Sir Charles energetically asserted, he was certainly justified in calling attention to the light which the operations of 1855 threw upon the inactivity of 1854.

A French document, given in the *Moniteur*, stated that during the two days' bombardment of Sveaborg, there were destroyed two powder-magazines, two shell-magazines, a flax and rope storehouse, two granaries filled with corn and flour, a pitch-manufactory, a storehouse of hospital drugs, the house and office of the governor-general, and seventeen private houses. Besides this, a three-decker and eighteen other vessels were more or less touched by the shot and shell; while 2000 Russians were killed or wounded. What was the authority for this detailed statement does not appear. The Russian government told a widely different story, founded on General de Berg's dispatch, published in the *Invalide Russe*. De Berg stated that the Allied fleet numbered no less than eighty vessels of various kinds and sizes; that he prevented the marines belonging to one of the ships from effecting a landing on the island of Drumsö; that the excellent fire of his artillery caused much wreck and loss to the gun-boats which came within range; that one of his batteries sent such a volley against two screw-steamers, as to compel them to retreat, the one towing the other as if injured; that although the fire of the Allies was tremendous, resulting from 21,000 projectiles thrown during the two days, and although many conflagrations and explosions occurred, 'the damage done to the works of the fortress, and to the batteries in general, was insignificant;' and, finally, that, notwithstanding the peril to which all had been exposed, the loss of men was by no means severe—comprising 55 killed and 204 wounded, of whom only 6 were officers. Admitting, on the one hand, the probability that this dispatch was coloured with the usual Muscovite tint, it does not, on the other, appear by what means the Allies could have obtained any accurate knowledge of the real amount of damage wrought to the fortress and its garrison.

This bombardment ended, Dundas and Penaud returned to Nargen, to consider the practicability of any further exploits. A declining temperature,

squalls, rain, thunder, and lightning, indicated the approach of weather unfavourable for naval operations; and the officers and seamen of the fleets began to lose their hopes of any glorious achievements. The return to Nargen was followed by the usual round of monotonous everyday duty, enlivened occasionally by the arrival and departure of ships intrusted with special cruising errands. Now the *Cossack* would cross over to Hangö or Dagerört; now the *Arrogant*, with two or three gun-boats, would set out to reconnoitre the mouth of the Narva; now would Admiral Seymour depart to relieve Admiral Baynes off Cronstadt; another day the *Pylades* set forth to make a reconnaissance at Seskar, the *Cuckoo* and the *Harrier* to cruise off Biörneborg, the *Amphion* to watch Sveaborg, and the *Dragon* to the Gulf of Bothnia. The mortar-boats, carrying the cracked and wounded mortars, began to return to England, nearly the whole of them rendered useless by their hot service at Sveaborg; and thus the fleet lost its dread-sounding *Growler*, *Blazer*, *Havock*, *Surly*, *Porpoise*, *Pickle*, *Beacon*, *Grappler*, *Rocket*, *Manly*, *Mastiff*, &c. Sixteen mortars had sent 3150 shells, weighing 500 tons, into the fortress, with charges which enabled them to carry an average distance of more than two miles: it was this severe service which had worn them out. During the cruising expeditions of the month, the *Cuckoo* and the *Harrier* captured a small steamer in rather a gallant manner at Biörneborg; and the *Fire-fly*, at the port of Vasa in the Gulf of Bothnia, cut out and destroyed numerous small trading-vessels under circumstances of great daring. Even such small achievements as these were denied to the squadron stationed before Cronstadt, a squadron left in idleness both during and after the bombardment of Sveaborg, much to the annoyance of the crews. From the second week in July to the third in August, Admiral Baynes had been there in command, unable to effect anything further than strictly blockading Cronstadt, and inflicting a little damage on the enemy's coasts; the great stronghold itself frowned in its strength against any threat of attack, unless from a much larger fleet of gun-boats than the Allies could command. The ships' boats destroyed many telegraphs along the coast, thus interfering with the quick transmission of intelligence to and from St Petersburg. By the middle of August it became evident that the anchorage off Cronstadt would speedily be insecure for such large and deep-draught vessels as the *Royal George*, *Orion*, *James Watt*, *Colossus*, *Cæsar*, *Cressy*, *Majestic*, *Hogue*, *Blenheim*, *Nile*, *Centaur*, *Impérieuse*, &c.; and arrangements were made for transferring them to another anchorage off the island of Seskar, a few miles lower down the gulf—leaving at Cronstadt only two or three ships standing off and on, to watch the enemy's movements. Admiral Baynes, when relieved by Admiral Seymour at this station, went to take the command of a flying-squadron in the Gulf of Bothnia.

September opened as August had closed—the crews 'tired of doing nothing.' Sometimes the officers of one ship would challenge those of another to a game at cricket on Nargen or Seskar islands; and, liking the active amusement, they got up weekly cricket-matches. Running-matches and foot-races were also planned; and on such occasions programmes were printed, and distributed to the various ships, headed, 'Immense Excitement! Nargen Grand Foot-races!' and containing various entries concerning runners and running, in imitation of the customary sporting language. Such amusements have no historical value, except as indications how heavily time hung upon the hands of men who would willingly have been, but were not, actively employed. The two war-vessels left at Cronstadt, the *Colossus* and *Impérieuse*, occasionally saw Russian ships and boats emerging from the harbour, as if to entice them into shoal waters; but never on any occasion would the enemy venture to measure strength in actual contest with the British, who were so desirous of warlike service that they would have accepted almost any odds. During the month, Admiral Baynes was busily employed in a series of small achievements in the Gulf of Bothnia, penetrating the narrow creeks and channels, capturing every craft that ventured afloat, and destroying every place he could reach. Some of the other ships bombarded, on one particular day, two forts at the mouth of the Düna, the river on whose banks, some miles higher up, the important town of Riga is situated; but the results obtained were unimportant.

Another month came, bringing with it October winds, sudden and violent gales, frequent fogs, heavy rains, thunder and lightning storms, sleets and snows, and indications of biting cold weather. The captains and sailing-masters found their skill severely taxed in preserving their ships from injury; and the admirals made preparations for despatching their fleets in small detachments to England, retaining sufficient force to blockade the ports until winter set in. Admiral Dundas made one more careful reconnaissance of Cronstadt early in the month, as if to satisfy himself that nothing could really be accomplished in that quarter; and after this the various detached squadrons—off Cronstadt, Sveaborg, Riga, Revel, in the Gulf of Bothnia, &c.—did little more than maintain an efficient blockade. As Dundas counted about twenty-four war-ships in and near Cronstadt Harbour, besides gun-boats, it was evident that the Allied fleet could not safely relax in its watchfulness so far as to permit these to come out. Wormsö and Dagö, two islands at the mouth of the Gulf of Riga, belonged to two Russian noblemen, who had been told by the czar that, as he could not protect them, they had better keep on good terms with the invaders; consequently, the officers of the ships engaged in blockading Riga found a courteous reception and open house awaiting them; while a tariff of prices was established, for the sale of produce by the peasants of the islands to the ships'

crews. Before the end of the month, all the gun-boats transferred their heavy guns to the ships, and then returned home in four divisions; the larger vessels, too, steamed and steered gradually westward, in the midst of such boisterous weather as rendered manœuvring very perilous. One of the steamers, more lucky than the rest in finding something to do, fished up nearly twenty beautiful guns, sunk by the Russians near Hangö in shallow water, as if to be made available when the invaders should have departed: this done, the crew landed, and attended a burial-service read over the mounds which covered the bodies of the poor fellows shot during the 'Hangö massacre' in June.

When November arrived, the Baltic fleet had shrunk to small dimensions, by the departure of so many of the ships and all the gun-boats. Admirals Dundas, Seymour, and Penaud prepared to return home; while to Admiral Baynes was intrusted the duty of maintaining a look-out at the Russian ports as long as the weather would permit him to remain in those perilous seas. Baynes selected Farö Sund and Elgsnaben, in the Swedish waters, as his principal stations, they being less dangerous than most others available to him; his squadron comprised many light steamers, which succeeded in intercepting and capturing numerous small trading-vessels. It became known that large numbers of such vessels, laden with valuable cargoes, were waiting in Prussian and Mecklenburg ports, ready to start off for Russian ports as soon as the British cruisers would leave them an opening; and Baynes remained to check those traders as long as the weather would possibly permit. At length the daily thickening films of ice told him that his departure must be no longer delayed; and shortly before Christmas his steamers finally left those waters.

Thus ended the second Baltic campaign, which bore an unsatisfactory resemblance to the first in being marked by only one important operation. The vast fleet of the Allies in 1854 had effected nothing worth recording in the pages of naval history except the capture of Bomarsund; the still more extensive and powerful fleet of 1855 had nothing of importance to record save the bombardment of Sveaborg. A few forts were battered, many ranges of government buildings and stores were burnt, and numerous small trading-vessels captured; but it will remain as an instructive memento of the mode in which this war was carried on, that the most powerful fleets the world had ever seen performed two notable achievements only, in two years, and that even one of these was neither a victory nor a capture, but only a partial destruction.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE WHITE SEA.

As in the Baltic, so in the White Sea, the operations of 1855 bore much resemblance to those of 1854. The Russians would not fight a naval action; and the Allies were hence perplexed how to manage an attack against them. It has been seen in an earlier section,* that during the summer of 1854 a few English and French ships cruised about the White Sea and its vicinity, endeavouring to capture or to destroy everything belonging to the Russian government, but to leave as much as possible uninjured all private property not engaged in evading the blockade laws. To renew this system in 1855 was a part of the duty of the Allied governments.

Early in the spring the ministers were asked in parliament whether they intended to establish a strict blockade in the White Sea; and the reply was to the effect that such a blockade was intended, as soon as the state of the ice should permit the ingress and egress of vessels. As the neutral ports had contrived to evade in a considerable degree the blockade of 1854, it was intended to adopt more stringent regulations. By the end of April a small squadron was fitted out, and held in readiness to depart from the English ports at a day's notice; it set forth in May, under the command of Captain Baillie, and arrived opposite Archangel early in June. A French squadron, under Captain Guilbert, arrived in those seas shortly afterwards. It was found that the White Sea having been free from ice at rather an earlier date than usual, several neutral vessels had taken advantage of that circumstance to carry cargoes of wheat and other merchandise to or from Archangel. The blockade was formally established on and from the 11th of June, and included within its provisions all the ports, havens, and creeks in the White Sea, from Point Orlofka in long. 41° 22′, to Cape Kanoushin in long. 43° 49′, especially the ports of Archangel and Onega. As, however, many trading-ships had entered Archangel before the blockade was established, it was deemed fair to allow them to depart, either in ballast, or with such portions of cargo as they had shipped by the date named; under this permission, various Norwegian, Danish, Bremen, and American merchant-ships took their departure, mostly with cargoes of grain and flour.

The two squadrons were employed in blockading the ports, and in scouring the sea in search of trading-ships; for there appeared not the smallest probability of any action with the enemy's ships-of-war. The chief towns, however, had been strengthened in their fortifications during the winter; and around Archangel had been collected a force of light cavalry and Cossacks, 12,000 infantry, and a camp of militia; while the forts defending the channel up to the town were mounted with powerful batteries of artillery; the citadel, too, had been enlarged, and two new bastions constructed. The city was, indeed, regarded by the inhabitants as now almost impregnable; and they felt confidence under the guidance of Admiral Kruschtscheff, governor-

* Chapter VI., pp. 184-188.

general of the province, and commander at Archangel.

The *Invalide Russe* published an account of a marvellous defence made by the villagers of Liamtsa, in the Onega district. On the 9th of July, we are told, an English steamer anchored before the village, and sent in four boats full of men. The villagers, only thirty-four in number, placed themselves under an old retired soldier, fired upon the boats, and compelled them to return to the ship. Thereupon the steamer opened a fire of ball, grape, and rockets, which it continued for three hours; after which two boats laden with troops pulled towards the shore; but the villagers, headed by the peasants Lyskoff, Soverschaïeff, Izumoff, and the priest Peter Lyskoff, met them with such indomitable courage that a landing could not be effected. The boats returned to the steamer, which immediately recommenced its cannonade, maintained throughout the whole of the night. Notwithstanding this bombardment, the village suffered very little, and only one villager was wounded. This achievement shrinks to much smaller dimensions in the English account; which is to the effect that the *Phœnix*, cruising near the coast, sent two boats with a flag of truce and an interpreter, to buy a few provisions from the villagers; that the villagers enticed the boats near, and then fired at the men; that the boats were hastily recalled; and that the *Phœnix* sent a few balls and rockets into the village to punish the inhabitants for their disregard of the flag. The ridiculous inconsistency of the two accounts would lead to a disbelief in both, were not the want of veracity in the dispatches sent by the local commanders to the Russian government, and then embodied in semi-official articles in the government journals, so apparent.

Numerous but trifling were the captures, burnings, and destroyings effected by the blockading squadrons. Sometimes the ships' boats would penetrate the rivers which flow into the White Sea, row up a few miles, reconnoitre on both sides, and then return; if so much as a single mast was visible, the invaders made it an object of attack; but villages wholly without shipping were seldom molested. This depended, however, on the conduct of the inhabitants; if they resisted a search, or fired on the invaders, it was generally a forerunner to the destruction of their little village. The more usual practice was for the villagers to run into the interior, and there remain until the invaders had satisfied themselves concerning the vessels or government stores at the place. So characteristic were these proceedings of all that occurred in and near the White Sea, that it becomes wholly unnecessary to narrate in detail the movements and operations of the *Phœnix*, or *Meander*, or the *Cléopâtre*, *Pétrel*, *Cocyte*, or other ships, at Solovetz, Zaiatski, Kouzoff, Shelna, Megra, Kemi, Kollovara, Kiyi, Zolotitsa, or other small places whose names are nearly unknown in England, and whose insignificance might well have shielded them from the fear of any attacks. The Allied commanders had been driven to a minuteness of rigour against their own wishes and intentions; they had laid down a rule that, while all Russian coasting-vessels should be stopped and destroyed, boats should be left unmolested which appeared to belong to the localities where they were seen; but learning that such boats had been employed to carry muskets from place to place, to arm the peasantry, they felt the necessity of carrying the principle of blockade to its utmost range, by checking the passage of any vessels or boats, however small, in any direction. Thus it happened that, by the arrival of autumn, the maritime trade of the White Sea had been stopped in the most complete and rigorous manner.

To follow the cruising movements month by month will be unnecessary. Enough has been said to explain the nature of the operations carried on: operations during which not even the semblance of a sea-fight presented itself.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE NORTH PACIFIC AND KAMTCHATKA.

One component in the remarkable group of parallels, adverted to in the opening of the present Chapter, was observable in the regions of the North Pacific. Here, as in the Baltic and in the White Sea, the plans of the Allies for 1855 were nearly identical with those for 1854; and it will be seen that the results were equally far from bringing glory to the two nations forming the alliance.

The operations in 1854 consisted * in little more than an unsuccessful attack on Pétropaulovsk in Kamtchatka, preceded by the melancholy suicide of Admiral Price. The English and French squadrons returned southward to winter; and prepared in the following spring, under the command of Admiral Bruce, to renew their attacks on the Russian settlements in the North Pacific. Concerning the enemy's ships in that quarter, nothing more than a vague knowledge was possessed by the Allies. The *Ingermanland* line-of-battle ship was supposed to be in those seas, but had not been seen; the *Diana* frigate had been sent thither, but her locality was unknown: it was believed, however, that at the beginning of 1855 the czar had in the North Pacific the *Pallas* of 50 guns, *Dvina* of 22, *Olovetska* or *Olivetsa* of 22, *Aurora* of 44, *Vostock* of 5, and three or four schooners and store-ships.

In order to understand the naval arrangements in the Pacific at this time, it is necessary to bear in mind that there were two English fleets under two admirals. Admiral Stirling commanded in the China seas, protecting British interests on the Asiatic and Australian coasts; while Admiral

* Chapter VI., pp. 188-191.

Bruce commanded the Pacific fleet cruising near the west coast of America; but both alike were expected to assist in curbing the power of Russia in and near that ocean. The Allies, by the month of March, assembled a considerable fleet of English and French ships in the China seas, consisting of five frigates, seven steamers, five sailing-sloops, besides tenders and surveying-vessels, the whole carrying about 300 guns and 3000 men. It was from this fleet, in the Chinese waters, that ships were detached to act against the Russians in various directions, aiding other ships detached from the Pacific fleet. The *Encounter* and *Barracouta* were sent to Pétropaulovsk; the *Sibylle*, *Hornet*, and *Bittern*, to the Gulf of Tatary and the mouth of the Amur; the *Spartan* to the Kurile Isles; and several other ships to the neighbourhood of Nangasaki.

When, in the month of April, three ships were despatched by Admiral Stirling to the mouth of the river Amur or Amoor, to watch the Russians, great eagerness was expressed by various officers to join the expedition, partly in the hope of wiping out the disgrace of the preceding year, and partly to visit a region almost wholly unknown to the English. Captain Whittingham, at that time on the point of relinquishing the command of the Royal Engineers at Hong Kong, offered his services in a military capacity to the admiral; but he was told that Stirling had no intention of attacking any of the Russian ports in the East. This reply, not very welcome to the officers, led Whittingham to accompany the squadron merely as an amateur spectator; and to his visit we owe the greater part of the information, imperfect at the best, made public concerning the operations in the North Pacific;* for the government, having little reason to be satisfied with those operations, published very few dispatches relating thereto. On the 7th, the *Sibylle* 40-gun frigate, *Bittern* brig, and *Hornet* steam-corvette, set sail from Hong Kong, under the charge of Commodore the Hon. C. Elliot: the *Sibylle* being heavily laden with powder and shot, and six months' provisions. On approaching the Japan islands fogs began, which perplexed the squadron throughout the summer months—a peculiarity of those seas. After passing through the Strait of Corea and the Sea of Japan, the squadron threaded the Strait of Sangar, and anchored at Hakodadi in the island of Yesso or Yezo. This port had, shortly before, been thrown open by the exclusive Japanese authorities to the commerce of England and America; and Commodore Elliot visited it for commercial as well as political objects, much to the satisfaction of all his officers and men. The squadron remained anchored there, from the 27th of April till the 7th of May, and sailed round the western coast of Yesso to the Gulf of Tatary, bound northward to the mouth of the Amur. The situation of this gulf is rather remarkable. The narrow island of Saghalien, or Tarakaï, nearly 700 miles in length, stretches parallel with the coast of Chinese Tatary, having the Gulf of Tatary and the Gulf of Saghalien between it and the shore; the former opens into the Sea of Okhotsk, the latter into the Sea of Japan; the river Amur flows into the one, and De Castries Bay forms part of the other. Between the river and the bay the strait is so shallow that vessels can scarcely navigate it; insomuch that many geographers have regarded Saghalien not as an island, but as a peninsula attached to the mainland by a narrow isthmus. Commodore Elliot, sailing northward up the Gulf of Tatary, found in De Castries Bay a Russian frigate, three corvettes, a brig, and a small steamer. He spent many hours in reconnoitring and vain manœuvres, tempting and defying them to come out and fight fairly; but here, as elsewhere, the invitation was declined. Four of the Russian vessels were ascertained to be the *Aurora*, *Olovetska*, *Dvina*, and *Vostock*; but the other two were not made out. Elliot's force being too small to justify him in endeavouring to cut out the Russian squadron, he hesitated how to act; he exchanged shots with them; but as the navigation becomes shallow and dangerous in and northward of De Castries Bay, he did not deem it prudent to force a passage.

The situation was a perplexing one for Elliot. The gulf was almost wholly unknown to Western



De Castries Bay, Gulf of Tatary.

Europeans, and he knew not what hidden dangers might beset him. It was on the 20th of May that his squadron had thus come suddenly upon the Russian flotilla; and his officers and men prepared for action with unbounded alacrity. The brig was sent in further than the frigate, and the corvette further than the brig, to reconnoitre the enemy;

* *Notes on the late Expedition against the Russian Settlements in Eastern Siberia.*

but the shallow water soon indicated a vexatious obstacle to the advance of all these ships. Three small islands guarded the entrance to the bay, and shoals appeared to block up the channels between some of the islands; hence it became a problem, which of the channels served for the entrance and exit of the Russian ships. As far as he dared, without charts to pilot his way, Elliot advanced; and then sent a few 32-pound shot at the enemy from the *Hornet;* but the distance was too great for effective service, and the commodore ordered the firing to cease. On the 21st he held 'off and on,' trying to entice the Russians out of the harbour; but with no success. What was now to be done? Elliot would unquestionably have attacked them could he have reached them; but this being impracticable, he might blockade them closely, or might blockade the gulf lower down. Whatever was the balance of probabilities, the choice made was an unlucky one, for it allowed the enemy to get clear altogether. Elliot determined to cruise about the gulf with two vessels, while the third went to Admiral Stirling for reinforcements. They sailed southward on the night of the 21st, and on the two following days; the *Bittern* then started for the China seas on the 23d, while the *Sibylle* and the *Hornet* remained on the watch. Here occurred a delay that has been much criticised; from the evening of the 21st until the 28th, the commodore, although cruising in and near the gulf, never once looked into De Castries Bay; and when he did so—the prey had escaped! Keen and bitter was the disappointment of all: the Russians were gone, no one knew whither; and thus the labours of the squadron had been rendered not merely useless, but positively mischievous. Elliot worked his way into the harbour, by close examination; and after landing, he found the remains of a small deserted Russian settlement. He found also some official documents; but not one officer in the squadron could read Russian, and the documents were therefore useless to him. The roughly-hewn log-buildings, the wooden tressel-beds, a few miscellaneous articles of uniform and clothing, boxes and packages, barrels of rye-flour and vegetables, sows and their young, an oven and some black bread—these were small consolations for the disappointment arising on other grounds. Whither had the Russians gone? It was afterwards admitted by the First Lord of the Admiralty in parliament, that the gulf was almost unknown to us, and that Elliot had no correct chart to appeal to. The Russian ships probably found a passage over the bar or shoal separating the Gulf of Tatary from the Gulf of Saghalien, and thus reached the mouth of the river Amur; but Elliot evidently was not aware of the existence of such a passage. It was afterwards ascertained that if he had followed the only route which he believed would have led him up to the squadron in the bay his three ships would inevitably have been lost on the sands. The government acquitted him of blame in not entering the bay to engage the Russians at close quarters, because he had no gun-boats for shallow channels, and because the soundings were unknown; but they thought he would have exercised a wise discretion in keeping close watch on the squadron in the bay instead of roaming over the gulf. He believed, if the enemy escaped at all, it would be by a southerly course; but while he was watching in the south, they gave him the slip, and escaped by the north—he believed that, northward, they were hemmed into a *cul de sac;* whereas they knew of a little channel bearing some analogy to the narrow neck in the middle of an hour-glass. Commodore Elliot and all else in his squadron, as well as critics at home, were much mortified at this result; for as the Russian ships refused to fight, capture was the only chance; and in this case capture was averted by the adroitness of the enemy.

When Commodore Elliot sent southward, to communicate news of the Russian squadron to Admiral Stirling, the *Bittern* came up with the admiral on the 29th of May near the coast of Japan, to which he had shifted his head-quarters from the Chinese coast. On the next day the admiral, with the *Winchester* and the *Bittern*, set sail, and was joined in the Strait of Sangar by the *Spartan* and the *Tartar*. This strait separates the Japanese island of Yesso or Yezo from that of Niphon, while the Strait of La Perouse separates Yesso from Saghalien; there was therefore only the island of Yesso between the admiral and the commodore; and it is inexplicable why so long a time should have been allowed to elapse before Stirling paid attention to the Gulf of Tatary; for the two officers did not meet in the gulf until the 7th of June, by which time the 'bird was flown.' Nay more; it was not until the 17th that the admiral, with the *Winchester*, *Spartan*, *Bittern*, *Hornet*, and *Sibylle*, set sail up the gulf to make a personal examination. On the 27th, exactly a month after his former visit, Elliot looked in at De Castries Bay, to ascertain whether any traces of the Russians were visible; for the admiral and the commodore appear to have retained the opinion that the gulf is a *cul de sac* or closed funnel, and that the Russians could not have escaped by the north. Nothing being seen of them, Stirling emerged from the gulf, and—fancying they must have eluded his squadron and taken a southern route—sailed into the open sea in search of them; some of the ships steering towards Japan, and the others towards the Sea of Okhotsk. Thus one-third of the month of May, and the whole of the month of June, were wasted, so far as concerned any efficient search for the Russian squadron.

Attention must now be directed to the region around Kamtchatka, before noticing the further proceedings of Elliot.

After the unsuccessful attack by the English and French against Pétropaulovsk in the autumn of 1854, the news was conveyed to the respective

governments as rapidly as the immense distance would allow. And here it became a curious question in which direction news could travel most expeditiously. Stretching a thread over a globe, it will be seen that the most direct route from Pétropaulovsk to St Petersburg is about 3600 miles, and to London 4600; but taking actual travelling routes, the overland distance in the former case is 7500 miles, and the voyaging distance in the latter case 17,500. As our Pacific steamers are not remarkable for celerity, it may well be supposed that the Russian couriers had transmitted the news to the czar's capital before the arrival of dispatches by sea to London. Indeed it was afterwards ascertained that Captain Martinoff—conveying, not news to the capital, but orders from the capital—made on this occasion the quickest journey ever known across the vast wastes of Siberia. He left St Petersburg on the 20th of December, arrived at Irkoutsk on the 5th of January, left that place on the 12th, crossed sixty versts of smooth ice on Lake Baikal in two hours, arrived at Okhotsk on the 2d of February, travelled by dog-sledges during five weeks round the bay of that name, and arrived at Pétropaulovsk on the 13th of March—a feat that astonished all the Russians by its rapidity. Pending the arrival of instructions, the Russian authorities proceeded during the winter to protect their fort in the remote east. They constructed at Pétropaulovsk nine batteries for fifty-four guns, skilfully formed of fascines strongly bound together; the earthworks of the batteries were twenty-five feet thick, staked and filled in, and some of them ditched round, with covered-ways leading from one to another, and trees planted in the rear. Indeed, every preparation was made to offer a stubborn resistance to any attack in 1855.

The English government, on their part, sent out orders to watch Pétropaulovsk closely; and this duty was intrusted rather to Admiral Bruce than to Admiral Stirling. The ships belonging to the Pacific fleet, on the Valparaiso station, told off for this service, were chiefly the *President* (50), *Encounter* (14), *Barracouta* (6), *Pique* (40), *Trincomalee* (24), *Amphitrite* (24), *Dido* (18), and *Brisk* (14); while the French squadron, under Admirals Penanros and Fournichon, consisted of four ships —making altogether twelve war-vessels mounting 354 guns—a force apparently adequate to notable achievements. The *Barracouta* and *Encounter* being despatched to watch Pétropaulovsk, arrived near Kamtchatka about the middle of April; but they appear to have anchored at a rendezvous sixty or eighty miles distant, and made no attempt to examine the state of the town and fort until the remainder of the fleet had come up, which did not take place until the latter end of May. Little did the captains of those vessels suspect the manœuvres of the Russians in this wasted interval.

When Admiral Bruce with his well-armed fleet reached Pétropaulovsk, he found to his astonishment and vexation that the enemy had eluded him, leaving him the barren honour of occupying a deserted town and harbour. Circumstances afterwards shewed that the Russian authorities, under certain contingencies that might arise, had resolved not to persist in defending Pétropaulovsk, but to send all their ships to some spot unknown to the invaders, and abandon the town. Orders to this effect had arrived while icy winter still bound the coasts; indeed Captain Martinoff was the messenger who brought them. Pétropaulovsk had been well fortified, but required men and ammunition, and these were to be sent by the *Diana*, 50 gun-frigate. The hapless fate of this ship will presently be noticed; but it will suffice to say here merely that, the *Diana* not arriving at the appointed time, the garrison prepared to take their departure. The vessels had to saw through the ice to obtain a passage out of the harbour; and then, on the 17th of April, they set forth, carrying all the guns and munitions of war, all the government *employés*, and some of the garrison, about 800 persons in all, and leaving only three or four inhabitants in the place; the rest of the garrison retired to a village in the interior. The vessels which thus cut out a path for themselves were, according to Admiral Bruce's dispatch, the *Aurora*, *Dvina*, *Olovetska*, *Baikal*, and *Irtish*, the first three being ships-of-war, and the rest merchant-ships or armed transports; they steered towards the mouth of the Amur, eluding the *Barracouta* and *Encounter* in a way most mortifying to the crews of those vessels. When Bruce's squadron entered the harbour at the end of May, after so unfortunate a delay, the Russians had been gone several weeks; and at Pétropaulovsk was found not a ship, gun, or soldier—nothing but empty embrasures and deserted houses. A substitute for an American flag appeared to be flying; this had been hoisted by the only inhabitants left—an American trader, his two clerks, and a runaway French sailor—who employed it as a friendly signal to the invaders. These strangers informed Bruce that the government officials had gone to the Amur, while the inhabitants, about 1200 in number, had retired inland to the village of Avatscha. The houses were tenantless, and packs of hungry dogs alone disturbed the silence of the streets. The Russians had taken care to render the new fortifications valueless, by removing or burying the guns: indeed, the evacuation had been most completely and thoroughly effected. Admiral Bruce caused the batteries to be destroyed, but regarded it a point of honour to respect the houses of an undefended, unresisting town. He found a Russian whaler, of 400 tons, moored in an inner port; and ascertained that it was intended to be employed in conveying away the family of the governor, who had temporarily taken refuge in the interior: this vessel he destroyed, as being engaged in Russian government service. After a delay of a day or two, he succeeded in opening a communication with Captain Martinoff, stationed in the interior, and effecting an exchange of three

Russian prisoners for two English—all five having been captured during the contest in the previous September. Having destroyed the new batteries and the whaler, exchanged the prisoners, and placed a fence round the graves of Admiral Price and those who had fallen in the month just named, Bruce was at a loss what more to do in that locality; his work had been frustrated by the Russians themselves.

It is not easy to imagine a position more ludicrous than that in which the Allies found themselves in June. Two captains, watching the Russians at Pétropaulovsk, but out of sight of those whom they professed to watch, had allowed them to escape; two other captains, watching the Russians at De Castries Bay, but equally out of sight of their prey, similarly allowed them to escape; and then four admirals, with nearly twenty captains, employed nearly twenty ships-of-war in roaming about the North Pacific, marvelling whither the enemy had gone. Noticing the names of the Russian vessels, and putting together the various threads of narrative, it appears—that those vessels had passed the winter in Pétropaulovsk harbour; that on April 17th, pursuant to orders received from higher authorities, they had taken on board part of the garrison, and all the government officials and stores; that the flotilla, thus heavily laden, and quite unfitted to resist an attack from a hostile force, had successfully baffled the vigilance of the *Barracouta* and *Encounter*, and made its way across the Sea of Okhotsk to De Castries Bay; that this flotilla, or one nearly identical with it in the number and names of the vessels, was seen by Commodore Elliot in that bay on the 20th of May; that, on or about the 25th, it eluded the watch of the *Sibylle* and *Hornet*, and escaped from De Castries Bay; and lastly, that, so far as the luckless pursuers were aware, the five or six ships forming the Russian flotilla succeeded in reaching a safe haven at or near the mouth of the river Amur. The whole transaction told much more for the vigilance of the Russians than that of the Allies; the admirals made the best of it in their dispatches, but could not conceal their mortification at the result.

The Amur or Amoor, frequently mentioned in this section, may possibly at some future time become an important Russian river. Only the upper part of its course is in the czar's dominions, the rest being in the Chinese territory of Manchooria; but its mouth is near the Siberian confines, and political changes may easily modify the boundary between the two empires. Be this as it may, however, a river having a course nearly 2000 miles in length, and connecting many regions of Eastern Asia with the Pacific, cannot but have a commercial importance at some future time. At the mouth of that river the Russians have constructed forts, rendered strong by the intervention of shoals and sandbanks. The navigation near the mouth is intricate, bearing some resemblance to that of the Mississippi; the banks and channels are constantly changing their character, owing to quicksands and to the vast quantity of alluvium brought down by the stream; and thus a fleet, belonging to a power familiar with the hydrography of the region, might be easily moored in spots inaccessible to other ships. The Russians possess good charts of the Amur; and any settlement near its mouth would be more valuable to them, both commercially and politically, than one in the remote and inhospitable Kamtchatka, provided it did not involve them in disputes with their Chinese neighbours.

The proceedings of Commodore Elliot must now be further traced.

The *Sibylle* and the *Hornet* remained beating about in and near the Gulf of Tatary, looking for the Russians, and waiting for reinforcements from Admiral Stirling. Thus May closed. On the 7th of June the *Winchester* and *Spartan* arrived from Stirling's fleet, and, some days later, the *Styx* steam-corvette and *Tartar* steam-tender. The whole month was wasted in idleness, Elliot apparently waiting for instructions, which either never came or were indefensibly delayed. Captain Whittingham, speaking of these valuable days and weeks lost, remarks: 'How galling the delay must have been to the gallant men, who keenly felt the temporary escape of the Russian squadron, can be understood by every Englishman; and I hope I shall never forget the noble examples of self-restraint imposed by the superior officers upon their eagerness to advance, and of cheerful and respectful obedience to orders, at the first at all events, distasteful to the bold daring of our seamen.' Elliot, detained near the southern end of Saghalien during the whole of June, sailed northward into the Sea of Okhotsk in July. One of the facts ascertained during the detention was, that the native inhabitants of that island are a rude tribe called 'Ainos; but that the Russians claim control over the northern half, and the Japanese over the southern. In the middle of July, when near the mouth of the Amur, Elliot was joined by the *Barracouta*, bringing the news of the escape of the Russians from Pétropaulovsk. During the rest of the month, he was vainly trying to find an entrance into the Amur, the want of charts leaving him quite helpless in this particular. Early in August, he sailed to Aian, a small settlement formed by the Russians on the west coast of the Sea of Okhotsk, defended by three slight earthen batteries. It was deserted by the government authorities, who had gone inland with their guns and stores. Finding nothing to do at Aian, being unable to penetrate into the Amur, and knowing little or nothing concerning the actual locality of the Russian ships, Elliot, with various ships belonging to the fleets both of Bruce and Stirling, cruised about in and near the Sea of Okhotsk during the month of August, and then sailed southward.

The fate of the *Diana* and her crew furnished the most remarkable incident in this uneventful

year in the Pacific. Strongly armed, and well provided with men and stores, she had sailed from Cronstadt soon after the declaration of war, and, eluding the English cruisers, had reached Japan and De Castries Bay. While negotiating a treaty with the Japanese government, Admiral Paniutin, as envoy from the czar, remained on board the *Diana* in Simoda harbour, island of Niphon. Here an earthquake caused the wreck of the ship, in November 1854. After a long detention, Paniutin bargained with an American trader to convey the crew of the *Diana* to Pétropaulovsk in three trips of the *Caroline Foote*. In April 1855, the captain and 150 men safely reached that fort; but finding that the Russians had just abandoned it, they followed them to the Amur. The American trader refused to have anything further to do in this delicate business; and Paniutin thereupon proceeded with great energy to build a vessel for himself; it was a small schooner-yacht, on which he employed his own carpenters and several Japanese. The yacht was intended to enable the admiral and a few officers and men to sail up the Amur *en route* to Irkoutsk and St Petersburg; and this intention was carried out. Meanwhile, 280 of the *Diana's* crew remained at Japan, longing for some mode of making their escape; but none such occurred until July, when the *Greta*, a small Bremen brig, undertook to convey them to Aian or the Amur. Just as this vessel was reaching its destination, the *Barracouta* descried it, and took all the Russians prisoners—thus giving a hapless climax to their shipwreck and detention on the Japanese coasts.

Little more need now be said. That the Russian flotilla had taken refuge at the Amur appeared probable enough; and some of the Allied ships, as we have just seen, were sent to watch in that quarter; but still the manœuvres, as a whole, partook of a rambling and desultory character—a part of the fleet going south to Japan, and other parts to Sitka, to Vancouver, to San Francisco, and other ports in the North Pacific. Two French frigates, forming part of the Allied fleet, took possession of the island of Urup, the centre of Russian trade in the Kurile Archipelago, captured a trading-vessel laden with furs, and changed the name of the island temporarily to 'Alliance.'

The Allies never recovered the time lost in the early part of the season. The few vessels forming the Russian squadron succeeded, it is supposed, in reaching a part of the Amur where sandbanks and land-batteries prevented Elliot's squadron from following them; and so far as regarded a real capture or conquest of a ship-of-war, no such event occurred. Much bitter commentary was made at home on these barren proceedings. It was said that 'a calm and philosophical leisure has distinguished our proceedings in all places and times, and under all circumstances;' that 'at home and abroad, in our offices and our dockyards, in the Baltic and in the Black Sea, under sun and frost, by sea, by land, in the Tropics and under the Arctic Circle, it is always the same; when the occasion requires the utmost secrecy and dispatch, when half-a-dozen men at the most should know what is brewing, and when it is such a race between us and our nimble foe that twenty-four hours are all-important, we proclaim our dire intent, marshal a solemn procession, march across the earth or sea with drums beating and colours flying, and then—are too late.' Like most smart writing, this exaggerates the truth; but there is nevertheless truth at the bottom of it; for the war was characterised throughout by a want of promptness—the right operations being too frequently postponed to a wrong time. It is also worthy of note that, while Russian officers, naval and military, are to a large extent familiar with the English as well as the French languages, the British fleets in the Pacific do not appear to have possessed one officer who could read or speak Russian.

Cruising over the North Pacific, Admirals Bruce and Stirling had much reason to regret that England possesses no naval station on the west coast of America, north of Vancouver. Many thoughtful men have urged that, as England possesses the American seaboard of the Pacific from lat. 49° to 56°, a road of 1300 miles would connect that coast with Lake Superior, whence there is water-communication through British America to the mouth of the St Lawrence, and onward nearly in a direct line to England. For want of some such station, the Pacific squadron is obliged to sail so far south as San Francisco or the Sandwich Islands to rendezvous, and is then in danger of losing its sailors by desertion in those tempting regions. It seems indeed singular, that at a time when the Russians held five naval stations in the Pacific—at Sitka, Pétropaulovsk, Okhotsk, Aian, and the mouth of the Amur—where their ships could be repaired or refitted by their own workmen, England had not one of similar character, but had to send her ships home, or to some distant port, for repair. It is probably not too much to assert, that if the broad belt of North America now under notice had belonged to the United States, instead of being under the stagnant control of the Colonial Office or the Hudson's Bay Company, the Pacific coast would teem with an active population, busily employed in convenient harbours, and developing the mineral and vegetable resources of the interior. Limiting attention, however, to the more immediate subject of the war, there can be little doubt that the Russian squadron might have been captured if Admiral Bruce had found facilities for wintering, or at least rendezvousing, in those latitudes.

The naval operations in the North, as this Chapter has shewn, were attended with as few successful results in 1855 as in 1854. The parallelism was borne out. True, Russia was prevented from sending her fleets into the open ocean, or to

any seas where they might ravage the coasts of the Allies, or to any ports where they might have compelled the Allies to raise the blockade; but, on the other hand, those fleets so successfully took shelter behind stone-forts, and so vigilantly baffled the pursuers, that they nearly all remained intact; while no large fortress, with the exception of Bomarsund and Sveaborg, suffered any considerable damage during two years' operations of two enormous fleets.

Burial-place of the English and French killed at Pétropaulovsk in September 1854.

CHAPTER XIV.

A SECOND WINTER IN THE CRIMEA.

THE fortune of war rendered necessary a second winter encampment of the Allied armies in the Crimea. Whatever may have been the paucity of great victories on their part, or the financial and material exhaustion on the part of the Russians; whatever the fluctuations between success and failure in the diplomatic attempts to arrive at a satisfactory peace—the approach of winter 1855–6 found the czar apparently as little willing as ever to acknowledge himself beaten, or to lessen the stubborn resistance offered to the attacks of the Allies. No officers fought better than those who led in his armies; no soldiers rushed upon death with more blind devotion, however little this devotion may have been accompanied by true military qualities, than those who served him; and these characteristics were displayed with full as much efficiency at the period now under notice as at any earlier date in the war. How the czar's dominions were becoming desolated, and his sources of wealth drained, the Western Powers were not fully to know until a later period.

THE ALLIES IN SEBASTOPOL.

When, on the morning of the 9th of September, the Allied commanders found that Prince Gortchakoff and the Russian garrison, together with nearly the whole of the inhabitants, had crossed from the south to the north side of Sebastopol Harbour,* they saw that a decided line of policy was immediately necessary. It became their duty to ascertain whether any explosive mines had been purposely laid by the Russians; to occupy the town and the Karabelnaïa suburb with troops; to ward off pilferers and camp-followers; to guard against a Russian cannonading from the northern heights; to prepare an inventory of all the stores and other property captured; and to take measures, subject to orders from London and Paris, for the destruction of the docks and defence-works.

The appearance of the devoted city at the time when the conquerors entered it, and indeed long after, was fearfully wild. Destructive forces had been raging with a violence never before equalled perhaps in the history of sieges; and the whole internal area, from the Malakoff in the east to Fort Quarantine in the west, from Fort Nicholas in the north to the Flagstaff Battery in the south, was one vast disordered heap of crumbled earthworks, splintered and shattered masonry, ball-pierced buildings and houses, torn-up streets and roads, scorched timbers, overturned cannon, broken muskets, balls and shells fired into the town by the besiegers, unused balls and shells intended to have been fired from the town by the defenders, gabions and sand-bags with which the earthworks had been hastily formed, and shattered vehicles. With unspeakable astonishment did the English and French officers thread their way through the barely discernible streets. In reference to the space more immediately contiguous to the siege-works, an eye-witness said: 'The ground in parts is literally paved with shot sunk in the earth, above which their upper surface scarcely rises; there are ditches and trenches in which they lie as thick as apples in a basket; in some places numbers of them have been buried. You see them of every size, from the huge 68-pounder down to the diminutive grape—jolly little fellows, of a pleasant vinous appellation, but very nasty to run against as they are passing through the air. As to the fragments of shell, you might macadamise roads with them—jagged rusty bits of iron, infinitely various in size and form; one thinks, as one looks at them, how many a stout and gallant fellow received his quietus from some of them before they fell to the ground after their diverging upward flight. Then you come upon ill-treated cannon—trunnionless some, others with muzzles knocked off, some burst into two or three pieces, and others bearing indentations as from the hammer of a Cyclops. You walk up into the Redan—into the Malakoff, if the French sentries object not—and you marvel at the huge dimensions of those famous works, and feel more surprised at their having ever become ours than at their having so long resisted the utmost efforts of English and French—such a medley of enormous earthworks, huge lumps of stone, heaps upon heaps of shot, and broken shell, and damaged

* Chapter XI., p. 481.

guns, everything rugged and battered—a work of giants reduced to chaos. And then the gloomy, fetid bomb-proofs, where, for so long a time, the stubborn Russians lurked—wretched holes, worse than most dungeons.'

The town itself, although exhibiting a wreck of warlike appliances less wild than the lines of disrupted batteries, made perhaps a still greater impression on those who directed their steps among the deserted homes of the late inhabitants. The buildings were shattered into forms truly fantastic; some with the lower stories almost shot away, and barely able to support the superstructure; some with enormous gaps in the walls, or with roofs broken into a mere fringe-work. Proofs were manifold that the Russians intended to have defended the town street by street, had the besiegers forced an entrance; for across every principal street were constructed barricades of large stones, defended by pieces of artillery; reasons of strategy induced Gortchakoff to change his plan, and to retreat to the north side of the harbour rather than maintain a street-fight, seeing that the Malakoff commanded the whole town. In the first burst of confusion following the capture, the French soldiers roamed through the streets, entered the riddled and deserted houses, and brought out bedsteads, tables, pictures, musical-instruments, wardrobes, and any property which their greed led them to hope might be regarded as spoil; and hence the streets presented a strange medley of cannon-balls, falling ruins, and household furniture; but these irregularities were checked as soon as General Bazaine became installed as military governor of the place. The Russians had attempted to destroy what they could not remove: this was only partially effected through insufficiency of time; but enough was done to mingle cinders and ashes with the other indications of ruin spread around. In some of the best houses columns were found broken by cannon-shot, ceilings fallen which those columns had once supported, elegant articles of furniture crushed beneath broken cornices and beams, and fragments of shattered looking-glass mingled with dust on the parquetry floors. Appearances shewed that most of the larger houses had been abandoned for a considerable time by the inhabitants, to be given up to the soldiery. Exteriorly, the white stone buildings which looked so smiling and cheerful from the besiegers' camp, were cold forbidding ruins when viewed closely, pierced from top to bottom with shot-holes. The effect of the 13-inch shells had been extraordinary. These dread missiles, of which so many thousands had been hurled into the town, weigh 200 pounds each, and, falling from an altitude of a mile and a half, have a percussive force of nearly seventy tons; large gaps or empty spaces in rows or clusters of buildings told that shells had penetrated roofs or walls, descended to a depth below the foundation, and then scattered everything around to a distance far and wide.

Never, perhaps, was the occupation of a city obtained under more strange circumstances; for although the English and French were the victors, they could scarcely remain in the place they had conquered. The Russians, in possession of the heights and forts northward of the harbour, sent forth shot and shell at long range whenever opportunity of working mischief occurred. The Allies continued to encamp outside the town, sending into the interior only so many troops as would suffice to guard it, and cautiously seeking quarters for those troops among the ruins. The Russians were strongly posted, and held the northern heights as completely as the Allies held those on the south; the main body occupied the formidable Sievernaya or Star Fort, and the batteries and forts near the mouth of the harbour; another body covered the Valley of the Belbek, and was protected in front by field-works thrown up along the ridge of Inkermann; while Liprandi's army occupied the ground from the Mackenzie heights to the hills near Aïtodor. Whether Gortchakoff would effect a retreat into the interior, by abandoning altogether the position near Sebastopol; or whether, if he did not so, the Allies would be enabled to attack and conquer him—were questions left for the winter to solve; but the immediate necessity was for caution in guarding isolated portions of the Allied troops from the fire of the Russians stationed on the north.

To take an inventory of the captured stores being one of the earliest duties on the part of the Allies, an Anglo-French commission was formed for this purpose; seeing that a division of trophies and spoils between the two armies was one of the conditions in the treaty of alliance. The commission consisted of about twenty military, naval, and engineering officers — generals, brigadiers, majors, captains, lieutenants, commissaries, with one or two civilians; and its proceedings were very characteristic; for—dealing with missiles and implements of war—its deliberations were from time to time disturbed by a shot or a shell from the northern forts, ploughing into or near the very building in which the officers were sitting. More correctly, however, there was a head commission assisted by subordinate commissions; the former consisted of Sir George Dacres, Captain Drummond, Colonel Chapman, Mr Drake, General Niel, General Thiry, Admiral Regault de Genouilly, M. Paris, and M. Budin; and, under these nine commissioners, arrangements were made for exploring the city and forts by sub-commissions formed of the other twenty officers. One sub-commission visited the western half of the city, with Forts Nicholas and Alexander, the Quarantine and Flagstaff Batteries, and the Central Bastion; while the other paid a similar exploratory visit to the Karabelnaïa suburb, with the Malakoff, the two Redans, and the other defence-works on that side. This examination occupied about ten days during the latter part of September. It was found that the town contained the enormous

number of 3839 cannon, 128 brass and the rest iron; the commission proposed to present two of the finest brass guns to General della Marmora, as a memento of good-will towards the Sardinians, and to divide the remainder equally between the English and the French. Considered as a question of money-value, however, it was decided that the three nations should receive booty according to the number of men employed. This number, on the 8th of September, had been 126,705 French, and 63,715 Anglo-Sardinians. As to the poor Turks, they appear here, as on many other occasions during the war, to have been almost wholly forgotten, except by having presented to them two brass guns which had been Turkish field-pieces. The inventory included a vast quantity of *matériel* used in offensive and defensive warfare, in engineering, and in supplying the daily wants of a garrison.* Half a million shot and shell, nearly as many ball-cartridges, half a million pounds of gunpowder, and nearly four thousand cannon, shewed how enormous were the defensive resources of Gortchakoff at the time when he resolved on abandoning the city. A large quantity of black bread, unpalatable to English and French troops, but familiar to Slavonic and Asiatic races, was sent to feed the Tatar inhabitants of Eupatoria, who were only saved from utter starvation by supplies from the Allies. The few objects of fine art found, not injured by balls and bullets, were placed at the disposal of the commanders. In valuing the cannon they were taken by weight as mere metal—2f. 50c. per kilogramme for brass guns, and 10c. per kilogramme for iron (about 11d. per lb. and ½d. per lb. respectively). All articles in duplicate, and all of which the value could be correctly determined, were shared equally between the Allies. Large quantities of clothing, accidentally discovered in a store, were added in a supplementary list. As wood was especially valuable for fuel, the eastern half of the city was given up to the English, and the western to the French, in respect to the wood and other materials obtained by destroying houses and buildings; but many a shot was received from the northern batteries during this process of demolition.

Lamentable as such destruction would have been under circumstances less stringent than those of stern war, it was destined to be carried still further by the blowing up of the splendid docks on which the Czar Nicholas had expended such immense sums. This was an imperative duty; since the power of Russia to maintain a threatening attitude over Turkey had been based in considerable degree on the facilities afforded by Sebastopol for building, repairing, and harbouring ships-of-war. The forts and the docks became equally objects of attention on the part of the Allies. It was found that Gortchakoff, in evacuating the south side, had not had time to destroy so many of the forts as he had intended. Fort Paul was blown to atoms; Fort Alexander was very much damaged; but Forts Quarantine and Nicholas had been little injured. As for the fleet, it was gone; more than fifty vessels-of-war, including eighteen sail-of-the-line, lay sunken at the bottom of the splendid harbour, with their mast-heads jutting above the water—a memento of the extraordinary tactics adopted by the Russians.

To destroy the docks was a work of immense difficulty, so strongly and perfectly had they been constructed. This fine specimen of hydraulic engineering—comprising three inner docks, a basin, two outer docks, and a lock, with the steam-machinery for filling them with water—had been left uninjured by the Russians. Many English officers present were impressed with the appearance of these docks as surpassing any before seen, bespeaking the skill and energy of the Englishman who had constructed them, and the lavish expenditure of the autocrat under whose orders they had been constructed. It has already been noticed* that Mr Upton went to Russia as a kind of engineering adventurer, and succeeded in gaining the confidence of Nicholas. One authority states that the original plan for the Sebastopol docks was drawn up by a French engineer, M. Riancourt; that his estimate of 6,000,000 roubles startled the authorities; that Upton thereupon undertook the arduous enterprise; that he promised to complete it in five years, at a cost of 2,500,000 roubles; but that the ultimate cost in time was doubled, and in money quadrupled. He began his labours in June 1832, and is said to have employed at one time a whole army of military labourers, 30,000 in number; who suffered dreadfully from exposure to burning sun, glaring white rocks, and clouds of fine dust. The principal basin, 400 feet by 300, was 30 feet above the level of the sea; and as there were no tides to fill it, a necessity arose for constructing an aqueduct to bring water from the Tchernaya river, from a point far above the Inkermann Valley. Even this supply being inadequate in hot weather, a pumping-engine was obtained from

* Round-shot, 407,314; shell, 101,755; canister-cases, 24,080; gunpowder, 525,000 lbs.; ball-cartridges for muskets and carbines, 470,000 in good condition, and 160,000 damaged; wagons, 80; yawls, 6; logs of *lignum vitæ*, 500; anchors of port-moorings, 400; anchors of different sizes, 90; grapplings and small anchors, 50; chains for anchors, 200 yards; old copper for sheathing, 104,000 lbs.; old ropes, 100,000 lbs.; water-casks, 300; new ropes of different sizes, 50,000 lbs.; pulleys, 400; spars, 40; tools, 300; bar-iron and steel, 1,460,000 lbs.; iron-wire, 400 lbs.; iron-checks, 320 lbs.; sheet-iron, 16,000 lbs.; tin-plate, 14,000 lbs.; red copper, 120,000 lbs.; nails, 6000 lbs.; fir-wood, a large quantity; pitch and tar, 200 barrels; barrels of paint, 150; small boilers, weighing 6000 lbs.; the remains of a steam-engine of 220 horse-power, taken out of a steamer burned by the Russians; large copper-boilers (weighing 100,000 lbs.), 8; old copper, 100,000 lbs.; copper-screws, 10,000 lbs.; old iron, 160,000 lbs.; large bells, 6; small bells, 10; hospital-beds, 350; iron forges, in great numbers; main-tackles, 12; coal, 2000 tons; steam-engines, of 30 horse-power, for the basins, 2; large pumps for the basins, 3; iron boilers, 3; 1 high-pressure engine of 16 horse-power, for the basins; iron cranes, 17; an engine of 12 horse-power in the military bakery; 2 dredging-machines of 30 horse-power, unserviceable; a still, a clock, six marble statues, two sphinxes, a large basso-rilievo; biscuit, 500 tons; flour, 150; barley, 9; buckwheat, 117; oats, 18; millet, 54; wheat, 20; pease, 1½; salt-meat, 60; wheat in the granaries, 500 quarters, &c.

* Chapter VII., p. 232.

Messrs Maudslay's in London, to raise water from the harbour. It was originally designed to make the dock-gates of timber; but the destructive attacks of the *teredo navalis* being feared, gates were made of cast-iron frames covered with wrought-iron plates. Nine pair of enormous dock-gates were made on this plan, by Messrs Rennie; some of these, for admitting ships of 120 guns into the largest docks, were 64 feet in width, by 34 in height, ranking among the largest works ever constructed for hydraulic purposes.

To dismantle by English and French ingenuity, that which the Uptons and Maudslays and Rennies had constructed, became a definite work in the hands of the new occupants of Sebastopol. Immediately after the evacuation of the town by the Russians, sappers and miners began to sink deep shafts, in positions which would enable them, by the aid of gunpowder and electric apparatus, to blow up the masonry of the docks. The Russians, during several weeks, had the mortification of witnessing, from their strongholds on the northern heights, the preparations for destroying those fine docks in which the czar their master had taken such pride. A mine would be sunk, a charge of powder laid, an electric discharge made, and a portion of masonry blown up; and thus the operations continued bit by bit. On one occasion 8000 pounds of powder were exploded at once; huge masses of granite were riven from their beds in all directions, and hurled into the air; but the mines were so planned as to insure the disruption rather than the indiscriminate hurling of the stone. Gray smoke, an explosion, a dust-cloud, and down would fall masses which had perhaps cost months of labour to set up. French and English officers grouped themselves around, at safe distances, some provided with photographic apparatus to let the disruption paint its own results; and thus did one explosion after another take place, until the work of ruin had been sufficiently effected.

General Codrington, in a dispatch dated the 2d of February, said: 'The destruction of the docks of Sebastopol is now completed; the sides of the last dock were blown in yesterday morning, small parts of the wall here and there only remaining. Thus the whole of the canal of entrance and north docks in charge of the French, the basin in our mutual charge, and the south docks in English charge, are separate but shapeless masses of dirt; heavy broken stones, split beams of timber, and shattered gates protruding from the heap of confusion. The labour of destruction has been difficult. . . . . It is now a picture of destruction, desolation, and silence; there lies against the quay the half-sunken hull of a vessel, and in the harbour beyond the only things breaking the surface of the water are the lower masts of sunken ships-of-war. . . . . Amid great difficulties of cold and wet, very severe frost at one time and perpetually recurring pressure at another, the work went steadily on; and great praise is due to all those concerned—the Engineers and Sappers, parties of the Royal Artillery, the 18th Regiment, and latterly of the 48th Regiment. These parties return to their duty to-morrow after constant and laborious work. The casualties have been but six, of which two only have been fatal, and one man of the 48th Regiment was lost by foul air in a shaft; after several vain attempts by Major Nicholson, other officers and men—themselves descending at great risk—the poor fellow's body was brought up, but life was gone. . . . . The voltaic-battery, we must confess, did not always succeed; it seems to require great nicety in preparation; but in those cases in which I saw it succeed, the effect was perfect—ignition and its result, the shake of the ground, the heaving up of the mass seemed to be instantaneous.' The work was intrusted to Colonel Lloyd, commanding the Royal Engineers, under whom were Colonel Gordon and Major Nicholson. Being desirous to test the value of voltaic submarine blasting, Colonel Lloyd obtained from Sir Edmund Lyons the services of Mr Deane, diver and submarine-engineer; and strengthened by more than 400 sappers and engineers, he gave the system a fair trial; the result was only partially successful, and Colonel Lloyd exploded most of the mines by means of fuses. One pair of dock-gates having been ordered to be sent to England as trophies, they were removed before the explosions, but at the cost of a vast amount of labour and trouble. The English undertook the demolition of the three southern docks, and one-half of the east and west sides of the basin; while the French undermined and destroyed the rest. The English appear to have been much more annoyed and hindered than their Allies by the flooding of their mines with water; but all difficulties were one by one surmounted, and the magnificent docks became a scene of ruin.

The aqueduct was fated to desolation, as well as the docks. This fine work, bringing water from a distance of twelve miles by an artificial channel, comprising two tunnels, three aqueduct bridges, and an ingenious combination of locks, was constructed chiefly in 1832 and the two following years. The tunnel at Inkermann, 900 feet long, 10 feet high, and sufficiently wide to admit a footpath on each side of the narrow water-channel, was excavated in hard rock by gangs of labourers working day and night, and relieving each other every four hours; it required sixteen months for its excavation, and was regarded at the time as a marvel of engineering. The small stone-arches by which the aqueduct crossed a part of Careening Bay gave it the appearance of a Roman work. It was not necessary to destroy the whole of this aqueduct, but only the works of construction near the harbour. Another aqueduct, also made by Mr Upton, brought water from a spring three or four miles distant to supply the great reservoir and fountains at Sebastopol; it was mostly subterranean, and was nearly obliterated during the progress of the siege.

Another scene of disruption was the series of

forts on the southern shore of the harbour, or such of them as had been left intact by the Russians. If Sebastopol were fated to disappear as a stronghold and arsenal menacing to Turkey, it became necessary to raze the fortifications defending it. This, it is true, could not at that time be effected by the Allies on the northern side of the harbour; but the southern, being in their hands, could be treated as they deemed best. Early in February, Fort Nicholas, at the junction between the Inner and Outer Harbours, was blown up, by the explosion of 120,000 pounds of powder; a quantity equal to double this amount was found by the French under the fort, stored there by the Russians either for the use of the batteries, or with an unfulfilled intention to demolish the fort. When this destruction, which the enemy in their hurried departure had not been able to accomplish, was effected by the besiegers, Fort Alexander, guarding the mouth of the Outer Harbour, was similarly destroyed.

Thus nothing but fragments remained to tell of the docks and forts of proud Sebastopol.

THE OPPONENT ARMIES OUTSIDE SEBASTOPOL.

Seldom, in any former wars, had two great armies been more singularly situated relatively to each other, than those of Russia and the Allies during the winter months now under notice. Between 300,000 and 400,000 armed men were confronted in two opposing bodies, ready, if not eager, to attack; and yet no battle took place—scarcely even did swords meet, bayonets thrust, or muskets fire; for the few lives lost and wounds received were attributable to isolated and unsystematic artillery-firing. The provisioning of these enormous masses was, perhaps, as costly a duty as the annals of warfare ever presented; seeing that the scene of struggle, the field of operation, had become almost denuded of every ear of corn and head of cattle. The czar was enforced to send sustenance to his troops from the mainland of Russia, at a frightful sacrifice of draught-animals; while the Allies, receiving their commissariat supplies oversea, either incurred vast charges for transport, or paid exorbitant prices to speculative dealers near at hand.

It will be convenient to touch briefly on the condition and proceedings of the czar's forces, before tracing the winter operations of the Allies in and near Sebastopol.

Of the actual strength of the Russian armies, little was at the time known to the Allies; whereas the state of the Allied camps, as appeared from subsequent evidence, was throughout the war minutely reported to the czar's generals—shewing that, whether from want of will or want of power, the Allies did not employ espionage so successfully as their opponent. Greek traders penetrate into every part of the regions around the Black Sea; and the strong sympathy existing, throughout the war, between the Greeks and the Russians, led the former to act willingly as spies in the service of the latter. The Armenian traders, too, had a leaning rather towards the Russ than the Moslem, although not strongly attached to either.

Four months before the fall of Sebastopol the czar had made one of those levies of troops which, occurring frequently, were only too certain to exhaust the resources of his empire. By an imperial ukase, dated $\frac{\text{April 24th}}{\text{May 6th}}$, he ordered a levy, to the extent of twelve men for every 1000 souls, throughout seventeen governments in the western half of the empire, such as Grodno, Volhynia, Minsk, &c. The levy was to be effected during June and July, and the local authorities were to provide money for regimental uniforms, at the rate of ten roubles twenty kopecks silver per man. While the numerical strength was sought to be maintained by these levies, the priesthood endeavoured to instil into the Russian soldiers a fanatical ardour rendering them fearless of death. Many proclamations and dispatches, illustrating this sacerdotal policy, have been noticed in former Chapters; and, a few weeks before the fall of the beleaguered city, Prince Gortchakoff issued a manifesto shewing no falling off in this tendency.* Positive as were the archiepiscopal assertions that the images of saints and the pictures of Holy Virgins would lead the Russians to victory, the devoted soldiery were hewn down in tens of thousands, with little of victory to encourage their heroism. The Allied generals learned that the Russians had buried 90,000 men in and near Sebastopol in twelve months; that 100,000 more had died in the Crimea of cold, disease, starvation, or causes other than wounds received in battle; and that deaths from similar causes in the provinces immediately contiguous to the Crimea swelled the number to a quarter of a million—irrespective of those who fell in other parts of the field of warfare.

After the fall of Sebastopol, it was natural that the Russian authorities should seek to impart to

* 'In the time of the earliest wars of the Russians, the archpriests and other ecclesiastics of the Orthodox Church gave their benedictions to the troops who were armed for the defence of the country. This benediction, which called for the presence of the sacred images in the midst of our regiments, was the source of all our successes against the enemy of the country. Thus the sacred and miraculous image of the Holy Virgin, the Mother of God, from Smolensko, gave by its presence in the army a series of victories to our arms, and led our soldiers from Moscow to Paris. Now that all our countrymen pray with fervour for us, his Eminence the Metropolitan Philarete of Kieff, after the example of *ancient* times, has just blessed the troops confided to my command, by taking from the catacombs of Kieff the sacred and miraculous image, which represents the ascension of the Mother of God, our celestial intercessor, and which in bygone times was conferred by the Mother of God on that temple as a pledge of the eternal protection which is granted to Orthodox Russia. By a particular disposition of God, the arrival of the sacred image took place simultaneously with that of his High Eminence Innocenti, Archbishop of Kherson and Taurida, whom the dangers of war have not prevented from visiting his flock, and giving his benediction to the troops who defend Sebastopol with so much heroism. On the 8th of this month, his Eminence, in the besieged city, while the enemy's cannon were roaring, blessed the troops of the garrison and of the forts; he blessed them with the sacred image of St Mitophan, and in eloquent words promised them fresh successes and victory.'

that great event a colour favourable to themselves and their cause. The *Nord*, a newspaper in Russian interests published at Brussels, asserted that the grand move of the 9th of September was more advantageous to the czar than to his enemies; that the defence of the city, further protracted, would probably have led to the annihilation of the Russian army cooped up within its limits, whenever the day of capture should come; but that, by abandoning the south side of the town, Gortchakoff saved his army, and thereby cheated the Allies of their coveted prey. It was claimed for the prince that the evacuation was part of a preconceived plan, not suddenly forced upon him by the exigencies of his position—that 'the throwing of the bridge over the harbour, the activity displayed in fortifying the north side, the conveyance thither of a portion of the *matériel*, and the promptitude and order with which the transit was made on the final dreadful night, prove that the plan had long been prepared and matured.' Furthermore, it was asserted that, by transferring all his forces to the north side of the harbour, the prince was enabled to draw an irresistible cordon between the invaders and the interior of the Crimea, and to increase both the mobility and the power of his own army. Whatever small fragments of truth there may be in this reasoning, the document is evidently an attempt to make the best of a misfortune; for that the fall of Sebastopol was regarded as a great blow, a wound to the national honour, throughout the empire, is beyond all doubt. After the utter annihilation of the Black Sea fleet, chiefly through the strategy of Menchikoff and Gortchakoff, many of the seamen were transferred to a flotilla maintained by the czar in the Caspian, under Vice-admiral Vasilieff: these men never ceased to direct their thoughts towards Sebastopol; they erected a monument to the memory of the three admirals who had fallen there—Nachimoff, Korniloff, and Istomine; and when they heard that the southern half of the great stronghold had been abandoned, the news made a deep and painful impression upon them.

In an 'order of the day,' addressed on the 11th of September to the army of Sebastopol, the czar spoke in terms very little exaggerated of the exertions of the garrison;* for it is impossible to withhold admiration of the indomitable perseverance with which the place was held. Frenzied with fanaticism, and brutalised with drink, the soldiery may occasionally have been; but they bravely bore cold, heat, hunger, and fatigue, and yielded not an inch of the defences without fighting for it. If Alexander, in his 'order of the day,' somewhat undervalued the victory of the besiegers, by declaring that Gortchakoff gave up to them 'only blood-stained ruins,' he may, perhaps, be forgiven: manifestoes to the soldiery, whether Russian or French, will seldom bear very close criticism. The passionate mixture of religion with political and warlike affairs, so remarkable in Russia, was strongly shewn in a rescript addressed by the czar on the 20th of September to the military governor of Moscow. Bidding Count Zakrewsky thank the inhabitants of the ancient capital for their enthusiastic reception of him, and adverting to the tragic events at Sebastopol, the Czar Alexander added: 'I accept past and present events as the impenetrable decrees of Providence, which has given a year of sad trials to Russia. But Russia has supported still greater trials; and the Lord, in His great mercy, has always given her His tacit support. Let us, therefore, now also place our trust in Him. He will defend Orthodox Russia, who has taken up arms for a just cause—for the cause of Christianity. It is a great satisfaction for me to see the unceasing proofs which all men are giving in their readiness to sacrifice their property, their families, and even the last drop of their blood, for the maintenance of the integrity of the empire and for the national honour. It is in the manifestation of these sentiments of the nation and in these acts that I derive strength and consolation; and uniting myself inseparably with my heart to my heroic and faithful people, I repeat, putting my trust in the help and grace of the Almighty, the words of the Emperor Alexander I., "*Where right is, there is God also!*"' It is impossible to avoid seeing that such language, whether regarded as springing from religion or from fanaticism, must make a deep impression on the minds of those to whom it is addressed—provided there be any considerable amount of sincerity in him who utters it; and that the czars have had a deep faith in the privileges and favours vouchsafed to 'Holy Russia,' 'Orthodox Russia,' there is no reason to doubt.

During several weeks after the great event at Sebastopol, the armies on both sides were in doubt concerning the plans of the czar and his generals; whether or not the Russians would

* 'The defence of Sebastopol, which has lasted so long, and which is perhaps unexampled in military annals, has drawn upon it the attention not only of Russia but of all Europe. From its very commencement it placed its defenders in the same rank as the most illustrious heroes of our country.

In the course of eleven months, the garrison of Sebastopol has disputed with a powerful enemy every inch of ground of the country which surrounds the town, and each of its enterprises has been distinguished by the most brilliant bravery. The obstinate bombardment, four times renewed, and the fire of which has been justly styled "infernal," shook the walls of our fortifications, but could not shake or diminish the zeal and perseverance of their defenders. They beat the enemy or died with indomitable courage, with a self-denial worthy of the soldiers of Christ, without a thought of surrendering.

Regretting from my heart the loss of so many generous warriors, who offered their lives as a sacrifice to their country, and submitting with resignation to the will of the Most High, whom it has not pleased to crown their acts with complete success, I feel it a sacred duty, on this occasion, to express in my name, as well as in that of all Russia, to the brave garrison of Sebastopol the warmest gratitude for its indefatigable labours, for the blood it has shed in the defence, for nearly a year, of those fortifications which it erected in a few days.

But there are impossibilities even for heroes. On the 8th of this month, after six desperate assaults, which were repulsed, the enemy succeeded in getting possession of the important Korniloff Bastion [Malakoff]; and the commander-in-chief of the army in the Crimea, desirous of sparing the precious blood of his companions, who, under the circumstances, would only have shed it uselessly, decided upon passing over to the north side of the fortress.'

evacuate the Crimea altogether. This question was set at rest by an order of the day published by Gortchakoff on the 15th of October; in which he stated that the czar had graciously left to him the decision of this great problem, based on all the circumstances of his position; and that, in the exercise of the trust thus reposed in him, he resolved to maintain a defensive attitude in the Crimea. 'His Imperial Majesty our Father,' said he to his troops, 'is persuaded that the army, after having acquired freedom of operation in the field, will continue by all possible efforts to defend the soil of holy Russia against the invasion of the enemy. . . . . Valiant warriors! you know what our duty is. We will not voluntarily abandon this region, in which St Vladimir received the water of grace, after having been converted to the Christianity we adore.' This resolution taken, it became necessary to provide reinforcements, to fill up the gaps made by war, disease, and privation; and hence another levy. By a ukase, dated October 3d (15th), a general levy of the whole empire, with the exception of six governments or provinces already nearly exhausted, was ordered: every province to send ten armed men out of 1000 souls; and Jews as well as Christians being included in the levy—a departure from the system followed in previous levies. To encourage the troops sent to the Crimea, and steel them to the endurance of privation and suffering, the czar Alexander paid them a visit in November. He entered Baktchéserai on the 9th, accompanied by his brothers Nicholas and Michael, and Duke George of Mecklenburg, and was received with all possible military, civic, and sacerdotal honours. The clergy presented him with the cross and holy-water; the citizens presented bread and salt; the chief of the Crim Tatars, and the rabbi of the Karaïte Jews, came to shew him allegiance; and the staff of Prince Gortchakoff's army gave him a military reception. Reviews, banquets, toastings, and illuminations followed. On the next day the illustrious visitors advanced to the heights on the north of Sebastopol, inspected the troops, and looked long and earnestly at the spot which had for thirteen months been the theatre of such extraordinary events. On the 11th the czar visited and inspected the troops encamped on the Upper Belbek; and on the 12th those on the Katcha; after which he walked through the fearfully crowded hospitals at Baktchéserai, conversing with many of the wounded officers and men; and on the 13th, ordering silver medals for all those who had fought and defended at Sebastopol, he departed from Simferopol, on the return-journey to the north. At the same time he left an order of the day, to be read by the officers to their men, warmly thanking all for their devotion to his service, and announcing the institution of a silver medal, to be worn at the button-hole with the ribbon of St George. Setting aside national preferences and prejudices, their antagonists could not with justice deny that the defenders of Sebastopol had worthily earned from their sovereign such honour as a medal or a ribbon could confer.

Early in the year 1856, Prince Gortchakoff resigned the command of the 'army of the south.' Succeeding Menchikoff in March of the preceding year, he had during ten months been engaged in the arduous duties of defending Sebastopol, or occupying the northern heights. In reference to any operations in the open field, he had met with as little success as his predecessor; and touching the heroic defence of Sebastopol, it may be probable that the defenders owed more to their engineer Todtleben than to their commander Gortchakoff; but still the prince's name will worthily be connected with the history of one of the most gallant struggles on record. At Odessa, Gortchakoff handed over the command of the Crimean army to General Lüders; he himself returned to St Petersburg, was received with honours by the czar and his court, and shortly afterwards entered on the important military command of Poland. It is useless to inquire whether Prince Paskévitch, whose service in the czar's armies commenced so far back as 1805, would have had greater success than the other two Muscovite princes in the war of 1853–6; his health was too far broken to enable him any longer to head armies, and he died about the period now under notice; but it is at anyrate noteworthy that neither Menchikoff nor Gortchakoff won a battle in the open field throughout the war: if they met with success, it bore relation to the defence of batteries and forts. About the date when Lüders entered on the command of the Crimean armies, at the end of January, the Russian troops are supposed to have numbered about 120,000 men, at Simferopol, Eupatoria, the Belbek, the Mackenzie heights, the Tuzla, the Bulganak, and the steppes near Perekop and the Putrid Sea; besides those more immediately occupying the northern heights at Sebastopol.

Having thus glanced at the condition and proceedings of the czar's generals, at and soon after the evacuation of the besieged city, it will now be necessary to trace the winter operations of the Allies.

And first, for the means of communication—the roads and railways. This war was remarkable, beyond any that preceded it, for the application of civil engineering to military purposes. The muddy tracks between Balaklava and Sebastopol have already been described, as well as the attempt to overcome that obstacle by the construction of a railway. When, in August 1855, the fall of Sebastopol was yet doubtful, the Allied commanders began to look forward to a second wintering on the plateau as a probability; and they deemed it a part of their duty, aided by supplies and reinforcements from home, to improve the hutting and the intercommunications of the respective camps. The English, Sardinians, and Turks, with the various Transport Corps, Army Works Corps, and other civilians employed in the

service of the army, numbered not much less than 100,000 men; and as the whole of these looked to Balaklava as their only port—Kamiesch being appropriated to the French—it became necessary to place that town and harbour under good organisation, and to form efficient communications thence to the camp. Colonel M'Murdo continued to employ the Land Transport Corps in carrying provisions and stores from the harbour to the camp; but it became desirable for Mr Doyne, who went out as superintendent of the Army Works Corps, to employ a large force of his men in making and repairing roads—a labour which the soldiers had before shewn themselves ill fitted to perform, even if their numbers had been greater. Invaluable as the railway had become, it was inadequate to the conveyance of the immense bulk and weight of supplies required day by day in the army; and hence it was necessary to do that which, if done in the early winter of 1854, would have saved so many valuable lives—construct a new road from Balaklava to the camp. No engineering could change the character of the mud on the plateau and the plain, the 'Sebastopol paste' so adhesive after rain. The officers and civilians, narrating the events of the camp, sought industriously for language in which to describe this most unwelcome compost. One of them wrote: 'The paste has a great affection for straws, with which it succeeds in working itself up into a kind of gigantic brick, somewhat underdone, in which condition it threatens to build your legs into the ground if you stand long enough in one place to give it a chance; it mightily affects horseshoes also, and sucks them off with a loud smack of relish. Literally and truly it is like glue half boiled, and spread over the surface of the earth to a great depth.' Road-makers, however, could and did harden certain portions sufficient to make a way practicable for commissariat and artillery wagons. The British commander, writing on the 29th of September, said in his dispatch: 'The troops have been employed daily, to the number of 9500 men, in making the road from Balaklava to the camp; and as, after a few hours of rain, the whole distance is converted into a mass of deep mud, the work that has to be performed, from this reason as well as the great distance that the stones have to be transported, renders it one of great labour and difficulty.' By the end of October, much excellent new road was constructed, including branch-roads to the several division-camps. The French at the same time constructed a road across the valley which connects the Fedukhine heights with the main road to Kamiesch, thereby increasing the facilities of access to those important heights; and they also improved the old Tatar roads around Baidar, Tchorgouna, and Tchouliou. The English, plunged into disaster by the want of roads in the winter 1854–5, employed in the winter 1855–6 soldiers and Army Works Corps to the number of 10,000 in all, in making a road so excellent that it remains as a memento of British occupation, having received 40,000 tons of hard limestone as 'metalling' in a length of three and a half miles; while the French, in the one winter as well as the other, constructed roads just sufficient for the military wants of the period, without any waste of power. The English soldiers required the aid of non-military workmen; the French and Sardinian soldiers were their own workmen and labourers. These differences arose from the different habitudes and training of the respective soldiers, as well as from differences in the government departments.

The road-improvements did not in any degree relax the exertions of those who sought to give the greatest possible efficiency to the railway. The 'navvies' originally sent out to finish and manage the railway from Balaklava up to the plateau, left when their work was ended; but Mr Beatty, and a few officials and overseers, remained at the request of the commander-in-chief. Messrs Peto, Brassey, and Betts, taking up the subject during the terrible exigencies of the previous winter, had formed the railway, worked it during the spring and summer, and erected lime-kilns, wharfs, store-houses, wash-houses, and other useful buildings: they ended their contract and withdrew their corps in August—the labours after that date being undertaken by the newly organised Army Works Corps. The railway was at first made quickly rather than substantially; but by draining and ballasting it was brought into excellent order; and a new supply of trucks, sent out from England, and of horses to draw them, greatly increased the efficiency of the line. Mr Beatty, in the autumn, received instructions to form two new lines of railway, one to Kamiesch and one to Tchorgouna—the labour for the first to be supplied by the French, and that for the second by the Sardinians. The Tchorgouna line, passing over the plain from Kadikoï to the Woronzow Road, was likely to be very valuable, the saturated plain being almost impassable by other means in winter. It was a testimony paid to the skill with which Mr Beatty laid out the original tramway, that when the engineers came to plan the new metalled road from Balaklava to the camp, they could find nothing better than Mr Beatty's route, so well were the gradients planned; they therefore proceeded to make their new road by the side of the railway, at the same time effectually draining both. Hitherto the railway had been worked almost wholly by horses and ropes, but now locomotives began to be rendered available, especially on the Tchorgouna line. By the early spring of 1856, more than twenty miles of well-ballasted and drained railway was at work, fit for the transit of locomotives, and for the conveyance of the almost inconceivably large amount of stores required daily at the camp.

The British army in the Crimea, for whose service these excellent roads and railways were mainly intended, amounted, soon after the fall of Sebastopol, to about 56,000 men, of whom 4500

were invalided. It comprised fourteen regiments of cavalry, 5000; fifty-two battalions of infantry, 33,000; Artillery and Royal Engineers, 8500; Land Transport Corps, Army Works Corps, Medical Corps, Commissariat, &c., 9500. There was at the same time a calculation, that making a fair allowance for casualties during the winter—supposing no great battles occurred—these 56,000 might probably be reduced to 49,000 by the spring; that England would easily be able to send out 3000 more cavalry and 20,000 more infantry during the winter, raising the 49,000 to 72,000; and that the Turkish Contingent of 20,000, with the German, Swiss, and Italian Legions of 5000, would raise the Crimean military force in British pay, or commanded by British officers, to little short of 100,000 men, of whom 85,000 would be effective combatants.

This army of about 50,000 available healthy British, with more than double that number of French, and the small contingent of Sardinians, were, as has been already implied, engaged in scarcely any severe military duties during the winter. A few facts, noted month by month, will serve as a sufficient record.

During the three weeks of September which followed the evacuation of the south side of Sebastopol, the Russians were quietly but actively strengthening their fortifications on the north side, making all the heights bristle with cannon, and firing those cannon whenever an opportunity seemed to offer of working mischief upon the new occupants of the city. A deep arm of the sea intervened between the belligerents; and as each party commanded this estuary, transit in boats was out of the question. The Allies planted a few guns so as to bear upon the northern heights; but no disposition was entertained to open a regular bombardment. The French began to make demonstrations towards Baidar and Aïtodor; and camp rumours arose concerning some supposed expedition into the interior of the Crimea; but the securing of the captured city was regarded as the first duty. On the 20th, the anniversary of the battle of the Alma, there occurred a distribution of medals and clasps among the soldiers—with not a few adverse criticisms on the artistic merits of the medal, the bit of ribbon, and the resemblance of the 'Alma' and 'Balaklava' and 'Inkermann' clasps to the labels on public-house wine-bottles; the honour of the decoration was, however, appreciated. The day was commemorated by many 'Alma dinners' and much festivity in both camps.

October commenced, and was marked by the steady persistence of the Russians in fortifying their northern heights. Immense trains of wagons and carts could be seen passing in various directions, followed by the formation of depôts towards the Belbek and further eastward. The Allies could espy stores of provisions, of ammunition, and of coals, gradually accumulating at these depôts; and the hopes began to fade, that the czar's troops would abandon the place by a retreat. Along the whole line from the sea at the mouth of the harbour to the heights near the Upper Belbek and Katcha the two opponent forces suspiciously watched each other—neither shewing any disposition to retreat, and equally unwilling to make a bold attack. The extreme French right was in the immediate neighbourhood of Ozenbash, Aïtodor, and other places near the extreme Russian left; and neither could have advanced far without coming into instant collision with the other. The 180,000 or 200,000 soldiers in the Allied camps, although employed in part in making roads, building huts, and preparing for winter, had nevertheless too little to employ their time; the English were better paid than English soldiers usually are; and idleness and money together led them into scenes of drunkenness which brought considerable scandal upon the army—although the commander denied that the vice was so prevalent as many civilians asserted it to be. It was a great social blessing when the Post-office money-order system was introduced at the camp; soldiers sent home to their relations in the old country a part of the money which would otherwise have been wasted in drink at Kadikoï—a very 'Donnybrook' of suttlers' booths and disorderly traders.

The month of November witnessed another change in the command of the British army in the East—the substitution of General Sir W. J. Codrington for General Sir James Simpson. When the latter succeeded Lord Raglan in June, he did so by virtue of seniority, not by selection or by choice. It is understood that his declining health and energies rendered him anxious to be relieved from the onerous duty. There was, in truth, an unquestionable disadvantage attending the absence of a bold and intrepid commander, at a time when the British were called upon to hold a worthy companionship with the more martially disposed French. General Simpson's simplicity of manners and singleness of mind conciliated the regard of all; but all felt, as did he himself, that Crimean command at such a time required a stronger hand than his own—that the old Peninsular officer, who had distinguished himself under Wellington forty-five years before, was not fitted in his declining age for the stirring scenes at Sebastopol. The new commander, Sir W. J. Codrington, as though a total contrast had been necessary, was an officer who had seen no service until he entered the Crimea; he obtained the highest command in fourteen months after he fought his first battle—a fact almost unprecedented in the history of European armies. This arose mainly from the sweeping manner in which death, illness, and retirement, had carried off generals long accustomed to scenes of warfare. His father, Admiral Codrington, had twenty-six years earlier assisted the Russians to destroy the Turkish fleet at the battle of Navarino; and now he himself, at the age of fifty, assumed the command of an army

employed in assisting the Turks to defeat the Russians. Sir William had passed through all the regular grades in the Coldstream Guards, up to colonel in 1846, without seeing a battle-field; and received his rank of major-general in June 1854, when the British army was in Turkish waters. Under the usual course of routine, this promotion, severing his connection with regimental service, and ending his colonelcy of the Coldstreams, would have led to his return home; but wishing for active and honourable service, he begged to be allowed to remain with the army, to share its dangers and glories. General Airey, commanding a brigade of the Light Division, was promoted while in the East to the office of quartermaster-general; and Codrington immediately stepped into his place. It was by this singular luck—for luck it may almost be called—that Major-general Codrington obtained the command of one brigade in Sir George Brown's Light Division; and this heroic brigade, comprising the 7th, 23d, 33d, and 2d battalion of rifles, covered itself with glory, and won a good name for its brigadier, at Alma and at Inkermann. When, at a later date, the veteran Sir George Brown retired, Codrington was appointed general of the whole Light Division; and, as such, his conduct was somewhat sharply criticised in reference to the unfortunate attack on the Redan on the 8th of September, in which his division was concerned, and in which Colonel Windham, the 'hero of the Redan,' was left without supports at a critical moment; but the due apportionment of blame, in connection with that inauspicious affair, cannot be determined without the aid of official documents not made public. When, on the retirement of Simpson, Codrington obtained the command of the whole army, the appointment was popular with the troops; for he had shewn energy and intrepidity, and had from the first shared in all the good and ill fortune of his companions-in-arms.

The appointment of Sir William threw increased activity into the mechanism of the British forces, but did not greatly change the general character of the proceedings. There were still two vast armies, watching each other on opposite heights, with a harbour and several valleys intervening. At one time it appeared as if Pelissier, advancing further and further among the defiles of the Upper Belbek, intended to turn the extreme left of the Russians, and penetrate into the interior of the Crimea by Aïtodor and Mangoup Kalé; but the plan, if entertained, died away. Certain it is that the armies longed for an advance against the enemy; they did not like the thought of settling down into winter-quarters without at least one more brilliant victory. Sometimes the camps were enlivened by rumours of a suspected attack by the Russians, a second battle of the Tchernaya; but the Allies were now stronger than ever, and such an attack did not seem at all probable. Then, again, speculations arose touching the possibility of the Russians maintaining their position during the winter, seeing how frightful must be the expenditure of money and labour, and perhaps of life, in supplying them with food. No retreating movement, however, was observable; on the contrary, an increase in the number of huts and tents became plainly perceptible, indicating an intention to winter on the northern heights. On the 15th of the month, the Allied camps were thrown into disorder by a fearful explosion of a French magazine near Inkermann, containing 30,000 kilogrammes of powder, 600,000 cartridges, 300 charged shells, and other projectiles; many pieces of ordnance, near at hand, were destroyed; and the ignited materials from the magazine, hurled to a distance, caused a violent conflagration in one of the English artillery depôts. The French had thirty killed, including two officers, and several hundred wounded; the English, too, lost considerably. Indeed, it is probable that more loss of life and limb followed this explosion than resulted from the belligerent operations of the whole month.

When December arrived, the soldiers in the British army could but contrast their position with that of the preceding year. In the closing weeks of 1854, when Inkermann and Balaklava had filled so many hospital-tents, and when inclement weather commenced, want of food, forage, huts, tents, clothing, fuel, medicines, roads, vehicles, and horses, was producing its tragic results; men lay down in the mire to die of very despair; and no regimental commander could even guess how many of his poor fellows could be available for active service on the morrow. But now, towards the close of 1855, almost every kind of supply was in abundance—in some cases lavish abundance; and the army was in a state of health never excelled and rarely paralleled in foreign warfare; the roused indignation of their countrymen had compelled the adoption of such changes in management, although at a cost in money almost unparalleled, as had vastly improved the condition of the soldiery. Well fed and well clothed, they looked out for some active operations against the enemy. At one time during the month there appeared a probability that such field for active exertion would be offered; for, on the 8th, a body of 2000 to 3000 Russian infantry, and 400 to 500 horse, descended from the heights, and attacked the French near the villages of Baga, Urkasta, and Savatka, in the Baidar Valley.* General D'Autemarre's division, on the Upper Tchernaya, had a semicircle of advanced outposts, at the base of the wooded heights which separate that river from the Upper Belbek; and it was to capture these outposts that the attack was made. The three outposts were assaulted simultaneously, at daybreak; and the French officers commanding them were called upon to offer a sudden resistance to attacks suddenly made: they were fully equal to the duty; insomuch that when D'Autemarre sent General Niel with two battalions and a

* See Coloured Map, 'Portion of the Crimea forming Chief Seat of Warfare.'

squadron, this aid was found to be unneeded—the enemy had been repulsed, leaving in the hands of the French about 150 killed, wounded, and prisoners. If the Russians had succeeded in this surprise, they would thereby have limited the area whence the Allies obtained wood for fuel and grass for horse-fodder.

The new year 1856 opened—a year destined to bring the war to an end, although few in the camp believed such a result to be really probable. So comfortable were the men, so few the laborious duties required, so little the prospect of battle, that the 'special correspondents' of the newspapers were puzzled to find events sufficiently important to narrate; they recorded jokes and described 'jollifications,' in default of more dignified matter. The meteorology of the Crimea never ceased to be a source of wonderment to all; the alternation of drenching rains, bright sunshine, piercing winds, dense fogs, bracing frosts, and blinding snows, taxed the ingenuity of the officers and men to adapt their clothing and their camp-dwellings to the varying exigencies of the weather—so sudden, frequent, and unforeseen were the changes. A decline of temperature equal to 43 degrees Fahrenheit on one occasion took place within twenty-four hours. As to military matters, the soldiers had almost forgotten that fighting was their ostensible trade; scarcely a shot was fired on either side throughout the month of January.

Nor did February present any great changes in strategy or military manœuvring. The Russians continued to hold the northern heights, the Allies the southern, each refraining from any decisive attack on the other. The British army in the Crimea, according to a document made public, was at that time composed of the forces tabulated in a note;* but it contained only a remnant of the men who had fought at Alma and Inkermann. If the month passed without any hostile encounter, it was at least distinguished by an amicable meeting of very remarkable character. The next Chapter will shew by what stages, at the end of February, the diplomatists at Paris had agreed upon an armistice during the discussion of a treaty of peace; the immediate effect was observable at Sebastopol, as soon as the several commanders had received telegraphic information of the fact. On the morning of the 29th a white flag was hoisted on the Russian side of Tchernaya Bridge; and near it assembled General Timoieff, a staff of officers, and a troop of Cossacks. General Barnard, with a staff of English officers, and accompanied by others from the French and Sardinian camps, descended the Woronzow Road, crossed the bridge, and met in military form the Russians with whom were to be discussed the details of an armistice. This cessation of hostilities was to endure one month, during the consideration of the treaty, and a necessity arose for marking a boundary between the opposing forces, and regulating intercourse. The officers of the four nations sought to throw as much courtesy as possible into their demeanour, and managed—chiefly through the medium of French, aided by a smattering of English, Italian, German, and Russian—to carry on the necessary conversation.

The most peculiar month, perhaps, spent by the Allies in the Crimea, was that of March in the year now under notice (1856). War was entirely stopped; and yet none could say whether it might not recommence in all its horrors. The diplomatists at Paris gave themselves one month to discuss the momentous questions submitted to them; and on the response given to those questions depended peace or war in April and the succeeding months. The commanders, while rigorously maintaining their boundary arrangements, did not quite forbid occasional friendly meetings between the officers and soldiery of the respective armies. Sometimes a few English or French soldiers would trudge across a reedy marsh on the banks of the Tchernaya, perchance amid the whitening bones of some who had fallen sixteen months before at the battles of Balaklava and Inkermann, and try to maintain a friendly converse with Russian soldiers on the other side of the narrow river; and at such a time the czar's troops were favoured with the 'bono Rooskee,' 'bono Moscov,' denied to them on all other occasions: small exchanges of trifles took place; and as the English were at that period well and comfortably clothed, their smart red uniforms appeared to attract much attention from the roughly-clad Russians. In a few instances officers and men trespassed on the indulgence by crossing the boundary; but temporary arrest and severe reprimand cured this evil. For the rest, the operations of the month differed little from those of the training-camps at Aldershott and elsewhere—all the regiments being exercised and reviewed at intervals, in the various open spots on the plateau. Sometimes the Russians and the English would be holding these military reviewings on the same day, the glittering arms of each force full in view of the other; and both alike safe in the conviction

* *Light Division.*

First Brigade	= 7th, 23d, 33d, 34th, 2d Battalion Rifles.
Second "	= 19th, 77th, 88th, 90th, 97th.

First Division.

Guards' Brigade	= 3d Batt. Grenadier Guards, 1st Batt. Coldstream Guards, 1st Batt. Fusilier Guards.
Second "	= 9th, 13th, 31st, 56th.

Second Division.

First Brigade	= 3d, 30th, 55th, 95th.
Second "	= 41st, 47th, 49th, 62d.

Third Division.

First Brigade	= 4th, 14th, 39th, 50th.
Second "	= 18th, 28th, 38th, 44th.

Fourth Division.

First Brigade	= 17th, 20th, 21st, 57th, 63d.
Second "	= 46th, 48th, 68th, 1st Battalion Rifles.

Highland Division.

First Brigade	= 42d, 79th, 92d, 93d.
Second "	= 1st, 71st, 72d.

Besides this infantry force there were 11 field-batteries, 2 heavy brigades, 2½ troops Horse-artillery, 29 companies Siege-train, and 9 companies of Royal Engineers. There were, in addition, 2 regiments and 18 artillery companies at Balaklava, Turkish Contingent at Kertch, British cavalry at Scutari, and British German Legion at Kululi.

that no unfriendly shot would come to disturb the pageant. At one period in the month festivities in the Allied camps celebrated the birth of an heir to the French imperial throne; bonfires were kindled on the heights, cannon fired in the batteries, reviews held on the plateau, horse-races run on the banks of the Tchernaya, banquets held in the tents, and healths drunk by French officers and their Allies—nay, Pelissier even claimed the fraternisation of the Russians on the occasion; for he said, in a congratulatory dispatch to the French minister of war: 'Even the Russians participated in our rejoicings; for, on the evening of the 23d, perceiving that bonfires had been kindled at the three camps, they responded by lighting fires along all their lines.' Touching the political state of affairs, some of the officers and soldiers, who had never left the Crimea since the landing at Old Fort eighteen months before, hoped that the armistice might ripen into a peace, and that they might return home to tell in person their tales of terrible battles and sieges; while others, sent out at a later date, trusted that peace would not supervene until they had had opportunity to win a place in the records of glory. Subaltern officers, too, viewing the army as an instrument towards worldly prosperity, yearned for some of those stirring events which might lift them on the ladder of promotion. They could not, if they would, drive from their remembrance the remarkable facts that their commander had become a regimental colonel without witnessing any fighting; that he was a colonel when the war began; and that now he ranked with the Pelissiers and Della Marmoras in command.

April brought with it the treaty of peace, and with it a realisation of the hopes of some, and the fears of others. The armistice was not renewed, nor was war recommenced; for before the hour had arrived when the armistice would have expired, news was received that the treaty had been signed at Paris.

SUBORDINATE OPERATIONS DURING THE WINTER.

Few as may have been the incidents deserving record, there is yet a necessity for glancing at the winter operations in other quarters of the scene of contest. When autumn ended and winter began, there were detachments of the Allied forces at Kinburn, at Eupatoria, at Kertch and other places in and near the Sea of Azof, and in Asia; these detachments held their several positions, not for the immediate advantages thence accruing, but as bases for any renewed operations in the spring of 1856, in the event of failure in diplomatic negotiations.

Kinburn, the fort on the desolate sandy spit forming the southern boundary to the estuary of the Dnieper, was one of the most dreary positions imaginable as winter-quarters for English or French troops—scarcely a vestige of civilised life within view; few houses, no peasantry, no trees or hedges, no fields, no brooks: nothing but a flat sandy neck of land bounded north, south, and west by wide-spreading dreary waters, over which withering blasts blew with terrible force. The operations at that isolated spot* in October had ended with the capture of the fort; November was occupied chiefly in restoring and strengthening the defences, and in laying in stores for the winter; and then the cold-months were passed in quiet watchfulness against any possible but not probable attack by the enemy. The Dnieper froze that year earlier than usual; the ice soon attained great thickness; the thermometer fell to a low point; and warm garments were sedulously sought for. The garrison had not been neglected; sheepskin clothing, wood for fuel, and wholesome food, were abundant. Ships arrived at intervals during the winter from Kamiesch or Balaklava, to bring stores and provisions, and to receive or communicate intelligence; beyond this, the winter proceedings at Kinburn were nearly a blank, no encounter with the Russians having taken place.

Eupatoria presented to the occupants during the winter a scene almost as dreary and monotonous, unrelieved by military encounters, as Kinburn. Yet was it a position more important relatively to the strategy of the Russian commanders; seeing that all the plans for reinforcing and provisioning the garrison of Sebastopol, or rather the army on and near the Mackenzie heights, were made subservient to the fact that the Allies commanded the western coast of the Crimea nearly midway between Perekop and Sebastopol, and might possibly interrupt the convoys by an advance eastward into the interior. It has been already shewn,† that during the autumn of 1854 Eupatoria was occupied by a small force of English and French; that during the winter a large Turkish army was sent thither; and that in the spring of 1855 this army was frequently engaged in skirmishes with Russians quartered in the vicinity. Later in the same year,‡ after a summer of almost complete idleness at Eupatoria, the Turks were reinforced by a detachment of French and English under General D'Allonville, sent by Pelissier and Simpson after the fall of Sebastopol; nevertheless these large forces—for such they unquestionably were collectively—were engaged merely in trifling contests during September and October. Throughout the whole of the following winter, until the establishment of peace in the spring of 1856, Eupatoria remained garrisoned by a large Allied force, fed oversea at an enormous expense, and almost entirely exempt from any contests with the enemy.

Turning now to the eastern part of the Crimea, washed by the Sea of Azof, it will be seen that the winter was marked by more enterprise than at

* Chap. XII., pp. 437-442. † Chap. VIII., pp. 330-335.
‡ Chap. XIII., pp. 433-437.

Kinburn or Eupatoria, far as the results may have been from realising the hopes and wishes of the Allied armies. Strong opinions had been expressed that, by possessing the command of that sea, as well as of the two positions just named, the Allies would be able to cut off the supplies required by the Russians near Sebastopol, and thereby to starve them out of the Crimea. These opinions, whether sound or not in theory, were not borne out by facts.

When the Sea of Azof was visited by the efficient steam-squadron in May 1855,* and Kertch and Yenikalé were taken almost without the loss of a man; when this capture was followed by the destruction of vessels, government buildings, and stores of corn, at Berdiansk, Genitchi, Taganrog, Mariopol, and Gheisk; when the Turks sent garrisons to the forts of Anapa and Soudjuk Kalé, evacuated by the Russians; and when the captors settled down as the steady occupants of Kertch and Yenikalé—it was foreseen that the Allies would command the sea during the winter, whether or not they could intercept the enemy's convoys on the eastern roads of the Crimea.

After Commander Osborn's operations with his light steam-squadron in July, the sea and its coasts were left nearly unmolested during the remainder of the summer. On the 17th of September, a cavalry skirmish took place at two villages, Kosserai Min and Seit Ali, about fifteen miles from Kertch; in which the Chasseurs d'Afrique and the 10th English Hussars routed a large body of Cossacks, who were endeavouring to collect and drive away all the arabas in the neighbourhood. On the 24th of the same month, the *Minna, Lynx, Snake, Arrow,* and *Harpy,* with nine French gun-boats, took on board at Kertch three companies of the 71st Regiment and six companies of French infantry, bound on an expedition to Taman, on the opposite shore of Kertch Strait.† The troops landed at noon a little eastward of Phanagoria, covered by the fire from the gun-boats against an attack of Cossacks at that place and Taman; they found Phanagoria evacuated, and immediately took possession of the fort and its buildings and stores, after dispersing about 600 Cossacks. The capture was of small pecuniary value, as the buildings—an hospital, two powder-magazines, and some storehouses—were nearly empty, and sixty-six pieces of artillery had been rendered unserviceable before the Russians left them. Taman was found deserted, and all stores either removed or destroyed, except eleven old guns, which the besiegers rendered useless. Although the possession of Phanagoria gave to the Allies the command of the Taman peninsula, it was not deemed desirable to retain the place; the troops destroyed the few buildings, and returned to Kertch on the 3d of October, taking with them the wood of the destroyed buildings for fuel, after having rendered the town and the fort wholly unfit for occupation by the Russians. It had been arranged that, while these operations were in progress at Taman and Phanagoria, Captain (formerly Commander) Osborn should make an attack on Temriouk—these three fortified posts being the only places of importance in the Taman peninsula. Captain Hall of the *Miranda,* and Captain Bonet of the *Pomone,* commanded the respective flotillas, while Major Hunter of the 71st headed the English troops, 300 in number; the French troops, about 600, were marines, under Captain Dall. On the 23d, Osborn proceeded towards Temriouk with the *Vesuvius, Curlew, Ardent, Wrangler, Beagle, Fancy, Grinder,* and *Cracker;* and was joined at daybreak on the 24th by the French steamers *Milan, Caton,* and *Fulton,* under Captain De Cintré. The water is so extremely shallow, that not even the boats could reach the town; and as there was a considerable body of Russian horse and foot, with some guns, near, the attack was frustrated. Osborn then endeavoured to cut off the communication between Temriouk and Taman, and succeeded; he destroyed a bridge which spanned a channel connecting the Sea of Azof with the Temriouk Lake; and prevented the garrison of this town, 2000 strong, from advancing to the relief of Taman and Phanagoria.

When Captain Osborn had returned from this short service, he steamed to another part of the Sea of Azof, in search of further adventures against the enemy. Accompanied by the *Vesuvius, Curlew, Recruit,* and *Ardent,* he steamed across to Biéloserai Spit, where the Russians had placed a considerable force in the ruins of the old fishing-establishments, digging rifle-pits and constructing breast-works. The *Recruit,* on the 15th of October, destroyed seven boats and five fishery-stations, but could not succeed in dislodging the riflemen, who maintained a fire so severe as to render this enterprise one of considerable peril. On the 20th, the *Ardent* went further east to Krivaïa or Crooked Spit, and destroyed three boats, despite the opposition of a large body of cavalry. On the 24th, the *Vesuvius,* struggling against bad weather and shallow water, approached near the Biéloserai Spit; and Osborn forced the riflemen from their pits, effected a landing, and destroyed the barracks, a fishery-station, and eleven fine boats. On the same day, the *Recruit,* in the neighbourhood of Mariopol, destroyed two large fishery-stations, and several fine launches mounted on land-carriages. It is sad to contemplate this destruction of fisheries and fishing appliances, regarded in a commercial point of view; but as the produce was known to be intended for the Sebastopol army, stern war demanded the devastation. Captain Osborn, in his dispatch to Sir Edmund Lyons, said: 'The extraordinary efforts made by the enemy to prosecute their fisheries upon this coast are the best proof of their importance. They sometimes move down 200 or 300 soldiers, who escort large launches placed upon carriages and arabas drawn

* Chapter XII., pp. 449-457.
† See coloured map, 'Sea of Azof.'

by oxen laden with nets and gear, as well as fishermen to work them. The fish, directly they are caught, are carted off into the interior; and when it is remembered that we have destroyed some 100 and odd launches upon one spit alone, some idea can be formed of the immense quantity of fish consumed on this coast; and in proof of its being a large item in the sustenance of Russian soldiers, I would remind you that hundreds of tons of salted and dried fish were found and destroyed by us in the first destruction of the military depôts at Genitchi in May last.'

While Osborn was thus engaged on the northern spits, Lieutenant Commerell, of the gun-boat *Weser*, succeeded in crossing the Spit of Arabat, entering the Putrid Sea, and executing a dashing manœuvre. He had ascertained that large quantities of corn and forage were stored on the banks of the river Salghir, opposite the centre of the spit; and although a guard-house and a signal-station were near, he determined to attempt the destruction of the store. At four in the morning on the 11th of October, Commerell, accompanied by a small party of four persons, dragged a boat across the sandy spit, and launched it on the Putrid Sea. With one petty-officer and one seaman, he then forded the river, walked two miles and a half, came up to the corn and hay store, and destroyed about 400 tons. How he and his companions fared after this act of audacity, the lieutenant may himself tell. 'This alarmed the guard, and from twenty to thirty mounted Cossacks, who were encamped in a village close at hand. On our retreating we were so hard pressed by them that, but for the circumstance of the last 200 yards being mud, and the cover of rifles from Mr Lillingstone (mate) and a man who remained in the boat, we could hardly have escaped capture. Having recrossed the spit, we returned to the *Weser* by eight A.M.' He praises the conduct of William Rickard, the quarter-master, 'who, though much fatigued himself, remained to assist the other seaman who, from exhaustion, had fallen in the mud, and was unable to extricate himself; notwithstanding the enemy were keeping up a heavy fire on us, at a distance of thirty or forty yards.' This singular enterprise, so illustrative of the care-for-nought tendencies of British seamen, won a commandership for Lieutenant Commerell, and a medal and a gratuity for William Rickard.

Early in November, Captain Osborn, commanding the whole of the squadron in the Sea of Azof, again disturbed the operations of those who were endeavouring to collect stores of provisions for the Russian army. Sir Edmund Lyons had ascertained that the enemy were accumulating large quantities at Gheisk, intended to be conveyed over the ice and frozen snow during the winter to the neighbourhood of Sebastopol. Having several small gun-boats, lately returned from Kinburn, at hand, he sent them to Osborn, who at once steamed off towards Gheisk—near the eastern end of the sea. On the 3d of the month, leaving the *Vesuvius*, *Weser*, *Curlew*, and *Ardent*, in convenient positions outside the small shallow harbour, Osborn entered the harbour with all his gun-boats and ships-boats. Very shortly he committed to the flames large stacks of corn, hay, and fuel, visible near the shore at Vodina and Glofira; the stores were immense, and as they were guarded by bodies of cavalry and infantry, the burning did not take place without a collision with the enemy, in which a few lives were lost on both sides; a small earth-work had been thrown up, and the capture of this was a necessary part of the operations. Gheisk, near which enormous stacks were seen, was next visited; and a long struggle here took place, for there were 3000 Cossacks and other Russian troops defending the place; nevertheless Osborn did not stay his hand until his prescribed work was finished. The stores destroyed were incalculable in amount—none of the officers could even guess the quantity.

Later in the month, the armies and fleets were kept in conflicting suspense respecting a rumoured expedition on a large scale to the regions around the Sea of Azof; orders and counter-orders passed between the Crimea, Constantinople, Paris, and London, until at length the fine weather departed, and nothing could safely be attempted with large ships. Captain Osborn, who had been six months in that sea, found that the east winds, frequent fogs, and coming ice, warned him to depart. He reconnoitred once again the ports of Mariopol, Taganrog, Berdiansk, Gheisk, Genitchi, &c., to assure himself that Russian trade was entirely at an end at those places for the winter; and then he returned to Kertch with his light steam-squadron, the value of which in shallow waters had been fully tested.

When December arrived, Kertch and Yenikalé became gloomy places for the Allied troops quartered there. No enemy was visible, no operations were planned, and few points of interest were to be met with in the half-deserted and half-dismantled town. The Allies were punished for the brutal demolition of houses and buildings at Kertch; seeing that they now found themselves barracked in shattered structures which would have been warm and weather-proof had the soldiery been checked in their riotous licence. The town was divided into the English quarter, French quarter, and Turkish quarter; and the officers sought to make themselves comfortable in the less injured houses. The traders—a motley group of Russians, Tatars, Greeks, Germans, Italians, Maltese, Jews, Circassians, Armenians, Turks, and Persians—carried on a petty commerce with the victors of the place, taking care to avoid giving or receiving political offence, and managing their polyglot dealings by signs for language and by fingers for arithmetic. The vice of dram-drinking became a curse to the place; for whether the traders dealt in hats, boots, pictures, candles, sugar, crockery, sausages, handkerchiefs, or any other commodities, they also

carried on a half-concealed trade in ardent spirits; and many a scene of grovelling drunkenness resulted therefrom. The English and French, except a small number, gradually left the place; and Turkish troops thenceforward garrisoned Kertch, Yenikalé, and Fort Paul. These troops belonged chiefly to the Anglo-Turkish contingent, organised at Constantinople under British officers. This force, suggested by the authorities in London, had never been popular either with Lord Raglan or Omar Pacha; while the French had nothing to do with it. Hence the great irresolution in making it practically serviceable. At one time during the year it was proposed to employ the contingent in Asia; then at Varna; and then in turn Eupatoria, Balaklava, Kertch, and Shumla, were suggested: every plan was overthrown in turn, and officers and men became wearied with fretful inactivity. At length Kertch was finally decided on, late in autumn; portions of the force arrived by degrees; and the English officers laboured incessantly to bring their men into good discipline, to hut them well for the winter, to lay in stores of all kinds, and to maintain the defences in good order against bands of Cossacks hovering in the neighbourhood.

The year 1856 arrived, bringing with it cold so intense that the Kertch and Yenikalé bays became frozen over; all was ice-bound; and a problem arose whether the Russians would attempt any attack on the Allies, distant as the latter were from their fleets. This severity did not continue, however, for occasional thaws loosened the ice. General Vivian, who had undertaken the heavy task of organising the Turkish Contingent—rendered still more difficult by a strange jealousy on the part of the Queen's officers in the regular army against this irregular force—succeeded in bringing them into admirable order; and by their exertions the defences of Kertch, Yenikalé, and Fort Paul were made so strong as to defy attack from without. From the date of his arrival in the Kertch peninsula a great change, too, was observable in other particulars; drunkenness lessened, and the trading arrangements were placed upon an improved footing. At the end of the month the weather broke sufficiently to permit ships to enter with supplies; and the 20,000 men in the three fortresses became amply furnished with all necessaries. From time to time rumours spread around that the Russians contemplated an attack; this attack never came; but there were nevertheless many indications during the winter that the enemy, freed from the harassing operations of Captain Osborn's squadron, succeeded in rendering the Spit of Arabat available as a channel whereby provisions and stores could be sent to the army on the Sebastopol heights. It was strongly argued by many military authorities, that Arabat should have been destroyed and the spit taken possession of by the Allies, ere the winter's frost closed the Sea of Azof against the steam-squadron; and, viewing the relation between Kaffa and Arabat, the two ends of the isthmus separating the peninsula of Kertch from the other part of the Crimea, it certainly appears as if such an achievement would have been practicable—seeing that a military force and two naval forces might have co-operated to that end.

What operation the spring might have brought forward in the Azof regions, the contending powers were not called upon to determine. Peace was proclaimed; and the offensive and defensive arrangements alike ceased.

One more scene of warfare, Asia, remains to be noticed.

After the departure of the Turkish garrison and the English officers to Gumri and Tiflis,* in December 1855, the Russians entered and occupied Kars. At the same time the Turks, now deprived of the energetic support of General Williams and his gallant companions, and left to their own incompetent and too often venal Osmanli pachas, made the best preparations they could for fortifying and defending Erzeroum. This, in truth, was not a difficult matter; for, in the first place, Williams had constructed many strong earthworks in the town several months earlier; and, furthermore, winter offered few inducements to General Mouravieff to hazard an expedition over the snow-clad hilly country between Kars and Erzeroum. It had been a general opinion among the English officers, that Selim Pacha of Erzeroum might have saved Kars if he had sent food and reinforcements at a time when he possessed power so to do: they attributed his neglect to timidity; but reason was afterwards furnished for thinking that he entertained a dislike to the English officers. Early in 1856 he began to get rid, by any available pretexts, of the Englishmen near him; feeling, like many other pachas, that his tendency to official peculation and bribery would not bear the scrutiny of honest and keen-sighted men—men, too, who were supported, though not so strenuously as was needed, by the British representative at Constantinople. The Ottoman government became aware of Selim's unfitness for his high office, and recalled him in March. The mushir appointed in his stead was Ismail Pacha, distinguished among many of that name as the successful general at Kalafat. Although he had not enjoyed a military education, he was an intelligent man, morally as well as physically brave, and able to bear the responsibility of a high position. The dauntless Hungarian, Kmeti, accompanied him, either as chef-d'état major or general of division; and a fair probability was presented that those two leaders would worthily maintain Turkish interests in and near Erzeroum. The restoration of peace occurred, however, before this question could be tested.

Another Asiatic force—Omar Pacha's army—was, it will be remembered,† quartered for the winter on the frontiers of Mingrelia, at a point

* Chapter XII., p. 466. † Chapter XII., p. 467.

whither supplies could be conveyed up a small river flowing into the Black Sea near Redout Kalé. An extensive camp was formed, forests cleared, strong earthwork defences made, huts built, roads cut, and drainages effected. Ali Pacha, left in charge by Omar, kept the troops in good exercise; and made frequent excursions into the interior, to ascertain the locality and strength of the enemy. Omar doubtless knew that he could trust this officer; for, in truth, he needed to be quite certain on this point, since, at the battle of the Ingour, although his soldiers behaved admirably, many of his officers had betrayed a degree of cowardice almost inconceivable. One Osmanli colonel, on that day, hid himself in an hospital during the whole of the battle, despite the efforts of the surgeons to drive him out; and two others, sheltered in a house, refused to join their men until Colonel Ballard offered to take them up, one by one, on a horse behind him—his body to form a screen between the enemy's shot and these pusillanimous Osmanlis. And yet, when medals and honours were sent from Constantinople, these craven officers managed to obtain a share. During the winter, Omar Pacha visited various places near the eastern margin of the Black Sea, and Turkish garrisons were maintained at Trebizond, Batoum, Redout Kalé, Soucoum-Kalé, and other posts; but peace was proclaimed before these forces were called upon again to meet the enemy.

Many authorities, conversant with the geography and nations of South-western Asia, urged upon the Allies the importance of framing an attack, for the campaign of 1856, on the Russian power in those regions. It was urged that, if a curbing of Muscovite aggression were really the object held in view, the operations of the Allies in Asia ought not to be merely defensive. The Volga, the Ural, and other important rivers flowing into the Caspian, are channels for a very large trade with Persia, Bokhara, and Turcoman tribes on the borders of that sea; and it was submitted that this commerce should be broken. One plan, divulged through the medium of the public journals, was remarkable. Its originator proposed that England and France should join to send an army of 20,000 men to Batoum in May 1856; that this army, aided by the Turks, would conquer all the region between the Black and Caspian Seas by July; that the materials for a steam-flotilla, framed and ready for building, should follow the army; that this flotilla should be set afloat in the Caspian by August; that Russian trade in that sea would be immediately checked; that Schamyl and other Caucasian chieftains would be induced to aid such powerful neighbours so close at hand; and that Russian power in Asia would thus meet with a decisive and severe check; indicated by the establishment of the line of the Caucasus as the southern boundary of the czar's empire. The war did not continue long enough to afford time either for the acceptance or the rejection of this plan.

CAMP AND HOSPITAL IMPROVEMENTS.

It would not be proper to terminate this Chapter, the concluding one relating to hostilities between the several armies and fleets, without adverting briefly to a few remarkable circumstances connected with the British army in the East during its second wintering in the Crimea. If a season of suffering places the institutions of a country upon their trial, it is well to know that England bore the trial well, in so far as concerned the improved condition of the army after the defects had been made known. A cry of indignation went up from the people at large, when the woes arising from misgovernment had become known: this cry could not insure an immediate and efficient remodelling of the government departments; but it could and did lead to the organising of such plans, although at an expenditure truly enormous, as prevented a recurrence of those miseries in the following winter.

In hospital management, the winter of 1855–6 presented a manifest improvement over the preceding winter—not in the conduct of those heroic ladies who throughout sacrificed ease and comfort, and imperilled health, in tending to the wants of wounded and sick soldiers—but in the practical details of the several departments. The nation was no longer astounded with accounts of cargoes of drugs buried beneath cannon-balls and shells on shipboard; of medicines carried to Balaklava which were needed at Scutari; of hospital-stretchers lying at Varna when the wounded soldiers were 200 or 300 miles distant; of bedstead-frames on the Thames while the bedstead-legs were on the Bosphorus; of convalescents retained in hospitals because there was no apparel with which to cover their nakedness; of lime-juice and other medicines, arrow-root and other medical comforts, lying for many weeks in store, while surgeons were crying out in vain for small supplies of those treasures. These startling evidences of mal-organisation were no longer presented. Soldiers' lives became valued at a higher price than official formalism; and it was no longer permitted to retain a shattered soldier unheeded on shipboard for twenty-four hours, while the authorities debated which hospital should, according to the etiquette of the service, receive him. Nor was there any repetition of the mournful spectacle of a body of wounded marines, beating about in the Bosphorus until the knotty question could be solved whether these sea-soldiers ought to be sent to a seamen's hospital or a soldiers' hospital. Those days were passed. The hospitals were increased in number, and vastly improved in management.

At Balaklava, sufficiently removed from the overcrowded unhealthy town to obtain the advantages of the hill-breezes, was an hospital consisting of one central building, surrounded by numerous huts and sheds for the accommodation of invalids, surgeons, nurses, cooks, and

others. At Scutari and Kululi, on the Bosphorus, were those large establishments which have already been described,* and which were the first to receive benefit from the gentle hand of woman as an administrator. Later in the date of its establishment was the hospital at Renkioï, a village imbedded in the hills at the mouth of the Dardanelles on the Asiatic side; founded in the autumn of 1855, and placed under the management of Dr Parkes, this hospital became excellent in all its arrangements: the sad experience of the past having suggested numerous advantageous plans and contrivances. A smaller and less convenient hospital had previously been established at Abydos, a little further north on the same shore. Lastly, still more remote from the seat of war, was the hospital at Smyrna.

Numberless were the points of interest connected with these hospitals and their internal history; but the most instructive were those relating to the personal characteristics of the inmates. Two or three of the ladies who volunteered their services have published narratives or diaries of their experience while in the

British Military Hospital, Balaklava.

hospitals; and it is worthy of note how favourable was the impression left on the minds of the writers by the conduct of the soldiers themselves. One has recorded the odd but impassioned way in which a soldier said to his comrade: 'Tom! them's the *nusses!*'—and the deep earnestness with which a wounded man said to one of her lady-companions: 'I believe you are not a human being, but an angel!'—and the expression of positive certainty with which a newly arrived soldier said to her: 'I would like some of that; I have had nothing from the hand of a woman yet; I believe if I had something from the hand of a woman I would get well.' She has recorded, too, many instances of quaint coolness under suffering. The authorities at Smyrna Hospital had prohibited smoking in the wards and corridors; but an invalid surmounted the obstacle thus:—He had just had one of his toes taken off under the influence of chloroform. It bled profusely; and the surgeon, after binding it up, went away, giving her strict injunctions not to allow him to move, and ordering him some medicine, to be presently sent. She was called away for a few minutes, and went, leaving M—— with strict orders not to put his foot down. On her return to his bedside, to her astonishment he was gone; and after searching, she discovered him, by the traces of blood on the stairs and corridor, sitting down in the yard, smoking his pipe with the greatest *sang froid*. She spoke to him seriously about disobeying orders and doing himself an injury; but he was perfectly callous on the subject of his toe. She succeeded, however, in working on his feelings, at having disfigured the corridor with blood. So irresistible were the yearnings of most of the men for the cheap luxury of a pipe, that the hospital authorities afterwards relaxed the severity of their rule in this particular.

An important testimony to the character of the common soldiers was furnished by the gentlewomen who thus had opportunities of observing

* Chapter VIII., pp. 298-311.

them under trials of great severity. It is agreed on all hands that the conduct of the men towards the ladies themselves was most exemplary; every soldier was, in the proper meaning of the word, a gentleman, in so far as concerned a delicate respect for the sex of those who had voluntarily devoted themselves to deeds of kindness under circumstances so peculiar; if swearing and coarse language are too common among troops, all was hushed when the good Samaritans were near—honour, justice, delicacy, thankfulness, drove away all rough thoughts and rough words at such moments. One of the men said to a visitor: 'Before Miss Nightingale came, there was such cussin' and swearin'! but after that it was as holy as a church.' In their normal condition, too, as healthy active men, the soldiers shewed themselves willing to follow where judicious example led. When regularly paid, and with no other mode of indulgence, they spent their pay in liquor, and disgraced the camp with drunkenness; but when the Post-office authorities established two money-order offices, at head-quarters and at Balaklava, the remembrance of 'home sprang up; parents, wives, sweethearts, sisters, children, were called to mind, and money-orders were sent to the old country, to comfort those who had been left behind. In the first two weeks after the establishment of this salutary system, more than 1000 money-orders were obtained, for sums averaging about £3 each; some of the soldiers sent so much as £15 or £20, shewing that they must have saved their pay during the din of war. Miss Nightingale, than whom no one had earned a better right to form an opinion, spoke at all times strongly and firmly in favour of the soldiers. Mr Augustus Stafford, during a debate in parliament concerning the war,* read a letter received from that lady in March 1856, in which she said: 'I have never been able to join in the popular cry about the recklessness, sensuality, and helplessness of the soldier. I should say—and, perhaps, few have seen more of the manufacturing and agricultural classes of England than I have before I came out here—that I have never seen so teachable and helpful a class as the army generally. Give them opportunity promptly and securely to send money home, and they will use it. Give them schools and lectures, and they will come to them. Give them books and games and amusements, and they will leave off drinking. Give them work, and they will do it. Give them suffering, and they will bear it. I would rather have to do with the army than with any other class I have ever attempted to serve; and when I compare them with . . . . . I am struck with the soldier's superiority as a moral, and even an intellectual being.' This is indeed encouraging praise from such a source.

It was not meet that the war should end without some public recognition of the services rendered by Miss Nightingale, albeit she required no reward but the approval of her own conscience. Accordingly a committee was formed to collect subscriptions for a 'Nightingale Fund;' as 'a record of national gratitude for the invaluable services rendered by her to the sick and wounded of the British forces;' and 'to enable her to establish an institution for the training, sustenance, and protection of nurses and hospital attendants.' The latter object was in accordance with the wish of Miss Nightingale herself, who desired that the testimonial should be a means of good to others, and not a compliment merely personal to herself. At the public meeting in London (November 29, 1855) which established the Fund, Mr Sidney Herbert gave many singular anecdotes of the influence which this lady had over the soldiery. A correspondent at Scutari wrote to him: 'I have just heard such a pretty account from a soldier describing the comfort it was even to see Florence pass—"She would speak to one and another, and nod and smile to a many more; but she couldn't do it to all, you know, for we lay there by hundreds; but we could kiss her shadow as it fell, and lay our heads on the pillow again content."' The men who could thus speak poetry while speaking only that which they felt to be true, were not likely to forget her whom the Testimonial was intended to honour. It was right that the list of subscribers should comprise the names of the high-born and wealthy, the princes, the statesmen, the merchants of the land; it was satisfactory to see that British residents in all parts of the globe sent their contributions; but it was still more pleasant to know that all the Crimean soldiers took part in the good work. A subscription-book was opened in each regiment; and about sixty regiments collected an average sum of nearly £50 each; besides the regular regiments, too, the Commissariat, Land Transport, Ordnance, Hospital, Post-office, and all other general departments contributed. In short, it was an expression of grateful homage from 50,000 weather-beaten men to a small number of gentle but dauntless women, who had braved a multitude of dangers and discomforts in the sole desire to do good.

The subscribed funds for the use of the sick and impoverished soldiers, or for the support of their widows and orphans,* had been most pressingly in request during the winter 1854–5. The 'Crimean Army Fund' closed its labours in May; and Lord Raglan, writing to Lord Panmure, gracefully acknowledged the labours of the gentlemen who acted as the administrators of the Fund: 'Their courtesy, their kindness of heart, and their unceasing desire to gratify the wishes of all, are above all I can say in their favour. They carry with them the grateful acknowledgments of every officer and man, who are equally anxious with myself to bear the amplest testimony to the manner in which

* Proceedings of the House of Commons, May 8, 1856.

* Chapter VIII., pp. 311-318.

they have fulfilled their onerous task, despite of fatigue, weather, and every possible inconvenience.' The whole enterprise was, indeed, admirably managed; for the administrators, by engaging mules, muleteers, and Croatian hamals or porters at Constantinople, were enabled to convey their welcome stores to the camp; 'they never had cause to ask for the services of a fatigue-party, or in any way to encroach upon the already overwrought strength of the troops.' It is probable that a sum of £24,000 was never better expended for the comfort of a body of men than by this association. The 'Sick and Wounded Fund,' founded by the *Times*, was a worthy companion to the 'Crimean Army Fund;' it was commenced about the same time, ended its operations about the same time, and involved the expenditure of about an equal sum of money: the one fund was to supply extra articles of generous diet to the overworked and underfed officers and troops at the camp; the other was to furnish medical comforts to the hospitals at Scutari and elsewhere. The 'Central Association in Aid of the Wives and Families of Soldiers ordered on Active Service,' collected between the autumn of 1854 and the spring of 1856 the sum of £120,000; of which sum £80,000 had been administered in pecuniary relief, and a portion of the remainder in bedding, clothing, furniture, medical attendance, and other modes of assistance; of about 70 regiments engaged in the Crimea, the Association assisted on an average about 90 soldiers' wives and 130 soldiers' children per regiment, amounting to 16,000 in all; among the recipients were 'four widows, each with five sons engaged in the war.' The 'Patriotic Fund' reached a sum of £1,400,000; and at a time when the cessation of war (March 1856) defined a limit to the number of those who would be made widows or orphans by the effects of the war, the Commissioners raised the rate of allowance, and classified the payments in a clear form.* At that time there were on the books of the Fund 74 officers' widows, and 149 officers' children; 2850 non-commissioned officers' and privates' widows, and 3423 children—presenting a total of 6496 pensioners. The difference between the two Funds, financially considered, was mainly this: the 'Central Association' made its payments for temporary relief out of *capital*, and necessarily exhausted its means soon after the termination of the war; whereas the 'Patriotic Fund' made its grants and pensions out of *interest*, and thereby retained means of giving permanency to its operations.

* 'Army and Royal Marines.	Corresponding Ranks Royal Navy.	Weekly Allowance.			
		Widows.	In addition for Children living with Mother, or Dependent upon her.		
			One Child.	Two Childr.	
	Class.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	
Staff Non-commissioned Officers, ...	5th	7 0	2 0	3 0	With an increase of 1s. per week for each additional child.
Sergeant (Colour-sergeant 6d. a week additional),	6th	6 0	2 0	3 0	
Corporal or Bombardier,	7th	5 6	1 6	2 6	
Drummer, Trumpeter, or Private, ...	8th	5 0	1 6	2 6	

And to the widows and orphans of colonels, annually, £66, and for each child, £16; lieutenant-colonels, annually, £53, and for each child, £16; majors, annually, £46, and for each child, £14; captains, annually, £37, and for each child, £12; lieutenants, annually, £30, and for each child, £10; ensigns, annually, £27, and for each child, £10; with corresponding ranks in the Royal Navy.

These allowances give to the widows and orphans of officers above the rank of major a sum equal to two-thirds of the ordinary pension, and to the whole of the ordinary compassionate allowance; and to the widows and orphans of officers below that rank, a sum equal to three-fourths of the ordinary pension, and to the whole of the ordinary compassionate allowance.

The dietary operations of the army—a subject of no small importance—underwent great improvement in the interval between the two winters. The English officers readily admitted that M. Soyer, sent out by the government with a commission to this intent, wrought useful reforms in a department wherein the English army is less skilful than the French. Supposing a definite amount of provisions to be at hand, it is an important problem to determine how best to prepare from them nourishing rations, especially for the sick, at times and in places where few facilities are offered. It was in the hospitals at Scutari, during their time of wretchedness and misery, that M. Soyer first began his operations; he built new kitchens, or rearranged those already existing; invented stoves and ovens that would economise fuel; surrounded himself with culinary apparatus; brought his staff of assistants into a good system; and shewed that good food might be provided more cheaply than bad, under efficient arrangements. He wrote out exact instructions for the guidance of those whom he could not personally superintend; and as the Minister of War had sent out orders that the plans of M. Soyer should receive every aid from the various army departments, reforms were gradually introduced without collisions in authority. When, by the month of May 1855, M. Soyer had improved the cookery for invalids at Scutari and Kululi, he departed for Balaklava, to ascertain whether he might render similar service to the strong and healthy at the seat of war. Examining the usual rations issued by the commissariat; considering the kinds, qualities, and quantities of the food; looking round at the simple culinary apparatus available to the soldiers; and appreciating the smallness of the time and skill likely to be at their disposal—he sought to make the best of that which was at hand. He prepared recipes for camp-cookery, caused them to be printed at head-quarters, and then distributed them throughout the regiments. Thus the officers and men became admitted into the mysteries of 'Mutton-soup,' 'Plain Pea-soup,' 'Stewed Salt Beef and Pork à la Omar Pacha,' 'French Beef-soup or Camp Pot au Feu,' 'Stewed Fresh Meat,' 'Cossacks' Plum-pudding,' &c.—the principle of composition, in all cases, being, that no component should be named but such as the soldiers had a fair chance of obtaining: practical utility was the first thing aimed at. The opening of the Guards' camp-kitchen, in the summer, was a grand affair, at

which the commanders of both armies were present; huge iron boilers were each devoted to its peculiar soup or stew, all prepared from the common rations of the troops. Shortly after this, M. Soyer gave a course of instruction to the cooks of the regiments, teaching them how to employ the stoves and ovens which he had contrived, how to economise fuel, how to use every atom of provisions without waste, and how to produce nourishing warm food at a less cost than the half-cooked ill-served rations of the previous winter. Colonel Daniel, of the Coldstream Guards, wrote to head-quarters in expression of his sense of the marked value of these improvements; shewing the singular way in which the prevention of waste led to real cheapness, and adding: 'I consider the arrangements relative to the small consumption of fuel, and the simplicity with which the cooking is conducted will, when fully carried out, tend much to the health, comfort, and wellbeing of the soldiers.' At a later period, when an armistice led to an interchange of hospitalities between the hostile commanders, and when Codrington entertained Lüders, Pelissier, Della Marmora, and a large number of other officers, at a grand banquet, M. Soyer prepared a *pièce de resistance*, which he designated 'Soyer's Culinary Emblem of Peace, the Macèdine Lüdersienne à la Alexander II.'—a monster compound prepared in a singular way from all the usual materials for officers' camp-dinners; and served up in the cover of a stove, default of a dish sufficiently large. Such dietetic curiosities, however, were of little account: if the novelties had borne relation merely to delicacies obtainable by officers, they would have had little military importance; but the recipes and apparatus were made applicable to the regiments generally, in their daily routine of service, and to the daily rations; and M. Soyer did not relinquish his labours until he had obtained from England large supplies of boilers and culinary vessels constructed on his own plans, nor until he had made his systems of procedure familiarly known throughout the British army in the Crimea. All felt that camp-cookery—in relation to the saving of time, space, and material, and to the maintenance of health and strength among the men—deserved more attention than it had hitherto received in the British army.

In their hours of relaxation, during the later months of the war, the officers and men sought to bring back home-pleasures to remembrance by getting up theatrical performances. The French, at all times more disposed than their Allies to holiday and spectacle, began the system; but the English were not slow to follow. The very excitement attending the construction of a theatre, the painting of scenes, the provision of dresses, and the selection of music, added to the merriment of the attempt; and the commanders were too wise to check a tendency which kept the armies in good-humour. Sometimes the English visited the French performances, sometimes the French those conducted by the English; the Sardinians and Turks were nothing loath to mingle among the spectators; and the *vivandières* of the French regiments occasionally graced the performances with their half-military, half-feminine presence. Shakspeare and genteel comedy were hardly practicable; rattling farce and laughable burlesque came more easily within the means of the performers, were less obnoxious to criticism, and led more directly to the merriment which was the chief object in view. The performers were in most cases officers from the rank of colonel downwards, including the surgeons; but a few of humbler grade were occasionally intrusted with subordinate parts. In one of the divisions of the army, the sergeants and corporals of the Rifle Brigade gained high renown from a performance wholly by themselves, considered to rival the best histrionic displays of the commissioned officers: it constituted a material part of the amusement to see how Corporal Stainer maintained the part of Ellen Courtly, or Sergeant Hill that of her maid Lucy; and in what manner the dealers' stores of Balaklava had been rendered available to the supply of feminine apparel. On other occasions, the officers would impart mystery to the playbills by spelling their names backwards, and announcing 'surprising athletic performances' by Professors Egatymra, Margiw, and Nrubpeh. Performers were frequently called before the curtain to receive the meed of general applause; and if no bouquets were thrown at them, it was because there were no bouquets to throw. Some of the officers displayed considerable skill as scene-painters; and the regimental bands supplied excellent music. Although in most cases the spectators were assembled in a pit arranged with democratic equality, there were a few special occasions on which cushioned benches were supplied for the *élite*—six generals, on one auspicious evening, honoured a camp-theatre with their august presence. The Light Brigade, at one performance, made a collection among the audience, and sent £70 to the humbler class of sufferers by the burning of Covent Garden Theatre in London; thus making amusement and kindness go hand in hand. About Christmas, the French gave a 'dress-ball' to the English at their camp-village of Little Kamiesch, on the Woronzow Road; and as the ladies, vivandières and shopkeepers, numbered only eight, the attempts to imitate the etiquette of a ball-room added not a little to the general hilarity. In the daytime, during dry bracing wintry weather, nearly a hundred mounted officers would sometimes join in a 'paper-hunt'—thus managed: a man, well mounted, started off at a high speed over the plateau, dropping pieces of paper at intervals, and keeping as much as possible out of sight among the hollows; after a quarter of an hour's start, the huntsmen would ride off in pursuit of him, guided in their track only by the pieces of paper, the 'fox-trail;' and the hunt ended when any of the pursuers came up with the man-fox.

Trifling as these amusements, and any details concerning them, may appear, they have a historical value in this respect: they shew that—while in the winter 1854–5, the British troops in the Crimea were called upon to bear an almost unparalleled amount of undeserved sufferings—in the winter 1855–6 they were so free from care and privation, so removed from daily conflict with the enemy, so influenced by the negative or inactive policy of the commanders, that they were fain to appeal for amusement to familiar home-taught sports and pastimes.

Thus ended the second winter spent by the Allied troops in the Crimea—a winter almost wholly without sanguinary contests. And to the seamen it was a season still more barren of stirring incidents; there was no enemy's fleet to capture or conquer; and it did not come within the plans of the Allies to batter down Odessa or other commercial towns. How it arose that no renewal of hostilities occurred in the spring of 1856—notwithstanding vast preparations, especially naval, made by England and France to this intent—the next Chapter will shew.

Camp Theatre, outside Sebastopol.

CHAPTER XV.

DIPLOMACY, FROM THE VIENNA CONFERENCES TO THE PEACE.

IT now becomes necessary to revert to the diplomatic negotiations, which had never ceased to be carried on during the war—the subtle battles with the pen having been fully as numerous as the deadly contests with the sword. The peculiar nature of the war has rendered desirable such a mode of narrating its history as would permit the two simultaneous streams of operations, political and belligerent, to be treated separately. Thus, irrespective of the warlike series, former Chapters of the volume have discussed, in succession, the political circumstances which led to the war*—the 'secret correspondence,' and the formation of an alliance between the Western Powers and Turkey†—and the course of European diplomacy, either to terminate the struggle or to strengthen the hands of the Allies, from the declaration of war in 1854 to the Vienna Conferences in 1855.‡ Another twelve months of negotiation now await notice. By a curious coincidence, it happens that the events of the war, diplomatically considered, are separable into three intervals, each about a year in duration: thus, the month of April, 1853, rendered manifest to all Europe that Prince Menchikoff's mission to Constantinople was of such a nature as would involve Russia and Turkey in war; April, 1854, placed the nations of the world in possession of the declaration of war by England and France against Russia, signed towards the end of March; April, 1855, witnessed the failure of the diplomatists to produce a satisfactory result from the conferences at Vienna; and April, 1856, was opened by the flashing across Europe, through the medium of the electric-wires, of the news that a TREATY OF PEACE had been signed at Paris a few hours before the month began. By what course of negotiation the terms of this Treaty were determined, the present Chapter will narrate.

RESULT OF THE VIENNA CONFERENCES.

The failure of the mission intrusted to Lord John Russell, as British representative at the Vienna Conferences in 1855, was marked by several circumstances worthy of note. Diplomacy is, in its nature, of a secret character. The sovereigns of Europe, whether despotic or constitutional, claim and exercise the right of making war or of signing peace: whether the necessary funds, the 'sinews of war,' are willingly provided by the respective nations, is a question of detail in each particular case; as is likewise the safety of a sovereign or his ministers, in the event of a war being unpopular; but the right is inherent in the very nature of sovereignty. It follows that, in form if not in substance, kings make war rather than nations; and the political correspondence ending in war or in peace, as the case may be, is regal rather than national. England, as an example, has in many instances been left almost wholly in ignorance of diplomatic quarrels until brought to the verge of war, since the ministers of the crown claim the exercise of their own discretion concerning the time and mode of divulging their political secrets. These characteristics of diplomacy, whether conducive or not to the well-being of the nation, were displayed during the late war—in the ignorance of the British nation, during a long period, concerning the 'secret correspondence' with Russia; and in similar ignorance of the concluding scenes in the Russell mission to Vienna. It was felt to be necessary in a former section* to trace the mode in which the 'secret correspondence' became known to the British public, through the discontent of a Russian diplomatist; and now it is equally necessary to mark the steps which led to the revelations concerning the Russell mission, induced as those revelations were by the discontent of an Austrian diplomatist. In this instance, if in no other, painful consequences, without corresponding benefits, attended the withholding of plain facts from a people anxious only for an honourable policy during a critical period.

When the plenipotentiaries assembled at Vienna in March 1855, Lord John Russell went armed with instructions from the Earl of Clarendon,† touching the terms on which England would consent to terminate the war with Russia. Referring for details to the Chapter just noted, it

* Chapter I., pp. 1-29. † Chapter III., pp. 56-74.
‡ Chapter IX., pp. 345-375.

* Chapter III., pp. 61-64. † Chapter IX., pp. 372-375.

will suffice here to call to memory, that on the 2d of December in the preceding year, England, France, and Austria had agreed concerning the minimum of concessions by Russia likely to form the basis for a satisfactory peace; and that on the 28th of the same month they signed a 'Memorandum' on this subject, embodying those conditions in the 'Four Points;' namely—the abandonment by Russia of all control over Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia; the liberation of the mouths of the Danube from Russian interference; the abrogation of all treaties between Russia and Turkey, likely to give the former a preponderance of power in the Black Sea; and a renunciation by Russia of all special protective powers over Christians in the Ottoman states. When the diplomatists met, Lord John Russell was empowered to demand these four conditions, on the part of England; and Clarendon especially drew his attention to the Third Point as the most important of all; seeing that the others would possess little value 'unless effectual precautions were taken to render the Turkish Empire an integral part of the European system, and sufficient restraint be imposed upon the military and naval power heretofore exercised by Russia in the Black Sea, and the overbearing influence which by reason of that power she has acquired over the councils of the Porte.' The Earl of Clarendon considered that the object of the Third Point might best be obtained by a reduction of the Russian naval force in the Black Sea within such limits as might, in co-operation with an equal Turkish force, suffice to protect commerce, without offering temptation to aggressive warfare; but the British plenipotentiary was instructed to weigh any and every other mode that might be proposed for the attainment of the desired end. It will be remembered that, about the middle of March, Lord John Russell, the Earl of Westmoreland, Baron de Bourqueney, Count Buol, Baron Prokesch, Aali Pacha, Aariff Effendi, Prince Gortchakoff, and M. de Titoff, met at Vienna, as the representatives of England, France, Austria, Turkey, and Russia—Prussia taking no part in the conferences; that the First and Second Points were assented to without much difficulty; that on the 26th the Russian diplomatists announced their non-possession of instructions concerning the Third Point; that a delay of three weeks occurred, to enable Gortchakoff and Titoff to communicate with their government; that the Allies refused to consider the Fourth Point, or to give any validity to the First or Second, until the Third had been agreed upon; that England and France began to suspect the sincerity with which the czar had entered upon negotiations; that M. Drouyn de Lhuys was sent to Vienna to strengthen the advocacy of the Western Powers; that on the 17th of April, Russia announced a determination not to suggest any plan for embodying the Third Point; that on the 19th the Allies proposed a plan; that on the 21st Gortchakoff rejected this plan, and proposed another; that thereupon Lord John Russell ceased to attend any more meetings, on the ground that he was not empowered to discuss any proposal departing widely from the plan marked out by the Earl of Clarendon; and that the remaining plenipotentiaries held one more meeting on the 26th. For the next phase of this history, we must look to the British parliament.

On the 23d of April, Lord Palmerston stated in the House of Commons, that as Prince Gortchakoff had rejected all the modes of settling the Third Point suggested by the Allies, and had proposed another quite inadmissible consistently with the objects of the war, the conferences at Vienna were virtually at an end. On the next day, the Earl of Clarendon made a similar announcement in the House of Lords. On the 30th Lord John Russell resumed his seat in the Commons as Secretary of State for the Colonies, and gave a brief sketch of the proceedings at Vienna; he adverted to the anxiety of Austria that some further mode of satisfactory agreement should be sought, and to the refusal by himself and Drouyn de Lhuys to discuss any such mode, on the ground that their instructions were exhausted. On the 4th of May the Earl of Clarendon spoke at some length in the House of Lords on the subject; he laid stress on the fact that the Allies, as a mode of shewing respect to the honour and dignity of Russia, had invited the czar's plenipotentiaries to take the initiative at Vienna, by proposing such measures as they thought would best carry out the principle of the Third Point; that this did not lead to the desired result; and that the British government saw no prospect of the renewal of negotiations—although Count Buol had announced that Austria would deem it her duty to seek further for terms acceptable to all. On the same day, and again on the 7th, inquiries were made in the House of Commons for the protocols, the official documents which would narrate in detail the proceedings at the Conference. The desire to know all that could be known on this important subject was strengthened by the fact that M. Drouyn de Lhuys, about this period, resigned the high office of Foreign Secretary of State in the French government; it became rumoured that this retirement arose in some way out of the negotiations at Vienna; but as no public announcements were made on this matter, the French and English nations were left to draw such inferences as might seem to them just.

In the parliamentary discussions concerning the conferences, the ultra war-party censured the government for yielding to Russia so much as Lord John Russell had been permitted to yield; while the peace-party wished that the concessions had been still greater, in order to terminate the war more speedily. The government naturally took up a position between these two extremes. On the 11th of May Mr Milner Gibson, a peace-advocate, gave notice in the House of Commons that, on some subsequent day, he would move an

address to the crown—expressive of regret that the Vienna Conferences had not been continued to a satisfactory issue; and asserting that the interpretation of the Third Point, as conceded by Russia, furnished the elements for a just and honourable peace. On the 21st Mr Sidney Herbert announced that the conduct of himself and his friends—the 'Peel party,' as they were usually called—touching Mr Gibson's resolutions, would depend on the course taken by the government; whereupon Lord Palmerston stated—that he did not consider the means of pacification quite exhausted; that Austria was still furnished, under the sanction of the Allies generally, with means for discussing the terms of a peace; that the conferences, though suspended, were not officially closed; that the most favourable consideration would be given by the government to any propositions made through Austria by Russia for a pacific purpose; and that in considering such propositions, they would take care to consent to such terms only as would be satisfactory and honourable to the British nation. These remarks gave rise to a long debate; seeing that it remained doubtful whether the war would be prosecuted with vigour, so long as the subtleties of diplomacy were allowed to linger at Vienna. Lord John Russell again sketched in outline the proceedings at the conferences, and stated his belief that Austria would shortly make some final proposition which, if rejected, would terminate the conferences, and if accepted, would re-open negotiations under more favourable auspices than before. With the general consent of the House, Mr Gibson, after these ministerial explanations, withdrew his resolutions. Another advocate of peaceful counsels, Earl Grey, introduced the same subject in the same month to the House of Lords. On the 25th he proposed resolutions similar to those of Mr Gibson, declaratory of the satisfactory nature of the concessions made by Russia as a basis for peace. After adverting to the terms offered and rejected on both sides at Vienna, the earl added: 'It is said that you must continue the war in order to reduce the power of Russia. I know no other means by which you can reduce that great power except by subjecting her to a great territorial loss. My lords, I trust it will be well considered, before we come to so fearful a determination, what right we have to carry on a war to wrest from Russia any portion of her territory. The moment that object is avowed the war will become one of undisguised aggression. The danger must be obvious and imminent, and not a remote or an imaginary danger, sufficient to justify any people in having recourse to arms. My lords, I am persuaded the desire to continue the war for some vague and indefinite object of which we have not had any account, does not proceed from any rational or calm consideration of what are the rights and interests of this country, and, above all, of what it is just for this country to do. It is founded on nothing of that sort, but I fear it is the result of a passionate and an unreasoning spirit of animosity towards Russia. I cannot help saying that I have observed for months past a spirit of this kind arising in this country—a spirit created and encouraged by attacks against Russia, put forward in language of the most unjustifiable character. I fear a temper of this kind has been created by language such as I have endeavoured to describe; and it is with deep concern I am compelled to say that such language has been used by members of Her Majesty's government, and more especially by two noble lords in the other House of Parliament, one of whom is now at the head of the government. The indiscreet language which those noble lords have used has greatly contributed to embitter the feelings of the people against Russia.' The Earl of Clarendon replied forcibly, shewing that the terms conceded by Russia were not such as would secure the objects of the war. Earl Grey's resolutions, meeting with no support, were negatived without a division.

It serves strikingly to illustrate the difficulties pressing on the government at that time, that while, on some evenings, the ministers were compelled to talk in a warlike strain against those who wished for peace, on other evenings they spoke more peacefully against those who advocated a vigorous warlike policy. The same month which witnessed the debates of the one class, arising out of the resolutions of Mr Milner Gibson and Earl Grey, witnessed also those of the other, originated by the Earl of Ellenborough and Mr Disraeli. On the 14th of May the earl last named moved a string of resolutions in the House of Lords, relating to an address to the Queen, declaratory of the justice of the war, of the willingness on the part of the nation to bear the burden of the war, of the necessity of extricating Turkey wholly from the pernicious power of Russia, and ending by a statement that the House of Lords 'cannot withhold from Her Majesty the avowal of our conviction that the conduct of the war has occasioned general dissatisfaction and given rise to just complaints; and that we must humbly lay before Her Majesty our deliberate opinion that it is only through the selection of men for public employment without regard to anything but the public service that the country can hope to prosecute the war successfully, and to obtain its only legitimate object—a secure and honourable peace.' This was in some degree a party attack, but was professedly based on the official shortcomings during the winter 1854–5; the ministers met it by a statement of the reforms gradually introduced; and the Earl of Ellenborough was defeated by 181 votes against 71.

Mr Disraeli's resolution, brought before the House of Commons on the 24th of May, bore more direct relation to the discussions concerning peace. It was thus worded: 'That this House cannot adjourn for the [Whitsuntide] recess without expressing its dissatisfaction with the ambiguous

language and uncertain conduct of Her Majesty's government in reference to the great question of peace or war; and that, under these circumstances, this House feels it a duty to declare that it will continue to give every support to Her Majesty in the prosecution of the war, until Her Majesty shall, in conjunction with her Allies, obtain for this country a safe and honourable peace.' All the former subjects were again brought up in the debate that followed—What had Russia proposed? Ought her propositions to be accepted? What did the government intend? Had they a definite, manly, firm policy; or were they 'drifting' into peace as they had drifted into war? Mr Disraeli condemned the government generally, and Lord John Russell in particular, for mismanagement of the Vienna Conferences; asserting that an honourable peace was more distant than ever, on account of the weak vacillation of English policy. As this motion was understood to be virtually a vote of want of confidence in ministers, the members mustered strongly on both sides, and the arguments were continued at great length on two successive evenings. The combinations became very remarkable on this occasion; for the Peel party sided with the peace-party in regretting that the Russian terms had not been accepted; many independent Liberals joined the Derby party in regretting that England had not been even more decidedly opposed to Russia; while the ministers steered a course midway between these extremes. Mr Disraeli, the leader of one party in the Commons, called upon the House to declare that the time for negotiation was past; while Mr Gladstone, the most distinguished member of another party, declared that, after what Russia had conceded, 'a prolongation of the war would be unjustifiable and unchristian'—two assertions as diametrically opposed as can well be imagined. The ministers found a source of strength in pitting these antagonists against each other, allowing Mr Disraeli and Mr Gladstone to annihilate each other's arguments; and claiming credit for a *via media*, better than either extreme. Lord John Russell again adverted to the part he had taken in the Vienna Conferences, and defended his course of proceeding. He maintained that the Russian propositions touching the Third Point could not be accepted without abandoning one of the main objects of the war; that 'the maintenance by Russia of a strong fleet in the Black Sea could be desired only with the view of attacking Constantinople; from which danger the privilege to be granted to the sultan of summoning aid from other powers would prove a most ineffectual protection;' and that 'the alternative proposed by the Allied Powers, to make the Euxine a merely commercial sea, on which only a limited number of ships-of-war was to be permitted, formed, he believed, the most satisfactory principle whereon to solve the difficulty.' The ministers succeeded in defeating Mr Disraeli's motion by 319 votes against 219.

Up to this time, the public had known nothing of any difference of opinion between Lord John Russell and his colleagues concerning the Vienna Conferences; it was supposed that all the various propositions had been made generally known. Now, however, a new phase of the subject was presented. Count Buol, hearing how strongly the Russian proposals were condemned in the British parliament, and how unfavourable were the criticisms on Austria's supposed Muscovite leanings, began to write in his own defence, adverting to some of the later proceedings at Vienna. A circular addressed by him to Austrian ministers at foreign courts attracted attention in England. One such document stated that Austria had drawn up a proposal, deemed likely to be acceptable to Russia, concerning the much vexed question of naval power in the Black Sea; that if that proposal were accepted by the Allies, Austria would transmit it to St Petersburg; that if the czar rejected it, the rejection would be regarded by Austria as a *casus belli*, a cause in which she would at length draw the sword against Russia; that Lord John Russell was made acquainted with this proposal before he left Vienna; and that M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who left a few days later, undertook to aid Lord John in urging upon the governments of England and France the acceptance of the Austrian plan. On the 29th of June a question was asked in the House of Commons, suggested by this Austrian document—'Whether Lord John Russell and M. Drouyn de Lhuys had agreed to an Austrian proposal for settling the Third Point?' The answer made to this question shewed that one important stage in the diplomatic proceedings had never yet been acknowledged in parliament; and the whole field of discussion was reopened, amid great distrust in the public mind concerning the mode in which the negotiations had been carried on.

On the 6th of July the subject was brought forward in a way which rendered some explanation necessary from Lord John Russell. The question in substance was—Why did he, after assenting at Vienna to Austrian proposals, speak and vote and act with a government which refused to accept those proposals? Lord John admitted that Count Buol, at the conferences, had made a proposition in which he concurred, thinking that it would give, not a certainty, but a very fair prospect, of a durable peace. He gave an outline of conversations between the diplomatists, distinct from the formal conferences. Count Buol had proposed that Russia should be allowed to maintain any number of war-ships in the Black Sea; but that Turkey should be allowed an equal number, and England and France together an equal number; insomuch that three fleets would be always present, each subject to variation in strength, but all varying at the same time and in the same ratio: the choice of diminution or augmentation being left with Russia. It was this proposal which Russell and Drouyn de Lhuys undertook to recommend to their respective governments; as

being, if not wholly satisfactory, calculated at least to give the Western Powers a hold over Russia in the Euxine. Whether the czar would accept these terms, was quite a distinct question. Lord John stated that he knew this proposal to be inconsistent with his instructions; but that, nevertheless, being rather favourable to it himself, he had promised to Count Buol that he would recommend it to the British government. He came to London, he unfolded the plan, he supported it; the cabinet discussed it fully, and then rejected it; as did the Emperor of the French when M. Drouyn de Lhuys introduced it to him.

This announcement made a considerable sensation in the House of Commons. M. Drouyn de Lhuys had resigned his place in the French cabinet when this proposal was rejected; whereas Lord John Russell had not only retained his cabinet position, but had for more than two months concealed from parliament that such a plan had ever been advocated by him. He became involved in this dilemma—if he still approved the Austrian plan, he ought to consider the further prosecution of the war improper, and quit the cabinet; if he approved the continuance of war, then he had changed his opinion without acknowledgment, involving everything in confusion. Lord John, in explanation, stated that he would have resigned office under ordinary circumstances; but that such was the peculiar state of the public mind—such the disposition to run down ministers, and render any stable government difficult, if not almost impossible—he should probably have imperilled the Palmerston administration, had he done so, however much he might have felt disposed to remain a supporter of the government. This speech met with much condemnation from the House and the country. The peace-party upbraided the negotiator for continuing to belong to a war-ministry after his advocacy of Buol's plan had been nullified; the Derby party upbraided him for sacrificing his convictions to his Whig sympathies; the war-party, whether independent or in opposition, upbraided him for having secretly supported an Austro-Russian policy inconsistent with the objects of the war; while the press, almost with one voice, upbraided him for having acted a double part, however honest the intention, where singleness of purpose was so important. The strictures were rendered more bitter by the recollection that the same minister, during the autumn of 1854, had remained in office while disapproving of the mode in which his colleagues carried on the war, and yet had left—not only the nation, but the majority of his colleagues—ignorant of his disapproval.

This revelation was shortly followed by another—that the minister who had been so unsuccessful in his diplomacy had at length resigned his seat in the British cabinet. On the 10th of July, Sir E. B. Lytton gave notice of a resolution:—'That the conduct of our minister in the recent negotiations at Vienna has, in the opinion of this House, shaken the confidence of this country in those to whom its affairs are intrusted.' This declaration or assertion was unquestionably true, irrespective of any mere party contests; and the result of any discussion on the resolution was looked to with uneasiness by the government. Before the critical hour came, however, the difficulty was removed by the minister who had occasioned it. On the 12th, Lord Palmerston laid on the table of the House further documents relating to the conferences; on which occasion Lord John Russell made two brief statements—one, in answer to a question to the effect that he had obtained the Queen's permission for the very unusual revelation of delicate diplomatic matters made in the preceding week—or rather, obtained the Queen's sanction *after* he had done so; and the other that, although he had approved of Count Buol's plan in April, he had since changed his mind, and now opposed it. On the 16th, when the vote of censure was about to be introduced, Lord John Russell averted it by announcing his resignation, and the motives which had led to it. Additional facts were brought to light on this occasion. It now appeared that Aali Pacha as well as Russell and Drouyn had approved of Buol's plan, and promised to support it. Lord John further stated that a change had been wrought in his own opinions so early as one week after his return from Vienna, founded on arguments adduced by his colleagues; consequently his remaining in the cabinet was not so inconsistent as had been supposed. Even here, however, there was a vagueness in the explanation; for the circumstances which led to the change of opinion were 'quite independent of the merits of the propositions themselves, and did not alter my opinion of the merits of those propositions.' Lord John's approval of Buol's plan he characterised as being rather a recognition of the importance of retaining Austria as an ally with the Western Powers, than a liking for the plan itself; he believed the two assertions—that Austria was willing to present the plan to the czar, and would go to war with the czar if that plan were rejected. When Lord Clarendon announced to Count Buol the refusal of England to accept the plan, Austria claimed credit for having fulfilled her mission, and to be exonerated from blame in respect to any non-participation by her in the war, which she then left the Western Powers to carry on as before, without her aid. Lord John Russell proceeded to offer various arguments in defence of a line of policy which had to so many persons seemed wanting in directness; he adverted bitterly to the falling away of some friends, who had frankly told him that they must take rank with his opponents if the vote of censure were actually proposed; he stated that he had two or three times proffered his resignation, which Lord Palmerston begged him to withdraw; and that finally, hearing from so many quarters an opinion

that he would damage the ministry by remaining within it, he had once more given in his resignation, which the Queen had accepted.

Thus ended the remarkable connection of a popular statesman with the Vienna Conferences—a connection resulting in much pain without corresponding benefit. The House of Commons was greatly excited by this explanation, coming so soon after many others. It was not without acquiescence on both sides of the House that Sir E. B. Lytton said: 'I declare that I speak more in sorrow than in anger. What! is it you, whose genius and labours have so honoured your name, that we feel every stain on it as a national calamity—you, who have taken from the people of England power and dignity for twenty years—you, then still holding office as Minister of the Crown—is it you who would call upon your countrymen to send their children to unnecessary slaughter, and advise your Sovereign to jeopardise her sceptre rather than endanger the feeble and rickety thing that you call a government, of which you told us that we ought to be more tender, because it had lost the favour of the people? The noble lord complains that the executive is weakened by popular discontent. I tell you, the government, that the weakness and the discontent both come from that belief in your insincerity and vacillating purpose, of which the last and most signal proof up to Thursday night was the appearance of the noble lord upon that bench.' Other portions of the baronet's speech were devoted to party politics, on which the two sides of the House would obviously vote discordantly if a vote were forced; but there was a general feeling of regret among all at the position into which Lord John Russell had brought himself, or had been brought by an inauspicious combination of circumstances. The peace-party, the war-party, the Peel party, and the Derby party, all took exception to his conduct, although on different grounds; and even the Whig party could scarcely feel that his continuance in office would be otherwise than a source of weakness to the government at such a time. Hence the resignation of Lord John Russell, and hence the withdrawal of the threatened vote of censure.

STATE OF PUBLIC FEELING IN ENGLAND.

The sufferings of the army during the winter; the official denial of those sufferings until made manifest by the newspaper press; the discord in the Aberdeen ministry; the disruption of that ministry by the secession of Lord John Russell; the difficulties attending the formation of a government by Lord Palmerston; the failure of the Vienna Conferences; the strange revelations made by Lord John Russell concerning that failure; the oscillation of the Peel party between peace-policy and war-policy; the small amount of success obtained by the magnificent fleets of the Allies; the absence of any evidence that the siege of Sebastopol would end triumphantly; the distrust entertained of Austria and Prussia—all tended to bring about a very uneasy state of the public mind in England during the spring and summer of 1855. Statesmen were distrusted who had long held a high place in public favour; generals were censured who had learned in the school of Wellington; admirals were at discord with Admiralty officials; individual ministers were accusing government departments, and were by them accused in turn; commissions and committees were every week laying bare some of the decayed spots in old institutions and usages; and political parties became broken and re-formed on no other principle than that of dissatisfaction with the existing state of things.

A former section* has described some of the symptoms of this national uneasiness. The irregularities in the transport of stores; the disastrous loss of the *Prince* steamer; the unhappy wrong committed upon Captain Christie; the medical shortcomings at the hospitals, and the terrible scenes in the hospital-ships; the road-less state of the camp; the loathsome condition of Balaklava—all became subjects of inquiry, by parliamentary committees or royal commissioners. Among the various disclosures and reports made by these bodies of investigators, those of the 'Sebastopol Committee' and the 'Crimean Commissioners,' adverted to in the section just noted, were the most important. Arising out of these and many other occurrences, were numerous parliamentary debates, public meetings, and exciting speeches, which must be briefly touched upon as indications of the national mind concerning the objects of the war and the mode in which it should be carried on.

The revelations occasionally made concerning ministerial difficulties and differences, and the tendency shewn to retain power in the hands of a small number of public men, led to an apprehension that government measures were planned rather for party purposes than for national honour; while the course of diplomacy, especially in relation to Austria and Prussia, engendered a doubt whether the ministers were really in earnest in the prosecution of the war. Hence arose many questions and motions in parliament indicative of suspicion. Thus, on the 29th of March, Mr Scott moved for copies of instructions to the commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean and Black Sea, and for any correspondence touching the indulgence shewn to Odessa; the ministers chose to interpret this as an attack on Admiral Dundas, whereas it was intended to convey a suspicion on the ministers themselves, in regard to their earnestness of purpose. On the same evening Mr Berkeley introduced the vexed question of the Earl of Lucan's grievance; that cavalry-officer having been treated with marked displeasure by

* Chapter VIII., pp. 322-330.

Lord Raglan, in connection with the battle of Balaklava,* and having in vain endeavoured to obtain from the military authorities a court-martial to set him right with the country; the demand was again resisted in parliament, on grounds of etiquette rather than with any reference to the merits of the question; but the nation felt the incongruity in the position of the Earl of Lucan, who had been thanked by parliament, although recalled by the government under circumstances implying disgrace. It was a military rather than a political quarrel; yet it tended to increase the general doubt among and concerning public men.

The month of April presented its own series of symptoms of discontent, in and out of parliament. The Sebastopol Committee was prosecuting its inquiry; and the newspapers day by day made public those harrowing details which created such wonder and disgust in the public mind. The news that the Vienna Conferences had failed coming to hand, men began to doubt whether there was sincerity in any quarter among cabinets and diplomatists. On the 17th, the lamentable deficiencies of the medical department in the army were brought under the notice of the House of Commons by Captain Boldero; the evidence taken before the Sebastopol Committee was adduced in proof of the deficiencies; a committee of inquiry was demanded; and although the government resisted the demand on the ground that reforms were gradually being effected, the proposal was defeated by only a very narrow majority. On the 20th, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer made his financial statement, and announced that he would require, for the year 1855–6, more than 86 millions sterling, including 40 millions for army, navy, and ordnance, complaints again broke forth—not so much at the cost of the war, as at the mismanagement by the public functionaries of the large funds generously placed by the nation at the disposal of the government: sums fully expended, although the soldiers had been starved and frozen, and the nation lowered in the eyes of Europe. Shortly afterwards, when the means for providing the immense outlay came on for discussion, considerable acrimony marked the debate; the estimated taxes would be 23 millions sterling short of the required amount; ministers proposed to take 16 millions of this by a loan, to be paid off by 1 million per annum after the war should be ended; but hence arose great contention whether each year should pay its own wars, or whether posterity should be saddled with the consequences—a question of national honour worthy of calm study, but mixed up at that time with much excitement and bitterness. Public discontent, spreading in various ways, led to a notice of motion on the 27th, by Mr Layard—'That the state of the country is such as to cause serious alarm; that the sacrifice of efficiency to family and party interests is the source of great misfortune and disgrace to the country; and that the House will support any ministry which can enforce the efficient conduct of the public service and the vigorous prosecution of the war.' The same evening witnessed one among many painful scenes, in which personal accusations became hurled to and fro; the denouncers of military incapacity in the management of the war, while accusing the authorities of giving commissions based rather upon parliamentary or family interest than upon professional merit, had overstepped the due limit, and had accused some undeservedly; the refutation was bitter, and was met by bitter retorts—until at length the House became disheartened by the wearying question: 'Who's to blame?'

Another month, and the sources of uneasiness became somewhat varied in form, although equally numerous. Indian officers had long felt the inequality in the two services, the Queen's and the Company's; there were honours and chances of promotion in the former greater than those in the latter, although the nation generally felt alike towards both, and valued those who had become bronzed beneath the sun of Hindostan. Two attempts were made in May to remedy this system. The Earl of Ellenborough, on the 3d, claimed a promise from the government concerning the gradual equalisation of honours and emoluments in the two services, and obtained partial success. The other attempt, on the 10th of May, was made by Sir E. Perry, who moved in the Commons for a select committee to inquire how the Anglo-Indian army might be made most available for the war against Russia; he contended that the East India Company's army should be made a royal army, and rendered available for national purposes; but, being opposed by the government, this proposition, although supported by General Sir de Lacy Evans, was negatived by 171 votes against 62. In the same month, to satisfy in some degree the public yearnings for army reform, Lord Panmure, as Secretary of State for War, gave in the House of Lords an outline of the changes proposed to be introduced—comprising the abolition of the Ordnance Board; the transfer of the military duties of that Board to the Commander-in-chief, and of the civil duties to the Secretary for War; the appointment of a new contract department and clothing department; various minor changes in many departments; and improved machinery whereby all might be placed in correspondence with the Secretary for War as official head of the whole. Pending the preparation of these changes, a renewal of the discussion concerning Captain Christie's case* arose in the House of Commons, reopening the wounds which the ministers would fain have hoped had closed finally, and reviving personal charges and counter-charges which pained all and benefited none—except in so far as they did honour to the memory of the deceased officer. The parliamentary discussions in this month

* Chapter VII., p. 259.

* Chapter VIII., pp. 322-324.

concerning the Vienna Conferences—the Earl of Clarendon's statement on the 4th; the conversations in the Commons on the 4th, 7th, and 11th; the Earl of Ellenborough's resolutions on the 14th; the discussion on Mr Milner Gibson's motion on the 21st; Earl Grey's resolutions on the 25th; and Mr Disraeli's vote of censure on the 24th and 25th —have been adverted to in the last section; but there were other discussions, both in the Lords and in the Commons, touching the suspicious policy of Austria and Prussia in the war. The ministers, whatever may have been their own misgivings, were enforced, in courtesy to foreign courts, to gloss over the inconsistencies in the policy pursued at Vienna and Berlin, and to endeavour to explain that which was confessedly difficult of explanation. On one occasion a direct vote was taken, founded on the Earl of Albemarle's resolution, moved on the 15th of May—'That, in order to bring the war to a speedy termination, it is necessary to restrict the trade with Russia by more efficient measures than any which have hitherto been adopted or announced by Her Majesty's government;' the resolution was aimed against Prussia, who was known to be lax in her neutrality concerning trade across the Russian frontier; it was opposed by the government, on account of the difficulty in distinguishing between Russian produce and Prussian produce; it was supported by the Earl of Derby and his party, on the ground that such a resolution, if adopted, would give vigour and efficiency to the mode of carrying on the war; it was opposed by Earl Grey, as tending to draw tighter, as a means of injuring an enemy, the restrictions on trade and the commerce of the world; and finally, it was rejected by 47 votes against 31.

Nor were there wanting indications, beyond the walls of parliament, of discontent at the mode in which the affairs of the country were carried on, especially in relation to the war. New members cavilled at the government and the aristocracy; old members went to their constituents, and made impassioned speeches; powerful leading articles appeared in the influential journals; and letters were written, suggesting the organisation of societies and associations intended to bring about useful reforms. Hence originated the 'Administrative Reform Association,' set on foot by a public meeting at the London Tavern on the 5th of May. The state of public opinion at the time cannot perhaps be better shewn than by transcribing three 'resolutions' passed at that meeting: '*First*, That the disasters to which the country has been subjected in the conduct of the present war are attributable to the inefficient and practically irresponsible management of the various departments of the state, and urgently demand a thorough change in the administrative system. *Second*, That the true remedy for the system of maladministration which has caused so lamentable a sacrifice of labour, money, and human life, is to be sought in the introduction of enlarged experience and practical ability into the service of the state; that the exclusion from office of those who possess in a high degree the practical qualities necessary for the direction of affairs in a great commercial country is a reflection upon its intelligence and a betrayal of its interests; that while we disclaim every desire of excluding the aristocratic classes from participation in the councils of the crown, we feel it our duty to protest against the pretensions of any section of the community to monopolise the functions of administration. *Third*, That an association be now formed to promote, by all constitutional means, the attainment of administrative reform; and that the association be called the "Administrative Reform Association."' Several meetings were held, a fund for defraying ordinary expenses was subscribed, and many earnest speeches were made; but the war came to an end without any visible improvements having been wrought by the Administrative Reform Association. This fact may perhaps be accounted for on four grounds—the members comprised only a small number possessing influence on the public mind; they differed as to the extent of the malady to be cured; they wrought only by speech-making, and applauding each other's speeches; and they prepared no definite plan for giving practical efficiency to their objects. In these particulars, irrespective of the actual merits of the improvements suggested, the 'Administrative Reform Association' of 1855 contrasted unfavourably with the 'Anti Corn-law League' of earlier days.

With the arrival of June came an increase in the number of debates touching the state of public affairs, all indicative of distrust and uneasiness, whether bearing or not on the failure of the Russell mission. In the House of Lords they were chiefly a few queries and ministerial answers, relating to the Vienna Conferences, the employment of a Turkish legion in British pay, the massacre at Hangö, and projects by inventors for destroying fortresses with unheard-of celerity and completeness. One debate, however, bore relation to the doubtful policy of Austria. Lord Lyndhurst, on the 26th, contrasted the relative positions of Austria and Prussia, with a view of shewing, however servile the latter power might have shewn herself to Russia, that better things were to have been expected from Austria, who yet had missed a grand opportunity of vindicating her own rights and maintaining her own interests by entering into an offensive and defensive alliance with France and England; he expressed a suspicion that Austria throughout the negotiations had some secret understanding with Prussia and Russia. The Earl of Clarendon deprecated any insinuations that might give offence to Austria, and continued to 'hope for the best,' without being able to assign any strong grounds for that hope.

The discussions took a much fiercer tone in the House of Commons. When, on the 24th of the preceding month, Mr Disraeli had moved his

resolution on the policy of the government concerning the war, Sir Francis Baring moved one amendment, and Mr Lowe another; the original resolution was negatived, and the two amendments postponed until after the Whitsuntide vacation. When, therefore, the House met again on the 4th of June, Baring's proposition came on as a substantive motion, and Lowe's as an amendment to it. The former was an echo of ministerial opinions—'That this House having seen with regret that the conferences at Vienna have not led to a termination of hostilities, feels it to be a duty to declare that it will continue to give every support to Her Majesty in the prosecution of the war, until Her Majesty shall, in conjunction with her Allies, obtain for this country a safe and honourable peace;' whereas Lowe's amendment assumed a neutral form—'That this House having seen that owing to the refusal of Russia to restrict the strength of her navy in the Black Sea, the conferences at Vienna have not led to the cessation of hostilities, feels it to be its duty to declare that, by that refusal the means of coming to an arrangement on the third basis of negotiation having been exhausted, this House will give its best exertions to carry out the successful prosecution of the war.' Disraeli's motion had contained censure on the government; Baring's was intended to remove that censure; while Lowe's was directed rather to a strengthening of the war policy. The debate thence arising was one of the longest in the session, extending over the 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8th of the month; the leading members on all sides spoke, including Milner Gibson, Molesworth, Bulwer Lytton, Cobden, Ewart, Graham, Russell, Roebuck, Sidney Herbert, Drummond, Baring, Cockburn, Cardwell, Walpole, Disraeli, Palmerston, and Gladstone; every part of the subject was reopened, and old accusations renewed and repelled; the peace-party abused the war, the Derby party abused the ministers, the Peel party marked out for themselves a peculiar line of argument opposed to both the others, the ministerialists defended all that had been done, while the men of no party found Sir Francis Baring's resolution sufficiently expressive of their opinions: as a consequence, Mr Lowe's amendment was rejected and Baring's resolution adopted without a division, seeing that the latter was so cautiously worded as to clash with few or none of the opinions expressed during the debate. The tide of angry feeling was not allowed to subside long; for on the 15th Mr Layard brought forward the subject of Administrative Reform, by moving a resolution—'That this House views with deep and increasing concern the state of the nation; and is of opinion, that the manner in which merit and efficiency have been sacrificed, in public appointments, to party and family influences, and to a blind adherence to routine, has given rise to great misfortunes, and threatens to bring discredit upon the national character, and to involve the country in grave disasters.' This resolution, containing a covert attack on the aristocracy, was acceptable neither to the ministers nor to the Derby party, and was rejected by 359 votes against 46; instead of it, a resolution by Sir E. B. Lytton was adopted without division, declaring, 'That this House recommends to the earliest attention of Her Majesty's ministers the necessity of a careful revision of our various official establishments, with a view to simplify and facilitate the transaction of public business, and, by instituting judicious tests of merit, as well as by removing obstructions to its fair promotion and legitimate rewards, to secure to the service of the state the largest available proportion of the energy and intelligence for which the people of this country are distinguished.'

No stronger proof could be afforded of the uneasy state of the public mind in political affairs, than that it drew forth a complaining speech from one whose guarded conduct had obtained very general approval throughout the country. Prince Albert, from his peculiar position as consort to the Sovereign, needed to observe a delicate abstinence on political matters; seeing that the country would not tolerate any interference save that for which the ministers might be made responsible. The prince attended a banquet given by the Trinity Corporation on the 9th of June; and he thus hinted, in a speech, at the continuous opposition to those in authority: 'If there was ever a time at which Her Majesty's government, by whomsoever conducted, required the support—ay, not the support alone, but the confidence, good-will, and sympathy of their fellow-countrymen—it is surely the present. It is not the way to success in war to support it, however ardently and enthusiastically, and, at the same time, to tie down and weaken the hands of those who have to conduct it. We are engaged with a mighty enemy, who is using against us all those wonderful powers which have sprung up under the generating influence of our liberty and our civilisation. You find him with all that force which unity of purpose and action, impenetrable secrecy, and uncontrolled despotic power have given, while we have to meet him under a state of things intended for peace, and for the promotion of that very civilisation, the offspring of public discussion, of the friction of parties, and of the popular control on the government and the state. The Queen has no power to levy troops, nor has she any at her command but such as offer their voluntary services. Her government can take no measure for the prosecution of the war which it has not beforehand to explain in parliament. Her armies and fleets can make no movements, nor even prepare for any, without their being publicly announced in the papers. No mistake, however trifling, can occur, no want or weakness exist, which is not at once denounced, and even sometimes exaggerated, with a kind of morbid satisfaction. The Queen's ambassador can enter into no negotiations without the government having to defend him by entering into all the arguments

which that negotiator, in order to be successful, ought to be able to shut up in the innermost recesses of his heart. Nay, at the most critical position, when war and diplomatic relations may be at their height, an adverse vote in parliament may at a moment deprive the Queen of the whole of her confidential servants. Gentlemen, our constitutional government is undergoing a heavy trial, and we shall not get successfully through it unless the country will grant its confidence—patriotic, intelligent, and self-denying confidence—to Her Majesty's government.' On some occasions during the spring months, unfavourable hints were thrown out against the prince's supposed political tendencies; and speculations arose concerning a law passed in the same year in Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, by which that dukedom might eventually belong to a member of the English royal family, and might possibly render German sympathies too strong in the English court. But these suspicions never had much currency; while the conduct of the Queen herself won the hearts of her subjects—a distribution of medals to soldiers returned from the war, frequent visits to the sick troops, a contribution to the Patriotic Fund of the proceeds of the sale of drawings and pictures by the royal children, and many other kindly deeds of analogous character, were duly appreciated by the nation at large.

The month of July did not present any improvement in the tone of public discussions; for it was marked by the Russell revelations, narrated in the last section—the explanation concerning the Vienna Conferences given in the Commons on the 6th; the further explanation on the 12th; the announcement of his resignation on the 16th; and the debate consequent on that announcement. It was marked, too, by the discussion on the vote of censure proposed by the chairman of the Sebastopol Inquiry Committee. Nor was this all. On the 10th, the subject of Administrative Reform was again brought forward, and the characters of public men freely canvassed; the ministers assented to the general opinion that merit should have greater prominence than heretofore in the appointment to office; but they opposed a resolution brought forward on the subject, and defeated it by the narrow majority of 140 votes against 125. On another evening, the 20th, the House was called upon by the government to authorise a loan of £5,000,000 to Turkey, to enable the sultan to carry on the war—or rather, to guarantee the payment of the interest on such loan, in order that the money might be obtained on more favourable terms. Turkey, earlier in the war, had been forced to pay 7½ per cent. for a loan of two or three millions; whereas if a guarantee were given by England and France, much easier terms would be obtainable. Although the government stated that the agreement had actually been made between England, France, and Turkey, and that a refusal would appear to the French government very like repudiation, the opposition in the House of Commons was strong, and even bitter; the Peel party sided with the Derby party; and the ministers carried the resolution only by the close majority of 135 votes against 132. Some of the opponents objected to the guarantee altogether; some objected to a confusion between the technical terms 'joint obligation' and 'joint and several obligation,' in reference to the French share in the guarantee; while others obviously supported any manœuvre calculated to shake the Palmerston administration.

When suspicions are afloat, slight facts become magnified beyond their usual proportions. Hence a painful commotion in London, about the period now under notice, concerning a matter which at another time would have been left quietly to find its cure through an ordinary medium. An act of parliament having been passed for regulating the sale of fermented liquor on Sundays, the working-classes experienced a restriction on their customary usages. They met in Hyde Park, and discussed their grievances; ruffians took advantage of the excitement to commence lawless violence; the police interfered with injudicious severity, or with severity exhibited at the wrong time; and then arose a violent outcry, echoed by a portion of the press, against peers, bishops, the aristocracy, the ministers, and even the court. The iniquities in the war were mixed up with the alleged iniquities of the Sunday bill; and the humbler classes were urged to believe that the high-born and wealthy were enemies to the country. This dangerous impression was removed before it had acquired any great intensity.

As the autumnal months approached, these various symptoms of national uneasiness softened down; the discontent, which might have ripened into insurrection in a country where the right of free discussion did not exist, removed itself by the very act of expression; all parties had censured and upbraided those whom they believed to have mismanaged the war and the political affairs of the nation; and when this was done, all joined in a gradual process of reforming that which appeared wanting in efficiency. Shortly before the prorogation of parliament, in the middle of August, Mr Laing sought to bring the peace proposals once again into favour; and Lord John Russell made a speech full of gloomy forebodings on the war, without suggesting any useful or practicable advice concerning it; but the House of Commons had become worn out with such discussions, and—seeing no prospect of national advantage by any change of ministry at that time—resolved to support the government in a steady prosecution of the war, until the declared objects had been attained. The Chancellor of the Exchequer obtained all the supplies asked for; and when the Queen's speech, at closing parliament, announced that the failure of the Vienna Conferences had determined her to prosecute the war with all possible vigour, the nation generally responded to the determination.

PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATION.

Having thus rapidly glanced at the remarkable state of the public mind in England during the spring and summer of 1855, concerning the war and its management, it will now be convenient to resume the history of those diplomatic negotiations whereby the restoration of peace was to be brought about.

After the departure of Lord John Russell and M. Drouyn de Lhuys from Vienna, in the last week of April, the ambassadors of the several powers continued their interviews and correspondence on the subject of peace, although the formal conferences were at an end. The two diplomatists above named, as has been already sufficiently shewn, differed from their respective governments in regard to the value of the proposal made by Austria concerning the Third Point: the First, Second, and Fourth Points being deemed easier of solution. Lord Clarendon wrote on the 8th of May to Lord Westmoreland, British ambassador at Vienna, commenting on the proposal which Count Buol had made, shewing how inadequate it would be to the curbing of Russian power in the Black Sea, justifying the English and French governments for having rejected it, and desiring that the arguments against it should be placed before the Austrian government. England and France, in fact, demanded that Austria should fulfil her pledge by joining them in the war, 'unless she could devise a scheme that would be effectual—imposing conditions on Russia, and not a scheme by which the Allies are to impose conditions upon themselves, leaving in the Black Sea complete freedom of action to Russia.' On the 20th, Buol replied at considerable length, in a letter directed to be read by Count Colloredo, Austrian ambassador in London, to Clarendon; he regretted the resolve of England and France, gave the details of his plan in full, and announced that Austria would refuse to go to war with Russia until that plan had been more fully considered. As a means of comparing these terms with the actual conditions of peace afterwards obtained, it will be useful to print them in a note.* It will be seen that these proposals relate wholly to the Third Point, the determination of the naval forces of Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea; the first proposition forbids Russia to maintain more than a certain number of ships in that sea; while the second leaves that number unlimited, but checked by a particular mode of balancing in other quarters. These were the propositions, one or both, which Russell and Drouyn de Lhuys had approved, but which the Western governments rejected. Count Buol strangely enough expressed his belief that Russia would reject these propositions, and yet he suggested that the conferences should be reopened for the sake of embodying them. Lord Clarendon, on the 29th of May, pointed out the objections to the plans in themselves, and the inconsistency of submitting them to Russia with a belief that they would be rejected. England and France contended that Austria ought now to join them in war against Russia, by virtue of the treaty of the 2d of December; while Austria, contending that the Western Powers should have accepted Buol's proposals, refused to declare war.

Besides the correspondence between the foreign ministers of the respective governments, there was a series of official documents transmitted by each government to its ambassadors at foreign courts. Russia directed M. de Glinka, the czar's representative to the Germanic diet at Frankfort, to inform all the members that his imperial master, although the Vienna Conferences had failed on the Third Point, would be willing to act upon the other three points, '*so long as the German courts*

* First Proposition.

Art. I.—The High Contracting Parties being desirous that the Sublime Porte should participate in the advantages of the good understanding established by the Law of Nations among the various States of Europe, severally engage to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, guarantee in common the strict observance of this engagement, and will in consequence consider every act and every event which would be of a nature to endanger it, as a question of European interest. If a difference should arise between the Porte and one of the Contracting Powers, those two States, before resorting to arms, should place the other Powers in a position to obviate this contingency by pacific means.

Art. II.—The Russian Plenipotentiaries and those of the Sublime Porte will propose in common to the Conference the equal effective force of the naval armaments which the two sea-bordering Powers will maintain in the Black Sea, and which must not exceed the amount of Russian vessels at present afloat in that sea.

Art. III.—The rule respecting the closing of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, established by the Treaty of July 13, 1841, shall remain in force, with the exceptions specified in the following Articles:—

Art. IV.—Each of the Contracting Powers which has no establishment in the Black Sea, will be authorised by a firman from His Highness to send into and station in that sea two frigates or vessels of smaller force.

Art. V.—In the event of the Sultan being menaced with aggression, he reserves to himself the right of opening the Straits to all the naval forces of his Allies.

Second Proposition.

Art. I.—(Repetition of Article I. in First Proposition.)

Art. II.—The rule respecting the closing of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, established by the Treaty of July 13, 1841, shall continue in force, with the exceptions specified in the following Articles:—

Art. III.—Each of the Contracting Powers which has no establishment in the Black Sea, will be authorised by a firman from His Highness to send into and station in it two frigates or vessels of smaller force, in order to protect their commerce, and to exercise the necessary inspection.

Art. IV.—If Russia should increase the amount of her naval forces at present afloat, as duly defined, the Contracting Powers who do not possess an establishment in the Black Sea would be authorised by a firman of His Highness, by giving a previous warning of five days, to send respectively into that sea an additional number of vessels of the same class, equal to one-half of the naval forces of Russia.

Art. V.—At no time will ships-of-war of foreign nations be allowed to anchor in the Golden Horn, with the exception of the small vessels hitherto admitted belonging to the Embassies; and in time of peace the number of ships-of-the-line of the Contracting Powers which have no establishments in the Black Sea, must never exceed four at a time before Constantinople, on their way from the Dardanelles to the Black Sea, and from the Black Sea to the Dardanelles

Art. VI.—In the event of the Sultan being menaced with aggression, he reserves to himself the right of opening the Straits to all the naval forces of the Allies.

Tripartite Treaty.

England, France, and Austria to sign a Treaty, binding them,

1st, To enforce the observance of the principle established in the 1st Article, in the event of the violation of the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire by Russia.

2dly, To consider as a *casus-belli* the increase of the amount or strength of the Russian naval force in the Black Sea as regards its effective force at the beginning of the war.

If Russia should herself engage not to exceed that number, the three Powers would consent not to give publicity to the Treaty.

maintained a neutral attitude.' This was in accordance with the czar's policy of keeping Austria, Prussia, and the German states as long as possible out of the field of warfare against him. Austria, by its representative, advised the diet to make no resolutions or propositions concerning this Russian declaration, on the ground that none of the 'Points' would become valid until all were so; whereas Prussia, in a document very obscurely worded, lent a more favourable ear to that declaration. Count Walewski, the successor of M. Drouyn de Lhuys as foreign minister of France, wrote to the French ambassadors and envoys at foreign courts, narrating the events at the Vienna Conferences, and justifying the part taken by the Western Powers in relation thereto; this dispatch or circular, replied to through various media by Russia, gave origin to many statements and counter-statements, which occupied the attention of the diplomatists of Europe.

During the month of June, many attempts were made by Austria to shew that her propositions might safely be accepted; and many by the Western Powers to prove that the Third Point could not in such a way be satisfactorily disposed of. Lord Clarendon contended that, 'so far from causing the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea to cease, the proposed conditions would go to establish a competition for preponderance between the Allies and Russia; such a state of things could not be peace, but a constant preparation for war, and a constant source of uneasiness to Europe.' The relations between Austria and the Western Powers assumed a coolness; and in England an opinion spread that Russia, Prussia, and Austria, whatever might be their outward diplomacy, had a secret understanding concerning the terms which might ultimately be accepted. This opinion was perhaps incorrect; but at least Count Nesselrode, on the part of Russia, expressed satisfaction at the mode in which Count Buol had treated the negotiation at the Vienna Conferences; and, moreover, the three powers agreed with one voice that France and England were alone to blame for the non-arrival at a treaty of peace. It was further remarked, also, as somewhat strange, that a reduction was at that time commenced in the Austrian army. The motives for this step were explained in a dispatch to the Germanic diet: Austria declared that she had tried her utmost to bring about a peace; that England and France had disappointed her hopes; that she would not go to war in the existing state of affairs; that she would reduce her army as a means of lightening the burden pressing on the nation; and that she would hold herself in readiness to discuss any new propositions, as soon as the Western Powers should shew a disposition more conciliatory towards Russia.

The negotiations were almost discontinued during the autumn. Russia proposed nothing; Prussia manifested throughout more sympathy with the czar than with the Western Powers; England and France began to see clearly that any great success in the Crimea would effect more for their cause than diplomatic dexterity; Turkey waited the movements of her Allies; while Austria remained poised in equilibrium, hoping to obtain some advantage without fighting for it. What were the secret proposals and correspondence at the time, was known only to the courts. A rumour spread that the Empress-dowager of Russia wrote privately to the Archduchess Sophia of Austria: these imperial ladies, mothers to the two reigning emperors, had a domestic if not a political influence over their sons; and, according to the rumour, an attempt was made to render this influence available, by bringing the Emperor Francis Joseph to refuse the demands of the Western Powers for any terms more stringent than those already proposed by Count Buol. Politically considered, there is no improbability in such a letter having been written.

In truth, the state of Russia at that time was becoming so grave, that the czar would gladly have ended a war which was rapidly impoverishing his dominions. Nearly all classes suffered, the landed proprietors most severely, from causes which may readily be assigned. The products whence the revenues of the Russian nobles are mainly obtained are corn, timber, cattle, tallow, hemp, linseed, bristles, wool, and flax; together with metals in the Siberian part of the empire—all these require sedulous attention from the serfs on the estates; anything that interferes with the labour of the serfs affects ultimately the quantity of marketable produce; and any obstacles to free shipment at the ports limit the command of foreign markets. Now both these evils operated with great force during the war. The ports of the White Sea, Baltic, Sea of Azof, and Black Sea being blockaded, foreign trade was almost annihilated; raw produce rotted for want of means of export—or, if sold overland through Germany, the cost of transport seriously lessened the rate of profit to the producer. Many estates in the southern provinces have 20,000 or more sheep each, one-tenth of which are annually sold for their wool and tallow; but during the war these articles were comparatively unsaleable; while, on the other hand, if the animals were kept unslaughtered, a large outlay would be incurred for fodder. But these were only part of the woes under which the landowners suffered. There was, in addition, the conscription for recruits, which in time of peace amounts to about 7 in every 1000 males, once a year; but during the war there were four conscriptions within two years, amounting in all to nearly 50 able-bodied men out of 1000 males of all ages. This was a terrible drain on the labour available for the estates. Moreover, when recruits are sent to the towns, a large additional number go with them, as substitutes for those who may be rejected; and these are sometimes detained at the depôts two or three weeks before being liberated. Every proprietor, *too*, pays a sum of money to fit

out and arm the recruits taken from his estate. Besides all this, the landed proprietors in the northern provinces were, during the war, obliged to supply militia in the ratio of 30 to 1000; while those in the south were called upon for contributions which, although designated 'voluntary,' exerted all the pressure of taxation. Thus, in the spring of 1854, the proprietors near the Crimea were enforced to send oxen and biscuits as rations for the troops, wagons and draught-animals to convey those supplies, and drivers so long as their services were needed by the military commanders; while some of the estates were so far distant, that four months of valuable corn-growing and harvesting weather were consumed in the transport of the biscuit, &c., to the camp, followed by the return-journey. An 'Eye-witness,' who has given a graphic account of the internal condition of Russia during the war,* asserts that the troops of the large Russian army which fought the battle of Inkermann were conveyed to the Crimea by wagons and horses or oxen supplied wholly by the landed proprietors as 'voluntary contributions.'

The serfs belonging to these proprietors were thus employed as chattels in the service of the state, greatly to the loss of their owners; while the crown-peasants had their own set of grievances. These peasants occupy a medium position between freemen and serfs, and were doubly taxed during the war; for while, as freemen, they were called upon to give oxen and biscuit, as serfs they had to give their personal services as drivers. So corrupt, too, was the official machinery, that the peasants never knew how much of their contribution really went to the state, and how much was nefariously appropriated by others. The state professed to pay for the hire of vehicles employed in the conveyance of warlike stores to the Crimea; but it is doubted whether much of this money reached the pockets of the crown-peasants who chiefly supplied the means of transport. The villagers on the line of route to the seat of war suffered miseries which no ear ever heard; for, as it has been significantly said, there is no *Times* in Russia. The soldiers traversed a wide belt of country on either side of the road, eating up like locusts all that came within reach, and exhausting the little store of provisions which each villager is in the habit of accumulating for the winter: in most instances the poor people obtained no payment for the food thus taken; and untold misery was the result.

The landed proprietors, the crown-peasants, and the free-villagers, being thus subjected to sufferings of various kinds, it may be supposed that the artisans and small tradesmen did not wholly escape. The bootmakers and tailors were ordered by the government to make the clothing for the troops, in preference to any private trade; the materials were supplied to them, and a small payment was fixed for labour; but this payment became little more than nominal, by the time the money had filtered through several official pockets. The merchants, too, were necessarily embarrassed by the war; but as their property consisted mainly in available money, they had means of modifying their position, and suffered less than the classes hitherto named; the 'voluntary contributions' were, nevertheless, rendered very heavy in its pressure on this class. On the other hand, these men being naturally desirous of taking their money out of trading investments in troubled times, there arose such a scarcity of floating coin as greatly embarrassed the government as well as the community generally. All the various causes of misery were rendered still more intense by the difficulties and expenses of travelling in an almost roadless country. The writer lately cited gives a striking instance of this difficulty. A party of Sisters of Mercy—the Florence Nightingales of Russia—left St Petersburg in the middle of November 1854 to proceed to Sebastopol, there to tend the wounded soldiers of the czar. This winter-journey of 1400 miles was a hard one for ladies. They had a good high-road as far as Koursk, one less perfect thence to Kharkoff, and miserable tracks during the rest of the distance. They left Kharkoff in large clumsy diligences, each drawn with fifteen horses, which were occasionally increased to thirty as the only means of extricating the wheels from deep mire; and so many and varied were the difficulties, that the rate of travelling did not practically exceed two miles an hour.

Superadded to all these evidences of the ruinous severity with which the war pressed upon the material resources of Russia, there were not wanting signs of uneasiness touching the moral consequences. The Russians are not a turbulent people; yet are the peasants and serfs ground down with usages so oppressive that the ominous words 'reform' and 'revolution' are occasionally heard, as indicating something which may supervene at a future day. In no country in the world, perhaps, is less of the *truth* allowed to reach the ears of the humbler classes than in the czar's dominions; the peasant is expected to believe not the truth, but that which his superiors wish him to believe. And indeed this is the relation between each class and that above it. At no period during the war did the czar feel that he could afford to be veracious to his people; he could not acknowledge candidly that Russia was to any degree in the wrong, that she suffered defeats, that she had large numbers killed in battle, or that she would relax in her haughty claims—he could not do this without damaging the idol, the God-man, which the humbler Muscovites associate with the name of czar. Hence the unscrupulous and systematic falsehoods with which Russia so startled the other nations of Europe during the war. The rulers might well dread the day, if it should ever come, when the deluded peasantry would learn the truth; and might well hope that the war would

* *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1855.

end before such a revelation were dragged forth.

There is, therefore, abundant reason to believe that the Russian authorities, in the autumn of 1855, were really desirous of peace, and were only making use of the tricks of diplomacy to obtain the best terms possible.

TREATY OF ALLIANCE WITH SWEDEN.

While these negotiations—now suspended for a while, now renewed with some appearance of earnestness, now again suspended—were engaging public attention, Scandinavian politics demanded the notice of the Western Powers.

Situated as are Sweden and Norway in relation to the Baltic and the North Sea, those kingdoms cannot be otherwise than deeply interested in any aggressive movements of Russia. The Norwegians, in this and other particulars, claim to be treated as a distinct nation much more decidedly than other powers are in the habit of admitting. If a treaty be made with Sweden, it is considered to be made with Norway also, as a subordinate kingdom under the same monarch; but the Norwegians are not willing it should be forgotten that this state of things has existed only since 1814, and that they took care to have their constitutional independence acknowledged at the signing of the union. In time of peace there exists little further community between Sweden and Norway than between two free and independent nations. There is at all times a military alliance between them, for their mutual assistance and defence; this alliance is rendered perpetual by the aid of a joint hereditary monarchy; and hence, perhaps, arises the erroneous opinion in England and other countries that the relation between Sweden and Norway is analogous to that between England and Ireland or Scotland. So far is this from being the case, that the king governs through separate ministers, and with the aid of separate legislative bodies. A diplomatic courtesy between the two nations is maintained, by the king in his state-papers giving the name of Norway or Sweden the preference, according as the document specially affects one or the other. As a further evidence, it may be remarked that in 1851, when the Great Exhibition was held in London, Sweden and Norway were represented by separate commissioners totally independent of each other. The two nations are pledged to assist each other in war, or at least not to take opposite sides; but the Norwegian council of ministers must accord its sanction before the sovereign can declare war in the name of both countries; and the Norwegian storthing or parliament must vote its consent before a single Norwegian regiment or ship will join the Swedish forces. Thus, it will be seen, Norway is in a very wide sense independent of Sweden; although this independence does not often become manifest in the foreign relations with other countries.

Practically, this difference has not much affected the state of feeling towards Russia; seeing that both Norwegians and Swedes have long distrusted the policy of the czars. Still, Norway is more interested in watching the movements of Russia in the North Sea; while Sweden feels greater peril in the Baltic. The difference between these two lines of aggression may usefully be sketched here.

It will be observed* that at the time when Peter the Great ascended the throne, Russia possessed all the northern coast as far west as Varanger or Waranger Fiord; and that, although the possession reached a more westerly meridian at a later date, it never gained another mile of sea-coast. To extend its sea-board in this direction, the court of St Petersburg encouraged many intrigues during the reigns of Alexander and Nicholas. To obtain Varanger Fiord has been an especial object of desire. This fine bay has a mouth twenty miles wide, all deep water; and is bounded by a Norwegian headland on one side and a Russian headland on the other. The bay, running nearly east and west, has several fine harbours on the south shore, all but one within the Norwegian limit. Russia has tried sedulously to obtain all this southern side, and offered at one time to exchange for it a miserable and nearly useless tract called Enontekis Lapmark. The exchange was not effected; but Russia contrived to maintain a sort of chronic boundary-dispute with Sweden, to furnish a pretext for 'appropriation' at some critical juncture. The Norwegian and Lapland fishermen have long had an undefined dread of Russian policy in that quarter; and even at Hammerfest, on the Atlantic side of the North Cape, a similar distrust has prevailed. Varanger Fiord abounds in fish; and it was under a pretence of making it a fishing-station that Russian diplomacy endeavoured to obtain possession of the fine harbours. One of these harbours, that of Köfjorden, fronted by the island Scogesö, and having water five to fifteen fathoms deep, might accommodate a very large fleet; Englishmen who have travelled in that region see in it the capabilities of a second Sebastopol or Sveaborg; and the Norwegians entertain a well-founded dread that if this harbour were once possessed by Russia, the czar's power would soon round the North Cape and make itself felt on the Atlantic coast of Norway. An English tourist in Lapland in 1855 heard a merchant at Hammerfest say: 'If it had not been for this war, Finmark would have been a Russian possession in four years, and I should have been a count; but I would rather be what you call a country gentleman;' he further explained that during many years Russian agents had occasionally traversed Finmark, sounding the people, and making overtures to them of increased trading advantages, and titles to their influential men, if they would

* See Coloured Map of 'Russia in Europe.'

further Russian interests in that quarter. Considering that there are no 'Sound dues' payable at the North Cape, no intricate navigation among Danish and Swedish islands, and no maritime interests of Prussia or Denmark to consult, far-seeing men have argued that a Russian arsenal in Varanger Fiord might perchance be more troublesome to England than any establishments belonging to the czar in any other parts of the world; and that, without incurring any charge of selfishness, she might consistently demand a limitation in that quarter.

The spread of Russian influence in the Baltic, more nearly affecting Sweden than Norway, has already been noticed.* The Swedes unquestionably hoped that the Western Powers would put a decided check upon that influence during the war: the hope was a reasonable one, the vast strength of the Allied fleets being considered; yet little occurred to give realisation to it, from the operations at Bomarsund in 1854, and at Sveaborg in 1855, to shake the hold of Russia upon Finland. Trade, it is true, was nearly stopped during two years, and all classes of the czar's subjects suffered in consequence; but the whole injury was one of mere money-value, if the war should end without any limitation of the Russian sea-board in the Baltic. The Swedes, in conversation and in their newspapers, gave free expression to their apprehensions on this point. Unfortunately, too, the mode in which the war was carried on in the Gulf of Bothnia greatly exasperated the Finlanders against the English: the wholesale destruction of stores, warehouses, granaries, ships, boats, and fishery-stations—notwithstanding every care that the attack should be limited to imperial property, or property intended for imperial uses—fell heavily on the traders living in the towns and villages on the Finland side of the gulf; as a consequence, the Finlanders were much more earnest in the czar's cause in 1855 than in 1854.

The Swedes at first thought the war to be a virtual declaration of civilised Europe against the unscrupulous aggressions of a semi-barbaric nation—a declaration intended to produce fruit in the north as well as in the south; but when they found, during the prolonged conferences at Vienna in two consecutive years, that the Baltic was scarcely named, they lost heart. It was little to them who held the mouths of the Danube, or who controlled the Turkish Christians, or who governed the Principalities, or who maintained the largest fleets in the Euxine; but it was a question of vital importance to the Scandinavian nations, whether or not the czar were permitted to extend his Baltic influence in the direction of the Sound? When they thought they saw before them a great struggle of civilisation and freedom against Muscovite rudeness and serfdom, they began to count up their soldiers and their ships, and see whether they too could take a share in the honourable contest; but when symptoms appeared that Turkish interests alone were to be heeded, they pondered whether offence given by Sweden to Russia during the war might lead to disastrous consequences when the war should be over. It was pointed out again and again that the spirit which dictated the acquisition of Livonia, Courland, Esthonia, and Finland, still existed, and would not rest until the Baltic became virtually a Russian lake; and Cronstadt, Sveaborg, and the unfinished Bomarsund were pointed to as proofs that the czar—certainly not needing such vast strongholds for mere peaceful commercial objects—evidently intended them as bases for further aggressive movements. When, after the operations of 1854, the Aland Islands were given back again to Russia, the poor islanders suffered severe punishment for the aid they were supposed to have given to the invaders; they, as well as the Finlanders, had been injured rather than bettered by the visit of the Allies; and the Swedes were entitled to ask, whether they too might not share in this disadvantage, if they moved from their position of neutrality? At any time during the war the Swedes and Norwegians would have supported their king in a struggle against the great Muscovite power; but they approved his determination to remain neutral until the Western Powers gave positive proof that they meant to impose a limit to the encroachments of Russia in the north as well as the south. The Swedes hoped that England, at least, would see the danger of allowing Russia to become mistress of the Baltic, to possess such harbours as those of Karlskrona or Landskrona, to hold the Sound and the Great Belt, to obtain Bergen or Trondjem on the western coast, or to claim the services of the hardy fishermen who dwell along the coast. The Scandinavians counted up their two national fleets of gun-boats, and found that Sweden and Norway together could furnish more than 300 of those useful craft, fitted to navigate the creeks and shoal-waters of the Baltic; that there were 50,000 hardy seamen belonging to Norway alone; that Sweden could furnish an army of 40,000 men, eager to assist in reconquering Finland from Russia; and they said to the Western Powers: 'If you will make the great contest European instead of merely Turkish, we will aid you with these appliances; else, our position requires that we should remain strictly neutral.'

These facts, and the reasonings founded thereon, were not forgotten by the governments of England and France. Unquestionably the war arose out of a Turkish question, and could not be regarded as European without new alliances, new manifestoes, new demands; but the interests of the Baltic nations were nevertheless held in mind; and although Sweden did not join the Western Powers in a war against Russia, a treaty was signed likely to have important results. After much correspondence between the three courts, England and France agreed upon a plan, and sent

* Chapter VI., pp. 152-155.

General Canrobert as a negotiator: this selection being made, apparently, to convince the general that the transfer of Crimean command from him to Pelissier had not lessened him in the estimation of the emperor. The general went to Sweden in November 1855, stopping at Denmark on the way; he was received with marked distinction at Copenhagen and Stockholm, both by the royal families and by the two nations generally; and he negotiated the terms of an alliance between Sweden on the one part and England and France on the other. The treaty was signed on the 21st of November, and the ratifications exchanged at Stockholm on the 17th of December. Its provisions, chiefly comprised in two articles,* are unquestionably very important to the Scandinavian nations. Whenever Russian intrigue shall entangle Sweden into a net, or shall threaten the extension of the czar's power in Sweden or Norway—whether on the North Sea, German Ocean, or Baltic coasts—England and France are immediately to be called in to council; the king engages not to make any cession without consent of his new allies; while they undertake, in the event of any armed aggression on the part of Russia, to afford military and naval aid to the king—the obvious purport being, that Russia shall not be allowed to increase her strength in the north at the expense of Sweden and Norway. This treaty gave great satisfaction to those two nations, and no little irritation to the court of St Petersburg. Baron Stierneld, Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed, on the 18th of December, a circular to Swedish envoys at foreign courts, explanatory of the motives which had led to the treaty. He reminded them that Sweden and Denmark, at the commencement of the war, had signed a convention binding them both to neutrality, and that these engagements had been kept; but he added: 'The more the struggle gained in extent, the nearer the inconveniences of war approached our shores, the more had we to consider the dangers it might bring upon ourselves.' The policy of the czars was thus adverted to: 'Apprehensions for the future, founded on remembrances too well known to need mention, and suggested by the obstacles made by Russia to a satisfactory adjustment of the boundary relations in the northern provinces, were increased still more by the manifestation of aggressive plans by that power in the East; under other and more favourable circumstances, those plans might obtain a development in the north of a nature to cause us serious embarrassment. . . . . No one can say what eventual contingencies are hidden in the womb of the future; and in such difficult circumstances as the present, it is the duty of every sovereign to look after the maintenance of the independence, and to insure the welfare, of the nations intrusted to his care.' The baron requested the envoys to point out to foreign courts 'that the terms of the treaty are too precise to admit of any misconception. The alliance just concluded is a defensive one; it will depend upon Russia to prevent its application, as this would not occur unless caused by an aggression on her part. Let Russia respect our rights—let her cease to inspire cause of alarm for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe—and this treaty will not be of any prejudice to her.'

Denmark, although she had agreed with Sweden on a policy of neutrality, did not join in this treaty. The Western Powers made many attempts, during the progress of the war, to draw the court of Copenhagen into closer amity; but her interests were not identical with those of the other Scandinavian nations. Moreover, Denmark was troubled with internal subjects of discord. The king had given a constitution to his Danish subjects in 1848; but his war with Holstein, in rebellion against his sovereignty, plunged him into difficulties. The German powers, when this revolt was over, would not allow him to introduce Danish liberty into Holstein; and therefore, as he had undertaken to 'unite' the whole Danish monarchy under one system, he felt impelled to infuse Germanism into Denmark Proper and Schlesvig. This naturally irritated the Danes, who were rendered uneasy when the plan was first proposed in 1852, and suspicious when the seeming fairness of the plan was shewn to be illusory. Struggles, party divisions, ministerial changes, dissolutions of the Danish parliament, threats of impeachment, followed; and the Danes were hence too much occupied with domestic troubles to mingle in foreign politics. Being a trading people, too, the mass of the inhabitants relished a state of

* *Treaty between Her Majesty, the Emperor of the French, and the King of Sweden and Norway.*

'Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, being anxious to avert any complication which might disturb the existing balance of power in Europe, have resolved to come to an understanding with a view to secure the integrity of the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway, and have named as their plenipotentiaries to conclude a Treaty for that purpose' [here the names and official titles are given], 'who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

ART. I.—His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway engages not to cede to nor to exchange with Russia, nor to permit her to occupy, any part of the territories belonging to the Crowns of Sweden and Norway. His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway engages, further, not to cede to Russia any right of pasturage, of fishery, or of any other nature whatsoever, either on the said territories or upon the coast of Sweden and Norway, and to resist any pretension which may be put forward by Russia with a view to establish the existence of any of the rights aforesaid.

ART. II.—In case Russia should make to His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway any proposal or demand, having for its object to obtain either the cession or the exchange of any part whatsoever of the territories belonging to the Crowns of Sweden and Norway, or the power of occupying certain points of the said territories, or the cession of rights of fishery, of pasturage, or of any other right upon the said territories and upon the coasts of Sweden and Norway, His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway engages forthwith to communicate such proposal or demand to Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of the French; and their said Majesties, on their part, engage to furnish to His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway sufficient naval and military forces to co-operate with the naval and military forces of His said Majesty for the purpose of resisting the pretensions or aggressions of Russia. The description, number, and destination of such forces shall, if occasion should arise, be determined by common agreement between the three Powers.

Done at Stockholm, the 21st of November, in the year of our Lord 1855. ARTHUR C. MAGENIS.
V. LOBSTEIN.
STIERNELD.'

neutrality while others were at war, since it led to a vast expenditure of English and French money at Danish ports. Moreover, an arrangement had been made concerning the succession to the Danish throne, which would give Russia an interest in the subject; and the royal family was believed to be influenced by Muscovite sympathies. As a result of all these combined circumstances, when England and France proposed to Denmark a treaty similar to that concluded with Sweden, a decided refusal was given. The king announced his determination to remain neutral, and to hold entirely aloof from the bond with which his Scandinavian neighbour had bound himself to the Western Powers. Russia, in addition to other ties, had contrived to make herself useful to Denmark in a complicated question relating to the 'Sound dues;' a question which could not be solved definitely without the concurrence of about a dozen maritime nations; and the czar's government obtained a hold over that of Denmark in the negotiations connected therewith.

The above considerations will tend to shew, therefore, that in so far as the Western governments endeavoured to establish alliances with the Scandinavian nations against Russia, the endeavour was successful with Sweden and Norway, but not with Denmark. The alliance, it will also be seen, had relation to possible future contingencies, and not to actual participation in the war.

PEACE CONGRESS AT PARIS.

While the policy and terms of the Swedish treaty were under consideration; while the British parliament, wearied with a long session, was resting after its stormy and often unsatisfactory labours; while continental politics were apparently in a state of abeyance—Austria continued to search for means of pacification between Russia and the Western Powers. To what extent this search was aided by Russia herself, was not acknowledged. The czar seemed, outwardly at least, to be the first to propose peace; England and France, on their part, felt that the best pacificator would be some signal victory by land or by sea, and resolved not to propose any new terms of peace until the war had somewhat further advanced. It thus arose that Austria, or Prussia, or both, would necessarily be the channel of communication—seeing that Turkey was not likely to operate until her Allies had broken ground. That the princesses belonging to the imperial courts of St Petersburg and Vienna, or others of either sex possessing court influence, corresponded on the subject unknown to the world at large, is probable enough; but it is at least known that the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Buol, laboured actively during the

Czar Alexander II.

autumn in search of peace propositions. Whatever may be the judgment formed concerning the value of the Austrian plan proposed at the Vienna Conference in April, Count Buol was unquestionably entitled to claim for it this merit—that it had met with the approval of Lord John Russell and M. Drouyn de Lhuys; a fact not to be gainsaid, however decisive may have been the rejection of the plan by the two courts of which those statesmen were the accredited but unsuccessful plenipotentiaries. The fall of Sebastopol, in September, was probably the most efficient instrument in elaborating a system of pacification; for, within a few weeks after that important event, rumours of negotiations again spread from one to another of the European capitals.

Austria, in the course of lengthened negotiation, ascertained the *minimum* amount of concession the Western Powers would require from Russia, as the basis for a peace; and proceeded to draw up a proposal founded on that basis. A difference of opinion on this matter appears to have existed for some time between England and France, the former having required more stringent terms from Russia than the other; but a unity of plan having at length been arrived at, Austria employed Count Valentine Esterhazy, her representative at the court of St Petersburg, to lay that plan before the notice of Count Nesselrode. The court of Vienna at the same time solicited the aid of Prussia in bringing about a peaceful solution of the European difficulty. The court of Berlin, whatever may have been its family bias towards that of St Petersburg, was necessarily in antagonism with it in many important particulars: the king was the continental patron and supporter of Protestantism, upholding that faith at Rome and at Constantinople as well as in his own dominions; there are 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 Protestants in Russia, mostly in the provinces adjacent to Prussia; and on these several grounds, the king was necessarily far from accord with the czar—professing, as the latter did, to be the head of the only 'orthodox' church. Still, whatever may have been the points of divergence, Prussian advocacy was not unreasonably valued, in so far as it might induce Russia to accept equitable terms of peace.

The Austrian proposals were made to Russia about Christmas. The newspapers which received their inspiration from St Petersburg affected to spurn the idea that these proposals would be more stringent than those rejected in the spring; but it soon appeared that the Western Powers would not sanction them unless the stringency were very materially increased. Nay, there is not wanting evidence that the czar was the first to make the new propositions. Be this as it may, Russia agreed to a plan suggested by Austria, to form the basis of a conference or congress of all the powers concerned. The plan comprised 'Four Points,' like many others that had preceded it. The first, relating to the Danubian Principalities, abolished the Russian protectorate; sanctioned a new form of government, in the determination of which the inhabitants should have a voice; declared that the various states of Europe would respect such form of government as the sultan should grant, and as the inhabitants should be willing to accept; and laid down the principle that Russia would abandon so much of Bessarabia as was required to render the Moldavian frontier on the Pruth less exposed to danger. The second, relating to the Danube, freed that important river from all political obstructions; and declared that each of the contracting powers should have the right of stationing one or two small vessels at the mouths of the river, to insure the freedom of Danubian commerce. The third, relating to the Black Sea, closed that sea against all fleets except a few light Turkish and Russian vessels to act as a maritime police or coast-guard; the sea to be open to merchant-ships of all nations; and the Turkish and Russian ports to be available for commercial purposes only, not as naval or military arsenals. Finally, the fourth, relating to the Christian subjects of the Porte, placed those Christians under the joint protection of all the powers, without any preference to Russia—the protection being so exercised as not to infringe on the independence and dignity of the sultan's crown. There was a supplementary or annexed clause, not so definite as the Four Points, but admitting important consequences: it declared that the Allies reserved to themselves the right of proposing special conditions, over and above the Four Points. Comparing these terms with the series proposed by Austria in the spring of the year, it will be seen that they were more stringent against Russia, especially on the Third Point, which declared the virtual annihilation of the czar's naval power in the Black Sea. Russia so far assented to these terms as to agree that they should form the materials out of which a pacification might be framed.

It was on the 16th of January 1856, that the Russian acceptance of the terms became known in Vienna, and a few hours afterwards in Paris and London. So many had been the disappointments arising out of the repeated failures in diplomacy, that the sincerity of this acceptance was at first much doubted. Reasonable men sickened at the thought that a repetition of the abortive Vienna Conferences was possible; and they preferred to work out a peace by open war rather than by secret diplomacy. Still, those best acquainted with the internal condition of Russia knew that nearly all classes in the czar's dominions yearned for peace, if such could be obtained on terms not absolutely humiliating and dishonourable; and this yearning, supported by the known desire of the Emperor of the French to prevent the war from extending its range, was regarded as an augury favourable to the acceptance of terms not overwhelming in their stringency upon Russia. A variety of circumstances, operating

differently upon different nations, had rendered the courts of St Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris more earnest than that of London in desiring peace; in England, the government received a larger measure of popular support when exhibiting a warlike than a deferential tendency towards Russia; and it became evident that the nation would rather bear heavy taxation for another year of war, than listen to a peace which would leave the czar opportunity to prey again upon the sultan.

When Russia had provisionally accepted the terms offered, a question at once arose—Ought hostilities to continue during the diplomatic conferences; or would it be right to establish an armistice for a definite period, until the result of the deliberations had been ascertained? In England, the proposal for an armistice was very unwelcome; the public generally expected the conferences would fail, and believed that the czar would make use of the period to strengthen his military position at all assailed points. Precedent, however, pointed to an armistice under such circumstances; but it was not possible to assign a date to the armistice until numerous official dispatches had passed to and from the courts of London, Paris, St Petersburg, Vienna, Constantinople, Turin, and Berlin, which would necessarily consume much time. Concerning the two last-named powers, Sardinia had earned a right to a voice in the congress, by having drawn the sword in alliance with the Western Powers; while Prussia was supported by Russia and Austria in a claim, not at first admitted by England and France, to take part in the discussions, as a power deeply interested in the peace of Europe. Many continental towns were named as the place of meeting, each having its advocates; the Allies, having seen and felt the disadvantages of Vienna for such a purpose, proposed Paris, and this proposition was assented to by all.

Each sovereign justified the proposition for the conference in the eyes of envoys and nations, by such arguments as appeared most applicable. The Russian government, in a circular to its ministers at foreign courts, said: 'This is not the place to inquire whether these propositions unite the conditions necessary for insuring the repose of the East and the security of Europe, rather than those of the Russian government; it is sufficient here to establish the point, that at last an agreement has been actually arrived at on many of the fundamental bases for peace. Due regard being had to this agreement, to the wishes manifested by the whole of Europe, and to the existence of a coalition the tendency of which was every day to assume larger proportions, and considering the sacrifices which a protraction of the war imposes upon Russia, the Imperial government has deemed it its duty not to delay by accessory discussions a work the success of which would respond to its heartfelt wishes. It has, in consequence, just given its adhesion to the propositions transmitted by the Austrian government as a project of preliminaries for negotiations for peace. By the energy of its attitude in the face of a formidable coalition, Russia has given a measure of the sacrifices which she is prepared to make to defend her honour and dignity. By this act of moderation, the Imperial government gives at the same time a new proof of its sincere desire to arrest the effusion of blood, to conclude a struggle so grievous to civilisation and humanity, and to restore to Russia and to Europe the blessings of peace. It has a right to expect that the opinion of all civilised nations will appreciate the act.' The British government, in the Queen's speech at the opening of the parliamentary session for 1856, touched on the subject with more brevity and coldness: 'The naval and military preparations for the ensuing year have necessarily occupied my serious attention; but, while determined to omit no effort which could give vigour to the operations of the war, I have deemed it my duty not to decline any overtures which might reasonably afford a prospect of a safe and honourable peace. Accordingly, when the Emperor of Austria lately offered to myself and to my august ally, the Emperor of the French, to employ his good offices with the Emperor of Russia, with a view to endeavour to bring about an amicable adjustment of the matters at issue between the contending powers, I consented, in concert with my Allies, to accept the offer thus made; and I have the satisfaction to inform you, that certain conditions have been agreed upon, which I hope may prove the foundation of a general treaty of peace.'

Among the questions which the various courts of Europe were called upon to discuss, before the plenipotentiaries met at Paris, was that relating to the interpretation of the Fourth Point. Christian Europe was to protect the Christians of Turkey, but only on some system assented to by the sultan. To determine this system, the ambassadors of the several powers at Constantinople conferred with the Ottoman government. The sultan—a quiet man plunged into the conflicts of a stormy period—was not difficult to be dealt with by the ambassadors; he had the good sense to see that his Allies would no longer tolerate the oppressions which weighed upon the rayahs or Christians of Turkey; and after a few interviews, terms were agreed upon which enabled the various powers to give a definite form to the Fourth Point, in the forthcoming congress at Paris, and which will need to be treated somewhat fully in a future page.

An important day was the 25th of February 1856, the day on which the fourteen representatives of the seven powers—or rather the twelve representatives of six powers, for Prussia was not at first admitted—held their first formal meeting at Paris for the transaction of official business: intrusted with the task of putting an end to stern war, by devising the means of pacification, at the same time reconciling the discordant interests of

various states. The diplomatists intrusted with these onerous duties were the following:—

England,	Earl of Clarendon, Lord Cowley.
France,	Count Walewski, Baron de Bourqueney.
Austria,	Count Buol-Schauenstein, Baron de Hübner.
Russia,	Count Orloff, Baron de Brunnow.
Turkey,	Vizier Aali Pacha, Mehemmed Djemil Bey.
Sardinia,	Count de Cavour, Marquis de Villa-Marina.

Introduced at a subsequent date—

Prussia,	Baron de Manteuffel, Count de Hatzfeldt.

Preparations were made by the French government to accommodate the diplomatists in a saloon well shielded from prying eyes and curious ears. The building selected for this purpose was the hotel or official residence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the Quai d'Orsay. Rigid precautions were adopted to prevent the divulgence of any details concerning the debates. This was absolutely necessary; for, in the interests both of commerce and of politics, it was right that all the powers should be placed upon a level touching the reception of news from the seat of diplomacy. The sittings took place at intervals generally of two or three days apart—sometimes as many as five or six; for the two plenipotentiaries from each country had many things to discuss in private, concerning the tactics at each successive meeting. There was a system of intrigue carried on at that time in Paris; Russian ladies, noble in title but spies in avocation, were seeking to worm out the secret intentions of the French emperor; for the czar's government desired to sever or shake the tie between England and France, and to obtain better terms as a consequence. The policy of Orloff and Brunnow, therefore, consisted in making practically available all the facts which could be ascertained by their agents; and it became the more incumbent on the English and French plenipotentiaries to be at the same time firm and watchful.

The narrative of the proceedings of the congress, in the original French and the English translation, as presented by command of the crown to parliament, fills a Blue-book of considerable magnitude; but it may be possible to give such a condensed summary of the 'protocols' as will suffice for the objects of the present volume. Each protocol is the record of one day's proceedings, or one sitting; and as there were twenty-four days of formal meeting—or, more strictly, twenty-four sittings on twenty-three days—between the 25th of February and the 16th of April, there are in all twenty-four protocols.

At the first sitting (February 25th) Buol proposed, in courtesy to the sovereign in whose capital they had met, that Walewski should be president of the congress—a proposition assented to by the other plenipotentiaries. It was also agreed that the drawing up of the protocols should be intrusted to M. Benedetti, of the Foreign Office at Paris. The members then bound themselves to secrecy concerning the proceedings of the congress. After a discussion concerning an armistice at the seat of war, it was determined that such should be established, to be continued until the 31st of March—the hostile commanders to remain strictly at peace during that period, but the maritime blockade to be continued.

At the second sitting (February 28th), the discussion of the terms of peace was commenced: the Austrian propositions of the preceding December being adopted as a basis. The plenipotentiaries went over the propositions sentence by sentence, to ascertain that they agreed in the interpretation of the words employed, without which all subsequent discussions would be futile. It was agreed that Prussia should be invited to take part in the congress at a later period, but should have no voice in the main proceedings. The third sitting (March 1st) brought these preliminary discussions to a close.

At the fourth sitting (March 4th) the 'Third Point' was brought on; seeing that the Allies deemed this the most important as an element in peace. The representatives of Russia struggled for the best terms obtainable, in relation to the number of ships to be maintained in the Black Sea, the destruction of arsenals, and the limitation of ship-building to vessels of commerce. The members agreed that eight months should be allowed to a commission to settle the Asiatic boundary between Turkey and Russia. The fifth sitting (March 6th) was chiefly occupied with the question of the Danube; words being so carefully selected as to express clearly the mode in which the navigation of that important river should be liberated from obstructions.

Here it may be remarked that the world had never before witnessed a congress of plenipotentiaries acting under such extraordinary circumstances. As the electric-telegraph had afforded the means of flashing the news of a victory across Europe, so did it now furnish a channel through which terms of pacification might be discussed. Day by day did the plenipotentiaries send off telegraphic messages to their respective governments, detailing the proceedings of each sitting, and asking for instructions on any doubtful points, or rather, details were sent by couriers, and brief outlines by telegraph. The members were thus enabled, throughout the series of meetings, to fortify themselves with frequent instructions from their governments. This might have led to interminable delays, in the discussion of small and often renewed objections; but England and France were determined that, on this occasion at least, they would not be trifled with; and Russia, seeing and knowing this, exhibited a *bonâ-fide* wish to pursue the discussions to a peaceful conclusion.

At the sixth and seventh meetings (March 8th

and 10th), the 'First Point' was mainly discussed, concerning the future government of the Principalities. At what place the new boundary should commence; whether Moldavia and Wallachia should have joint or separate governments; what should be their relation towards the sultan; and what labours of adjustment should be intrusted to a separate commission—were questions fully considered. The eighth and ninth meetings (March 12th and 14th) were mainly taken up with the final settlement of several matters pertaining to the Danube and the Principalities, left in abeyance at the former meetings.

Most of the important outlines having been now marked out, Bourqueney, Buol, and Aali Pacha, as a sub-commission, were requested to prepare the terms of a treaty of peace; and the document produced by them was considered at the tenth sitting (March 18th). The members discussed also the terms of a separate convention between Turkey and Russia, respecting the fleets in the Black Sea; as likewise the nature of the duties to be intrusted to a commission, respecting the navigation of the Danube.

The time having now arrived when Prussia could be admitted to the much-coveted honour of a place in the congress, Manteuffel and Hatzfeldt made their appearance at the eleventh sitting, which was a second meeting on the same day (March 18th). At that meeting, and at the twelfth (March 22d), the regulations to be adopted concerning the closing of the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus were taken into consideration. At the thirteenth and fourteenth meetings (March 24th and 25th), the debates ran to great length concerning the Fourth Point—the amount and kind of guarantee which the sultan would be willing to give concerning the social position of the Christians in Turkey. The end of the month was now approaching, and as the armistice at the seat of war would cease on the 31st, it became essential to hasten the proceedings of the conference. Accordingly, at the fifteenth and three following sittings (March 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th), the formal articles of the Treaty were proposed and accepted one by one, together with various 'annexes' and conventions.

At length, on Sunday the 30th of March, the fourteen plenipotentiaries, holding their nineteenth meeting, signed the Treaty of Peace, and three conventions bearing relation to it.* This being done, the members agreed that the armistice should be further prolonged till the time of the exchange of ratifications; and orders to this effect were at once transmitted to the East by the representatives of the five powers actually engaged in the war—England, France, Sardinia, Turkey, and Russia.

The signing of the Treaty was a great event; and each plenipotentiary, it is said, had the intention of preserving as a memento the pen with which his signature was given. But this was overruled at the special request of the empress, who entreated that all the signatures might be written with one pen, to be preserved by her as a treasure; accordingly an eagle's quill, richly mounted with gold and jewels, was used as the symbol of pacification. The plenipotentiaries then went to the Tuileries in a body, and made a formal announcement to the emperor of the result of their long-continued deliberations.

The labours of the congress were, however, not yet over; for it was necessary to settle the details of all that related to the cessation of hostilities, and particularly to the blockades; to prepare the instructions designed to guide the Principalities' Commission; and to arrange the withdrawal of the various armies from the Crimea and other scenes of contest. Five more sittings were hence necessary, and were held on the 2d, 4th, 8th, 14th, and 16th of April. It was decided to raise the blockade at once, thereby liberating commerce from the trammels imposed by war, without waiting for the ratification of the Treaty by the respective sovereigns. The members also agreed that the withdrawal of English, French, Sardinian, and Turkish troops from the Crimea, of English and French troops from Turkey, of Russian troops from Kars, and of Austrian troops from the Principalities, should be effected as speedily as possible.

The twenty-second meeting (April 8th) was the longest, the most excited, and in some respects the most important of all; since it was marked by an interchange of opinions concerning several great European questions, not directly involved in the Russian war. It will be a useful course to single out the protocol of this meeting from all the others, and print it nearly in full in an Appendix; seeing that it became a groundwork or text for much political agitation afterwards, especially in Italy.* The plenipotentiaries, it will be seen, although invited merely to terminate a war caused by the aggression of Russia upon Turkey, did not think it right to separate without touching on other grounds of European dispute; they thought a peace congress a fitting instrument to extend the blessings of peace in other countries. Yet it was a delicate undertaking; for the various powers of Europe have conflicting interests to subserve. All the plenipotentiaries were free to express a wish for better government in Greece; but when the distracting state of Italy was noticed, Russia was silent, and Austria uneasy and contentious; when Prussia put in a claim concerning Neufchatel, she wished to make the congress a handle for her own extension of territory; and when France wished to lay an iron hand on the journals of Belgium, England was obliged to withhold assent to a doctrine subversive of that liberty of the press which she so cherishes. These difficulties apart, however, it was well that the plenipotentiaries

* These documents are printed in full, in the Appendix.

* *Vide* Appendix.

exchanged opinions on these subjects. The case of Italy became afterwards the most important; for Sardinia, as her only reward for having fought and bled in the war, demanded that the miserable despotisms of Italy should be inquired into, and that her own power as a state in Europe should be freed from the haughty interference of Austria and the priestly tyranny of Rome. Sardinia had earned the right of a place among the 'great powers' of Europe, and demanded to be treated accordingly: England and France admitted the right, but Austria shewed extreme jealousy and irritation; insomuch that Count Buol found this meeting of the 8th of April the least satisfactory of the whole series.

The supplementary labours of the plenipotentiaries were valuable in two additional directions. One, declaratory of the importance of mediation as a possible preventive of war, was embodied in a document brief but interesting. Another, tending to lessen the crushing effects of war upon commerce, assumed the form of a declaration and a short series of resolutions. Both these documents are printed in the Appendix.

THE PACIFICATION.

The representatives of the seven powers having, on the 30th of March, signed at Paris the Treaty of Peace, copies of this Treaty were transmitted to the several courts, to receive the signatures of the sovereigns, as a ratification or final acceptance. When these ratifications were exchanged at Paris, on the 27th of April, the terms of the Treaty became binding upon all; and the respective governments entered upon those several proceedings to which they had pledged themselves.

England and France presented striking differences during the sittings of the congress. The French were becoming tired of the war, which pressed heavily on the national resources; the Crimea had afforded sufficient victories to excite the enthusiasm of a military nation; and their emperor had so cleverly managed his foreign affairs as to bring the eyes of all nations upon him as, at that time, the most influential potentate in Europe. England, on the other hand, had only just remedied the disasters occasioned by an ill organisation in the army and the state; she had improved her army in numbers and condition; she had vastly increased her stock of useful gunboats; and she knew that she could bring to the war in 1856 a force more complete than had been possible in either of the preceding years. There was, too, a wound in the national dignity; men smarted to think how little England had really effected during the war, compared with the anticipations entertained at starting. Hence the prospect of peace, of an immediate peace, was decidedly unpopular; there was a general wish for another 'brush' with the Russians—a taking of Sveaborg or Cronstadt—or a signal limitation to the territorial dominions of the czar. The tax-payers measured the achievements with the cost, and found them wanting.

While the sittings at Paris were being held, frequent questions were put to the English ministers in parliament concerning the progress of the negotiations. Would the terms be stringent upon Russia? would she be made to pay the expenses of the war? would she be punished by losing the Crimea, or the Caucasus, or Finland? would Poland, or Italy, or Hungary, or the Circassians be thought of by the plenipotentiaries, and benefited by the terms of pacification? would Sardinia be rewarded for her gallant alliance with the Western Powers? would Austria be allowed an equal voice, after having refused to share the cost and perils of war? would Prussia be admitted on any terms to the congress, after having observed so doubtful a neutrality? To these questions the ministers could answer but little; the responsibility on the plenipotentiaries was great, and the power placed in their hands ought to be great also. The answer was not satisfactory to those who were opposed to the government, or were violent against Russia; but as it was in accordance with official usage, no parliamentary movements were made to disturb the official reserve. When the terms of the Treaty became known, they exceeded the expectations of some persons, and fell short of those of others. The peace-party thanked the Earl of Clarendon for having obtained such large concessions from Russia; while those in whom the anti-Russian feeling was strong, bitterly reproached him for not having ground the czar to the dust. One London newspaper went to the extravagance of placing itself in mourning, as a symbol of its intense grief and shame at the disgrace alleged to have been brought upon England by the Treaty; and all who entertained a dislike to what was termed 'Germanism,' asserted or hinted that the honour of the country had been sacrificed to the German sympathies of the court. In the firing of guns and ringing of bells; in the proclamations by heralds and mayors; in the receptions and congratulations; in the fireworks and illuminations—the same remarkable state of public feeling was exhibited. There had been no very earnest desire for peace; and therefore when peace arrived, its terms were discussed with a stern scrutiny utterly alien from the wild enthusiasm which distinguished its reception among the Parisians.

All the sovereigns of Europe had something to say to their subjects, laudatory of the pacification; they could not do otherwise without acknowledging themselves defeated in diplomacy. The czar and his three brothers went to Moscow in the second week of April, and addressed a deputation of nobles, generals, and civil authorities. After a few preliminary words concerning the justness of the war, he remarked: 'I should certainly have carried it on had not the voice of neighbouring states pronounced itself against the

policy of late years.' This was an unmistakable admission that Prussia and Austria had disapproved of the aggressive tendency of Nicholas. The czar then added: 'Many of you, I am aware, regret that I should have so readily accepted the propositions made to me. It was my duty as a man and as the head of a great empire, either to reject or accept them frankly; I have honourably and conscientiously fulfilled that duty; I am sure that allowances will be made for the difficult position in which I was placed, and that shortly every devoted friend of Russia will render justice to my views and intentions for the welfare of the country. Supposing the fate of arms should have remained constantly favourable to us, as it has been in Asia, the empire would have exhausted its resources in keeping up large armies on different points, the soldiers of which would in a great measure be taken away from agriculture and labour. In the government of Moscow itself many manufactories have been compelled to close. I prefer the real prosperity of the arts of peace to the vain glory of combats. I have thrown open the ports of Russia to the commerce of the world, the frontiers to the free circulation of foreign produce. I wish, henceforth, that the greatest facility shall be afforded in our markets for the exchange of ware of every origin, and of the raw materials and manufactures of our soils. Various projects will shortly be communicated to you, the object of which will be to give an impulse to home industry, and in which, I trust, every nobleman will take a share.' The address of the patriarch of Moscow to his flock, a few days later, was a much less straightforward document: it burned with frenzied intolerance against the enemies of 'orthodox' Russia, and yet it was enforced to assume a sort of satisfaction that war was over. A manifesto, published by the czar on the 1st of April, immediately on the arrival of the telegraphic news that the Treaty had been signed at Paris, was couched in terms calculated to make his subjects believe all the objects sought by his father Nicholas had been attained; but in his subsequent address at Moscow he was more candid, and approached more nearly to an honest confession of the real facts of the case.

The czar, nevertheless, and his ministers Orloff and Brunnow, were bitterly mortified to find that England, France, and Austria shewed evidence of distrusting Russia's sincerity, even at the time of the pacification. In the interval between the signing and the ratification, a Tripartite Treaty was made by those powers wholly without the knowledge of the Russian plenipotentiaries. On the 15th of April—the day after the sitting during which the remarkable conversation took place concerning European politics generally, and the day before the final sitting of the congress—Clarendon, Cowley, Buol, Hübner, Walewski, and Bourqueney signed a treaty between England, France, and Austria, plainly indicating distrust of Russia, and recognising the necessity of checking that power by something stronger than mere pledges or promises.* The last-named power had bound herself by certain terms in the great treaty of pacification; but there was nothing in that treaty to determine in what manner Russia should be punished if she broke the treaty and again troubled Turkey—hence the Tripartite Treaty, declaratory of the fact that England, France, Austria, one or all, would declare war against Russia—or rather against any power—that failed to observe the stipulations concerning the integrity of the sultan's dominions. When this agreement became known, the irritation of the Russian authorities was great; they found that diplomatic tact had not wholly succeeded; they saw that, while endeavouring to obtain the best practicable terms for Russia, they had not succeeded in removing suspicion from the minds of their antagonists; they felt the czar to be still treated as an offending member of the European family of sovereigns. The Emperor Napoleon had managed so skilfully as to ingratiate himself with Russia during the congress; and compliments had begun to pass profusely between the two states; but the Tripartite Treaty brought forward an indignant remonstrance, as if the French emperor had unworthily distrusted the czar. It is doubtful whether England and France, in reply to such remonstrances, could candidly own the truth, and acknowledge a distrust of Russian sincerity; but whether candour or diplomatic courtesy prevailed, it was impossible for Russia to feel otherwise than mortified by this revelation. Against Austria especially the anger was extreme. There had evidently been an expectation that Austria would befriend the czar at the congress, against the Western Powers; this was not done to the desired extent; a coolness between Orloff and Buol hence arose at their official meetings; and the unpleasant feeling spread to the two courts when the contents of the Tripartite Treaty became known.

Peace having been declared, the armies in the Crimea were naturally among the first bodies to be

* 'Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, wishing to settle between themselves the combined action which any infraction of the stipulations of the Peace of Paris would involve on their part, have named for that purpose as their Plenipotentiaries [here follow the names]; who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:—

ART. I.—The High Contracting Parties guarantee, jointly and severally, the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, recorded in the Treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of March 1856.

ART. II.—Any infraction of the stipulations of the said treaty will be considered by the Powers signing the present Treaty as *casus belli*. They will come to an understanding with the Sublime Porte as to the measures which have become necessary, and will without delay determine among themselves as to the employment of their military and naval forces.

ART. III.—The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in a fortnight, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Paris, the 15th day of the month of April, in the year 1856.

CLARENDON.
COWLEY.
BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
HÜBNER.
A. WALEWSKI.
BOURQUENEY.'

affected thereby. The cost of maintaining those armies was immense, insomuch that the revenues of the several states were heavily pressed upon even by each single week of warfare; and the work of withdrawal was eagerly begun. The generals, as agents of their sovereigns, first thanked the armies, and then commenced the arrangements for evacuating the Crimea. There was something characteristic of the various nations in the mode of making the announcement. Pelissier, almost at the very hour of receiving the news from Paris, proclaimed it in impetuous and high-flown language;* while Della Marmora, waiting a few days, issued a proclamation† equally soldierlike, but couched in more moderate phraseology. The English, tardy in this as in many other things, deferred the congratulatory announcement until much later; and then it was not so much an address from a general to his soldiers, as a dispatch from Lord Panmure, in which the army was spoken *of* instead of spoken *to*. The dispatch, adverting to the services of the army, included the following among the modes in which it had won glory and honour:—'Shortly after its arrival in Turkey, and while doubtful as to the manner in which it was to be brought in contact with the enemy, it had to sustain the terrible attack of cholera, which prematurely closed the career of many a gallant and eager spirit; on this occasion, the army proved that moral as well as physical courage pervaded its ranks. Led to the field, it has triumphed in engagements in which heavy odds were on the enemy's side. It has carried on, under difficulties almost incredible, a siege of unprecedented duration, in the course of which the trying duties of the trenches, privations from straitened supplies, the fearful diminution of its numbers by disease, neither shook its courage nor impaired its discipline. Notwithstanding that many a gallant comrade fell in their ranks, and they were called to mourn the beloved Commander who led them from England, and who closed in the field his noble career as a soldier, Her Majesty's troops never flinched from their duties, or disappointed the sanguine expectations of their country.' The praise here given was fully deserved; and if a dispatch from a secretary of state is more cold and formal than an address from a great general to his soldiers, it must be remembered that there was no great general to address the British at that time and place—no one whom the voice of the ranks proclaimed to be a commander imbued with high military genius.

There was another army, the Anglo-Turkish contingent, necessarily withdrawn from the scene of warfare after the pacification. Formed at a vast expenditure of time and trouble, it had only just arrived at a state of efficiency when peace was proclaimed.

Constructed out of Turkish materials by British skill and money, the contingent was gradually brought to a condition in which much was expected from it; and a prolongation of the war would probably have led to a fulfilment of this expectation. When the armistice was agreed upon, Lieutenant-general Vivian left the contingent at Kertch, to restore his shattered health; and wrote from London on the 1st of May, after the Treaty was signed, to take leave of his companions-in-arms. Enumerating the services rendered by the several officers, in bringing to a state of admirable organisation the departments of quartermaster-general, adjutant-general, commissary-general, engineering, medical, land-transport, &c., he specially mentioned the names of Major-generals Shirley, Mitchell, Dickson, and Cunnynghame; Brigadier-generals Neill, Evans, Holmes, and Hall; Colonels Wetherall, Morris, and Graham; Lieutenant-colonel Crewe; Majors Stokes, Johnstone, Vaughan, and Brett; Dr M'Pherson; Commissary-general Adams; and his two Turkish aids-de-camp Hussein Bey and Arif Bey. Of the Turks themselves, Lieutenant-general Vivian thus spoke: 'The Turkish officers and soldiers of all arms have displayed great merit in the cheerful devotion with which they have laboured through the winter to render their position as strong as possible. The lieutenant-general assures them of the high opinion he has formed of them during the period they have been under his command. In their military ardour, care of their weapons, obedience, sobriety, and patience, he sees the noble qualities which led, under proper direction, to the brilliant defence of Silistria and Kars—qualities which he feels assured would have conduced to similar results had the contingent been engaged under their

* 'Soldiers—The Emperor lately said to your brethren: "You have well deserved of the country." You will successively hear, in your turn, the same expressions from the august lips of His Majesty.

Soldiers—By your energy, by your resolution, your heroic constancy, your indomitable courage, you have achieved, with our brave and faithful Allies, the peace of the world.

I have a right to say it, at the sight of so many fields of battle sprinkled with your blood, witnesses of your calm self-denial, and from which each time your glory rose more radiant and noble, and crowned your sublime efforts.

You will shortly see again your country, happy at your return, happy at a glorious peace, a peace signed at the cradle of an Imperial infant. Let us all be impressed with that augury; let us find in it a new sign of Divine protection, and, if necessary, an additional inducement to accomplish all our duties towards the Emperor and the country.—The Marshal Commander-in-chief,

A. Pelissier.'

† 'Soldiers—The peace signed at Paris on the 30th of March last, puts an end to the hopes each of us entertained for the glory of our arms. This feeling is more keenly felt by those who know the important task which was reserved to us had hostilities continued. But the object for which the sword was drawn having been attained, we ought not to desire the prolongation of the calamities which are inseparable from war. Let us console ourselves with the thought that what we have done, and what we were ready to do, is appreciated by our generous Allies, and will not be lost for the future of our country.

I owe you praises and thanks for your constant self-denial, for your exemplary discipline, for your ingenious activity, and for your bravery; but you will hear them with greater pleasure from the mouth of our beloved Monarch, whom we hope shortly to behold again.

Whatever may be the post in which the Sovereign will may place me, I shall never forget how on the 16th of August, after having contributed in driving back the formidable attacks of the enemy, you all eagerly desired to follow the flag which crossed the Tchernaya. I shall always remember with what ardour, on the 8th of September, each of you was desirous of taking part in the assault, one of the most murderous recorded in history.

And should fate hereafter lead us to other battle-fields, I shall esteem myself happy to be with you, my present comrades in this memorable war of the Crimea.—The Commander-in-chief,

La Marmora.'

British officers.' Later in the same month, Major-general Dickson took leave of the artillery division of the contingent, in the same complimentary terms as Vivian had addressed the whole body. These were not empty, insincere compliments; for Vivian at Kertch, as Williams at Kars, had found indubitable proofs that the Turks make admirable soldiers—brave, obedient, honest, and temperate—when well commanded; and General Beatson succeeded in infusing a modicum of civilisation even into the wild reckless Bashi-Bazouks.

The expression of thanks and the awarding of praise were the holiday phases of peace, so far as the Crimea was concerned; to which perhaps may be added a pleasure-trip that fell to the share of some of those encamped on the plateau outside Sebastopol. During the month's armistice, the Russian authorities gave permission to a few Allied officers and journalists to take a short tour into the interior; and this afforded a most welcome change from the monotony of the camp during a period of no-warfare. The visitors went along the coast to Baidar, Alupka, Yalta, and Alushta; then turned inland, crossed the Tchatir-dagh to Simferopol; and returned to Sebastopol by way of Baktchéserai. Prince Woronzow's magnificent palace at Alupka was visited, and although deserted by its owner, was found to have been well tended, and almost wholly uninjured by the war. The empress's palace at Oreanda, and the palaces belonging to the Prince de Ligne, Prince Galitzin, Count Potocki, Count Petroffsky, and General Narishkin—structures which shewed to what an extent the southern coast of the Crimea had been selected as a pleasure-spot by wealthy Russians—exhibited in like manner evidence that their owners would find them nearly intact at the conclusion of the war. The tourists, passing thence into the interior towards Simferopol, had ample proofs how much the villagers had suffered in various ways, and how greatly the Crim Tatars wished that they could have seen the departure of the Russians altogether. On the hill-slopes around Simferopol were vast cantonments for the Russian troops, underground huts of which the roofs alone peered above the hillside; and the country on all sides of the town was trodden into a bare, brown plain by the ceaseless march of soldiers. Many of the private houses had been appropriated as hospitals; for the number of sick was terrible. The town was found to be entirely undefended, not a gabion or a gun on any side. The English officers were now convinced, as many had before suspected, that the Allies could easily have captured Simferopol after the battle of the Alma, and have cut off Sebastopol from its supplies; yet, although the stupendous siege of that wonderful fortress would thus have been obviated, it is not certain that the result of the war would have been more favourable to the Allies. For it is worthy of observation that the material resources of the Russian Empire were actually brought to the verge of exhaustion by the defence of Sebastopol alone—the frightful loss of human life, draught-animals, vehicles of transport, food and fodder, stores and ammunition, all being duly considered; and there is at least a possibility, perhaps a probability, that if this siege had not taken place, the Russians might have been less exhausted than they were by two years of warfare, and less willing to listen to terms of pacification. All this might be true, and yet little merit be due to the Allied governments and commanders, who were certainly without any great plan of strategy, any comprehensive scheme of policy, when the campaign commenced. One of the tourists, speaking of the scene which met his view on the return from Simferopol to the British camp, said: 'As we advanced towards Mackenzie's Farm by the main road from Baktché-serai to Sebastopol, we began to appreciate the enormous difficulties under which our adversaries laboured in the late contest. It is only short of miraculous that they continued to feed their army at Mackenzie and Inkermann at all. The expenditure of life of man and beast, and the amount of labour required in order that their transport-service might be conducted with the smallest success, would be incredible, if one did not see the tracks of hardened mud still marked with the bones of oxen—the quantities of fascines laid down to make those tracks passable, and the bridges which have been constructed over the Alma, the Katcha, and the Belbek.'

The armistice afforded a few scenes of gaiety to the commanders themselves. General Codrington, writing to Lord Panmure on the 19th of April, said: 'General Lüders invited Marshal Pelissier, General Della Marmora, and myself to meet him at the Traktir Bridge at twelve o'clock on the 13th inst., in order that we might accompany him to a breakfast on the Mackenzie heights. The meeting accordingly took place. General Lüders, with a large staff of Russian officers, was received in the French lines by a guard of honour, and with a salute of artillery; after which, followed by many officers of the Allied and Russian armies, we crossed the river and the plain of the Tchernaya, and ascended the heights of Mackenzie, at the road by which our army came to Balaklava on the flank-march from the Belbek, in September 1854.' A military parade and a breakfast followed, in which the Russian officers displayed every possible courtesy to their late opponents. On the 15th, General Lüders came, with many Russian officers, to Marshal Pelissier's to breakfast, and to be present at some races. 'It is needless to say that their reception was as cordial and the attention as kind as that shewn to us in the Russian camp. The afternoon was passed at the course in the neighbourhood of the Monastery of St George, where the races and a *carrousel* of the Chasseurs d'Afrique finished the day.' On the 17th, Marshal Pelissier reviewed the French army on the range of heights near the Monastery of St George; Lüders attended; and the march of the French past the

assembled commanders was superb—88 battalions, 5 regiments of cavalry, siege-artillerymen, sappers, and 198 guns. The whole of the assembled generals then went to luncheon at General Codrington's head-quarters. 'The English army was formed at a short distance in front of these head-quarters; the siege-train and the sappers on the right of the infantry; 49 battalions in contiguous quarter-distance columns of regiments; 2 troops of horse-artillery, and 5 batteries on the right of the line; 6 batteries and 2 heavy batteries on the left of the line—in all 86 guns. Two regiments of the Land-transport Corps were complete and in good order in rear. . . . . General Lüders returned to Baktchéserai, having expressed himself much gratified at the attention shewn him by the Allies.'

Duties of a more serious character, however, now demanded the attention of the generals. Large armies were to be removed from the Crimea, and vast stores of provisions and ammunition brought down from the plateau on which they had been collected in such immense quantities. The French gradually drew in their outposts from the Baidar Valley and its vicinity towards Kamiesch; the Sardinians collected their small force from Tchoulion and other places near the Tchernaya; while the British began to make preparations at Balaklava for the due shipment of men and stores. To expedite and facilitate the departure, Lüders gave permission that the Harbour of Sebastopol might be employed. It was with intense curiosity, a mingled feeling of triumph and disappointment, that the Allied naval officers steered a way with some of their ships between the uprising masts of the sunken Russian vessels, and entered that magnificent harbour which for nineteen months had to them been an unattainable object.

Various complainings began to be heard in the English camp. Officers whom the fortune of war had rapidly placed in command over brigades, found themselves, according to the usages of the army, thrust back again, in rank and pay, to the position of regimental colonels; and officers' horses, taken over by them at a great expense, were to be disposed off in any way practicable, either sold or brought home as the officers themselves might prefer. The difficulty of insuring means of transport was the main cause for this decision, a decision regarded by the officers as mean and unjust on the part of the government. To facilitate the disposal of the horses which could not be brought to England, Codrington obtained leave from Lüders for the holding of a horse-fair on Mackenzie heights, in order that the English officers might have an opportunity of selling their horses to Russians or others; but this was a woful failure; the prices offered were so ridiculous for their smallness as to be scarcely worthy of acceptance. The discontent on this subject was partially removed by new orders from London, authorising arrangements somewhat more favourable to the officers. It was a matter of more serious import to the officers, however, to determine what would become of themselves when all was over: would they be able to earn their bread with their swords? It is the custom, when war supervenes, and calls for an enlargement of the army, to increase—not greatly the number of regiments—but the number of battalions, companies, and soldiers in each regiment, entailing also an increase in the number of officers. This was done during 1854; the officers receiving full pay were largely augmented; and now it became certain that a return to a peace establishment would throw these additional officers out of employment. It was supposed that not less than 400 would, in some way or other, be unfavourably affected by the change; and a state of doubt concerning the extent of this injury pressed anxiously on the thoughts of every man of slender means. Even the humbler grade of persons suffered: many sergeants who had bravely gone through the terrible struggles at Alma and Inkermann, had been promoted to cornetcies in the Land-transport Corps, and had been put to some expense in fitting themselves out in their new dignities; and yet peace thrust them back to their former positions. The extra sixpence per day, too, given to the privates during the war, was withdrawn almost on the very day when the war ended. These results were inevitable concomitants of a return from war to peace; but the army was irritated at the manner in which the change was effected—at the cold parsimony marking the last stage of a war in which such lavish expenditure had occurred.

Week after week, during the summer months, did the various regiments leave the Crimea—some for Malta, others for the Ionian Islands, the West Indies, or Canada, but the greater part for England. All the camp-equipage and stores for each regiment had to be brought into transport order, and everything brought down to the landing-place where the embarkation was to take place. Early in the month of June, when it became a question what best to do with certain dietetic luxuries, a tariff of prices was established, contrasting curiously with the cost which the nation must previously have incurred for the purchase and transport of those articles.* The Sardinian army was conveyed in

* General Order, No. 8; June 7th.—'The following is a list and prices of articles in the purveyor's store in Balaklava, to be sold to officers of the navy and army:—Port wine, 21 hhds., price £30 each, in wood; ditto, 2500 doz., £1, 1s. per doz., in 2 doz. cases; sherry, 24 half hhds, £15, 1s. per doz., in 10, 4, 3½, 3, 2, and 1 doz. cases; ditto, 1800 doz., £1, 1s. per doz., in 2 doz. cases; Madeira, 6 half hhds, £15 each; Marsala, 10 quarter-casks, £5 each, in 10 gallons; brandy, 900 doz., £1, 10s. per doz., in 1 doz. cases; ale, 500 doz., 9s. per doz., in 2 doz. cases; soda-water, 200 doz., 4s. per doz., in 4 and 8 doz. cases; tea, 2200 lbs., 1s. 3d. per lb., 85-lb. cases; sugar, 20,000 lbs., 5d. per lb., 85-lb. cases; rice, 12,000 lbs., 2d. per lb., 266-lb. cases; arrowroot, 2000 lbs., 8d. per lb., 56-lb. and 84-lb. cases; sago, 4000 lbs., 6d. per lb., 85-lb. cases; tapioca, 500 lbs., 6d. per lb., 85-lb. and 120-lb. cases; oatmeal, 150 barrels, £2 per barrel; preserved meats, 20,000 lbs., 6d. per lb., 89-lb. and 76-lb. cases; preserved soups, 2000 lbs., 6d. per lb., 89-lb. and 72-lb. cases; soup and bouilli, 50,000 lbs., 6d. per lb.; preserved milk, 6617 lbs., 1s. 6d. per lb., in 56-lb. cases; candles (sperm), 1000 lbs., 8d. per lb., 56-lb. and 80-lb. cases; soap, 4000 lbs., 3d. per lb., 56-lb. and 112-lb. cases; milk, 6000 lbs., 6d. per lb., 60-lb. cases; cocoa and milk, 8000 lbs., 1s. 6d. per lb., 67-lb. cases.'

British steamers from Balaklava, and had left the Crimea long before the last English regiments. The French, well versed in military details, embarked at Kamiesch steadily and continuously, with their immense stores of camp and siege-material.

The slight attempts made in England to give a triumphant reception to the returning fleets and armies were but partially successful. Official rejoicing scarcely harmonises with the genius of the English people; nor do the government authorities understand fully the management of those pageants which form so brilliant a feature in French demonstrations. Whether the soldiers should have a public reception; how many of them; where and when; in what form and by whom—became matters of controversy almost angry in its character. And when the mighty fleet was reviewed, so lame was the official organisation, that bitter complaints and scornful taunts were the chief reward given to the Admiralty. In truth, the career of the fleet during the war was felt as a national wound—not only by the people, but by the officers and seamen themselves. The former willing to pay, the latter willing to fight; and yet during two years the finest navy in the world had effected little that could be afterwards referred to as grand and glorious. This feeling was prevalent in the minds of the vast concourse of spectators who, on the 23d of April 1856, assembled at Portsmouth to witness the steaming to and fro of the stupendous fleet there collected. The Admiralty had made greater preparations for a naval war in 1856 than in either of the two preceding years; Commodore Watson had been sent out to the Baltic as soon as the ice began to give way, with a vanguard squadron of steamers, or 'fleet of observation;' and during the winter a vast fleet of gun-boats had been built. All these preparations had come too late; the visitors admired the wondrous assemblage at Spithead; but their admiration was damped by the consciousness that a fleet, fitted for the battles to be fought, was only assembled in the very month when the war ended. A fine sight it unquestionably was. Nearly sixty steam ships-of-war, of which fourteen were 80 guns and upwards; two 90-gun sailing men-of-war; forty-four mortar-boats and floating-batteries; and about 160 steam gun-boats—congregated at Spithead, and manœuvred in the presence of the royal family, the two Houses of Parliament, the great officers of state, and countless spectators. It was a fine sight, in relation both to the physical excellence of the force, and to the moral evidence it afforded of the resources of a nation that could make such a display at the end of a war; but it failed to inspire enthusiasm. Old men sighed over the recollections of Nelson and Collingwood, Howe and Jervis; and men of the newer generation, believers in steam and in science, asked for some evidence that those adjuncts had yet added anything to the glory of England on the seas.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.

Peace being proclaimed, the nations of Europe naturally inquired whether the objects for which the horrors of war had been incurred were realised. Or rather, it was in England mainly that this inquiry arose. Austria and Prussia had borne none of the horrors; Sardinia was not deeply concerned; Turkey had been taught to look rather to her Allies than to her own resources; France was too earnestly desirous for returning peace to scrutinise closely the terms of the Treaty; while Russia, as the losing party, could not of course be expected to view the result with any satisfaction. Thus the critics of the Treaty were mostly to be found in England. Irrespective of mere party opponents, great disapproval of the terms of pacification was felt and expressed by many independent members of parliament, and by large sections of the nation. Men asked of the ministers—Have you crushed the power of Russia? have you put a permanent check to the aggressive spirit which had been pronounced so dangerous to Europe? have you taken from the czar the whole or any part of the Crimea, or Circassia, or Georgia, or Bessarabia, or Poland, or Finland? have you reinstated the oppressed nationalities? have you demanded the surrender of the remaining fleets belonging to Russia? have you insisted that the czar shall defray the expenses of this war? When it was found that every one of these questions must be answered in the negative, the disappointment and anger in many quarters were very great.

When, however, the conditions of the war came to be duly considered, a doubt arose whether the disappointment, as thus indicated, was altogether well-founded. It may reasonably have been that the English nation desired larger results from a war so costly in blood and treasure; but it was necessary, in common fairness to the ministers, first to ascertain whether the original objects of the war had been attained. Now these objects had relation to the aggressive tendency of Russia on Turkey. Month after month, during the year 1853, the powers of Western and Southern Europe, as with one voice, urged upon the Czar Nicholas the propriety of withdrawing claims which could not be conceded without shaking the independence of Turkey to its very centre. He refused to

acquiesce in these concessions; and hence England and France, in the spring of the following year, declared war against him. Referring to the language* of this declaration, as used by the Queen of England, which was a counterpart of that by the Emperor of the French, it will be seen that the conduct of Russia towards Turkey was adverted to as the sole cause of the war. The question of the Holy Places, the Menchikoff mission, the demand for a secret treaty, the invasion of the Principalities, the refusal of Russia to listen to the advice of the Four Powers—all were cited in turn; and the Queen then declared that, in conjunction with France, she had felt called upon, 'by regard for an ally, the integrity and independence of whose empire have been recognised as essential to the peace of Europe, by the sympathies of her people with right against wrong, by a desire to avert from her dominions most injurious consequences, and to save Europe from the preponderance of a power which has violated the faith of treaties, and defies the opinion of the civilised world—to take up arms, in conjunction with the Emperor of the French, for the defence of the Sultan.'

Now, if the Declaration of War and the Treaty of Peace be regarded as two links in a chain of causation—the one a statement of wrongs, and the other a remedy for those wrongs—it can scarcely be disputed that the remedy applies directly to the wrongs indicated. The czar claimed powers in Servia, and not only claimed but exercised powers in Wallachia and Moldavia, utterly inconsistent with the sovereign powers of the sultan: the Treaty puts an end completely to this interference, and takes from Russia a portion of Bessarabia to strengthen the Principalities. The czar connived at the choking up of the Danube, and at the establishment of posts, in part military and in part quarantine, to check Turkish commerce, and paralyse Turkish influence in that region: the Treaty stops this injustice at its source, by taking away from Russia every foot of ground held by her at or near the banks of the river. The czar maintained so overwhelming a fleet in the Black Sea, and such vast arsenals at Sebastopol and Nicolaïeff, as to hold a perpetual menace over the Ottoman Porte, and to render a repetition of the Sinope outrage not only possible but probable: the Treaty puts an end to this danger by limiting the size and number of Russian war-ships in the Black Sea; by forbidding the building of war-ships on any port or in any river belonging to that sea; by authorising Turkey to maintain there a small fleet equal to that of Russia; by allowing a few light vessels belonging to England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Sardinia, to cruise in those waters, as a means of insuring the fulfilment of the terms of the Treaty; by authorising the sultan to call in the aid of the fleets of the Western Powers, if Russia should infringe the terms of pacification; and by laying down the general principle that this sea is to be regarded and used simply as a highway for the commerce of all nations. The czar kept up a vast system of intrigue and espionage in every part of the Turkish dominions inhabited by Greek Christians, claiming to be the natural protector of those Christians, 13,000,000 in number, and sapping the foundations of the sultan's authority over them: the Treaty checked this tendency by declaring null and void all special protective power; and by declaring all Turkish Christians—whether Greek Catholic, Roman Catholic, or Protestant—to be under the joint protection of all the Christian powers of Europe in common, as a price paid by Turkey for being admitted into the great family of European states, and for having a voice in European affairs. Furthermore, to remove any doubt concerning the obligation laid upon Russia to respect the terms of the Treaty, the six powers—England, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Sardinia—by Article VII., bind themselves each to respect the independence and integrity of the sultan's dominions; to guarantee in common the strict observance of this obligation; and to regard as a question of European international importance any tendency to infringe it. As if to strengthen still further this hold upon the good faith of Russia, the special treaty of the 15th of April binds England, France, and Austria to regard as a *casus belli* any departure by the czar from the terms of the greater Treaty.

If, after this, the future of Turkey be left in doubt and peril, it must be attributed to causes inherent in the state of that remarkable empire, rather than to a dangerous power left in the hands of Russia. England and France did not undertake to make Turkey prosperous and happy; it would have been an object Utopian in character, unattainable by any external means; but what they did attempt was to remove the northern incubus which weighed upon the sultan, and it is only fair to admit that they effected this.

So strong, during a long-continued series of years, had been the sympathy of the English nation with the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Italians, against the spoliations or crushing despotism of the governments of St Petersburg, Vienna, Rome, and Naples, that any moderate liberation of those nationalities would have been joyfully accepted as parts of the general treaty of pacification; men would have borne more willingly the losses and numerous humiliations of the war, if they could point to any 'rectification' of Europe as one of the fruits. Had England, alone and unassisted, undertaken to fight the battle of liberty, she might have marked out her own course, and chosen her own weapons. But she allied herself with other powers for a special object; and then arose the question—What would her allies assist her in doing? Would France, governed by a despotic emperor, who had created a throne for himself by exceptional means—would imperial France lend much countenance to constitutional

* Chapter III., pp. 70, 71.

yearnings, to freedom of debate, to liberty of the press, in other countries? Would Austria, as part of a policy of defending Turkey from Russia, listen to arguments for liberating Galicia, or Hungary, or Lombardy from her rule? A particular mode of cure was adopted for a particular disease; and it is no reproach to that cure to say that it was inapplicable to a disease of another kind. Had the military and naval successes of the Allies been more complete, a few more concessions might have been wrung from Russia. But they could have affected the Treaty in *degree* only, not in *kind;* for the parties to the Treaty in an alliance formed with especial reference to Turkey, would not have been unanimous concerning any terms that would have applied to the various social maladies affecting the nationalities of Europe. Russia would have been only too glad to see such questions arise during the progress of the war, since they would have tended to break up the alliance, and weaken the force against which she was contending.

The relation borne by the Treaty to the war of which it was a sequel, and the relation borne by that war to the general condition of European politics, may perhaps best be considered by glancing successively at many different nations. The means will thus be afforded for determining whether the war could and did cure the evils, or supply the deficiencies, observable in the social condition of the respective countries.

Turkey.—Not only has the Ottoman Empire been long undergoing a process of disorganisation, but this disorganisation has been one of the excuses for Russian interference. The czars have long contended that as the 'sick man' must surely die, it may be well to determine who shall seize upon his effects. The question on which statesmen have been most discordant is—Whether the Ottoman disorganisation be indicative of a final break up, or only of a healthy reform at some future date? The Western Powers, in their treatment of the sultan, have leaned rather to the latter theory; they see, or think they see, elements of strength in the midst of the weakness, and would willingly develop those elements by due encouragement. They are conscious, too, that any disruption of the Osmanli rule would lead to a scramble among the potentates of Europe—each endeavouring to obtain a share of the spoil, and in danger of being plunged into war by diverse views concerning the partition.

Externally, it can hardly be denied that the war left Turkey stronger than before. Russian audacity was expelled from Servia and the Principalities; Russian interference was driven from the mouths of the Danube; Russian fleets were all but annihilated in the Black Sea; Russian fortresses on that sea were reduced in number and in strength; and Russian claims to a special protection of the Greek Christians in Turkey were formally repudiated by the united voice of Europe. If, internally, Turkey were doomed to a much longer season of suffering and disorder, this was what no war could obviate. Miseries resulting from organic vices within a nation cannot be reached by any external cure. The Allies were well aware of this; and hence the earnestness with which they urged upon the sultan the adoption of useful domestic reforms, as the only means of giving stability to his empire. It was from these remonstrances, strengthening the sultan's own convictions, that resulted the truly remarkable 'hatti-shérif,' the *Magna Charta* of Turkish liberty, granted in the spring of 1856. This document can best be studied by regarding it as a sequel to a former charter, the 'hatti-shérif' of Gulhané in 1839; and in order to afford means for this comparison, both are printed in the Appendix.

To appreciate the value of these charters, we must know something of the social maladies which afflicted the people. Men raised to office through the most despicable influences, without any reference to their ability; intrigues at Constantinople to obtain the downfall of one favourite and the uprising of another; peculation and bribery throughout the whole range of government and municipal offices; taxes laid on Christians, from which Mohammedans were exempt; inequality of the law, when Christians and Mohammedans appeared before the tribunals; monopolies granted to favourites, to the injury of fair trading; rapine and disorder in many localities, through the absence of an efficient police—these were some only of the drawbacks to the welfare of Turkey. Others were inherent in Mohammedanism as a religion, and in Orientalism as a mode of domestic life, which no reforms can wholly root out.

Although there was a remarkable democratic equality in theory among all beneath the sultan, the mass of the Turkish people gained little by this seeming fairness; it promised well, but fell off wofully in practice, by reason of bribery, fraud, favouritism, intrigue, and violence. The rayahs or Christians were exposed to further and peculiar pressure. Besides the regular taxes to the government, the rayah peasant had to pay a tax to the Mohammedan superior of the town or village in which he lived, and a poll-tax for every male member of his family; he was compelled to furnish provisions and horses during the march of an army; he was required to devote twenty or thirty days of labour in every year to public works, and to prepare roads and buildings for the reception of the great functionaries during their official visits—all these being imposts or vexations laid upon him because he was a Christian.

The most sagacious of the sultans have long seen that the corruptions in office and the oppressions on Christians were weakening the stability of the empire; but the fanaticism which forms so remarkable a constituent in Mohammedanism has rather checked than aided any reforms in these matters. Sultan Mahmoud planned many changes; and when his son Abdul-Medjid succeeded him in 1839, he proceeded at once to give

effect, in words at least, to Mahmoud's wishes, by making public a hatti-shérif which had long been prepared. It was such a day as ought to be reckoned among the golden days of a nation, when this charter of liberty was promulgated; that is, it would have been a golden day if the promises made were fulfilled. The hatti-shérif of Gulhané, drawn up by Reshid Pacha as minister of the sultan, was regarded as a part of the *Tanzimat*, or Reform Bill, or Bill of Rights, or Magna Charta of the Turks; or rather, the tanzimat was the reform, while the hatti-shérif was the imperial manifesto which gave sanction and validity to it. On the 3d of November 1839, numerous tents were raised in the gardens of the imperial palace of Gulhané, within the Seraglio at Constantinople; and there were assembled the sultan, numerous members of his family, the great vassals of the empire, the high dignitaries of the state, the ambassadors from foreign powers, deputations from the Greek and Armenian churches, the chief rabbi of the Jews, deputations from various corporate bodies, and lines of soldiery. The grand vizier presented the hatti-shérif, or imperial manifesto, to Reshid Pacha, who read it in a loud voice; the sheikh-ul-islam pronounced a prayer; the artillery fired off a salvo; and the reform was considered to be formally established—or, more correctly, set in train for being established at some subsequent period.

Reading the successive clauses of this document,* it will be seen that useful reforms were pointed out, praised, and sanctioned; but that no definite rules were laid down for attaining the end desired; it bore some such relation to an actual change of governmental proceeding, as a resolution of the House of Commons bears to an act of parliament—it was the expression of a desire, rather than the enforcement of a determination. The hatti required careful wording, to avoid arousing fanatical opposition on the part of the old Mussulman party; and this gave a slight air of contradiction to some of the clauses. The main improvements announced related to the security of life and property to all subjects of the Ottoman Empire, without reference to their religion; a regular mode of taxation; and an equality in conscription. Most of the clauses relate to one or other of these three objects. The government proceeded gradually to give effect to some of these improvements, by means of the official machinery indicated in the hatti itself. The whole of the changes thus begun are generally referred to as the tanzimat, a collection of reform-statutes, to which additions are made from time to time by the great councils, and which, if carried on, would constitute a body of statute-law for the Ottoman Empire. Practically, the tanzimat has advanced slowly. It has been found easier to write reforms than to make them. So many Turks are bigoted to old usages, so many more profit by old abuses, that the sultan's wishes have advanced tardily towards realisation.

When the diplomatists of Europe, at the beginning of 1856, began the final negotiations for peace, they sought to bind down Turkey, once for all, to the observance of the tanzimat and its reforms, as some return for the services rendered by the Western Powers. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe drew up the scheme for a new hatti, still more sweeping than that of 1839. On the 29th of January, a council was held, and the Porte accepted the proposed document, with a few minor changes; and not only so, but the sultan ratified his consent by going to a public ball at the mansion of the British ambassador—a condescension quite unprecedented in a 'Padishah of all the Ottomans,' and exciting unbounded astonishment among the orthodox believers of the old school. The new charter*—called, somewhat confusedly, by all the three titles 'firman,' 'hatti-shérif,' and 'hatti humayoon,' and presenting the form of an explication of the tanzimat and of the hatti-shérif of Gulhané—was printed in all the languages spoken in the empire. It was publicly read first at Constantinople, on the 18th of February, in presence of the ministers, civil and military functionaries, together with the softas, ulemas, hadjis, patriarchs, archbishops, bishops, and rabbis of the several religious communities, and afterwards at the different mosques.

During the sittings of the congress at Paris, the plenipotentiaries endeavoured to obtain the recognition of these sweeping Turkish reforms as part of the Treaty itself; but this was resisted by the sultan's representatives. At the second sitting, Count Orloff asked what steps the sultan had taken, or was about to take, to secure the privileges of the Turkish Christians; and Aali Pacha, in reply, gave an outline of the new hatti-shérif, which would be formally communicated to the powers of Europe by an official note. The plenipotentiaries generally expressed an opinion that this important charter should be mentioned in the general Treaty—not as indicating a right of interference with the internal policy of Turkey, but as a justification of the trust placed by those powers in the good faith of the sultan. Aali Pacha did not feel that he was empowered to assent to this, without further instructions from Constantinople. At the thirteenth sitting, Walewski, Clarendon, and Aali Pacha agreed on the mode in which mention of the hatti-shérif should be made in the Treaty, 'in such terms as at once to establish the spontaneity of the Ottoman government in this matter, and so as that there should not, in any case, result from it any right of interference on the part of the other powers.' Orloff and Brunnow raised many objections to this; as if they, representing the czar, doubted the good faith of the sultan in what concerned the Greek Christians; Russia still yearned for a

* See Appendix.

* See Appendix.

remnant of the old power of 'protection' over her co-religionists in Turkey. Aali Pacha, however, stated that the sultan was firm in insisting that the hatti-shérif should have all the aspect of a spontaneous proceeding; it would weaken his power as an independent sovereign, and lower him in the eyes of his subjects, if this concession appeared to spring from any external pressure. Aali remained immovable on this point; Clarendon and Walewski supported him; and the Russian plenipotentiaries yielded. It will be seen in the Treaty* that phraseology singularly guarded has been employed on this subject—a very necessary precaution, to prevent other powers from constantly intermeddling with the internal economy of Turkey. A patient might suffer from too many doctors.

The representatives of all the powers felt that a long series of years must elapse before the concession of this truly great charter could be fully effected. Any violent effort at reform would cause rebellion; and therefore the changes required cautious handling. Whether Abdul-Medjid—a man of weak character, now frightened by the foreign ambassadors, and now cajoled by his numerous wives, daughters, pipe-bearers, and harem attendants—would be able to support firmly his part in the important and difficult changes, was only one among many sources of uncertainty to the Western Powers.

The war found Turkey in terror and peril from an external foe; it left her in an internal convulsion. But it would be erroneous to infer that the war caused this convulsion. If the old effete Orientalism had continued, unaffected by European vigour, the Ottoman Empire, in the opinion of statesmen of all countries, would have frittered away to ruin; the war, and the terms of pacification, have given it a chance at least of reviving, by determining to what extent the enterprise of the European Christian can be grafted on the conservatism of the Oriental Mohammedan. Turkey is richly gifted by nature; and the tanzimat, if it can be peacefully realised, will allow of these natural gifts being developed by industry, commerce, and education. The diplomatists of 1856 did not wish to anticipate the question—What shall be done if the 'sick man' should die?

Danubian Principalities.—Unless difficulties of unforeseen character arise, the Treaty of Peace should render these important regions more prosperous than they have been during many ages; since it will afford means for developing the resources of a country rich in corn, cattle, and other produce. Placed between three empires, with ill-defined relations towards all, Wallachia and Moldavia have been a prey to miserable intrigues and hostile invasions—as has more than once been noticed in this work. The Austrian occupation during the war shewed that the House of Hapsburg desired eagerly to extend its power into those regions. The Roumani—a national name for the inhabitants of both Principalities—shuddered at such a prospect; for during the two years' occupation, the Austrians rendered themselves hateful by their cruelty, harshness, and overbearing conduct.

During the sittings of the congress at Paris, the members, especially those representing England and France, sought earnestly for the means of placing the Principalities on a safe and advantageous basis. They debated whether the two provinces, if joined into one state, under one hospodar, would be improved by the change; whether the hospodarate should be hereditary; whether a constitution should be drawn up by Turkey, or by all the powers in common, or by the Roumani themselves; whether they should have forts and an army of their own; and whether a slip of Bessarabia (itself a Roumani province) would not be required from Russia, to render the navigation of the lower part of the Danube free for Wallachian and Moldavian commerce. It will be seen*, that the Articles XV. to XIX. of the Treaty lay down rules of a precise character for the attainment of this last-named very desirable end; insomuch that, if all be carried out in good faith, the trade and industry of the Danubian provinces cannot be otherwise than benefited by the Treaty. It will be noticed, also, that eight Articles, XX. to XXVII. inclusive, give a sketch of the machinery whereby a system of good government may afterwards be established—leaving power to the Roumani themselves, subject to the approval of the Porte, to determine whether they would be governed unitedly or separate.

Abundance of intrigue, as in all Eastern countries, marked the commencement of the proceedings, in the Principalities, authorised by the Treaty. Turkey did not wish to see the Principalities united, lest they should be too strong and independent; Austria shared this dislike, from a horror at any approach to constitutional government in any state near her frontier; Moldavian local politics tended in the same direction, lest Jassy should be eclipsed by the more important Bucharest; whereas the Wallachians generally desired the union, as did the liberal and thinking portion of the Roumani in both provinces, on the well-grounded belief that they would be stronger together than separate. Before the congress met at Paris, the ambassadors of England, France, and Austria had met the Turkish ministers at Constantinople, and had agreed upon a string of thirty resolutions or propositions concerning the Principalities, forming a sort of constitution for those countries; but when these resolutions came afterwards to be discussed by the congress, it was deemed prudent to leave the settlement of details to special commissioners, to be chosen in the way indicated in the Treaty. Turkey wished to *give* privileges and constitutional rights, as from her

* Appendix, Treaty of Peace: Article IX.

* Appendix—Treaty of Peace.

spontaneous liberality; but the congress recognised the right of the Roumani to a voice in the settlement of their own political affairs.

That order should be suddenly infused into a region subject to distraction through so long a period, and on so many sides, was more than could reasonably be demanded—especially as some of the members of the congress represented governments which, for selfish reasons of their own, would rather have seen the Principalities torn by dissensions than strengthened by unity. Nevertheless, all things considered, the Treaty of Peace effected as much in this direction as could well be expected, steering between hostile and impracticable theories, and following a middle course which might possibly lead to an advantageous end.

Caucasian Provinces.—The Treaty was less satisfactory when considered in relation to the Caucasian provinces. In truth, it settled nothing here. Schamyl had long been engaged in hostilities with Russia; and, being a Mohammedan chieftain, it was expected, when the war of 1854 began, that he would have been taken into the alliance on the side of Turkey. In the summer of that year, when a strong opinion prevailed in England that Russia ought to be despoiled of some of her possessions, as a means of lessening her power of aggression, the Earl of Aberdeen's government was repeatedly attacked in parliament because he would never admit the propriety or justice of such a course. On the 20th of June, Lord Lyndhurst made an energetic speech, combating step by step the maintenance of the *status quo*, and contending that the Allies would effect little if this pusillanimous doctrine were adhered to. Speaking of the Circassians, he said: 'Can it be supposed possible that, after we have encouraged the Circassians and supplied them with arms, it should be intended again to restore that territory to Russia, to place her in the situation which she before occupied? How unjust would such conduct be towards the Circassians—how unjust to our Allies! I say that such a course of proceeding never can by possibility be adopted.'

During the war, the English and French governments sent agents among the Circassians, to determine whether any and what kind of alliance could be established with them. But these missions were not attended with much success. Popular language in England gives the name of Circassians to all the tribes of the Caucasus, and speaks of them as one people. Some, on the contrary, are Christians and some Mohammedans; some are subject to the sacerdotal rule of 'prophet-warriors,' while others are republican mountaineers; some have yielded to the temptation of Russian bribes, while others have wholly resisted that temptation; and the relations between the several tribes are in many cases far from friendly. It was ascertained; moreover, that if Russian power in these regions were driven back, and the old power of Turkey restored, the authorities at Constantinople would like to rule by pachas, just in the old way, attended with the same attributes of bribery and extortion as elsewhere. This would have been no improvement to the Circassians and other mountaineers. On the other hand, if Russia were repelled without the intervention of Turkey being permitted, the Allies would have had to deal with numerous chieftains, each jealous of any superior advantages yielded to the others. A strong wish was felt in many quarters to erect here an independent, self-governed state, under the protection of the Western Powers; and it is evident that the chieftains themselves were looking out for something of the kind. What might have been effected if Omar Pacha, or General Williams, or any other leader in the cause of the Allies, had won great victories in Mingrelia and Georgia, it is futile now to inquire; but as no such victories had preceded the negotiations for peace, the plenipotentiaries of the Western Powers went into the council-room with weak hands in this matter. It would have been useless to demand the cession of the Caucasus from Russia, unless a practicable plan were formed for disposing of it when obtained—and no such plan appears to have suggested itself.

When the rumours of peace spread to the mountains, with no mention of Circassia, the Mohammedan tribes, or many of them, sent a deputation to Constantinople with an address to the sultan, couched in truly Oriental language.* The Christian Caucasians of course did not join in this petition, nor is it easy to determine the amount of sincerity with which the petitioners sought to place themselves again under Turkish rule. The sultan, however, could do nothing without his Western Allies; and as they could not make up their minds to any definite plan, the whole region around the Caucasus was left by the Treaty just as it had been before the war. When the English ministers were reproached in parliament for having 'deserted the Circassians,' by handing them over to Russia, the First Lord of the Admiralty replied: 'What are the provinces which we have handed over? With regard to Georgia, Mingrelia, and Imeritia, the feelings of the population of those provinces were in favour of Russia

* 'To His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, &c.,

Prayers addressed to God for the Life and Prosperity of the Sultan.

Although you are at all times our Padishah, our light, the source of our prosperity, and our refuge, yet the invasion of the cursed Russian has thrown us under his tyrannical dominion, and has caused us great evils. Nevertheless, as when the sun sets it is certain that he will rise again, so have we neither been seduced by his persuasions and intrigues, nor corrupted by his gold, although we have had much to suffer from his tyranny. We have never ceased to oppose to his forces our lives, our goods, and our children; and by the aid of God, we have been fighting up to this day, as everybody knows. . . . . When this war broke out, in which our Padishah has fought with his two allies against the Russians, your undersigned servants have also fought, as far as it was in their power, under the orders of Sefer Pacha; but as rumours of peace have arrived, without any mention of Circassia, this petition, drawn up by the different Circassian tribes, declaring that we will never separate from our Padishah, has been intrusted to 350 Circassian deputies, chosen among those tribes; and, according to the maxim that everything returns to its source, we have turned towards you, and we beg your Majesty, kissing the dust of your feet, to order that we may be placed for ever under the majestic shade of your Imperial Throne.'

rather than of the Allies, and certainly they took no active part against Russia in the prosecution of the war. The inhabitants of Daghestan, led by their gallant chief Schamyl, certainly were at war with Russia; their territory, however, is not on the Black Sea, but on the shores of the Caspian; and they have never co-operated with us.' Speaking of the hill-tribes of the Caucasus, he added: 'They inhabit districts over which there is no fixed government, and consequently there is great difficulty in treating with them. Each chief is something like a Highland laird of the olden time, and in his own territory is independent of all control, and acknowledges no superior; so that in order to treat with them, the first thing to be done must be to establish a government, and then secure some kind of alliance with that government and guarantee its continuance. I can only repeat, that the condition of those provinces now is exactly the same as it was before the war began. I don't mean to say that if the war had continued the establishment of the independence of Circassia might not have been attempted. I do not say that if an independent country could have been set up between Russia on the one hand and Persia on the other hand, great benefits might not have been gained.'*

In short, the Allies had not won victories enough to give them much claim in the Caucasian regions; and moreover, if they had had such claim, they would have been greatly puzzled how best to exercise it.

Central Asia.—The vast regions of Asia were left by the Treaty fully as much as ever in the power of Russia. France, Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Turkey, were all nearly indifferent on this matter; England was the only power which, possessing a vast territory in India, looked with uneasiness at the progress of the czar's intrigues in the East. It thus arose that England could not consistently ask the Allies of Turkey to aid in curbing Russia in Central Asia, they having few or no interests to subserve in the matter.

Viewing the region between the Caspian and India, it will be seen that many states intervene, mostly in a semi-barbarous condition. The chiefs of these states have tasted much of Russian intrigue and bribery, employed as a means of establishing a footing for the czar's agents, preparatory to an annexation at some future day. The English in India, during a long series of years, have heard and known of these machinations; and some have augured ill as to the consequences. They have traced Russian agents from Astrakhan and Orenburg to Khiva, Bokhara, Samarcand, Khokan, Kashgar, and Yarkand, to the confines of Tibet; and from the south shore of the Caspian to Meshed, Balkh, Herat, Kandahar, and Cabul, to the Indus. They have found these agents mixing themselves up with the quarrels between the chiefs in these regions, or fomenting quarrels if none existed before. They have seen and heard all this; and hence many officers in the Anglo-Indian service have advocated a determined British policy in Central Asia, as the only means of checking a dangerous increase of Muscovite power. The public journals have not been wanting in paragraphs tending in the same direction. At one period there would be an account of magnificent presents sent by the czar to the shah, as a means of paving the way for Russian influence in Persia. At another, correspondents in the Crimea ascertained that Russian military officers are purposely instructed as far as possible in all that concerns India, its topography, roads, products, and tribes. Other letters, conversations, observations, or rumours, from time to time told that the whole sandy tract from Orenburg to Bokhara has been surveyed by Russian officers; that the Russians have endeavoured to render themselves acceptable to the trading communities of Central Asia by encouraging commercial relations with them; that the Caspian, by the establishment of several small ports, and the building of many small steamers, is becoming every year more and more a thoroughly Russian lake; and that the czar's spies were at the same time inciting the khan of Bokhara to put down the khans of Khokan and Khiva, and the khan of Cabul to oppose the khan of Bokhara—the Muscovite to rise on the ruin of all the others.

Even if these rumours and statements, and more than these, were true, England could have effected very little in a contest with Russia on the sands of Central Asia, so long as she was allied with the powers of Central and Western Europe in a war for the benefit of Turkey. France has nothing to gain, nothing to lose, in those regions; there is no evidence that her emperor would have sent his fine troops thither, or have afforded any material aid to the English. France, throughout the war, was as a nation less hostile to Russia than England, less urgent in demanding that the czar should be permanently checked in progress and curtailed in power. A long continuance of the war might possibly have increased the area over which it extended; but the pacification, coming when it did, left the British plenipotentiaries little room to demand concessions from Russia in Central Asia, and little chance of being supported in such demands by her Allies.

Poland.—The Poles watched anxiously the progress of the war, hopeful that the chain of events might take such a direction as would resuscitate their nationality, and restore to them some of their former freedom, even though it should not give them a place among the independent states of Europe. But the alliance of Austria with the Western Powers was alone sufficient to raise misgivings in the minds of those who would else have been hopeful. Austria possesses part of ancient Poland; but Austria gives nothing unless she can gain by giving. A speech made by Lord John Russell shews how fully the English

* Proceedings of the House of Commons, May 3, 1856.

ministers felt the uselessness of attempting anything for Poland, while seeking Austrian aid against Russia. 'We have never promised or held out hopes of the restoration of Poland; for we have always considered, in conformity with the declaration of the First Lord of the Treasury, that, if that restoration be accomplished at all, it will be accomplished by Austria. Being on terms of intimacy with many Poles, when they have spoken to me on this subject I have always told them, "If Austria will take your part, and should consider the restoration of Poland attainable, you may then entertain some hopes of accomplishing such a result; but do not imagine that England and France will alone undertake to accomplish it." I stated recently to a Polish nobleman, of whose friendship any one may be proud, that I had no conception that England and France would attempt the restoration of Poland; and that, if they did not attempt it, I thought it would be the greatest crime to encourage expectations which must be disappointed.'* There was one period during the diplomatic negotiations, in 1855, when a restoration of Poland was talked of—Austria to have the Danubian Principalities instead of Austrian Poland; Prussia to have some equivalent for Prussian Poland; and then both to aid the Western Powers in compelling the abandonment by the czar of Russian Poland. Even if this project went beyond mere talk, there was an element of iniquity in it, since it involved the transfer of other provinces to Austria and Prussia, without any regard to the wishes of the inhabitants.

When the terms of the Treaty of Peace became known, many Poles resident in England and France protested bitterly against the failure of justice to their country. They urged vehemently that the spirit of nationality yet burned within the breasts of 20,000,000 of their countrymen, and that neither czars nor kaisers could crush it out. On the 3d of May, Count Christian Ostrowski, together with most of the Poles residing in Paris, presented an address to Count Walewski—himself a Pole, although a high dignitary in the French cabinet—expressing their astonishment and dismay that not even the name of Poland occurs in the Treaty. They urged that the powers of Europe, parties to the congress of Vienna in 1815, had never sanctioned the final extinction of Poland; that Poles had offered to join the Allies against Russia, as against a common enemy to the peace of Europe; that they had believed in the sympathy of England and France for their ill-used country; that the French chambers under Louis-Philippe, and the British parliament, had repeatedly expressed this sympathy between the years 1831 and 1848; that they had hoped to see in Napoleon III. a renewal of the sympathy felt towards Poland by Napoleon I.; and that the congress of Paris in 1856, a supplement to the congress of Vienna in 1815, was bound to see that Poland, at the very least, should be placed in no worse position at the later date than at the earlier. 'Why then,' they asked, 'should Europe refuse to fulfil its engagements towards one of the most ancient of valiant nations in Christendom? Europe has taken an interest in the fate of the Greeks, the Roumani, the Servians, the Scandinavians, the Tatars, the Zingaros, and other heterogeneous populations whose existence is scarcely known. Can it do less in favour of the Poles—of a nation of 20,000,000 men, kept by the common enemy under a yoke a hundred times more painful?' The Poles residing in England gave expression to their thoughts in similar language.

All was in vain. Treaties and conventions were signed, guns fired, armies withdrawn, congratulations exchanged; but not a word said for Poland and the Poles. If this despoiled nation had never heard sympathetic and generous sentiments towards them and their country, expressed by English ministers in parliament, they might have borne their lot with greater equanimity; but such sentiments had unquestionably been expressed, and had raised hopes destined to be crushed. The Earl of Clarendon afterwards stated in parliament that Polish affairs were not mentioned at the congress, because he despaired of obtaining any useful result. The Czar Alexander, within a few weeks after the signing of the Treaty of Peace, announced the pardon of all Poles who, abandoning their political hostility, would wish to return to their native country: he promised that they should be restored to their civil rights, and should be considered admissible to the service of the state. He also set on foot a series of reforms in the army and the state which gave promise of a more lenient government for Poland than his father had permitted. Still, everything like constitutional rights was utterly ignored.

In fine, those Poles who still dreamed of a national Poland were left to dream on.

Greece.—If Poland has been neglected by the Western Powers, Greece has been petted. They remained quiet while the nationality of the former was being extinguished; but they sought to establish the nationality of the latter at the expense of Turkey. The work of 1833, by which a small kingdom of Greece was founded, was badly done; the people have been ill governed; and the great powers of Europe have been much troubled with their protégé. At the celebrated sitting of the Paris Congress on the 8th of April,* the plenipotentiaries exchanged remarks concerning the wretched condition of that country; but they did not find themselves in a position to embody any declaration on the subject in the Treaty. At the time of signing and ratifying, English and French troops were on the soil of Greece, maintaining order in the districts near Athens; but the country regions were infested with

* Proceedings of the House of Commons, July 6, 1855.

* See Appendix.

brigands and exposed to violence of an intolerable kind; while the king and queen acted as if they felt more sympathy with those brigands than with the peaceful inhabitants. The queen had, throughout the war, been an intensely zealous Russian partisan; and her hostility to England and France, as opponents of the czar, had gradually ripened into bitter hatred.

A more striking picture of the degraded state to which Greece had been reduced, at the time of the ending of the war, could not be given than in the language of a minister of one of the powers which had raised up that kingdom by the disruption of a part of the Turkish Empire: 'I am sorry to say the course pursued by the government of Greece,' said Lord Palmerston, 'only too well confirms the justice of anything I may have said in condemnation of it. With regard to the occupation of Greece by detachments of French and British troops, that occupation took place in consequence of measures of aggression either instigated or promoted by the government of Greece against the Turkish territory. The governments of England and France justly thought that when they were engaged in a war with Russia for the defence of the Turkish dominions, it was not fitting that a small state like Greece, which was essentially bound by obligations to neutrality, should attack on the one side the state which the two governments were defending against the assaults of a larger power on the other. For that purpose the Piræus was occupied, and during the occupation the aggression which led to the occupation ceased. I wish I could say that the occupation had produced any improvement in the system of government, or the internal tranquillity of the country. I cannot state that; for the system of government is just what it has been considered to be hitherto, and those disorders commonly called brigandage—such as carrying off people for their ransom, of pillage, of robbing villages and highway travellers—continue to take place to a great and lamentable extent. The real fact is, that the government and court party have been ever since the accession of King Otho in a state of conflict with the representative system. The three Allied Powers of England, France, and Russia, when they made their arrangement with Turkey for the independence of that territory which constitutes the Greek kingdom, issued a proclamation to the Greeks, promising them a representative government, to be delayed until the majority of the king. He was then called upon to fulfil his engagement, but he evaded it. At last, in 1843, an insurrection broke out, which extorted from the king the representative constitution he was unwilling to give; and from that time to the present there has been a perpetual endeavour to get rid of the constitutional government by corrupt and indirect means; and that money which ought to have been appropriated to the payment of the debt of Greece was appropriated in corrupting the electors, and afterwards those who were elected, so as to make the Greek parliament a mere shadow of the substance.'* A miserable tale, truly, to tell of a kingdom established under the special patronage of so many great powers —a tale tending to shew that diplomatists are not more successful in king-making than in slicing up countries to establish a 'balance of power.'

Italy.—Many as were the interesting topics involved in the diplomatic conversation of the 8th of April, the affairs of Italy far exceeded all the rest in general interest and importance. Statesmen of liberal views had long mourned over the oppressed condition of that beautiful country —Lombardy and Venice trodden under the iron heel of Austria; the Pontifical states withering more and more under ecclesiastical government; Naples and Sicily ruled by a king who trusted none but priests, police spies, and lazzaroni; Tuscany, Parma, and Modena governed by dukes almost wholly in the power of Austria. Liberty of the press, liberty of speech, liberty of meeting, were all denied—and so far as the spiritual papacy could exert influence, liberty of thought also. Every aspiration of the Italians to be treated as reasoning, reasonable creatures, was checked. Austrian troops defended the Duke and Duchess of Parma from their subjects; and French and Austrian bayonets alone upheld the pope on the throne, in the midst of his Roman subjects. The Sardinian states presented the one sole exception to this mournful picture; their king ruled by constitutional laws; and parliaments and newspapers diffused among the people a knowledge of that which in other Italian states was most dreaded by the rulers—the truth.

When Sardinia joined the Western Powers, she made no express stipulations in her own favour. She claimed to participate in the negotiations for peace when the war should end, but left events to mark out the rest. In the Crimea, her generals and soldiers behaved gallantly; and in the council-chamber at Paris her right to be heard was fully maintained. Cavour and Villa-Marina attended the congress with two objects—to assist in making a satisfactory peace with Russia; and to induce the great powers to interfere determinately in the affairs of Italy, with a view to place matters on a fairer basis. It will be seen by referring to the protocol of the 8th of April,† how energetically Count Cavour urged the intervention of the great powers in the affairs of Italy; in what friendly language Clarendon and Walewski expressed themselves regarding the views of Sardinia; and how irritated was Count Buol at finding the subject introduced at all. Sardinia had wished to have this subject noticed in the Treaty, but had been disappointed; her plenipotentiaries then hoped that the conversation of the 8th of April would have led to some plan approved by all; and then, after a lapse of eight days, appeared an admirable

* Speech in the House of Commons, June 2, 1856.
† See Appendix.

'Memorandum,' prepared by the Sardinian representatives at Paris, signed by them as accredited agents of their sovereign, and addressed to the English and French governments.* Before the Treaty itself was signed, towards the close of March, the Sardinian plenipotentiaries presented to those of England and France a 'Verbal Note,' in which an interesting sketch was given of the deplorable state of Italy—shewing by what steps the papal dominions had plunged lower and lower in the scale of degradation, and how perniciously that decline was operating on the whole of the Italian peninsula. When Cavour and Villa-Marina found their exertions at the congress to be checked by the leaden weight of Austria, they penned the energetic memorandum of the 16th. This document touched briefly but warmly on the wrongs of Italy, the obstinate resistance of Austria, and the claims of Sardinia to the good offices of England and France. Conversations had privately taken place among the representatives of the three powers, in the interval between the 8th and the 16th of April; and Count Cavour, having a good right so to do, sought to obtain from the Western Powers an official declaration of their sympathy with Sardinia in the affairs of Italy. Hence the Memorandum of the 16th. In a remarkable debate, on the 7th of May, in the Sardinian parliament at Turin—almost the only spot throughout Southern or Eastern Europe where such a debate could have been hazarded—the ministers gave an account of their proceedings, and received the warm support of the national representatives. Count Cavour, narrating the course of events at Paris, attached value to the friendly disposition of the Western Powers towards Sardinia: 'Those powers,' he said, 'have declared that it is the interest of Europe that the evils of Italy should be remedied. A verdict given by England and France cannot long remain sterile. On the other hand, it is certain that the Paris negotiations did not improve our relations with Austria. I must say that the Sardinian and Austrian plenipotentiaries, after sitting side by side for two months, and co-operating in one of the greatest political works accomplished during the last forty years—separated without any personal anger, it is true, for I must do justice to the perfectly courteous demeanour of the Austrian representatives—but with the intimate conviction that the political systems of the two countries are more opposed than ever. Those differences may give rise to difficulties, and create dangers; but that is the inevitable consequence of the system of liberty which Victor Emmanuel inaugurated on ascending the throne, and which you have ever since upheld. I do not think that the foreseeing those perils ought to induce the king to alter his policy. To-day the cause of Italy has been brought before the tribunal of public opinion, whose decision, to use the noble expression of the Emperor of the French, is without appeal. The trial may be long, but I am confident that its definitive issue will be conformable to the justice of the cause.' On the same occasion, M. Mamiani, one of the Sardinian representatives, expressed the following remarkable opinion:—'I am inclined to believe that ere long in civilised Europe—not even excepting Russia—there will be no other absolute power but Austria. That power, owing to the heterogeneous elements which compose it, can never adopt another form of government. As for the pale satellites of Austria—such as Naples, Florence, Parma, Modena, and Rome—it will soon be seen whether they can long continue to govern in an arbitrary and illiberal manner. As respects Sardinia, the glorious presence of her tricolored banner next to those of England and France, has fixed the attention of Europe upon us, and the honest press of every country is now preoccupied with our affairs.' Most persons in England, however, regarded these expectations concerning absolutism as too good to be true—too hopeful to meet with realisation.

That Austria was unmanageable in all that concerned liberal or national politics, became more and more evident as the negotiations proceeded. Not only had she trampled upon the image of liberty in Hungary, Poland, and Italy, but she had just concluded a 'Concordat' with the pope, assigning over to the Romish hierarchy the suppression of what little moral freedom was still left in her dominions.

The Earl of Clarendon, on the 26th of May, sent a dispatch to Sir James Hudson, British minister at Turin, intended to be read to Count Cavour. It was a cautiously worded expression of English sympathy with the cause of good government in Italy. Every phrase had evidently been well weighed; for England, France, and Austria had a multitude of treaties and conventions arising out of the war, and the English ministers either did not wish, or did not feel they had the right, to quarrel just then with Austria concerning the misgovernment of Italy. The earl propounded nothing stronger than that he 'entertained a hope' that friendly discussion would bring about improved results. The French government forwarded a dispatch couched in similarly guarded style. These negative proceedings greatly disappointed the Sardinians—especially as Count Buol had, a few days previously, commented, at once bitterly and haughtily, on Victor Emmanuel and his government, in a circular addressed to the Austrian representatives at Rome, Florence, Naples, and Modena, dated the 18th of May. He altogether denied the right of Sardinia to speak for or in the name of Italy; and betrayed the vexation of an Austrian minister at finding that a second-rate European kingdom had, by frankness and gallantry, suddenly risen to the rank of a leading power.

The diplomatic conversation of the 8th of April,

* See Appendix.

then, produced this effect among others—it laid bare a series of woful maladies afflicting Italy, which sooner or later would need a process of cure, violent or gradual according as those most nearly concerned might determine. It laid them bare, and there left them: postponing to some future day the decision of the question, whether the mode of cure approved by Sardinia, England, and France, would be assented to by Austria, Rome, and Naples.

The facts in European politics sketched above, and others which might greatly have lengthened the list, shewed plainly that the Treaty of Peace had been far from pacifying Europe generally. The diplomatists just dipped beneath the surface of many troubled waters, to find themselves powerless in smoothing them. They could do little, unless new bases of alliance were established between the several powers. Those in England who had looked to the war for a 'rectification' of the map of Europe, naturally reproached the government with having made an unsatisfactory peace; while those who knew how numerous were the wrongs and social disorders of various countries, and how conflicting the views of the respective governments concerning the best modes of cure, saw that little beyond Turkish affairs could be rectified by such an alliance as that which was formed before and during the war. England might perchance be the chivalrous knight, fighting for the liberties and constitutional privileges of all nations; but in such case this knight must reckon little on the alliance of imperial France, less on that of Prussia, and not at all on that of Austria.

The period immediately after the signing of the Treaty, as well as that immediately preceding, was marked by much excited discussion in the Houses of parliament. Those who had hoped to see Russia humbled and greatly weakened pointed bitterly to the evidences of renewed activity in all parts of the czar's empire. They adverted to the facts, that Russia was preparing to extend her operations considerably in the North Pacific, where the Allies had failed so miserably; that the fleet having, by the terms of the Treaty, been suppressed in the Euxine, those in the Baltic, the White Sea, and the North Pacific were being reorganised and greatly augmented; that projects for new railways in various parts of the empire were being entertained; that commercial reforms were talked of, calculated to increase manufactures and free trade; that she had anticipated England in obtaining commercial advantages both in China and Japan; that she was endeavouring to strengthen herself by friendly alliance with the United States of America—all these facts and prospects were noted, and the extreme party spoke in a dissatisfied spirit, seeing no evidence that Russia was to be broken up or organically weakened. In numerous debates which arose on this subject, the advocates on the other side contended that as Russia had been punished in the Black Sea regions for offences there committed, the professed object of the war had been attained; and, moreover, that the six Allied powers could not possibly have agreed upon any further display of anti-Russian policy. Lord Cowley, British ambassador at Paris, took part while in London in a discussion relating to the Treaty which he and the other plenipotentiaries had signed; and made pointed allusion to the fact that England was only one among the powers whose wishes had had to be consulted. 'I have only to remark upon the general question, that I think the Treaty has been discussed this evening too much as if England had been the only party on one side, and Russia on the other. It should be remembered that from the day on which we entered into the alliance with France, we practically gave up our right to independent action, both in reference to the operations of war and to the negotiations for peace. If we had been able to have an undivided command in the field, we might have stood in a much better position than at present; while, in the negotiations for peace, it is but fair to recollect that we were bound to consider the wishes of others as well as our own.'*

The opposition sought to cast odium on the government by bringing forward, just at the time when the terms of the Treaty were under criticism, the subject of the surrender of Kars as a means of strengthening public indignation against the ministers. On the 28th of April, Mr Whiteside moved a resolution: 'That while this House feels it to be its duty to express its admiration of the gallantry of the Turkish soldiery and of the devotion of the British officers at the siege of Kars, it feels it to be equally a duty to express its conviction that the capitulation of that fortress and the surrender of the army which defended it, thereby endangering the safety of the Asiatic provinces of Turkey, were in a great measure owing to the want of foresight and energy on the part of Her Majesty's Administration.' Had the blame been fairly distributed between the Turkish, French, and English governments, the commanders in the Crimea, and the ambassadors at Constantinople, parliament and the nation might possibly have arrived at a nearly unanimous view of the question; but the manœuvres and the speeches indicated so evidently a party attack on the ministry of the day, that most of the independent members joined the government in defeating it; and the resolution was rejected by 303 votes against 176. This debate received a singular comment two months later, when Sir William Fenwick Williams, the 'hero of Kars,' was entertained at a banquet by the Army and Navy Club. He spoke in the following terms of the minister who had just been accused, by a party in the House of Commons, of neglect little less than treasonable towards the army at Kars: 'I have a sacred duty to perform

* Proceedings of the House of Lords, May 5, 1856.

in bringing to your notice the constant encouragement which I received from the minister of state under whom I was particularly engaged—I mean Lord Clarendon. His dispatches, when they arrived among us, produced, as it were, a kind of electric shock which impelled us to go on. We were not at the time a melancholy crew; we were laughing, we were merry, we were like men that would not be extinguished. We were surrounded by very great difficulties; but whenever the dispatches arrived, they produced a most extraordinary effect upon us. Not only were these dispatches read among us, but there were numerous private letters read from that nobleman; and if we had not, on the receipt of them, exerted ourselves to the utmost of our power, and valued our lives at the worth of a straw, we should not have been worthy of the name of Englishmen. I can assure you that the very soldiers who served with me were ready to die for him.' The speech in which this remarkable statement was comprised adverted to the Kars army in terms of so much enthusiasm, that a few extracts may not be out of place here.* Popular and professional opinion having been alike favourable to Williams, he was shortly afterwards appointed to the command of the artillery at Woolwich.

Several other subjects, discussed in parliament shortly after the conclusion of peace, served to indicate a dissatisfied state of public opinion. One was the Crimean Commissioners' Report, followed by the sitting of a board of officers at Chelsea, to find an answer to the question: 'Who was to blame for the disasters of the Crimean winter?'—a question that remained nearly as unsettled when all the inquiries had been made, as before they had been begun. Another was the Foreign Legion, which had nearly plunged England into a war with America, and which, without any opportunity of rendering actual service, had been involved in many disputes with English troops. Another was the militia, which had been disbanded in a way unwelcome both to the officers and the men belonging to it. A fourth was the Maritime Neutrality Convention or agreement, which was distasteful to those who clung to the old maxim that 'Britannia rules the waves.' Another was the mode of commissioning the army—acknowledged on nearly all sides to be so bad, that on the 10th of May a royal commission was formed, consisting of the Duke of Somerset, Lord Stanley, Mr Sidney Herbert, Mr Edward Ellice, Lieutenant-general Wynyard, Sir de Lacy Evans, Sir Harry D. Jones, Major-general Bentinck, Mr G. Carr Glyn, and Colonel Wetherall, to inquire into the system, and suggest improvements.

Regarding the war as a question of expenditure in men and money, it has been found that great as the miseries were during the calamitous winter of 1854–5, England did not lose more than 22,500 soldiers, from the first battle to the day of pacification,* of whom not more than 4000 were killed in action or died from wounds—all the rest having been carried off by cholera and other maladies. It may be well to remark, however, that Lord Panmure's statement of numbers killed is somewhat below the aggregate made up from various official returns; and that his totals do not agree with his items. Moreover, it does not include losses in the fleet, naval brigade, or royal marines. Various tabulated returns have been prepared, concerning casualties not fatal; but they do not sufficiently distinguish between wounded men and men invalided from other causes. Lord Panmure estimated the loss of the Russians at the frightful number of 500,000, so great had been the devastation in traversing the provinces of the immense empire. To shew, however, the caution necessary in receiving such figures, it may be remarked that the *Moniteur de l'Armée* has put down the Russian loss at only 277,000; the same authority places the French loss at 63,551. British vessels,

* 'I must tell you there sits Colonel Lake—there sits the man who was continually by my side working by day at the fortifications, and watching unceasingly by them at night. There, too, sits Teesdale. Alas! Thompson is no more—I cannot present him to you; but I can assure you that they never would have lived until the eventful day of the 29th of September, if I had not laid upon them the iron hand of discipline. For day by day they were engaged with the enemy, and it was only my stern word of command which preserved them up to the last day of the struggle. Let me also point out to you my young secretary—a youth whom I took with me from his mother, and who proceeded step by step in his career until the eventful day when, taking command of a battery, he did, I assure you, most essential service to our cause. I wish to associate myself with these my gallant companions-in-arms, and to share with them the honour which you have bestowed upon me. . . . . I must now tell you about the glory of the Turkish army—men who, when I came to them, were starving, were without clothes, men without hope; but such was their confidence in the efforts which I was able to make for them, that they stood by me in the most gallant manner. No troops on earth could have behaved better than those men; for instance, on one occasion, at the battle of the 29th September, about which you have all read, they had been working all day and watching all night at those fortifications; but I wish to speak to you particularly about this 29th of September. They were not on this occasion an unruly, undisciplined force behind walls, but were disciplined soldiers, standing behind their intrenchments. Colonel Lake could tell you what they did, for no one could help admiring their courage, their discipline, their file-fire, their rolling-fire. I assure you that neither the Guards of London nor those of Paris could have surpassed them. From early dawn till an hour after mid-day that fire continued—the noise of a thousand drums never ceased for a moment; therefore you may suppose what soldiers they were. When the enemy got into those intrenchments—which, in consequence of the absolute necessity for protecting other points, were for the time unmanned—they were driven out again by those brave little fellows at the point of the bayonet.' Speaking of his captivity in Russia, and of the chivalrous conduct of General Mouravieff, Sir William said: 'From the very moment that we entered his camp, although we had inflicted very severe losses on his army, we were received with a charm, a frankness, and a delight which all gentlemen feel when they receive a friend. He received us in his camp as comrades; and from that time till the time we quitted the Russian dominions, we were treated with the greatest kindness. It may be said, to be sure, that such chivalry was to be expected from such high quarters; but when I tell you that he was equally kind and humane to the Turk, to the Turkish soldier, to the suffering, starving host, who went out to deliver themselves up that day—then I think you will give a cheer for General Mouravieff. From that moment, every arrangement which humanity could suggest, and which the most extensive commissariat could execute, was carried out. They clothed and reclothed the Turks.'

* 'From the 19th of September 1854, the day on which the army was first engaged in action, to the 28th of September 1855, there were 158 officers and 1775 men killed; died of their wounds, 51 officers and 1548 men; died of cholera, 35 officers and 4244 men; died of other diseases, up to the 31st of December 1855, 20 officers and 11,425 men; died of their wounds up to the 31st of March last, 322 men: making a total loss by death of 270 officers and 19,314 men. In the same time there were discharged from the service as incapacitated from disease and wounds, altogether 2873 men; making a total loss of 22,467 men killed, died of their wounds, and discharged, up to the 31st of March.'—*Statement by Lord Panmure*, May 8, 1856.

during the war, carried 220,000 soldiers—English, French, and Sardinian—to the Black Sea, and moved 210,000 from one part of the Black Sea to another; they conveyed also 54,000 horses and 340,000 tons of stores. Not only in the transport of men and stores, but in the production and consumption of various kinds of supplies, the records of the war present figures and numbers of enormous magnitude. Of this the following is an example: the steam floating-bakery *Abundance*, while anchored in Balaklava harbour, sent forth no less than 5,555,694 pounds of bread, averaging 18,000 pounds per day! The expense of the war to England was estimated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at about £44,000,000 down to the middle of February 1856; although there were not wanting financiers who took a much higher estimate. Discrepancies in this matter arose from the fact that some of the computers included all the expenses for Army, Navy, Ordnance, Militia, Commissariat, &c., during two years of war; while others included only those sums which were in *excess* of the expenditure during an equal period of peace.

Thus ended the eventful war with Russia—a war commenced without any selfish motive on the part of England; a war which cost the country at least £50,000,000 sterling; and which, while attaining in great part the end held immediately in view, nevertheless left Europe involved in the intricacies of many unsolved problems, likely to be productive of national revolutions if not international wars.



Balaklava Harbour.

APPENDIX.

I. TREATY OF PEACE, 1856.

General Treaty between Her Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Russia, the King of Sardinia, and the Sultan.—Signed at Paris, March 30, 1856.—Ratifications exchanged at Paris, April 27, 1856.

IN the name of Almighty God.—Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of the French, the Emperor of All the Russias, the King of Sardinia, and the Emperor of the Ottomans, animated by the desire of putting an end to the calamities of war, and wishing to prevent the return of the complications which occasioned it, resolved to come to an understanding with His Majesty the Emperor of Austria as to the bases on which peace might be re-established and consolidated, by securing, through effectual and reciprocal guarantees, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

For this purpose their said Majesties named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable George William Frederick Earl of Clarendon, Baron Hyde of Hindon, a Peer of the United Kingdom, &c.; and the Right Honourable Henry Richard Charles Baron Cowley, a Peer of the United Kingdom, &c.;

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, the Sieur Charles Ferdinand Count of Buol-Schauenstein, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Leopold of Austria, &c.; and the Sieur Joseph Alexander Baron de Hübner, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Iron Crown, &c.;

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, the Sieur Alexander Count Colonna Walewski, a Senator of the Empire, Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honour, &c.; and the Sieur Francis Adolphus Baron de Bourqueney, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honour, &c.;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Sieur Alexis Count Orloff, His Aid-de-camp General and General of Cavalry, &c.; and the Sieur Philip, Baron de Brunnow, His Privy Councillor, &c.;

His Majesty the King of Sardinia, the Sieur Camille Benso, Count of Cavour, Grand Cross of the Order of St Maurice and St Lazarus, &c.; and the Sieur Salvator Marquis de Villa-Marina, Grand Cross of the Order of St Maurice and St Lazarus, &c.;

And His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans, Muhammed Emin Aali Pacha, Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire, &c.; and Mehemmed Djemil Bey, decorated with the Imperial Order of the Medjidié of the second class, &c.;

Which Plenipotentiaries assembled in Congress at Paris.

An understanding having been happily established between them, Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the Emperor of All the Russias, the King of Sardinia, and the Emperor of the Ottomans, considering that in the interest of Europe His Majesty the King of Prussia, a signing Party to the Convention of the 13th of July 1841, should be invited to participate in the new arrangements to be adopted, and appreciating the value that the concurrence of His said Majesty would add to a work of general pacification, invited him to send Plenipotentiaries to the Congress.

In consequence, His Majesty the King of Prussia named as His Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: the Sieur Otho Theodore Baron de Manteuffel, President of His Council, and His Minister for Foreign Affairs, &c.; and the Sieur Maximilian Frederick Charles Francis Count of Hatzfeldt Wildenburg-Schoenstein, His Actual Privy Councillor, &c.

The Plenipotentiaries, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

ARTICLE I.—From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty, there shall be Peace and Friendship between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, His Majesty the King of Sardinia, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, on the one part, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, on the other part; as well as between their heirs and successors, their respective dominions and subjects, in perpetuity.

ARTICLE II.—Peace being happily re-established between their said Majesties, the territories conquered or occupied by their armies during the war shall be reciprocally evacuated. Special arrangements shall regulate the mode of the evacuation, which shall be as prompt as possible.

ARTICLE III.—His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias engages to restore to His Majesty the Sultan the town and citadel of Kars, as well as the other parts of the Ottoman territory of which the Russian troops are in possession.

ARTICLE IV.—Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of the French, the King of Sardinia, and the Sultan, engage to restore to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the towns and ports of Sebastopol, Balaklava, Kamiesch, Eupatoria, Kertch, Yenikalé, Kinburn, as well as all other territories occupied by the Allied troops.

ARTICLE V.—Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of the French, the Emperor of All the

Russias, the King of Sardinia, and the Sultan, grant a full and entire amnesty to those of their subjects who may have been compromised by any participation whatsoever in the events of the war in favour of the cause of the enemy. It is expressly understood that such amnesty shall extend to the subjects of each of the belligerent parties who may have continued, during the war, to be employed in the service of one of the other belligerents.

ARTICLE VI.—Prisoners of war shall be immediately given up on either side.

ARTICLE VII.—Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and His Majesty the King of Sardinia, declare the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system (*concert*) of Europe. Their Majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement; and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as a question of general interest.

ARTICLE VIII.—If there should arise between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the other signing Powers, any misunderstanding which might endanger the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime Porte, and each of such Powers, before having recourse to the use of force, shall afford the other Contracting Parties the opportunity of preventing such an extremity by means of their mediation.

ARTICLE IX.—His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, having, in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, issued a firman which, while ameliorating their condition without distinction of religion or of race, records his generous intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire; and wishing to give a further proof of his sentiments in that respect, has resolved to communicate to the Contracting Parties the said firman, emanating spontaneously from his sovereign will. The Contracting Powers recognise the high value of this communication. It is clearly understood that it cannot, in any case, give to the said Powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the internal administration of his Empire.

ARTICLE X.—The Convention of the 13th of July 1841, which maintains the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire relative to the closing of the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles, has been revised by common consent. The act concluded for that purpose, and in conformity with that principle, between the High Contracting Parties, is and remains annexed to the present Treaty, and shall have the same force and validity as if it formed an integral part thereof.

ARTICLE XI.—The Black Sea is neutralised: its waters and its ports, thrown open to the mercantile marine of every nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war, either of the Powers possessing its coasts, or of any other Power, with the exceptions mentioned in Articles XIV. and XIX. of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XII.—Free from any impediment, the commerce in the ports and waters of the Black Sea shall be subject only to regulations of health, customs, and police, framed in a spirit favourable to the development of commercial transactions. In order to afford to the commercial and maritime interests of every nation the security which is desired, Russia and the Sublime Porte will admit Consuls into their ports situated upon the coast of the Black Sea, in conformity with the principles of international law.

ARTICLE XIII.—The Black Sea being neutralised according to the terms of Article XI., the maintenance or establishment upon its coast of military-maritime arsenals becomes alike unnecessary and purposeless; in consequence, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan engage not to establish or to maintain upon that coast any military-maritime arsenal.

ARTICLE XIV.—Their Majesties the Emperor of All the Russias and the Sultan having concluded a Convention for the purpose of settling the force and the number of light vessels, necessary for the service of their coasts, which they reserve to themselves to maintain in the Black Sea, that Convention is annexed to the present Treaty, and shall have the same force and validity as if it formed an integral part thereof. It cannot be either annulled or modified without the assent of the Powers signing the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XV.—The Act of the Congress of Vienna having established the principles intended to regulate the navigation of rivers which separate or traverse different States, the Contracting Powers stipulate among themselves that those principles shall in future be equally applied to the Danube and its mouths. They declare that this arrangement henceforth forms a part of the public law of Europe, and take it under their guarantee. The navigation of the Danube cannot be subjected to any impediment or charge not expressly provided for by the stipulations contained in the following Articles: in consequence, there shall not be levied any toll founded solely upon the fact of the navigation of the river, nor any duty upon the goods which may be on board of vessels. The regulations of police and of quarantine to be established for the safety of the States separated or traversed by that river, shall be so framed as to facilitate, as much as possible, the passage of vessels. With the exception of such regulations, no obstacle whatever shall be opposed to free navigation.

ARTICLE XVI.—With the view to carry out the arrangements of the preceding Article, a Commission, in which Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, shall each be represented by one delegate, shall be charged to designate and to cause to be executed the works necessary below Isakcha, to clear the mouths of the Danube, as well as the neighbouring parts of the sea, from the sands and other impediments which obstruct them, in order to put that part of the river and the said parts of the sea in the best possible state for navigation. In order to cover the expenses of such works, as well as of the establishments intended to secure and to facilitate the navigation at the mouths of the Danube, fixed duties, of a suitable rate, settled by the Commission by a majority of votes, may be levied, on the express condition that, in this respect as in every other, the flags of all nations shall be treated on the footing of perfect equality.

ARTICLE XVII.—A Commission shall be established, and shall be composed of delegates of Austria, Bavaria, the Sublime Porte, and Würtemberg (one for each of those Powers), to whom shall be added Commissioners from the three Danubian Principalities, whose nomination shall have been approved by the Porte. This Commission, which shall be permanent: 1. Shall prepare regulations of navigation and river police; 2. Shall remove the impediments, of whatever nature they may be, which still prevent the application to the Danube of the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna;

3. Shall order and cause to be executed the necessary works throughout the whole course of the river; and 4. Shall, after the dissolution of the European Commission, see to maintaining the mouths of the Danube and the neighbouring parts of the sea in a navigable state.

ARTICLE XVIII.—It is understood that the European Commission shall have completed its task, and that the River Commission shall have finished the works described in the preceding Article, under Nos. 1 and 2, within the period of two years. The signing Powers assembled in Conference having been informed of that fact, shall, after having placed it on record, pronounce the dissolution of the European Commission, and from that time the permanent River Commission shall enjoy the same powers as those with which the European Commission shall have until then been invested.

ARTICLE XIX.—In order to insure the execution of the regulations which shall have been established by common agreement, in conformity with the principles above declared, each of the Contracting Powers shall have the right to station, at all times, two light vessels at the mouths of the Danube.

ARTICLE XX.—In exchange for the towns, ports, and territories enumerated in Article IV. of the present Treaty, and in order more fully to secure the freedom of the navigation of the Danube, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias consents to the rectification of his frontier in Bessarabia. The new frontier shall begin from the Black Sea, one kilometre to the east of the Lake Bourna Sola, shall run perpendicularly to the Akerman Road, shall follow that road to the *Val de Trajan*, pass to the south of Bolgrad, ascend the course of the river Yalpuck to the Height of Saratsika, and terminate at Katamori on the Pruth. Above that point the old frontier between the two Empires shall not undergo any modification. Delegates of the Contracting Powers shall fix, in its details, the line of the new frontier.

ARTICLE XXI.—The territory ceded by Russia shall be annexed to the Principality of Moldavia under the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte. The inhabitants of that territory shall enjoy the rights and privileges secured to the Principalities; and, during the space of three years, they shall be permitted to transfer their domicile elsewhere, disposing freely of their property.

ARTICLE XXII.—The Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia shall continue to enjoy under the suzerainty of the Porte, and under the guarantee of the Contracting Powers, the privileges and immunities of which they are in possession. No exclusive protection shall be exercised over them by any of the guaranteeing Powers. There shall be no separate right of interference in their internal affairs.

ARTICLE XXIII.—The Sublime Porte engages to preserve to the said Principalities an independent and national administration, as well as full liberty of worship, of legislation, of commerce, and of navigation. The laws and statutes at present in force shall be revised. In order to establish a complete agreement in regard to such revision, a Special Commission, as to the composition of which the High Contracting Powers will come to an understanding among themselves, shall assemble, without delay, at Bucharest, together with a Commissioner of the Sublime Porte. The business of this Commission shall be to investigate the present state of the Principalities, and to propose bases for their future organisation.

ARTICLE XXIV.—His Majesty the Sultan promises to convoke immediately in each of the two Provinces a Divan *ad hoc*, composed in such a manner as to represent most closely the interests of all classes of society. These Divans shall be called upon to express the wishes of the people in regard to the definitive organisation of the Principalities. An instruction from the Congress shall regulate the relations between the Commission and these Divans.

ARTICLE XXV.—Taking into consideration the opinion expressed by the two Divans, the Commission shall transmit, without delay, to the present seat of the Conferences, the result of its own labours. The final agreement with the Suzerain Power shall be recorded in a Convention to be concluded at Paris between the High Contracting Parties; and a hatti-shérif, in conformity with the stipulations of the Convention, shall constitute definitively the organisation of those Provinces, placed thenceforward under the collective guarantee of all the signing Powers.

ARTICLE XXVI.—It is agreed that there shall be in the Principalities a national armed force, organised with the view to maintain the security of the interior, and to insure that of the frontiers. No impediment shall be opposed to the extraordinary measures of defence which, by agreement with the Sublime Porte, they may be called upon to take in order to repel any external aggression.

ARTICLE XXVII.—If the internal tranquillity of the Principalities should be menaced or compromised, the Sublime Porte shall come to an understanding with the other Contracting Powers in regard to the measures to be taken for maintaining or re-establishing legal order. No armed intervention can take place without previous agreement between those Powers.

ARTICLE XXVIII.—The Principality of Servia shall continue to hold of the Sublime Porte, in conformity with the Imperial Hats which fix and determine its rights and immunities, placed henceforward under the collective guarantee of the Contracting Powers. In consequence, the said Principality shall preserve its independent and national administration, as well as full liberty of worship, of legislation, of commerce, and of navigation.

ARTICLE XXIX.—The right of garrison of the Sublime Porte, as stipulated by anterior regulations, is maintained. No armed intervention can take place in Servia without previous agreement between the High Contracting Powers.

ARTICLE XXX.—His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and His Majesty the Sultan, maintain, in its integrity, the state of their possessions in Asia, such as it legally existed before the rupture. In order to prevent all local dispute, the line of frontier shall be verified, and, if necessary, rectified, without any prejudice as regards territory being sustained by either Party. For this purpose, a Mixed Commission, composed of two Russian Commissioners, two Ottoman Commissioners, one English Commissioner, and one French Commissioner, shall be sent to the spot immediately after the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the Court of Russia and the Sublime Porte. Its labours shall be completed within the period of eight months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XXXI.—The territories occupied during the war by the troops of Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, and the King of Sardinia, according to the terms of the Conventions signed at Constantinople on the twelfth of March, One thousand eight hundred and fifty-four, between Great Britain, France, and the Sublime Porte;

on the fourteenth of June of the same year between Austria and the Sublime Porte; and on the fifteenth of March, One thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, between Sardinia and the Sublime Porte; shall be evacuated as soon as possible after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty. The periods and the means of execution shall form the object of an arrangement between the Sublime Porte and the Powers whose troops have occupied its territory.

ARTICLE XXXII.—Until the Treaties or Conventions which existed before the war between the belligerent Powers have been either renewed or replaced by new Acts, commerce of importation or of exportation shall take place reciprocally on the footing of the regulations in force before the war; and in all other matters their subjects shall be respectively treated upon the footing of the most favoured nation.

ARTICLE XXXIII.—The Convention concluded this day between Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of the French, on the one part, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, on the other part, respecting the Aland Islands, is and remains annexed to the present Treaty, and shall have the same force and validity as if it formed a part thereof.

ARTICLE XXXIV.—The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Paris in the space of four weeks, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Paris, the thirtieth day of the month of March, in the year One thousand eight hundred and fifty-six.

(L.S.)	CLARENDON.
(L.S.)	COWLEY.
(L.S.)	BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
(L.S.)	HÜBNER.
(L.S.)	A. WALEWSKI.
(L.S.)	BOURQUENEY.
(L.S.)	MANTEUFFEL.
(L.S.)	C. M. D'HATZFELDT.
(L.S.)	ORLOFF.
(L.S.)	BRUNNOW.
(L.S.)	C. CAVOUR.
(L.S.)	DE VILLA-MARINA.
(L.S.)	AALI.
(L.S.)	MEHEMMED DJEMIL.

Additional and Transitory Article.

The stipulations of the Convention respecting the Straits, signed this day, shall not be applicable to the vessels-of-war employed by the belligerent Powers for the evacuation, by sea, of the territories occupied by their armies; but the said stipulations shall resume their entire effect as soon as the evacuation shall be terminated.

Done at Paris, the thirtieth day of the month of March, in the year One thousand eight hundred and fifty-six.

[Here follow the signatures, as above.]

II. CONVENTIONS ANNEXED TO THE TREATY OF PEACE.

1. *Convention between Her Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Russia, and the King of Sardinia, on the one part, and the Sultan on the other part, respecting the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus.—Signed at Paris, March* 30, 1856.—*Ratifications exchanged at Paris, April* 27, 1856.

In the name of Almighty God.—Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of All the Russias, signing Parties to the Convention of the thirteenth day of July, One thousand eight hundred and forty-one; and His Majesty the King of Sardinia; wishing to record in common their unanimous determination to conform to the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire, according to which, the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus are closed to foreign ships-of-war, so long as the Porte is at peace. Their said Majesties on the one part, and His Majesty the Sultan on the other, have resolved to renew the Convention concluded at London on the thirteenth day of July, One thousand eight hundred and forty-one, with the exception of some modifications of detail which do not affect the principle upon which it rests. In consequence, Their said Majesties have named for that purpose as their Plenipotentiaries—[Here follow the names and titles of the fourteen Plenipotentiaries who had just signed the Treaty of Peace]—who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

ARTICLE I.—His Majesty the Sultan, on the one part, declares that he is firmly resolved to maintain, for the future, the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire, and in virtue of which, it has at all times been prohibited for the ships-of-war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus; and that, so long as the Porte is at peace, His Majesty will admit no foreign ship-of-war into the said Straits. And their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, the Emperor of All the Russias, and the King of Sardinia, on the other part, engage to respect this determination of the Sultan, and to conform themselves to the principle above declared.

ARTICLE II.—The Sultan reserves to himself, as in past times, to deliver firmans of passage for light vessels under flag of war, which shall be employed, as is usual, in the service of the Missions of Foreign Powers.

ARTICLE III.—The same exception applies to the light vessels under flag of war, which each of the Contracting Powers is authorised to station at the mouths of the Danube, in order to secure the execution of the regulations relative to the liberty of that river, and the number of which is not to exceed two for each Power.

ARTICLE IV.—The present Convention, annexed to the General Treaty signed at Paris this day, shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the space of four weeks, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Paris, the thirtieth day of the month of March, in the year One thousand eight hundred and fifty-six.

[Here follow the signatures, as above.]

2. *Convention between the Emperor of Russia and the Sultan, limiting their Naval Force in the Black Sea.—Signed at Paris, March* 30, 1856.—*Ratifications exchanged at Paris, April* 27, 1856.

In the name of Almighty God.—His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, taking into consideration the principle of the neutralisation of the Black Sea established by the preliminaries contained in the Protocol No. 1, signed at Paris on the 25th of February of the present year, and wishing, in consequence, to regulate by common agreement the number and the force of the light vessels which they have reserved to themselves to maintain in the Black Sea for the service of their coasts, have resolved to sign, with that view, a special Convention, and have named for that purpose—[here are given the names and titles of four Plenipotentiaries]—who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:—

ARTICLE I.—The High Contracting Parties mutually engage not to have in the Black Sea any other vessels-of-war than those of which the number, the force, and the dimensions are hereinafter stipulated.

ARTICLE II.—The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves each to maintain in that sea six steam-vessels of fifty mètres in length at the line of flotation, of a tonnage of 800 tons at the maximum, and four light steam or sailing vessels of a tonnage which shall not exceed 200 tons each.

ARTICLE III.—The present Convention, annexed to the General Treaty signed at Paris this day, shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the space of four weeks, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Paris, the thirtieth day of the month of March, in the year One thousand eight hundred and fifty-six.

(L.S.) ORLOFF.
(L.S.) BRUNNOW.
(L.S.) AALI.
(L.S.) MEHEMMED DJEMIL.

3. *Convention between Her Majesty, the Emperor of the French, and the Emperor of Russia, respecting the Aland Islands.—Signed at Paris, March* 30, 1856.—*Ratifications exchanged at Paris, April* 27, 1856.

In the name of Almighty God.—Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, wishing to extend to the Baltic Sea the harmony so happily re-established between them in the East, and thereby to consolidate the benefits of the general peace, have resolved to conclude a Convention, and have named for that purpose—[here are given the names and titles of six Plenipotentiaries]—who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

ARTICLE I.—His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, in order to respond to the desire which has been expressed to him by Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Emperor of the French, declares that the Aland Islands shall not be fortified, and that no military or naval establishment shall be maintained or created there.

ARTICLE II.—The present Convention, annexed to the General Treaty signed at Paris this day, shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the space of four weeks, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Paris, the thirtieth day of the month of March, in the year One thousand eight hundred and fifty-six.

(L.S.) CLARENDON.
(L.S.) COWLEY.
(L.S.) A. WALEWSKI.
(L.S.) BOURQUENEY.
(L.S.) ORLOFF.
(L.S.) BRUNNOW.

III. DECLARATIONS ON MEDIATION AND PRIVATEERING.

1. *Extract from the Protocol No.* 23, *of the Sitting of the Congress of Paris, April* 14, 1856; *relating to Mediation as a Preventive of War.*

The Earl of Clarendon, having demanded permission to lay before the Congress a proposition which it appears to him ought to be favourably received, states that the calamities of war are still too present to every mind not to make it desirable to seek out every expedient calculated to prevent their return; that a stipulation had been inserted in Article VII. of the Treaty of Peace, recommending that in case of difference between the Porte and one or more of the other signing Powers, recourse should be had to the mediation of a friendly state before resorting to force. The first Plenipotentiary of Great Britain conceives that this happy innovation might receive a more general application, and thus become a barrier against conflicts which frequently only break forth because it is not always possible to enter into explanation and to come to an understanding. He proposes, therefore, to agree upon a resolution calculated to afford to the maintenance of peace that chance of duration hereafter, without prejudice, however, to the independence of Governments.

Count Walewski declares himself authorised to support the idea expressed by the first Plenipotentiary of Great Britain; he gives the assurance that the Plenipotentiaries of France are wholly disposed to concur in the insertion in the Protocol of a wish which, being fully in accordance with the tendencies of our epoch, would not in any way fetter the free action of Governments.

Count Buol would not hesitate to concur in the

opinion of the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain and of France, if the resolution of the Congress is to have the form indicated by Count Walewski; but he could not take, in the name of his Court, an absolute engagement calculated to limit the independence of the Austrian Cabinet.

The Earl of Clarendon replies that each Power is, and will be, the sole judge of the requirements of its honour and of its interests; that it is by no means his intention to restrict the authority of the Governments, but only to afford them the opportunity of not having recourse to arms whenever differences may be adjusted by other means.

Baron Manteuffel gives the assurance that the King, his august Master, completely shares the ideas set forth by the Earl of Clarendon; that he therefore considers himself authorised to adhere to them, and to give them the utmost development which they admit of.

Count Orloff, while admitting the wisdom of the proposal made to the Congress, considers that he must refer to his Court respecting it, before he expresses the opinion of the Plenipotentiaries of Russia.

Count Cavour, before he gives his opinion, wishes to know whether, in the intention of the author of the proposition, the wish to be expressed by the Congress would extend to military interventions directed against *de facto* Governments.

Lord Clarendon replies that the wish of the Congress should allow of the most general application; he observes that if the good offices of another Power had induced the Government of Greece to respect the laws of neutrality, France and England would very probably have abstained from occupying the Piræus with their troops. He refers to the efforts made by the Cabinet of Great Britain in 1823, in order to prevent the armed intervention which took place at that time in Spain.

Count Walewski adds, that there is no question of stipulating for a right or of taking an engagement; that the wish expressed by the Congress cannot in any case oppose limits to the liberty of judgment of which no Power can divest itself in questions affecting its dignity; that there is therefore no inconvenience in attaching a general character to the idea entertained by the Earl of Clarendon, and in giving to it the most extended application.

Count Buol approves the proposition in the shape that Lord Clarendon has presented it, as having a humane object; but he could not assent to it if it were wished to give to it too great an extension, or to deduce from it consequences favourable to *de facto* Governments, and to doctrines which he cannot admit. He desires, besides, that the Conference, at the moment of terminating its labours, should not find itself compelled to discuss irritating questions, calculated to disturb the perfect harmony which has not ceased to prevail among the Plenipotentiaries.

Count Cavour declares that he is fully satisfied with the explanations which he has elicited, and he accedes to the proposition submitted to the Congress.

Whereupon, the Plenipotentiaries do not hesitate to express in the name of their Governments, the wish that States between which any serious misunderstanding may arise, should, before appealing to arms, have recourse, as far as circumstances might allow, to the good offices of a friendly Power. The Plenipotentiaries hope that the Governments not represented at the Congress will unite in the sentiment which has inspired the wish recorded in the present Protocol.

[The signatures follow.]

2. *Declaration respecting Maritime Law, signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, assembled in Congress at Paris, April* 16, 1856.

The Plenipotentiaries who signed the Treaty of Paris of the thirtieth of March, One thousand eight hundred and fifty-six, assembled in conference—

Considering: That maritime law, in time of war, has long been the subject of deplorable disputes; that the uncertainty of the law and of the duties in such a matter, give rise to differences of opinion between neutrals and belligerents which may occasion serious difficulties, and even conflicts; that it is consequently advantageous to establish a uniform doctrine on so important a point; that the Plenipotentiaries assembled in Congress at Paris cannot better respond to the intentions by which their Governments are animated, than by seeking to introduce into international relations fixed principles in this respect;

The above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries being duly authorised, resolved to concert among themselves as to the means of attaining this object; and having come to an agreement, have adopted the following solemn Declaration:—

1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished; 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war; 3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag; 4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective—that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.

The Governments of the undersigned Plenipotentiaries engage to bring the present Declaration to the knowledge of the States which have not taken part in the Congress of Paris, and to invite them to accede to it. Convinced that the maxims which they now proclaim cannot but be received with gratitude by the whole world, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries doubt not that the efforts of their Governments to obtain the general adoption thereof, will be crowned with full success. The present Declaration is not and shall not be binding, except between those Powers who have acceded, or shall accede, to it.

Done at Paris, the sixteenth of April, One thousand eight hundred and fifty-six.

(Signed) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
HÜBNER.
WALEWSKI.
BOURQUENEY.
CLARENDON.
COWLEY.
MANTEUFFEL.
HATZFELDT.
ORLOFF.
BRUNNOW.
CAVOUR.
DE VILLA-MARINA.
AALI.
MEHEMMED DJEMIL.

IV. DECLARATIONS ON THE AFFAIRS OF EUROPE.

1. *Extract from the Protocol No. 22, of the Sitting of the Congress of Paris on the 8th of April* 1856; *relating to Greece, Italy, the Press in Belgium, and the Rights of Neutrals.*

Count Walewski suggests that it is desirable that the Plenipotentiaries, before they separate, should interchange their ideas on different subjects which require to be settled, and which it might be advantageous to take up, in order to prevent fresh complications. Although specially assembled for settling the Eastern question, the Congress, according to the first Plenipotentiary of France, would have cause to reproach itself for not having taken advantage of the circumstance which brings together the Representatives of the principal Powers of Europe, to clear up certain questions, to lay down certain principles, to express intentions; in fine, to make certain declarations, always and solely with the view of insuring the future tranquillity of the world, by dispelling, before they become menacing, the clouds which are still seen looming on the political horizon.

It cannot be denied, he says, that Greece is in an abnormal state. The anarchy to which that country was a prey, has compelled France and England to send troops to the Piræus at a time when their armies were already fully occupied. The Congress knows in what state Greece was; neither is it ignorant that the present state is far from being satisfactory. Would it not, therefore, be advantageous that the Powers represented in the Congress should manifest the wish to see the three protecting Courts take into serious consideration the deplorable situation of the kingdom which they have created, and devise means to make provision for it?

Count Walewski does not doubt that the Earl of Clarendon will join with him in declaring that the two Governments await with impatience the time when they shall be at liberty to terminate an occupation; to which, nevertheless, they are unable, without the most serious inconvenience, to put an end, so long as real modifications shall not be introduced into the state of things in Greece.

The first Plenipotentiary of France then observes that the Pontifical States are equally in an abnormal condition; that the necessity for not leaving the country to anarchy, had induced France as well as Austria to comply with the demand of the Holy See, by causing Rome to be occupied by French troops, while the Austrian troops occupied the Legations.

He states that France had a twofold motive for complying without hesitation with the demand of the Holy See, as a Catholic Power and as a European Power. The title of eldest son of the church, which is the boast of the Sovereign of France, makes it a duty for the Emperor to afford aid and support to the Sovereign Pontiff; the tranquillity of the Roman States, and that of the whole of Italy, affects too closely the maintenance of social order in Europe, for France not to have an overbearing interest in securing it by all the means in her power. But, on the other hand, it is impossible to overlook the abnormal condition of a Power which, in order to maintain itself, requires to be supported by foreign troops.

Count Walewski does not hesitate to declare, and he trusts that Count Buol will join in the declaration, that not only is France ready to withdraw her troops, but that she earnestly desires to recall them so soon as that can be done without inconvenience as regards the internal tranquillity of the country and the authority of the Pontifical Government, in the prosperity of which the Emperor, his august Sovereign, takes the most lively interest.

The first Plenipotentiary of France represents how desirable it is for the balance of power in Europe that the Roman Government should be consolidated in sufficient strength for the French and Austrian troops to be able, without inconvenience, to evacuate the Pontifical States; and he considers that a wish expressed in this sense might not be without advantage. In any case, he does not doubt that the assurances which might be given by France and Austria as to their real intentions in this respect, would have a salutary influence.

Following up the same order of ideas, Count Walewski asks himself if it is not to be desired that certain Governments of the Italian Peninsula, by well-devised acts of clemency, and by rallying to themselves minds gone astray but not perverted, should put an end to a system which is directly opposed to its object, and which, instead of reaching the enemies of public order, has the effect of weakening the Governments, and of furnishing partisans to popular faction. In his opinion it would render a signal service to the Government of the Two Sicilies, as well as to the cause of order in the Italian Peninsula, to enlighten that Government as to the false course in which it is engaged. He is of opinion that warnings conceived in this sense, and proceeding from the Powers represented in the Congress, would be the better received by the Neapolitan Government, as that Government could not doubt the motives which dictated them.

The first Plenipotentiary of France then says, that he must call the attention of the Congress to a subject which, although more particularly affecting France, is not the less of great interest for all the Powers of Europe. He considers it superfluous to state that there are every day printed in Belgium publications the most insulting, the most hostile against France and her Government; that revolt and assassination are openly advocated in them. He remarks that quite recently, Belgian newspapers have ventured to extol the society called 'La Marianne,' the tendencies and object of which are known; that all these publications are so many implements of war directed against the repose and tranquillity of France by the enemies of social order, who, relying on the impunity which they find under the shelter of the Belgian legislation, retain the hope of eventually realising their culpable designs.

Count Walewski declares that the intention and sole desire of the Government of the Empire is to maintain the best relations with Belgium; he readily adds that France has reason to be satisfied with the Belgian Government, and with its efforts to mitigate a state of things which it is unable to alter: its legislation not allowing it either to restrain the excesses of the press, or to take the initiative in a reform which has become absolutely indispensable. We should regret, he says, to be obliged ourselves to make Belgium comprehend the strict necessity for modifying a legislation which does not allow its Government to fulfil the first of international duties—that of not

assailing, or allowing to be assailed, the internal tranquillity of the neighbouring States. Representations addressed by the stronger to the less strong have too much the appearance of menace, and that is what we desire to avoid. But if the Representatives of the Great Powers of Europe, viewing in the same light with ourselves this necessity, should find it useful to express their opinion in this respect, it is more than probable that the Belgian Government, relying upon all reasonable persons in Belgium, would be able to put an end to a state of things which cannot fail sooner or later to give rise to difficulties, and even real dangers, which it is the interest of Belgium to avert beforehand.

Count Walewski proposes to the Congress to conclude its work by a declaration which would constitute a remarkable advance in international law, and which would be received by the whole world with a sentiment of lively gratitude.

The Congress of Westphalia, he adds, sanctioned liberty of conscience; the Congress of Vienna sanctioned the abolition of the Slave Trade, and the freedom of the navigation of rivers.

It would be truly worthy of the Congress of Paris to lay down the basis of a uniform maritime law in time of war as regards neutrals. The four following principles would completely effect that object:—1. The abolition of privateering; 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods except contraband of war; 3. Neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not liable to capture even under enemy's flag; 4. Blockades are not binding except in so far as they are effective. This would indeed be a glorious result, to which none of us could be indifferent.

The Earl of Clarendon, sharing the opinions expressed by Count Walewski, declares that, like France, England proposes to recall the troops which she was obliged to send to Greece so soon as she shall be able to do so without inconvenience to the public tranquillity; but that it is necessary, in the first instance, to provide solid guarantees for the maintenance of a satisfactory state of things. According to him, the Protecting Powers may agree among themselves upon the remedy which it is indispensable to apply to a system injurious to the country, and which has altogether departed from the object which they had proposed to themselves, when establishing there an independent monarchy, for the wellbeing and the prosperity of the Greek people.

The first Plenipotentiary of Great Britain remarks that the Treaty of March 30 opens a new era; that—as the Emperor had said to the Congress on receiving it after the signature of the Treaty—this era is that of peace; but in order to be consistent, nothing should be omitted to render that peace solid and lasting; that, representing the principal Powers of Europe, the Congress would fail in its duty if, on separating, it sanctioned by its silence a state of things which is injurious to the political equilibrium, and which is far from shielding peace from danger in one of the most interesting countries of Europe.

We have just provided, continues the Earl of Clarendon, for the evacuation of the different territories occupied by foreign armies during the war; we have just taken the solemn engagement to effect the evacuation within the shortest period; how would it be possible for us not seriously to advert to occupations which took place before the war, and to abstain from devising means for putting an end to them?

The first Plenipotentiary of Great Britain does not consider it of any use to inquire as to the causes which have brought foreign armies into various parts of Italy; but he considers that even admitting that those causes were legitimate, it is not the less true that the result is an abnormal and irregular state of things, which can be justified only by extreme necessity, and which should come to an end as soon as that necessity is no longer imperiously felt; that, nevertheless, if endeavours are not made to put an end to that necessity, it will continue to exist; that if we are content to depend upon the armed force, instead of seeking to apply a remedy to the just causes of discontent, it is certain that a system little honourable for the Governments, and lamentable for the people, will be perpetuated. He conceives that the administration of the Roman States presents inconveniences from whence dangers may arise which the Congress has the right to attempt to avert; that to neglect them would be to run the risk of labouring for the benefit of such resolutions as all the Governments condemn and wish to prevent. The problem which it is a matter of urgency to solve, consists, he conceives, in combining the retreat of the foreign troops with the maintenance of tranquillity, and the solution depends on the organisation of an administration which by reviving confidence would render the Government independent of foreign support: that support never succeeding in maintaining a Government to which the public sentiment is hostile; and there would result from it, in his opinion, a part which France and Austria would not wish their armies to perform. For the wellbeing of the Pontifical States, as also for the interest of the sovereign authority of the Pope, it would, therefore, in his opinion, be advantageous to recommend the secularisation of the Government, and the organisation of an administrative system in harmony with the spirit of the age, and having for its object the happiness of the people. He admits that this reform might perhaps offer in Rome itself, at the present moment, certain difficulties; but he thinks that it might easily be accomplished in the Legations.

The first Plenipotentiary of Great Britain observes, that for the last eight years Bologna has been in a state of siege, and that the rural districts are harassed by brigands: it may be hoped, he thinks, that by establishing in this part of the Roman States an administrative and judicial system, at once secular and distinct, and that by organising there a national armed force, security and confidence would rapidly be restored, and the Austrian troops might shortly withdraw without having to apprehend the return of fresh troubles; it is at least an experiment which, in his opinion, ought to be attempted, and this remedy proposed for indisputable evils ought to be submitted by the Congress to the serious consideration of the Pope.

As regards the Neapolitan Government, the first Plenipotentiary of Great Britain is desirous of imitating the example given him by Count Walewski, by passing over in silence acts which have obtained such grievous notoriety. He is of opinion that it must doubtless be admitted in principle that no Government has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other States; but he considers there are cases in which the exception to this rule becomes equally a right and a duty. The Neapolitan Government seems to him to have conferred this right, and to have imposed this duty upon Europe; and as the Governments represented in the Congress are all equally desirous to support the monarchical principle and to repel

revolution, it is a duty to lift up their voices against a system which keeps up revolutionary ferment among the masses instead of seeking to moderate it. 'We do not wish,' he says, 'that peace should be disturbed, and there is no peace without justice; we ought, then, to make known to the King of Naples the wish of the Congress for the amelioration of his system of government—a wish which cannot remain without effect—and require of him an amnesty in favour of the persons who have been condemned or who are imprisoned without trial for political offences.'

As regards the observations offered by Count Walewski on the excesses of the Belgian press, and the dangers which result therefrom to adjoining countries, the Plenipotentiaries of England admit their importance; but as the Representatives of a country in which a free and independent press is, so to say, one of the fundamental institutions, they cannot lend their sanction to measures of coercion against the press of another State. The first Plenipotentiary of Great Britain, while deploring the violence in which certain organs of the Belgian press indulge, does not hesitate to declare that the authors of the execrable doctrines to which Count Walewski alludes, the men who preach assassination as the means of attaining a political object, are undeserving of the protection which guarantees to the press its liberty and its independence.

In concluding, the Earl of Clarendon observes that, like France, England at the commencement of the war sought by every means to mitigate its effects, and that with this view she renounced, for the benefit of neutrals during the struggle which has now come to an end, principles which up to that time she had invariably maintained. He adds, that England is disposed to renounce them definitively, provided that privateering is equally abolished for ever; that privateering is nothing else than an organised and legal piracy, and privateers one of the greatest scourges of war; and that our condition of civilisation and humanity requires that an end should be put to a system which is no longer suitable to the present day. Even, however, if the whole of the Congress were to adopt the proposition of Count Walewski, it should be well understood that it would only be binding in regard to the Powers who may accede to it, and that it could not be appealed to by Governments who may refuse their accession.

Count Orloff observes that the powers with which he is furnished having for their sole object the restoration of peace, he does not consider himself authorised to take part in a discussion which his instructions had not provided for.

Count Buol congratulates himself on seeing the Governments of France and England disposed to put an end, as speedily as possible, to the occupation of Greece. Austria, he gives the assurance, wishes most sincerely for the prosperity of that kingdom, and is equally desirous with France that all the States of Europe should enjoy, under the protection of public law, their political independence and complete prosperity. He does not doubt that one of the essential conditions of so desirable a state of things exists in the wisdom of a legislation so combined as to prevent or repress the excesses of the press which Count Walewski, with so much reason, has blamed, when speaking of a neighbouring State, and the repression of which must be considered as a European necessity. He hopes that in all the States of the Continent where the press presents the same dangers, the Governments will be able to find in their legislation the means of restraining it within proper limits, and that they will thus be enabled to secure peace against fresh international complications.

As regards the principles of maritime law which the first Plenipotentiary of France has proposed for adoption, Count Buol declares that he appreciates their spirit and bearing, but that not being authorised by his instructions to express an opinion upon a matter of such importance, he must, for the time, confine himself to announcing to the Congress that he is prepared to solicit the orders of his Sovereign thereupon.

But here, he says, his task must end. It would be impossible for him, indeed, to discuss the internal situation of independent States, which are not represented at the Congress. The Plenipotentiaries have received no other commission than to apply themselves to the affairs of the Levant, and they have not been convened for the purpose of making known to independent Sovereigns wishes in regard to the internal organisation of their States; the full powers deposited among the acts of the Congress prove this. The instructions of the Austrian Plenipotentiaries, at all events, having defined the object of the mission which has been intrusted to them, they would not be at liberty to take part in a discussion which those instructions have not anticipated.

For the same reasons, Count Buol conceives that he must abstain from entering into the train of ideas adverted to by the first Plenipotentiary of Great Britain, and from giving explanations upon the duration of the occupation of the Roman States by the Austrian troops, although adhering entirely and completely to the words uttered by the first Plenipotentiary of France on this subject.

Count Walewski observes that there is no question either of adopting definitive resolutions or of entering into engagements, still less of interfering directly with the internal affairs of Governments represented or not represented at the Congress; but merely of consolidating, of completing the work of peace, by taking into serious consideration beforehand the fresh complications which might arise, either from the indefinite and unjustifiable prolongation of certain foreign occupations, or from an unseasonable and impolitic system of severity, or from a turbulent licentiousness at variance with international duties.

Baron Hübner replies that the Plenipotentiaries of Austria are not authorised either to give an assurance or to express wishes: the reduction of the Austrian army in the Legations sufficiently shews, in his opinion, that the Imperial Cabinet intends to withdraw its troops as soon as such a measure shall be considered opportune.

Baron Manteuffel declares that he knows enough of the intentions of the King, his august Master, not to hesitate to express his opinion on the questions on which the Congress is engaged, although he has no instructions on the subject.

The maritime principles, says the first Plenipotentiary of Prussia, which the Congress is invited to adopt, have always been professed by Prussia, who has constantly exerted herself to obtain their recognition; and he considers himself authorised to take part in the signature of any Act having for its object their definitive admission into the public law of Europe. He expresses his conviction that his Sovereign would not withhold his approval from any agreement which might be established in this sense among the Plenipotentiaries.

Baron Manteuffel by no means overlooks the great importance of the other questions which have been discussed, but he observes that an affair of the utmost interest for his Court and for Europe has been passed over in silence; he refers to the present situation of Neufchâtel. He remarks that this Principality is, perhaps, the only point in Europe where, in contradiction to Treaties and to what has been formally recognised by all the great Powers, a revolutionary power which disregards the rights of the sovereign, holds sway. Baron Manteuffel demands that this question should be included in the number of those to be inquired into. He adds, that the King, his Sovereign, anxiously wishes for the prosperity of the Kingdom of Greece, and that he ardently desires to witness the disappearance of the causes which have produced the abnormal state of things marked by the presence of foreign troops; he admits, however, that it might be proper to examine into circumstances calculated to present this matter in its true light.

As for the steps which it might be considered advantageous to take, in what relates to the state of affairs in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Baron Manteuffel observes that such steps might present various inconveniences. He says that it might be well to ask one's self whether admonitions such as those which have been proposed would not excite in the country a spirit of opposition and revolutionary movements, instead of answering to the ideas which it had been contemplated to carry out, certainly with a benevolent intention. He does not deem it proper to enter upon an examination of the actual situation of the Pontifical States. He confines himself to expressing the desire that it may be possible to place the Government in a condition which would henceforth render superfluous the occupation by foreign troops. Baron Manteuffel concludes by declaring that the Prussian Cabinet fully admits the pernicious influence exercised by the press, subversive of all regular order, and the dangers which it propagates by preaching up regicide and revolt: he adds, that Prussia would voluntarily take part in the inquiry into the measures which might be deemed suitable for putting an end to such practices.

Count Cavour does not mean to question the right of each Plenipotentiary to abstain from taking part in the discussion of a question which is not contemplated by his instructions; it is nevertheless, he thinks, of the utmost importance that the opinion manifested by certain Powers, in regard to the occupation of the Roman States, should be recorded in the Protocol.

The first Plenipotentiary of Sardinia states that the occupation of the Roman States by the Austrian troops assumes every day more of a permanent character; that it has lasted seven years, and that, nevertheless, no indication appears which would lead to the supposition that it will cease at a more or less early period; that the causes which gave rise to it are still in existence; that the state of the country which they occupy is, assuredly, not improved; and that in order to be satisfied of this, it is enough to remark that Austria considers herself obliged to maintain, in its utmost severity, the state of siege at Bologna, although it dates from the occupation itself. He observes that the presence of the Austrian troops in the Legations and in the Duchy of Parma destroys the balance of power in Italy, and constitutes a real danger for Sardinia. The Plenipotentiaries of Sardinia, he says, deem it, therefore, a duty to point out to the attention of Europe a state of things so abnormal as that which results from the indefinite occupation of a great part of Italy by Austrian troops.

As regards the question of Naples, Count Cavour shares entirely the opinions expressed by Count Walewski and the Earl of Clarendon; and he conceives that it is in the highest degree important to suggest modifications which, by appeasing passions, would render less difficult the regular progress of affairs in the other States of the Peninsula.

Baron Hübner, on his part, says that the first Plenipotentiary of Sardinia has spoken only of the Austrian occupation, and kept silence in regard to that of France; that nevertheless the two occupations took place at the same time, and with the same object; that it is impossible to admit the argument drawn by Count Cavour, from the permanency of the state of siege at Bologna; that if an exceptional state of things is still necessary in that city, while it has long since ceased at Rome and Ancona, this appears at the utmost to prove that the dispositions of the people of Rome and of Ancona are more satisfactory than those of the city of Bologna. He remarks that in Italy it is not only the Roman States which are occupied by foreign troops; that the Communes of Menton and of Roquebrune, forming part of the Principality of Monaco, have been for the last eight years occupied by Sardinia; and that the only difference which exists between the two occupations is, that the Austrians and the French were invited by the Sovereign of the country, while the Sardinian troops entered the territory of the Prince of Monaco contrary to his wishes, and maintain themselves therein, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Sovereign of the country.

In reply to Baron Hübner, Count Cavour says that he is desirous that the French occupation should cease as well as the Austrian, but that he cannot help considering the one as being far more dangerous than the other for the independent States of Italy. He adds, that a small corps d'armée, at a great distance from France, is menacing for no one; whereas it is very alarming to see Austria resting on Ferrara and on Placentia, the fortifications of which she is enlarging, contrary to the spirit if not to the letter of the Treaties of Vienna, and extending herself along the Adriatic as far as Ancona.

As for Monaco, Count Cavour declares that Sardinia is ready to withdraw the fifty men who occupy Menton, if the Prince is in a condition to return to the country without exposing himself to the most serious dangers. Besides, he does not consider that Sardinia can be accused of having contributed to the overthrow of the ancient Government, in order to occupy those States, since the Prince has not been able to maintain his authority in the single town of Monaco, which Sardinia occupied in 1848, in virtue of the Treaties.

Baron Brunnow thinks it is his duty to point out a particular circumstance—that the occupation of Greece by the allied troops took place during the war, and that relations being happily re-established between the three Protecting Courts, the time is arrived for coming to an understanding as to the means of reverting to a situation in conformity with the common interest. He gives the assurance that the Plenipotentiaries of Russia have received with satisfaction, and will eagerly transmit to their Government, the intentions manifested in this respect by the Plenipotentiaries of France and of Great Britain; and that Russia, with a conservative object and with a view to ameliorate the state of things existing in Greece, will readily join in every

measure which may appear calculated to effect the purpose contemplated in the foundation of the Hellenic Kingdom.

The Plenipotentiaries of Russia add, that they will take the orders of their Court upon the proposal submitted to the Congress relative to maritime law.

Count Walewski congratulates himself on having induced the Plenipotentiaries to interchange their ideas on the questions which have been discussed. He had supposed that it might have been possible, perhaps with advantage, to express themselves in a more complete manner on some of the subjects which have fixed the attention of the Congress. 'But such as it is,' he says, 'the interchange of ideas which has taken place is not without advantage.'

The first Plenipotentiary of France states that the result of it is, in effect:

1. That no one has contested the necessity of seriously deliberating as to the means for improving the situation of Greece; and that the three protecting Courts have recognised the importance of coming to an understanding among themselves in this respect.

2. That the Plenipotentiaries of Austria have acceded to the wish expressed by the Plenipotentiaries of France for the evacuation of the Pontifical States by the French and Austrian troops, as soon as it can be effected without prejudice to the tranquillity of the country and to the consolidation of the authority of the Holy See.

3. That the greater part of the Plenipotentiaries have not questioned the good effect which would result from measures of clemency, opportunely adopted by the Governments of the Italian Peninsula, and especially by that of the Two Sicilies.

4. That all the Plenipotentiaries, and even those who considered themselves bound to reserve the principle of the liberty of the press, have not hesitated loudly to condemn the excesses in which the Belgian newspapers indulge with impunity, by recognising the necessity of remedying the real inconveniences which result from the uncontrolled licence which is so greatly abused in Belgium.

That, finally, the reception given by all the Plenipotentiaries to the idea of closing their labours by a declaration of principles in the matter of maritime law, must give reason to hope that at the next sitting they will have received from their respective Governments authority to adhere to an Act, which, while completing the work of the Congress of Paris, would effect an improvement worthy of our epoch.

[The signatures follow.]

2. *Sardinian Memorial relating to the Affairs of Italy, addressed to the Governments of England and France, April* 16, 1856.

The undersigned, Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the King of Sardinia, full of confidence in the just sentiments of the Governments of France and England, and in the friendship which they profess for Piedmont, have never ceased since the opening of the Conferences to hope that the Congress of Paris would not separate without taking into serious consideration the state of Italy, and deliberating on the means to be adopted for the re-establishment of its political equilibrium, disturbed at present by the occupation of a great part of the Peninsula by foreign troops. Certain of the concurrence of their allies, they could not think that any other Power, after having testified so lively and so generous an interest in the fate of Eastern Christians of the Slavonic and Greek races, would refuse to interest themselves in the people of the Latin race, who are still more unhappy by reason that the advanced degree of civilisation which they have attained makes them feel more acutely the effects of bad government.

This hope has been disappointed.

Notwithstanding the good-will of France and England—notwithstanding their well-intended efforts, the persistence of Austria obliged the discussions of the Congress to be strictly bounded within the sphere of the questions marked out before its meeting, and is the cause of this assembly, on which the eyes of Europe are fixed, being about to dissolve, not only without having effected the least amelioration for the ills of Italy, but without giving a ray of hope for the future, to the nations on the other side of the Alps, calculated to calm their minds and to make them bear the present with resignation.

The peculiar position occupied by Austria in the Congress perhaps rendered this deplorable result inevitable. The undersigned are forced to acknowledge this. Nevertheless, without addressing the least reproach to their allies, they believe it a duty to call their serious attention to the sad consequences that this may have for Europe, for Italy, and especially for Sardinia.

It would be superfluous to trace here an exact picture of the state of Italy. What has taken place in those countries is only too notorious. The system of repression and violent reaction commenced in 1848 and 1849—justified in its origin, perhaps, by the revolutionary disturbances which had shortly before been suppressed—continues without the smallest relaxation. It may even be said that, with few exceptions, it is exercised with redoubled rigour. Never were the prisons and dungeons more full of persons condemned for political causes; never has the number of exiles been greater; never has the police been more vexatious, nor martial law more severely applied. What is taking place at Parma only proves this too clearly.

Such a system of government must necessarily keep the populations in a constant state of irritation and revolutionary ferment.

This has been the state of Italy for seven years. Nevertheless, the popular agitation appeared recently to be calmed. Italians, seeing one of their national princes coalesced with the great Western Powers for the support of the principles of right and justice, and for the amelioration of the fate of their co-religionists in the East, conceived a hope that peace would not be made without some relief for their misfortunes. This hope kept them calm and resigned. But when they know the negative results of the Congress of Paris; when they learn that Austria, notwithstanding the good offices and benevolent intervention of France and England, refused all discussion—that she would not even enter into an examination of the means proper for remedying such a sad state of things—there can be no doubt that the dormant irritation will be awakened among them more violently than ever. Convinced that they have nothing to expect from diplomacy and the efforts of the Powers which take an interest in their fate, they will throw themselves with southern ardour into the ranks of the revolutionary and subversive party; and Italy will again become a hotbed of conspiracies and tumults, which may perhaps be suppressed by redoubled rigour, but which the least European commotion may cause to burst forth in the most violent manner. So sad a

state of things, if it merits the attention of the Governments of France and England, equally interested in the maintenance of order and the regular development of civilisation, must naturally pre-occupy the Government of the King of Sardinia in the highest degree. The awakening of revolutionary passions in all the countries surrounding Piedmont, by the effect of causes calculated to excite the most lively popular sympathies, exposes it to dangers of excessive gravity, such as to compromise that firm and moderate policy which has had such happy results for the interior, and gained it the sympathy and esteem of enlightened Europe.

But this is not the only danger threatening Sardinia. A still greater is the consequence of the means employed by Austria to repress the revolutionary ferment in Italy. Called by the Sovereigns of the small States of Italy, who are powerless, to repress the discontent of their subjects, this Power occupies militarily the greater part of the Valley of the Po and of Central Italy, and makes its influence felt in an irresistible manner, even in the countries where she has no soldiers. Resting on one side on Ferrara and Bologna, her troops extend themselves to Ancona, the length of the Adriatic, which has become, in a manner, an Austrian lake; on the other, mistress of Piacenza, which, contrary to the spirit, if not to the letter, of the treaties of Vienna, she labours to transform into a first-class fortress; she has a garrison at Parma, and makes dispositions to deploy her forces all along the Sardinian frontier, from the Po to the summit of the Apennines. This permanent occupation by Austria, of territories which do not belong to her, renders her absolute mistress of nearly all Italy, destroys the equilibrium established by the Treaty of Vienna (1815), and is a continual menace to Piedmont.

Bounded thus on so many sides by Austrian influence; seeing developed on her eastern frontier, completely open, the forces of a Power which she knows to be animated by unfriendly feelings towards her—this country is held in a state of constant apprehension, which obliges her to remain armed, and to take defensive measures excessively burdensome to her finances, already tasked by the events of 1848 and 1849, and by the war in which she has just participated. The facts thus indicated by the undersigned suffice to render evident the dangers of the position in which the Government of the King of Sardinia finds itself placed. Disturbed within by the action of revolutionary passions; excited all round by a system of violent repression and foreign occupation; threatened by the extension of Austrian power—it may at any moment be forced, by an inevitable necessity, to adopt extreme measures of which it is impossible to calculate the consequences.

The undersigned do not doubt but that such a state of things will excite the solicitude of the Governments of France and England, not only on account of the sincere friendship and real sympathy that these Powers profess for the Sovereign who, alone among all, at the moment when their success was most uncertain, declared himself openly in their favour; but, above all, because it constitutes a real danger for Europe. Sardinia is the only State in Italy that has been able to raise an impassable barrier to the revolutionary spirit, and at the same time remain independent of Austria. It is the counterpoise to her invading influence. If Sardinia succumbed, exhausted of power, abandoned by her allies—if she also was obliged to submit to Austrian domination, then the conquest of Italy, by this Power, would be achieved; and Austria, after having obtained, without its costing her the least sacrifice, the immense benefit of the free navigation of the Danube, and the neutralisation of the Black Sea, would acquire a preponderating influence in the West. This is what France and England would never wish—this they will never permit.

In conclusion, the undersigned are convinced that the Cabinets of Paris and London, taking into serious consideration the state of Italy, will decide, in concert with Sardinia, on the means for applying an efficacious remedy.

C. CAVOUR.
PARIS, *April* 16, 1856. DE VILLA-MARINA.

V. TURKISH CHARTERS, GRANTED BY THE SULTAN IN 1839 AND 1856.

1. *Hatti-shérif of Gulhané*, 1839.

It is well known that, during the early ages of the Ottoman monarchy, the glorious precepts of the Koran and the laws of the Empire were ever held in honour. In consequence of this, the Empire increased in strength and greatness, and all the population, without exception, acquired a high degree of welfare and prosperity. For 150 years a succession of incidents and various causes have checked this obedience to the sacred code of the law, and to the regulations which emanate from it; and the previous internal strength and prosperity have been converted into weakness and poverty; for, in truth, an empire loses all its stability when it ceases to observe its laws.

These considerations have been ever present to our mind; and since the day of our accession to the throne, the thought of the public good, the amelioration of the condition of the provinces, and the alleviation of the national burdens, has not ceased to claim our entire attention. If we take into consideration the geographical position of the Ottoman provinces, the fertility of the soil, and the aptness and intelligence of the inhabitants, we shall arrive at the conviction that, by applying ourselves to discover efficacious plans, the result which, with the aid of God, we hope to attain will be realised within a few years. Thus, then, full of confidence in the help of the Most High, supported by the intercession of our Prophet, we consider it advisable to attempt, by new institutions, to obtain for the provinces composing the Ottoman Empire the benefits of a good administration. These institutions will principally refer to the following topics:—1. Such guarantees as will insure our subjects perfect security for their lives, their honour, and their fortune. 2. A regular method of establishing and collecting the taxes. 3. An equally regular method of recruiting and levying the army, and fixing the duration of the service.

In truth, are not life and honour the most precious blessings in existence? What man, whatever may be his detestation of violence, could refrain from having recourse to it, and thereby injuring the government and his country, if his life and honour are exposed to danger? If, on the contrary, he enjoys perfect security in this respect, he will not forget his loyalty, and

all his acts will conduce to the welfare of the government and his fellow-subjects. If there is no security for their fortune, all listen coldly to the voice of their Prince and Country; none attend to the progress of the commonweal, absorbed as they are in their own troubles. If, on the other hand, the citizen possesses in confidence his property, of whatever kind it may be, then, full of ardour for his own affairs, the sphere of which he strives to extend, in order to increase that of his own enjoyments, he daily feels the love for his Prince and his Country growing more fervent in his heart. These sentiments become within him the source of the most laudable actions.

It is of the highest importance to regulate the imposition of the taxes; as the State, which, in the defence of its territory, is forced into various expenses, cannot procure the money necessary for the army and the other branches of the service, save by contributions levied on its subjects.

Although, thanks to God, our subjects have for some time been delivered from the scourge of monopolies, falsely regarded hitherto as a source of revenue, a fatal practice still exists, although it can only have the most disastrous consequences: it is that of the venal concessions known by the name of *Iltizam*. Under this system, the civil and financial administration of a province is intrusted to the arbitrary will of an individual; that is, at times to the iron hand of the most violent and covetous passions; for, if the administrator be not honest, he cares for nothing but his own advantage. It is therefore necessary that, in future, each member of the Ottoman Empire should be taxed in a ratio to his fortune and his faculties, and that nothing further should be demanded from him. It is also necessary that special laws should fix and limit the expenses of our forces on land and sea.

Although, as we have said, the defence of the country is an important consideration, and it is the duty of all the inhabitants to furnish soldiers for this end, it is nevertheless necessary to establish laws to regulate the contingent which each district should furnish according to the requirements of the moment, and to reduce the time of active military service to four or five years. For it is both committing an injustice and inflicting a deadly blow on the agriculture and industry of the country, to take, without regard to the respective population of the districts, more from one, and less from another, than they are able to furnish; at the same time it is reducing the soldiers to despair, and contributing to the depopulation of the country, to retain them during their whole life in the service. In fine, without the various laws whose necessity has been recognised, the Empire can possess neither strength, wealth, prosperity, nor tranquillity; whereas it will expect them all from the existence of these new laws. For this reason, in future, the cause of every accused party will be tried publicly, in conformity with our divine law; and, until a regular sentence has been pronounced, no one can put another to death, secretly or publicly, by poison or any other form of punishment. No one will be permitted to assail the honour of any one, whomsoever he may be. Every person will enjoy the possession of his property of every nature, and dispose of it with the most perfect liberty, without any one being permitted to impede him: thus, for example, the innocent heirs of a criminal will not be deprived of their legal rights, and the property of the criminal will not be confiscated. These imperial concessions extend to all our subjects, to whatever religion or sect they may belong; they will enjoy them without any exception. Perfect security is therefore guaranteed by us to the inhabitants of the Empire, with regard to their life, their honour, and their fortune, as the sacred text of our law demands.

With reference to the other points, as they must be regulated by the concurrence of enlightened opinions, our Council of Justice—augmented by as many new members as may be deemed necessary—to whom will be adjoined, on certain days which we shall appoint, our Ministers and the notables of the Empire, will meet for the purpose of establishing the fundamental laws on those points relating to the security of life and property, and the imposition of the taxes. Every one in these assemblies will state his ideas freely, and give his opinion.

The laws relating to the regulations of the military service will be discussed by the Military Council, holding its meetings at the palace of the Seraskier. As soon as a law is decided upon, it will be presented to us; and in order that it may be eternally valid and applicable, we will confirm it by our sanction, written above it with our Imperial hand.

As these present institutions are solely intended for the regeneration of religion, government, the nation, and the Empire, we engage to do nothing which may be opposed to them. As a pledge for our promise, we intend, after having deposited them in the hall which contains the glorious relics of the Prophet, in the presence of all the Ulema and Grandees of the Empire, to take an oath in the name of the Almighty, and cause the Ulema and Grandees also to swear to that effect. After that, any one of the Ulema or Grandees, or any other person whatsoever, who violates these institutions, will undergo, without regard to rank, consideration, or credit, the punishment appointed for his guilt when proven. A penal code will be drawn up to this effect.

As all the functionaries of the Empire will receive from this day a suitable salary, and those whose functions are not at present sufficiently rewarded, will be advanced, a rigorous law will be passed against the traffic in favours and appointments (*richvet*), which the divine laws reprove, and which is one of the principal causes of the decay of the Empire.

The enactments thus made being a complete renovation and alteration in ancient usages, this Imperial rescript will be published at Constantinople, and in all the towns of our Empire, and will be officially communicated to all the Ambassadors of friendly Powers residing in Constantinople, in order that they may be witnesses of the concession of these institutions, which, with the favour of the Almighty, will endure for ever.

May the All-powerful God have us all in His holy keeping! May those who commit any act contrary to the present institutions be the objects of the Divine malediction, and eternally deprived of every kind of happiness!

2. *Hatti-shérif of* 1856.

Let it be done as herein set forth. To you my Grand Vizier, Muhammed Emin Aali Pacha, decorated with my Imperial Order of the Medjidié of the first class, and with the Order of Personal Merit; may God grant to you greatness, and increase your power! It has always been my most earnest desire to insure the happiness of all classes of the subjects whom Divine Providence has placed under my Imperial sceptre; and since my accession to the throne, I have not ceased to direct all my efforts to the attainment of that end. Thanks to the Almighty, these unceasing efforts have

already been productive of numerous useful results. From day to day the happiness of the nation and the wealth of my dominions go on augmenting.

It being now my desire to renew and enlarge still more the new institutions ordained with the view of establishing a state of things conformable with the dignity of my Empire and the position which it occupies among civilised nations; and the rights of my Empire having, by the fidelity and praiseworthy efforts of all my subjects, and by the kind and friendly assistance of the great Powers, my noble allies, received from abroad a confirmation which will be the commencement of a new era, it is my desire to augment its wellbeing and prosperity, to insure the happiness of all my subjects, who in my sight are all equal, and equally dear to me, and who are united to each other by the cordial ties of patriotism, and to insure the means of daily increasing the prosperity of my Empire.

I have therefore resolved upon, and I order the execution of the following measures:—The guarantees promised on our part by the Hatti-Humayoon of Gulhané, and in conformity with the Tanzimat, to all the subjects of my Empire, without distinction of classes or of religion, for the security of their persons and property and the preservation of their honour, are to-day confirmed and consolidated, and efficacious measures shall be taken in order that they may have their full and entire effect.

All the privileges and spiritual immunities granted by my ancestors *ab antiquo*, and at subsequent dates, to all Christian communities or other non-Mussulman persuasions established in my Empire under my protection, shall be confirmed and maintained.

Every Christian or other non-Mussulman community shall be bound, within a fixed period, and with the concurrence of a Commission composed *ad hoc* of members of its own body, to proceed, with my high approbation, and under the inspection of my Sublime Porte, to examine into its actual immunities and privileges, and to discuss and submit to my Sublime Porte the reforms required by the progress of civilisation and of the age. The powers conceded to the Christian Patriarchs and Bishops by the Sultan Mahomet II. and his successors, shall be made to harmonise with the new position which my generous and beneficent intentions insure to these communities.

The principle of nominating the Patriarchs for life, after the revision of the rules of election now in force, shall be strictly carried out, conformably to the tenor of their firmans of investiture.

The Patriarchs, Metropolitans, Archbishops, Bishops, and Rabbins shall take an oath on their entrance into office, according to a form agreed upon in common by my Sublime Porte and the spiritual heads of the different religious communities. The ecclesiastical dues, of whatever sort or nature they be, shall be abolished and replaced by fixed revenues for the Patriarchs and heads of communities, and by the allocation of allowances and salaries equitably proportioned to the importance of the rank and the dignity of the different members of the clergy.

The property, real or personal, of the different Christian ecclesiastics shall remain intact; the temporal administration of the Christian or other non-Mussulman communities shall, however, be placed under the safeguard of an Assembly to be chosen from among the members, both ecclesiastics and laymen, of the said communities.

In the towns, small boroughs, and villages where the whole population is of the same religion, no obstacle shall be offered to the repair, according to their original plan, of buildings set apart for religious worship, for schools, for hospitals, and for cemeteries. The plans of these different buildings, in case of their new erection, must, after having been approved by the Patriarchs or heads of communities, be submitted to my Sublime Porte, which will approve of them by my Imperial order, or make known its observations upon them within a certain time. Each sect, in localities where there are no other religious denominations, shall be free from every species of restraint as regards the public exercise of its religion.

In the towns, small boroughs, and villages where different sects are mingled together, each community, inhabiting a distinct quarter, shall, by conforming to the above-mentioned ordinances, have equal power to repair and improve its churches, its hospitals, its schools, and its cemeteries. When there is question of the erection of new buildings, the necessary authority must be asked for through the medium of the Patriarchs and heads of communities from my Sublime Porte, which will pronounce a sovereign decision according that authority, except in the case of administrative obstacles. The intervention of the administrative authority in all measures of this nature will be entirely gratuitous. My Sublime Porte will take energetic measures to insure to each sect, whatever be the number of its adherents, entire freedom in the exercise of its religion.

Every distinction or designation tending to make any class whatever of the subjects of my Empire inferior to another class, on account of their religion, language, or race, shall be for ever effaced from the Administrative Protocol. The laws shall be put in force against the use of any injurious or offensive term, either among private individuals or on the part of the authorities.

As all forms of religion are and shall be freely professed in my dominions, no subject of my Empire shall be hindered in the exercise of the religion that he professes, nor shall be in any way annoyed on this account. No one shall be compelled to change his religion.

The nomination and choice of all functionaries and other *employés* of my Empire being wholly dependent upon my sovereign will, all the subjects of my Empire, without distinction of nationality, shall be admissible to public employments, and qualified to fill them according to their capacity and merit, and conformably with rules to be generally applied. All the subjects of my Empire, without distinction, shall be received into the Civil and Military Schools of the Government, if they otherwise satisfy the conditions as to age and examination which are specified in the Organic Regulations of the said Schools. Moreover, every community is authorised to establish Public Schools of Science, Art, and Industry; but the method of instruction and the choice of professors in schools of this class shall be under the control of a Mixed Council of Public Instruction, the members of which shall be named by my sovereign command.

All commercial, correctional, and criminal suits between Mussulmans and Christian or other non-Mussulman subjects, or between Christians or other non-Mussulmans of different sects, shall be referred to Mixed Tribunals. The proceedings of these tribunals shall be public; the parties shall be confronted and shall produce their witnesses, whose testimony shall be received, without distinction, upon an oath taken according to the religious law of each sect. Suits relating to civil affairs shall continue to be

publicly tried, according to the laws and regulations, before the Mixed Provincial Councils, in the presence of the Governor and Judge of the place. Special civil proceedings—such as those relating to successions or others of that kind—between subjects of the same Christian or other non-Mussulman faith, may, at the request of the parties, be sent before the Councils of the Patriarchs or of the communities. Penal, correctional, and commercial laws, and rules of procedure for the Mixed Tribunals, shall be drawn up as soon as possible, and formed into a code. Translations of them shall be published in all the languages current in the Empire. Proceedings shall be taken, with as little delay as possible, for the reform of the penitentiary system as applied to houses of detention, punishment, or correction, and other establishments of like nature, so as to reconcile the rights of humanity with those of justice. Corporal punishment shall not be administered, even in the prisons, except in conformity with the disciplinary regulations established by my Sublime Porte; and everything that resembles torture shall be entirely abolished. Infractions of the law in this particular shall be severely repressed, and shall besides entail, as of right, the punishment, in conformity with the Civil Code, of the authorities who may order and of the agents who may commit them.

The organisation of the police in the capital, in the provincial towns, and in the rural districts, shall be revised in such a manner as to give to all the peaceable subjects of my Empire the strongest guarantees for the safety both of their persons and property. The equality of taxes entailing equality of burdens, as equality of duties entails that of rights, Christian subjects, and those of other non-Mussulman sects, as it has been already decided, shall, as well as Mussulmans, be subject to the obligations of the Law of Recruitment. The principle of obtaining substitutes, or of purchasing exemption, shall be admitted. A complete law shall be published, with as little delay as possible, respecting the admission into and service in the army of Christian and other non-Mussulman subjects. Proceedings shall be taken for a reform in the constitution of the Provincial and Communal Councils, in order to insure fairness in the choice of the deputies of the Mussulman, Christian, and other communities, and freedom of voting in the Councils. My Sublime Porte will take into consideration the adoption of the most effectual means for ascertaining exactly and for controlling the result of the deliberations and of the decisions arrived at.

As the laws regulating the purchase, sale, and disposal of real property are common to all the subjects of my Empire, it shall be lawful for foreigners to possess landed property in my dominions, conforming themselves to the laws and police regulations, and bearing the same charges as the native inhabitants, and after arrangements have been come to with foreign Powers. The taxes are to be levied under the same denomination from all the subjects of my Empire, without distinction of class or of religion. The most prompt and energetic means for remedying the abuses in collecting the taxes, and especially the tithes, shall be considered. The system of direct collection shall gradually, and as soon as possible, be substituted for the plan of farming, in all the branches of the revenues of the State. As long as the present system remains in force, all agents of the Government and all members of the Medjlis shall be forbidden, under the severest penalties, to become lessees of any farming contracts which are announced for public competition, or to have any beneficial interest in carrying them out. The local taxes shall, as far as possible, be so imposed as not to affect the sources of production, or to hinder the progress of internal commerce.

Works of public utility shall receive a suitable endowment, part of which shall be raised from private and special taxes levied in the Provinces which shall have the benefit of the advantages arising from the establishment of ways of communication by land and sea.

A special law having been already passed, which declares that the Budget of the revenue and expenditure of the State shall be drawn up and made known every year, the said law shall be most scrupulously observed. Proceedings shall be taken for revising the emoluments attached to each office.

The heads of each community and a delegate, designated by my Sublime Porte, shall be summoned to take part in the deliberations of the Supreme Council of Justice on all occasions which may interest the generality of the subjects of my Empire. They shall be summoned specially for this purpose by my Grand Vizier. The delegates shall hold office for one year; they shall be sworn on entering upon their duties. All the members of the Council, at the ordinary and extraordinary meetings, shall freely give their opinions and their votes, and no one shall ever annoy them on this account.

The laws against corruption, extortion, or malversation shall apply, according to the legal forms, to all the subjects of my Empire, whatever may be their class and the nature of their duties.

Steps shall be taken for the formation of banks and other similar institutions, so as to effect a reform in the monetary and financial system, as well as to collect funds to be employed in augmenting the sources of the material wealth of my Empire.

Steps shall also be taken for the formation of roads and canals, to increase the facilities of communication, and increase the sources of the wealth of the country. Everything that can impede commerce or agriculture shall be abolished. To accomplish these objects, means shall be sought to profit by the science, the art, and the funds of Europe, and thus gradually to execute them.

Such being my wishes and my commands, you, my Grand Vizier, will, according to custom, cause this Imperial firman to be published in my capital, and in all parts of my Empire; and you will watch attentively, and take all the necessary measures that all the orders which it contains be henceforth carried out with the most rigorous exactness.

VI. FRENCH OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE WAR.

[In the spring of 1856, a work was published in France, entitled *L'Expédition de Crimée, jusqu'à la Prise de Sebastopol: Chroniques de la Guerre d'Orient.* It was written by Baron de Bazancourt, author of *Histoire de Sicile sous la Domination des Normands*; and *Cinq Mois au Camp devant Sebastopol.* The baron had been requested by M. Fortoul, Minister of Public Instruction, to proceed to the Crimea, and to prepare a chronicle of the achievements of his compatriots in the war, with a view to the preparation of

a history at a subsequent period. Marshal Vaillant, Minister of War, wrote a letter to the baron on the 28th of December 1854, informing him that instructions had been sent out, to Marshal de St Arnaud, to afford all practicable facilities for this object. Thus accredited, Baron de Bazancourt went to the French camp outside Sebastopol, in January 1855, and there remained till the capture in September. When that favoured writer, therefore, published his 'History,' it was at once accepted as semi-official—dedicated as it was, too, to the emperor. Many English readers at once objected to it, on the ground that the English army and its exploits are seldom mentioned; that the mention is always brief; that the English army is generally treated as a mere appendage to the French; that the successes are recorded as something belonging peculiarly to the French; and that where the commanders differ, the French are in the right and the English in the wrong. Viewed, however—not as a history of the war, but as a chronicle of French participation in the war, and a record of French opinion concerning it—Baron de Bazancourt's work contains many French official documents, an English translation of a few of which may usefully be given here, touching on matters not made public through any other medium.]

1. *French Fleet in Turkish Waters*, 1854.

BLACK SEA SQUADRON, VICE-ADMIRAL HAMELIN.

		Guns.	Horse-power.
Friedland,	Man-of-war, 1st Class,	120	0
Valmy,	〃 〃, 〃 〃,	120	0
Ville de Paris,	〃 〃, 〃 〃,	120	0
Henri IV.,	〃 〃, 2d 〃,	100	0
Bayard,	〃 〃, 3d 〃,	90	0
Charlemagne,	〃 〃, auxiliary steam,	90	450
Jéna,	〃 〃, 3d Class,	90	0
Jupiter,	〃 〃, 〃 〃,	90	0
Marengo,	〃 〃, 4th 〃,	80	0
Gomer,	Steam-frigate,	16	450
Mogador,	〃 〃,	8	650
Descartes,	〃 〃,	20	540
Vauban,	〃 〃,	20	440
Cacique,	〃 〃,	14	450
Magellan,	〃 〃,	14	450
Sané,	〃 〃,	14	450
Caton,	Steam-corvette,	4	260
Prométhée,	Steam Dispatch-boat,	4	200
Salamandre,	〃 〃 〃,	2	120
Sérieuse,	Corvette à gaillard,	30	0
Mercure,	Brig,	20	0
Olivier,	〃,	20	0
Beaumanoir,	〃,	20	0
Cerf,	Dispatch-brig,	10	0
Heron,	Steam Dispatch-boat,	2	200
Monette,	〃 〃 〃,	2	200

MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON, VICE-ADMIRAL BRUAT.

		Guns.
Montebello,	Man-of-war, 1st Class,	120
Napoléon,	〃 〃, steamer,	62
Suffren,	〃 〃, 3d Class,	90
Jean Bart,	〃 〃, auxiliary steam,	90
Ville de Marseille,	〃 〃, 4th Class,	80
Alger,	〃 〃, 〃 〃,	80
Pomone,	Frigate, auxiliary,	40
Caffarelli,	Steam-frigate,	14
Roland,	Steam-corvette,	8
Primauguet,	〃 〃,	8

[These names and figures will probably correct a few slight errors in the text of the present volume; but De Bazancourt himself does not make his totals agree with the items composing them.]

2. *French Crimean Army in February* 1855.

[When General Niel arrived in the Crimea after the siege had endured four months, the commanders agreed that the Malakoff should thenceforward be regarded as the key to the whole place—strategy advocated by some of the English engineers from the very commencement. This new arrangement entailed a new organisation of the French Crimean army—into a siege-corps and a corps of observation: the former to conduct the siege in the south and west; and the latter to guard the plateau from Russian counter-attacks on the side of Inkermann and the Tchernaya, as well as to conduct the siege of the Malakoff and neighbouring works. General Pelissier was sent from Africa to command the one corps, while General Bosquet was intrusted with the other: Canrobert remaining commander-in-chief of the whole. The organisation became therefore as follows:—]

Head-quarters.

General Canrobert.

Artillery Commander, General Thiry.
Engineer Commander, 〃 Bizot.

Left or First Corps.

General Pelissier.

Artillery Commander, General Lebœuf.
Engineer Commander, 〃 Tripier.
1st Division, 〃 Forey (afterwards 〃 D'Autemarre).
2d 〃, 〃 Le Vaillant.
3d 〃, 〃 Paté.
4th 〃, 〃 De Salles.

Right or Second Corps.

General Bosquet.

Artillery Commander, General Beuret.
Engineer Commander, 〃 Frossard.
1st Division, 〃 Bouat.
2d 〃, 〃 Camou.
3d 〃, 〃 Mayran.
4th 〃, 〃 Dulac.

[Shortly afterwards the army was reinforced by the following corps of fine troops, to be held free for any ulterior operations.]

Reserve Corps.

General Regnault de St Jean D'Angely.

1st Division (Imperial Guard), General Mellinet.
2d 〃 (Line Infantry), 〃 Herbillon.
3d 〃 (〃 〃), 〃 D'Aurelle.
4th 〃 (Cavalry), 〃 D'Allonville.

3. *Emperor Napoleon's Plan for a Campaign outside Sebastopol.*

[In the spring of 1855, when the siege progressed slowly, and when differences of opinion arose between the Allied commanders, the Emperor of the French announced a determination to go to the Crimea and head the united armies himself. Political considerations having induced him to abandon this idea, he wrote the following remarkable letter to Canrobert, developing a plan for a campaign:—]

THE EMPEROR TO GENERAL CANROBERT, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY IN THE EAST.

28th April 1855.

The cannonade which has been opened against Sebastopol must by this time either have succeeded or failed. But in either case it is absolutely necessary to depart from the strategy followed during the last six months. Acting in accordance with the English government, I suggest that the whole Allied force be divided into three commands—one siege-army, and two armies of operation.

The first of these will guard Kamiesch, and blockade the garrison of Sebastopol.

The second will operate at a short distance from Balaklava, and, if needful, occupy the Mackenzie heights.

The third will be at liberty for a distinct expedition.*

If, as I believe, the Russians have 35,000 men inside Sebastopol, 15,000 north of Eupatoria, and 70,000 between Simferopol, the Belbek, and the Tchernaya, a force of 60,000 good troops would suffice to destroy the Russians, surprised before they could unite; and even if they did unite, we should find ourselves nearly equal to them in number; for the great principle of strategy must not be forgotten—that if a diversion be made at a certain distance from the base of operations, the troops employed in this diversion should be sufficiently numerous to resist the opponent army, collected in all force against them.

All this duly considered, I would send 40,000 men to the Valley of Baidar; these, supported by Lord Raglan, would command the four roads which cross the Tchernaya, between Skelia and Tchorgouna. We should thus obtain several *têtes du pont*, menacing the Russian left on the Mackenzie heights.

This done, I would leave Lord Raglan master of all the positions on the left bank of the Tchernaya; I would bring together, in rear of the line occupied by the English, the 40,000 men of the French active army, with the cavalry and the means of transport; and would then, with look-outs on the cliffs, await the arrival of the army of reserve from Constantinople. The active French army would then consist of one corps under General Bosquet, comprising four divisions of infantry, and one of light cavalry; and one under General Regnault de St Jean d'Angely, comprising two divisions of infantry, one of the Imperial Guard, and one of heavy cavalry. The whole of this active army would be under General Canrobert; while General Pelissier would command the siege-army.

What would then be our position, as against the Russians?

The movement upon Baidar, giving us routes across the Tchernaya, menaces their left, and leads them to suppose it to be our intention to dislodge them from the heights of Inkermann and Mackenzie: this holds the Russians in check, and draws their attention to Inkermann and Perekop. Our position in such case would be excellent, and my projects unknown; and even if anything were to occur to derange them, nothing would be compromised.

Supposing the movement to succeed thus far, matters would proceed as follow:—

As soon as the fleet is descried, bringing the reserve corps of 25,000 men, give orders to effect a landing at Alushta, at a spot previously examined. Let the first 3000, on landing, establish themselves three leagues from Alushta, beyond the defile of Ayen; and until this occupation is effected, let no others disembark. All being prepared, let the remainder land; and let the 40,000 men of the other army march along the sea-side road from Baidar past Yalta. Thus within three days 65,000 troops would assemble and penetrate to Simferopol; the town would be taken, a garrison placed in it, and the roads in the rear of the army secured.

One of two things would then occur. Either the Russian army which is near Sebastopol would abandon this formidable position, and go to meet the invading army on the Baktchéserai Road; in which case Lord Raglan's army would at once seize the position on the Mackenzie heights—or else the Russians would remain within their lines; and then Canrobert's large army, advancing from Baktchéserai to Sebastopol, with its left on the heights, would form a junction with Lord Raglan's army (advanced in the meantime from Baidar to Albat), and repulse the Russians, driving them either into Sebastopol or into the sea.

This plan appears to me to possess immense advantages. The army, even at Simferopol, which is only nine leagues from Alushta, will be able to maintain a communication with the sea; it will traverse a healthy region, containing the best water in all the Crimea; its base of operations in the rear will be secured; it will occupy ground in which an inferiority in cavalry will not be of much moment; and, lastly, it will come suddenly on the line of operation of the Russians—separating them from their supplies, and perhaps from their reserve artillery.

If the defile of Ayen, a position indispensable to the success of the project, is too strongly fortified to be taken, the 3000 men first sent thither must at once re-embark. The whole army of reserve (D'Angely's corps) would in that case land at Balaklava, and would endeavour to operate against Simferopol by Baidar instead of Ayen: a plan, however, far less advantageous.

As to the march of 40,000 men (Bosquet's corps) from Baidar to Alushta, I deem it little dangerous; for there is a protecting range of mountains near; the Russian forces are at some distance; and steam-ships might follow a parallel course near the shore. The steamers might carry eight days' rations for 65,000 men with D'Angely's corps; wagons might carry as much with Bosquet's corps; and thus the entire force under Canrobert would be victualled for sixteen days. Further supplies, if the expedition were successful, would be sent inland by the route from Alushta.

As to a diversion by way of Eupatoria, nothing would seem to me more dangerous, more opposed to the rules of art or the counsels of prudence. If we operate from Eupatoria towards Simferopol, we shall be in an insalubrious country, exposed, and almost wholly without water, upon ground where the numerous Russian cavalry would have every chance of success; and we should have to march sixteen leagues in face of an enemy who could approach from the north as well as from the south, and could possibly cut off the retreat of our columns. Our wings would not rest on any natural obstacles. To go from Eupatoria to Simferopol, we should have to carry with us all the provisions and ammunition; for, once away from Eupatoria, our rear would be harassed, and our convoys intercepted by the 15,000 Russians who are near that town, mostly cavalry. If we were resisted at Simferopol, and if the Russian army, by change of front, should gain the road which we had just traversed, our columns would be annihilated or starved. Besides, it is another principle of strategy, that a flank-march must not be attempted except at a distance from the enemy, and when sheltered by the natural conformation of the country.

It thus appears that any army, operating on Simferopol from Eupatoria, would be without a line of operation, without a secured flank, without means of retreat, without a favourable field for battle, and without supplies on the road. Besides, the Eupatorian army, instead of being compact, composed of soldiers of one nation commanded by one head, would be formed in great part of Turks, strengthened by a few English or French divisions—wanting in unity, security, and confidence.

If, as a further supposition, the army from Eupatoria

* Probable strength of these three armies:

1st Army,	30,000 French and 30,000 Turks,	60,000
2d " ,	(under Lord Raglan)—25,000 English, 15,000 Piedmontese, 5000 French, and 10,000 Turks,	55,000
3d " ,	40,000 French already on the plateau, with 25,000 reserve about to arrive,	65,000

were to direct its operations at once against Sebastopol, it would be a repetition of the original landing and march in the Crimea, obstructed by still more formidable defence-works on the banks of the Alma, Katcha, and Belbek: it would be disastrous. Then would arise the necessity of leaving at Eupatoria no more Turks than are absolutely necessary to defend the place.

I have thus explained the plan which I should have liked to carry out, at the head of the brave troops whom you have hitherto commanded; and it is with the most profound and earnest regret that I find myself forced, by considerations of grave import, to remain in Europe. NAPOLEON.'

4. *Canrobert's Motives for Resigning.*

[In April and May 1855, about the period when the above letter from the emperor was written, General Canrobert and Lord Raglan took such opposite views concerning Crimean strategy, that, with every wish on both sides to conciliate, they could no longer act together with effect. Canrobert resolved to resign the command in favour of Pelissier, giving as the official reasons for this step the declining state of his health. De Bazancourt, however, prints the following extracts from a letter from Canrobert to the emperor, dated May 19, more explanatory in its character:—]

'The little effect hitherto produced against Sebastopol by the numerous and excellent batteries of the Allies; the non-attack by the enemy on our exterior lines—an attack which appeared very probable, and on which I had founded hopes of success more decisive even than that of Inkermann; the arduous difficulties which I have experienced in preparing for the plan of operations laid down by your Majesty—rendered *almost impossible* by the non-co-operation of the chief of the English army; the false position in which I have been placed, towards the English, by the sudden recall of the Kertch expedition, to which, as I have since learned, they attached very great importance;* the extraordinary fatigue, moral and physical, to which I have been incessantly exposed during the last nine months—all these reasons, Sire, have produced in my mind a conviction that I ought no longer to hold the direction in chief of an immense army, whose esteem, affection, and confidence I have sought to earn.

It hence becomes my duty, towards your Majesty and towards my country, to resign, and to substitute for myself the general [Pelissier] for whom, in his sage foresight, the Emperor had confided to me a letter of [transfer of] command; and who unites the qualities of capacity, moral authority, power of conducting important affairs, and the energy necessary for bringing to a successful result the vast enterprise which had fallen to my charge by the death of my predecessor and the will of the Emperor. Soldiers and officers alike know the military qualities of General Pelissier; they will give him all their confidence; we shall all act harmoniously together; and I know that the new commander has a lively faith in his own success.

Your Majesty will permit me to add that my name is too well known to the troops, whose confiding affection has never ceased to honour me, for me to do otherwise—notwithstanding present circumstances—than remain among them: in order to afford, in face of fatigues and perils, an example of devotion to the service and the glory of the Emperor and of France.

I venture, then, to ask from your Majesty permission for me to command a simple division, in the fine and heroic army whose conduct has honoured and will always honour France.'

* This refers to the first Kertch expedition, recalled on May 5, (see Narrative, p. 450) by Canrobert, against the wish of Raglan and the admirals.

5. *Strength of the Siege-Artillery, at the Final Bombardment of Sebastopol.*

		Batteries.	Guns.
French.—Against	Flagstaff Bastion,	19	129
"	Central Bastion,	19	134
"	Quarantine Bastion,	13	83
"	Malakoff,	34	267
"	Two small redoubts,	4	14
		89	627
English.—Right attack,		17	71
Left "		15	108
		32	179
Total,		121	806

[A few of these guns were not fired during the struggles of that day. De Bazancourt and his English translator make the total of French batteries inconsistent with the items composing it: seventy-two instead of eighty-nine.]

VII. ARMY ORGANISATION.

[The Sebastopol Committee, the Crimean Commissioners, and the Chelsea Board of Inquiry, published Reports and voluminous evidence relating to the disasters of the British army in the Crimea in the winter 1854–5. These Reports gave rise to much acrimony and many denials and counter-charges, in regard to accusations against individuals. Many of the statements, however, free from this personal bias, are valuable as exemplifications of deficiencies in the British military system. The following are two examples, in addition to several given in the text of the *History*:—]

1. *On British Military Hospitals.*

'The British army has hitherto, during peace, been kept on so limited an establishment, that it was necessary to resort to every expedient in order to economise its numbers. This, no doubt, originated the long-established practice of having the hospital duties performed by men from the ranks instead of by persons specially enlisted for that duty. The former, when no great pressure of sickness requires their presence in hospital, can be made available for military duty, while the latter are a permanent source of expense, without any such contingent advantage. That system had worked moderately well for a long series of years; but when the army was required for service in Turkey, its numbers were so limited, that it became necessary to add to the effective strength by every possible expedient, and one of the readiest which presented itself was to restore to the ranks the men usually withdrawn for hospital service, and to replace them from some other source.

Nations whose armies are raised by conscription are never likely to encounter any difficulty in providing attendants on the sick. Out of the large number of conscripts annually placed at the disposal of the Government, there will always be many who, from

their particular aptitude for that service, or on account of their being less fitted for more active military duty, can be selected with advantage; but an army which has to depend entirely upon voluntary enlistment possesses no such facilities; the strictness with which all military obligations are interpreted in this country renders it necessary, if he is to be employed exclusively as an hospital attendant, that the recruit should be enlisted specially for that particular duty; and, among men in the vigour of youth, who are inclined to enter the army, few are disposed to place themselves in the position of nurses at a time when the operations of active warfare are going on. Although recruiting for this particular service has now been carried on for nearly a year, with pay, pension, and other advantages much exceeding what is granted to the private soldier, the number required is understood still to be incomplete, notwithstanding that recruits have been taken at a much more advanced age than they would be received into any other branch of the service.

But when the war broke out there was not time to obtain the necessary attendants for the hospital by the slow process of recruiting; the demand for their services was immediate, and it was desirable, especially at the commencement of a campaign, that they should have some military experience, lest they might prove an incumbrance: recourse was, therefore, had to a selection from the military pensioners, till some more suitable body of men could be obtained.

The employment of this class, even for the more onerous occupation of garrison-duty at home and abroad, was not an innovation; it has always been the practice, on the commencement of a war, to call back into the service the pensioners who may have recovered from their disabilities, or are still of an age to perform garrison-duty, and they hold their pensions expressly on condition of attending to such calls. During the Peninsular War upwards of 10,000 pensioners were employed in veteran and garrison battalions at home and abroad, and immediately on the breaking out of the present war all those belonging to the navy and marines were re-examined, and about 2000 sent on shipboard, or into the coast-guard, where they have since been constantly employed. No such call was made for the services of the military pensioners, because it was conceived that they would be equally useful as an enrolled force in their respective districts; but, as they are a younger body than the Greenwich pensioners, their average age being only between forty and fifty, it was not an unreasonable supposition, considering their previous military experience and habits, that they might be usefully employed in the hospital and ambulance duties, for which soldiers from the ranks could no longer be spared.'

2. *Mr Commissary-general Filder's Remarks on the Commissariat of the War.*

The Commissariat has the duty, by the regulations of the service, of raising, of holding, and of paying the funds necessary to meet the whole of the army expenditure, and of making all purchases required for the service of its own or any other department. It is responsible for keeping up the supplies of provisions, forage, fuel, and light, according to the regulated scales of allowance, with such additions as may be specially authorised by the Commander of the Forces; but the Commissary-general has no authority to alter, nor has he, except so far as his opinion may be asked or deferred to, any influence in altering the established ration or other allowances in the most minute particular. With respect to supplies of any other kind, such as Quartermaster-general's and hospital stores, the Commissariat, during the time I was in charge of it, only held them on behalf of the departments at whose respective disposal they were, and issued them on their requisitions. Stores of this description, with the army in the East, have recently been given over to storekeepers of the Ordnance Department; but it was, and is still, the duty of the Commissariat, in case of any deficiency in the supply sent out from England, or of any emergency rendering necessary articles of a description not ordinarily in use, to purchase them on the authorised requisition of the proper departments, the heads of those departments being responsible for the extent and nature of their demands.

The Commissariat had likewise, till it was transferred to a separate and independent establishment, the duty of providing all the land-transport required for the service of the army.

To carry on these extensive and onerous duties—which, indeed, embrace all the civil administration of the army, excepting the hospitals, and have since been divided among three separate departments—I had from the first an insufficient establishment both of officers and subordinate *employés*, which was still further weakened by the great amount of sickness and mortality which prevailed, owing to the nature and excessive labour of the duties to be performed. None of the subordinate establishments absolutely necessary to the efficiency of a field Commissariat existed at the outbreak of the war, and even the officers had to be collected from the most distant parts of the empire, from Sierra Leone, the Cape of Good Hope, and New South Wales, and of course by slow degrees. In the meantime, I had to carry on the duties with the temporary assistance of gentlemen furnished from other public departments, and wholly without experience in Commissariat service. This inefficient state of the department, when I took charge of it, necessarily diverted much of my attention from the more important general arrangements of the service, to the regulation of details; but I notice it less for the purpose of accounting for my own possible errors and omissions, than with the object of meeting the comparison which has been frequently made elsewhere, and is partially made use of in this Report, between the success of the French and British Commissariat operations. That the success has been uniformly on the side of the former is far from being established; but that generally it ought to be so, is quite clear, inasmuch as there is the greatest possible advantage on that side in the completeness of the establishments on which so much of Commissariat success depends. These are not, as with us, discarded at the termination of a period of active warfare, and wholly neglected during the continuance of peace, but are constantly kept up in an effective, even if a reduced state, and are considered as necessary an accompaniment of every body of detached troops, as any other portion of the army; and thus give a facility of action to a French force at the outset, which can be acquired by an English army only after long, and perhaps disastrous as well as costly experience. I do not presume here to enter into the question, whether or not a similar system ought to be adopted in our service; but the fact that no such system does exist in it should be taken into consideration in estimating the exertions of the British Commissariat officers, who usually, like myself, are thrown at once upon their own slightly aided resources, and compelled to occupy themselves in creating the means of action at the moment when action is already needed.

VIII. HONORARY DISTINCTIONS TO THE BRITISH SERVICES.

1. *Clasps and Medals.*

After the battles of the Alma, Balaklava, and Inkermann, three varieties of clasps were prepared, for presentation to all the British soldiers, without distinction of rank, engaged in those several actions. Also medals, as honorary testimonials of Crimean service generally.

2. *Inscriptions on Flags.*

HORSE GUARDS, *October* 16, 1855.

The Queen has been graciously pleased to command that, in commemoration of the gallant conduct of the troops concerned, the words 'Alma,' 'Balaklava,' and 'Inkermann' be borne on the regimental colour of the regiments specified in the accompanying list.

Also that the several corps composing Her Majesty's army in the Crimea on the 5th of September 1855, shall bear the inscription 'Sebastopol' on the regimental standard or colour, as a memorial of the arduous and successful operations which have led to the reduction of that fortress.

Regiments which have no standards or colours will bear these distinctions on their cap or helmet plates.

Rifle regiments will wear them on their breastplates and cap-plates.

By command of the Right Hon. Field-marshal Viscount HARDINGE, Commanding-in-chief.

REGIMENTS AUTHORISED TO BEAR THE WORDS 'ALMA,' 'BALAKLAVA,' 'INKERMANN,' AND 'SEBASTOPOL.'

REGIMENTS.	Alma, September 20, 1854.	Balaklava, October 25, 1854.	Inkermann, November 5, 1854.	Reduction of Sebastopol.
1st Dragoon Guards,	. . .	. .	. .	Authorised
4th " " ,	. .	Authorised	.	do.
5th " " ,	. .	do.	. .	do.
6th " " ,	. .	. .	. .	do.
1st Dragoons,	. .	Authorised	. .	do.
2d "	. .	do.	.	do.
4th Light Dragoons,	Authorised	do.	Authorised	do.
6th Dragoons,	. .	do.	. .	do.
8th Hussars,	Authorised	do.	Authorised	do.
10th " ,	. .	. .	. .	do.
11th " ,	Authorised	Authorised	Authorised	do.
12th Lancers,	. .	. .	. .	do.
13th Light Dragoons,	Authorised	Authorised	Authorised	do.
17th Lancers,	do.	do.	do.	do.
Grenadier Guards 3d Battalion,	do.	. .	do.	do.
Coldstream Gds., 1st Battalion,	do.	.	do.	do.
Scots Fusilier Gds. 1st Battalion,	do.	. .	do.	do.
1st Foot, 1st Bat.,	do.	.	do.	do.
1st " , 2d Bat.,	. .	. .	. .	do.
3d " ,	. .	. .	. .	do.
4th " , . .	Authorised	. .	Authorised	do.
7th " , .	do.	.	do.	do.
9th " , . .	. .	. .	. .	do.
13th " , .	.	.	. .	do.
14th " , . .	. .	. .	. .	do.
17th " , .	.	.	.	do.
18th " , . .	. .	. .	. .	do.
19th " , .	Authorised	.	Authorised	do.
20th " , . .	do.	. .	do.	do.
21st " , .	do.	.	do.	do.
23d " , . .	do.	. .	do.	do.
28th " , .	do.	.	do.	do.
30th " , . .	do.	. .	do.	do.
31st " , . .	. .	. .	. .	do.
33d " , . .	Authorised	. .	Authorised	do.
34th " , .	. .	. .	. .	do.
38th " , . .	Authorised	. .	Authorised	do.
39th " , . .	. .	. .	. .	do.
41st Foot, . .	Authorised	. .	Authorised	Authorised
42d " , .	do.	. .	. .	do.
44th " , . .	do.	. .	Authorised	do.
46th " , . .	. .	. .	. .	do.
47th " , . .	Authorised	. .	Authorised	do.
48th " , . .	. .	. .	. .	do.
49th " , . .	Authorised	. .	Authorised	do.
50th " , .	do.	.	do.	do.
55th " , . .	do.	. .	do.	do.
56th " , .	. .	. .	. .	do.
57th " , . .	. .	. .	Authorised	do.
62d " , .	. .	. .	. .	do.
63d " , . .	Authorised	. .	Authorised	do.
68th " , .	do.	.	do.	do.
71st " , . .	. .	. .	. .	do.
72d " , .	. .	.	. .	do.
77th " , . .	Authorised	. .	Authorised	do.
79th " , .	do.	.	. .	do.
82d " , . .	. .	. .	. .	do.
88th " , .	Authorised	.	Authorised	do.
89th " , . .	. .	. .	. .	do.
90th " , .	. .	. .	. .	do.
93d " , . .	Authorised	Authorised	. .	do.
95th " , .	do.	. .	Authorised	do.
97th " , . .	. .	. .	. .	do.
Rifle Brigade, 1st Battalion, .	Authorised	. .	Authorised	do.
Rifle Brigade, 2d Battalion, .	do.	.	do.	do.

By command,
G. A. WETHERALL, *Adjutant-general.*

3. *Clasps for Seamen.*

ADMIRALTY, *May* 1, 1856.

Her Majesty having been graciously pleased to signify her intention of granting the 'Sebastopol' clasp to the officers and crews of Her Majesty's ships employed in co-operation with the land-forces in the reduction of Sebastopol, as well as a clasp, bearing on it the word 'Azof,' to the officers and crews of Her Majesty's vessels employed in the Sea of Azof, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty hereby give notice of the same.

The period for which the 'Sebastopol' clasp is to be awarded for services as aforesaid, dates from the 1st of October 1854 to the 9th of September 1855.

The 'Azof' clasp will be awarded to the officers and crews of such ships as served in the Sea of Azof between the 25th of May 1855 and the 9th of September 1855, as well as to the officers and men who were employed in the boats of line-of-battle ships which took part in the operations against Taganrog, or elsewhere within the Sea of Azof.

In cases in which officers or men have been engaged in any expedition or operation in the Sea of Azof after the 9th of September 1855, the period for which the 'Azof' clasp is to be awarded will be extended to the 22d of November 1855, and the service for which the same is claimed must in such cases be duly certified.

4. *Victoria Order of Merit.*

[This new Order, with a Maltese cross, a Royal crest, and an inscription as its symbol, was founded during the war by the following Royal mandate.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February* 5, 1856.

The Queen has been pleased, by an instrument under her Royal Sign Manual, of which the following is a copy, to institute and create a new naval and military decoration, to be styled and designated 'The Victoria Cross,' and to make the rules and regulations

therein set forth under which the said decoration shall be conferred :—

VICTORIA, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen, Defender of the Faith, &c. To all to whom these presents shall come greeting;

Whereas we, taking into our Royal consideration that there exists no means of adequately rewarding the individual gallant services either of officers of the lower grades in our naval and military service, or of warrant and petty officers, seamen, and marines in our navy, and non-commissioned officers and soldiers in our army; and whereas the third-class of our most honourable Order of the Bath is limited, except in very rare cases, to the higher ranks of both services, and the granting of medals, both in our navy and army, is only awarded for long service or meritorious conduct, rather than for bravery in action or distinction before an enemy, such cases alone excepted where a general medal is granted for a particular action or campaign, or a clasp added to the medal for some special engagement, in both of which cases all share equally in the boon, and those who by their valour have particularly signalised themselves remain undistinguished from their comrades; now, for the purpose of attaining an end so desirable as that of rewarding individual instances of merit and valour, we have instituted and created, and by these presents, for us, our heirs and successors, institute and create a new naval and military decoration, which we are desirous should be highly prized and eagerly sought after by the officers and men of our naval and military services, and are graciously pleased to make, ordain, and establish the following rules and ordinances for the government of the same, which shall from henceforth be inviolably observed and kept :—

1. It is ordained that the distinction shall be styled and designated 'The Victoria Cross,' and shall consist of a Maltese cross of bronze, with our Royal crest in the centre, and underneath which, an escrol, bearing this inscription: 'For valour.'

2. It is ordained that the Cross shall be suspended from the left breast by a blue ribbon for the navy, and by a red ribbon for the army.

3. It is ordained that the names of those upon whom we may be pleased to confer the decoration shall be published in the *London Gazette*, and a registry thereof kept in the office of our Secretary of State for War.

4. It is ordained that any one who, after having received the Cross, shall again perform an act of bravery, which, if he had not received such Cross, would have entitled him to it, such further act shall be recorded by a bar attached to the ribbon by which the Cross is suspended, and for every additional act of bravery an additional bar may be added.

5. It is ordained that the Cross shall only be awarded to those officers or men who have served us in the presence of the enemy, and shall have then performed some signal act of valour or devotion to their country.

6. It is ordained, with a view to place all persons on a perfectly equal footing in relation to eligibility for the decoration, that neither rank, nor long service, nor wounds, nor any other circumstance or condition whatsoever, save the merit of conspicuous bravery, shall be held to establish a sufficient claim to the honour.

7. It is ordained that the decoration may be conferred on the spot where the act to be rewarded by the grant of such decoration has been performed, under the following circumstances :—

I. When the fleet or army in which such act has been performed, is under the eye and command of an admiral or general officer commanding the forces.

II. Where the naval or military force is under the eye and command of an admiral or commodore commanding a squadron or detached naval force, or of a general commanding a corps or division, or brigade on a distinct and detached service, when such admiral, commodore, or general officer shall have the power of conferring the decoration on the spot, subject to confirmation by us.

8. It is ordained, where such act shall not have been performed in sight of a commanding officer as aforesaid, then the claimant for the honour shall prove the act to the satisfaction of the captain or officer commanding his ship, or to the officer commanding the regiment to which the claimant belongs, and such captain or such commanding officer shall report the same through the usual channel to the admiral or commodore commanding the force employed on the service, or to the officer commanding the forces in the field, who shall call for such description and attestation of the act as he may think requisite, and on approval shall recommend the grant of the decoration.

9. It is ordained that every person selected for the Cross, under Rule 7, shall be publicly decorated before the naval or military force or body to which he belongs, and with which the act of bravery for which he is to be rewarded shall have been performed, and his name shall be recorded in a General Order, together with the cause of his especial distinction.

10. It is ordained that every person selected under Rule 8 shall receive his decoration as soon as possible, and his name shall likewise appear in a General Order as above required, such General Order to be issued by the naval or military commander of the forces employed on the service.

11. It is ordained that the General Orders above referred to shall, from time to time, be transmitted to our Secretary of State for War, to be laid before us, and shall be by him registered.

12. It is ordained that as cases may arise not falling within the rules above specified, or in which a claim, though well founded, may not have been established on the spot, we will, on the joint submission of our Secretary of State for War and of our Commander-in-chief of our Army, or on that of our Lord High Admiral or Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty in the case of the navy, confer the decoration, but never without conclusive proof of the performance of the act of bravery for which the claim is made.

13. It is ordained that, in the event of a gallant and daring act having been performed by a squadron, ship's company, a detached body of seamen and marines, not under fifty in number, or by a brigade, regiment, troop, or company, in which the admiral, general, or other officer commanding such forces, may deem that all are equally brave and distinguished, and that no special selection can be made by them : then in such case, the admiral, general, or other officer commanding, may direct, that for any such body of seamen or marines, or for every troop or company of soldiers, one officer shall be selected by the officers engaged for the decoration; and in like manner one petty-officer or non-commissioned officer shall be selected by the petty-officers and non-commissioned officers engaged; and two seamen or private soldiers, or marines, shall be selected by the seamen, or private soldiers or marines engaged respectively, for the decoration; and the names of those selected shall be transmitted by the

senior officer in command of the naval force, brigade, regiment, troop, or company, to the admiral or general officer commanding, who shall in due manner confer the decoration as if the acts were done under his own eye.

14. It is ordained that every warrant-officer, petty-officer, seaman, or marine, or non-commissioned officer or soldier, who shall have received the Cross, shall from the date of the act by which the decoration has been gained, be entitled to a special pension of £10 a year, and each additional bar conferred under Rule 4 on such warrant or petty officers, or non-commissioned officers or men, shall carry with it an additional pension of £5 per annum.

15. In order to make such additional provision as shall effectually preserve pure this most honourable distinction, it is ordained, that if any person on whom such distinction shall be conferred, be convicted of treason, cowardice, felony, or of any infamous crime, or if he be accused of any such offence, and doth not after a reasonable time surrender himself to be tried for the same, his name shall forthwith be erased from the registry of individuals upon whom the said decoration shall have been conferred by an especial warrant under our Royal Sign Manual, and the pension conferred under Rule 14 shall cease and determine from the date of such warrant. It is hereby further declared, that we, our heirs, and successors, shall be the sole judges of the circumstance demanding such expulsion; moreover, we shall at all times have power to restore such persons as may at any time have been expelled, both to the enjoyment of the decoration and pension.

Given at our Court at Buckingham Palace, this 29th day of January, in the 19th year of our reign, and in the year of our Lord 1856. By Her Majesty's command,

PANMURE.

To our Principal Secretary of State for War.

5. *Order of the Legion of Honour, awarded by the Emperor of the French to British Subjects.*

WHITEHALL, *August* 2, 1856.

The Queen has been pleased to give and grant unto the under-mentioned officers and men in Her Majesty's service Her Majesty's royal licence and permission, that they may accept and wear the Insignia of the several Classes of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honour, attached to their respective names, which His Majesty the Emperor of the French hath been pleased to confer upon them as a mark of his Imperial Majesty's approbation of their distinguished services before the enemy during the late war, and that they may enjoy all the rights and privileges thereunto belonging—namely,

ROYAL NAVY AND ROYAL NAVAL BRIGADE.

GRAND CROSS (1ST CLASS).

Admiral Lord Lyons, G.C.B.

GRAND OFFICER (2D CLASS).

Rear-admiral the Hon. Sir R. Saunders Dundas, K.C.B.

COMMANDER (3D CLASS).

Rear-admiral Sir Houston Stewart, K.C.B.

OFFICERS (4TH CLASS).

For Service as Captains.

Rear-admirals Sir Stephen Lushington, K.C.B.; Frederick Thomas Michell, C.B.; Charles Graham, C.B.; Thomas Wren Carter, C.B.

Captains the Hon. Henry Keppel, C.B.; Lewis Tobias Jones, C.B.; William Peel, C.B.; William Moorsom, C.B.; William Robert Mends, C.B.; Thomas Abel Bremage Spratt, C.B.; Sherard Osborn, C.B.

For Service in Royal Marines.

Colonel Thomas Hurdle, C.B.

Lieutenant-colonel Thomas Holloway.

KNIGHTS (5TH CLASS).

For Service as Commanders.

Captains John James Bartholomew Edward Frere; William Farquharson Burnett, C.B.; Leopold George Heath, C.B.; Henry Downing Rogers, C.B.; Henry Schank Hillyar, C.B.; George Granville Randolph; Lord John Hay, C.B.; Augustus Frederick Kynaston, C.B.; Richard Ashmore Powell, C.B.; John Borlase, C.B.; Rowley Lambert; John James Kennedy; Cowper Phipps Coles.

Commanders W. Montague Dowell, J. Edmund Commerell.

For Service as Lieutenants.

Commanders Wm. Rae Rolland, Henry Lloyd, Wm. Bowden, Jn. Proctor Luce, Wm. Gore Jones, William Armytage, Henry Frederick M'Killop, John Francis Campbell Mackenzie, William Horton, John Hay Crang, James Bull, Samuel Pritchard, John William Whyte, Radulphus Bryce Oldfield, William Brabazon Urmston, Henry James Raby, John Halliday Cave, Joseph Henry Marryat, George Fiott Day, Hubert Campion, Cecil William Buckley, Frederick William Gough, John Clark Byng, Charles Gerveys Grylls, Edward Hardinge, Hugh Talbot Burgoyne, Alfred Mitchell.

Lieutenants Colin Andrew Campbell, Charles Frederic Palmer, Osborne William Dalvell.

For Service as Masters and Second Masters.

Messrs Cornelius Thos. Augustus Noddall, William Thos. Mainprise, Robert Wilson Roberts, George Williams, Thos. Potter, Narcissus Arguimbeau, Edw. Codrington Ball.

Lieutenant Edward Wolfe Brooker.

Messrs Frederick Robert Glyndwr Llewellyn, and William Henessey Parker.

For Service as Mates and Midshipmen.

Lieutenants Wm. Nathan Wright Hewett, Horatio Laurence Arthur Lennox Maitland, William Derenzy Donaldson Selby, Andrew James Kennedy, George Parsons, Henry Knox Leet, John Brazier Creagh, John Barber Barnett, Thomas Livingstone Pearson, Neale Dottin Foveran Lillingston, John Robert Deane Cooper, Frederick Wm. Hallowes, Gordon Cornwallis Sinclair, and Acting Lieutenant Richard Ramsay Armstrong.

Messrs Henry Evelyn Wood, and Edward St John Daniel.

For Service as Secretaries to Naval Commanders-in-chief.

Messrs David James Simpson, and Frederick Cleeve.

For Service as Medical Officers.

Messrs David Deas, C.B., Inspector of Hospitals and Fleets; John Rees, Deputy Inspector of Hospitals and Fleets; James Walsh, M.D., surgeon; William Richard Edwin Smart, M.D., surgeon; James Jenkins, M.D., surgeon.

For Service as Inspector of Machinery.

Mr Thomas Baker.

For Service as Engineers of Royal Navy.

Messrs George Murdoch, John Henry Langley, Wm. Rumble.

For Service as Paymasters.

Messrs Frank Harger and John Beal.

For Service when Clerk's Assistant.

Mr George William Muir.

Warrant Officers, &c.

Messrs John Roberts, John Hayles, Richard Verey, George Greenirk Dunlop, Richard Rowe—Gunners, Royal Navy.

Messrs Robt. Spilsbury and Joseph Kellaway, Boatswains.

John Shepherd, Boatswain's Mate, *Royal Albert;* William Rickard, Quartermaster, *Weser;* John Cleverly, Gunner's

Mate, *London;* John Taylor, Captain of Forecastle, *London;* John Sullivan, Captain of Afterguard, *Rodney;* Charles Willis, Captain of Afterguard, *Agamemnon;* William Allen, A.B., *Agamemnon;* Peter Hanlan, A.B., *Curlew;* George Milestone, A.B., *Weser;* Joseph Trewavas, Ordinary Seaman, *Agamemnon.*

Royal Marines.

Brevet Lieut.-colonels George Gardiner Alexander, R.M.A.; and William F. Hopkins.

Brevet Majors William Henry March, and George S. Digby, Royal Marine Artillery.

Captains David Blyth and George Brydges Rodney.

First Lieutenants Frederick George Pym; Arthur C. Steele, R.M.A.; A. A. Douglas, R.M.A.; Harrisson J. Jull, R.M.A.

Messrs Charles Horner, R.M.A.; George Yule, R.M.A.; Edwin Richards; John Jordan—Sergeants.

William Chappel, Corporal; Thomas Wilkinson, Royal Marine Artillery, Bombardier; John Bull and Thos. Kerr, Gunners, Royal Marine Artillery; John Bunton and John Osborn, Privates, Royal Marines.

ARMY.

Grand Cross (1st Class).

Generals Sir James Simpson, G.C.B.; and Sir George Brown, G.C.B.

Grand Officers (2d Class).

General Sir John Fox Burgoyne, Bart, G.C.B.

Lieutenant-generals Sir De Lacy Evans, G.C.B.; Sir Richard England, G.C.B.; Sir Colin Campbell, G.C.B.

Major-generals Sir John Lysaght Pennefather, K.C.B.; and Sir W. F. Williams, of Kars, Bart., K.C.B.

Commanders (3d Class).

Major-generals the Earl of Lucan, K.C.B.; Sir H. J. W. Bentinck, K.C.B.; Sir H. W. Barnard, K.C.B.; Lord Rokeby, K.C.B.

Lieutenant-general Sir W. John Codrington, K.C.B.

Major-generals Sir Harry David Jones, K.C.B.; Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.; the Hon. Sir James Y. Scarlett, K.C.B.; Sir William Eyre, K.C.B.; the Earl of Cardigan, K.C.B.; Sir Hugh Henry Rose, K.C.B.; Sir George Buller, K.C.B.; Sir R. James Dacres, K.C.B.; Chas. Ash Windham, C.B.

Officers (4th Class).

Staff.

Captain and Lieutenant-colonel and Brevet Colonel Thomas M. Steele, C.B., Military Secretary, Coldstream Guards.

Colonel the Hon. W. L. Pakenham, C.B., Adjutant-general.

Sir J. Hall, K.C.B., M.D., Inspector-general of Hospitals.

Colonel William Montagu Scott M'Murdo, Director-general Land-transport Corps.

Major and Colonel Lord Fred. Paulet, Coldstream Guards.

Captain and Lieutenant-colonel and Brevet Colonel the Hon. Alex. Gordon, C.B., Quartermaster-general's Department.

Colonels Arthur Augustus Thurlow Cunynghame, C.B.; Hon. P. E. Herbert, C.B., Quartermaster-general; Richard Wilbraham, C.B., Assistant Adjutant-general.

Captain and Lieut.-colonel and Brevet Colonel Studholme Brownrigg, C.B., Grenadier Guards.

Lieutenant-colonels Anthony Sterling, C.B., Assist. Adjutant-general; the Hon. St George Gerald Foley, C.B., Unat.; Edward Stopford Claremont, C.B., Unat.

Cavalry.

Colonels Lord George Augustus Frederick Paget, C.B.; and Frederick George Shewell, C.B., 8th Hussars.

Infantry.

Major and Colonel Chas. Wm. Ridley, Grenadier Guards.

Colonels the Hon. Geo. Fred. Upton, C.B., Coldstream Guards; Edward W. F. Walker, C.B., Scots Fusilier Guards; Lord William Paulet, C.B.

Colonels Charles Thos. Van Straubenzee, 3d Regiment; Frederick Horn, C.B., 20th Regiment; Charles Richard Sackville, Lord West, C.B.; Daniel Lysons, C.B., 23d Regiment; Frank Adams, C.B., 28th Regiment.

Lieut.-col. James Thos. Mauleverer, C.B., 30th Regiment.

Colonels Duncan Alex. Cameron, C.B., 42d Regiment; Hon. Augustus Almeric Spencer, C.B., 44th Regiment; Robert Garrett, 46th Regiment.

Lieutenant-colonel Rich. Thos. Farren, C.B., 47th Regiment.

Colonels Charles Warren, C.B., 55th Regiment; Charles Trollope, C.B., 62d Regiment; Horatio Shirley, C.B., 88th Regiment; Arthur Johnstone Lawrence, C.B., Rifle Brig.

Captain and Lieutenant-colonel and Brevet Colonel Francis Seymour, Scots Fusilier Guards.

Royal Artillery.

Major-general John Edward Dupuis, C.B.

Colonels James Wm. Fitzmayer, C.B.; John St George, C.B.; Edward Charles Warde, C.B.; David Edward Wood, C.B.

Lieutenant-colonel John Miller Adye, C.B.

Royal Engineers.

Colonels Alexander Gordon, and Fred. Ed. Chapman, C.B.

Knights (5th Class).

Staff.

Captain and Lieut.-colonel and Brevet Colonel Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar, Grenadier Guards.

Colonel Charles Tyrrwhit, Unattached.

Captain and Lieut.-col. Charles Lennox B. Maitland, Dep.-Assist. Quartermaster-general, Grenadier Guards.

Lieutenant-colonel the Hon. James William Bosville Macdonald, C.B., Unattached.

Major Hon. Wm. Colville, Aid-de-camp, Rifle Brigade.

Brevet Lieut.-colonels Francis Pym Harding, Aid-de-camp and Assistant Adjutant-gen., 22d Regiment; and Lawrence Shadwell, Aid-de-camp and Assistant Quarter-master-general, Unattached.

Brevet Major Gustavus Hume, Aid-de-camp and Deputy-assistant Adjutant-general, 38th Regiment.

Brevet Lieut.-cols. Kenneth Douglas Mackenzie, Assistant Quartermaster-general, 92d Regiment; and Edmund Gilling Hallewell, Assistant Quartermaster-general, Unattached.

Brevet Colonel Edward Robert Wetherall, Assistant Quarter-master-general, Unattached.

Brevet Lieutenant-colonel Hon. Francis Colborne, C.B., Assistant Quartermaster-general, Unattached.

Captain and Lieutenant-colonel James Talbot Airey, C.B., Assistant Quartermaster-general, Coldstream Guards.

Brevet Lieutenant-colonel George Wynell Mayow, Unattached, Assistant Quartermaster-general.

Captain and Lieutenant-col. Hon. Arthur Edward Hardinge, Assistant Quartermaster-general, Coldstream Guards.

Brevet Lieutenant-colonels Joseph Edwin Thackwell, Assistant Adjutant-general, Unattached; and Hugh Smith, 3d Regiment, Assistant Adjutant-general.

Colonel William Sullivan, C.B., Unattached.

Brevet Lieutenant-colonel Robert Blane, Unattached, Assistant Adjutant-general, and now Military Secretary.

Lieutenant-colonel John Stewart Wood, C.B., Assistant Adjutant-general, Unattached.

Colonel Collingwood Dickson, C.B., Royal Artillery.

Major George Latham Thompson, Deputy-assistant Adjutant-general, 4th Regiment.

Brevet Lieutenant-colonels Charles J. Woodford, Deputy-assistant Quartermaster-general, Rifle Brigade; William Morris, C.B., Deputy-assistant Quartermaster-general, 17th Lancers; George Harry Smith Willis, Deputy-assistant Quartermaster-general, 77th Regiment.

Brevet Majors Frederick Smith Vacher, Deputy-assistant Quartermaster-general, 33d Regt.; and Wm. Bellairs, Deputy-assistant Quartermaster-general, 49th Regiment.

Brevet Lieut.-col. Julius R. Glyn, Brig. Major, R. Brigade.

Brevet Major Arthur M. Earle, Brig. Major, 57th Regiment.

Lieutenant-colonels Js. Wells Armstrong, 49th Regiment; and George Vaughan Maxwell, C.B., 88th Regiment.

Captain and Lieutenant-colonel Cuthbert George Ellison, Brigade Major, Grenadier Guards.
Majors Chas. F. Torrens Daniell, Brig. Major, 38th Regt.; and Roger Barnston, Deputy-assistant Quartermaster-general, 90th Regiment.

Medical Staff.

Deputy Inspector-generals Archibald Gordon, M.D., C.B.; and James Mouatt, M.D., C.B.
First Class Surgeon Thomas Patrick Matthew.
Senior Surgeon Ordnance Med. Dep., Richard Coffin Elliot.
Inspector-general Thomas Alexander, C.B.
Staff Assistant-surgeon Thomas Clarke Brady.
Second Class Staff Surgeons Thomas Ligertwood, M.D., late 40th Regiment; and Henry Thomas Sylvester, M.D., 23d Regiment.
Acting Assistant-surgeons George Fair, M.D.; and Charles O'Callaghan.

Commissariat.

Deputy Commissary-generals W. H. Drake, C.B.; John Wm. Smith, C.B.; Philip Turner; Frederick S. Carpenter.
Assistant Commissary-generals Montague Wm. Darling, and Kean Osborn.

Cavalry.

Major James Conolly, Deputy-assistant Quartermaster-general, Unattached.

Brevet Major Alexander James Hardy Elliott, Aid-de-camp, 5th Dragoon Guards.

Captain Michael M'Creagh, 4th Dragoon Guards.
Sergeant William Percy, 4th Dragoon Guards.

Corporal Henry Herbert, 5th Dragoon Guards.
Private Charles Babbington, 5th Dragoon Guards.

Brevet Major William de Cardonnel Elmsall, 1st Royal Dragoons.
Sergeant William Keyle, 1st Royal Dragoons.

Captain and Brevet Lieutenant-colonel George Calvert Clarke, 2d Royal Dragoons.
Troop Sergeant-major Wm. Rant, 2d Royal Dragoons.

Major and Brevet Lieut.-col. Alex. Low, 4th Lt. Dragoons.
Sergeant David Gillam, 4th Light Dragoons.

Major and Brevet Lieutenant-colonel Charles Cameron Shute, 6th Inniskillen.
Sergeant Richard Jeffreys, 6th Inniskillen.

Major and Brevet Lieut.-col. Rodolph de Salis, 8th Hussars.
Trumpet-major William Gray, 8th Hussars.

Troop Sergeant-major George G. Guttridge, 11th Hussars.
Private John Thomas Bambrick, 11th Hussars.

Brevet Major Arthur Tremayne, 13th Light Dragoons.
Regimental Sergt.-major T. G. Johnson, 13th Lt. Dragoons.

Captain Sir William Gordon, Bart., 17th Lancers.
Trumpeter John Brown, 17th Lancers.

Infantry.

HOUSEHOLD BRIGADE.

Grenadier Guards.—Captains and Lieutenant-colonels and Brevet Colonels Frederick William Hamilton, and the Honourable Hugh Manvers Percy; Lieutenant and Captain and Brevet Lieutenant-colonel George Wentworth Alexander Higginson; Lieutenant and Captain and Brevet Major Sir Charles Russell, Bt.; Lieutenant and Captain Viscount Balgonie.

Coldstream Guards.—Captains and Lieutenant-colonels William Gregory Dawkins, and Clement William Strong; Lieutenants and Captains and Brevet Majors Henry Armytage, and Gerard L. Goodlake; Lieutenant and Captain Harvey Tower.

Scots Fusilier Guards.—Captains and Lieutenant-colonels Frederick C. A. Stephenson, and the Honourable John Strange Jocelyn; Lieutenants and Captains and Brevet Majors Reginald Gipps, and Francis Baring; Lieutenant and Captain Robert James Lindsay.

REGIMENTS OF THE LINE.

Brevet Major Frederick Wells, 1st Royals, 1st Battalion.
Captains James Archibald Rudell Todd, 1st Royals, 1st Battalion; John Martin Brown, 1st Royals, 1st Battalion; Charles Hurt, 1st Royals, 1st Battalion.
1265 Colour-sergeant William Gillies, 1st Royals, 1st Batt.
Captain Theobald M'Kenna, 1st Royals, 2d Battalion.
1896 Private H. Crisell, 1st Royals, 2d Battalion.

Brevet Lieutenant-colonel Fred. F. Maude, 3d Regiment.
Major J. Lewes, Unattached, late 3d Regiment.
Lieutenant and Adjutant G. N. Roe, 3d Regiment.

Lieutenant-colonel Thomas Williams, 4th Regiment.
Brevet Major Patrick Robertson, 4th Regiment.
Captain James Paton, 4th Regiment.
Colour-sergeant Thomas Watt, 4th Regiment.

Brevet Lieutenant-colonels W. W. Turner, C.B., Unattached; and Arthur J. Pack, half-pay, 7th Regiment.
Brevet Major Hugh John Hibbert, 7th Regiment.
Captains Frederick Ernest Appleyard, 7th Regiment; and Henry Mitchell Jones, 7th Regiment.
Lieutenant George Henry Waller, 7th Regiment.
1215 Colour-sergeant Joseph Bell, 7th Regiment.
2710 Private James Raines, 7th Regiment.

Major Henry Ralph Browne, Unattached, late 9th Regiment.
Captain Hopton Bassett Scott, 9th Regiment.
Sergeant William Ryder, 9th Regiment.
Corporal William Cooke, 9th Regiment.

Major George King, 13th Regiment.
Captain George Henry Tylor, 13th Regiment.

Brevet Major John Dwyer, 14th Regiment.
Sergeant John Macdonald, 14th Regiment.

Lieutenant Joseph Oates Travers, 17th Regiment.
Captain William Dalrymple Thompson, 17th Regiment.
Sergeant John Plant, 17th Regiment.

Brevet Majors Anthony W. S. F. Armstrong, 18th Regt.; and Matthew Jones Hayman, 18th Regiment.
Sergeant John Grant, 18th Regiment.

Major Montague Hamilton Dowbiggin, Unattached.

Lieutenant Wm. Godfrey Dunham Massey, 19th Regiment.
Lieutenant-colonel John Lewis Richard Rooke, 19th Regt.
Brevet Lieutenant-colonel Robert Warden, 19th Regiment.
Major Robert Onesiphorus Bright, 19th Regiment.
Brevet Major Edward Chippindall, 19th Regiment.
1651 Private John Lyons, 19th Regiment.

Lieutenant-colonel Frederick Charles Evelegh, 20th Regt.
Brevet Major Charles Richard Butler, 20th Regiment.
2760 Sergeant Arthur Rule, 20th Regiment.
3313 Private Joseph Brown, 20th Regiment.

Captains Roger Killeen, 21st Regiment; William Henry Carleton, 21st Regiment; John George Image, 21st Regt.; Arthur Templeman, 21st Regiment.
3313 Sergeant James Line, 21st Regiment.

Lieut.-cols. Henry William Bunbury, C.B., 23d Regt.; and Arthur James Herbert (now holding Unattached Substantive Rank).
Major Edward William Deddington Bell, 23d Regiment.
Brevet Major Francis Edward Drewe, 23d Regiment.
2465 Colour-sergeant William Stait, 23d Regiment.
2945 Corporal Robert Shiels, 23d Regiment.

Brevet Lieutenant-colonel Percy A. Butler, 28th Regiment.
Brevet Majors John G. R. Aplin, 28th Regiment; and William Roberts, 28th Regiment.
Captain Orlando Robert H. Orlebar, 28th Regiment.
2632 Private Charles Smith, 28th Regiment.

Brevet Majors Francis Topping Atcherley, 30th Regiment; and Charles Mengaye Green, 30th Regiment.
Lieutenant Stamer Gubbins, 30th Regiment.
Sergeant-major Richard Nagle, 30th Regiment.
2422 Private John M'Cormick, 30th Regiment.

Majors Frederick Spence, 31st Regiment; and Robert John Eager, 31st Regiment.

Lieut.-col. George Valentine Mundy, C.B., 33d Regiment.

Brevet Lieut.-col. John Elias Collings, 33d Regiment.
Major Edward Westby Donovan, 33d Regiment.
Brevet Majors John Edward Tanbman Quale, 33d Regt.; and William Pretyman, 33d Regiment.
2908 Sergeant William M'Kay, 33d Regiment.

Lieutenant-colonel Arthur Cyril Goodenough, 34th Regt.
Brevet Lieutenant-colonels John Simpson, 34th Regiment; and John Gwilt, 34th Regiment.
Sergeant-major John Mortimer, 34th Regiment.

Lieut.-colonel John William Sidney Smith, 38th Regiment.
Captain Compton Alwyn Scrase Dickens, 38th Regiment.
Lieutenant William Kidston Elles, 38th Regiment.
Assistant-surgeon William Younge Jeeves, 38th Regiment.
1510 Private John Scott, 38th Regiment.

Lieutenant-colonel William Munro, 39th Regiment.
Brevet Major William Leckie, 39th Regiment.
Captain Ralph Edward Carr, 39th Regt., late 39th Regt.
Sergeant-major Joseph Jobberns, 39th Regiment.

Major George Skipwith, Unattached.

Lieutenant-colonel Julius Edmund Goodwyn, 41st Regt.
Brevet Majors Hugh Rowlands, 41st Regt.; and Lumley Graham, Unattached.
Captain William Allan, 41st Regiment.
Sergeant James O'Neill, 41st Regiment.
Lance-corporal Peter Stockey, 41st Regiment.

Captains John Chetham M'Leod, 42d Regiment; and John Drysdale, 42d Regiment.
Assistant-surgeon William A. Mackinnon, 42d Regiment.
Lieutenant and Adjutant William Wood, 42d Regiment.
Colour-sergeant Charles Christie, 42d Regiment.

Brevet Lieutenant-colonel Wm. MacMahon, 44th Regiment.
Brevet Majors John Robinson, 44th Regiment; and Richard Preston, 44th Regiment.
Assistant-surgeon John Gibbons, 44th Regiment.
Private Robert Thimbleby, 44th Regiment.

Lieutenant-colonel Alexander Maxwell, 46th Regiment.
Brevet Major George Dallas, 46th Regiment.
3492 Private William Bond, 46th Regiment.
3030 Private William Simpson, 46th Regiment.

Brevet Lieutenant-colonels John Henry Lowndes, 47th Regiment; and James Villiers, 47th Regiment.
Brevet Majors Charles Courtney Villiers, 47th Regiment; and Charles Aldersey Stevenson, 47th Regiment.
Colour-sergeant John Wilson, 47th Regiment.

Major Frederick West, 48th Regiment.
2730 Corporal Thomas Kelly, 48th Regiment.

Lieut.-col. John Thornton Grant, C.B., 49th Regiment.
Brevet Lieutenant-colonel John Hynde King, 49th Regiment.
Brevet Major James William Dewar, 49th Regiment.
Brevet Lieutenant-colonel Cadwallader Adams, 49th Regt.
Capt. Thos. Priaulx St George Armstrong, 49th Regiment.
Corporal James Butler, 49th Regiment.

Lieut.-colonels Richard Waddy, C.B., 50th Regiment; and John Lucas Wilton, 50th Regiment.
Major Heathfield James Frampton, late 50th Regiment.
Brevet Major Andrew Campbell K. Lock, 50th Regiment.
Colour-sergeant Angus Macpherson, 50th Regiment.

Lieut.-colonel Henry C. B. Daubeney, C.B., 55th Regiment.
Brevet Major Frederick Cockayne Elton, 55th Regiment.
Captain John Richard Hume, 55th Regiment.
Brevet Major Robert Hume, 55th Regiment.
Captain William Barnston, 55th Regiment.
2612 Drummer and Lance-corporal Joseph Doyle.

Captain Richard Anderson, 56th Regiment.

Brevet Major Henry Butler, 57th Regiment.
Captain Gerard John Forsyth, 57th Regiment.
Sergeant-major George Cumming, 57th Regiment.
2101 Sergeant William Griffith, 57th Regiment.
1782 Joseph Burgess, 57th Regiment.

Brevet Lieutenant-colonel James Daubeny, 62d Regiment.
Brevet Major Charles Cooch, 62d Regiment.
Captain Edward Henry Hunter, 62d Regiment.
Private Joseph Newman, 62d Regiment.

Brevet Lieutenant-colonel Thomas Harries, 63d Regiment.
2616 Sergeant Hawthorn Christopher Elliott, 63d Regiment.

Lieutenant-colonel Henry Smyth, C.B., 68th Regiment.
Captain Thomas De Courcy Hamilton, 68th Regiment.
Lieutenant Aubrey Harvey Tucker, 68th Regiment.
Colour-sergeant Henry Sladden, 68th Regiment.
2773 Corporal Fletcher, 68th Regiment.
2330 Private John Ogden, 68th Regiment.

Lieut.-colonel Charles Ready, 71st Regiment.
Major William Hope, 71st Regiment.

Lieutenant-colonel William Parke, 72d Regiment.
Majors Alexander Dalton Thellusson, 72d Regiment; and William Rickman, Unattached, late 77th Regiment.

Brevet Major Henry Robert Carden, 77th Regiment.
Captain Edward Henry Chawner, 77th Regiment.
Sergeant-major Henry Borritt, 77th Regiment.
1825 Private Thomas Coonin, 77th Regiment.

Brevet Lieutenant-colonel William M'Call, 79th Regiment.
Brevet Major William Chanval Hodgson, 79th Regiment.
Captain Henry Wotton Campbell, 79th Regiment.
Lieutenant and Adjutant James Young, 79th Regiment.
Sergeant William Davie, 79th Regiment.

Brevet Lieut.-colonel Ed. Herbert Maxwell, 88th Regiment.
Brevet Major Nathaniel Steevens, 88th Regiment.
Captains George Richard Browne, 88th Regiment; and George Robert Beresford, 88th Regiment.
2453 Sergeant Thomas Goggins, 88th Regiment.
3257 Sergeant Joseph Grennan, 88th Regiment.

Brevet Lieut.-colonel Fred. Charles Aylmer, 89th Regiment.
Brevet Majors William Boyle, 89th Regiment; and J. Macdonald Cuppage, 89th Regiment.
Private John Fisher, 89th Regiment.

Brevet Lieut.-colonels R. Grove, 90th Regiment; and T. Smith, 90th Regiment.
Captain Garnet Joseph Wolseley, 90th Regiment.
2921 Sergeant Joseph Smaller, 90th Regiment.

Brevet Lieut.-colonel John Alexander Ewart, 93d Regiment.
Captains Robert Crowe, 93d Regiment; and George Cornwall, 93d Regiment.
Colour-sergeant Alexander Knox, 93d Regiment.

Lieutenant-colonel Henry Hume, C.B., 95th Regiment.
Major John Neptune Sargent, Unattached, late 95th Regt.
Brevet Major Hon. Eyre Challoner Henry Massey, 95th Regt.
Captain George Lynedock Carmichael, 95th Regiment.
Lieutenant and Adjutant John Sexton, 95th Regiment.
1829 Private Timothy Abbott, 95th Regiment.

Lieutenant-colonel Thomas Onslow Ingram, 97th Regt.
Brevet Lieut.-col. Edmund Cornwall Legh, 97th Regiment.
Brevet Major Charles Henry Lumley, 97th Regiment.
1886 Colour-sergeant Peter Lawless, 97th Regiment.
2139 Private Peter John Stone, 97th Regiment.

Lieut.-col. Edw. Arthur Somerset, 1st Batt. Rifle Brigade.
Brevet Major Hon. Henry Clifford, 1st Batt. Rifle Brigade.
Lieut. and Adjutant John Brett, 1st Batt. Rifle Brigade.
1174 Sergeant Timothy Murphy, 1st Batt. Rifle Brigade.
Private Francis Wheatley, 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade.

Brevet Lieut.-col. Alex. Macdonnell, C.B., 2d Batt. Rifle Br.
Brevet Major Wm. A. Fyers, 2d Battalion Rifle Brigade.
Captain Edward Wm. Blackett, 2d Battalion Rifle Brigade.
Lieut. John Simpson Knox, 2d Battalion Rifle Brigade.
Sergeant John Andrews, 2d Battalion Rifle Brigade.

Brevet Major Claud T. Bourchier, 3d Batt. Rifle Brigade.

Royal Artillery.

Lieutenant-colonel Edwin Wodehouse, C.B.
Brevet Lieutenant-colonels Henry F. Strange, C.B.; and Edward Bruce Hamley.
Brevet Majors G. T. Field, Assistant Quartermaster-gen.; John Fraser Lodington Baddeley, John George Boothby, John Singleton, Edmund John Carthew, John Edward Hope, William John Bolton, Charles Henry Owen, Spencer Delves Broughton, John James Brandling, C.B.; John Turner, C.B.; Edward Moubray, William Edmund Moyses Reilly, William Windham Augustus Lukin,

Brevet Majors Frederick Miller, William James Easten Grant, Philip Dickson, Roderick Mackenzie, Hugh Archd. Beauchamp Campbell, William Powell Richards, John Spurway, William Henry Randolph Simpson.
Captain Henry Hamilton Conolly.
Lieutenants Augustus Henry King, James Lyons, Raynsford Cytherus Longley, Henry James Alderson, John Edward Ruck Keene, Henry Arbuthnot, Stuart Maxwell, Arthur Rideout, John Andrew Price, John Henry Brown, Walter Aston Fox Strangways, Edwin Markham, Charles Edward Torriano, William Stirling, Ernest Courtenay Vaughan, Henry Percy Tillard, Legh Delves Broughton, Francis Walter de Winton, Henry John Foquett Ellis Hickes, Noel Hamlyn Harris, W. J. Hall, Fred. Coulthurst Elton.
Surgeons S. H. Fasson, 95th Regt., late Royal Artillery; and W. Pearson Ward, 17th Regt., late Royal Artillery.
2d Class Staff-surgeon Thomas Park, late Royal Artillery.
Assistant-surgeon Arthur Henry Taylor.
Veterinary-surgeon John Surtees Stockley.
Commissary William Young.
Deputy Assistant-Commissaries John Isaac Lilley, and Arthur Hunt.
Sergeant-major William Norton.
Quartermaster-sergeant Geo. Mervin, Royal H. Artillery.
Company-sergeant Jos. Mitchell, 6th Com., 11th Battalion.
Sergeant Thomas Mitchell, 2d Company, 8th Battalion.
Sergeant-conductors John Devine; Geo. Kerr, 12th Batt.; Robert Bruce.
Corporals John Hargreaves, 4th Company, 12th Batt.; and John Stevenson, H. Battery.
Bombardier Hugh Wheatley, 6th Company, 12th Batt.
Gunners and Drivers Wm. Todd, 6th Company, 11th Batt.; William Hendry, 1st Company, 12th Battalion; Robert Burke, 6th Company, 11th Battalion; John Gibbs, 8th Company, 3d Battalion; J. M'Veigh, 4th Company, 11th Battalion.

Royal Engineers.

Brevet Lieutenant-colonels George Bent, C.B.; Eustace Fane Bourchier, C.B.; Edward Stanton.
Brevet Majors James Frankfort Manners Browne, C.B.; Horace William Montagu; Francis Horatio de Vere.
Lieutenants Arthur A'Court Fisher, Gerald Graham, John Clayton Cowell, John Fretcheville Dykes Donnelly, Howard Craufurd Elphinstone, Glastonbury Neville, William Christian Anderson, Charles Nassau Martin, John Mervin Cutcliffe Drake, Charles George Gordon.
Cornet John Landry, late Sergeant, No. 1176, L.T.C.

Royal Sappers and Miners.

Colour-sergts. Henry Macdonald, No. 237; Joseph Stanton, No. 861; George Jarvis, No. 1873.
Sergeants Peter Leitch, No. 763; and Samuel Cole, No. 2515, Driver Company.
Corporal John Paul, No. 1119.
2d Corporal Joseph Collins, No. 2382.

[Many lists were published during the war, containing the names of officers and men whose services had received honorary mention by the commanders: such, for instance, as a list of those engaged in the attack on the Redan; but the above is perhaps best fitted to be placed upon permanent record—containing, as it does, names belonging to all the regiments and all the departments of service engaged in the East. Of the 22,500 gallant men who were carried off by wounds and diseases during the war, none lived to see the day when this 'Legion of Honour' distribution took place.

The Honorary Distinctions recorded in this Appendix relate only to the British Army and Navy, and do not include those awarded to the French, Sardinians, and Turks.]

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

OF THE

CHIEF EVENTS DURING THE WAR.

1853.

Mar. 2. Prince Menchikoff at Constantinople.
" 6. " " held interview with Sultan.
Apr. 19. " " increased rigour of demands.
" 21. 'Secret Correspondence' with Czar closed.
May 4. Sultan granted Firman concerning 'Holy Places.'
" 21. Russian Embassy left Constantinople.
" 28. Sultan's Manifesto to European Powers.
" 31. Count Nesselrode demanded 'Material Guarantees.'
June 8. British Fleet ordered to Dardanelles.
July 2. Russian Army crossed the Pruth.
" 14. Turkey protested against the Invasion.
Oct. 5. " declared War against Russia.
" 8. Omar Pacha demanded recall of Russians.
" 23. First hostile Encounter, at Lakeha.
" 28. Turks crossed Danube at Kalafat.
" 30. British Fleet entered Bosphorus.
Nov. 1. Russia accepted War with Turkey.
" 4. Turks gained Battle of Oltenitza.
" 30. Russian Attack at Sinope.
Dec. 31. Sultan accepted 'Identic Note.'

1854.

Jan. 3. Sweden and Denmark, Treaty of Neutrality.
" 4. Allied Fleets entered Black Sea.
" 5. Turks gained Battle of Citate.
" 8. Russians entered the Dobrudscha.
" 29. Emperor Napoleon's Letter to the Czar.
Feb. 9. Czar replied to Napoleon.
" 10. Peace Deputation, interview with Czar.
" 21. Czar issued threatening Manifesto.
" 28. British Forces began to embark for East.
Mar. 11. Baltic Fleet sailed from Spithead.
" 19. French Forces began to embark for East.
" 20. Baltic Fleet (French) sailed from Brest.
" 28. England and France declared War.
" 30. Baltic Fleet left Kiel.
Apr. 14. Russians commenced Siege of Silistria.
" 15. Convention between England, France, and Turkey.
" 18. Omar Pacha defeated Liders near Rassova.
" 20. Austria and Prussia, Convention of Neutrality.
" 21. 27,000 Allied Troops near Gallipoli.
" 22. Odessa bombarded.
May 1. Allied Armies advanced to Bosphorus.
" 4. Turkish Fleet entered Black Sea.
" 12. Loss of the *Tiger* off Odessa.
" 28. Allies advanced to Varna.
" 29. Desperate Sortie at Silistria.
June 9. Russians advanced towards Kars.
" 19. Allied Fleets joined in the Baltic.
" 14. Austria and Turkey, Treaty of Boyadji-Keuy.
" 16. Turks defeated at Oltenitza.
" 23. Russians raised Siege of Silistria.
July 7. Turks gained Battle of Giurgevo.
" 21. Fleets advanced to reconnoitre Crimea.
" 28. Russians evacuated Wallachia.
" " Turks defeated near Bayazid.
" 30. French Army joined Baltic Fleet.
Aug. 6. Turks lost Battle of Kurekdere.
" 13-16. Siege of Bomarsund.
" 20. Austrians entered Principalities.
" 21. Bombardment of Kola, in White Sea.
" 25. Expedition to Crimea announced.
" 30. Suicide of Admiral Price.
Sep. 4. Allies defeated at Petropaulovsk.
" 5. Allied Armament began to leave Varna.
" 9. French Army quitted Baltic.
" 14. Allies landed at Old Fort.
" 15. Russians evacuated Moldavia.
" 19. Cavalry Skirmish at Bulganak.
" 20. Battle of the Alma.
" 23. Allies commenced Flank-march.
" " Menchikoff sank Russian Fleet.
" 24. Menchikoff's Flank-march to Baktchiserai
" " British Wounded began to reach Scutari.
" " General Williams arrived at Kars.
" 26. British took possession of Balaklava.
" 30. Death of Marshal St. Arnaud.
" 30. Todtleben began to fortify Sebastopol.
Oct. 2. Siege-army encamped before Sebastopol.
" 12. *Times'* Sick and Wounded Fund established.
" 13. Patriotic Fund established.
" 17. First Bombardment of Sebastopol commenced.
" 23. Miss Nightingale departed to the East.
" 25. Battle of Balaklava.
" 26. First Battle of Inkermann.
Nov. 5. Second or Great Battle of Inkermann.
" 14. Destructive Hurricane at Crimea.
" 20. Contests at the 'Ovens,' near Sebastopol.
Dec. 2. Tripartite Treaty against Russia.
" 22. Sir E. Lyons succeeded Admiral Dundas.
" 24. Admiral Brant succeeded Admiral Hamelin.
" 28. 'Memorandum' on the 'Four Points.'

1855.

Jan. 23. Lord John Russell quitted Aberdeen Ministry.
" 26. Sardinia entered the Alliance.
" 29. Sebastopol Committee appointed.
" 31. Aberdeen Ministry resigned.
Feb. 5. Palmerston Ministry formed.
" 6. Warrant giving Commissions to Sergeants and Corporals.
" 20. Night-march in Snow to Tchernaya.
" 22. White Works constructed by Russians.*
" " Peel Party quitted Palmerston Ministry.
" 24. French defeated at the White Works.
Mar. 2. Czar Nicholas died.

* An error occurs at p. 342. The fortified earthworks constructed by the Russians on the 22d of February were the 'White Works' on Sapoune Hill: the Mamelon was fortified a few days later.

Mar. 15. Vienna Conferences commenced.
" 22. Great Sortie from Sebastopol.
Apr. 4. Baltic Fleet left Spithead.
" 9. Second Bombardment of Sebastopol.
" 16. Black Sea Telegraph completed.
" 17. Russian Ships escaped from Pétropaulovsk.
" 19. Rifle-pits taken by Colonel Egerton.
" 24. Sardinian Army embarked at Genoa.
" 26. Vienna Conferences closed.
May 1, 2. French captured Rifle-pits.
" 16. Pelissier succeeded Canrobert.
" 22, 23. Fierce contests near Cemetery at Sebastopol.
" 23. Expedition to Sea of Azof.
" 24. Mr Disraeli's Motion against the Ministry defeated.
" 25. Allies took Kertch and Yenikale.
" [illegible] Russian Ships escaped from De Castries Bay.
" 26. Allies entered Sea of Azof.
June 1. Allied Fleets joined in Baltic.
" 3. Allies cannonaded Taganrog.
" 5. Hangö Massacre.
" 6. Third Bombardment of Sebastopol.
" 8. Sir F. Baring's Motion in favour of the Government carried.
" " Mamelon, Quarries, and White Works taken.
" 9. Prince Albert's Speech on Public Affairs.
" 17. Fourth Bombardment of Sebastopol.
" 18. Allies defeated at Malakoff and Redan.
" " Sebastopol Committee issued Report.
" 28. Death of Lord Raglan.
July 16. Lord J. Russell quitted Palmerston Ministry.
July 26. Funeral of Lord Raglan.
Aug. 9–11. Bombardment of Sveaborg.
" 16. Battle of the Tchernaya.
" 17. Fifth Bombardment of Sebastopol.
Sep. 5. Final Bombardment commenced.
" 9. Allies entered Sebastopol.
" 24. Expedition to Taman.
" 29. Cavalry Action near Eupatoria.
" " General Williams defeated Mouravieff at Kars.
Oct. 3. Omar Pacha landed at Soucoum-Kalé.
" 17. Bombardment and Capture of Kinburn.
Nov. 6. Omar Pacha forced Passage of the Ingour.
" 10. Czar Alexander visited Sebastopol.
" 15. Terrible Explosion of French Magazine.
" 21. Treaty of Sweden with Western Powers.
" 25. Surrender of Kars.
" 29. Nightingale Fund established.
Dec. 8. Omar Pacha ended Mingrelian Expedition.

1856.

Jan. 16. Russia accepted Bases of Negotiation.
" 20. Sultan issued new Hatti-Humayoon.
Feb. 25. Plenipotentiaries met at Paris.
" 29. Armistice commenced in Crimea.
Mar. 30. Treaty of Peace signed at Paris.
Apr. 8. Discussion in Congress on State of Europe.
" 15. Separate Tripartite Treaty signed.
" 16. Paris Congress closed.
" " Sardinian Memorandum on Affairs of Italy.
" 27. Treaty of Peace ratified at Paris.

THE END.

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

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